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Minutes of the
evidence taken at
the trial of
Warren Hastings
Appendix

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fulleſt Conſideration, we have agreed to ſundry diſtinct Reſolutions upon the general Subject of them; a Copy of which we tranſmit to you for your Authority and Guidance.

At the ſame Time that we refer you to theſe for our Reply to your Letter, we muſt requeſt that you will attend particularly to the following Explanation of the Circumſtances and Conſiderations on which they have been formed.

We have ſuppoſed, that your Intentions were to act in concert with the Maratta Government; to aſſiſt in compoſing its inteſtine Diviſions, at the particular Solicitation of its chief Miniſter; and by Means of ſuch a Policy, to prevent the Growth of an Influence dangerous to the Company's Intereſts; to defeat the Intentions of a Party adverſe to the Company, and to promote the Security of the Company's Poſſeſſions. In this View, we give our Aſſent and Sanction to the Plan which you propoſe to engage in; making it an expreſs Condition of our Concurrence, that you reſtrict your Operations merely to the Objects ſo required and defined; and that you withdraw your Forces as ſoon as theſe ſhall be fully accompliſhed.

We are, &c.

Fort William,
2d February 1778.

N° 29.

Read the Governor General's Propoſition contained in his Opinion on the 8th Queſtion.

Mr. Wheler—If the Board are determined to ſend Troops to Bombay, I agree, that it will be highly proper to conſult the General upon the Subject; but I abide by my former Opinion of the Impropriety of that Meaſure.

Mr. Francis—I yield to the Governor General's Propoſal as a Conſequence of a Reſolution already taken; but I muſt deſire it to be underſtood, that I ſhall not deem myſelf bound by the Anſwer to the Enquiry, diſapproving totally of the Reſolution itſelf.

Mr. Barwell agrees to the Reference.

Reſolved accordingly.

The Governor General—I further propoſe, That the Sentiments of the Commander in Chief be taken upon the Propriety of augmenting the Sepoy Eſtabliſhment, by new Levies of Thirty Private to each Company of Sepoys, and making the Strength of each Battalion One thouſand Men compleat: In this Caſe our Force will not be diminiſhed by any Drafts that may be made for the Service of Bombay.

Mr. Wheler agrees.

Mr. Francis—If any Force ſhould be ſent from hence to Bombay, I conclude it will be neceſſary to replace it by new Levies here; but this is an additional Reaſon with me for diſapproving of the Meaſure.

Mr. Barwell agrees.

Reſolved, That the Sentiments of the Commander in Chief be taken upon the Propriety of augmenting the Sepoy Eſtabliſhment by New Levies of Thirty Private to each Company, and making the Strength of each Battalion One thouſand Men compleat.

Mr. Francis—Setting aſide all other Conſiderations but thoſe of Policy and Expedience, I conceive, That the Reſolution of the Preſidency of Bombay, to carry Ragoba to Poona, cannot be juſtified on any Principle whatever, but that of the Probability of their carrying it into Execution inſtanter, or by a Surprize. Their actual Force is not equal to a regular Series of Military Operations, or to contend with a well-concerted Reſiſtance; when their Force was entire under Colonel Keating, they were unable to make any Impreſſion on the Army oppoſite to them: But a Reſolution to aſſiſt them with Money, and ſtill more with a Body of Troops from hence, which cannot arrive at Bombay till ſeveral Months after the Commencement of Hoſtilities, ſuppoſe the Continuance of a War for an indefinite Time, and to an unlimited Extent. It is in vain for us to ſay, that we conſent to the Enterprize under ſuch and ſuch particular Limitations: When once we are engaged in it, we can no longer command the Event, nor determine how far it will lead us, or at what Point we ſhall ſtop. For this Reaſon, in Addition to thoſe I have already ſtated, I diſſent from and proteſt againſt the Reſolutions taken this Day, and all the Conſequences that may attend them.

Governor General—I muſt beg Mr. Francis's Permiſſion to aſk, Whether he means by this Diſſent and Proteſt, and by the Anſwers which he has delivered to the Two laſt Queſtions propoſed by me on the laſt Council Day, to declare againſt affording any Kind of Aſſiſtance to the Preſidency of Bombay, if they ſhould be actually engaged in a War?

However we may differ in our Opinions of the paſt Conduct of that Preſidency, I would hope, that we ſhall be at leaſt unanimous in our Reſolutions to ſupport them; which will be to ſupport the Company's and the National Intereſts committed to their Charge, in the caſe of a War. For this Reaſon only I propoſe the Queſtion.

Mr. Francis—My Diſſent and Proteſt are meant to be applied generally to all the Reſolutions of this Day on the Queſtion now ſtated to me by the Governor. I have already declared [illegible] plicitly, in the Minute which I had the Honour of laying before the Board on [illegible] and embarraſſing Queſtion, and not to be decided on any Principles, however juſt [illegible]

Facts, which we cannot alter or reſiſt, may force us into Meaſures againſt our moſt deliberate Opinions. Defence is the only Object for which I would aſſiſt the Preſidency of Bombay; and when I know with Certainty, that they have engaged in Meaſures of an offenſive Nature againſt the Maratta State, my Opinion will be, that we ſhould command and require them to withdraw from thoſe Meaſures, and return to the Defence of their own Territories. I cannot give a more poſitive or determinate Anſwer to a Queſtion, which in its Nature muſt in ſome Degree be ſubject to Events.

Governor General—I beg Mr. Francis will believe that I had no Intention to embarraſs him by the Queſtion which I have propoſed. I expected the Anſwer which he has given to it, but choſe rather to propoſe the Queſtion in Form, than either to leave his Intentions doubtful, as they would have appeared from the Minute recorded in this Day's Proceeding, or to appear to impute to him an Inconſiſtency with his former Declaration, by referring to it.

As Mr. Wheler in his Anſwer to the Second Queſtion, ſeems to doubt the Reality of the Deſigns of the French, as they are repreſented by the Preſident and Council of Bombay, I requeſt that the following Extracts of our Poona Correſpondence may be entered in this Place, and that Mr. Elliot's Letter, which was addreſſed to the Board on the 1ſt of October laſt, may be annexed to them; as I think it now, whatever it might have been before, of no Conſequence to withhold it from a Place in our Records. Theſe Evidences, the Firſt of which have not I believe been ſeen by Mr. Wheler, will I think remove every Doubt of the Exiſtence of ſuch a Deſign, and of its having been carried into Execution, ſo far as it could have been effected by the avowed Delivery of the Credentials received by the French Agent from the Court of France, and by the written Engagements affirmed to have been executed between him and one of the Miniſters.

Mr. Wheler—I do not recollect that I implied any ſuch Doubt of the Intention of the French Interference in my Minute. I have it is true endeavoured to make it appear that our immediate Fears cannot ariſe from any ſuch Apprehenſions from the French; as it is ſaid, before they can carry Deſigns into Execution, they have diſpatched Monſieur de Sauty with Credentials to the French Miniſtry.

The Governor General—Mr. Wheler's Explanation is perfectly conſiſtent with the Words of his Minute; but as I think the Danger which may ariſe from the French Intrigues at Poona has not been ſufficiently underſtood, and as theſe form the principal Grounds for the ſuppoſed Reſolutions of the Preſident and Council of Bombay, I ſtill deſire that the Papers above mentioned may be recorded in this Day's Conſultation.

From Row Jee to the Nabob Wallah Jah, dated the 13th May 1777.

Some Time ago tranſmitted to the Preſence Two Papers of Intelligence; the former written on the 1ſt of Rabbe-ul-awul (11th of April) the latter the 19th of the ſame Month (29th of April): Theſe you have doubtleſs received, and have communicated the Contents to his Highneſs. The Particulars relative to the French Sirdar are theſe: Mr. Chevalier, with a Team conſiſting of an Elephant and Standard, and Seven Gentlemen in Palankeens, came to Durky, where he remained Ten Days waiting for his Things to come up. On the 24th of Rabbe-ul-awul (4th May) he ſet out from thence, and travelled to Bhaoury: Bheem Row Paula went on the Part of Seremunt Pundit Purdhaun to meet him. On the 25th Siccaram Pundit and Nanna Purnaveeſe went to the Encampment under the Walls of the Fort, where the French Chief was introduced to them: He had not brought his Preſents with him. After the Ceremony of the Introduction was over he retired with Siccaram Pundit, Nanna Purnaveeſe, Madho Row Sadaſhao, Kiſhen Row Belal, Booſila's Vackeel, and Congee the Interpreter, and produced a Letter from the Prime Miniſter of the King of France, addreſſed to Seremunt Pundit Purdhaun. As there was no Frenchman belonging to the Sircar to read it, Mr. Chevalier read it himſelf, and the Interpreter explained it: The Subſtance was, that "from Time immemorial "Friendſhip and Harmony had ſubſiſted between the Two States, which it was expedient to preſerve "in Time to come, and that Mr. Chevalier would perſonally explain all further Particulars." The Miniſters enquired after Mr Buffy, and were informed by Mr. Chevalier that he was in Health, and employed in an eminent Station about the Prime Miniſter, and that he had deſired his Compliments to Ramchunder Jadoo Row. They then enquired if the French and Engliſh were Friends, or otherwiſe; to which Mr. Chevalier anſwered, that they were at preſent Friends, and that the French were not at Variance with any Power whatever. This was all that paſſed in the Firſt Meeting; after which he took his Leave and retired. Proviſion for 200 Men, Provender, &c. are daily ſupplied by the Sircar Mulhar Pundit Muttafuddy; and 20 Hircarrahs are appointed to attend on Mr. Chevalier, and procure for him whatever he wants. On the laſt of Rabbe-ul-awul (9th May) Mr. Chevalier was deſired to attend at the aforeſaid Encampment, to be introduced to Seremunt Pundit Purdhaun: There was nobody of Conſequence preſent at this Interview except Seremunt Pundit and the Two Miniſters. Mr. Chevalier preſented Five Paintings on Glaſs, a Cup, a Gun, a Pair of Piſtols, and a Glaſs by which Poiſon might be diſcovered. After ſome Minutes ſpent in Profeſſions of Friendſhip, Mr. Chevalier preſented a Letter from the French King, addreſſed to Seremunt Pundit: I have not yet been able to learn the Contents of it; as ſoon as I do I ſhall inform his Highneſs. After receiving the Letter, Seremunt took Leave of Mr. Chevalier and returned to the Fort; Mr. Chevalier remained in private with the Two Miniſters and the Interpreter. Siccaram then deſired him to communicate what he had to ſay; to which he replied, "I have a great Variety of Matter to treat "of, which I will fully explain at a convenient Time." Siccaram Pundit then ſaid, "I will appoint

' ſome Perſon to negociate your Buſineſs for you; it muſt be a Perſon who is well verſed in your ' Affairs. I know of no one qualified for this Purpoſe except Madho Row Sadaſhas." Mr. Chevalier not reliſhing this Propoſal made anſwer, " He is employed in the Negociations with the ' Engliſh, how is it poſſible we ſhould unite?" Siccaram replied, " Be under no Kind of Apprehenſions on this Account; in like Manner as I am ſo alſo is he, a Muttaſeddy of the Sircar: All Negociations are conducted through Muttaſeddies; but I act in ſuch Manner as I think right." Mr. Chevalier made no Reply, but retired. Siccaram Pundit then went to Shaſhoore to a Wedding; Nanna Purnaveeſe is alſo going to Poona, where he will ſtay ten Days or a Fortnight: This of courſe occaſions a Delay in the Negociations of the French, which I underſtand will be concluded on their Return. Madho Row is under great Perplexity; not knowing his Highneſs's Pleaſure in this Matter, he is at a Loſs what Steps to take. I have addreſſed frequent Arzees to you in the Courſe of the laſt Month relative to the French, which you have doubtleſs fully explained to his Highneſs: I am aſtoniſhed that I have not yet been honoured with a Line in Anſwer thereto. It is now neceſſary that you communicate the above Particulars relative to Mr. Chevalier to his Highneſs, and write me a full and expliciť Anſwer; and alſo inform me what Conduct I am to obſerve here, that I may accordingly ſatisfy Madho Row. The French have till now remained perfectly quiet, but it appears from theſe late Meaſures that they deſign to enter again into the Affairs of this Part; I have therefore ſent repeated Expreſſes to the Preſence. Having made yourſelf acquainted with his Highneſs's Pleaſure, write me fully on the Subject.

From the Nabob Wallah Jah to Row Jie; dated the 6th June 1777.

I underſtand from your Letter written the 3d Rabeaſſanie (13th May) to Sheeh Row, that one Monſieur Chevalier, a Frenchman, is arrived in thoſe Parts, under the Pretence of having come from Europe on an Embaſſy to Row Pundit Purdhaun, and that on this News a Man of Rank went from Row Pundit Purdhaun, met, and conducted him to the Preſence of the principal Miniſters, who received him with every Mark of Friendſhip, gave ear to the Repreſentations of that Impoſtor, which he himſelf had fabricated, and then produced as coming from the Prime Miniſter of France; and that Madho Row Sadaſhae conceived that a Connexion between him and the Miniſters muſt give Offence to the Engliſh Chiefs. The Hiſtory of this Frenchman is this; he was formerly in the Service of Hyder Ally Khan, and after waiting ſome Time for an Opportunity of quarrelling with him, he deſerted him with a Party of Fugitives, and continued for a long Space of Time to wander in thoſe Parts. Monſieur Bellecombe, who is lately arrived from Europe in the Station of Governor of Pondicherry, has not the leaſt Knowledge of him, but ſays that he invents theſe Impoſitions to procure himſelf a Support in the different Places to which he wanders. As the firmeſt Friendſhip has ſubſiſted for Three Generations between my Family and that of Row Pundit Purdhaun, I deſire you will repreſent to Madho Row Sadaſhae, that ſince Friendſhip and Union has been firmly eſtabliſhed by Treaty between Row Pundit Purdhaun and the Engliſh, the Fame of whoſe good Faith and Steadineſs is every where ſpread, and whoſe Conſtancy in Friendſhip is become a Proverb throughout the World; and ſince the Governor General of Bengal, who is the abſolute Repreſentative of the Engliſh Nation in this Country, is the Author of this Treaty, it is neceſſary that he ſhould reflect how highly diſpleaſing the Encouragement of this Impoſtor of another Nation muſt be to the Engliſh; that it is therefore incumbent on him (as a Man of Wiſdom, Penetration, and Fidelity to Row Pundit Purdhaun, and as he was employed, on Colonel Upton's Arrival at Poona, on the Part of the Governor General of Bengal, as the Channel of that Negociation) to paint to the Miniſters of Row Pundit Purdhaun, in the ſtrongeſt Colours, the Impropriety of ſhewing any Countenance to ſuch an Impoſtor, and to perſuade them ever to preſerve with the greateſt Care the Friendſhip of the Engliſh, which is of the greateſt Value.

Extract of a Letter from Siccaram Pundit to Colonel Upton.

Monſieur Chevalier de St. Lubin, on the Part of the King of France, lately arrived on board a Ship on this Coaſt, and landed on Rio-Dunda, belonging to this Government, from whence he tranſmitted a Letter to the Preſence of Seremunt Row, Sahib Row Pundit Purdhaun, containing a Requeſt of an Audience to treat with him, which if granted he would wait on him, and fully explain to him the Subjects of his Miſſion. As Friendſhip had ſubſiſted from Time immemorial between the French Nation and the illuſtrious Family of Seremunt Sahib, and moreover as Hoſpitality is due to the Envoy of a great Prince, an Order for his Approach was ſent from the Preſence. When the aforeſaid Gentleman arrives the Subjects of his Negociation will be explained. The Governor and Council of Bombay will repreſent this Matter to the Supreme Council of Calcutta in an injurious Light; I have therefore written you and the Supreme Council the Relation of what has really paſſed. Friendſhip is now eſtabliſhed between us, which ſhall never be interrupted in the ſmalleſt Degree. Do you my Friend amply repreſent all the Particulars to the Governor and Council.

APPENDIX, N° 27, 28, and 29.

Extract of a Letter from Siccaram Pundit; received the 17th July 1777.

Monſieur the Chevalier de St. Lubin, on the Part of the King of France, lately arrived on board a Ship on this Coaſt, and landed at Rio Dunda, belonging to this Government; from whence he tranſmitted a Letter to Seremunt Row, Sahib Row Pundit Purdhaun, containing a Requeſt of an Audience to treat with him, which if granted he would wait on him, and fully explain to him the Subjects of his Miſſion. As Friendſhip has ſubſiſted from Time immemorial between the French Nation and the illuſtrious Family of Seremunt Sahib, and moreover in Compliance with the Duties of Hoſpitality, an Order for his Approach was ſent from the Preſence. When the aforeſaid Gentleman arrives, the Subjects of his Negociation will be explained.

The Governor and Council of Bombay will repreſent this Matter to you in an injurious Light, foreſeeing which, and poſſeſſing the moſt ſincere Friendſhip towards you, I have given you Intelligence of this Gentleman's Arrival, and what has actually paſſed. No Interruption ſhall ever proceed from this Sircar, of the Friendſhip which has been ſo firmly eſtabliſhed between us.

From the Nabob Wallah Jah, 3d September.

I ſometime ago ſent you for your Information a News-paper from Poona, containing an Account of the Arrival of Monſieur Le Chevalier, a Frenchman, at that Place; and at the ſame Time tranſmitted you a Copy of a Letter which I wrote to Row Jee, my News-writer, to exert his utmoſt Endeavours to prevent the Poona Chief giving Countenance to ſuch a Cheat and Impoſtor. I now enclоſe you an Anſwer from the aforeſaid News-writer, addreſſed to his Brother. I am induced by the Warmth of my Friendſhip to ſend you this News-paper. You will keep it under the moſt profound Secrecy; for ſhould it be known that my News writer had communicated this Intelligence, his Life would be in Danger.

Extract of a Letter from Row Jee to Skeſh Row.

You ſent me Two Letters on the Subject of the French Chief to this Purport: That this Perſon who was to come to Poona, was an Impoſtor; that no Countenance muſt be ſhewn to him, or any extraordinary Appearance of Civility kept up with regard to him; for ſhould the Gentlemen of the Adminiſtration of Bengal ſuſpect ſuch an Intercourſe, it will be productive of very diſagreeable Circumſtances. This I perfectly underſtand. I repreſented all the Particulars to the Miniſters, through the Channel of Madho Row Sadaſhae; but Kiſhen Row Billal is the Patron of this Frenchman, and makes uſe of every Method to perſuade the Miniſters to countenance him. They therefore pretend to Mr. Moſtyn and me, that they are about to give him his Diſmiſſion; but their real Deſigns are different. They have been Three or Four different Times to the Houſe of the French Chief, and I hear that he has promiſed, that in the Courſe of Eighteen Months he will procure them from Europe a reſpectable Body of European Troops, with all the neceſſary Stores, &c. and that the Chiefs of all the different Settlements ſhall likewiſe receive expreſs Inſtructions for their Conduct from the King of France. He repreſents, that a Place on the Sea Coaſt will be neceſſary for the Reſidence of the Forces, and the ſecure Anchorage of the Ships. A ſmall Village has therefore been fixed upon near Rio-Dunda. This they will give up to him as ſoon as an Anſwer arrives from Europe. He demands at preſent a Monthly Stipend of One Lack and a Half of Rupees for the Support of the People he has with him; and that 10,000 additional Sepoys ſhould be raiſed and properly diſciplined. He has brought on Shore from the Ships Eighty Pieces of Cannon; and has alſo with him 200 European Soldiers, with all Kinds of Arms and Ammunition; and is deſirous of diſciplining this naval Body. The Miniſters ſay amongſt themſelves, theſe Troops will be diſciplined under the Direction of Europeans, and the Sepoys which we keep in our Service are without Neceſſaries or Diſcipline, but if put under the Direction of Europeans, they will be rendered fit for Service. Such are their Deliberations. I do not know if Madho Row Sadaſhae is acquainted with this Circumſtance, and conceals it from me, or whether the Miniſters keep him ignorant of it. I aſked Madho Row Sadaſhae, what was the Reaſon that Cannon, Lead, Powder, and Ammunition, had been landed at the Ghaut of Rio Dunda, and Orders given for the building of Storehouſes, &c.? He replied, That it was the tempeſtuous Seaſon which rendered it neceſſary to unload the Ships; but they had therefore been lightened of their Cargoes; that after this Seaſon was over, they would be again carried on board the Ships, and the French Chief ſhould receive his Diſmiſſion. I ſhall communicate whatever I learn in future.

Tranſlate of a Letter from Siccaram Pundit, dated the 20th October 1777.

I ſome Time ago wrote you Information of the Approach of a Perſon deputed by the King of France to this Quarter; Monſieur Le Chevalier de St. Lubin has lately been honoured with an Audience

Audience of Row Pundit Purdhaun Peſhwa Sahib, when he delivered Letters from the King of France on the Subject of ſtrengthening and confirming the ancient Friendſhip which ſubſiſted between the Two Nations; and he alſo ſpoke on the Subject of their ancient Intimacy and Connection.

As the rainy Seaſon was ſet in violently, Mr. Le Chevalier did not deſire his Diſmiſſion, and his Departure has been delayed on this Account. The Duties of Hoſpitality, both to Friends and Strangers, are incumbent on Chiefs of high Rank.

Should this Circumſtance be related to you in an unfavourable Light, you will not, I am perſuaded, give Credit to it. There will never be the leaſt Deviation in Government from the Duties of the Friendſhip eſtabliſhed, but it will take deeper Root. I ſend you a Letter in a Kereta, from Serement Row Pundit Purdhaun, addreſſed to the King of England, on the Subject of Friendſhip; be pleaſed to tranſlate it to England, and procure an Anſwer. By this you will much oblige me, give great Pleaſure to Row Sahib Pundit Purdhaun, and increaſe the Friendſhip which at preſent ſubſiſts.

Extract of a Letter from Row Jie to the Nabob Wallah Jah; dated the 30th of September.

The French Chief brought here Five Lacks of Rupees in Goods, which he has ſold to the Merchants of this Place, but he is to deliver them here; he is accordingly gone with his People to Rio to fetch them.

Extract of a Letter from Dewagur Punſit, Dewan of Mudajee Boſſa, Rajah of Berar. Received 18th December.

Soon afterwards an experienced Ambaſſador arrived on the Part of the King of France, with a Letter and Preſent of various Articles, and earneſtly intreated an Audience of Pundit Purdhaun, which he obtained: I was alſo acquainted with the Diſcourſes they held in private: Five Perſons only were privy to this Matter. The Intention of what I have written above, is to ſhew, that as ſoon as the Engliſh entered into Alliance with Pundit Purdhaun, the Powers of other Countries immediately courted his Friendſhip, and his Government thereby acquired a freſh Degree of Splendour.

Firſt Extract from a Letter from Rowjee to the Nabob Wallah Jah; dated the 11th April 1777.

Mr. Moſtyn informed me, that Two French Ships, one carrying 70 Guns, and the other 40, were arrived at Rio, and the other at Rio Dunda; that they had ſent Boats to learn Intelligence concerning Ingria, who was near to them, with 4 or 5 Men in a Boat from the Ship, who coming to Rio Dunda, viſited the Government Gomaſtah, and through him wrote an Arzee to the Preſence, to be admitted to an Audience. Mr. Moſtyn hearing this, repreſented that the French were in Alliance with Hyder Aily Khan, and that it was neceſſary the Government ſhould be on its Guard; but the Miniſters paid no Regard to him, but ſent Orders to the Gomaſtahs at Rio Dunda to furniſh the French who were arrived there with Conveyances to tranſport them to the Preſence. On the Arrival of theſe Orders, Three Europeans, Two Caffries, with a Writer of Ingria's, and Forty-five Peons, ſet out for the Preſence, and arrived at Poona. On the 28th Nanah Purnaveeſſe returning to Poona, they waited on him, but what paſſed between them is not known. Madho Row has taken no Part in this Buſineſs, nor is there any Perſon of Credit engaged in it except Nanah Purnaveeſſe. I hear that ſome French Officer is arrived at Rio Dunda, and means to proceed to the Preſence; on this Account, Nanah Purnaveeſſe continues ſome Days at Poona. This Circumſtance has thrown a Damp on Mr. Moſtyn's Negociations. The French Chief is daily expected; when he arrives I will make myſelf acquainted with the Subject of his Negociation, and tranſmit you an Account thereof. I learn from Report, that the French Officer's Name is Monſieur Le Chevalier de St. Lubin.

From the Aumil of Windawrs, dated 29th Auguſt 1777.

I have already informed you of the Arrival of the French Officer, and of his Engagement with the Miniſters to bring them Aid from Europe in the courſe of 18 Months, during which Time they are to give him the Command of 10,000 Infantry, to be diſciplined by him. They were ſettling the Pay of this Body when your Highneſs's Letter to me arrived, directing me to explain in the cleareſt Manner to the Miniſters, that by giving Encouragement to a French Sirdar, the long eſtabliſhed Friendſhip between them and your Highneſs and the Engliſh would be deſtroyed; and that they muſt not expect in ſuch Caſe any Friendſhip, either from you or the Engliſh. This Repreſentation occaſioned much Reflection and threw a Damp on the Negociation.

I hear that the French Sirdar has written Letters to France through the Factory of Surat, but the Purport is not known. Mr. Moſtyn told me that the King of France ſent him to gain Intelligence.

It is very certain he has a Letter from the King of France. The Miniſters ſent Diſpatches to Europe through the Chief of Surat, in conſequence of which the King ſent this Man, and it is probable that whatever he may have propoſed in his Letters will be complied with.

For the Sake of Appearances, he brought Goods with him, and is engaged in Commerce, but his real Deſigns are different. His Expences are great; how ſhould he be able to make ſuch Preſents of himſelf? From theſe Circumſtances it is evident that he is no Impoſtor.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

Having been fortunate enough to obtain ſome Intelligence before I left Europe, in which the Intereſt of the Eaſt India Company and the Influence of Great Britain in India appear to be deeply intereſted, I think it incumbent upon me to take the earlieſt Opportunity of communicating it to your Honourable Board: I am concerned at the ſame Time to be under the Neceſſity of laying the Facts only before you, without having it in my Power to point out the Channels through which the Intelligence was conveyed to me; as my Promiſe was moſt particularly taken before I was myſelf entruſted with it, that I ſhould conceal the Names of the Perſons from whom I received the Information. It was not without ſome Difficulty that I obtained Permiſſion to inform the Governor General and Sir John Clavering of this material Circumſtance, and that only upon Condition that they ſhould not truſt it to the Records of the Company, however ſecret they might be. The Opinions which thoſe Gentlemen muſt form as to the Authenticity of the Facts which I now propoſe myſelf the Honour of laying before you, will be a ſufficient Juſtification of me for addreſſing you in this Letter.

It appears by the Information to which I allude, that Monſieur Sartine, Miniſtre de la Marine of France, has concerted with Three or Four of the principal Miniſters of that Country a Scheme, the Object of which is the total Overthrow of the Engliſh Intereſts in India; that he was ſenſible the Force which France could herſelf bring againſt our Settlements would prove inſufficient for ſo great an Undertaking, and had therefore thought it neceſſary to the Completion of his Views, to begin by intriguing with the Country Powers, and by endeavouring to ſecure them in the Intereſt of France, in Oppoſition to thoſe of Britain; that for this Purpoſe it was reſolved to ſend a Perſon to India with full Powers, in the Character of Agent, and likewiſe to ſend out Perſons, who in the Information are called des Exerceurs, to diſcipline the Natives of India, and a conſiderable Quantity of Arms and Military Stores. The Perſon who was nominated to this Office was deſcribed to me as one who had before been in India. He was to go to Pondicherry firſt, but to aſſume no public Character, that he might not be ſubjected to the Suſpicions of the Engliſh; he is furniſhed with Letters from the Court of France to all the Country Princes of any Note in India, to be uſed at his own Diſcretion; he likewiſe carries out Preſents of conſiderable Value, which he is to diſtribute as he may judge neceſſary. The Subſtance of his Inſtructions are as follows: To treat with ſuch of the Country Powers as he may have Reaſon to think will moſt readily aſſiſt the Views of France, and to form Alliances with them in the Name of the King of France; to endeavour to perſuade the Country Powers to fall upon the Engliſh Settlements; and he is authorized to promiſe ſuch as will accede to his Propoſal, the warmeſt Support of his Nation ſecretly till Hoſtilities are actually commenced, and then openly. He is warned however in his Inſtructions, that France is not to take the Lead in the War, but is to come in as an Aſſiſtant only. The Perſon from whom I learned theſe Particulars knows for certain that the Agent ſailed from Marſeilles in the Beginning of April laſt, but was unacquainted with his Name, and unable to inform me for certain what Road he had followed to India, but ſeemed to be of Opinion that he muſt have paſſed over to Alexandria, in the Intention of embarking at Suez for India.

Having informed you of what I venture to ſay may be relied on as authentic, it will not be miſplaced to add an Account more in Detail of ſome Enquiries which my Knowledge of the above Circumſtances led me to make, which though by no Means ſo ſucceſsful as my Zeal on this Occaſion would make me wiſh, will not, I flatter myſelf, be deemed unworthy of your Notice.

A Circumſtance which I learned from Colonel Capper, who had paſſed through Egypt in February laſt, and which was confirmed to me by Mr. Dighton, who was in his Company, rendered it very probable that the Agent had paſſed through that Country in his Way to India. That the French Conſul at Cairo was in daily Expectation of the Arrival of a Ship at Cairo, when they paſſed through that Town; and I was told by Mr. Baldwin, an Engliſh Gentleman reſiding at Cairo, that when an Account was brought of a Ship's being ſeen off or in the Red Sea, which afterwards proved to be the Swallow Sloop of War; the French Conſul ſaid in his hearing that he was ſure it was a French Ship, as he had certain Intelligence that one was diſpatched from India, which ſhould arrive about that Time. I was aſſured nevertheleſs by Three or Four French Merchants at Cairo, from whom I made Enquiries upon this Subject, that they never had any Expectation of ſeeing a French Ship at Suez; and I learnt at Mocha that there has not been a ſingle French Ship in the Red Sea this Year. In paſſing through Marſeilles I made all the Inquiries that I could, without rendering myſelf ſuſpicious, but could learn nothing of any Conſequence, but that ſome Ships had ſailed from that Port early in the Year for India. As there was no Ship to ſail from Suez under Three Weeks or a Month after my Arrival at Cairo, I had an Opportuity of tracing a Gentleman who had left Cairo a few Days before my Arrival, and who in many Particulars anſwered the Deſcription given to me of the French Agent on the other Side of the Water. It appears from the Intelligence which I received, which was principally derived from Mr. Baldwin, and partly from the Gentlemen of the French Factory in Egypt, and from a Turk whom I ſhall afterwards have Occaſion to mention more particularly, that

early

early in April a French Gentleman wearing a Croſs, and calling himſelf the Chevalier de Montagny, arrived at Cairo from France. It was reported upon his firſt Arrival that he was going to India, but after having ſtaid at Cairo about a Month that Report was entirely dropped; and upon my aſking the Queſtion of the French Conſul, was poſitively contradicted. He aſſociated but very little with the Gentlemen of Cairo, which is uncommon where the Society of Europeans is ſo ſmall. A Venetian Gentleman and a Janizary who attended upon the Chevalier, informed Mr. Baldwin and myſelf, that he had a Perſian Maſter whilſt at Cairo, and uſed to ſtudy that Language great Part of the Day. With ſome Difficulty the Man, a Native of Damaſcus, with whom he had ſtudied, was traced, and I had an Opportunity of converſing with him more than once. From him I learnt that the Chevalier had ſtudied Perſian with him about Six Weeks or Two Months before his Departure from Cairo; that he underſtood the Language a little before he came to Egypt, and was able to converſe in it, though not without ſome Difficulty; that he brought Perſian Books with him from France, the Names of which were mentioned to me, and had likewiſe many Perſian Letters, which upon queſtioning the Turk I found were Letters of Hindoſtan, as their *Alcabs*, or complimentary Addreſſes were uſed in Hindoſtan only; that his Attention was given more to thoſe than to the Books; and that he informed this Man he was going to India, and offered him advantageous Appointments if he would accompany him, which from an Apprehenſion of the Danger of a Sea Voyage was refuſed by the Turk. About the 20th of June he went away from Cairo in a very ſecret Manner, taking Leave of no one, as is always cuſtomary amongſt the Europeans at Cairo; which was not only obſerved as a Singularity by Mr. Baldwin and the Venetians, but likewiſe by the French Merchants, who expreſſed their Aſtoniſhment at what they deemed a Want of Politeneſs. It is obſervable that he left Cairo the Day after the Arrival of a Mail from France. Mr. Baldwin would have remained ignorant of his Departure, as the Chevalier had not been viſible for a Month before, had he not by mere Accident ſeen a conſiderable Quantity of Baggage going out of Cairo, which upon Enquiry he found to be his, and he was then told by the Arabs, a Body of whom always eſcort Travellers acroſs the Deſart, that they were going to Suez. The Air of Myſtery with which every Thing was conducted which had any Relation to this Gentlemen, led Mr. Baldwin to be more particular in his Enquiries, and the Cuſtom Maſter, a Native of Egypt, and who could conſequently have but little Idea of the Jealouſy ſubſiſting between the Two Nations, obſerved that there muſt be ſomething very particular in this Gentleman, who, though there were Four Engliſh Veſſels at Suez, could not be perſuaded to embark on one of them for India, where he was going, but was reſolved to go to Judda or Mocha on a Boat, in which he was ſubjected both to Danger and Delay. I cannot help dwelling a little upon this Circumſtance, becauſe it ſeems to me to be a ſtrong preſumptive Proof that the Chevalier is in ſome Shape employed by the Court of France. It was neceſſary to apply to the Cuſtom Maſter, from his Office, for a Country Boat; and he was the Perſon who I conjecture adviſed him to embark on board an Engliſh Veſſel; and unleſs the Chevalier's Diſlike to this Mode had been expreſſed in a Manner very marked, it is not probable that a Native of Cairo would have drawn ſuch a Concluſion from it. The Misfortune which befel Mr. Grand Maiſon, and the Seizure of his Papers after his Death on board the Terrible, is a Circumſtance with which your Honourable Board muſt be acquainted, and of which the Chevalier could not be ignorant, as I myſelf heard the Story related at Cairo; after which it is not to be wondered at, if he would not truſt himſelf in an Engliſh Veſſel. The laſt Circumſtance which I learned at Cairo, ſeems to be the moſt concluſive, which is, that he was furniſhed with a very large Credit by the Court of France; and this Circumſtance I rely upon as authentic, becauſe I was informed of it by a French Merchant at Cairo, and likewiſe by a French Renegado at Suez, who learned it from the Chevalier's own Servant. It will not be miſplaced here, to obſerve, that Monſieur Grand Maiſon had a ſimilar Credit for Ten thouſand Venetian Sequins, about 4,500l. When I enquired, whether it was cuſtomary for the Court of France to grant ſuch Credits, the French Gentleman who informed me of it, ſeemed ſenſible that he had committed an Imprudence, and ſaid that he imagined the Chevalier de Montagny was employed by the Court as a Man of Literature and Knowledge, to make a Journey into Egypt. Upon my Arrival at Suez, I found that the Chevalier had been there; and not being able to find a Boat that would ſail with him in leſs than Three Weeks, had made a Journey to Mount Sinai, from whence he returned a few Days after my Arrival at Suez, and had ſailed for Judda about the 15th July. I thought it worth while to enquire, whether he had uſed any Mathematical Inſtruments in his Excurſion to Mount Sinai; and was aſſured by the Arabs who accompanied him, that he had carried none with him, having left his Baggage at Suez. Had he been employed as a literary Traveller, he certainly muſt have uſed Inſtruments. His Servant told the Renegado, that he was a Traveller of Curioſity, and meant to go from Juddah to Mecca; this was not poſſible, as he embarked avowedly as a Chriſtian; and as it is notorious that the Mahometans allow no Chriſtians to approach a City which they eſteem ſo holy, and which they would conceive to be polluted by the Preſence of thoſe whom they call Infidels.

I have thought it neceſſary to be very minute in the Account of what I was able to diſcover relative to this Gentleman, becauſe it appears to me that he muſt be employed by his Court in ſome Shape or another, though there are many Circumſtances which render it probable that he is not the Perſon entruſted with the Commiſſion mentioned in the Fifth Part of my Letter. Though the French Title of Chevalier is a Title which carries little or indeed no Importance in it in any Part of Europe, it is not ſo common in India; and if the Chevalier de Montagny ſhould turn out to be the Agent, the Court of France will certainly, in ſome Shape, have departed from their original

Plan, which was to give him as little external Conſequence as poſſible. I was likewiſe told at Cairo, that he is himſelf a Major in the Army, and the Son of a Perſon who either is or has been a Farmer General, and that his Family, by a late Promotion, are become *Nobleſſe*. There is one Part of the Intelligence I received at Cairo which does not agree with the Information given me in Europe, as it was poſitively aſſerted that he had never before been in India; though the Truth of his Aſſertion may be doubted, as his talking Perſian, and his being in Poſſeſſion of Indian Correſpondence, are ſufficient Reaſons for ſuſpecting that he had been there. One French Gentleman went ſo far as to ſay to me, that he was a Perſon, qui vouloit ſe donner du merite envers les Bureaus. If the Chevalier de Montagny had been entruſted with ſo important a Commiſſion, it is very extraordinary that a Veſſel ſhould not have been ready to receive him at Suez; and none having even come into the Red Sea in the Courſe of the whole Year, affords a ſtrong Preſumption that he is not the Perſon, though it by no Means amounts to a Proof, as many poſſible Accidents may have occaſioned ſuch a Miſtake; and it muſt be obſerved on the other Hand, that the French Conſul, who is the National Agent there, aſſured himſelf that one would arrive. The French Merchants diſagreeing with him in this Expectation, leaves room to conjecture that the Ship he expected was employed by Government, and not upon a trading Voyage, as he is himſelf reſtricted from Trade. On the whole, I doubt not your Honourable Board will deem the Appearances ſufficiently ſtrong to think it worth while to take ſome Steps to clear up whatever may appear doubtful about this Gentleman, and as it is poſſible, and indeed likely, that he ſhould aſſume another Name and Character upon his Arrival at Mocha, I made particular Enquiries about his Perſon, and venture to add, however uſeleſs it may be, the Deſcription I received of it: He is ſhort in his Stature, ſtoops much, and looks down when he is ſpeaking with any one; his Hair is brown, and his Complexion inclinable to be dark; his Legs are remarkably ill proportioned, being nearly as thick at Bottom as at Top; he is accompanied by a Europpean Servant, who is a ſtout, tall Man.

He will in all Probability make an exceeding long Voyage down the Red Sea, and will not be able to reach Mocha till the latter End of Auguſt. He will find no French Ship at Mocha, and will be reduced to the Neceſſity of embarking on board the Alexander, an Engliſh Ship trading in the Red Sea, or of going over Land to Muſcat, on the Perſian Gulph, a Journey not to be performed without much Difficulty and great Delays. It is however poſſible that he may arrive Time enough to ſail in a Portugueſe Ship, which intended to ſail from Mocha to Surat about the 20th Auguſt. At any rate I think it is not poſſible that he ſhould be landed in any Part of India ſooner than the End of October 1777.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. Elliott.

The Governor General delivers in the following Minute:

Mr. Francis having drawn up Objections to the Reſolution of the Preſident and Council of Bombay in the Form of a Proteſt, with his Reaſons ſtated in diſtinct Articles, I have thought it proper to copy his Minute entire, and to inſert my Reply oppoſite to each correſponding Paſſage, for the better Comprehenſion of the ſeveral Arguments contained in both.

I would propoſe that the Board ſhould proteſt, as I mean to do myſelf, ſeparately, againſt the Reſolution of the Preſidency of Bombay, communicated to us in their Letter of the 12th December laſt, for the following Reaſons:

1ſt. Becauſe their reſolving to join with a Party in the Maratta Government in Meaſures tending to engage the Company in a War, or their entering into Engagements to that Effect, as they declare they will do inſtantly on receiving an Application from the Perſons who are ſuppoſed to form the above Party, without the Conſent and Approbation of this Council firſt had and obtained, is againſt Law.

I cannot agree to the Motion made by Mr. Francis, for proteſting againſt the Reſolutions of the Preſident and Council of Bombay, becauſe I approve thoſe Reſolutions, for the Reaſons which will occur in the following Anſwers to Mr. Francis's Objections:

1ſt. This is a partial Conſtruction of the Act of Parliament, which admits of Two Exceptions from the general Prohibition. That no Doubt may be left upon this Caſe, I will quote the Clauſe of the Act at large which Mr. Francis alludes to, in pronouncing the Reſolution of the Preſidency of Bombay to be "againſt Law." It is as follows:

"And be it further enacted by the Authority "aforeſaid, That the ſaid Governor General and "Council, or the major Part of them, ſhall have, "and they are hereby authorized to have Power "of ſuperintending and controlling the Govern- "ment and Management of the Preſidencies of "Madras, Bombay, and Bencoolen reſpectively, "ſo far and in ſo much as that it ſhall not be "lawful for any Preſident and Council of Madras, "Bombay, or Bencoolen, for the Time being, "to make any Orders for commencing Hoſtilities, "or declaring or making War againſt any Indian "Princes or Powers, or for negociating or con-

" cluding any Treaty of Peace, or other Treaty,
" with any ſuch Indian Princes or Powers, with-
" out the Conſent and Approbation of the ſaid
" Governor General and Council firſt had and
" obtained; except in ſuch Caſes of imminent
" Neceſſity as would render it dangerous to poſt-
" pone ſuch Hoſtilities or Treaties until the
" Orders from the Governor General and Council
" might arrive; and except in ſuch Caſes where
" the ſaid Preſidents and Councils reſpectively
" ſhall have received ſpecial Orders from the
" ſaid United Company."

The Reſolution of the Preſidency of Bombay was formed on ſuch a Caſe of imminent Neceſſity as would have rendered it dangerous to poſtpone the Execution of it till the Orders from this Council might arrive; a Treaty concluded near Two Years ago yet unaccompliſhed, and the Grounds of a hoſtile Alliance formed by one of the Parties to the Treaty, Ballajee Pundit, between the Maratta State and the Crown of France; ſuch were the Dangers impending over the Preſident and Council of Bombay. A Meaſure was offered to their Choice, by which theſe Dangers might be removed and averted, and it was in its Nature ſuch as required their inſtant Acceptance or Refuſal, for it would have been impoſſible to have kept a Deſign, planned by One of the Two ruling Parties in the Maratta Adminiſtration to diſpoſſeſs the other, in Suſpence and Secrecy, till it could be communicated to the Governor General and Council of Bengal, and receive their Sanction for its Execution. No other Expedient could have occurred, which could promiſe ſo effectually to reconcile the Differences ſubſiſting between the Governments of Poona and Bombay, nor which, if ſucceſsful, could with Certainty prevent the Effects of French Intrigues. It was therefore a Caſe of equal Danger and Neceſſity, and ſuch as juſtified the Reſolution taken upon it by that Preſidency, on its own ſeparate Authority.

2d. Becauſe it is equally againſt the Company's Inſtructions in their General Letter of April 1777, by which the Expediency of any future Alliance with Ragoba is expreſsly left to our Determination.

2d. The Company's Inſtructions, to which this Paſſage refers, are contained in the 25th Paragraph of their General Letter of the 5th February 1777, which runs as follows:

" You cannot but obſerve, that we have hi-
" therto ſuppoſed the Affairs of Ragoba are
" rendered deſperate, and that the Miniſters at
" Poona maintain their Ground, and conſtitute
" at preſent the Maratta Government. We are
" nevertheleſs of Opinion, that an Alliance ori-
" ginally with Ragoba would have been more
" for the Honour and Advantage of the Com-
" pany, and more likely to be laſting, than that
" concluded at Poona; his Pretenſions to the
" Supreme Authority, either in his own Right,
" or as Guardian to the Infant Peſhwa, appear to
" us better founded than thoſe of his Competi-
" tors: And therefore, if the Conditions of the
" Treaty of Poona have not been ſtrictly fulfilled
" on the Part of the Marattas, and if from any
" Circumſtances you ſhall deem it expedient, we
" have no Objection to an Alliance with Ragoba,
" on the Terms agreed upon between him and
" the Governor and Council of Bombay."

Theſe Inſtructions were immediately addreſſed

to

to the Governor General and Council, as they related to a Point depending on their general Controul; but muſt be ſuppoſed to include the ſame Exceptions as the prohibitory Clauſe above quoted in the Act of Parliament. The ſame Sentiments are expreſſed in the general Letter of the 16th April 1777, to Bombay, and almoſt in the ſame Terms, without any direct Reſtriction of them, to the excluſive Authority of the Governor General and Council, which it is not probable that the Company would have omitted, had it been intended to bind the Preſident and Council of Bombay in the Execution of them, further than they were already bound by the Act of Parliament.

Diſobedience of Orders neceſſarily implies the Exiſtence of Orders. Thoſe ſuppoſed in the preſent Caſe muſt be Orders forbidding an Alliance with Ragoba; but the Declaration made of Orders given to the Governor General and Council of Bengal, to form an Alliance with Rogaba, cannot poſſibly admit the Conſtruction of Orders given to the Preſidency of Bombay, not to form an Alliance with him. The Reſolution therefore of that Preſidency, ſo far as it tends to the Formation of an Alliance with Ragoba, is not a Diſobedience of Orders, nor, to uſe Mr. Francis's Words, is it "againſt the Company's Inſtructions?" On the contrary, I am of Opinion, that the general Tenor of their Inſtructions, the Urgency of the Occaſion, and the legal Latitude allowed them, amount, by their combined Weight, to an Obligation on the Preſident and Council of Bombay, to act in ſuch a Caſe as they have done.

3d. Becauſe it is a Violation of the 9th and 10th Articles of the Treaty concluded between the Governor General and Council and the Peſhwah.

3d. The 10th and 12th Articles, which I ſuppoſe to be here meant, expreſs, that the Engliſh ſhall withdraw their Forces from Ragonaut Row, and that they ſhall not aſſiſt him; that is, that they ſhall not take his Part againſt the Maratta Government, as the 12th Article expreſſes in Terms; but if that Government itſelf adopts the Party of Ragonaut Row, and ſolicits the Aſſiſtance of the Engliſh in his Behalf, it can never be inferred from their Compliance, that they are guilty of a Violation of the Treaty.

It will be remembered, that the only Perſons who have ſigned the Treaty on the Part of the Marattas, are Succaram Pundit and Ballajee Pundit, not as Principals, but as the profeſſed Repreſentatives of the Peſhwa, who is yet an Infant; of theſe, Succaram Pundit is acknowledged to be the Superior, being by Office the Dewan. To him only all our firſt Letters were written; and Colonel Upton's Credentials were addreſſed, as to the Perſon in whom the legal Adminiſtration was veſted. By the Conſtitution of all Indian Governments, the executive Power is always held by the Hands of a ſingle Man. The Perſon of the Peſhwa and his Seal, by which all Acts of Government are authenticated, are in the Poſſeſſion of Succaram Pundit; whoſe Acts are therefore the regular Acts of Government, whilſt the Members of it continue divided.

He is ſuppoſed to have invited the Preſidency of Bombay, to unite with him in giving Aſſiſtance

to

to Ragonaut Row; and we have received Aſſurances from that Preſidency, that they will not comply with the Invitation, until they ſhall receive the due Evidence of its Authenticity. Their Aſſiſtance of courſe will be granted equally to the Maratta State as to Ragonaut Row; and to the Peſhwa, the actual Ruler of the Maratta State. It is not therefore a Violation of the Treaty concluded between the Governor General and Council, and the Peſhwa.

4th. Becauſe ſuch Violation of a public Treaty between Two States is not to be juſtified by the Reaſons aſſigned for it, viz. That a Number of Individuals in one of thoſe States are inclined to engage in Meaſures ſubverſive of all or any of the Stipulations of ſuch public Treaty, and have privately applied for Aſſiſtance in carrying ſuch Meaſures into Execution.

4th. This Objection appears to me to conſiſt of a ſimple Denial of an Argument erroneouſly ſtated. The Propoſition which it introduces, is incompatible in Terms. A Violation of a public Treaty cannot be juſtified by any Reaſons aſſigned for it. The Reaſons aſſigned to the Preſident and Council of Bombay, are not that *a Number of Individuals in the Maratta State are inclined to engage in Meaſures ſubverſive of all or any of the Stipulations of the Treaty, and have privately applied for Aſſiſtance*, &c. but, That the ruling Member of the Maratta State has himſelf removed the Obligation of the Treaty which relates to the Perſon of Ragonaut Row, by deſiring the Engliſh to grant that Aſſiſtance to Ragonaut Row in behalf of the Maratta State, which they had before pledged their Faith to him to withhold while he was conſidered as an Enemy to that State. The Reaſons thus aſſigned appear to me to be a complete Juſtification and Acquittal of the Preſident and Council of Bombay, in their ſuppoſed Acquieſcence from the Charge of having violated the Treaty.

5th. Becauſe even the Evidence of ſuch a Diſpoſition in Perſons alluded to, appears to us very uncertain and defective, being no more than a private verbal Meſſage from them to Mr. Moſtyn's Subſtitute at Poona; meant perhaps for no other Purpoſe but to diſcover our Intentions with reſpect to Ragoba, and which they may diſavow at Pleaſure.

5th. If the Meaſures of the Preſident and Council of Bombay, have been decidedly taken on ſuch weak Grounds as are ſuppoſed in this Objection, their Conduct would have been truly reprehenſible. The contrary appears on the Face of their Proceedings. I have not either of the Copies before me, underſtanding that they are in Circulation; but I truſt ſecurely to my Memory, in affirming, that their Reſolutions are guarded with all the Cautions which ſuch a Caſe demanded, with perhaps one Exception: They had done nothing on the Overtures made to them, but had only agreed on what they would do, if theſe were confirmed and authenticated by an Inſtrument in Writing, ſigned by the Miniſter and his Colleagues, and ſealed with their Seals, and delivered by a Perſon deputed by them expreſsly to the Governor. Such Evidence will be certain and complete; and on ſuch Evidence only have the Preſident and Council of Bombay reſolved to enter into Engagements with the Miniſter.

6th. Becauſe there are no Proofs before us to warrant our giving Credit to an Aſſertion ſo improbable as, that Succaram Baboo, whoſe Letters to the Governor have been conſtantly, and are to this Time, filled with Complaints againſt the Non-execution of the Treaty, and particularly of the Protection given to Ragoba, ſhould voluntarily enter into private Engagements, to reſtore Ragoba to the Regency, and ſolicit the Aſſiſtance of the Preſidency of Bombay for that Purpoſe.

6th. We have been long ſince informed of the mutual Jealouſies of the Two Miniſters. This is an Effect which requires no Evidence of Facts to prove it; it being phyſically impoſſible for Two Men, ſharing with equal Power, and without any conſtitutional Right, the chief Adminiſtration of a deſpotic Government, to maintain their Union entire againſt the Competitions excited by their particular Intereſts, or the more intereſted Suggeſtions of their reſpective Partizans and Dependants; added to theſe Cauſes, which are common

to all Men placed in a Condition ſimilar to theirs, their Proſpects and Diſpoſitions are ſuch as muſt draw them in contrary Directions; and this too is a Conſequence which ſimple Speculation may form independant of formal Evidence: One is diſqualified from Action by the Infirmities of Old Age, and whatever Influence his Ambition might have had on his Mind when he firſt engaged in a Scene of Troubles, this muſt have wholly forſaken him with the Object, which moſt probably excited it in the Loſs of an only Son. To ſuch a Man Eaſe and perſonal Safety are the only Comforts that Life can preſent to him, or that can animate him to any Degree of temporary Exertion: We are accordingly told, and on the Authority of Credit, that he reſides entirely in the Fortreſs of Poorunder, which is his own Property, with the Infant Peſhwa in his Poſſeſſion, and (as I have heard) a conſiderable Hoard of Treaſure, which he refuſed to part with, even at the Time when his Colleague was involved in great Difficulties by the Want of Money to pay the Army, which had mutinied for their Arrears. The other is yet in the active Seaſon of Life, ſupported partly by the perſonal Intereſt of his Aſſociate joined to his own, partly by the Attachment Hurry Punt Furkia, the Commander in Chief of the Forces of the Maratta State, and partly by the immediate Direction of all the current Buſineſs of Government, which he has either aſſumed or his Partner has left to his ſole Charge. To ſuch a Man it was an obvious and neceſſary Policy to employ the preſent Means of precluding all future Competitions, and for ſecuring the firſt Place in the State on the Event of the Death of Succaram Baboo: The Means employed for ſuch an End, and eſpecially the Proviſion made of a foreign Alliance to promote it, could not fail to heighten the Suſpicions of his preſent Rival, and to breed Diſaffection in others.

If Succaram Baboo can obtain the aſſured Conditions of perſonal Safety, and the unmoleſted Poſſeſſion of his own Property, from Ragoba, I ſee no Cauſe to regard his Acceptance of them as improbable, although he ſhould have joined in more adverſe Acts againſt Ragoba, than that inſtanced by Mr. Francis of his Complaint of the Protection granted by the Engliſh to Ragoba, whilſt his own Intereſt and Safety appeared to be endangered by it.

I am not certain whether I may not miſconceive the Tendency of this and the preceding Objection, but they ſeem to me to imply that the late Overtures made to the Preſidency of Bombay by Succaram Baboo and his Party, through Mr. Lewis, may have been an Artifice concerted between them and Nanna Furneeſs himſelf, not only to diſcover our Intentions with reſpect to Ragoba, but to gain the Poſſeſſion of his Perſon and to deſtroy him. This would be a very dangerous Policy both to the Miniſters themſelves, if they were ſincerely united in it, as it would draw on them a very unneceſſary Scene of Troubles, which from paſt Experience of the Succeſs which has generally attended the Engliſh Arms, they have ſo great a Cauſe to ſolicit, and particularly to Nanna Furneeſs, as it would place him preciſely and truly in the Situation which it was intended

to

7th. Becauſe, admitting that a Party has been ormed to ſupport the Pretenſions of Ragoba, ſuch arty is either ſtrong enough to accompliſh their urpoſe without our Aſſiſtance, conſequently our nterference is unneceſſary; or if their own trength be in itſelf unequal to the Enterprize, they ill then want an immediate and continued Support which the Preſidency of Bombay is in no Conlition to give them. In their Letter of the 7th December they tell us, that their European Battaions are greatly deficient of their proper Complement, which they have no Means or Proſpect of ompleting: And that notwithſtanding they give very Encouragement, it is very difficult to raiſe ood Sepoys on that Coaſt. That they are unible to co-operate with the other Preſidencies, in aſe of an Attack upon either of them; that limited as their Power is, and unprovided as they re with Reſources, they cannot exert themſelves s the Occaſion requires, they can do no more han repreſent their Situation and Circumſtances o us, &c.

It follows then that the Reſolution of the Bombay Preſidency, to carry Ragoba to Poona, may involve s in a War, in which the Safety of our Poſſeſſions n the Maratta Coaſt may be immediately haarded, and which can no Way be ſupported ereafter but by Supplies of Men and Money rom Bengal.

8th. Becauſe it is at all Times the Duty of his Council to give their utmoſt Attention to he Preſervation of Peace in India, but at this uncture more particularly than at any other, while

to feign, and leave him at the abſolute Mercy of his Accomplices, if they choſe to convert a pretended Plot againſt him into a real one. In effect I ſhould conſider the Exiſtence of ſuch a Deſign as in the Nature of Things impoſſible.

7th. I agree with Mr. Francis, that the Preſidency of Bombay is unable to ſupport a continued War, but by Supplies of Men and Money from Bengal. This is an Argument to ſupply them with Men and Money, but it is not in itſelf an Objection to their Reſolution; if their own Means are equal to its immediate Execution, and to its Support until they can be aſſiſted from Bengal.

This Government can aſſiſt them with both Men and Money, and I truſt without feeling the Want of either for the Support of its own Concerns. By the laſt Returns from Bombay, the groſs Numbers of their different Military Corps ſtood as follows:

Artillery, Rank and File		—	261
European Infantry,	D°	—	783
Sepoys	D°	—	5621
Irregulars	—	—	1231

The Force of this Preſidency was much leſs at the Battle of Plaſſey. It was much leſs, when it was at the ſame Time occupied in the Defence of theſe Provinces againſt the Shahzade, and in the Expedition under Colonel Forde againſt Maſulipatam; and it was much leſs when unſupported by any Country Power, it wreſted the Provinces of Bengal and Bahar from the Hands of Coſſein Ally Cawn.

I have no Doubt of their being in a State to enter upon the Meaſure which they have propoſed. The Diſtance of Bombay from Poona is but a March of Four Days. I am informed that Madajee Sindea and Tuccojee Holkar are both encamped in the Neighbourhood of Poona, with about 20,000 Horſe. They are, if the Aſſociation has taken Place, in the Intereſt of Ragoba. Hurry Punt Furkia was, I am informed, on the Banks of the River Kiſtna, at a Place called Kiſtna Teer, with the main Army of the Maratta State, engaged in a War with Hyder Ally: He is repreſented to be attached to Nana Furneeſe, but can afford him little Service on ſuch an Occaſion and at ſuch a Diſtance. Such is the preſent State of the Parties on which the Event of an Undertaking, ſuch as has been propoſed by the Preſidency of Bombay, is likely to depend, at leaſt ſuch I have gathered it to be from Authorities unconnected with thoſe of Bombay. I ſhall not preſume to draw any Concluſions from ſuch uncertain and variable Materials; but I am ſatisfied that all Appearances, ſuch as they are, are favourable, and convinced that it depends on the Prudence of the Government of Bombay to prevent the Company's Affairs from ſuffering any Prejudice by the propoſed Engagements; if they ſhould even fail to derive any inſtant Benefit from it.

8th. The Argument which is here introduced as an Objection to the propoſed Meaſure, would, in my Judgment, be better applied to the Defence of it. If the Apprehenſion of a War with

France

while a conſiderable Part of the national Force is employed in America, and while the Apprehenſion of a War with France and Spain hangs over the Councils of the Nation.

France and Spain hangs over the Councils of the Nation, we relieve them from a conſiderable Share of their Apprehenſion, by eſtabliſhing a firm Intereſt in the moſt powerful State of India; and by checking in its firſt Growth the Seeds which the French have ſown of an Alliance with it, and which, if ſuffered to grow to Maturity, may prove fatal to the Britiſh Poſſeſſions in India. At the ſame Time it is the moſt unexceptionable Way by which the French Deſigns could poſſibly be obviated; as they have no oſtenſible or direct Concern in theſe Diſputes, but will be eventually cruſhed by the Overthrow of their Friends; whereas by waiting till they have acquired an Eſtabliſhment in the Maratta Dominions, we ſhall be reduced to act openly againſt them, which we cannot do without an immediate additional Hazard, nor without involving the Two Nations in a War.

9th. Becauſe the Requiſition made by the Preſidency of Bombay to that of Fort Saint George, of a Body of Troops for any Purpoſe but that of immediate Self-defence without our Conſent and Approbation, appears to us highly irregular, and in its Conſequences dangerous, as it tends to defeat the Intention of the Legiſlature in the Inſtitution of this Council; and to make it impoſſible for us to provide for the Safety of the Britiſh Empire in India by any general Plan of Meaſures.

It is not poſſible that the Company's Forces ſhould act under a ſteady and united Direction for the general Safety and Defence of our Poſſeſſions, or move together in any one Plan of Action, as long as the reſpective Diſpoſition of the Forces of each of the other Preſidencies is liable to be altered without our Knowledge or Conſent.

9th. A like Application was made by the Preſidency of Bombay to that of Fort Saint George in the Year 1775, with which, in a Letter written to the latter on the 7th September, we forbad their Compliance.

The Sentiments expreſſed by the Court of Directors in the 45th Paragraph of their Commands of the 24th December 1776 on that Interference, is ſo pointedly oppoſite to the Objection now ſtated by Mr. Francis, that I ſhall inſert an Extract of that Paragraph as a complete Reply to it.

" We are ſorry to obſerve, that you appear " to entertain an Opinion of the controlling " Powers veſted in the Governor General and " Council of Bengal over our other Preſidencies, " beyond what in our Opinion is authorized by " the late Act of the Legiſlature.

" This Obſervation ariſes from your Interference with our Governor and Council of Fort " Saint George, to prohibit them ſending Troops " out of their own Diſtricts for Aid to our Settlement of Bombay, although the ſaid Act expreſsly forbids any of the other Preſidencies to " engage in political Negociations with the Natives, or foreign Nations, without the Participation and Concurrence of the Supreme Council; " yet it certainly leaves each diſtinct Government " Power to take from Time to Time ſuch Steps " as the immediate Exigency of their Affairs may " require for Self-defence or Protection, or for " the neceſſary Aid or Aſſiſtance to be given to " other Settlements; and on this Principle we " muſt diſapprove your Interference in this Caſe."

10th. Becauſe the Reſolutions taken by the Preſidency of Bombay not only ſtand in direct Contradiction to the Authorities and Engagements hereinbefore recited, but more eſpecially to the Inſtructions of this Council, unanimouſly agreed, on the 18th Auguſt laſt, which they appear to have totally diſregarded, and which it is our Duty to ſupport and inſiſt on. I deſire the Second Paragraph in that Letter may be read.

The firſt Point has undoubtedly afforded juſt Cauſe of Offence and Jealouſy to the Maratta Government. We wiſh that Ragoba had been induced to accept the Terms of Conciliation lately offered

10th. While I was preparing the Minute recorded on the 26th January, and written before the Receipt of the late Advices from Bombay, I cauſed the laſt of theſe Expedients to be ſtated in a Caſe and referred to a learned Pundit for his Opinion upon it. I intended it at that Time for my own Information only; and it was on the Strength of this Opinion, that I declared the Expedient to be impracticable in the Minute abovementioned; I ſhall now enter the Queſtion ſtated to the Pundit, his Anſwer, and Note of Mr. Elliot's, which accompanied it, and produce the Originals of each at the Board for further Satisfaction.

Queſtion,

fered to him by the Miniſters, to reſide at nares, with a Jaghire of Five Lacks of Ru- es per Annum, in the Neighbourhood of Cal- e. Theſe Conditions, though they effectually moved the Objections formerly made by Rago- a againſt the Terms ſecured for him by the reaty, were excepted to by him on account of e Difficulty of proceeding to Benares; from e Danger that he thought his Perſon would expoſed to in a Journey by Land through the laratta Dominions; and his religious Scruples gainſt a Voyage by Sea.

" We can ſee no Reaſon to doubt, that the Preſence of Ragoba at Bombay will continue " to be an inſuperable Bar to the Completion of " the Treaty concluded with the Maratta Govern- " ment; nor can any ſincere Cordiality and good " Underſtanding be eſtabliſhed with them as long " as he ſhall appear to derive Encouragement and " Support from the Engliſh: On the contrary, " we think that although it may not furniſh ſuf- " ficient Grounds for the actual Renewal of " Hoſtilities, it will ſo far eſtrange the Minds of " the Miniſters at leaſt, as to compel them to " form Connections to the Diſadvantage of the " Britiſh Government; ſo that notwithſtanding " the Forms of a Reconciliation ſhould exiſt, " neither Party will benefit by the Effects of it. " We therefore think it incumbent upon us to " recommend to your moſt mature Conſideration " the dangerous Effects of your perſiſting ſtill to " continue that Protection to Ragoba, and to deſire " you will do all that lies in your Power to re- " move the Obſtacles which oppoſe his Departure " from Bombay; for this Purpoſe we think that " he ſhould be required to make choice either " of a Journey by Land, if Tuccojee Holcar and " Madhajee Sindia will give proper Security to " conduct him in Safety, which we have been " aſſured, they would do; or of a Voyage by " Sea, which might be accompliſhed without " affecting his religious Purity, if he were ac- " commodated with a Veſſel fitted out and man- " ned immediately under his Orders, and by " Perſons of his own Sect, to be accompanied by " One of the Company's Marine Veſſels for his " Protection. If both theſe Expedients ſhould " be rejected by Ragoba, we muſt naturally con- " clude, that it is not his Intention to part with " his preſent Aſylum, but that the Objections " which he has ſtarted to the Terms propoſed to " him, are mere Pretexts; and on this Ground, " we repeat our Injunctions, that he be poſitively " required to quit the Company's Dependencies, " as we ſhall hold you reſponſible for all the Con- " ſequences of continuing the Company's Pro- " tection to him, after ſuch a Refuſal on his " Part."

Queſtion. A Brahmin of high Caſt is deſirous of viſiting Bengal from Surat. It is propoſed, that he ſhall be attended by Perſons of his own Sect, and that the Veſſel on which he may em- bark for this Voyage ſhall be navigated ſolely by Hindoos. Will this Voyage in any Shape affect his religious Purity, or hinder him from performing the neceſſary and indiſpenſable Rites and Forms of Devotion?

Note from Mr. Elliot.

" I ſend you the Solution to your Queſtion " by the Court Pundit, the only one I could " immediately find. He is a Man much re- " ſpected for Knowledge. He added in Con- " verſation, that a ſingle European or other *In-* " *fidel*, would preclude the Brahmin from mak- " ing the Voyage.

(Signed)
" A. Elliot."

Tranſlate of the Pundit's Anſwer.

" If all the Men in the Ship are Hindoos, and " all Jowlbugharge *, or Men from whoſe Hands " it is not impure to receive Water to drink, and " Two or Three Brahmins ſhould accompany " him, and he eats, drinks, waſhes, and prays, " &c. according to the Shaſter, then he will not " ſuffer in his Caſt, and in the Caſe ſtated he may " come upon a Ship.

(Signed)
" Serree Ram Kiſhun Suema,
" the Court Pundit."

I am aſſured, that though it is cuſtomary for Hindoos to navigate Veſſels on the Weſt Coaſt of India, yet they are always joined with Mahometan Laſcars, who are conſtantly em- ployed in the moſt difficult Manœuvres of the Ship, and in the working of their Guns; and the Society of ſuch Men being themſelves polluted, is, as is well known, equally forbidden to the more ſcrupulous Hindoos with that of the Pro- feſſors of a different Religion: This Expedient was therefore impracticable. What Objections either Ragoba's Diſtruſt of Madhajee Sindia and Tuccojee Holcar, or their Refuſal to give the re- quiſite Securities, might have created to the other Expedient, we cannot know, becauſe Time was not given for the Trial of either; but had either been practicable, it ought not to have prevented the Preſident and Council of Bombay from accepting a Propoſition which promiſed ſo much more effectual a Conciliation of the Differences ſubſiſt- ing between them and the Miniſters; and at the ſame Time accorded ſo perfectly with the declared Wiſhes of the Court of Directors. It was not forbidden by our Orders, for theſe profeſſed only to preſcribe the only Means which had occurred to us for the firſt of theſe Ends, nor had any Reference to a Caſe, which we neither foreſaw nor imagined.

If the Intentions of that Preſidency in this Inſtance are juſtified by the Act of Parliament, as I have proved; if they were ſuch as the Com- pany's Orders not only juſtified but required,

* Jowlbugharge is a Term which includes nearly all the Caſts of Hindoos, the very loweſt only being excepted.

which I have alſo proved; no Influences drawn by forced Implications from the Orders of this Government, can deprive them of their Rectitude, which they derive from ſuch ſuperior Warrants. In Truth, whatever Cauſe the Preſident and Council, of Bombay have formerly given to this Government to charge them with a Want of due Attention to its Authority, nothing could be more unjuſt than to impute that Fault to them on this Occaſion, if it be admitted, as it muſt, that the Reſolution which they propoſed to take was ſuch as could not poſſibly wait the Sanction of this Government; as ſoon as it came in Contemplation before them, and before they had either formed the Plan of their Operations, or propoſed the Advantages to be obtained by them, they inſtantly apprized us of it, and thereby furniſhed an Argument againſt themſelves, to charge them with the Neglect of thoſe eſſential Conſiderations, in their Precipitancy to communicate to us the firſt Suggeſtions of a Deſign of ſuch Importance to the political Intereſts of the Company.

If the Board ſhould agree in the preceding Reſolutions, I am of Opinion that a Copy of them ſhould be ſent to the Preſident and Council of Bombay, with an additional Declaration, That we deem them ſolely reſponſible to the Company and the Nation for all the Conſequences of the Meaſures they have taken, or may take on this Occaſion, without our Conſent and Approbation; and that whereas they have not yet demanded of us any ſpecific Supply, either of Men or Money, to ſupport the Execution of the above Meaſures, we are determined, that whatever Aſſiſtance we may be compelled to give them, by the Neceſſity of defending the Company's Poſſeſſions on that Coaſt, ſhall be ſtrictly confined to the Objects of Defence; and that we will never encourage or ſupport any Plan of Operations calculated to carry the Company's Arms beyond that Line without our Conſent and Approbation firſt had and obtained, or without the expreſs and ſpecific Orders of the Company to that Effect; that when we receive the further Advices they promiſe to give us, of what is likely to be the Iſſue of this Buſineſs, we ſhall communicate to them our Opinion and Reſolution thereupon.

(Signed) Warren Haſtings.

Mr. Barwell—As a Diviſion has unhappily ariſen on the preſent Queſtion, on the Meaſures adopted by the Government of Bombay, and the Reſponſibility of the Approbation expreſſed in the Votes of this Day, pointedly fixed on the approving Members; that it may not be ſuppoſed I admit in the leaſt Degree the Objections that now appear upon the Proceedings, I adopt entirely the Governor General's Reaſonings upon the Subject of them, and ſubſcribe my Name as fully to his Minute, as if it had been written with my Aſſent and Participation.

Mr. Francis—Much might be ſaid in Defence of thoſe Opinions, which the Governor General has been pleaſed to canvaſs ſo minutely; but as the Argument would turn chiefly on the Conſtruction of Words, on nice Diſtinctions in forming ſuch Conſtructions, and probable Inferences deduced from thence, I ſhall not enter into it: I do not expect that ſuch an Argument would be attended to at Home, nor do I think it affects the Principle on which a Queſtion of the Magnitude of that which is now before us ought to be determined. I ſhall leave it to a higher Tribunal to determine, whether the Caſe of *imminent Neceſſity*, deſcribed by the Legiſlature, relates ſolely to Meaſures of Self defence, or includes all others, according to the Opinion, and at the Diſcretion of the ſubordinate Preſidencies? and whether, when the Company ſay "That, if "from any Circumſtance our Governor General and Council ſhall deem it expedient, they have no "Objection to an Alliance with Ragoba," they mean to refer that Queſtion ſolely to *us*, or to ſubject it to a Sort of concurring Juriſdiction in the Government of Bombay? If they meant the laſt, it might have happened, that the Queſtion would have received Two oppoſite Deciſions; and that the inferior Juriſdiction might, by Acts done upon their own Principles, decide it againſt our Judgment and Reſolutions. I ſhall alſo leave another Queſtion untouched, viz. Whether the Caſe of Ragoba's Caſt is an Object of ſuch Importance to this Government, that we are to hazard a general War in India for the ſake of preſerving of it? I have but One more Obſervation to make upon the Governor's Minute, in Reply to my Objection to the Requiſition made by the Preſidency of Bombay for Military Aſſiſtance from that of Madras. He quotes a Letter from the Company, from which he concludes, that in the Opinion of the Court of Directors we are not entitled to forbid ſuch Requiſitions: I do not admit, that in any Caſe whatever, eſpecially a Caſe of ſuch great Importance as the preſent, Arguments are ever anſwered by Authorities; but I contend, that the Senſe of the Court of Directors, even in the Paragraph ſo recited, does not ſtand in Oppoſition to the Opinion ſtated in my former Minute: It ſuppoſes, that the ſubordinate Preſidencies may lawfully apply for Aſſiſtance to each other, "as the immediate Exigency of their Affairs may require, for Self-defence or Protection."

This

This Caſe is included in that of the imminent Neceſſity ſtated by the Legiſlature; and I have never affirmed, that Self-defence and Protection did not authorize the ſubordinate Preſidencies to take Meaſures tending to thoſe Purpoſes only, without our previous Conſent and Approbation.

Mr. Barwell—I beg the Occaſion on which the Bombay Preſidency made their Application to Maſras, the Diſapprobation of this Government, the Materials on which the above Sentiments on the Court of Directors are expreſſed, may follow in this Place.

The Governor General—I believe it is expreſſed in the following Letter, written by this Preſidency to Fort St. George, dated 7th September 1775.

Copy of a Letter to Fort St. George, dated the 7th September 1775.

Underſtanding from a Letter which we have received from the Preſident and Council of Bombay, dated 13th July, that they have applied to you for a Reinforcement of 300 Europeans, and Two complete Battalions of Sepoys, to join their Army now in Quarters with Ragoba, we think it neceſſary to deſire, that you will not comply with this Application, as we have judged it expedient to order that Preſidency to withdraw their Army from the Service of Ragoba to their own Garriſons, and confine their Views and Operations to the Safety of the Company's Poſſeſſions, including Salſette; truſting that a ſecure and honourable Peace will be effected with the Miniſterial Party by Colonel Upton, on his Arrival at Poona.

Mr. Francis—I beg Leave to move, that Notice may be taken, in the preſent General Letter, of the Supply of 6,000 Muſkets and 4,000 Hand Grenades, furniſhed by the Preſidency of Bombay to Hyder Ally, with our Requeſt to them, that they will take it into their Conſideration, and furniſh us and the Preſidency of Bombay with their Sentiments and Inſtructions thereupon.

Mr. Wheler aſſents.

Mr. Barwell—I do not know the Object of this Queſtion: It appears to be ſuggeſted without Conſideration, that this Information muſt already have been given to the Company by that Preſidency; and to ſwell it into a Degree of Importance which the Subject does not merit, the Papers in courſe go Home with the general Intelligence from Bombay. I therefore am againſt the Motion.

Governor General—I object to the Motion. It may be mentioned in the General Letter, as a Propoſition made, but not agreed to. This will bring it equally before the Notice of the Court of Directors, if an Extract be added from the Proceedings of the Preſident and Council of Bombay, of ſo much as relates to it.

Mr. Francis—I aſſent to the Mode propoſed by the Governor General.

Reſolved, That the Motion be notified to the Court of Directors, as a Propoſition having been made, but not agreed to.

APPENDIX, N° 30.

Extract of a Letter from the Governor General and Council in Bengal to the Court of Directors; dated 4th February 1778.

Par. 7. IN our Letter by the Europa, dated 21ſt November, we mentioned the Reſerve of the Preſident and Council of Bombay, in their Communications to us: After waiting till the 26th ultimo, in Expectation of further Advices on the important Subjects which had raiſed our Anxiety, we received a Letter from them, dated the 7th December, encloſing a Copy of the Propoſals brought by Mr. Moſtyn from the Miniſters, for an Accommodation with Ragoba, which he declined to accept, chiefly becauſe he did not think they contained an adequate Proviſion for his perſonal Safety. Secret ment.

8. On the 29th January we received another Letter from Bombay, dated 12th December, adviſing us of Overtures which had been ſecretly made by an Agent, in the Names of Succaram Baboo, Moraba Furneſe, Bucherba Proonder, and Tuccojee Holcar, to Mr. Lewis, Mr. Moſtyn's Subſtitute at Poona, for the Aſſiſtance of the Engliſh in replacing Ragonaut Row in the Adminiſtration of the Affairs of the Maratta Government. The Preſident and Council conſidering theſe Overtures as made by the Maratta State, have agreed, that if the above Perſons ſhould join in a formal Application to them, for the Company's Aſſiſtance in favour of Ragonaut Row, they would immediately grant it, and directed Mr. Lewis to communicate their Intentions to the Party with all poſſible Caution and Secrecy.

9. We

9. We immediately aſſembled for the Conſideration of Proceedings of ſo much Importance; and after the moſt attentive Deliberation, we came to the following Reſolutions; but as they were not taken without much Debate, and Variety of Opinions, we think it neceſſary to recommend to your Peruſal the Conſultations noted in the Margin, which are tranſmitted a Number in the Book Packet.

nſ. 26 Jan. 29 D°. 2 Feb. ee Appendix 27, 28, 29.

10. In the Conſultation 2d February, you will find a Motion from one of our Members, to notify to you a Supply of 6,000 Muſkets and 4,000 Hand Grenades, which have been furniſhed by the Preſident and Council of Bombay to Hyder Ally, &c. but as we did not agree to mention it in the Terms of the Motion, we beg Leave to quote the Letter from Bombay, wherein this Tranſaction is imparted to us; viz. "We encloſe for your Notice, Copy of a Letter from the Nabob "Hyder Ally to our Reſident at Onore: We have to obſerve, that we ſupplied him with the "Muſquets therein mentioned by Permiſſion from the Honourable Company, for the Purchaſe of "Sandal Wood and Pepper in his Dominions."

11. We have juſt received a Letter from the Preſident and Council at Fort Saint George, dated 16th ultimo, which contains a State of the Force and Reſources of that Preſidency, with many other Informations of Conſequence; we have therefore cauſed a Copy of it to be added to our laſt Conſultation for your Notice.

12. In this Letter the Preſident and Council have given us, as nearly as they could judge of them, an Account of the probable Views, Intereſts, and Connections of the different Country Powers adjacent to your Poſſeſſions on the Coaſt, with ſuch Informations as they had received reſpecting them. It appears that the Attention of Hyder Ally is wholly occupied in the Defence of his own Dominions againſt his natural Enemies the Marattas, but that he has a Vackeel at Pondicherry, who receives Encouragement from the Governor, Monſieur Bellecombe, and that this Gentleman maintains a Correſpondence with Hyder, by which he endeavours to ſecure him to the Intereſts of the French.

13. The Maratta Army oppoſed to Hyder's was greatly ſuperior to his; but he ſurprized them in the Night of the 5th ultimo near the Banks of the Jungabuddra, drove them acroſs that River, and obtained a conſiderable Advantage over them.

14. We are further informed from Madras, of an Application which they had received from the Preſident and Council at Bombay to hold in Readineſs 200 Europeans, a Battalion of Sepoys, and 50 Artillery, to march to Anjengo if their ſubſequent Engagements ſhould make it neceſſary to require them. Although the Preſident and Council at Fort Saint George did not think proper to comply with this Requeſt, we have informed them of our Reſolution to afford the Countenance and Support of this Government to the Undertaking at Bombay in favour of Ragoba, provided it be confined to the Objects which have been defined; and we have earneſtly recommended it to them to grant a Reinforcement of Troops if the Application ſhould be renewed.

We are,

Honourable Sirs,

Your faithful humble Servants,

Fort William,
4th February 1778.

Warren Haſtings,
Rich[d] Barwell,
P. Francis,
Edw[d] Wheler.

APPENDIX, N° 31.

Copy of a Letter from the Governor General and Council in Bengal, to the Court of Directors, dated the 16th February 1778.

Honourable Sirs,

et Depart-t.

1. IN Addition to our Advices from this Department, dated the 4th inſtant, by the Kingſton, we have only to tranſmit Duplicates of the Letters from Bombay, therein referred to, with our Proceedings on the Subject, and Copies of ſubſequent Advices, which we have received from that Preſidency, and from Mr. Moſtyn ſince his Return to Poona. Theſe do not contain any Account of the further Progreſs of the Negociations begun with Mr. Lewis, and we are very defective in many eſſential Points of Information, but we can collect from them that the Government of Poona was in great Confuſion. Mr. Lewis refers to a Letter which he wrote to the Preſident at Bombay, on the 12th December, for the Purport of a Converſation which had paſſed between Moraba Furneſe and him, previous to the Receipt of the Orders of the 12th December; this we conclude is of ſome Importance, as it muſt either have confirmed or diſapproved the Authority of the firſt Overtures made for the Company's Aſſiſtance; but by ſome Accident we are not furniſhed with a Copy of it. A

Day

day had been fixed by Moraba for another Interview, but in the mean Time he ſuddenly retired om Poona, to avoid a Scheme which had been laid by Nana for ſeizing him, and it appears that he turned as ſuddenly: We are unacquainted with the Cauſe, though Mr. Lewis mentions a Conjecture, that it was at the Invitation of Siccaram Baboo, who had it in View to engage Nana if poſſible in the Aſſociation for introducing Ragoba.

2. On the 14th December, News was received at Poona of the Death of Ram Rajah, the Sovereign of the Maratta State, which was likely to encreaſe the Confuſion among the Miniſters, by the different Intereſts which would be formed in the Nomination of a Succeſſor. And Nana was further diſconcerted, by a Report which arrived ſoon after of the Defeat of the Maratta Army under Purry Punt, in an Engagement with Hyder Ally: He immediately went to Poona in conſequence of it, where he had a long Conference with Siccaram Baboo.

3. This is the Subſtance of the Intelligence we have been able to collect from Mr. Moſtyn's Letters; and he accounts for the Imperfection of it, by informing us that Guards had been placed by Nana's Orders upon the Engliſh Reſidency, which notwithſtanding his Remonſtrance to the Durbar, had not at the Date of his Letter been withdrawn.

We are,
Honourable Sirs,
Your moſt faithful
humble Servants,
Warren Haſtings,
Richard Barwell,
P. Francis,
Edwd Wheler.

Fort William,
16th February 1778.

APPENDIX, N° 32.

Bombay Secret Conſultations, the 6th January 1778.

EARLY this Morning Mr. Moſtyn ſet off for Poona.

PRESENT,
The Honourable William Hornby, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor,
The W. John Carnac, Eſquire, Daniel Draper,
Nath. Stackhouſe, Willm Aſhburner,
Andrew Ramſay.

Read, and approved, our laſt Conſultation of the 2d Inſtant.

The Preſident lays before us Two Letters from Mr. Lewis, One from Mr. Moſtyn, and One from Moraba Furneeſe, all entered hereafter.

It is reſolved, That nothing further can be done in the Buſineſs, unleſs Succaram Bappoo joins in making Application to us for the Aſſiſtance of the Company to reinſtate Ragoba; as we cannot think of acting in any Manner contrary to the late Treaty, unleſs by expreſs Deſire of the principal Perſon with whom it was concluded.

Wm Hornby,
W^m Aſhburner,
D. Draper,
N. Stackhouſe.

Adjourned.
Edwd. Ravenſcroft, Sec^ry.

The Gentleman has at laſt begun to open himſelf, by a Meſſage late this Evening, and I will run all Riſques of having a Meeting with him To-morrow or next Day: He wants to know how many Troops we will ſupply, and if we will ſupply warlike Stores.

Dated 6th January
1778.

I am this Moment come from Moraba. He began the Diſcourſe by telling me, that he was ready to join us for the Purpoſe your Honour knew of: But, ſays he, if we once enter into it, let us go through heartily, and let there be no Excuſe on the Part of the Governor and Council afterwards,

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wards, that they have received Orders to make Peace, as they did before. I told him, that I thought the moſt likely Method to avoid ſuch Orders, would be for the Four Gentlemen formerly mentioned, to ſend ſuch a Letter as was promiſed me. To this however he objected, ſaying, that he would not make uſe of any other Perſon's Name than his own; and that he could himſelf bring Twenty thouſand Men into the Field, if your Honour and the Board thought proper to go upon the Buſineſs in his Name. He further added, that if the Council would declare their Reſolution to act conformable to what he now ſaid, he would open himſelf entirely to me, and tell me how many more Troops he could bring, and on whom he could depend for Aſſiſtance: But, ſays he, it will be improper to explain myſelf further, until I know their Anſwer; for the Buſineſs muſt be managed in my Name only. He alſo ſaid, that if the Engliſh and he once undertook the Affair in a proper Manner, he would anſwer to ſettle the Government in Three Months Time. Before I left this Gentleman, he made me promiſe, that I would write your Honour the above before I went to ſleep, and to requeſt that an Anſwer might be ſent in Five Days from this Date, if poſſible.

Dated the 9th January 1778.

Honourable Sir,

I addreſſed you the 7th at Night from Compolee, encloſing Two Letters I met on the Road from Mr. Lewis; I make no Doubt of their having reached you. As there was nothing in their Contents to prevent my proceeding, I ſet out the next Morning, and arrived here Yeſterday about 10 o'Clock. Nothing occurred on the Road, nor did the Government take the leaſt Notice of me, not even by a complimentary Meſſage, though they were publicly adviſed of my coming into Town that Morning by Mr. Lewis. Immediately on my Arrival I gave the neceſſary Notice both to Nanah, Mado Row, and Byrow Punt, and requeſted of the former that I might be favoured with an Audience as ſoon as poſſible, not only to acquaint them with the Iſſue of the Buſineſs they had entruſted me with, but alſo the Buſineſs I was charged with from your Honour, &c. He replied, that that Day was their Sancrant, and that To-day was an unlucky one; he therefore could not ſee me, but To-morrow would *conſider* of it. I know no Remedy but Patience, but will uſe every Endeavour to procure one as ſoon as I can; until when I ſhall defer addreſſing the Board, and alſo forwarding the public Packet for the Governor General and Council; not only that I may inform them with the Determination of the Durbar, but it may be altogether unneceſſary from the Letter you will receive from Mr. Lewis, and a Letter I now forward you from Moraba. This Letter I procured early this Morning, and will I hope convince you of his Sincerity, and alſo confirm what Mr. Lewis has wrote you. I wiſh to God you may be able to undertake the Buſineſs; ſuch another Opportunity may never again offer. Sacram I firmly believe is concerned, and will aſſiſt privately all he can, but I am afraid will not yet be brought to give it under his Hand. Moraba's Deſire, that the Buſineſs may be done in his Name, is I judge to prevent Büchaba laying a prior Claim to the Duanſhip, who is appointed by the Rajah, has never yet himſelf been the acting Man, and indeed is unequal to the Charge in theſe troubleſome Times.

Yeſterday being a Holiday, I could get little or no Intelligence; and indeed the ſtrict Watch that is kept over every one belonging to us will make it very tedious, as it can only be done by Night. You may depend on my being as expeditious as poſſible.

Permit me to entreat an early Anſwer to Moraba's Letter, and that it will be ſuch as not to diſappoint all his Hopes of concluding Matters through us.

I remain, with real Eſteem,

Poona,
11th January 1778.

Honourable Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
Tho' Moſtyn.

Bombay Secret Conſultations, the 19th January 1778.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

I have the Pleaſure of informing you that I arrived here the 10th, in the Morning, without meeting any Obſtruction, though not the leaſt Compliment was paid me on the Part of the Durbar, notwithſtanding they had been publicly adviſed by Mr. Lewis of my Intentions to enter the Town that Morning; immediately on my Arrival I gave the proper Notice to the Durbar, and requeſted an Audience as ſoon as poſſible. Nannah ſent me Word that that Day being a Holiday, and the next an unlucky Day, he could not conſider of it before the 12th. After repeated Meſſages I at laſt obtained an Audience on the 13th, at which were preſent Nannah Furneze, Mada Row, Jada Row, Byroo Punt, and Heſſorow, the Son of Mada Row, when I delivered the Letter from the Honourable the Preſident to the Peſhwa, ſent ſome Time ſince to Mr. Lewis, but which Nannah had declined receiving from that Gentleman, unleſs conveyed to him through the Hands of Mada Row, Jada Row, and Byroo Punt. I at the ſame Time agreeable to your Inſtructions remonſtrated in the ſtrongeſt Terms on the Diſreſpect ſhewn to the Company by the Reſtrictions laid upon their Repreſentative, and demanded a poſitive and ſpeedy Anſwer to every Point of the Letter. To which Nannah replied, That the Durbar

vould give ſuch an Anſwer as was uſual with them; when I obſerved to him that none but a plain ind direct Anſwer would be received: I then told the Durbar that no Anſwer had been ſent to a ormer Letter from the Honourable the Preſident; on which they obſerved, it required no Anſwer, hat Letter being only a Reply to ſome Letters the Peſhwa had written him; but on my reminding hem that it contained a Demand for a Duſtuck for the Two Gentlemen who came to us from the French, they pretended to recollect it; and ſaid they would likewiſe give their Anſwer thereto in Writng. I then acquainted them with the Iſſue of my Commiſſion to Ragoba, to which I received no Reply.

After I had taken my Leave of the Durbar, knowing Byroo Punt has great Influence with Nanah, I repeated to him the abſolute Neceſſity of a ſpeedy Anſwer to the above Letter, which he proniſed ſhould be ſent me in Two Days; however from the Knowledge I have of the Dilatorineſs of this Government, not chuſing to place entire Confidence in this Promiſe, I wrote under the 14th o Mhado Row, Jada Row that I hoped he would procure it me as ſoon as poſſible; and ſent a Meſſage of the ſame Kind to By'oo Punt. They replied that they had ſpoken to Nannah on the Buineſs after I had left him, who ſaid it was neceſſary he ſhould firſt conſult with Sacram Bappoo; in conſequence of which the enclоſed Correſpondence enſued; from which your Honour, &c. will plainly perceive Nannah is uſing every Artifice to evade giving an Anſwer; I ſhall therefore write to the Peſhwa, in Hopes of procuring ſome Reply; and in the mean Time beg Leave to obſerve that the Chowkeys are ſtill continued. I ſhould have done myſelf the Honour of addreſſing you before, but was induced from Promiſes made me by the Durbar to wait a few Days in Hopes of being able to ranſmit you their Anſwer to the Honourable the Preſident's Letter.

On the Evening of my Arrival, I endeavoured to bring Moraba to an Explanation, in conſequence of which he ſent me a Letter for the Honourable the Preſident, which was forwarded the 11th; and notwithſtanding I have ſince frequently urged him, he declines being more explicit until an Anſwer thereto.

The following, according to the beſt Information I have been able to procure, is the State of the different Armies: Moodajee Bounello is ſtill at Lackanwaddy Gaut, about 30 Coſs to the Eaſtward of Auringabad; Holkar continues at his own Village of Banbjam, and by his refuſing to ſee Nannah, or any one he may ſend, appears to be determined on not coming to any Terms with him; Madjee Scindy is endeavouring to raiſe Contributions on Janojee Patancar's Jaghire, near Rimutpore, has had a Skirmiſh with him, in which Janojee was killed; this Action it is ſaid has cauſed great Diſcontent amongſt all the Maratta Officers in Scindy's Camp.

Hurry Punt has again been defeated by Hyder, and has retreated to Panchmal, on the Northern Bank of the Kiſtna, in Hopes of receiving ſome Aſſiſtance from Downſa, who is encamped at Narrain Pent, about Twelve Coſs from Hurry Punt. Hyder's Army has croſſed to the Northward of the Tongebodras in Purſuit of him. The Durbar are uſing every Endeavour to perſuade the Nizam (who, on account of a Wedding in his Family, has not yet left Hyderabad, as was reported) to join them againſt Hyder, but which he refuſed doing till they comply with the Promiſes made him when he joined them againſt Ragoba, which are, their delivering him the Forts of Aſhur and Amadanagur. I have Reaſon to believe this Intelligence can be depended on, having received it from ſeveral Hands.

On my entering the Town, obſerving ſeveral Parties of Horſe encamped about it, I ſent People to make Enquiry of the Numbers; from whoſe Reports I find there are from 8 to 10,000, belonging to different Officers.

Monſieur de Corcelle, the French Gentleman who took our Protection, having received Aſſurances from People in whom he could confide, that he had nothing to fear, on the 14th at Night delivered me a Letter, Tranſlate of which is incloſed, and immediately left the Factory.

I am, with Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
Thomas Moſtyn.

Poona,
16th January 1778.

APPENDIX, N° 33.

Bombay Secret Conſultations, the 19th January 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable William Hornby, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor,
The W. John Carnac, Eſquire, Daniel Draper,
Nath. Stackhouſe, Willm Aſhburner,
Andrew Ramſay.

READ, and approved, our laſt Conſultation of the 14th Inſtant.

The Preſident informs us, that he has received a Meſſage from Ragoba, acquainting him that Advice has been ſent him from Poona, that an Agreement has actually been concluded in Writing for giving Row Dund or Choul to the French, but that the Sunnuds have not yet been iſſued.

It being of the utmoſt Importance to aſcertain the Truth of this Intelligence, Mr. Moſtyn muſt be directed to ſpare neither Pains nor Expence for that Purpoſe; and to ſend immediate Advice of the Reſult of his Enquiries to us, and the Governor General and Council.

From the uniform Conduct of the Poona Government for a long Time paſt, and from the repeated Intelligence we have received, it is paſt a Doubt that ſome Agreement has been concluded between them and the French, of which indeed the Governor General and Council appear to be convinced, by their Letter of the 20th October.——We think it very probable that the Intelligence ſent by Ragoba may be true; and more particularly from the Circumſtance of a French Gentleman having been landed at Choul the 30th ultimo, from a Veſſel directly from Pondicherry, who may have had ſome Commiſſion from Mr. Belcombe the Governor, which may have occaſioned the Ceſſion of that Place. The Conſequences are of ſuch a ruinous Nature to the Intereſt of the Company, that it is reſolved to ſend inſtant Advice of the Intelligence we have received to the Governor General and Council; and to aſk them expreſsly, and demand an explicit Anſwer, whether in caſe a Body of French ſhould arrive and take Poſſeſſion of Choul, or we ſhould receive certain Advice of ſuch a Meaſure being intended, we are to ſuffer them to proceed without Interruption, or to uſe our Efforts to prevent ſuch a Settlement from taking place?

It is our fixed and deliberate Opinion, which we think it neceſſary to record for our own Juſtification, and to make the ſame known to the Governor General and Council, that nothing but a Change in the preſent Adminiſtration at Poona can ſecure the Company from the Dangers and bad Conſequences of an Alliance between the French and the Marattas, and that there is no other Method to avert the impending Evils but by the Company's immediately taking a deciſive Part.

Read the Letter received this Morning from Mr. Moſtyn.

We think Monſieur de Corcelle quitting our Protection, appears a very extraordinary Circumſtance, after what has paſſed; but we hope during his Reſidence with Mr. Lewis, he has not made himſelf Maſter of any Intelligence of Conſequence; Mr. Moſtyn muſt ſend hither and to Bengal a Copy of his original Letter.

Mr. Moſtyn muſt be directed to ſend Advice of every material Circumſtance to Bengal, at the ſame Time he does to us, and particularly reſpecting the French, whereby much Time will be ſaved.

Adjourned.

Edwd Ravenſcroft, Secretary.

Wm Hornby,
John Carnac,
D. Draper,
N. Stackhouſe,
Wm Aſhburner,
Andrew Ramſay.

APPENDIX, N° 34.

Bombay Secret Conſultations, the 20th January 1778.

SIGNED the following Letters to Mr. Moſtyn, and the Governor General and Council:

Sir,

Since we wrote you the 14th Inſtant, we have received your Letter, dated the 16th.

Monſieur Corcelle's quitting our Protection, appears an extraordinary Circumſtance after what has paſt; but we hope, during the Time he lived amongſt the Engliſh, ſo much Caution was uſed, that he did not make himſelf Maſter of any Intelligence of Conſequence; we however direct that you tranſmit to us and to the Governor General and Council a Copy of his original Letter.

We have been informed by a Meſſage from Ragoba, that the Durbar has actually agreed, by a written Inſtrument, to put the French in Poſſeſſion of Choul, but that the Sunnud is not yet iſſued; and as it is of the utmoſt Importance to aſcertain the Truth of this Circumſtance, we direct, that you ſpare neither Pains nor Expence for this Purpoſe; and ſend inſtant Advice of the Reſult of your Enquiries, both to us and the Gentlemen at Bengal, to whom you will punctually tranſmit every Intelligence of Importance, particularly reſpecting the French, at the ſame Time you write to us; whereby much Time will be ſaved.

We learn that a French Gentleman from Pondicherry landed at Choul the 30th ultimo, and proceeded to Poona, which makes us the more apprehenſive of the Truth of Ragoba's Information; you will therefore make all poſſible Enquiries reſpecting this Perſon and his Errand at Poona.

We are

Bombay Caſtle,
20th January 1778.

Your loving Friends,
William Hornby, &c.

Gentlemen,

Encloſed is Duplicate of our laſt Letter, dated the 3d Inſtant.

By the Intelligence we have ſince received from Poona, contained in the encloſed Papers, it appears that Moraba, moſt probably from Views of Ambition, inſiſts on the Buſineſs being carried on in his Name only; upon which we immediately reſolved, that nothing further could be done, unleſs Saccaram Bappoo, the Principal in the late Treaty, joined in making a formal Application to us; and we in conſequence ſent the neceſſary Orders to the Reſident at the Durbar, as per Copy ſubjoined to the Letters from Poona.

We have ſent Orders for the Recall of all the European Infantry from the Garriſons of Surat and Tannah; but from the Diſtance of Broach, and the Importance of that Province, we judged it would be imprudent to weaken that Garriſon, and therefore continued it exactly upon the former Footing. We have alſo thought it improper to remove the Detachment of Artillery either from Surat or Tannah; the latter indeed is ſo contiguous, that we can always command its Service at an Hour's Warning.

We now have it in Contemplation to throw our whole Body of Infantry into One Battalion inſtead of Two, as the Companies are nearly reduced to a Third of their Complement.

On the 30th ultimo a French Gentleman landed at Choul, from a Snow commanded by a King's Officer, which had come direct from Pondicherry, and proceeded to Poona. On the 18th inſtant Ragoba ſent a Meſſage, acquainting us he had received Advice from Poona, that it had been agreed by a written Inſtrument, to give Choul or Row Dundah to the French, and that the Sunnud would be hereafter iſſued.

Combining the above Circumſtances with Ragoba's Intelligence, we are very apprehenſive that the French will ſoon be in Poſſeſſion of Choul; and that the French Gentleman had ſome Commiſſion from Monſieur Belcombe to the Durbar, which may have occaſioned the Ceſſion of that Place. We have however directed Mr. Moſtyn to ſpare neither Pains nor Expence to arrive at the Truth on theſe Points, and to adviſe you inſtantly of the Reſult of his Enquiry.

It is alſo extraordinary, that Monſieur de Corcelle, whom you were before adviſed had quitted Monſieur St. Lubin, and taken our Protection, withdrew himſelf abruptly from our Factory, and returned to Monſieur de St. Lubin. He delivered a Letter on his Departure, a Tranſlation of which, as ſent us by the Reſident, is now encloſed, and we have directed him to forward you a Copy of the Original.

After the Evidence already tranſmitted to you, it will be needleſs to inſiſt further on the Certainty of ſome Agreement being actually concluded between the French and the Poona Government, of which indeed you ſeem fully convinced by your Letter of the 20th October. Neither are any Arguments neceſſary to prove the certain Injury, if not total Ruin which muſt enſue to the Company's Intereſts on this Coaſt, if the French are once eſtabliſhed in a Port within 12 Miles from the Mouth of our Harbour. Our Duty to the Company, therefore, prompts us to aſk you, and earneſtly to requeſt an immediate Reply, whether in caſe a Body of French ſhould arrive to take Poſſeſſion of Choul,

and we ſhould receive certain Advice of ſuch a Meaſure being intended, we are to ſuffer them to proceed without Interruption, or to uſe our Efforts to prevent ſuch a Settlement from taking place?

It is our fixed and deliberate Opinion, and which we think it neceſſary to make known to you for our own Juſtification, in caſe what we apprehend ſhould happen, that nothing but a Change in the preſent Adminiſtration at Poona can ſecure the Company from the Dangers and bad Conſequences of an Alliance between the French and the Marattas; and that there is no other Method to avert the impending Evils, but by the Company's immediately taking a deciſive Part.

Mr. Moſtyn arrived at Poona the 10th, and enclоſed is Copy of the only Letter we have received from him, giving an Account of his Reception and firſt Audience. He has been directed punctually to communicate to you every Intelligence of Importance, and particularly reſpecting the Proceedings of the French.

We are, with Reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
Wm Hornby, &c.

Bombay Caſtle,
20th January 1778.

APPENDIX, N° 35 and 37.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, 23d February 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell, Philip Francis, Edward Wheler, } Eſquires.

THE Governor General having ſent the following Propoſition to the Secretary on Saturday Afternoon, with Directions to circulate it to the other Members of the Board, it was immediately ſent round.

The Governor General propoſes that the following Draft of a Letter be immediately written to the Preſident and Council at Bombay, in Reply to their Advices now before the Board, by the Ravenſworth, the Commander of which Ship he underſtands will leave Town this Evening. He at the ſame Time ſubmits to the Conſideration of the Board and for their Determination, the Propoſitions included in the Letter.

Gentlemen,

We have now to acknowledge the Receipt of Two Letters from you, dated the 3d and 20th ultimo, and Two from Mr. Moſtyn under Date the 19th and 24th ultimo.

We refer you to our Letter of the 2d Inſtant, a Triplicate of which you will receive by this Ship, for our Reſolutions paſſed on the Receipt of your Advices of the 12th December.

For the Purpoſe of granting you the moſt effectual Support in our Power, we have reſolved to aſſemble a ſtrong Military Force near Calpee, the Commanding Officer of which is to be ordered to march by the moſt practicable Route to Bombay, or to ſuch other Place as future Occurrences and your Directions to him may render it expedient.

Although the Event of the Overtures which have been made to you yet remains doubtful, we cannot help being exceedingly alarmed at the Steps which are taking by the French to obtain a Settlement on the Malabar Coaſt ſo near to Bombay, and to eſtabliſh a political Influence in the Maratta State, the immediate Object of which muſt be the Overthrow of your Settlement, and the future Conſequences dangerous to the Company's Poſſeſſions in the other Parts of India. We are therefore of Opinion that no Time ought to be loſt in forming and carrying into Execution ſuch Meaſures as may moſt effectually tend to fruſtrate ſuch dangerous Deſigns; eſpecially as the Seaſon is ſo far advanced that the Rains might ſet in before we could furniſh you with any Military Aſſiſtance, if we waited for definitive Advices from you. We propoſe therefore to give immediate Orders for collecting the Force abovementioned. We ſhall direct it to march as ſoon as the Stores ſhall be provided, and the other neceſſary Preparations compleated, unleſs from any immediate Advices received from you we ſhall judge the Proſecution of this Deſign unneceſſary.

We ſhall uſe every Precaution which can depend on our Care and Influence, for enſuring a ſafe and unmoleſted Paſſage to the Detachment, and obtaining regular Supplies of Proviſions on its March; and we earneſtly recommend to you to aſſiſt us in theſe Objects; for this Purpoſe we ſhall direct

direct the commanding Officer to adviſe you continually of his Progreſs and Wants, and ſhall place him under your Command from the Day on which he ſhall move with the Forces under his Charge.

We are, &c.

Fort William,
23d February 1778.

P. S. Vide the Governor General's Motion hereafter entered.

Read the following Opinion delivered by Mr. Wheler.

I object to the Governor General's Letter, intended to be written to the Preſident and Council of Bombay; becauſe, ſuppoſing the Board had already reſolved to grant that Preſident and Council a Military Force equal to the effectual Support of one Part of the Maratta State againſt the other, which I do not think adviſable, the Route which the Troops appointed for that Service are to take is neither fixed nor aſcertained, but left to the future Determination of the Governor and Council at Bombay, or to the Pleaſure of the commanding Officer; and more particularly becauſe it is not, previous to the March of the Troops, in any Degree aſcertained, that the reigning Powers through whoſe Dominions it ſhall ultimately be judged expedient for them to paſs, are either in Union or Alliance with the India Company, or that they are diſpoſed to give ſuch Aid and Aſſiſtance to the Support of the Detachment, as the commanding Officer may from Time to Time require; without which Aſſiſtance and Security I am apprehenſive we ſhall expoſe the Detachment to imminent Riſque.

Upon the whole I am of Opinion, that the Plan now propoſed for marching a ſmall Detachment of Troops into a diſtant and remote Country, without firſt ſecuring the Friendſhip and Alliance of the governing Powers, is contrary to all Syſtem, and will prove deſtructive in Practice.

To involve the Company in a Diſpute with the French upon the Subject of Negociations which are ſaid to have been carried on for the Purpoſe of obtaining a Settlement on the Malabar Coaſt, and likewiſe for the Purpoſe of eſtabliſhing a political Intereſt in the Maratta State, require a more minute Attention than the Time allotted will admit; nevertheleſs, that Part of the Governor's Letter which acquaints the Governor and Council of Bombay that "no Time ought to be loſt in forming and "carrying into Execution ſuch Meaſures as may moſt effectually tend to fruſtrate ſuch dangerous "Deſigns," is in my Opinion extremely objectionable; becauſe a Paragraph ſo looſely worded may involve not only the India Company, but likewiſe the Engliſh Nation, in a War with France; and becauſe I do not think we ſhould be juſtified in commencing Hoſtilities againſt the French for the avowed Purpoſe of depriving them of commercial Advantages ſaid to be acquired by Treaty. If therefore the French have already obtained, or are likely to obtain Advantages from their Negociations with the Maratta States, we ſhould endeavour to counteract thoſe Advantages by Negociation, and not by Force; but above all, we ought to be particularly careful at this Time to render our Inſtructions to the Governor and Council of Bombay ſo plain, diſtinct, and obvious, as not to afford them the ſmall Plea or Pretence to become the Aggreſſors, by commencing Hoſtilities againſt the French; and as Mr. Moſtyn has given it as his Opinion that no Agreement has yet been made between the Marattas and the French, I am induced to believe that it will require no great Ingenuity or Addreſs to counteract their Intentions.

22d February 1778. (Signed) Edwd Wheler.

Governor General—I muſt beg Leave in this Place to reply in a very few Words to Mr. Wheler's Minute, which I think is grounded on a Miſconſtruction of my Motion: I have not formally propoſed the Route which is to be taken, becauſe the Formation of the Detachment, if it is to go, is the Object that requires an immediate Determination; but I do not propoſe that it ſhould be left either to the commanding Officer or the Preſident and Council of Bombay: I have already determined the Route in my own Mind; theſe I will mention verbally to the Board; I hope it is not neceſſary yet to put them on Record. I have had Opportunities of ſtudying the Intereſts and Diſpoſitions of the different Powers of Hindoſtan and the Decan, although we have had little Intercourſe with them; and from the Knowledge which I have obtained, I believe the March from Calpee, at leaſt as far as Burrampore, to be practicable and eaſy, and to lead through the Country of our Friends: Beyond that I cannot anſwer; but the Diſtance is ſo ſmall, that I have no Doubt of making the Remainder of our Way good, whether it ſhall lead us to Poona, to Bombay, to Surat, or to Broach, even by Force if it ſhould be neceſſary. Mr. Wheler has ſaid, that the following Paragraph in the Letter propoſed to be written to Bombay is ſo looſely worded, that it may involve not only the India Company, but the Engliſh Nation, in a War with France; viz. "No Time ought to be loſt in form-"ing and carrying into Execution ſuch Meaſures as may moſt effectually tend to fruſtrate ſuch dan-"gerous Deſigns." I ſhould deſerve to forfeit the Place I hold were I wantonly or ſtudiouſly to engage this Government in Meaſures which ſhould have ſuch a Tendency, if it could be avoided. The Words which are above quoted are not the Words in which the Plan is deſcribed which we are to undertake, but they are the Grounds or Reaſons on which the Plan is concluded. All the public Advices from Bombay and Poona, corroborated by Intelligence through other Channels, prove beyond a Doubt, that the French have already formed a cloſe and intimate Connection with the ruling Adminiſtration of the Maratta State; have obtained Poſſeſſion of a Port, not a Port of Trade,

but a Door for the Introduction of Arms and Troops into the Maratta Country, almoſt without Sight of Bombay; that they have promiſed a military Aſſiſtance to the Marattas, which whether expected from France, or from their Garriſons at the Iſle of Mauritius, may in the Courſe of a few Months be landed on the Maratta Coaſt. The French already affect to ſpeak of the Port of Choul as their own. I have informed the Board of an Expreſs, which I have every Reaſon to believe has been lately ſent by Mr. Chevalier to the Malabar Coaſt, addreſſed both to Monſieur Bellecombe and the Chevalier St. Lubin. I ſhall not be ſurprized if the next Month's Intelligence ſhould inform us that Monſieur Bellecombe, the Chief of all the French Eſtabliſhments in India, has made his perſonal Appearance at Poona. It is, and always has been my Opinion, and I believe that I have more than once expreſſed it on theſe Records, that if ever the French make any Attempts to regain their former Power and Influence in India, it will not be by a naval Armament, which I repeat is impracticable, but by the previous Poſſeſſion of a political Eſtabliſhment in the Dominions of ſome Country Power of the firſt Conſideration. There are but Two Powers whoſe Alliance would avail them, Hyder Ally and the Marattas; the former will no Doubt, upon Principles of good Policy, keep upon good Terms with them, but will never attach himſelf ſo cloſely to them as to become their Dependent. The preſent Rulers of the Maratta State are preciſely in that Situation that will make them greedily catch at the Offers of the French of their Alliance, and to make any Sacrifices to obtain it; and I lay it down as a Point incontrovertible, that if a Detachment of much leſs than 1000 Europeans, with Arms for diſciplining a Body of Native Troops in the European Manner, ſhall have once obtained a Footing in the Maratta Country as the Allies of that Government, all the Native Powers of Indoſtan united will lie at their Mercy, and even the Provinces of Bengal be expoſed to their Depredations. The French therefore have now ſeized on the only Means by which they can ever become formidable to us in India; and it is to avert the dreadful Conſequences of ſuch a Deſign that I have propoſed to ſtrengthen the Hands of the Preſident and Council of Bombay, and to enable them to counteract it. It is impoſſible to form a Plan completed for this Purpoſe, becauſe it muſt depend upon Circumſtances, and even in a great Meaſure upon the Operations of our Enemies; it muſt be left to the Preſidency of Bombay, to whom nothing is neceſſary to be afforded on our Part but a Strength adequate to the Calls which they may have to exert it: I have therefore propoſed that the Detachment which may be formed ſhall be ordered to march as ſoon as it is formed, to the Aſſiſtance of Bombay, and this I apprehend is all that is at preſent neceſſary. I do not propoſe that they ſhould act againſt the French, but be ready to oppoſe any Deſigns of the French; to oppoſe any Deſigns of the Marattas, if the Marattas ſhould prove our Enemies; or to aſſiſt the Marattas of that Part of the Maratta State with which we are in Alliance. There is nothing in this Intention that can poſſibly involve the Nation in a War with France, ſince the French are not the declared Object of the preſent Enterprize; and we have even the Authority of the Paiſhwa and Miniſters themſelves to affirm, that the French have no Connection or Concern in their Affairs, but have been received ſimply on the Footing of Hoſpitality, and that Civility which is due from one State to another.

Some Time will be required to form and equip the Detachment before it can march. It is not neceſſary to ſend any Inſtructions to the Governor and Council of Bombay reſpecting the Application to be made of this Reinforcement, until it ſhall have actually begun to move: But I ſhall have no Objection, and I think it highly proper, to enjoin them in the ſtricteſt Manner, that they do not on any Pretence become the Aggreſſors, by commencing Hoſtilities againſt the French, nor yet againſt the Marattas; but to continue to adhere, as they aſſure us they will do, to the ſtrict Letter of the Treaty ſubſiſting between the Company and the preſent Adminiſtration of the Maratta State. I never underſtood or ſuppoſed that a formal Grant by Sunnud has been made to the French of the Port of Choul, but it is notorious that the French are in Poſſeſſion of that Port; and although Mr. Moſtyn does declare, nearly in the Words made uſe of by Mr. Wheler, that a Perſon well and officially informed, had aſſured him that he did not believe there was any Agreement entered into between Monſieur St. Lubin and the Durbar; yet what he adds in the Words immediately following, prove that Mr. Moſtyn himſelf did not mean by this Expreſſion to contradict the Belief that an Agreement paſſed between Monſieur St. Lubin and Nana Furneſe; his Words are as follows: "It therefore appears to me, that the Writing alluded to by my Superiors can be no other than "the private Treaty between Monſieur St. Lubin and Nana Furneſe, of which your Honour, &c. "were informed under the 29th November." This Mode of Alluſion implies, that Mr. Moſtyn had not even a Doubt of the private Agreement which had paſſed between Nana Furneſe and Monſieur St. Lubin.

Since writing the above, I have verbally mentioned the Precautions taken for ſecuring a free and peaceable Paſſage for the Detachment whenever it ſhall march; we cannot wait for their Effects, becauſe the Seaſon will be too far advanced; but if in the Interval between the Orders which may be iſſued for forming the Detachment, and the Time propoſed for the Commencement of its Operations, either the Advices which we may receive from Bombay ſhall render their March unneceſſary, or any better Means can be ſuggeſted for obviating and fruſtrating the Deſigns of our Enemies; in either Caſe I will gladly agree to remand the Troops to their reſpective Corps; and as Mr. Wheler has ſaid, that if the French had already obtained or are likely to obtain Advantages from their Negociations with the Maratta State, we ſhould endeavour to counteract thoſe Advantages by Negociation, and has even concluded with expreſſing his Belief, that it will require no great Ingenuity of Addreſs to counteract their Intentions. I hope he will point out the Means by which a Negociation of this Kind can be conducted with Succeſs, and the Offers which may be made to induce

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the Miniſter to cancel his Engagements with his new Allies, and to accept of the Friendſhip of the Engliſh Company in their Stead: I aſk this not from any Deſire of combating an Argument, but of obtaining either, ſuch Lights as may be afforded on that Side of the Queſtion, and profiting by them for the Peace and eaſier Conduct of the Company's Affairs, on a clear Conviction that no Negociation whatſoever will avail with the Powers of this Country that is not immediately and pointedly directed to their Intereſts or their Fears.

Mr. Wheler—It is evident from the Explanation which the Governor has now given of his Letter, that no Part of my Minute was either grounded upon Error or Miſconſtruction. The Governor aſſerts, that the French are now in Poſſeſſion of a Port, not a Port of Trade, but a Door for the Introduction of Arms and Troops into the Maratta Country, almoſt within Sight of Bombay. I requeſt that the Governor will favour this Board with his Authority for that Aſſertion, and likewiſe explain what he means by "Poſſeſſion."

The Governor General—I hope Mr. Wheler does not expect that I ſhall give up my Time to the Examination of all the voluminous Papers which have been written upon this Subject. That the French are in Poſſeſſion of the Port of Choul, has been aſſerted in the Letters from Bombay and Poona; in the Intelligence tranſmitted from the Nabob of Arcot; in other Papers of Intelligence; and it has been charged to the Miniſter, as I think, in Letters written from hence. The French Ships have been for near theſe Twelve Months paſt at Choul; their Goods have been landed at Choul, and continued there when the laſt Advices were diſpatched from thence. This Uſe of the Port is preſent Poſſeſſion. The Sunnud or Grant can only give them Property.

Mr Wheler—I certainly do not mean to give the Governor any unneceſſary Trouble: I thought the Aſſertion a very extraordinary one, eſpecially as I had not met with any Grounds for it upon the Company's Records: I do not conſider the Landing of Goods, without Interruption for Twelve Months, as a Proof of Right, or Poſſeſſion of a Port.

Governor General—Whenever theſe Minutes ſhall be read in England, the Company will be poſſeſſed of much more authentic Evidence than can be given here, either in Proof that the French are in Poſſeſſion of Choul, or that they are not in Poſſeſſion; it is unneceſſary therefore for me to continue to affirm my Belief of the Fact, nor will any Contradiction invalidate it.

Read the Minute delivered by Mr. Francis on the propoſed Letter to Bombay, which was circulated on Saturday.

Mr. Francis—I diſapprove of and object to every Part of the Letter propoſed by the Governor General to be written to the Preſidency of Bombay; the Meaſure, which it ſtates as reſolved on, viz. "of aſſembling a Force at Calpee with conditional Orders to march to Bombay," has not yet been debated, or even propoſed in Council; much leſs have the Objections to which ſuch a Step is liable, and the Conſequences which may attend it, been duly conſidered: At preſent I have no Idea of any Arguments that can induce me to conſent to the March of Four Battalions of Sepoys into the Heart of Indoſtan, through an immenſe Tract of Country, in which we have no Alliance or Connection whatſoever; no Magazines, nor a ſingle Place of Strength to retreat to: I will not be anſwerable for the Conſequences of hazarding a Detachment of our Troops, which we can very ill ſpare upon an Expedition in which they will probably be cut off, and for no Purpoſe but to ſupport an offenſive War, which I do not doubt will ſoon become general.

I beg Leave to ſay, that I am not at all alarmed at the Steps ſuppoſed to be taken by the French for obtaining a Settlement on the Malabar Coaſt. If the whole Story be not fabricated by Ragoba's Party, to anſwer particular Purpoſes, I have Mr. Moſtyn's Opinion and Authority for believing that no Agreement has yet been made between the Marattas and the French, for putting the latter in Poſſeſſion of Choul: The Intelligence comes from Ragoba, and Mr. Moſtyn himſelf thinks there is no Foundation for it; but admitting it to be true, what Right have we to make uſe of Force to prevent the French from obtaining ſuch a Grant by Negociation with an independant State? Or will the Members of a fictitious, not a real, Majority of this Board, created by a caſting Voice, run the Riſque of engaging the Nation in a War with France, with no better Cauſe of Quarrel, than that they are forming an advantageous Treaty or Alliance with the Marattas? If our's had been faithfully executed by us, and Ragoba diſmiſſed from Bombay, the preſent Queſtion would never have exiſted.

The Preſident and Council of Bombay now aſk us, Whether they ſhall uſe their Efforts to prevent ſuch a Settlement taking place? The Anſwer propoſed by the Governor, tells them, that "in our "Opinion, no Time ought to be loſt in forming and carrying into Execution ſuch Meaſures, as may "moſt effectually tend to fruſtrate ſuch dangerous Deſigns;" But what thoſe Efforts and Meaſures are to be, remains to be explained. I conclude, that Military Operations againſt the French are intended, as our former Permiſſion would hardly be neceſſary to authorize any others; but the Bombay Preſidency at this Moment tell us, that their Troops are nearly reduced to a Third of their Complement; and before the intended Detachment could reach Bombay, even if they met with no Interruption in their March, the Rains would be ſet in; they muſt march in the Months in which the hot Winds prevail with the greateſt Violence in the upper Parts of India; and when they arrive, the Rains will prevent their acting.

In my Opinion, we ought to forbid the Preſidency of Bombay from engaging in any offenſive Operations whatſoever, and moſt particularly againſt the French: I ſhall reſerve what I have farther to ſay on this Subject till the Meeting of the Council.

(Signed) P. Francis.

Mr. Francis—No Member of this Council makes a freer Uſe of his Privilege of dictating Minutes at the Board, than the Governor General. I do not complain of it; on the contrary, I liſten to him at all Times with Reſpect, with Temper, and Attention. Yet, as much Time is loſt by delivering Opinions in this Manner, I muſt own I am unwilling to enter into a Diſcuſſion of all the ſuppoſed Facts, Aſſertions, and Arguments, ſtated in his laſt Minute. I fear it would be endleſs, and lead to no Concluſion. Public Advices not before the Board; general Intelligence from different Quarters; the ſuppoſed Notoriety of Facts not proved, and the Language ſuppoſed to be held by the French on Occaſions where their Intereſts are concerned, may have Weight with the Governor General; they have none with me; nor will they, I preſume, be deemed by our Superiors to be a ſolid and warrantable Foundation for the important Concluſions of Facts propoſed to be drawn from them. One Inſtance of the Uncertainty of ſuch Reports, as well as of the Facility with which they are introduced into our Debates as acknowledged Facts, appears in the Governor's repeated Aſſertion, that the French are now in Poſſeſſion of Choul; of which the only Proof afterwards produced is, that ſome of their Ships have been admitted into the Port, and that they have been ſuffered to land their Goods there. Choul is ſaid to be almoſt within Sight of Bombay; it would be very extraordinary, if the French had actually taken Poſſeſſion of that Place, and the Preſidency of Bombay had never mentioned to us a Fact from which they might have drawn Inferences ſo favourable to their preſent Deſigns. Mr. Moſtyn's Letter of the 24th January, is the lateſt from that Part of India: So far from intimating that the French were in Poſſeſſion of the Place, he denies the Exiſtence of any Agreement for that Purpoſe, and ſays "he cannot think that Nanah Furneſe will be ſo weak to do it "until the required Aſſiſtance arrives." What may happen hereafter, I know not. My preſent Opinion and Reſolution muſt be founded on Facts, and the authentic Intelligence of Facts, as they exiſt before me. I will not at preſent enter into any further Conſideration of the Governor's Minute, but endeavour to bring back the Queſtion, on which this Debate has ariſen, to its original Ground.

The Danger, ſtated in the propoſed Letter to Bombay, is ſaid to ariſe from the Steps which are taking by the French to obtain a Settlement ſo near Bombay. The Means recommended for obviating that Danger, are "that no Time ought to be loſt in forming and carrying into Execution "ſuch Meaſures as may moſt effectually tend to fruſtrate ſuch dangerous Deſigns." An Opinion given in this Form, is plainly an Inſtruction to the Bombay Council. The Objection urged againſt it is, that the Terms are not clear, direct, and ſpecific; and that in the only rational Conſtruction which can be given to them, they amount to an Authority from us to commence Hoſtilities againſt the French, to prevent their being put into Poſſeſſion of Choul. The Caſe of an Attack of the French againſt any Part of the Company's Poſſeſſions is not ſuppoſed, nor is it made the Condition of our undertaking hoſtile Meaſures againſt them. The Letter, as it ſtands, refers only to their obtaining a Settlement on the Coaſt, and the Neceſſity of our preventing it at all Events. If the Inſtruction recommended by Mr. Wheler, be now added to the Letter, "That they do not on any Pre-"tence become the Aggreſſors, by committing Hoſtilities againſt the French," I ſhall very much approve of it, becauſe I think it annihilates that Part of the Inſtructions to which I object; but then the Form of the Letter muſt be altered. I have nothing further to obſerve, but that the main Queſtion, "whether a Detachment ſhall or ſhall not be ſent, and of what Force it ſhall conſiſt," has not yet been debated or propoſed; and that, before that Queſtion is reſolved, the Conſideration of the Letter to Bombay is out of its Place.

The Governor General—When the ſevereſt Wounds are aimed at my public Character, it is hard to deny me the Privilege of Self defence; but if I have taken up more of the Time of the Board than I ought, in the Minute which I dictated at the Board this Day, I do not think that any Perſon who ſhall read the preceding Minute and attend to the Length of it, will think it ſeaſonably prefaced with a Complaint of that Nature; I will however profit by the Suggeſtion; both the preceding Minutes of Mr. Francis, both that written and that dictated by him, ſhall remain unanſwered, but by this ſhort Remark, that they combat Propoſitions which I have never made, and quote Proofs as given by me even where I declared that I meant not to produce any; repeated Arguments and Aſſertions long ſince combated and refuted, and employed the Attention of the Board on a verbal Diſputation; for the Whole that is ſaid and repeated of the Paſſage quoted from my Minute by Mr. Wheler, is really ſuch. The Propoſitions which were intended to follow the laſt Minutes of the Board in the Military Department, and which related to the Strength of the intended Detachment, and the Manner in which it ſhould be formed, have been ſent to the Military Secretary, and will be ſent in Circulation to the other Members of the Board, whoſe Opinions may be more deliberately given by the ſame Mode. It is neither my Wiſh, nor did I introduce the Practice, to ſpin out the Time of the Board in deſultory and indefinite Argumentations.

Mr. Francis—I do not know that any Wounds whatſoever have been levelled at the Governor, or that his public Character could poſſibly be in queſtion in this Debate. I ſubmit to Judgment, whether I have or have not ſtuck cloſe to the Meaſure propoſed for Deliberation. One Thing I muſt beg Leave to explain, becauſe I ſhould be ſorry to remain under the Imputation of a Failure in reſpect to the Governor General, or any Member of this Board. The Notice I took of the Length of his Minute, aroſe from ſome Words which he himſelf let fall in his Anſwer to Mr. Wheler, "That he hoped that "it was not expected he ſhould give his Time to the Examination of voluminous Papers, which have "been written on this Subject." It appeared to me that the Queſtion did not lay a Foundation for that Anſwer. I ſhall be ready to conſider the Papers when they are ſent in Circulation. That Mode

of

conducting Buſineſs is convenient in Matters of leſs Importance, and I have no Objection to it; but in a Caſe of this very great Conſequence I hope the Reſolution, whatever it may be, will be taken in Council.

The Governor General—If the Words I uſed in my Reply to Mr. Wheler could contain any Subject of Offence, I ſuppoſe Mr. Wheler was the moſt competent Judge of it, and did not require any other Perſon to reſent it on his Behalf. I meant thoſe Words only as an Excuſe for not replying to the Queſtion which he put to me, and do aſſure him that they were dictated with Temper, and with that Reſpect to his Character from which I never yet departed in any Debate.

Since Mr. Francis objects to the Mode which I propoſed for collecting the Sentiments of the Members of the Board, on the Propoſitions which I mentioned that I had ſent to the Secretary in the Military Department, although it was in Deference only to the Objections which had been juſt urged by himſelf againſt Minutes dictated at the Board, that I propoſed to collect the Opinions of the Members in Circulation; I now bring them before the Board, deſiring only that they may be demanded, with the Debates and Opinions given upon them, to the Military Department.

Mr. Francis—I conſider myſelf as a Party to every Queſtion propoſed for the general Information of the Board, let it come from whom it will, and of courſe intereſted in the Anſwer to it. My Remark was made on my own Account. I did not preſume to ſpeak for any other Member of the Board.

Mr. Barwell—The Length of this Debate has to me been quite unexpected; and I have declined taking a Part in it, becauſe it is no more than a Repetition of what has already paſſed upon the Subject of the general Intereſts of the Company, in influencing the Durbar of Poona. The Votes and Reſolutions on the 2d Inſtant are, or are not, to be ſupported. They ſtand at preſent binding on the Council; and any Attempt to prevent their Operation or defend them, is ſimply ſubjecting the Company to the ill Conſequences of Miſcarriage in a Point extremely intereſting to their Affairs; and from the Reſponſibility of which Miſcarriage I hold myſelf exempted, ſhould it in Fact, as I apprehend it will, ariſe from the Difficulties thrown in the Way of the executive Power. Whatever Meaſures in Prudence and Policy are propoſed upon the Votes that are already paſſed, ought not neceſſarily to involve the Propriety or Impropriety of theſe Votes. That Queſtion is diſmiſſed totally, and the new one becomes of a very different Nature, whether you will baffle the Powers of the Government, or give way to them. I agree to the latter.

Mr. Francis—I underſtand it to be conformable to the Sentiments of the Board, that the Preſident and Council of Bombay ſhould be reſtrained from commencing Hoſtilities againſt the French. I therefore propoſe, that the following Paragraph may be added to the Letter now reſolved on:

"We enjoin you in the ſtricteſt Manner, that you do not, on any Pretence, become the Aggreſſors, "by commencing Hoſtilities againſt the French nor againſt the Marattas; but that you continue "to adhere to the ſtrict Letter of the Treaty ſubſiſting between the Company and the preſent Adminiſtration of the Maratta State."

Governor General—As the preceding Motion is taken from the Words of my own Minute, I wiſh that it may be entered complete, with the Addition of the following Words, after the Word adhere, "as you aſſure us you will do." As the Letter is concluded and partly ſigned, the propoſed Addition can only be made in a Poſtſcript; but I think it will appear too abrupt in the above Form; and would therefore propoſe the following Introduction and Amendment.

"As we have no Property or Pretenſions to Property in the Port of Choul, we cannot authorize "you to uſe any overt Meaſures for preventing the French from forming an Eſtabliſhment at that "Place, however dangerous their Neighbourhood may be to your Preſidency. This muſt be ef"fected by other Means; that is, by an Appeal to that Power which alone can give them the "Right of Poſſeſſion. We think it neceſſary alſo to add the following Injunction; that you do "not, on any Pretence, become the Aggreſſors, by commencing Hoſtilities againſt the French "directly, nor againſt the Maratta State; but that you continue to adhere, as you aſſure us you "will do, to the ſtrict Letter of the Treaty ſubſiſting between the Company and the preſent Admi"niſtration of the Maratta State."

Mr. Francis—I acquieſce.

Agreed, That the Poſtſcript propoſed by the Governor General be accordingly added to the Letter to Bombay.

N° 37.

The Governor General lays before the Board for their Conſideration, the following Reply from Brigadier General Stibbert, to the Queſtions propoſed to him the 2d Inſtant, with his Minute upon it, containing Five Propoſitions, which he had ſent to the Military Secretary, intending that they ſhould be circulated by him.

Honourable

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

In Compliance with your Deſire, I now beg Leave to offer you my Sentiments, "upon the Pro-
"priety of augmenting the Sepoy Eſtabliſhment, by new Levies of Thirty Private to each Com-
"pany, and making the Strength of each Battalion One thouſand Men complete.

"Alſo upon the Means of ſupplying the Preſidency of Bombay with a Military Force, and the
"Number which may be ſpared from this Eſtabliſhment."

With reſpect to the Firſt, it is my Opinion, that augmenting the Sepoy Battalions to One thouſand ſtrong, would be improper, and at the ſame Time not anſwer the Ends propoſed from it; for the following Reaſons:

1ſt. By being encreaſed to the above Number, they would be too unwieldy a Body to manœuvre and move together without Confuſion in the Field, and with that Celerity and Compactneſs which is requiſite, and which ought to be particularly attended to in the Formation of all Bodies of Troops, but more eſpecially in the Sepoy Corps, amongſt whom, in Time of Action, it is well known to every Officer who has ſerved with them, that it is with the utmoſt Difficulty Regularity can be preſerved, even in the beſt-diſciplined Battalions.

2d. By increaſing the Battalions to the Number propoſed, would make them larger Bodies than are required for the different Services for which they are generally detached and ſent out upon, particularly in the Company's Provinces. This could only be remedied by breaking the Battalions, which would introduce great Confuſion into the Service, and be attended with many Diſadvantages, but above all be greatly prejudicial to their Diſcipline, and take off from that Reſponſibility which every Captain has for the Regularity and good Order of his Corps.

3d. There, where a larger Number of Men are required than the preſent Strength of the Battalions, or with the ſmall Augmentation that I ſhall propoſe, it will ſeldom happen that a Thouſand Men will be ſufficient for the Service; for in ſuch Caſes generally Two Battalions, and ſometimes Three, are neceſſary to be detached, to prevent every Poſſibility (as far as Prudence and human Foreſight can do it) of a Failure.

4th. To ſtrengthen the foregoing Arguments, give me Leave to obſerve, that the Honourable the Court of Directors, from their Directions reſpecting the European Regiments, ſeem to have adopted the ſame Opinion, that a Thouſand Men are too large a Body for one Battalion; and it is to be preſumed they did not form their Reſolutions thereupon without firſt taking the Advice of the General Officers now in England, who have ſerved in this Country.

But though I am of Opinion that the Battalions cannot with Propriety be raiſed to One thouſand ſtrong, for the Reaſons I have urged, I think they may with Utility be augmented from their preſent Eſtabliſhment of Seven hundred to Seven hundred and Eighty, Rank and File; that is, from 3 Havaldars, 3 Naicks, and 64 Private, to 4 Havaldars, 4 Naicks, and 70 Private each Company. This is the ſame as to Number, excepting a Colourman, who ranked as Havaldar, as the Companies ſtood Rank and File upon the old Eſtabliſhment; and is as large a Body as ought at any Time to be formed into One Battalion, and that can act together with Force and Advantage.

By this Augmentation an Increaſe will be made upon the whole 30 Battalions, attached to Brigades, now in the Pay of the Company, of 2,400 Men, Rank and File, equal to Three Battalions, which may be drafted as the Exigences of the Service may require, and their Numbers ſupplied by freſh Recruits, without being much felt by their reſpective Corps. My Reaſon for propoſing One additional Havaldar and Naick to each Company, is, that the Number now allowed to the Companies, as they ſtand at preſent, is not found upon many Occaſions ſufficient for the Duties of the Battalion; beſides, theſe Men, whenever Draughts are wanted, will be ready to go with them: It will be moreover enlarging the Door of Preferment, and giving additional Encouragement to Emulation, a Matter highly neceſſary to be attended to amongſt the lower Ranks, and Sepoys. No Augmentation will be required of the Officers of higher Rank, holding Warrants; a ſmall Addition of Pay given to the Jamadars, would not be improper, as what they receive at preſent is not ſufficient to ſupport them in ſuch a Manner as to keep them from aſſociating with the lower Ranks and Private Men, and of Courſe ſo as to be able to keep up that Authority which they ought to maintain in their Battalions.

For ſupplying the Preſidency of Bombay with a Military Force, I would recommend to the Board, that Four Battalions of Sepoys be immediately drafted for this Service from the Four Brigades, viz. One from each; and that theſe Battalions be formed under the Inſpection of the ſeveral commanding Officers of Brigades, by an equal Proportion of Drafts, of One Non-warrant Officer and Ten Private from each Company of the Three eſtabliſhed Brigades, which will furniſh a Body of 770 Rank and File from each Brigade, and be within Ten Men of the propoſed Number of Rank and File, for a Battalion, which may be recruited. The Subadars and Jemadars, for this new Battalion to be appointed by the Colonel of the Brigade, from ſuch Jemadars and Havaldars of the Seven Battalions as are moſt deſerving of Preferment; Attention being had to Seniority and Length of Services, as far as it can be done with Propriety. The Battalion to be formed from the temporary Brigade in the following Proportion, viz. Seven Battalions to furniſh Eight Non-warrant Officers and 80 Private each, and the Two remaining Battalions, Seven Non-warrant Officers and 70 Private each; which together will make a Body of 770 Rank and File, the ſame as to be drafted from the other Brigades. The Warrant Officers to be preferred and appointed from the Jemadars and

Havaldars of moſt Merit, in the ſame Manner as already mentioned ſhould be done from the eſtabliſhed Brigades.

To furniſh theſe Four Battalions with European commiſſioned and non-commiſſioned Officers, and alſo to give a due Proportion thereof to the temporary Brigade, which I think is highly neceſſary, I would adviſe that the Battalions, in the eſtabliſhed Brigades ſhould be reduced from their preſent Eſtabliſhment, of *Captain Commandant*, 10 *Subaltern Officers*, *One Serjeant Major*, *and* 10 ***Serjeants***, to *One Captain Commandant*, *Six Subalterns*, *and Six Serjeants*, *including the Serjeant Major*. By this Reduction of commiſſioned and non-commiſſioned Officers, 84 Subalterns and 105 Serjeants will be taken from the eſtabliſhed Brigades were they complete, which will be more than the Number wanted to give an equal Proportion of both to the temporary Brigade, and the new Battalions to be drafted for the Bombay Preſidency. The Number of Subalterns and Serjeants which I have here propoſed that the Battalions of the eſtabliſhed Brigades ſhould be reduced to, I would alſo recommend to be the fixed Eſtabliſhment in future for every Battalion (the Militia Battalions excepted) throughout the Service. This Number is calculated ſo as to have One Subaltern Officer and One Serjeant to be poſted in Time of Action, or to ſend out upon Service, with each Grenadier Company, and the ſame to each Grand Diviſion of the Battalion, compoſed of Two Companies, which, with the Captain and Native Officers, are fully ſufficient for leading on the Men, and every other Kind of Duty.

The Eſtabliſhment of European commiſſioned and non-commiſſioned Officers, fixed by the late Lord Clive for a Battalion of Sepoys, when he was Governor and Commander in Chief of this Preſidency, and when he regimented and brigaded the Troops in the Year 1765, was 1 Captain, 2 Lieutenants, 2 Enſigns, 1 Serjeant Major, and 4 Serjeants. It was afterwards in the Year 1770 ordered to be 1 Captain, 3 Lieutenants, 3 Enſigns, 1 Serjeant Major, and 4 Serjeants; and in the Year 1773 augmented to 1 Captain, 5 Lieutenants, 5 Enſigns, 1 Serjeant Major and 10 Serjeants, as it ſtands at preſent; but this latter Eſtabliſhment has been proved by Experience to add no Advantages either of Diſcipline or otherwiſe, to the Battalion. The Serjeants, more than what are ſufficient to drill the Recruits, or the Number to be poſted as I have mentioned, are entirely loſt to the Service, in being taken from the Regiments and put into the Sepoy Corps. Beſides which, it is morally impoſſible for the Regiments to ſupply the Number of Serjeants that are now wanted for the Sepoy Corps, even upon a lower Eſtabliſhment than Eleven to each Battalion, without ſelecting out all the beſt Men, and promoting a great many who are totally unfit for the Station, and who can only be rendered uſeful by being kept in the Ranks.

The Four Battalions I have propoſed to be formed by Drafts from the Four Brigades, are, with Two Field Pieces attached to each, full as great a Force as I think can well be ſpared of diſciplined Troops from this Preſidency, for the Service of the Preſidency of Bombay, keeping at the ſame Time in View the Defence and Security of the Provinces of Bengal and the Vizier's Dominions, which altogether form an Extent of Country, for the Defence of which, in caſe of a War or Troubles, but particularly of an European War, the Force we have at preſent on Foot would in my Opinion be rather inadequate, ſo as to give Protection in every Part, and repel the different Attacks that may be made at the ſame Time by the Country Powers and a foreign Enemy. Europeans either of Artillery or Infantry can on no Account be ſpared, as may be ſeen by the Returns of the Army.

The great Difficulty which has been ever found in prevailing on the Sepoys to embark on board of Ship, and the great Deſertions that have always happened when this Mode of tranſporting them has been adopted, render it neceſſary, as well as on account of their Numbers, to conſider of the moſt eligible Method of ſending the above Detachment by Land.

There are only Two Routes by which this can properly be done; one by the Way of Cuttack, and through the Decan; the other from the Weſtern Provinces by the Way of Calpee, Narva, Eugine, Brampoor, &c. The latter at Narvar falls into the great public Road from Delhy to the Decan, Surat, &c. and is much preferable to the former, both from its Practicability (as I believe) for Cannon, and on account of the Shortneſs of its Diſtance from the upper Stations of our Army. But the March of a Body of Troops with Safety and Diſpatch by this Road, or any other, can only depend upon the Friendſhip and Aſſiſtance, which they may be aſſured of receiving from the Princes and Powers poſſeſſing the Country through which they muſt paſs.

The greateſt Part of the Country lying between the Diſtrict of Bundelcund and the River Nurbudda towards the South-weſt and Eugine, is at preſent in Poſſeſſion of the Two Maratta Chiefs, Maddajee Sindiah and Tokajee Holkar, who both have very large Armies on Foot, and are eſteemed to hold a conſiderable Influence in the Maratta Government: It will therefore be neceſſary to ſecure as far as poſſible the Friendſhip and Aſſiſtance of theſe Leaders, for whatever Troops may be ordered to march through their reſpective Provinces. Tokajee is mentioned in the Papers received from Bombay, which the Board have done me the Honour to give me the Peruſal of, to be one of the Parties who are in the Intereſt of and deſirous of placing Ragonaut Row at the Head of the Maratta State, in whoſe Favour the Force in queſtion is intended to act in Conjunction with the Troops of Bombay, in which Caſe, and ſhould Maddajee Sindiah be prevailed on to join the Alliance, every Difficulty will I think be at once obviated. Tokajee has at this Time a conſiderable Force in the Neighbourhood of Gohud and Bundelcund, with the Aſſiſtance of which, and the Zemindars of the Diſtricts under his Authority, in procuring Proviſions and Neceſſaries, whatever Detachment Government may determine to ſend by the Route I have recommended, might, I ſhould imagine, proceed

with Eaſe and Safety till they could be joined by the Friends of Ragonaut Row on the other Side of the Nurbudda.

I have, &c.

Fort William, (Signed) G^r Stibbert.
16th February 1778.

Proceedings of the Governor General and Council in their Military Department.

Governor General—As the Letter juſt read from General Stibbert contains a Variety of Matters, which I ſuppoſe the Board would chuſe to conſider very maturely before they paſs any deciſive Reſolutions upon them; I recommend, that it be ſent in Circulation for the deliberate Peruſal of the Members of the Board, previous to any Reſolution which they may collectively form upon them; but there is one Subject which may require an earlier Attention to it. I hope that there will be no Neceſſity to ſend any Military Aſſiſtance to the Preſidency of Bombay; but it is very probable they will require it; but it cannot be effectual unleſs it can reach them before the periodical Rains. The Mode by which the Commander in Chief has recommended a Detachment may be raiſed for this Service, namely to draft 100 Men from each Battalion, would take up ſo much Time, that before they could be drafted and formed into their reſpective Corps, and aſſembled at the Points from which the Roads mentioned by him that lead to the other Side of India, the rainy Seaſon would approach ſo near as to render it impracticable for them to undertake the March. For which Reaſon I ſubmit the following Propoſitions to the Conſideration of the Board:

1ſt. That a Detachment be formed of Six Battalions of Sepoys from the firſt Brigade, with their Ordnance, One Company of Native Artillery with its Complement of Ordnance, to be furniſhed from the Field Train of the 1ſt Brigade at Allahabad, and Two Howitzers to be ſupplied from the ſame Station.

2d. That the Troops which are to compoſe this Detachment be directed to aſſemble at Korah, or in the Neighbourhood of Calpy.

3. That the Stores for this Detachment be furniſhed from the Magazines neareſt to the Place of Rendezvous, and that the Commanding Officer be furniſhed with unlimited Authority to indent for ſuch Stores, and in ſuch Quantities as he may deem neceſſary for the Service to be performed.

4th. That Colonel Leſlie be appointed to command this Detachment, with One Field Officer from the 1ſt Brigade, and one from the Temporary Brigade; and that Major Baillie be nominated to the Charge of the Artillery, with Two additional Subaltern Officers of that Corps to join the Company ordered upon this Service.

5th. That Colonel Leſlie be directed to make the neceſſary Preparations to conduct the Detachment by the moſt practicable Route to Bombay, or to ſuch other Place in that Neighbourhood as he ſhall be guided to by the Preſident and Council of Bombay, and that it be particularly recommended to him to provide the moſt effectual Means of inſuring a ſufficient Supply of Proviſions during the Courſe of the March.

A true Extract.
(Signed) Robt Kyd, Sec^y.

Agreed, That the Governor General's Propoſitions be circulated for Conſideration, and that the Minutes which may be delivered thereon be entered on this Day's Proceedings.

The Propoſitions delivered by the Governor General which are entered above having been circulated, they were agreed to by Mr. Barwell, and the following Minutes upon them were delivered by Mr. Wheler and Mr. Francis.

Mr. Wheler—In my Minute of Yeſterday I have given my Reaſons for diſapproving of the intended Support of one Part of the Maratta Power againſt the other. But as it is already determined in Council to aid the Meaſures of the Preſidency of Bombay, I am clearly of Opinion that the Detachment ought in every Reſpect to be adequate to the Service required; and as I muſt ſuppoſe that now propoſed by the Governor is ſo, I accede to it, and likewiſe to the 2d, 3d, 4th, and 5th following Propoſitions made by the Governor General.

24th Feb. 1778. (Signed) Edwd Wheler.

24th February 1778.

Mr. Francis—Waving for the preſent all former Objections to the general Reſolution of ſupporting the Preſidency of Bombay in an offenſive War, undertaken without our previous Approbation, I object to the March of the propoſed Detachment to the Malabar Coaſt, as I am of Opinion that ſo great a Force cannot be ſpared from our Eſtabliſhment, conſiſtently with the Defence and Safety of theſe Provinces, which ought to be the principal Object of our Attention, or with the Protection of the Dominions of our Ally the Nabob of Oude, who pays us a Subſidy for the Service of the Troops now ordered to Bombay. Their Removal muſt neceſſarily leave a conſiderable Part of his Frontier defenceleſs and open to the Marattas.

If a Reinforcement muſt be ſent to Bombay, I beg Leave to repeat my Opinion, that it may be ſpared with more Safety, and proceed with greater Expedition from Fort Saint George: As the firſt

Part

Part of this Opinion is ſupported by that of Brigadier General Stibbert, I deſire that the following Paragraph from his Letter to the Board may be recorded in this Place.

(Signed) P. Francis.

Extract of a Letter from Brigadier General Stibbert, dated 16th February.

he Four Battalions I have propoſed to be formed by Drafts from the Four Brigades, are, with "Two Field Pieces attached to each, full as great a Force as I think can well be ſpared of diſciplined "Troops from this Preſidency, for the Service of the Preſidency of Bombay, keeping at the ſame "Time in View the Defence and Security of the Province of Bengal, and the Vizier's Dominions, "which altogether form an Extent of Country, for the Defence of which, in caſe of War or Troubles, "but particularly of an European War, the Force we have at preſent on Foot would, in my Opi-"nion, be rather inadequate, ſo as to give Protection in every Part, and repel the different Attacks "that may be made at the ſame Time by the Country Powers and a foreign Enemy."

1ſt. Reſolved, That a Detachment be formed of Six Battalions of Sepoys from the Firſt Brigade, with their Ordnance, One Company of Native Artillery from the temporary Brigade with its Complement of Ordnance, to be furniſhed from the Field Train of the Firſt Brigade at Allahabad, and Two Howitzers to be ſupplied from the ſame Station:

2d. Reſolved, That the Troops which are to compoſe this Detachment, be directed to aſſemble at Cora, or in the Neighbourhood of Calpee, as ſhall be judged expedient by the commanding Officer:

3d. Reſolved, That the Stores for this Detachment be furniſhed from the Magazines neareſt to the Place of Rendezvous, and that the commanding Officer be furniſhed with unlimited Authority to indent for ſuch Stores, and in ſuch Quantities, as he may deem neceſſary for the Service to be performed:

4th. Reſolved, That Colonel Matthew Leſlie be appointed to command this Detachment, with One Field Officer from the Firſt Brigade, and One from the temporary Brigade; and that Major Baillie be nominated to the Charge and Command of the Artillery, with Two additional Subaltern Officers of that Corps, to join the Company ordered upon this Service:

5th. Reſolved, That Colonel Leſlie be directed to make the neceſſary Preparations to conduct the Detachment by the moſt practicable Route to Bombay, or to ſuch other Place in that Neighbourhood as he ſhall be guided to by the Preſident and Council of Bombay; and that it be particularly recommended to him to provide the moſt effectual Means of inſuring a ſufficient Supply of Proviſions during the Courſe of the March.

Ordered, That a Copy of theſe Reſolutions be ſent to the Secretary of the Military Board, that they may be carried into Execution under that Department:

Ordered, That a Copy of the above Reſolutions be tranſmitted immediately to the Military Department, that they may be carried into Execution.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 9th March 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler,
} Eſquires.

The Proceedings of the 5th Inſtant read, and approved.

The Secretary having received the following Propoſitions from the Governor General, with Orders to circulate them for the Concurrence of the Board, they were accordingly circulated, and received back, with the Opinions which are entered after them.

The Governor General recommends the following Propoſitions:

That Colonel Leſlie be permitted to take with him, for the Service of his Detachment, ſuch of the General Staff Officers belonging to the temporary Brigade as he ſhall think proper.

That Lieutenant Colonel Fortnom be appointed Field Engineer to attend this Expedition,

Mr. William Cator to be Pay-maſter,

Mr. Goold, Commiſſary of Muſters.

That Colonel Leſlie be empowered to nominate ſuch Perſons for the Regulation of the Depot of Proviſions, Supplies of Stores, and Proviſion of Draft and Carriage Cattle, as the Service may require.

That Colonel Leſlie be permitted to have a Quarter-maſter General and an Aſſiſtant Quarter-maſter General, alſo an Aſſiſtant Field Engineer, for this Service. The Choice of Perſons properly qualified for theſe Appointments, the Board are pleaſed to leave with Colonel Leſlie.

That the Board deem it neceſſary Colonel Leſlie ſhould be authorized to make whatever Diſburſements he ſhall think neceſſary on this Service: They do therefore direct the Pay-maſter to obey his Orders in every Particular, requiring his Signature to all Charges not allowed for in the Firſt Regulations of the Service; and for all ſuch extra Diſburſements they ſhall deem the commanding Officer reſponſible to them in their Board of Inſpection.

(Signed) W. Haſtings.

I agree.

(Signed) Rich[d] Barwell.

Mr. Francis—Having delivered my Opinion at large on the general Meaſure, it is unneceſſary for me to interfere in the Detail of Arrangements, which the Majority of the Board may deem neceſſary for carrying it into Execution.

(Signed) P. Francis.

Mr. Wheler—I ſhall not enter into the Arrangements which the Majority of the Board may deem neceſſary; it is ſufficient to ſay, that I have, and ſtill continue to object to their original Plan.

(Signed) Edw[d] Wheler.

The Governor General's Propoſitions being Reſolved in the Affirmative;

Ordered, That a Copy thereof be tranſmitted to the Military Department, that the Appointment and Arrangements thereby formed may be carried into Execution.

9th March.

The Governor General recommends, that the Reſident at the Vizier's Court be directed to reſerve the Sum of Ten Lacks of Rupees for the Pay and Expences of the Detachment formed under the Command of Colonel Leſlie; that he convert as much of this Sum as he can into Gold Mohurs for the greater Eaſe of Conveyance, and alſo Exchange; and that he wait the further Orders of the Board for tranſmitting this Treaſure to the Detachment.

Agreed to.

APPENDIX, N° 36.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 16th February 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Eſquire, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell, }
Philip Francis, } Eſquires.
Edward Wheler, }

READ a Letter from Mr. Moſtyn, as follows:

To the Honourable Warren Haſtings, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Council at Fort William.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

Mr. Lewis addreſſed you laſt under the 29th November, and I have now the Honour to inform you that I returned hither on the 10th Inſtant.

On the 14th ultimo, the Durbar received certain Advices of the Death of Ram Rajah; but they have not yet placed a new Rajah at Settara.

Mr. Lewis on the 28th ultimo, having received Intelligence, that Two or Three New Chokies had been placed as Spies on the Factory, ſent a Meſſage to Madahrow Jaddaroi, complaining thereof, and requeſted to know the Durbar's Reaſon for ſo doing; it being contrary to their Promiſes of the Engliſh being treated in the ſame Manner as heretofore. He received no other Reply, than that he was ignorant of the Matter; but would aſk Nanah Furneſe. Madahrow at the ſame Time added, that Nanah wanted all Europeans to leave Poona; and that if the Engliſh muſt have a Vackeel here he thought a Cafcoon with Four or Five People would be ſufficient for every Purpoſe. On the 29th the Chokies abovementioned having ſtopped and abuſed a poor Shop-keeper, who had only been to the

the Factory for the Payment of ſome trifling Articles which had been bought of him, for preſuming, as they ſaid, to go to the Engliſh without their Permiſſion, Mr. Lewis immediately ſent a Perſon to Madahrow, to acquaint him with this Inſtance of the Inſolence of the Chokies, who directly ſent one Sin[illegible] People with the Servant to explain the Matter to Nanah, who, inſtead of liſtening to the Prompt, aſked the Servant, by what Authority Mr. Lewis ſent People to turn away the Chokies from [illegible] Place where he, Nanah, had ordered them to ſtay? The Servant denied the Charge, and told [illegible] the Affair as it had really happened; to which Nanah replied, that he had been informed by one Madahjee Punt, a Man whom he had placed upon the Factory, That Gentleman had ſent Forty or Fifty Sepoys to diſlodge the Chokies; but upon the Servant requeſting that Nanah would ſend for the ſaid Madahjee Punt, and enquire into the Affair, when he would find he had been greatly impoſed upon, Nanah refuſed complying therewith, ſaying, he was well convinced Madahjee Punt had told him the Truth. Nanah then directed the Servant to deliver Mr. Lewis the ſame Meſſage as had been ſent the Day before by Madahrow with reſpect to the Engliſh leaving Poona, and deſired he would immediately write it to the Honourable the Preſident of Bombay.—Mr. Lewis requeſts Leave to declare in his own Vindication, that not a ſingle Sepoy was ſent, nor a Word exchanged with the Chowkies further than one of his Servants aſking them, by whoſe Orders they acted in giving ſuch Treatment to any one who came to our Factory.

In conſequence of Mr. Lewis's Repreſentations to the Preſidency, the Honourable the Preſident wrote a Letter to the Peſhwa, which this Gentleman was directed to deliver himſelf, and obtain an Anſwer; but notwithſtanding he frequently applied for an Audience for that Purpoſe, Nanah abſolutely refuſed to give him one, ſaying, that he would not receive the Letter from any one elſe than Madahrow Jadahroi and Byroo, who were appointed to tranſact the Engliſh Buſineſs with the Durbar; and that if Mr. Lewis inſiſted on delivering it himſelf, he muſt go to Proonder for that Purpoſe; he accordingly wrote a Letter to Saccaram Pundit, informing him of the above Circumſtances, and requeſting he would appoint a Day for receiving the Preſident's Letter; but Saccaram, by a Meſſage through Madahrow, referred him back to Nanah.

Immediately on my Arrival, I ſent proper Notice thereof to the Durbar, and requeſted to have an Audience as ſoon as poſſible; to which Nanah replied, that that Day being a Holiday, and the next an unlucky Day, he could not take it into Conſideration till the 12th; however, after repeated Meſſages, I at laſt obtained an Audience on the 13th, when I delivered the above-mentioned Letter, and Duplicate of one from the Honourable the Governor General, on the Subject of the Ship Aurora: After making an Apology for entering on Buſineſs at my firſt Viſit, contrary to the uſual Cuſtom, I remonſtrated in the ſtrongeſt Terms on the Diſreſpect ſhewn the Company, by the Reſtrictions laid on their Repreſentative; and demanded a ſpeedy and poſitive Anſwer to every Point in the Letter from the Governor of Bombay: To which Nanah replied, that the Durbar would give ſuch an Anſwer as was uſual with them. When I obſerved to him, that no other than a plain and direct one would be received. I then, agreeably to my Inſtructions, acquainted them with the Iſſue of the Commiſſion they had given me to Ragoba; of which your Honour, &c. have already been adviſed.

When I had taken Leave of the Durbar, I repeated to Byroo Punt, who attended me out, and has I know great Influence with Nanah, the Neceſſity of a ſpeedy Anſwer, which he promiſed ſhould be delivered in Two Days; but as from the Knowledge I have of the Dilatorineſs of this Government, I did not place any great Confidence in this Promiſe. I wrote the next Day to Madahrow and Byroo Punt, that I hoped they would uſe their joint Endeavours to procure one as ſoon as poſſible; to which they replied, That they had talked with Nanah on the Buſineſs, who ſaid it was neceſſary he ſhould firſt conſult with Saccaram Bapoo. Being now convinced that Nanah was uſing every Artifice to evade giving an Anſwer, I thought it neceſſary to addreſs a Letter to the Peſhwa, requeſting one, which I encloſed to Saccaram Bapoo, under the 16th. I beg Leave to obſerve here, Gentlemen, that notwithſtanding my Remonſtrances, the Chowkies are ſtill continued on the Factory; by which I am ſo ſtrictly watched, that it is almoſt impoſſible for me to have an Intercourſe with any one in Town.

Soon after my Arrival Moraba Furneſe ſent me a Letter for the Honourable the Preſident, which was forwarded under the 11th; in conſequence of which the Board have directed me to inform him, that they cannot take any Part in the Affairs of the Maratta Government, unleſs directly called upon by the Perſons with whom the Treaty was concluded.

By the beſt Information I can procure, I learn that Advices have within theſe few Days been received from Hurry Punt, acquainting the Durbar that Monackjee Panoria, and the reſt of the Maratta Officers mentioned in the laſt Addreſs from hence, had actually joined Hyder's Army, and together therewith, falling on Hurry Punt, had entirely defeated him, taking moſt of his heavy Cannon, and plundering his Buzar; this Officer has retreated to Pauncemahl, on the Northern Bank of the Kiſtna, in Hopes of receiving ſome Aſſiſtance from Downſa, who is encamped about Twelve Coſs from him. The Durbar have applied to the Nizam to join them againſt Hyder; but which he has refuſed, until they deliver him the Forts of Aſſur and Amadnagur, agreeable to the Promiſes made him on his joining the preſent Miniſters againſt Ragoba. I cannot take upon me to aſſure your Honour, &c. of the Truth of the above, the ſtrict Watch kept over me preventing my having that free Communication with People on whom I can depend, which I could wiſh; but from Nanah Furneſe going ſuddenly to Proonder Yeſterday, on Account it is ſaid of the Receipt of Hurry Punt's Letter, I am inclined to believe it is true. Tookajee Holkar and Madjee Scindy

have received repeated Orders from the Miniſters to join Hurry Punt, but have hitherto found Means to avoid complying therewith; the former is at one of his own Villages, about 15 Coſs from hence, and the latter ſtill continues at Rimutpore. Indeed there ſeems to be a total Diſaffection amongſt all the Maratta Officers, which is attributed to the Poverty of the Government.

Notwithſtanding the many Aſſurances given by the Durbar in general, and the Mini; ſepa rately, that Monſieur St. Lubin ſhould be diſpatched from hence on Deccra (the 12th Oct[illegible] laſt) I am ſorry to inform your Honour, &c. he is ſtill permitted to remain here, and is to all appearance in high Favour with Nanah Furneſe, but I believe with no one elſe.

The encloſed Packet to your Addreſs was delivered me by the Honourable the Preſident and Council of Bombay.

I am, &c.
(Signed) T[illegible] Moſtyn.

Poona,
the 19th January 1778.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 23d February 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Eſquire, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler,
} Eſquires.

To the Honourable Warren Haſtings, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Council at Fort William.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

I did myſelf the Honour of addreſſing you under the 19th inſtant.

Monſieur de Corcelle, the French Gentleman who had taken our Protection, as mentioned in a former Addreſs, having received Aſſurances from Cruſt Row Balol, in the Name of Nanah, that no Harm ſhould happen to him if he would leave the Protection of the Engliſh, that Gentleman on the 14th wrote me a Letter (Copy and Tranſlate of which are now encloſed) and immediately quitted the Factory; putting himſelf under the Protection of Senhor Norronho, a Portugueſe Officer in Command of the Artillery here, who has paſſed his Word to Monſieur de Corcelle, that the Government do not mean him the leaſt Injury, and with whom he actually now lives without having the leaſt Connection with Monſieur St. Lubin; nor do I ſuppoſe he will ever put it in the Power of this Gentleman to make a Second Attempt on his Life, in the infamous Manner repreſented in Monſieur de Corcelle's Letter of the 5th November laſt, which has already been forwarded to you. My Superiors apprehending from Monſieur de Corcelle's leaving us ſo ſuddenly, that his coming to us at all may have been a Scheme of Monſieur de St Lubin's to get at a Knowledge of what we were doing here, has induced me to be thus particular with reſpect to him; and I beg Leave to aſſure you, Gentlemen, that he has not received the leaſt Intelligence of Conſequence during his Reſidence in the Factory: Indeed it appears to me, that his ſole Motive for running to the Engliſh was to ſave his Life; and his Reaſon for quitting them was, as he explained the Matter, to convince his Friends in France that he remained no longer under the Engliſh Protection than was abſolutely neceſſary for that Purpoſe.

The Honourable the Preſident and Council, in a Letter dated the 20th, acquainting me they have received Information that the Durbar had actually agreed by a written Inſtrument to put the French in Poſſeſſion of Choul, but that the Sunnud had not been iſſued, I made the ſtricteſt Enquiry into the Truth thereof, and have received Aſſurances from the Perſon whoſe Province it is to draw out all Sunnuds, that no Orders have been iſſued for that Purpoſe, nor did he believe the Durbar had any Intention of the Kind, at leaſt until they ſhould be convinced that the French would afford them ample Aſſiſtance; neither did he believe there was any Agreement entered into between Monſieur St. Lubin and the Durbar, and if there was any ſuch he was totally ignorant thereof. It therefore appears to me, that the Writing alluded to by my Superiors can be no other than the private Treaty between Monſieur St. Lubin and Nanah Furneſe, of which your Honour, &c. were informed under the 29th November. I make no Doubt that Nanah, in order to carry his ambitious Views into Execution, would readily give the French the above-named Place, yet I cannot think he will be ſo weak as to do it until the required Aſſiſtance arrives.

My Superiors likewiſe mention that they had received Intelligence of a French Gentleman having landed at Choul, and proceeded to Poona. This Perſon, who proves to be a Monſieur le Roy, arrived here the 8th or 9th inſtant; but I cannot pretend to ſay what may be his real Motive for coming hither; he was diſpatched by Monſieur St. Lubin in Auguſt laſt, as was then given out by him, with Orders to Monſieur Belicombe, though I have ſince learnt that his real Errand was to raiſe Money at Pondicherry in the Name of Monſieur St. Lubin, with which he was to have purchaſed a Cargo for this Market; it appears, however, that he was diſappointed herein, for it is certain he brought no Goods with him to Poona. The Day Nanah Furneſe ſet off for Proonder, he received a Letter from the Soubadar of Choul, acquainting him with the Arrival of Two French Veſſels; and that Application

plication had been made to him for Permiſſion to land their Cargoes, conſiſting of Spices and Copper, which he refuſed granting until he could receive the Orders of the Durbar, but I am aſſured no ſuch Orders were given before Nanah left Town.

Since my laſt Addreſs, Intelligence has been received that Downſa after Hurry Punt's late Defeat ſent a Meſſage, requeſting he would remove from Paunce Mahl, which belongs to the Nizam, as his Troops remaining there would ruin the Country. Hurry Punt has in conſequence retreated to Serampore, about 20 Coſs to the Northward of the Kiſtna. Madjee Scindy has lately had an Engagement with Part of the Rajah of Collapore's Troops, in which he was defeated, and has been obliged to retreat ſeveral Coſs. Hurry Punt's Defeat ſeems to have thrown the Durbar into great Diſtreſs; and it is imagined from their want of Money, and the Diſobedience of their Jaghire Officers, that ſome Changes muſt take place, but which Way, it is impoſſible for me to ſay with any Degree of Certainty, however, you may depend, Gentlemen, I ſhall endeavour to gain the earlieſt Intelligence in my Power, and inform you of any material Alteration.

Notwithſtanding my Letter to Saccaram Bapoo, encloſing one for the Peſhwa requeſting an Anſwer to the Honourable the Preſident, as adviſed under the 19th, I have not yet been able to obtain one, though I am aſſured Saccaram and Nanah had a Meeting at Proonder Three Days ago.

The encloſed Packet in Duplicate to your Addreſs, was received this Day, and agreeable to my Superiors Orders, I now diſpatch them by the different Routes of Maſulipatam and Benares.

I am, &c.

Poona, (Signed) Tho[s] Moſtyn.
the 24th January 1778.

APPENDIX, N° 38.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 13th March 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler,
} Eſquires.

READ, and approved, the Proceedings of Yeſterday.

Governor General—I have given the Board the Trouble to meet in this Department, although before ſummoned for the uſual Diſpatch of Buſineſs in the Revenue Council, that I might lay before them a Letter which I received late laſt Night, ſigned with the Names of Meſſieurs Francis and Wheler: Addreſſes of this Kind I cannot but think in themſelves irregular; and I hope Mr. Wheler will excuſe me in requeſting of him particularly, that when he ſhall have Occaſion to communicate in Writing to me in my public Character, he will be ſo good as to make it the Subject of a Letter from himſelf only. I ſhall always pay him that reſpectful Attention which it has ever been my Study and even my Inclination to give to his Advice, his Wiſhes, and Opinions; but ſenſible as I am by Experience of the fatal Conſequences which ſooner or later muſt attend a Diviſion of the Members of the Adminiſtration into decided and confirmed Parties, I ſhould be wanting both in my Duty and common Prudence, if I conſented to make myſelf Inſtrumental to ſuch a Schiſm formed againſt myſelf.

I have read the Letter itſelf with great Attention; I have compared it with the Orders of the Court of Directors, to which it appears to allude; and clearly recollect the Subſtance of the Orders already iſſued for the March of the intended Detachment to Bombay, which Meſſieurs Francis and Wheler in their Letter mention it as their Opinion ſhould be immediately countermanded; but I cannot perceive their Connection. The Orders from the Court of Directors particularly quoted by Meſſieurs Francis and Wheler, loſe their real Meaning by that partial Quotation; I ſhall therefore here repeat them at large, ſo far as they relate to the Propoſition grounded upon them; they are as follows: "Though that Treaty is not upon the Whole ſo agreeable to us as we could wiſh, ſtill we are reſolved ſtrictly to adhere to it on our Parts. You muſt therefore be particularly vigilant whilſt Ragoba is with you, to prevent him from forming any Plan againſt what is called the Miniſterial Party at Poona; and we hereby poſitively order you not to engage with him in any Scheme whatever for retrieving his Affairs, without the Conſent of the Governor General and Council, or Court of Directors." Theſe Words imply an Authority, equal by the Conſtruction of them, to an expreſs Order to engage with Ragoba in any Scheme or Plan for retrieving his Affairs, which ſhall not be formed againſt what is called the Miniſterial Party at Poona, and which ſhall have obtained the Conſent of the Governor General and Council, or the Court of Directors. As the Propoſal made for

immediately

immediately countermanding the Orders already ſigned for the March of the intended Detachment to Bombay, is declared to be founded on the Principle which influenced the above Orders, I muſt requeſt, that the Orders particularly alluded to may be ſhewn, and if they ſhall appear to have ſuch a Tendency I will willingly conſent to their Repeal.

Sir,

Having attentively conſidered the particular and poſitive Inſtructions which the Court of Directors have given to the Preſident and Council of Bombay, in the laſt Paragraph of their Letter of the 4th July 1777 to that Preſidency, in regard to their Connections and Engagements with Ragoba, which they have been pleaſed to communicate to us in their General Letter received this Day, we think it our Duty to take the earlieſt Opportunity of ſubmitting to you our Opinion, that as the Court of Directors declare their Reſolution to adhere ſtrictly to the Treaty concluded with the Marattas by Colonel Upton, and have particularly ordered the Preſident and Council of Bombay to prevent Ragoba from forming any Plan againſt what is called the Miniſterial Party at Poona; every Meaſure taken or intended to be taken by that Preſidency, in conjunction with Ragoba, againſt the ruling Power at Poona, will ſtand in direct Violation of the Company's preſent Orders, and for that Reaſon, excluſive of all others heretofore urged to the ſame Effect, ought not to be ſupported or countenanced by this Government. On the ſame Principle we beg Leave to ſubmit our Opinion to you, that all the Orders already iſſued for the March of the intended Detachment to Bombay ſhould be immediately countermanded.

We have taken this Method of communicating our Thoughts to you on a Subject equally important and preſſing, as the Meeting of the Board in Council will not in the ordinary Courſe take place before Monday next, unleſs the Contents of this Letter ſhould induce you to think it adviſable to ſummon a Council before that Day.

We have, &c.

Calcutta,
12th March 1778.

(Signed) P. Francis,
Edwd Wheler.

Mr. Francis—An Objection to the Form in which Mr. Wheler and I thought fit to introduce the Conſideration of a Queſtion of ſuch Importance as that contained in our Letter to the Governor General, appears to me ſo very immaterial that I ſhall make no Reply to it. I leave the Letter to defend and anſwer for itſelf: The Court of Directors will judge whether it deſerves the Strictures which have been paſſed upon it.

A Diſpute about the Conſtruction of Words might be endleſs; I will therefore not enter into it, but content myſelf with ſtating what I think the true Senſe and Meaning of the Company's preſent Orders; every Member of the Board will judge for himſelf: It appears to me that, in the Words quoted by the Governor General, there are Three Declarations on the Part of the Company; the Two Firſt poſitive, and without any Qualification; the Third, conditional: Their Reſolution to adhere to Colonel Upton's Treaty is poſitive; their Order to the Preſidency of Bombay, to prevent Ragoba from forming any Plan againſt the Miniſterial Party, is alſo poſitive: The Third Declaration, which forbids that Preſidency from engaging with him in any Scheme whatever for retrieving his Affairs, is not abſolute, but may be departed from, provided they have our Conſent, or that of the Court of Directors. The true Queſtion then is, Whether the late Reſolutions taken at Bombay, and confirmed by the Approbation of this Board, are or are not a Violation of Colonel Upton's Treaty? and, Whether they do or do not make a Part of a Plan concerted with Ragoba againſt the Miniſterial Party at Poona? In my Opinion they do. The Information given us by the Preſidency of Bombay, in their Letter of the 12th December laſt, of Propoſitions made by or expected from the Miniſterial Party, in favour of Ragoba, appears to be totally without Foundation. Does there exiſt any one Fact, or the Repreſentation of a Fact, either from Bombay or Poona, ſubſequent to the Firſt Information, that tends immediately or remotely to confirm or ſupport it? I affirm that there does not. If I am miſtaken the poſitive Proof may be directly produced againſt me; yet the Reſolution taken, and the Orders given on the Receipt of the firſt Intelligence, and on the Preſumption that that Intelligence was well-founded, remain in full Force, and have been partly executed. We have remitted 10 Lacks of Rupees to Bombay; and we have given Orders for forming a Detachment nearly equal to a Brigade, and for their March to and Aſſembly at Calpee; the final Orders for their March from thence to Bombay are not yet iſſued, but every preparatory Step is taken, and I take for granted the Battalions are now on their March from their reſpective Stations to Calpee. Theſe are the Orders which, as Mr. Wheler and I meant, ſhould be countermanded. According to my Underſtanding, the whole Meaſure ſtands in direct Oppoſition to the plain Senſe and Meaning of the Court of Directors, expreſſed in their Letter now before us. I have acquitted myſelf of the Duty which belongs to my Station, in contributing to bring the Queſtion again under the Conſideration of the Board, which I apprehend I am warranted in doing by the Inſtructions received Yeſterday, and muſt leave the Determination of it to the Senſe of the Majority.

Mr. Wheler—Conſidering as I do that the Orders already iſſued for the aſſembling of Six Battalions at Calpee, with the further Deſign of proceeding to Surat, Bombay, or Poona, are in direct Contradiction to the Orders of the Court of Directors, it became my Duty to promote a further Conſideration of thoſe Orders, and if poſſible to prevent their being carried into Execution. I imagine

magine a Letter, addreſſed to the Governor General jointly with Mr. Francis, whoſe Opinion is well nown to have concurred with my own upon this Subject, would have more Force and Efficacy with e Governor General than my ſingle Application: But I am ſorry to find it has had the contrary fect; and if I could flatter myſelf that the Mode now recommended to me by the Governor would e the Means of uniting our Opinions, I ſhould be very ready to adopt the Meaſure. I have done t my Duty, in joining with Mr. Francis in an Addreſs to the Governor; and I have no Doubt but will be conſidered as ſuch by thoſe who are ultimately to judge of the Tranſaction.

Mr. Barwell—If the Object of the preſent Queſtion, agitated by a Letter to the Governor General, to prevent the Interpoſition of this Government in ſuch political Meaſures as may ariſe in the Weſt de of India; and under any Circumſtances whatever propoſes to decline giving the Preſidency of ombay ſuch Aid as may be neceſſary for its Support, I will venture to affirm, that it is not conſiſtent ith any Orders of the Company now received, nor conſiſtent with ſound Policy.

The Reſolutions that have already paſſed, for an effectual Aid and Support of the Bombay Go-rnment, do not neceſſarily involve us in any Meaſures that may not be conſiſtent with thoſe Reſo-ions. The Defence and Support of one of the Company's Settlements, and the giving them the eans of being equal to any Occaſions which may poſſibly call forth the Exertion of our Military rength, cannot be imputed to us as a Breach of the Treaty of Poona, or a Contradiction of any the Injunctions proceeding from the Company. In the Vote that authorizes the Bombay Govern-nt to take a Part in the Scenes at the Poona Durbar, the ultimate Object of them is the Tran-illity of India, and to ſecure our Government from Deſigns clearly apparent to have originated h a Faction at Poona, for the Introduction of the natural Enemies of our Nation, the French. e Meaſures that have been reſolved do not in my Opinion warrant a Deduction of the Conſe-nces that are imputed: They profeſs an entire different Object; and I hope the Public will ſo far dicate the Votes of the Majority, as to give them that Degree of Credit ſo ſolemn an Act merits. e National Intereſts can only be my Purſuit, and in Support of the Bombay Government Security d Peace to all our Poſſeſſions, I adhere to my former Opinion given on this Subject, and am nfirmed in them by a Review of the precarious State of Parties at the Poona Durbar. When ce the Blow has fallen upon Bombay, the greateſt Exertions on our Part will poſſibly fail to reſtore e Splendor of the Engliſh Government.

Governor General.—Mr. Barwell has ſo fully vindicated and explained the late Reſolutions of the ard, that he has left me nothing more to add, but that as the Objects of thoſe Reſolutions are ictly conformable to the Company's Orders, ſo alſo was the Means. We have not authorized, nor I ſt is it neceſſary to declare that we never will authorize, the Preſidency of Bombay to engage in any an againſt what is called the Miniſterial Party at Poona, while the Treaty ſubſiſts inviolate on their t. A Plan was ſuggeſted to us by the Preſident and Council of Bombay, which had for its Object Means to engage in a Plan for retrieving the Affairs of Ragoba, in conjunction with the niſterial Party at Poona, and at their Invitation: The declared Object of the Reſolution for ſending Military Reinforcement to Bombay, was, as it is expreſſed in our Letter of the 23d February to t Preſidency, to grant them the moſt effectual Support in our Power, but has no kind of Relation, er direct or implied, to a Violation of the Treaty formed with the Miniſters at Poona. I am inſt the Motion for countermanding the Orders iſſued for the March of the intended Detachment Bombay.

Reſolved, That the Orders for the March of the Detachment from the firſt Brigade, be not coun-rmanded.

Warren Haſtings,
Ric.d Barwell,
P. Francis,
Edw.d Wheler.

APPENDIX, N° 39.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 23d of March 1778.

THE Governor General having propoſed the following Letter to be written to the Preſident and Council at Bombay, it was circulated by his Order for the Sentiments of the Members of the ard:

Gentlemen,

In the late Diſpatches received from the Honourable Court of Directors by the Ship Beſborough, were furniſhed with a Copy of their General Letter to your Preſidency, dated the 4th July, and ncluding with the following Paragraph.

" 65. Although we cannot but agree to the Protection that you have given to Ragoba, conſidering " the Connection that you have had with him, by which we muſt ſuppoſe the Company benefited, " yet we are under ſome Apprehenſions that the Marattas will think it a Breach of the Treaty en- " tered into with them by Colonel Upton; for though that Treaty is not upon the Whole ſo agreeable " to us as we could wiſh, ſtill we are reſolved ſtrictly to adhere to it on our Parts. You muſt therefore " be particularly vigilant whilſt Ragoba is with you, to prevent him from forming any Plan againſt " what is called the Miniſterial Party at Poona; and we hereby poſitively order you not to engage " with him in any Scheme whatever in retrieving his Affairs, without the Conſent of the Governor " General and Council of the Court of Directors, at the ſame Time we think common Humanity " will warrant us in giving you Orders to protect his Perſon from Violence, if any ſuch Attempts " ſhould be made by the Partizans of the Miniſters."

We have given this Extract at full Length, becauſe we ſhall make it the Ground-work of our Inſtructions on that Part of it which reſtrains you from forming any Engagements with Ragoba without our Conſent.

Although Two Years are paſt ſince the Concluſion of the Treaty made by Colonel Upton, yet it does not appear that One Article of it has been accompliſhed, except thoſe which contain the Declaration of Peace between the Company and Marattas; and theſe, from the Inefficacy of the reſt, and from the dangerous Connection which has been formed by one of the ruling Members of the Maratta State and the French, ſtand on ſo inſecure a Footing, that we can place no Reliance upon them: We think it neither conſiſtent with good Policy nor with our public Duty, to ſuffer the Intereſts of our Employers to remain longer in this State of Suſpence and Alarm; nor the Obligation of the National Faith to be made the Inſtrument of a Policy, which aims at the Ruin and Extirpation of the Britiſh Influence in India, without making ſuch Efforts as our Means will afford, and the Treaty will allow, to remove the former, and fruſtrate the latter.

Your late Advices contain no Grounds for any rational Expectation or Concluſion, but that the Diſtractions and Weakneſs of the actual Adminiſtration at Poona were ſo ripe for a Change, as to make it probable that ſome great Event will have taken Place before you can receive this Letter; and the Objects of it anticipated or precluded, by your own Application of the Advantages which may have been preſented to you, to the more permanent Security of our common Intereſts.

Yet as the Reverſe is probable, we ſhall proceed to give you ſuch Inſtructions and Authorities for your Guidance, as are neceſſary; on the Suppoſition, that the ſame Adminiſtration remains, and that the Treaty continues on the ſame Footing as that on which it has ſtood for theſe Two Years paſt.

1ſt. We direct, That you demand immediate Poſſeſſion of a Country of Three compleat Lacks of Rupees, near or adjoining to Broach, conformable to, and in the Manner provided by, the 5th Article of the Treaty: But as the Execution of this Article has been hitherto ſuſpended by the Diſputes which have ariſen between you and the Miniſters, concerning the Interpretation of the original Words of the Treaty, *Jemma Caumil*, which are rendered by the Word *complete*, in Colonel Upton's Engliſh Draft of it.

Although we muſt regard the Advantage taken by the Miniſters in this Inſtance as diſingenuous; yet as a Proof of our Reſolution to abide by the ſtrict Letter of the Treaty, even againſt the evident Spirit and natural Conſtruction of it, and againſt our own aſcertained Intentions, we direct, that if on Enquiry, you ſhall learn that the technical Meaning of the Words *Jemma Caumil* is ſuch as the Miniſters have aſcribed to it, and ſuch as under that Interpretation will juſtify them in their Application of it to the Value of the Lands offered by them in virtue of the 5th Article of the Treaty, although eſtimated by you only at 2,10,000 Rupees, you do accept the ſame as a full Performance of that Article: But if it ſhall appear to you, on valid Authority, that the Words *Jemma Caumil* mean in their official Acceptation what their natural Conſtruction implies, a complete Rent, or a Rent equal to the eſtimated Sum, you will in ſuch Caſe inſiſt on the Performance of the 5th Article of the Treaty, conformably to this Interpretation: And if in either Caſe the Miniſters ſhall refuſe to comply with your Demand, we direct that you declare their Refuſal to be a Violation of the Treaty.

2d. We direct that you demand immediate Payment of the Sum of Twelve Lacks of Rupees due by the 6th Article of the Treaty, or of ſo much of it as ſtill remains unpaid; and that the Purgunnah of Jambooſeer be thereupon reſtored to the Miniſters, unleſs you ſhall have accepted of the ſame as an Aſſignment, under ſuch Engagements as ſhall have abſolved them from the literal Performance of that Article, and thoſe Engagements have been fulfilled on their Part; and if they ſhall refuſe to comply with the Demand ſo made to them, that you declare their Refuſal to be a Violation of the Treaty.

3d. We direct, That you keep Poſſeſſion of the Purgunnahs of Chickley and Corial, the Town of Veriow, the Three Villages of the Purgunnah of Chureaſſy, and the Village of Batta Gang, which were ceded to the Company by Futteh Sing Guicawar, ſince the Miniſters have failed in producing the Proofs that Futteh Sing did not poſſeſs Power or Authority to make ſuch Ceſſions.

4th. We direct, That you cauſe a Remonſtrance to be made to the Miniſters againſt the Countenance afforded by them to the Chevalier St. Lubin; againſt the Engagements formed between him and Nanna Furneele; and againſt the Grant of the Port of Choul made to him, or to the French Nation through him, if you ſhall have obtained ſatisfactory Information, either that ſuch a Grant has been actually made, or that the Forms of Office only are wanting to render it complete;

te; though the Grant without these Forms may be equally effectual to the French, and equally ngerous to us; which appears to be the Case, from the Intelligence contained in Mr. Mostyn's ter of the 24th of January last.

Although we do not insist upon any positive Right to demand the Dismission of the Chevalier St. bin, nor the Exclusion of the French from the Port of Choul; yet we have a Right to require Knowledge of the Intentions of the Ministers in regard to these Points, so far as they respect Treaty of Peace subsisting between the Maratta State and the British Government in dia.

We therefore desire, That you will demand from the Ministers, a clear and satisfactory Explana- n of their Intentions; and that you declare to them, that we shall take such Measures ac- rdingly as Prudence shall dictate, for the future Safety of the Company's Interests and Possessions mmitted to our Charge.

We recommend it to you to obtain if possible a Copy of the Engagements entered into by anna Furneese with the Chevalier St. Lubin, and a Knowledge of the Measures which may have en taken for their Execution. We cannot view this Intrigue without feeling the most alarming Ap- hensions of the Consequences: In Effect, this is the sole Motive of all the late Measures taken for Support of your Presidency. We regard the Marattas as the only native, and the French as only foreign Power in India, capable of effecting the Influence which the British Nation has uired in it: The former were prevented from giving us any immediate or effectual Trouble, by ir internal Distractions, and the Inequality of their Numbers to the Effect of our Discipline; latter, by their Want of Territorial Property, or an Alliance which might supply it. An Al- ce formed between them would at once relieve all their mutual Wants, and afford them all e Requisites to dispute with us on equal Terms the Dominion of India, which we at present in a egree possess without a Rival. By timely Provisions, and a spirited Negociation, it may be pre- nted; but if it is once suffered to take Effect, by the Admission of a French Force into the aratta State, which may be the Work of a few Months, all our Efforts may prove insufficient defeat it, and the whole Empire become the Theatre of War between Two European Nations, cked by their respective Allies, with the same Calamities attending it, which we formerly expe- enced in the Carnatic; but rendered more dreadful by the superior Magnitude of the ntest.

5th. We have informed the Peshwa and Ministers of our Intentions to send a military Force for e Defence of the Company's Possessions on your Side of India; and have desired that they will ue the necessary Orders, both for their safe Passage and such Assistance as they may require on e March; assuring them, that the strictest Orders will be given to the Officer commanding this rce, to conduct himself in every Respect in a Manner suitable to the Peace and Friendship which ve been established between the Maratta State and ours; and that we are resolved most rigidly adhere to the Letter of the Treaty, and to maintain the Peace intended by it.

These Assurances we desire you will cause to be repeated, and that you will make the same Requi- ion for a free Passage and Assistance to our Troops.

6th. While Saccaram Baboo and Nana Furneefs continue to hold the Administration, and adhere erally to the Treaty to which they are Parties, we recommend and enjoin the same literal Adherence o it on your Parts.

This Obligation will remain in equal Force, if a Change of Government should take place, and he new Members of it shall declare the State to be bound by the Treaty, and pledge their own Faith to it; but if the present or future Members of the Administration shall either directly infringe he Treaty, or permit it to be infringed by Persons acting under their Authority, or shall refuse to fulfil the Conditions of it, we, as authorized by the Company, do invest you with Authority to form new Alliance with Ragoba, and to engage with him in any Scheme which you shall deem expedient nd safe for retrieving his Affairs. The like Authority we have already given you, in the Case of your receiving a formal Invitation to that Effect from the First Minister, Saccaram Baboo, in our Letter of the 2d February: We at the same Time recommended certain specific Advantages, which n such an Occasion we were of Opinion ought to be required as a Compensation for the Company's nterposition; but under every Circumstance, we recommended to you in the most earnest Manner o make the Establishment of a lasting Peace, which can only be effected by Conditions of reciprocal Advantage with the Maratta Government, and a total Exclusion of the French Influence, Interest, and Property, from the Maratta Government and Country, your sole general Objects, as they are ours.

7th. We do not mean however to preclude you from any Advantages which it may be possible to obtain by Negociation, though we instruct you to be bound by the Treaty, in case the new Mem- bers of the Maratta State shall declare themselves bound by that Treaty, and shall pledge their own Faith to it. But as a Change in the Administration at Poona will probably enable you to gain political Advantages highly beneficial to the Company and to the general Interests of our Nation, and to amend the Defects in our present Engagements, we leave it to you to pursue such a Policy as Circumstances shall warrant, independent of any particular Interest of Ragonaut Row, whom you must regard in the great political Objects of our Government as simply meriting our Consideration, and not necessarily connected or blended with them.

(Signed) Warren Hastings.

APPENDIX, N° 40.

Bengal Secret Country Correſpondence, N° 6.

To Mahah Rajah Modjee Bhooſila: Written 22d February 1778.

I HAVE received moſt authentic Intelligence from different Channels, that the French are now carrying on Intrigues at Poona; partly with a View of forming an advantageous Alliance for their own Nation, and partly with a View of deſtroying the Friendſhip which has for ſome Time ſubſiſted between the Engliſh and Maratta Governments. I have likewiſe learnt that the French Agent St. Lubin has met with great Encouragement from ſome of the Chiefs; that a Treaty has actually been concluded with him, and the valuable Port of Choul granted to the French, which is only a few Coſs diſtant from Bombay. The Grant of this Port not only marks an Indiſpoſition towards us, but puts into the Hands of the French an Arſenal where they may collect military Stores, and make Preparations for attacking our Poſſeſſions when we are unaware of their Deſigns. I who have the Superintendance of the whole Engliſh Force in India have nothing to fear from the Exertions of a Nation who are Infants in Strength in India, and who muſt tranſport every Soldier they have to bring into the Field from a diſtant Country, and over a wide Ocean; and the Conduct of ſuch of the Maratta Chiefs as may have joined the French in Preference to the Engliſh Intereſts, excited my Pity for their Want of Wiſdom rather than my Anger for their Preſumption. It is my Duty however to guard againſt the future Effects of their Intrigues; for if I permit the Enemies of the King of England and the Company to gather Strength, though my own Nation is too ſtrong to ſuffer in its Intereſts from any Thing they can do, the Lives of many Men may be ſacrificed in repelling Attacks for which we might not be prepared in one Part of our Dominions, though we ſhould have more than ſufficient Force on this Side of India to puniſh our Enemies for whatever Loſs our Government might ſuffer from ſuch Diſturbances.

For theſe Reaſons I have reſolved to ſend a ſtrong Military Force to reinforce our Settlement at Bombay; and have directed a large Detachment with a well-appointed Artillery, and commanded by experienced Officers, to aſſemble at Calpee, that they may be ready to march towards Bombay: There are Two Roads by which they may march, one by Soubah Malwah and the other through Berar. The Road through Soubah Malwah is the ſhorteſt, but I have not yet formed any Friendſhip with the Rulers of the Countries ſituated on that Road; and as my Enemies are your Enemies, and our Wiſhes in all Things the ſame, I have reſolved that my Troops ſhall paſs through Berar in their Way to Bombay; that by this Means our Friendſhip may be declared to all the World, and that the Seeds of an Alliance between the Engliſh and you, which has long been both my Deſire and yours, may be ſown. The Detachment will march in leſs than a Month from this Time, by which Time I have no Doubt you will have given Orders for their free Paſſage through your Country, and have ſent Information of your having given ſuch Orders to Calpee. It will be better if you ſend a truſty Perſon, and Part of your own Army, to accompany ours. I aſſure myſelf you will give me this Proof of your Friendſhip, that the whole World may be a Witneſs of its Sincerity, but as it is neceſſary to be certain of your Conſent before the Troops have proceeded too far, I deſire that if you ſhould not chuſe to comply with this Requeſt, you will give Notice of it to the Commander of the Detachment, who will accordingly take another Road. But this I will not ſuppoſe.

To Dewagur Pundit: D°.

Of the ſame Tenor as the foregoing, and requeſting he will employ his Influence with his Maſter, to obtain his ready Compliance for the March of the Troops through his Country.

To Modajee Bhooſila: Written 25th February.

The Day before Yeſterday I diſpatched a Letter to you on the Subject of Affairs here, and requeſting your Permiſſion for a Detachment of Engliſh Forces to march through Berar in their Way to Bombay; a Duplicate of which Letter accompanies this.

Since that Time I have had further Converſations with your Vackeel Beneram Pundit, who has warmly diſſuaded me from ſending the Forces by the Route of Malwah, as highly inconſiſtent with the Friendſhip ſubſiſting between us, and given me the fulleſt Aſſurances that you will, with the greateſt Pleaſure, comply with my Requeſt, and will afford the Detachment every poſſible Aſſiſtance, by ſupplying them with Proviſions, &c. and will ſend a truſty Perſon with a Part of your Army, to accompany it to the Place of its Deſtination.

I have in conſequence written to Colonel Leſlie, the Commander of theſe Forces, to repair with all Expedition to Calpee, and from thence by Bundlecund to Berar, and proceed to Bombay; and that

will receive every Kind of Aſſiſtance from you in his March. I requeſt that immediately on Receipt of this Letter you will write to Colonel Leſlie at Calpee, ſignifying to him your Compliance with the above Requeſt; and will at the ſame Time iſſue the neceſſary Orders to your Officers.

I have been induced to act thus from the firmeſt Conviction of the Sincerity of your Friendſhip, and full Confidence in the Aſſurances given me by your Vackeel Beneram Pundit; but ſhould you nevertheleſs not think proper to give your Conſent, you will give immediate Intimation of your Sentiments to Colonel Leſlie, who will in conſequence take ſome other Route.

To the Vizier: Written 3d March.

I have received repeated and authentic Intelligence that the French are now carrying on ſecret Intrigues at Poona with a View to form an advantageous Alliance for their own Nation, to enable them to acquire Power and Dominion in Hindoſtan; and alſo that their Agent St. Lubin has met with great Encouragement from ſome of the Maratta Chiefs. As there can be no Doubt of the Uſe they would make of any Force they might be ſuffered to acquire, namely, to attack the Engliſh and their Allies, it is incumbent on us to apply an immediate Remedy. Your Excellency's own Intereſt, independant of every Motive of Friendſhip or Alliance, requires your hearty Concurrence in this Meaſure. It is well known that the French can never attack Bengal by Sea with any Proſpect of Advantage, nor would they think of ſo warm an Attempt: Should they be ſuffered to form Alliances, and to become formidable, they would undoubtedly march from the Weſtward, and make their firſt Attempt againſt your Excellency's Dominions. To prevent the Poſſibility of this, and to enſure our future Peace and Tranquillity, I have determined to ſend a large military Force to reinforce the Government of Bombay, and to enable it to cruſh immediately the French Power in that Quarter. For this Purpoſe, I have directed Colonel Leſlie to march without Delay at the Head of a large Detachment, and well-appointed Artillery, to Bombay. Mr. Middleton will more fully explain to you the Nature of the Plan, and will make Application to you for your Aſſiſtance and Support of it. I have no Doubt but your Excellency, knowing that the future Proſperity of your own Dominions do eſſentially depend on our vigorous Oppoſition againſt the common Enemy, will cheerfully comply with every Application which that Gentleman ſhall make to you for Aſſiſtance from your own Bride, or any other which it is in your Power to furniſh.

To the Peiſhwa: Written 23d March.

In conſequence of repeated and circumſtantial Intelligence, of hoſtile Deſigns forming againſt the Company's Settlements on the other Side of India, I have judged it expedient to detach a Body of Troops from the Army for their Defence. As the March of the Detachment may probably lie through a Part of the Maratta Dominions, I muſt requeſt you will give the neceſſary Orders for allowing them a free Paſſage, and direct ſuch Aſſiſtance to be given them as they may require in their Route.

The commanding Officer is ſtrictly enjoined to obſerve ſuch a Conduct in all Reſpects, as is conſiſtent with the Peace and Friendſhip ſubſiſting between your Government and the Company.

I take this Occaſion of repeating my Aſſurances of the Determination of this Government to adhere ſcrupulouſly to all the Conditions of the Treaty, and to maintain the Peace inviolable as long as it ſhall be in our Power to maintain it; and I flatter myſelf that you will likewiſe act on the ſame Principles.

To the Rajah of Boondlecund: Written 1ſt April.

Having lately come to the Reſolution to diſpatch a conſiderable Body of Forces for the Reinforcement of the Government of Bombay, which will march by the Way of Calpee, through a Part of your Territory, I am to requeſt, that you will pay Attention to all ſuch Applications as may be made to you by Colonel Leſlie, the Commander of the Detachment; and that you will afford him ſuch Aſſiſtance as he may ſtand in need of, by ſupplying him with Proviſions and other Neceſſaries.

I can have no Doubt, from the Friendſhip which ſubſiſts between us, that you will be glad to ſhew your Attachment to the Company, by a ready Compliance with my Deſire, and have therefore directed Colonel Leſlie to apply to you in all Caſes where your Aſſiſtance can be of Uſe to him; he has likewiſe received Orders to obſerve the ſtricteſt Regularity in his March through your Territories; that ſo your Subjects may not ſuffer any Inconveniencies therefrom, but on the contrary be benefited by it. I could wiſh that you would ſend a truſty Perſon to attend Colonel Leſlie on your Part through your Country, to receive his Applications; and in caſe any Stragglers from his Army ſhould commit Diſorders, to repreſent it to him, and procure Redreſs—For the reſt knowing me, &c.

N. B. The Country of Boondlecund being under the Juriſdiction of Four different Chiefs, viz. Hinzooder Sing, the Chief of them, who ſucceeded to his Father Hindoput, Surrumput Sing, Gopaul Sing, and Comaun Sing, who each poſſeſs a Share of the Country; a Letter of the ſame Tenor with the above has been written to each of them; alſo one of the ſame Tenor to the Chief of Bopaul.

APPENDIX, N° 40, 41.

To Beneram Pundit: D°.

I encloſe you Letters to your Maſter Maha Rajah Modajee Bhooſilah and Dewan Dewagurt Pundit, which I requeſt you will forward to them with all poſſible Expedition, and accompanying them by Letters from yourſelf, for which Purpoſe I ſend you Copies for your Information.

If you have finiſhed the Buſineſs for which you went to Benares, I wiſh you to proceed without Delay and join Colonel Leſlie, who is very deſirous of ſeeing you, and of conſulting with you perſonally on many Points relative to his March, which can be much better effected by an Interview than by any other Means.

To Beneram Pundit: Written 4th April.

I have received your Letter informing me of your Arrival at Benares: I underſtand by the Letters written by you to your Brother, that Colonel Leſlie has deſired you to go to him to Cora, and that you have been much alarmed by the Reports communicated to you from Dondo Pundit; I before deſired your Brother to inform you of my Wiſh, which I now repeat; that whenever you ſhall have finiſhed the Buſineſs which was the original Cauſe of your Viſit to Benares, you will proceed to Colonel Leſlie, and aſſiſt him with your Advice and ſuch Communications as may be uſeful to him, until he ſhall have commenced his March. Dondo Pundit has no Authority for any Intelligence which he may pretend to have received from Calcutta; and you too well know the inventive Diſpoſitions of the People of this Place to give Credit to Rumours originating from them.

I have already communicated to you, in a confidential Manner, all that was neceſſary for you to know, and have told you, that the Object of the preſent Undertaking was to reinforce and ſtrengthen the Preſidency of Bombay, and to enable them to fruſtrate any Deſigns which may be formed againſt the Peace and Rights of the Company on that Side of India: On this Subject I have written more fully to Mr. Thomas Graham and to Colonel Leſlie; from either of whom, wherever you may be when you receive this Letter, you will underſtand it.

APPENDIX, N° 41.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, 23d March 1778.

THE Draft of the Letter propoſed by the Governor to be written to the Preſident and Council at Bombay, was returned, with the following Minutes from Meſſrs. Francis and Wheler:

Mr. Francis—As the intended Letter to Bombay profeſſes Two general Principles in which I concur; Firſt, to make the Company's Orders of the 4th of July 1777 the Ground-work of our preſent Inſtructions: Secondly, to make the Eſtabliſhment of a laſting Peace our ſole general Object; I have only to conſider how far the Inſtructions contained in this Letter are conſiſtent with thoſe Principles, with one another, with the Meaſures already reſolved on, and with the Motives originally aſſigned for thoſe Meaſures.

The Third Paragraph ſtates as preliminary Facts, that no One Article of the Treaty has yet been accompliſhed, except the Declaration of the Peace; and that a dangerous Connection has been formed by One of the ruling Members of the Maratta State and the French.

From thence a general Concluſion is drawn, that we are bound by Policy and Duty to make ſuch Efforts *as our Means will afford*, and *as the Treaty will allow*, to remove the Suſpence and Alarm of our preſent Situation, and to fruſtrate a Policy which aims at our Ruin and Extirpation.

On this Paragraph it is ſufficient to obſerve that we continue in the peaceable Poſſeſſion of Salſette, alſo of the Maratta Share of the City and Purgunnah of Broach.

That the compleat Execution of the 5th Article of the Treaty has only been retarded by a Diſpute about the literal Meaning of the Words *Kamil Jumma*, or in Effect, whether thoſe Words mean a nett Revenue of 2,10,000 Rupees, or Three Lacks.

In our Letter of the 18th of Auguſt laſt, we ſaid we underſtood the Term to mean a *groſs* Revenue, which I think decides the Diſpute againſt us.

At all Events we retain Chickley, Corial, and ſeveral other Places, and enjoy the Revenues thereof as Pledges, until the Sunnuds for the Country of Three Lacks ſhall be made out.

That the Sixth Article of the Treaty is alſo executed by the Marattas, ſince *they* have given and *we* have accepted of Jambooſeer, as a Mortgage to be held until the Revenues collected from thence ſhall have liquitated the Debt of Twelve Lacks.

Theſe important Conceſſions having been made and fulfilled on the Part of the Marattas, it ſeems

uit and reaſonable that ſome Satisfaction ſhould be given them on our Side; particularly that Ragoba hould be removed from Bombay with a proper Proviſion for his Eſtabliſhment in a private Station. n our Letter of the 18th Auguſt, we were *unanimous* in conſidering his Continuance at Bombay as n *inſuperable Bar to the Completion of the Treaty.*

The Second ſuppoſed Fact on which the preſent Meaſures are built, is introduced as uſual, with- ut Proof; viz. "That a Connection has been formed by Nana Furneeſe with the French, and that it aims at our Ruin and Extirpation." If any Negociations have taken place with the French, we ay trace them to their Source in the Protection given to Ragoba; his Reſidence at Bombay; and the ontinued Intrigues between him and that Preſidency. The true Way to defeat the Views of the rench is to give the Marattas a ſolid Proof of our good Faith by diſmiſſing Ragoba. While the Pre- nder to their Government is ſupported by us, we give them too much Cauſe for looking to France or Aſſiſtance. The preſent Meaſures, if carried into Execution, will leave them without a Choice. s for making uſe of ſuch Efforts *as our Means will afford*, and *as the Treaty will allow*, it is a Con- adiction in Senſe without ſaving Appearances. The Efforts in Queſtion are hoſtile, which a Treaty f Peace and Friendſhip cannot ſuppoſe or allow of.

The Firſt Inſtruction orders a peremptory Demand of a Country of Three *complete* Lacks, and leaves to the Preſidency of Bombay to determine, whether *Caumil Jumma* means complete or not. In our etter of the 18th of Auguſt, we determined that it ſignified *groſs*. Is it meant that we ſhould go to ar for the Difference, while we have Chickley, Corial, Veriow, &c. in our Hands as a Pledge for the curity of the Whole?

The Second Inſtruction orders a peremptory Demand of the Twelve Lacks which the Marattas nſented to pay us towards the Expences of the War. Is it meant that we ſhall renew the War for the immediate Payment of this whole Sum, while the Revenues of Jambooſeer are mortgaged us for the gradual Liquidation of it?

The Third Inſtruction decides, that Futty Sing had a Right to make the Ceſſions mentioned in e Seventh Article of the Treaty, and orders the Preſidency of Bombay to keep Poſſeſſion of them all Events. This Point ſeems to me very diſputable, and the Deciſion of it in our Favour, ry likely to make the Eſtabliſhment of a *laſting Peace* impoſſible.

The Fourth Inſtruction ſuppoſes the Fort of Choul to have been granted to the French. An ſſertion of the ſame Nature was introduced into the Debates on the 23d of February; and upon nquiry was acknowledged to be without Proof. The Remonſtrance againſt Monſieur St. Lubin to be accompanied with the Demands of a clear and ſatisfactory Explanation from the Miniſters their Intentions, and a Declaration that we ſhall take ſuch Meaſures accordingly as Prudence ſhall ctate. Is it meant to declare War with the Marattas, if their Anſwer ſhould not be ſatisfactory to Preſidency of Bombay, or to the Governor General and Mr. Barwell?

In the Fifth Inſtruction, a ſuppoſed Intrigue of Nana Furneeſe with Monſieur St. Lubin, is ted "as the ſole Motive of all the late Meaſures we have taken for the Support of the Preſidency of Bombay." The Reſolution of the 2d of February, from which all the late Meaſures have ginated was, "that our Sanction ſhould be given to the Plan which the Preſident and Coun- cil of Bombay had agreed to form with the Maratta Government." Now it is not diſ- ted, that no ſuch a Plan has ever been formed, and that Mr. Lewis's Account of Propoſals made him in the Name of the Miniſters, in favour of Ragoba, was founded on ſome Fallacy, and d produced no Effect of any Kind; yet the Meaſures taken on the Preſumption that ſuch a an had been formed, are adhered to, and now imputed to another Motive; that is, the firſt Ground iling, another muſt be aſſumed.

The Fifth Inſtruction ſays, that we have applied to the Peſhwa for a ſafe Paſſage for our Army rough their Dominions. Suppoſe they ſhould refuſe it: Is it meant that the Detachment ſhall arch through their Territories without their Permiſſion, or without their Conſent? If it be, this ct alone is a Declaration of War, which it is in vain to attempt to qualify, by any Aſſurances of r pacific Intentions? Such Language, united with ſuch Meaſures, is an Inſult to Common nſe; and much too plain, in my Opinion, to deceive either the Marattas or the Court of irectors.

The Sixth Inſtruction leaves it to the Preſidency of Bombay to judge whether or no the reaty is directly or indirectly infringed. If they determine that it is, they are at once "veſted with Authority to form a new Alliance with Ragoba, and to engage with him in any Scheme which they ſhall deem expedient and ſafe for retrieving his Affairs." In the preſent Temper d Diſpoſition of that Preſidency, I preſume there cannot be a Doubt in the Breaſt of any of , of the Uſe they will immediately make of this extraordinary Power; or that they will not forward to avail themſelves of it before it can be recalled.

The Seventh Inſtruction ſuppoſes the Probability of a Change in the Adminiſtration of Poona, om which more extenſive Advantages may be derived: In this Caſe it is left to them "to purſue ſuch Policy as Circumſtances ſhall warrant, independent of any particular Intereſts of Ragoba." the preceding Article they are authorized to engage with Ragoba in *any* Scheme for retrieving his ffairs: In the preſent Article they are inſtructed to gain as many Advantages as they can without y Concern for his Intereſts. Excluſive of the manifeſt Contradiction between the Two Inſtructions, d the hazardous as well as diſgraceful Conſequences of not purſuing ſome One determinate Syſtem, apprehend that we are not warranted in giving ſuch unlimited Power to the Preſidency of Bombay: heir Meaſures ought to be conſtantly ſubordinate to our Councils, and ſucceſſively directed by them.

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the Peace of India, perhaps the Fate of the British Empire in this Part of the World, is involved in the Queſtion, which we leave to their excluſive Deciſion. Are we juſtified in relinquiſhing our Juriſdiction, even for a Moment, over ſuch Queſtions?

Upon the Whole it appears to me, that the real Tendency of this Letter, notwithſtanding any qualifying Expreſſions interſperſed through it, is to provoke a War with the Marattas; that it ſeeks for Cauſes of Offence where none exiſt; that the Language it holds to the Marattas, is peremptory and hoſtile, and never uſed but when a Rupture is predetermined; that the Cauſes of Complaint on which it urges a Quarrel are trifling and exaggerated; that the Facts it refers to, are either clearly diſproved, or taken for granted without Evidence; and that the Terms of the Inſtructions contained in it, are in ſome Places ambiguous, in others contradictory. Whether they are or are not conſiſtent with the pacific Reſolutions, ſo clearly and poſitively expreſſed by the Court of Directors in their Letter of the 4th of July, muſt be left to their Judgment.

Mr. Wheler—Having already diſſented to and proteſted againſt any Interference on our Part between the contending Powers of the Maratta Government, and declared my Diſapprobation of the Armament now under Orders for Bombay, and the Purpoſes for which it is to be employed, and in general to all the Meaſures propoſed to be taken by the Majority of this Board relating to the Marattas, I ſhall not think it neceſſary in future to enter into a particular Diſcuſſion of any Propoſitions which may be made in the Courſe of our Correſpondence with the Preſidency of Bombay, by the Governor General or Mr. Barwell, as they have taken the whole Reſponſibility on themſelves, and muſt be anſwerable for the Conſequence of the Meaſures already reſolved on, and ſuch as may of Neceſſity follow. On the preſent Occaſion I ſhall content myſelf with making ſome ſhort Remarks on ſome Parts of the Draft of the Letter to Bombay, laid before us by the Governor General, and leave the Whole to be more fully diſcuſſed and decided on by our Superiors.

I agree with the Governor General, in wiſhing to make the 65th Paragraph of the Company's Letter to Bombay the Ground of our Inſtructions to the Preſident and Council there; but I differ with him, in thinking this ought to be extended, as far only as they are reſtrained by it from forming any Engagement with Ragoba without the Conſent of this Board. I wiſh to extend our Inſtructions to what I deem the Spirit and Meaning of the whole Order, to adhere to the Treaty of Poona made by Colonel Upton, and even in the Protection given to Ragoba, to be careful to avoid what the Marattas may think a Breach of that Treaty; and I am of Opinion that we ought to give the fulleſt Weight to that Part which directs, that the Council of Bombay be "particularly vigilant whilſt "Ragoba is with them, to prevent him from forming any Plan againſt what is called the Miniſterial "Party at Poona;" by which the late Reſolutions on this Subject, and the preſent Propoſitions, are I think entirely condemned.

I am not ſufficiently acquainted with the Conſequences of the Treaty of Poona to be able to enter into a particular Refutation of what is aſſerted in the Third Paragraph of the Governor General's Draft, that no One Article of it has yet been accompliſhed; but the Court of Directors, who have conſtant Information from Bombay, do not appear to be poſſeſſed with any ſuch Opinion, and declare, that they are reſolved to adhere ſtrictly to the Treaty on their Parts. With reſpect to the Conſequence to be expected from the French Negociators at Poona, I have already declared my Opinion of them, and how far they ought to be oppoſed by us: Any Interference on our Part between the contending Parties of the Maratta Government, can only have the Effect of forcing the other Party to unite with the French, and thereby produce that very Conſequence which the Governor General propoſes to guard againſt, of procuring them a powerful and uſeful Ally, to enable them to diſpute our Dominion in India.

I object to and proteſt againſt the Form and Subſtance of all Demands to be made by the Preſidency of Bombay on the Maratta Government, and to the March of our Troops through their Territories, and to the Powers propoſed to be given to the Preſident and Council of Bombay, to enter into any new Engagements with Ragoba, or to avail themſelves of any particular Circumſtances, or Change amongſt the governing Powers of the Maratta State, as ſubverſive to the Treaty of Poona; a Violation of the Company's Orders lately received; and tending to involve them, and perhaps the Britiſh Nation, in a dangerous and moſt expenſive War, which at this critical Period may not be confined to India alone, and which propoſes no adequate or reaſonable Purpoſe for incurring ſo great a Riſque.

(Signed) Edward Wheler.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, 6th April 1778.

The Governor General delivers in the following Anſwer to Mr. Francis's Objections to the Letter to the Preſidency of Bombay on the 23d March

Governor General—It is not perhaps incumbent upon me to make any Reply to the Minute delivered in by Mr. Francis, objecting to the propoſed Draft of a Letter to the Preſidency of Bombay, as I conceive that all the Points brought by Mr. Francis as Arguments againſt the Inſtructions contained in that Letter, have been fully canvaſſed in my former Minutes upon the State of the Maratta in relation to the Engliſh Government; and I will venture to pronounce, that to an unbiaſſed Reader, it will be proved by thoſe Minutes, and by the Documents on which the Arguments contained in them are founded, and which ſtand upon our Records, that the Seeds of a Combination be-

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en the leading though not the principal Members of the Maratta Adminiſtration, and an Agent o acts under the immediate Inſtructions of the firſt Miniſters of the French Nation, are ſown and ve already taken deep Root; that the Adminiſtration of Poona have treated the Agent of that Na- n with all the Attention due to the Miniſter of an Ally, whilſt they have behaved to ours with an ttention and Diſreſpect which in any European Court would be conſidered as a Diſmiſſion diſ- ceful to the Power he repreſented, and the Conſequence of which would be Satisfaction or War; that even allowing for the Difference of Manners to which ſuch a Conduct to our Miniſter may imputed, the ſtriking Contraſt in their Behaviour to the French Agent, with whoſe Nation I am the whole to underſtand Mr. Francis ſuppoſes them not in Alliance, and to ours to whom they are nd by Treaty, marks too clearly to be doubted, that ſuch Conduct proceeds from ſome deeper uſe than ſimply a Difference of Manners; and laſtly, it will appear that the Treaty of Poorunder, ed the 1ſt of March 1776, have not yet been carried into Execution.

I have repeatedly and in the moſt formal Manner declared, and I again declare it to be my pinion, that ſuch is the State of Affairs at Poona.

It is unneceſſary to ſeek further for the Cauſes of the Difference of Opinion in the Members of Board upon the important Queſtions which have lately been before it. We differ in the Belief the Facts on which our Deciſion is to be founded. Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler appear to be total Inaction; Mr. Barwell and myſelf are for taking ſome Steps which may ſecure us againſt the ect of Intrigues, which we are perſuaded are carrying on at Poona, and we wiſh at the ſame Time what we do ſhould be conſiſtent with the Treaty of Poorunder.

I ſhall now proceed to examine the Nature and Force of the Evidence by which I think the Pro- ſitions I have above laid down are ſupported.

In a Letter from Bombay under Date the 10th May 1777, and entered in our Conſultation of the 16th June, we are informed of the Arrival of a French Gentleman with his Train, who afterwards turned out to be the Chevalier St. Lubin. We are likewiſe informed of the high Reſpect ſhewn to him by the Durbar at Poona, and of the Suſpicion, with the Grounds of it, that the Port of Chowl would be granted by the Miniſters to the French. We find that Mahderow Bullob, an Officer of the Govern- ment, was appointed to tranſact the French Buſineſs.

In another Letter from Bombay, dated the 21ſt June 1777, and entered in Conſultation of the 18th Auguſt, is the following Paragraph:

" We now find that the French Deputy at the Maratta Durbar is no other than the celebrated " Monſieur St. Lubin, and not Monſieur St. Laub, as we at firſt imagined. At his firſt Audience " he was received with a Reſpect and Ceremony greatly ſuperior to what was paid to our Reſident; " The Two Miniſters themſelves, Succaram and Nanah, having gone without the Tent Walls, to " meet him on his alighting from an Elephant provided for him by the Circar, and introduced him " into the Durbar; whereas Mr. Moſtyn was only received by Two inferior Officers, and with " much leſs Ceremony. We have remonſtrated againſt the Indignity ſhewn to the Nation by this " Diſtinction ſhewn to the French, and the Reſtrictions laid on Mr. Moſtyn and his Attendants, ſo " contrary to the Law of Nations, and inſiſted upon their allowing him the ſame Privilege and " Freedom of Communication as heretofore."

In Conſultation the 22d September is entered a Letter from the Bombay Council, encloſing a Paper obtained by Mr. Moſtyn at Poona, from an Engliſhman in St. Lubin's Suite, ſaid to be the Production of his Secretary's Pen; in which it is ſtated, that Monſieur de Sartine was the Miniſter who was entruſted with the Management of the Expedition to India; that he was ſo much intereſted in its Succeſs as to viſit the Ports where the Ships intended for the Expedition lay; that 3,000 Men under the Command of Monſieur Dennas, late Governor of the Iſle of France, were originally intended for the Expedition; that St. Lubin was appointed Miniſter Plenipotentiary to the Maratta Court, and was bound to ſend an Expreſs to Europe upon his Arrival; of which, ſhould the Con- tents be favourable to their Views, the above-mentioned Number of Men would be ſent, &c.

The next Information in Order of Time which came before us, was Mr. Elliott's Letter, which he circulated amongſt the Members of the Board on the 1ſt October, though for the Sake of Secrecy it was not thought proper at that Time to put it upon Record. It is to be found in Conſultation the 2d February. As I mean however this Minute to contain a pretty full Abſtract of the Whole of the Evidence of the French Intrigues, and of the high Authority from which they originate, I ſhall here quote that Part of it which relates to the Objection which I am now writing.

" Having been fortunate enough to obtain ſome Intelligence before I left Europe, in which the " Intereſt of the Eaſt India Company, and the Influence of Great Britain in India, appear to be " deeply intereſted, I think it incumbent on me to take the earlieſt Opportunity of communicating " it to your Honourable Board; I am concerned at the ſame Time to be under the Neceſſity of " laying the Facts only before you without having it in my Power to point out the Channel through " which the Intelligence was conveyed to me, as my Promiſe was moſt particularly taken before I " was myſelf intruſted with it, that I ſhould conceal the Names of the Perſons from whom I re- " ceived the Information: It was not without ſome Difficulty that I obtained Permiſſion to inform " the Governor General and Sir John Clavering of this material Circumſtance, and that only upon " Condition, that they ſhould not truſt it to the Records of the Company, however ſecret they " might be. The Opinions which thoſe Gentlemen muſt form as to the Authenticity of the Facts

" which I now propoſe myſelf the Honour of laying before you, will be a ſufficient Juſtifica
" of me for addreſſing you in this Letter.

" It appears, by the Information to which I allude, that Monſieur Sartine, Miniſtre de la Mar
" of France, has concerted with Three or Four of the principal Miniſters of that Country a Schem
" the Object of which is the total Overthrow of the Engliſh Intereſts in India; that he was ſenſi
" the Force which France could herſelf bring againſt our Settlements would prove inſufficient for
" great an Undertaking, and had therefore thought it neceſſary to the Completion of his Views
" begin by intriguing with the Country Powers, and by endeavouring to ſecure them in the Intere
" of France in Oppoſition to thoſe of Britain; that for this Purpoſe he was reſolved to ſend
" Perſon to India with full Powers, in the Character of Agent; and likewiſe to ſend out Perſo
" who in the Information are called Des Exerceurs, to diſcipline the Natives of India; and a co
" ſiderable Quantity of Arms and Military Stores. The Perſon who was nominated to this Off
" was deſcribed to me as one who had before been in India: He was to go to Pondicherry firſt, b
" to aſſume no public Character, that he might not be ſubject to the Suſpicions of the Engliſh;
" is furniſhed with Letters from the Court of France to all the Country Princes of any Note
" India, to be uſed at his own Diſcretion; he likewiſe carries out Preſents of conſiderable Valu
" which he is to diſtribute as he may judge neceſſary. The Subſtance of his Inſtructions is
" follows: To treat with ſuch of the Country Powers as he may have Reaſon to think will mo
" readily aſſiſt the Views of France, and to form Alliances with them in the Name of the King
" France; to endeavour to perſuade the Country Powers to fall upon the Engliſh Settlements; a
" he is authorized to promiſe ſuch as will accede to his Propoſal, the warmeſt Support of his Nat
" ſecretly, till Hoſtilities are actually commenced, and then openly: He is warned however in h
" Inſtructions, that France is not to take the Lead in the War, but is to come in as an Aſſiſta
" only. The Perſon from whom I learnt theſe Particulars knew for certain that the Agent ſail
" from Marſeilles in the Beginning of April laſt, but was unacquainted with his Name, and unab
" to inform me for certain what Road he had followed to India, but ſeemed to be of Opinion th
" he muſt have paſſed over to Alexandria, in the Intention of embarking at Suez for India.

" Having informed you of what I venture to ſay may be relied on as authentic, it will not b
" miſplaced," &c.

If we had no other Proof of the Authenticity of the Information contained in this Letter, but i agreeing ſo exactly in all the material Facts with the Intelligence tranſmitted to us from Poona, the Paper I have already mentioned, and in the Letters of Mr. Farmer and Mr. Madgett, entered Conſultation the 26th January, I ſhould hold it to be incontrovertible.

The ſame Circumſtances brought from Europe, and traced in the Capital of the Maratta Em pire, upon the ſame Subject, muſt be Facts; the Authenticity of Mr. Elliott's Information does no however, ſingly depend even upon this ſtrong Ground; he takes upon him in his Letter to pronoun it to be authentic, and he has communicated to me, as he would have done to Sir John Clavering had he been alive, which Mr. Elliott thought he was when he drew up the Letter, as will appea from the Terms of it, the Grounds upon which he makes the Declaration; and I now declare tha he has not in the ſmalleſt Degree ſtated the Authenticity of his Information more forcibly than he warranted from the Nature of it. It is not therefore in ſupport of Mr. Elliott's Letter, that I mak the Compariſon between the Intelligence diſcovered in Europe and at Poona; but it is to examine ho far we ſhould give Credit to thoſe Parts of Mr. Madgett's Letter, which are not corroborated b Mr. Elliott's. If the Parts of his Letter which admitted of Proof are aſcertained by that Proof being obtained, we are I think bound to believe that the other Parts of it are equally authentic, i ſupport of which we are ſenſible no Proof could be obtained. The following is an Extract of hi Letter:

" I have heard it repeatedly mentioned by different Gentlemen who were there, that there wa
" ſome written Inſtrument, to one Side of which Nanah ſwore by the Cow, and the other Side Mon
" ſieur St. Lubin ſwore by the Holy Evangeliſt; that Nanah, further, kept the Book Monſieur St
" Lubin ſwore on."

Mr. Farmer in his Letter to Mr. Hornby, an Extract of which is here entered, uſes the following Words on the ſame Subject:

" They all perfectly agree in the Circumſtances of the Summons given to attend at Nanah's to
" witneſs the Treaty. Nanah was ſworn by his Bramin, and St. Lubin by his Padre, and Nanah kept
" the Book."

From the following Extract of our Letter to Bombay, under Date the 20th of October, which is conſiderably before the Letters from Mr. Farmer and Mr. Madgett were received by us, it will ap pear what was the unanimous Opinion of the Board upon the Subject of the French Intrigues. The Words with a Black Stroke under them are in Mr. Francis's Hand Writing. I know not why the great additional Weight of Evidence, brought before the Board ſince that Period, ſhould have made him change his Mind upon this important Subject.

" The Paper of Intelligence obtained by Mr. Moſtyn from a Perſon lately in the Service of
" Monſieur St. Lubin, and encloſed in your Letter of the 2d of Auguſt, has left no room to doub
" of the Commiſſion with which he is charged from the Court of France; and the ſecret Conference
" which he has been admitted to hold with the Poona Government, too ſtrongly indicate that they
" may have hearkened to Negociations of a hoſtile Nature to the Company. Monſieur St. Luba

" remain

" remains ſtill at the Maratta Court, and may poſſibly by this Time have entered into Engagements
" with the Paſhwa of a dangerous Tendency to the Company's Eſtabliſhments; at ſuch a Criſis,
" therefore, every Circumſtance is of Conſequence, and we are under great Anxiety to learn the
" Progreſs of his Negociations."

I delivered in to the Board on the 2d of February 1778, Extracts from the Perſian Correſpondence.

The Evidence contained in thoſe Letters appears to me to amount to Proof.

Saccaram Babboo the firſt Miniſter, and whoſe Name is One of the Two affixed to the Treaty, tells us, that Monſieur St. Lubin is come to Poona with the Character of Miniſter on the Part of the King of France; that he brought a Letter from his Royal Maſter to the Pundit Purdhaun (that is to the Peſhwa) that Friendſhip is the Object of his Negociation. This Letter is from the firſt Miniſter, and eſtabliſhed incontrovertibly the Character in which Monſieur St. Lubin came to India. It cannot then be aſſerted that St. Lubin is an Adventurer. The Nabob of Arcot's Vackeel details to his Maſter what paſſed between the French Agent and the Maratta Miniſter. The whole Letter is worthy of the utmoſt Attention, but I ſhall here quote only the following Words:

" Succaram Pundit then ſaid (to St Lubin) I will appoint ſome Perſon to negociate your Buſineſs
" for you; it muſt be a Perſon who is well verſed in your Affairs; I know of no one qualified for
" this Buſineſs, except Mado Row Sudaſhee." Mr. ——— not reliſhing this Propoſal, made anſwer,
" he is employed in the Negociations with the Engliſh, how is it poſſible we ſhould unite?"

The ſame Vackeel mentions the Chevalier St. Lubin's Deſire, that 10,000 Sepoys ſhould be raiſed to be diſciplined; the Aumil of Guyacawar mentions the ſame Circumſtance. It muſt be obſerved how exactly this agrees with the Information brought by Mr. Elliott from Europe, who ſays, " That
" for this Purpoſe he (Monſieur Sartine) reſolved to ſend a Perſon with full Powers to India, in the
" Character of Agent; and likewiſe to ſend out Perſons who in the Information are called Des Ex-
" erceurs, to diſcipline the Natives of India." I will here, for the ſake of bringing the whole Subject into one Point of View, introduce an Extract of Mr. Madgett's Letter which has been before quoted.

" Military Stores, 15,000 Muſquets, rejected from the King's Service, were ſpared to him at a
" very low Price from the King's Stores, by Means of the Influence of Monſieur de Sartine; Cloth
" of different Sortments and Colours, with a Quantity proper for Facing, formed alſo a Part of the
" Cargo, which, I frequently heard Monſieur de St. Lubin mention, was to clothe the Troops that
" might be raiſed in India for the Purpoſe of the Alliance: Having perhaps forgot it in the Owner's
" Cargo, he perſuaded an Officer in the Ship to get made and bring out a conſiderable Quantity of
" Buttons; the Device of the Buttons was given by Monſieur de St. Lubin; it is a Fleur de Lys in
" a Creſcent, which probably Monſieur de St. Lubin imagined to be the Maratta Standard, and had
" therefore intended it as emblematic of the Alliance."

The Aumil of Guyacawar writes from Poona upon the Subject of the French Agent, " The Ex-
" pences are great; how ſhould he be able to make ſuch Preſents of himſelf? From theſe Circum-
" ſtances it is evident that he is no Impoſtor."

In Mr. Elliott's Letter are the following Words, " He likewiſe carries out Preſents of conſiderable
" Value, which he is to diſtribute as he may judge neceſſary."

Dewagur Pundit, the Duan of Moodajee Booſlah, writes to me, that an experienced Ambaſſador is arrived from France, &c.

In a Letter from Mr. Lewis to the Governor of Bombay, which is recorded in our Conſultation the 16th February, we find, that Chokees were placed upon the Engliſh Factory; and that none of the Engliſh Reſident's People could ſtir without being attended with One or Two; and that the Inſolence of the Chokees was carried ſo far as to have ill treated a Shopkeeper who ſerved the Factory with the common Neceſſaries of Life: The only Satisfaction which the Durbar would give for an Indignity greater than ever was borne by any Nation, was a Declaration that Nanah Furneſſe wanted all Europeans to leave Poona, and that if the Engliſh muſt have a Vackeel there, he thought a Carkoon was enough; we are informed nevertheleſs, that Monſieur de St. Lubin was cloſeted with Nannah Furneſſe for Three Hours on the ſame Day.

The Governor and Council of Bombay in their Inſtructions to Mr. Moſtyn, entered in the ſame Conſultation, direct him to obtain a ſatisfactory Explanation of the Indignity offered to the Company in the Perſon of their Reſident; and to declare to the Durbar, that if they continue to treat their Reſident with the ſame Indignity in future, it will be conſidered as a Breach of the Treaty, &c.

Mr. Moſtyn informs us in his Letter of the 19th January, that he was promiſed an Anſwer to his Complaints in Two Days; on the 13th of January, that he has not only received no Anſwer to his Complaints, but the Chokies are continued on the Factory.

In Anſwer to all this, I am told that I take a Fact for granted without Proof: I have ſtated my Proofs, and I think they are clear and decided, and unleſs we could ſend a Commiſſion to Poona to take the Evidence of the confidential Officers of the Maratta Government, I know not how ſtronger Proofs could be obtained, and I do not conceive, that upon a political Queſtion ſtronger could be required. I will quote the Words uſed by Mr. Francis in a Minute which he circulated on the 1ſt December laſt, from which it will appear what his Opinions were at that Time of the French Deſigns.

" In the preſent Situation of public Affairs, and with the Opinion entertained by every Member of this Board, that the French are meditating Deſigns againſt ſome Part of the Company's Poſſeſſions

" in India, I think we cannot be too watchful in obſerving their Motions, and taking early Precau-
" tions againſt any Attempts they may poſſibly have in View; whether ſuch Attempts be likely to ſuc-
" ceed or not, at this Time every new Appearance on their Part is a juſt Object of Suſpicion."

In the Minute to which I mean this as a Reply, he ſhews, pretty clearly, that he does not ſo totally differ with me in Opinion as he would appear to do; for he apologizes for the Protection given by the Marattas to the French. The Apology which he makes for them is, that our Conduct in the Protection of Ragoba has authorized them to ſeek for Safety in the Arms of our natural Enemy. We do not then differ in the Fact; we only differ in the Cauſes which gave Riſe to the Connection. I ſhall not now enter into an Argument with Mr. Francis upon the Rectitude of Meaſures which are paſt. It will be here ſufficient to ſay, that the Court of Directors made Ragoba's perſonal Safety an indiſpenſable Condition of their Approbation of the Treaty. It will ſcarcely be denied, that ſhould he be delivered up to the Miniſters, or driven naked and defenceleſs from under the Protection of the Britiſh Flag, his Life muſt fall a Sacrifice to ſuch Injuſtice. The Conveyance of Ragonaut Row to Bengal by Sea, has already been under the Conſideration of the Board, and proved to be impracticable. Mr. Francis, I cannot doubt, though he has introduced this Subject by Way of Argument, would ſhudder at the Thought of delivering over a Man, to whom the Britiſh Faith has once been pledged, to certain Death. He ſays, nevertheleſs, that the true Way to defeat the FrenchViews, is to give the Marattas a ſolid Proof of our Friendſhip by diſmiſſing Ragoba. The Connection which he ſuppoſes to be formed between the French and the Marattas, and which he makes the Ground-work of this Propoſal, might poſſibly be diſſolved by adopting it; but if it ſhould not be diſſolved, we ſhould, by an untimely Act of Submiſſion, contrary to Hoſpitality, contrary to the Inſtructions of our Superiors, and contrary to Policy, give additional Strength to that Power which has been proved to be in Combination with our natural Enemies, the French. The perſonal Safety of Ragoba was an implied Article of the Treaty; no Member of this Board will, I apprehend, ſtain the Britiſh Faith with ſo foul a Reproach as to ſuppoſe it was not: If, however, it was not, the Deciſion of the Court of Directors has made it ſo. The Article of the Treaty which relates to his perſonal Reſidence, is incompatible with his perſonal Safety; for it was ſtipulated, that he ſhould reſide in the Heart of the Maratta Dominions. Mr. Francis may argue on this Queſtion, as he has on another, that there is no Proof that his Life would not be ſafe in the Place allotted for his Reſidence. I muſt leave the Deciſion of this Queſtion to the Convict on which every Man will feel upon it in his own Breaſt; and ſhall only ſay, that ſhould we try the Experiment, and the Proof afterwards come, it muſt be ſealed in Blood. Mr. Francis ſeems to dwell upon an Expreſſion uſed in the Preface to the Inſtructions to Bombay. He ſays, that to make uſe of ſuch Efforts as our Means will afford, and as the Treaty will allow, is a Contradiction in Senſe without ſaving Appearances. I am ſorry he ſhould think it worth while to play with Words when deliberating upon the moſt important Queſtions which can come before this Board. It is torturing Words to make them convey a Meaning which they do not apply. The Efforts which our Means will afford muſt be directed by future Events, by Neceſſity, or by Policy. They may be productive of War; but they may be productive of Harmony between the Engliſh and Maratta Government: If they ſhould be hoſtile, it muſt be upon the Principle of no Treaty of Friendſhip and Peace exiſting. The Treaty might allow us to demand the Payment of Twelve Lacks of Rupees for the Expences of the War; it might not however follow, that our Means would allow us to make uſe of ſuch Efforts as might enable us to enforce the Payment of our Due.

I ſhall here reply to that Part of Mr. Francis's Minute which alludes to the Fifth Inſtruction in the Letter to Bombay, becauſe it is connected with the Subject of which I am now treating. The Impreſſion meant to be conveyed by it is, that not having originally approved the Treaty of Poorunder, I was reſolved to break it at all Events. Mr. Francis ſays, that all the late Meaſures originated from the Reſolution of the 2d February; and upon the Truth of this Fact, he appears to reſt his Proof of my Determination on a Breach of Faith.

I ſhould draw this Minute to an unwarrantable Length were I to quote all the Paſſages from my Minutes, prior to that Date which clearly diſprove the Fact aſſerted: I am loth to ſuppoſe that Mr. Francis has made this the Ground-work of his Attack upon my Meaſures, in Hopes that the Papers, which are upon Record, are too voluminous to be read. In Anſwer to what he has ſaid on that Subject, particularly to theſe Words, " The firſt Ground failing, another muſt be aſſumed," I quote the following Extracts from my Minute entered in Conſultation the 26th January, which was prior to the Receipt of the Letter on which the Reſolutions of the 2d February were founded.

" That I may not appear to have drawn too forcible a Concluſion from the late Tranſactions between
" the Miniſters and the Chevalier St. Lubin, I beg Leave to call the Recollection of the Board to a
" Paper delivered to them by Mr. Elliott on the 1ſt of October laſt. From the Compariſon of the
" Intelligence contained in that Paper, and brought immediately from Europe, with the Information
" obtained by Mr. Moſtyn and Mr. Lewis at Poona, and their exact Agreement in the moſt eſſential
" Points, I think it appears beyond a Doubt, that the French Agent there is entruſted with a Plan
" which has for its Object the Subverſion of the Britiſh Influence in India: We are in actual Treaty
" of Friendſhip with the ruling Adminiſtration of the Maratta State; and our Treaty was formed at
" a Time when they were engaged in a War with the Company; from which they were releaſed by
" the Treaty which we granted them, and in the Proſecution of which, had it continued, they muſt

" have

have fallen. The Treaty was concluded by an Officer of Rank, deputed immediately from this Government; and the Attention of every Prince and Chief in Hindoſtan was turned upon this firſt Negociation of the Britiſh Power under the Direction of a general Government: It is diſgraceful to us, that the Government at Poona ſhould in any Situation, pay more Attention, and ſhew more Countenance to an Agent of the natural and known Enemy of our Country than to ours; but when we are informed, that the French Miniſtry have formed a Plan of an offenſive Alliance with the Maratta State; when we are informed that an Agent of the French Miniſtry has been received at Poona, has been treated with the greateſt Confidence and Marks of Diſtinction, while our own is diſregarded; that he has received from them the Grant of a Port of Trade within Twenty Miles of Bombay itſelf; has exchanged mutual Engagements with them, of which his Part is to ſupply them with Arms and a Military Force; and even the common News-papers relate theſe Tranſactions of univerſal Notoriety; what Concluſions are we, who are immediately concerned in them, to form from them? Are we to regard them as the allowable Machinations of political Intrigue, and quietly permit them to operate to their laſt Effect, if the Marattas commit no overt Act of Hoſtility, or direct Breach of the Treaty? Or ſhall we conſider the Preparations to a War as declaratory of an intended Breach of Treaty, and take ſuch Meaſures as the Neceſſity of ſuch a Situation demands for enſuring and confirming the Treaty, and giving it that Vigour which it yet confeſſedly wants? Or, if that ſhould prove impracticable, even to prevent the Deſigns of our Enemies, by openly counteracting and oppoſing them?

"That a Remonſtrance be made to the Miniſters againſt the Countenance afforded by them to the Chevalier St. Lubin, againſt the Engagements we underſtand have been formed with him, and againſt the Grant of the Port of Chowl, made as we underſtand to him, or to the French Nation through him; that though we do not inſiſt on any poſitive Right to demand his Diſmiſſion, nor the Excluſion of the French from the Port of Chowl, yet as we have a Right to require a Knowledge of the Intentions of the Miniſters in regard to theſe Points, ſo far as they reſpect the Treaty of Peace ſubſiſting between the Maratta State and the Britiſh Government in India, a clear and ſatisfactory Explanation be demanded of their Intentions; and that a Declaration be made to them, that we ſhall take ſuch Meaſures accordingly as Prudence ſhall dictate for the future Safety of the Company's Intereſts and Poſſeſſions committed to our Charge."

I ſhould apologize for the extreme Length of this Minute, and for the Number of Quotations I have been under the Neceſſity of making from our Records, with which every Member of the Board muſt be ſuppoſed to be acquainted, but the haſty Manner in which Mr. Francis accuſes me of introducing ſuppoſed Facts, as uſual, without Proof; and the Aſſertion which he makes, that the Cauſes of Complaint, on which the Letter urges a Quarrel, are trifling and exaggerated; and that the Facts it refers to are clearly diſapproved, or taken for granted without Evidence, has forced me in my own Defence to diſprove the Aſſertions of Mr. Francis.

Let Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler weigh the Force of Evidence upon which the Proof of the Combination between the French and Marattas is founded. Should they hereafter ſee the Armies and Fleets of France in Alliance with the Marattas, the Offſpring of the preſent Intrigues, and their propoſed Inaction, triumphing over the Engliſh Settlements in the Weſtern Parts of India, it would be a ſad Excuſe to their Country and to themſelves, to ſay, "We had no Proof that it would be ſo."

I am well aware of the innumerable Cauſes which may ariſe between this Time and the Period intended for the Execution of this Plan, to prevent its being executed at all; had I the ſame Conviction that the Plan would be carried into Execution, as I have that it exiſts, I ſhould not have propoſed that Troops ſhould be ſent to reinforce our Settlement at Bombay, but I ſhould have propoſed, that Engliſh Armies from Calpee and Bombay ſhould have met at Poona. I do not therefore act upon the Conviction that the French will ſend out Armies to India for the Purpoſe of effecting our Overthrow; I acknowledge the Chapter of Accidents to be open, and that it is a voluminous one. I am convinced however that when Monſieur St. Lubin was diſpatched from France, it was the Intention of that Government to back his Negociations by Force; and, as far as human Foreſight can lead us, we have every Reaſon to think that the French Adminiſtration will do every Thing they intended, for St. Lubin's Negociations appear to have been much more ſucceſsful than their moſt ſanguine Expectations could have permitted them to hope. The Line I have taken in Conjunction with Mr. Barwell is ſtrictly conſiſtent with theſe Principles; we tell the Miniſters, that if they do not give us a clear and ſatisfactory Explanation of their Intentions, we ſhall take ſuch Meaſures accordingly as Prudence ſhall dictate, &c.

This Declaration does not in any Shape commit us. Prudence may dictate us the Neceſſity of reinforcing our Settlement at Bombay, and no more. Such a Declaration may however alarm the Adminiſtration at Poona, and make them act with more good Faith towards thoſe with whom they are in Alliance; the Requiſition for Permiſſion that our Troops ſhall paſs through their Country, will give this Declaration additional Weight; and I think it is more than probable, that ſhould Nanah Furneſe, the Patron of the French, ſtill wiſh to ſupport the Views of that Nation, he will be checked by Succaram Baboo, and his other Colleagues in Office. This leads me to anſwer the Part of Mr. Francis's Minute, where he aſks, What is meant to be done ſhould the Marattas refuſe a Paſſage to our Troops through their Country? Future Events muſt decide this Queſtion; the Detachment is not yet marched; when it does march it may take another Road, or march but a Part of the Way. It is no Declaration of War to aſk a free Paſſage for our Troops, from one of our Set-

tlements to another; and I will never give my Conſent to a Declaration of War, or to any Act which is equal to it, againſt the Marattas, whilſt they maintain their Faith to us, or whilſt we are not obliged to act in our own Defence. The Advantages of our military Preparations muſt at all Events be acknowledged. If the Detachment reaches Bombay, it ſecures that Settlement againſt every Effort with which the French and Maratta Intrigues appear to be pregnant. If it ſhould ſtop in the Country of the Rajah of Berar, Poona will be between an Engliſh Army at Bombay and another in Berar. Its March may be ſuſpended, or it may be rendered wholly unneceſſary, by Advices received from Bombay, that the Members of that Preſidency have of themſelves effected the Purpoſes for which it was formed, either before the Detachment has made a conſiderable Progreſs, or poſſibly before it has even moved from the Ground of its firſt Station. But even in theſe Caſes it may have been productive of ſome Advantage by the Confidence excited in our Friends, and by the Impreſſion which the Rumour of ſo powerful a Reinforcement may have made on the Minds of a weak, unconſtitutional, and divided Miniſtry; which abandoning all its Hopes in the French Alliance, may chuſe, on any Terms, to ſolicit ours as their only Reſource; or to yield into their Hands, for the Condition of perſonal Safety, a Power which they are unable to retain.

I ſhall now endeavour to prove my Third Propoſition, that the Treaty of Poorunder paſſed on the 1ſt March 1777 is not yet executed; which will at the ſame Time anſwer the only Part of Mr. Francis's Minute which remains unanſwered.

The firſt Proof which is produced in that Minute in ſupport of the Opinion, that the Treaty is executed, is, that we are in Poſſeſſion of Salſette, and the Maratta Share of the City and Purgunnah of Broach.

It would be ſtrange indeed if we were not: We were in Poſſeſſion of them when the Treaty was concluded, and nothing but Force could have wreſted them from us; and that Force muſt have been greater than the whole Maratta Empire, unſupported by an European Alliance, could have brought againſt us. This is not a very ſtriking Inſtance to produce of the Maratta good Faith.

It is ſtipulated in the Treaty that Salſette and the other Iſlands ſhould remain in our Poſſeſſion. The only Way by which this Condition of the Treaty could be accompliſhed was by Silence and Acquieſcence; but the Treaty was ſcarcely ſigned when the Miniſters reclaimed thoſe Ceſſions, and have ſince repeated the Requiſition not as a Point of Option but of Right, with an Intimation too ſtrongly implied to be miſunderſtood, that at a proper Time they would uſe Force to recover it; yet Mr. Francis inſtances this as One Condition of the Treaty which has been accompliſhed: Surely it has not.

The 5th Article of the Treaty entitles us to a Country of Three complete Lacks of Rupees, &c. &c. This Article is not executed; and Mr. Francis acknowledges it, for he ſays, "The complete Execution of the Treaty has only been retarded by a Diſpute about the literal Meaning of "the *Kaumil Jumma*, &c." Mr. Francis ſays, "That in our Letter of the 18th Auguſt, we declared that we underſtood the Term to mean a Groſs Revenue;" which he thinks decides the Diſpute againſt us: By no Means; Mr. Francis has miſtaken or forgotten the Point in Diſpute. It is not a Groſs Revenue of Three Lacks which the Miniſter offers, for that we ſhould have accepted, but Lands which ſtand rated in the Books at a Revenue of Three Lacks. Our Inſtructions to the Preſidency of Bombay upon this Article in the Letter quoted by Mr. Francis, are ſtrictly conſonant to thoſe which we have now given, as will appear from the Peruſal of both.

Mr. Francis aſks, "Is it meant that we ſhould go to War? &c." The Inſtructions direct the Council of Bombay to aſcertain the Right; if we are wrong to relinquiſh our Demands, if we are right to inſiſt on our Right; and if not admitted to declare it a Breach of Treaty. It is extraordinary that if upon Proof it appears that we have Rights, that we ſhould relinquiſh thoſe Rights becauſe they are controverted by the Marattas. It is not very conſiſtent with the Honour of this Government to yield at ſo critical a Time to the Dictates of an Ally, the Terms of whoſe Alliance are not yet compleated. To declare it will be a Breach of Treaty is not a Declaration of War, but it is a Declaration that we have a Right to go to War, and will I have no Doubt be ſufficient to ſecure us our Right, unleſs the Marattas ſhall be ſupported by an European Ally.

Though I am not fond of commenting, I cannot help taking Notice of a Word uſed by Mr. Francis, in the Part of his Minute which alludes to the Execution of the 5th Article of the Treaty. He ſays, "The complete Execution of the 5th Article of the Treaty has *only* been retarded by "a Diſpute about the literal Meaning of the Words *Kaumil Jumma*." Any one not acquainted with the Subject would infer from this Expreſſion that the Execution of the Treaty was delayed, till by looking into a Dictionary we could aſcertain the Meaning of a Word. The Treaty has been concluded upwards of Two Years, and this Article by Mr. Francis's Confeſſion is not yet accompliſhed. How long would he permit it to remain ſo?

He ſays, "We retain Chickley, Corial, and ſeveral other Places, and enjoy the Revenue thereof "as Pledges till the Sunnuds for the Country of Three Lacks can be made out."

We do not hold the Places he mentions as a Pledge: They are the Ceſſions made to us by Futty Sing, and are our Property, as will be ſeen in my Anſwer to Mr. Francis's Objection to the Third Inſtruction.

The 6th Article of the Treaty is equally unaccompliſhed. The Marattas agree to pay us Six Lacks within Six Months of the Date of the Treaty, and Six Lacks within Two Years of the ſame Date, which laſt Period expired on the Firſt of laſt Month.

Mr. Francis appears to object to the Inſtructions propoſed for enforcing the Execution of this Article, upon a Reliance that they will not be read by thoſe who read his Objections. To contraſt his Objection with the Inſtructions is the ſhorteſt, but I am ſure the moſt concluſive of all Replies to his Obſervation.

Inſtruction.	Obſervation.
2d. " We direct that you demand immediate Payment of the Sum of Twelve Lacks of Rupees, due by the Sixth Article of the Treaty, or of ſo much of it as ſtill remains unpaid; and that the Purgunnah of Jambooſeer be thereupon reſtored to the Miniſters, *unleſs you ſhall have accepted of the ſame as an Aſſignment under ſuch Engagements as ſhall have abſolved them from the literal Performance of that Article, and thoſe Engagements have been fulfilled on their Part*; and if they ſhall refuſe to comply with the Demands ſo made to them, that you declare their Refuſal to be a Breach of the Treaty."	" The Second Inſtruction orders a peremptory " Demand of the Twelve Lacks which the Ma- " rattas conſented to pay us towards the Expences " of the War. Is it meant that we ſhall renew " the War for the immediate Payment of this " whole Sum, while the Revenues of Jambooſeer " are mortgaged to us for the gradual Liquidation " of it?"

It will ſcarcely be denied, that a temporary Mortgage of an open Country from one Nation to another, is not equal to ready Money, which was our original Agreement. War would mutually eaſe us from all our Engagements, and the mortgaged Country would be as much theirs as ours; but a Sum of Money in our own Treaſury would be indiſputably our own. I leave others, leſs unbiaſſed in their Opinions than my Opponent, to judge from this Minute of the Security we have, that Peace will long exiſt between the Engliſh and Maratta Governments.

The Deciſion that Futty Sing had a Right to make the Ceſſions he made to us, contained in the third Inſtruction, is likely, Mr. Francis ſays, to make the Eſtabliſhment of a laſting Peace impoſſible.

To our Letter of the 18th Auguſt I refer for a Reply to this Objection; it was a Letter written by the unanimous Conſent of the Board, and the Line with a black Stroke under it, is in the Hand Writing of Mr. Francis. An attentive Reader will perceive, that the Line to which I allude to forms the moſt forcible Part of the Argument in favour of our retaining the Ceſſions, as it is meant to prove that Futty Sing's Evidence did not make againſt our Right.

" We enclose for your Information Copies and Tranſlations of a Letter written by Futty Sing, in reply to a Reference made to him by Colonel Upton on the Subject of his Right to alienate any Territories dependent on him, and of Sunnuds granted at divers Times to the Guicawars. This Letter from Futty Sing, though it evades a poſitive and direct Anſwer to the Point in queſtion, ſeems to diſavow any Right in him to alienate theſe Poſſeſſions; but the Concerns which he has in the Queſtion makes his perſonal Evidence very ſuſpicious (eſpecially in the preſent Inſtance, in which it is oppoſed to his own perſonal Act) ſince whatever is relinquiſhed by the Company will revert to him.

" By the Tenure on which all Jagheery Poſſeſſions are held, we doubt whether any Part of them can be legally alienated for ever by the Jagheerdar, but we are not ſufficiently informed if the Lands poſſeſſed by the Guicawar Family are of this Nature. The Anſwer to the 7th Requeſt, contained in the 4th Sunnud, ſeems to allow of a Right in them to diſpoſe of their own Diſtricts in any Manner they pleaſed, without obtaining the ſpecial Concurrence of the Paiſhwa.

" The Requeſt and Anſwer are as follow:

" 7th Requeſt. I ſhall commence War againſt the independent Moguls who have Eſtabliſhments in my Share, and recover my Poſſeſſions from them at my own Expence; let not the Government concern itſelf with them.

" Anſwer. Should you take any Meaſures with reſpect to thoſe Diſtricts which are your own Share, the Government has no Concern in it.

" Agreed accordingly.

" Although the Inference which we draw from this Paſſage is not concluſive, yet we think it ſufficient to juſtify you in retaining Poſſeſſion of the Diſtricts ceded by Futty Sing, until clear Proof ſhall be afforded by him or by the Miniſter, that he had no Right to make thoſe Ceſſions. The Detention of the Country for a few Months longer, ſuppoſing it ſhould at laſt be reſtored to Futty Sing, will be no Breach of the Treaty on our Part, as long as any material Articles of it remain unexecuted on theirs."

I have now I think anſwered every Thing advanced in Oppoſition to the late Inſtructions to Bombay.

Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler may perhaps conſider themſelves as little reſponſible for Voices, ſuch as the Voices of a Minority, are not effectual. Mr. Barwell and myſelf are in different Situations.

Situations. I could wiſh to have been joined by every Member of the Board on this Occaſion, becauſe I think Unanimity would add Vigour to our diſtant Meaſures; and I hold them reſponſible for whatever Effects may be produced by their Oppoſition.

Mr. Francis—I beg Leave to offer a few ſhort Obſervations on the preceding Minute: They are meant for Explanation only, and not to continue the Argument at a Point of Time when Argument is uſeleſs.

1. With reſpect to the ſuppoſed Connection between the Marattas and the French, and which is ſaid to aim at our Ruin and Extirpation, the Governor General aſſerts, *that we do not differ in the Fact*, for that I have admitted "that our Conduct in the Protection of Ragoba has authorized them to ſeek "for Safety in the Arms of our natural Enemies." The Words in my former Minute, from which this Concluſion is drawn, are as follows, "While the Pretender to their Government is ſupported by "us, we give them too much Cauſe for looking to France for Aſſiſtance. The preſent Meaſures, if "carried into Execution, will leave them without a Choice." I ſubmit to Judgment, whether theſe Words have Relation to Events which I expect to follow from the Syſtem we are now purſuing, or to Events which have already taken place?

2. The Paſſage quoted from my Minute of the 21ſt of December related to the Number of French Ships at that Time at Chandernagore, and to the Neceſſity of guarding this Country againſt the Deſigns which that Appearance ſeemed to indicate. I have uniformly and repeatedly declared my Opinion, that Bengal is not in a State of Defence; and I have this Reaſon, in addition to every other for oppoſing a Reſolution, which not only tends to provoke a War without Neceſſity, but immediately weakens us in that Quarter, where all is at ſtake, and where our chief Strength ſhould be collected.

3. When I propoſed that Ragoba ſhould be diſmiſſed from Bombay, I never meant, and Mr. Haſtings knows it well, that he ſhould be delivered up a Sacrifice to his Enemies; he has no Right to ſuppoſe that I have departed from the Opinion, in which the Board was unanimous on the 18th of Auguſt laſt, when the Queſtion concerning the Proviſion to be made for Ragoba's perſonal Safety, was thoroughly diſcuſſed, and our Sentiments united thereupon; I deſire to be underſtood to adhere to the Terms of our Letter of the 18th of Auguſt, to the Council of Bombay on this Subject.

4. The Words of our Letter of that Date, and of the 20th of October, which the Governor General ſtates to be in my Hand-writing, were intended to correct and qualify other Expreſſions in the Secretary's original Draught, which appeared to me too ſtrong. I deem it highly irregular and uncandid to attribute to me excluſively or particularly, any Language or Opinions, which the Board, by their unanimous Concurrence and Aſſent, have adopted and made their own: To obtain that Concurrence in queſtion, ſomething, I believe, was given up on both Sides. Since however the Governor General has quoted the Correction as it ſtands in my Writing, it is proper that the original Draught may be compared with thoſe which I ſubſtituted in the room of them.

18th October 1777.

Original Draught.	Alteration agreed to.
This Letter from Futty Sing, though *very illuſive*, &c.	though it evades a poſitive and direct Anſwer to the Point in Queſtion, &c.

20th October 1777.

Monſieur St. Lubin remains ſtill at the Maratta Court, and *may probably by this Time have formed an Alliance with the Paiſhwa of the moſt dangerous Tendency to the Company's Eſtabliſhments.*	"*and may poſſibly by this Time have entered into Engagements with the Paiſhwa of a dangerous Tendency to the Company's Eſtabliſhments.*"

(Signed) P. Francis.

Warren Haſtings,
Richard Barwell,
P. Francis,
Edwd Wheler.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 15th April 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Eſquire, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler,
} Eſquires.

The Governor General delivers in the following Minute in Reply to Mr. Francis's of the 10th inſtant; and deſires that it may be ſent round to the Members of the Board for their Peruſal.

Mr.

Mr. Francis—

10th April 1778.

I beg Leave to offer a few ſhort Obſervations in the preceding Minute; they are meant for Explanation only, and not to continue the Argument at a Point of Time when Argument is uſeleſs.

1ſt. With Reſpect to the ſuppoſed Connection between the Marattas and the French, and which is ſaid to aim at our Ruin and Extirpation, the Governor General aſſerts that, *we do not differ in the Fact*, for that I have admitted "That our Conduct in the Protection of Ragoba has authorized them to ſeek for Safety in the Arms of our natural Enemy." The Words in my former Minute from which this Concluſion is drawn, are as follow: "While the Pretender to their Government is ſupported by us, we give them too much Cauſe for looking to France for Aſſiſtance: The preſent Meaſures, if carried into Execution, will leave them without a Choice." I ſubmit to your Judgment, whether theſe Words have Relation to Events, which I expect to follow from the Syſtem we are now purſuing, or to Events which have already taken Place?

2d. The Paſſage quoted from my Minute of the 21ſt of December, related to the Number of French Ships at that Time at Chandernagore, and to the Neceſſity of guarding this Country againſt the Deſigns which that Appearance ſeemed to indicate. I have uniformly and repeatedly declared my Opinion, that Bengal is not in a State of Defence; and I have this Reaſon in Addition to every other, for oppoſing a Reſolution which not only tends to provoke a War without Neceſſity, but immediately weakens us in that Quarter where all is at ſtake, and where our chief Strength ſhould be collected.

Governor General—

My Reply to Mr. Francis's Obſervations, dated the 10th Inſtant, on my Minute of the 6th, ſhall be very ſhort; and to avoid the Embarraſſment of Quotations, I ſhall here inſert his Obſervations at large with my own upon them in the oppoſite Column.

1ſt. The Words quoted by Mr. Francis from his Minute have certainly, in the plain and obvious Conſtruction of them, a Relation to Events which have already taken place ſince the Aſylum granted to Ragoba, which I underſtand to be intended by the Words "While the Pretender to "their Government is ſupported by us," is of a Date as old as the Treaty, and of courſe the Conſequence inferred from it by Mr. Francis, muſt allude to the paſt, not to the future. Whether the Protection granted to Ragoba was conſiſtent with good Faith, or contrary to it, is not now the Queſtion. I have aſſerted as a Fact, that the Miniſters had looked to France for Aſſiſtance, and Mr. Francis not denying the Fact, has barely aſſigned a Reaſon for it; I am therefore juſtified in ſaying, that *we do not differ in the Fact.*

2d. The whole Tenor of Mr. Francis's Minute of the 1ſt (not the 21ſt) December, was intended to prove, that the French had Deſigns againſt our Poſſeſſions in India. The Circumſtance which at that Time attracted his Attention, and which he thought indicated ſuch Deſigns, was the Number of French Ships lying at Chandernagore: It was my Opinion delivered then, and formed many Years before Mr. Francis came into the Country, that either the French would never attempt the Invaſion of Bengal by Sea, or if they did they muſt immediately fail in it, in conſequence of the natural Difficulties which, independent of other Cauſes, would oppoſe it. In Oppoſition to Mr. Francis's preſent Opinion, I declare it to be mine, that *Bengal is now in a better State of Defence* than it ever has been ſince the Engliſh were intereſted in its Safety; that its beſt Defence againſt the French is to render their Deſigns abortive before their Execution; and that if they do exiſt, as Mr. Francis himſelf ſuppoſes, it is a better Policy "to provoke the War," to uſe his Words, if ſuch muſt be the Conſequence of our preſent Meaſures, than to wait till they are ripe for Action, and have every Engine prepared that can enſure their Succeſs againſt us.

But I preſume it is now no longer neceſſary to dwell on this Argument. However doubtful the Suppoſition of the French Engagements with the preſent Rulers of the Maratta State were at the Commencement of this Conteſt, or even when Mr. Francis wrote the Minute before me, that Suppoſition is now reduced to a Certainty, if any Evidence can make it ſo. It is long ſince I acquainted the Board with the Intention of Monſieur Bellcombe to viſit the Malabar Coaſt, and verbally ſince of his actual Departure from Pondicherry. The laſt Letter from the Preſidency of Bombay, dated the 8th of March,

confirms this Report, and expreſſes their Opinion in Terms to which I think Mr. Francis himſelf will now ſubſcribe, that the Deſign of Monſieur Bellcombe "is not merely to ſuperviſe a "Settlement of ſo little Importance as Myhie, "which, they hear, is the avowed Motive; but "is rather occaſioned by the Negociations of "Monſieur de St. Lubin."

With the Duplicate of the ſame Diſpatches I received a Letter from Mr. Hornby, of a later Date, expreſſing the ſame Apprehenſion; and adding, that he had juſt heard a Captain in the Portugueſe Service ſay, "that the Governor of "Goa had written to him, that he expected Mon-"ſieur Bellcombe there."

To theſe Authorities I ſhall add that of Mr. Rumbold, on the following Extract of a Letter, which I have received from him, dated the 23d of March. "Monſieur Bellcombe embarked "ſome Time ago with One hundred Europeans, "ſome Artillery, and a Quantity of Stores on "a Frigate. We have ſince heard of their Arrival "at Mahé, on the Malabar Coaſt. Before he "left Pondicherry, he wrote the Nabob, that "having received Orders from his Court to viſit "all the Garriſons in India belonging to his "moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, he was entering "upon that Service, and would be abſent from "Pondicherry about Five Months; it is not "improbable but he intends ſome Aſſiſtance to "the Marattas."

It is not without Heſitation that I make this Uſe of a private Communication; but it appears to me ſo concluſive of the Deſigns which have been long imputed to the French, that I have thought I could not with Propriety withhold it from the Knowledge of the Board, for whoſe Information, and not for the Maintenance of an Argument, I have given it a Place in this Minute. What may be the real Object of Monſieur Bellcombe will be better ſhewn by the Event, which cannot be very remote, than by any Reaſoning upon Appearances; but theſe will at leaſt juſtify the preſent Concluſion, that if a War ſhould enſue, we cannot have provoked it by any Acts ſubſequent to them, and I have only advanced to meet it.

3d. When I propoſed that Ragoba ſhould be diſmiſſed from Bombay, I never meant, and Mr. Haſtings knows it well, that he ſhould be delivered up a Sacrifice to his Enemies: He has no Right to ſuppoſe that I have departed from the Opinion, in which the Board was unanimous on the 18th of Auguſt laſt, when the Queſtion concerning the Proviſion to be made for Ragoba's perſonal Safety was thoroughly diſcuſſed, and our Sentiments united thereupon. I deſire to be underſtood to adhere to the Terms of our Letter of the 18th of Auguſt to the Council at Bombay on this Subject.

3d. To diſmiſs Ragoba from Bombay without Proviſion made for his perſonal Safety, to diſmiſs him with ſuch a Proviſion only made for his Safety as cannot avail him, and to deliver him up a Sacrifice to his Enemies, are in my Senſe of them Propoſitions of ſynonymous Import. I had proved in a former Minute, that One of the Proviſions, ſuggeſted in our Letter of the 18th Auguſt, to the Council of Bombay, for the Safety of Ragoba, was totally impracticable; of the other, that is the Faith of Toccajee Holcar and Madajee Sindia pledged for his ſafe Paſſage through their Territories, no Trial had been made; and Mr. Francis muſt allow that it was at leaſt capable of valid Objections, but without having deigned to make any other Reply to my Proofs, except a Trait of Ridicule, by which he affected to repreſent this Government as precipitately reſolving on a War with the united Provinces of France and the Maratta Empire in Defence of the religious Scruples of

4th. The Words of our Letter of that Date, d of the 20th October, which the Governor neral ſtates to be in my Hand Writing, were ended to correct and qualify other Expreſſions the Secretary's original Draft which appeared me too ſtrong. I deem it highly irregular and candid to attribute to me, excluſively or parti-larly, any Language or Opinions which the ard by their unanimous Concurrence and Aſſent ve adopted and made their own. To obtain t Concurrence in the Inſtance in queſtion, ſome-ng I believe was given up on both Sides. Since vever the Governor General has quoted the rrection as it ſtands in my Writing, it is pro- that the Words in the original Draft may be pared with thoſe which I ſubſtituted in the m of them.

8th October 1777.

Original Draft.	Alteration agreed to.
This Letter from Fut-Sing, though *very il-ſive*, &c.	—"*though it evades a poſitive and direct Anſwer to the Point in queſtion*," &c.
20th October 1777. Monſieur de St. Lu-remains ſtill at the ratta Court, and *may bably by this Time have med an Alliance with Peiſhwa of the moſt gerous Tendency to the npany's Eſtabliſhments.*	*and may poſſibly by this Time have entered into Engagements with the Peiſhwa of a dangerous Tendency to the Company's Eſtabliſhments.*

Ragonaut Row. If I have treated this as equivalent to a Propoſition made for the Sacrifice of Ragoba to his Enemies, for I do not know the preciſe Words of my Minute, I muſt ſtill abide by the ſame Conſtruction of it.

4th. Mr. Francis is too liberal in the Uſe which he makes of the Words "Candour and Regularity." After having in the preceding Paragraph quoted for the Third or Fourth Time my Opinion, as it was included in the Letter written to Bombay on the 18th of Auguſt laſt, he has no Right to charge me in ſuch ſtrong Terms with want of Candour and Regularity in quoting his Opinions, as included in our Letter of the 18th and 20th of October. It was not my Intention to attribute thoſe Opinions to Mr. Francis excluſively, but to ſhew that they were not the Sentiments of a Majority in Oppoſition to his; for which Purpoſe I appealed to his Hand Writing in the Draft of the Letter. That theſe were his Opinions at that Time he does not deny, nor do I contend for more. The Quotations of the original Drafts do not contain the Evidence for which they ſeem to have been intended, ſince the Firſt Draft, and his Corrections of it, are in Senſe the ſame; the 1ſt Inſtance being no more than the Change of a ſingle Word for a Periphraſis, I own of more Preciſion, and perhaps of Elegance; and the latter of the Words *probably* for *poſſibly*, and *Alliance* for *Engagements*.

(Signed) W. H.

Warren Haſtings,
Rich[d] Barwell.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 27th April 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edw[d] Wheler,
} Eſquires.

The Governor General's Minute, recorded in the Conſultation of the 15th Inſtant, having been culated agreeable to his Deſire, Mr. Francis wrote the following in Reply to it; a Copy of which s ſent a Number in the Reſolution's Packet.

I will not continue to argue a Queſtion on which I have already ſubmitted to Judgment. If the rent of the preſent Meaſures ſhould ever force an Enquiry into the Origin and Motives of them; e Merit of thoſe Perſons, who have promoted or oppoſed them, will not be tried by nice verbal ſtinctions, or by torturing particular Expreſſions in Debate to a Senſe inconſiſtent with the general inciples, avowed Opinions, and uniform Conduct of thoſe who uſe them. The Inquiry will mmence at the Source of the Meaſures in queſtion. The Part unanimouſly taken by this Council the firſt Inſtance, that is when the Treaty between Ragoba and the Preſidency of Bombay was ſt communicated to us, will be compared with the Ideas which have ſince been adopted by ſome embers of the Board on the ſame Subject, and with the Meaſures lately reſolved on and now in tecution. A careful Review of our Debates will lead to a deciſive Judgment on that Point, which

it

it is moſt material to the Governor General to eſtabliſh on ſolid Grounds; viz. That the Evidence on which it has been reſolved to ſend One Fourth of our whole military Eſtabliſhment from the Frontiers of Oude to Bombay, is direct, authentic, and material. Much Pains have been taken to collect it, and very high Colourings induſtriouſly given, as I think, to Facts of little Moment. There muſt be a Diſtreſs for Evidence when Recourſe is had to private Letters, eſpecially in a Caſe where, if the Intelligence contained in them had been thought of Conſequence, it would naturally have been communicated to us through the regular Channel. Mr. Rumbold tells Mr. Haſtings, "that Monſieur Bellcombe had embarked from Pondicherry with One hundred Euro. "peans, and ſome Artillery and Stores, and that it is not improbable but he intends ſome Aſſiſt. "ance to the Marattas." And Mr. Hornby ſays, "that he had juſt heard a Captain in the Por. "tugueze Service ſay, that Monſieur Bellcombe was expected at Goa." Neither the Facts nor the Evidence are worth diſputing; nor do I think it eſſential to our Safety to aſcertain the Deſtination of an Armament of One hundred Men. It is probable enough that ſome low French Agents have been intriguing with the Marattas, and it is not impoſſible that they may have had Hopes given them of being allowed an Eſtabliſhment on that Coaſt. Such Eſtabliſhment, however, has not yet been granted them, nor would it ever if good Faith on our Part were preſerved to the Marattas. They can have no Motive for introducing the French into their Country, but to protect themſelves againſt that Spirit of Conqueſt which prevails in our Councils, and which they ſee is never to be ſatisfied.

The Governor General has quoted Part of the laſt Letter from the Preſidency of Bombay, dated the 8th March, to ſhew that the Deſign of Monſieur Bellcombe is occaſioned by the Negociations of Monſieur St. Lubin. What his Deſigns may be I know not, but I believe it would be very little in his Power to injure us, if it appeared by our Conduct to the Marattas that we were ſincerely diſpoſed to keep the Peace with them. There is another Paſſage in the above Letter which I muſt beg Leave to point out to the Attention of the Court of Directors, as it ſhews with what Eagerneſs Evidence is ſought for in ſupport of particular Views, and how readily any Evidence, with that Tendency, is accepted.

On the 23d February Mr. Haſtings aſſerted at the Board, *that it was notorious the French were in Poſſeſſion of Choul.* If it were ſo, they muſt have had Poſſeſſion Six Weeks at leaſt before the Intelligence of the Fact could have reached us, that is about the Middle of January; yet on the 8th March the Preſidency of Bombay tells us, "they much fear Monſieur Bellcombe's Viſit *will be* fol. "lowed by the French taking Poſſeſſion of Choul."

Whatever Difference of Opinion may now exiſt between the Governor General and me on the Subject of our Connection with the Marattas, and the Conduct we have obſerved to them, there certainly have been Times in which we were agreed. There was a Time when he thought * "the "Meaſures adopted by the Preſidency of Bombay had a Tendency to a very extenſive and indefinite "Scene of Troubles, and that their Conduct was *unſeaſonable, impolitic, unjuſt*, and *unauthorized.*" It is alſo not very long ago ſince he thought † "that there was no Reaſon to doubt, that the Preſence "of Ragoba at Bombay would continue to be an inſuperable Bar to the Completion of the Treaty "concluded with the Maratta Government, and that no ſincere Cordiality and good Underſtanding "could be eſtabliſhed with them, as long as he ſhould appear to derive Encouragement and Support "from the Engliſh."

* Vide Mr. Haſtings' Minute, 31ſt May 1775.

† Letter to Bombay, Aug. 1777.

If the Governor General departs from theſe Opinions I am not bound to follow him; if he adheres to them, we are agreed. In either Caſe he is bound to prove, that the Meaſures he now purſues are not built on thoſe which he has heretofore ſolemnly condemned.

(Signed) P. Francis.

The above Minute having been circulated, the Governor General wrote the following in conſequence; a Copy of which was alſo ſent a Number in the Reſolution's Packet.

I ſtill adhere to the Opinions delivered by me on the 31ſt May 1775, and on the 18th of Auguſt 1777; they have no Relation, at leaſt none apparent to me, to the preſent Argument. It is not neceſſary that we ſhould withhold our Support of the Company's Intereſts under Charge of the Preſidency of Bombay, becauſe we had Occaſion to cenſure their Conduct in the Year 1775, or becauſe Expedients were recommended by us in the Month of Auguſt 1777 for the Removal of Ragoba from Bombay, and for a Proviſion for his perſonal Safety as the Means of it. This is all that I think it requiſite to add, in Reply to the Minute laſt written by Mr. Francis. For the reſt I rely on the growing Evidence of Facts, on the Events yet depending and perhaps not very remote, and on the ſuperior Knowledge of the French Deſigns which is poſſeſſed by thoſe who are to be the ultimate Judges of our Conduct.

(Signed) Warren Haſtings.

APPENDIX, N° 42.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 6th April 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler,
} Eſquires.

THE Governor General lays before the Board the following Drafts, which he has prepared, of Inſtructions to Colonel Leſlie, and of a Letter to the Preſident and Council of Bombay, for their conſideration and Approval:

Draft of Inſtructions to Colonel Leſlie.

1ſt. Having thought proper to inveſt you with the Command of the Troops deſtined to reinforce the Preſidency of Bombay, we direct you to proceed with the ſame under your Charge, by the moſt convenient and practicable Route to Bombay, or to ſuch other Place as you ſhall be directed to by the Preſident and Council of that Preſidency. We judge the Road through Bundlecund and the Province of Berar the moſt eligible, on account of our Connection with the Raja of Berar; and recommend it preferably to any other, unleſs his Anſwers to the Letters which have been written to him by our Preſident for that Purpoſe, ſhall expreſs a Diſinclination to allow a Paſſage to the Detachment through his Territories; in which Caſe your own Judgment, and the Opportunities of nearer Enquiry, will beſt enable you to chuſe your own Road. You will make it your firſt Care to reconcile the Chief of the Country through which it may lie, to your March; but if he ſhall refuſe his Aſſent, we authorize you to proſecute it, even againſt Oppoſition; obſerving the Rules hereinafter preſcribed for ſuch Caſes, if ever they ſhall happen.

2d. From the Day on which you ſhall begin your March, you will obey all Orders which you ſhall receive from the Preſident and Council of Bombay, except ſuch as ſhall be contrary to theſe Inſtructions.

3d. Our Preſident informs us, that on the 4th of February laſt he wrote to Mr. Hornby, requeſting him to endeavour to obtain from Mahadajee Sindia and Tucoojee Holcar, Paſſports for the March of a Detachment through their Territories, and their Orders for ſupplying it with Proviſions, in the caſe of ſuch a Detachment being ſent, and ordered to take that Route. A Letter to the ſame Effect has been ſince written by our Preſident to Moodajee Booſla, the Chief of Berar, a Tranſlation of which we encloſe for your Information. We recommend it to your Attention to take every Opportunity that ſhall offer in the Courſe of your March, for cultivating a good Underſtanding with theſe Chiefs, particularly the laſt mentioned; and we authorize you to make uſe of any Expedient which you ſhall judge eſſentially neceſſary for enſuring your ſafe Conduct and Supplies of Proviſions for your Detachment; provided they ſhall not have a Tendency to infringe the Treaty exiſting between the preſent Miniſters of the Maratta State and this Government, or involve this Government in future Engagements. For your fuller Guidance on this Subject, we encloſe you a Copy of the Treaty of Poorunder, and you muſt make it the Ground-work of your Negociations in the Courſe of your March. It is needleſs to require your Attention to the State and Intereſts of the petty Chiefs, whoſe Poſſeſſions lie near your Line of March; they may be of much Service to you in ſupplying you with Proviſions, and facilitating your Progreſs, from their natural Enmity to the Marattas, and Fear of their Power.

4th. We recommend to you to obſerve the ſtricteſt Attention to the Safety of the Inhabitants, and of their Property, on your March; and that the moſt exemplary Puniſhment be inflicted on all Perſons detected in marauding, or Acts of perſonal Violence to the People.

5th. We enjoin you to uſe the greateſt Circumſpection in avoiding every Act which may, by any Conſtruction, be imputed to you as hoſtile to the particular States through which you paſs, or contrary to the Treaty ſubſiſting between the Maratta Miniſters and our Government. You muſt not ſuffer yourſelf to be diverted from the Proſecution of your March, by any new Object, however plauſible, except only for the Safety or Subſiſtence of your Troops, indiſpenſably requiring it. You are to be careful, on arriving near any new Frontier, to obſerve the Form of ſending to the Chief of the Diſtrict a Declaration of your pacific Intentions, a Demand of Permiſſion to paſs through his Country, and a Requeſt for the neceſſary Paſſports and Aſſiſtance of Proviſions; and if after ſuch Precautions your March ſhall be impeded or oppoſed by Force, you are to repeat the ſame Declarations to the Leaders in Command of the Forces prepared to oppoſe you, warn-

ing them not to commence a War by a cauſeleſs Attack. So poſitively is your Attention demanded to prevent any poſſible Imputation of Blame being thrown on your Conduct, that you will not be authorized in acting offenſively, even ſhould the Governor and Council of Bombay require it, unleſs they ſhall have firſt declared that there is War, and ſhall point out to you whom you are to regard as Friends and whom as Enemies.

6th. We deſire that you will adviſe the Preſident and Council of Bombay of your Progreſs as frequently as poſſible, whether you have any other Occurrence of Moment to communicate or not; for even ſuch Information will be of itſelf not only ſatisfactory, but of the greateſt Conſequence.

7th. We cannot preſcribe the Time of your March; but require you to begin it as ſoon as you ſhall be fully provided for it.

To Bombay.

We have already written to you in Duplicate, under Date the 23d February. You will there find our Sentiments at large, on the Subject of the Reinforcement of Troops, which have been ordered to march to your Side of India, with full Inſtructions for your Conduct in the Services intended to be effected by them.

From the high Opinion we entertain of the Experience and Abilities of Colonel Matthew Leſlie, we have been induced to appoint him to the Command of this Detachment; and as we have every Reaſon to rely on his Activity, Skill, and good Conduct for the Succeſs of the Expedition, if the Operations of the Army are left to his Judgment, we hope, and earneſtly entreat, that he may not be ſuperſeded in the Command, unleſs the Exigency of the Service ſhould at any Time make it abſolutely neceſſary for you to employ the Whole of your European Force, in conjunction with the Troops of this Preſidency, and to give the Command to an Officer of ſuperior Rank.

We have given Inſtructions to Colonel Leſlie for his Guidance in every Occurrence that may happen; a Copy of which we encloſe: For the reſt, we muſt leave it to you to furniſh him with ſuch Orders from Time to Time, as the Nature of the Service may require. The ſucceſsful Iſſue of the preſent Undertaking muſt neceſſarily depend, in a great Meaſure, on a full and unreſerved Communication of Intelligence with Colonel Leſlie; we therefore recommend it to you to ſend him the earlieſt Advices of every Circumſtance that may ſerve either to guide him in his March, or in the Execution of any Service that may be neceſſary for him to perform.

We are, &c.

Mr. Francis—I object to the Orders for the March of the Detachment, becauſe I conceive it will not be poſſible for them to begin their March before the End of this Month, and becauſe the periodical Rains, as I am informed, will be ſet in long before they can arrive at the Place of their Deſtination: As for the reſt, I am of Opinion, that the pacific Declarations contained in Colonel Leſlie's Inſtructions, will have little Weight in the Minds of the Powers of India, againſt the hoſtile Act of forcing a Paſſage through their Country without their Conſent.

Mr. Wheler—Having already objected to the Armament preparing for Bombay, I ſhall only add for the Reaſons aſſigned by Mr. Francis, that I likewiſe object to the March of the Troops.

Mr. Barwell approves of the Drafts of the Letters above entered.

Governor General—It was a very early Subject of my Enquiry to know to what Inconveniencies our Troops would be expoſed by marching in the Rains, which at firſt occurred to me as an inſurmountable Obſtacle: I have every Reaſon to believe, and am confirmed in this Opinion by that of Colonel Leſlie, that the Rainy Seaſon, ſo far from proving an Objection, will rather facilitate the March and prove a Relief to the Troops, which will ſuffer more from the Exceſs in Heats, and from Drought in the elevated and open Plains, through which they will probably paſs, than by the Rainy Seaſon, whenever it ſhall overtake them, as it certainly will; poſſibly too they will be leſs expoſed to the Attacks of Cavalry in the Rains; and in reſpect to Health, our own Records afford us one Inſtance, and I believe more, of our Sepoys, and even European Infantry, recovering from a State of Sickneſs by a March begun in the very Height of the Rains, as was the Caſe in the laſt Campaign of Colonel Champion.

Agreed, That the above Letters be accordingly written, and immediately diſpatched.

APPENDIX, N° 43.

Extract of a Letter from the Governor General and Council in Bengal to the Court of Directors, dated 20th March 1778. Secret Department.

Par. 2. THE Negociations lately propoſed by a Party of the Miniſters at Poona to the Preſident and Council of Bombay, for the Reſtoration of Ragoba to the principal Authority in the Durbar, of which we have already adviſed you, appear by the ſubſequent Letters we have received from that Quarter to be entirely laid aſide, at leaſt for the preſent, as Moraba Furneſe, One of the Principals mentioned in it, but apparently the only oſtenſible Perſon concerned, had inſiſted on carrying on the Buſineſs with the Preſidency of Bombay in his own Name ſolely; and was informed by them, that they could not agree to take any Part in the Affairs of the Maratta State, unleſs expreſsly ſolicited by the Members of that State with whom the Treaty was concluded; which made it neceſſary that Siccaram Baboo, whoſe Name was included in the original Overture, ſhould join with him in a formal Requiſition for the Aſſiſtance of the Engliſh: Moraba Furneſe ſoon after this quitted Poona, with Intention, as he reported, of proceeding on a religious Duty to Pundapore; and we have heard nothing farther of the Matter in Agitation with him.

3. We have nevertheleſs continued to carry into Execution the Reſolutions which we formed on the 3d ultimo, for the Aid and Support of the Bombay Preſidency, as the Contentions among the Miniſters at Poona ſtill ſubſiſt with unabated Violence; and the Confuſion likely to prevail in that Government as well from the repeated Defeats of the Maratta Army under Hurry Punt by Hyder Ally's Forces, as from the probable Increaſe of their inteſtine Diviſions, may we think afford Opportunities to the Preſident and Council at Bombay, aided as they will be by a reſpectable Force, and ample Reſources, to interpoſe with ſuch Advantages as will be of the moſt eſſential Conſequence to the Company's Intereſts, and which if neglected might add new Strength to their Enemies, and poſſibly hazard the Safety if not the very Exiſtence of that Settlement. We cannot help making theſe Reflections when we ſee the alarming Steps which the French have been taking to ſecure an Influence and Connection in the Maratta Government, and obtain a Port ſo cloſe to Bombay as Choul is, and when we alſo ſee the Encouragement which they have met with. Their Intrigues at this Juncture can only be formed with a hoſtile Intention to the Engliſh, and if attended with Succeſs which there is every Reaſon to ſuppoſe, an uninterrupted Continuance of them would effectually ſecure; we think they muſt be productive of the moſt dangerous Conſequences to the Company's Poſſeſſions in India.

4. From theſe Premiſes it is evident that no Time ought to be loſt in taking every fair Advantage that may offer to fruſtrate the Deſigns of the French in their Infancy, and to ſecure a permanent Peace with the Marattas without openly oppoſing or counteracting the Schemes of the French, which will be avoided by the Plan we have adopted; as the Object of our declared Purſuit is no Sort of Connection with them, we have therefore completed the extraordinary Supply we reſolved to ſend of Ten Lacks to the Preſidency of Bombay, which we have the Pleaſure to acquaint you was remitted by Bills of Exchange, at the advantageous Rate of 100 Bombay Rupees for 90 Sicca, and we have ordered a Force conſiſting of Six Battalions of Brigade Sepoys and One Company of native Artillery to aſſemble under the Command of Colonel Leſlie at Calpee; they will have Orders to march directly to Bombay, or to ſuch other Place as they may be directed to by that Preſidency to ſupport them, in caſe of any Attack made immediately upon your Poſſeſſions, or in any Operations which good Policy may lead them to engage in, for the Relief of that Part of the Maratta Government with which we are in Treaty, or for commanding and enforcing the due Execution of the Articles of the Treaty, which to this Day remain unaccompliſhed.

5. We have taken every Precaution that appears neceſſary to ſecure a ſafe Paſſage, and a conſtant Supply of Proviſions and Stores for the Uſe of this Detachment in its Route to Bombay, by Letters which have been written to the different Chiefs, through whoſe Countries it muſt paſs; and we have recommended the ſame to the Preſident and Council at Bombay, under whoſe Orders and Guidance we ſhall place the commanding Officer, from the Day on which he ſhall march; we have alſo directed the Reſident at the Vizier's Court to reſerve Ten Lacks of Rupees in Gold for the Diſburſements of the Expedition.

Extract of a Letter from the Governor General and Council in Bengal to the Court of Directors; dated 23d April 1778. Secret Department.

Par. 4. The Detachment of Six Battalions prepared for the Reinforcement of the Preſidency of Bombay, is now under Orders to march to that Place, by the Route of Bundelcund and Berar, as we hope from the friendly Intercourſe which has long ſubſiſted with the Chiefs of thoſe Diſtricts, that it will meet with no Impediment in traverſing their Countries.

5. Colonel Leſlie, who commands this Detachment, having been furniſhed with Inſtructions

for his Conduct, a Copy of which will be found in the Packet, we beg Leave to refer you to them, and to a Letter which we wrote to the Preſident and Council at Bombay on the Occaſion, which accompanies them.

APPENDIX, N° 44.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 11th May 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Eſquire, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell, Philip Francis, Edward Wheler, } Eſquires.

RECEIVED the following Letter from Bombay:

Gentlemen,

Mr. Moſtyn has already adviſed you of the Revolution that has taken place in the Poona Government.

Though on this important Occaſion we earneſtly wiſh to ſend you the moſt perfect and diſtinct Account of the Meaſures we meant to purſue, yet ſuch is the Uncertainty of our Situation, that we have come to no further Reſolution than to order all the Troops we can poſſibly ſpare, to be held in Readineſs to accompany Ragoba to Poona, the Moment Matters are advanced to that Stage as to render ſuch a Meaſure proper. An Agent from Moraba had arrived here before his Maſter had got Poſſeſſion of Poona, who only ſignified in general Terms Moraba's Deſire that no Time ſhould be loſt in ſending Ragoba to join his Party, but without making Propoſals of any Kind, either to him or us; neither have any yet been made to Mr. Moſtyn.

According to our Advices Sacaram Bappoo, the Chief Miniſter, has joined Moraba; but we are ſorry to add, that a Compromiſe is likely to be effected between the Party of Nana Furneſe, upon their becoming Security for the Safety of his Perſon and Treaſures from Ragoba's Reſentment.

The Approbation you were pleaſed to give our Plan for conducting Ragoba to Poona, was in a high Degree gratifying to us, as our Propoſal proceeded from the moſt firm Conviction, that our acceding to the Overtures which had been made was the only Reſource left us for accompliſhing thoſe important Objects we had in view. It is an unfortunate Circumſtance, that whilſt we through the Want of Powers were unable to take a Part, Ragoba's Friends have found their own Power ſufficient to procure them Succeſs without our Aſſiſtance, as we may not be able to procure the Terms we ſhould have had a Right to demand, had our Interference been more timely. However, you may be aſſured, Gentlemen, we ſhall make the beſt Stipulations we poſſibly can for the Advantage of the Company, in which we ſhall be guided by your late Inſtructions, and our Treaty with Ragoba.

Whatever may be the other Conſequences of this Revolution, we hope at any Rate it will defeat the Deſigns of the French, on which Point we inſtantly gave proper Inſtructions.

Monſieur Bellcombe arrived at Mahé the 3d ultimo, with the Brilliant of 64 Guns, and the Sartine, the Ship that was at Choul laſt Seaſon. They both ſailed to the Northward on the 10th and 11th, and it was ſaid they were bound to Choul. Sir Edward Vernon ſailed from hence the 10th, with the Rippon, Coventry, and Seahorſe, and we expect will fall in with, and will accompany, the French Ships up the Coaſt.

The Force Monſieur Bellcombe brought with him conſiſted, as we hear, of 300 Europeans which he landed at Mahé, and received on Board 140 of the Garriſon: We are doubtful whether he has proceeded up the Coaſt or remained at Mahé.

Upon an attentive Examination into the State of our Force, we find we ſhall only be able to detach from the Preſidency 300 European Infantry, Rank and File, Two Companies of Artillery, 2,000 Sepoys, and 500 Laſcars.

We ſhall ſend you further Advices the Moment we can write with more Preciſion. We have been honoured with your Letters of the 16th and 18th February, but have not yet received the new Cypher. Since writing thus far, your Three Letters of the 26th February have come to Hand.

We are, with Reſpect,
Gentlemen,
(Signed) Wm Hornby,
&c. &c. Council.

Bombay Caſtle,
5th April 1778.

This Letter having arrived on the 9th Inſtant, it was immediately circulated for the Information of the Board; the following Motion was delivered thereupon by Mr. Francis, and the Opinions of the other Members taken as follow it. *Vide Appendix, N° 45.*

APPENDIX, N° 45.

Minute of Mr. Francis, the 11th May 1778.

MR. Francis—As this Letter leaves us no Room to doubt that a Revolution has taken place in the Poona Government, and as the Re-eſtabliſhment of Ragoba, by whatever Means it may have been effected, muſt immediately defeat the Deſigns attributed to the French, and put an End to any Negociations which they may have entered into with Nanah Furneſſe, and the Party oppoſed to Ragoba, I conceive that the Expedition under Colonel Leſlie can no longer be neceſſary, even on the Principles on which it was undertaken. No Pretence is left for marching an Army acroſs India, to counteract any real Operations, or ſuppoſed Schemes of the French on the Malabar Coaſt, when the Party which they were to aſſiſt, and without whoſe Aſſiſtance in return no Deſigns of their own could promiſe the moſt diſtant Poſſibility of Succeſs, is itſelf overſet.

For theſe Reaſons I ſubmit my Opinion to the Board, that immediate Orders ſhould be diſpatched to Colonel Leſlie to ſuſpend the March of the Detachment under his Command; or, if they have already marched, to return forthwith to Calpee, or ſuch Station in the Nabob of Oude's Dominions as Colonel Leſlie may think moſt convenient.

Mr. Wheler—I concur with Mr. Francis in ſubmitting my Opinion to the Board, that immediate Orders ſhould be diſpatched to Colonel Leſlie to ſuſpend the March of the Detachment under his Command; or, if already marched, to return forthwith to Calpee, or ſuch other Station in the Nabob of Oude's Dominions, as Colonel Leſlie may think moſt convenient.

Governor General—I do not agree to Mr. Francis's Motion, as I think it would be highly impolitic and imprudent to ſuſpend the Progreſs of the Expedition on ſuch ſlight Grounds. The Detachment may eaſily return when we know with Certainty that the Company's Affairs on the other Side of India are in ſuch a State of Security as not to require its Aid. If it ſhould otherwiſe happen, its Aſſiſtance would arrive too late, if it was now recalled, and it ſhould in ſuch an Emergency be again ordered on Service.

Beſides we are not yet informed that the Revolution has been effected. We ſcarcely know the firſt Movements of it, and ſhould be liable to the Imputation of Levity and Precipitancy, were we on ſuch weak Grounds to annul a Meaſure of ſuch Importance in its Deſign, its Conſequences, and univerſal Notoriety.

I am ſurprized that Mr. Francis ſhould ſtill attempt to diſcredit the Suppoſition of the French Intrigues at Poona. Does he really regard the Letters and Preſents delivered to the Peſhwa from the King of France, by the Chevalier St. Lubin; the written Engagements declared by Mr. Moſtyn to have been interchanged by St. Lubin and Nanah Furneſſe; the extraordinary Viſit made by Monſieur Bellecombe to that Coaſt, and irreconcileable with any other Motive, as Facts of a doubtful Nature? In my Judgment they appear to bear the certain Demonſtration of Engagements actually formed, and ripe for Execution; and I ſhould deſerve to be deprived with Ignominy of the Office which I hold, if I neglected to uſe ſuch Means as were in my Power to defeat them.

Upon this Occaſion, I muſt take Notice of a very ſtriking Evidence afforded us in the Letter now before us, not of the Connection of Nanah Furneſſe with St. Lubin, but of the French Government with the Adminiſtration at Poona.

The Sartine, the Veſſel ſaid to have accompanied Monſieur Bellecombe in his Expedition to the Maratta Coaſt, is the ſame that brought Monſieur St. Lubin from France.

In the Narrative delivered by Mr. Madgett to Mr. Lewis, it is ſaid that the Sartine was diſpatched to China on the 24th of Auguſt. The Manner in which this is related, proves evidently that Madgett was himſelf impoſed upon in this Concluſion of her Deſtination, ſince he introduces it not as a political Event, but merely as a Fact, connected with other Circumſtances, which were intended to fix a Charge againſt Monſieur St. Lubin of having embezzled the Cargo, and defrauded his Owners. We now find, that inſtead of making a Voyage to China, the Sartine went directly to Pondicherry, and returned with Monſieur Bellecombe to the ſame Coaſt, if not the ſame Port, which ſhe quitted.

This Circumſtance affords more than a preſumptive Proof that Monſieur St. Lubin had imparted the Effects of his Negociations to Monſieur Bellecombe; that he had ſolicited Monſieur Bellecombe to fulfil the Engagements which he had formed, and ſent the Sartine to Pondicherry for that Purpoſe; that Monſieur Bellecombe had adopted the Deſign, and had in compliance with it employed the Sartine in ſupporting the Men and Stores promiſed by St. Lubin's Engagements, and himſelf gone in Perſon to aid or conduct what might remain of the Negociation.

I ſhall take this Occaſion to offer a few Remarks on the Intelligence now received from Bombay, which I think may throw ſome Lights on the State of the Maratta Government, as it appears to have been circumſtanced at the Time in which the Letter was written, and may convince the Board of the Neceſſity of proſecuting with Vigour the Meaſures which we have begun, until the Deſigns of them ſhall be fully accompliſhed.

The Preſident and Council of Bombay inform us, that "an Agent from Moraba had been ſent to Bombay to notify in general Terms Moraba's Deſire, that no Time ſhould be loſt in ſending Ra-

" goba to join his Party; but without making Propoſals of any Kind either to him or them, and that " neither had any been yet made to Mr. Moſtyn;" and that " a Compromiſe was likely to be " effected between the Party and Nana Furneeſe." This they mention with Regret, and add, " that " it is an unfortunate Circumſtance that Ragoba's Friends had found their own Strength ſufficient " to procure them Succeſs without our Aſſiſtance."

I rather regard all theſe as fortunate Circumſtances, if a proper Advantage be made of them, and the following are my Reaſons for this Concluſion.

Ragoba, naturally ſuſpicious and timid, as I am told he is, can never truſt his Intereſts and Perſon to the Diſcretion of his new Partizans; Men who were lately his moſt inveterate Enemies, and who even in their former Connection with him betrayed him. He will have had more Cauſe than the Government of Bombay to be alarmed at an Invitation made to him, to put himſelf into their Hands without any Stipulation or Propoſal, either for his perſonal Safety or for the Share which he was to expect in the public Adminiſtration. Nor could he be better pleaſed with the Compromiſe made with Nana Furneeſe, when in Addition to the perſonal Diſaffection which he has ever borne to Ragoba in a more eminent Degree than the reſt, and from which he will have departed only from the Motive of urgent Neceſſity, poſſeſſes the Support of Hurry Punt Furkia, the Commander in Chief of the Forces, and Engagements with the French Nation, which if they are ever carried into Effect will give him an abſolute and irreſiſtible Command of the Maratta State.

With ſuch Reaſons to diſtruſt the Party which has recalled him to the chief Adminiſtration of Affairs he muſt ſtrongly feel the oppoſite Neceſſity of truſting to the Protection of the Government of Bombay as his only and ſure Reſource: That Government has eſpouſed his Cauſe with a Zeal far exceeding that which a political Principle alone would have excited, a Zeal heightened by common Diſappointment, and a long perſonal Communication of the ſame Regrets, Apprehenſions, and Hopes.

Such being his Situation, I cannot ſuppoſe that he will conſent to move from Bombay without an Engliſh Military Force, nor perhaps under any future Situation of his Affairs, however proſperous, to part with it while thoſe are in Power to whoſe Friendſhip he may think he can truſt.

The Preſidency of Bombay have a Right to require Conditions of equal Advantage for that which they beſtow. Theſe are not likely to be unreaſonable, and whatever they may be he is not in a Condition to refuſe them.

The Union of Nana Furneeſe with the Party muſt inevitably produce this good Effect. It will indiſpoſe every other Member of the Adminiſtration to the French Alliance, by which if it takes Place, he alone will be a Gainer. Had he fallen in the Contention, it is not improbable that his Adverſaries would have taken up the Negociation where he left it, and one great, if not the only real Benefit expected from the Revolution, would have been loſt to us. In a Word, I repeat that this Accommodation muſt prove an Advantage. It completes a Syſtem of diſjointed and diſcordant Parts, which the Government of Bombay may hold together, but no other Power can; or by withdrawing their Graſp, let it fall to Pieces, and erect any other that they pleaſe in the room of it.

But to enable them to ſupport the Character which I have aſſigned them in this important Scene, they muſt poſſeſs the Means both of ſurmounting all immediate Obſtacles to Ragoba's Elevation, and of maintaining him in the Poſſeſſion of it, until his Authority ſhall be thoroughly confirmed by the Suppreſſion of every Party capable of oppoſing it. The ſame Means, and the ſame Opportunity will equally ſerve for the Advancement and Security of the Company's Intereſts, which, as their primary Concern, I cannot ſuppoſe will be neglected. For the firſt of theſe Ends, the Force which they tell us they propoſe to ſend will be ſufficient; it will preſerve the Aſcendant of Ragoba over his Aſſociates, and quiet his Apprehenſions with reſpect to their Fidelity: But it may prove an inadequate Proviſion for future Contingencies. The Reinforcement which we have prepared for them, will render their Strength equal to any Service: I have no Doubt of its having already produced ſome Effect; for if we reflect upon the Languor which followed the firſt Overtures of the Confederacy, and the ſudden Execution of their Deſign, in the ſame Inſtant of Time in which the Knowledge of the Armament formed by this Government muſt have reached the confederated Party, we muſt attribute the former to a Diffidence in their own Strength, and the latter to the Confidence excited by their expected Aid; which though not immediately intended for them, was profeſſedly calculated to counteract the Deſigns of our common Adverſary.

If in the Criſis of ſuch a Project we were to recall the Detachment, it might alarm our Friends and inſpire their Enemies, who in Effect are our's, with the Hope of ſucceeding in any Attempts to ſubvert all that has been already effected. By a Perſeverance we ſhall be ſure of maintaining the Ground which we may have gained; and if it ſhould be found neceſſary to let the Detachment proceed to its Deſtination, of commanding every Point which we can wiſh for the Company. On the Whole, I repeat, becauſe I think it concluſive of the preſent Argument, that if the Services of the Detachment ſhall not be wanted, nothing will have been loſt by its having marched, and it may be eaſily recalled, but if it ſhould be now withdrawn, and its Aid ſhould be hereafter required, it will be too late to afford it.

All the Difficulties which ſeemed at firſt to oppoſe the Meaſure have gradually diſappeared: The Apprehenſion of having the whole Force of an Empire to contend with is removed by the late Movements at Poona; and the Difficulty of ſubſiſting an Army in ſo long a Route is removed by the Offer of Supplies, and of every Aſſiſtance, made by Moodajee Boollah, the only Power lying between the Point of its Departure, and the Confines of Poona. After ſuch Pains taken to obtain them,

, ſuch Advantages ought not to be lightly abandoned. Even the Credit of our Government, Meaſure which has attracted the Attention and Expectation of all Indoſtan, demands the Proſe-on of it.

(Signed) Warren Haſtings.

Mr. Francis—The Letter from Bombay begins with theſe Words: "Mr. Moſtyn has already dviſed you of the Revolution that has taken place in the Poona Government." I conſider this Fact, and I draw the ſame Concluſion from it with the Preſident and Council of Bombay, that tever may be the other Conſequences of this Revolution, they hope at any rate it will defeat the gns of the French.

It is not of Moment to the preſent Queſtion, whether I relinquiſh or adhere to my Firſt Opinion of ſe Deſigns, becauſe I ſuppoſe an Event to have happened, which admitting ſuch Deſigns to have ſted, neceſſarily defeats the Effect of them. If the Board do not believe the Fact, they will of urſe continue the Expedition on the Principles on which it was undertaken: If they do believe I cannot comprehend how we ſhould be liable to an Imputation of Levity or Precipitancy in pending the Execution of a Meaſure which an unforeſeen Event has made unneceſſary.

Governor General—It matters not what Interpretation the Preſident and Council of Bombay have upon Mr. Moſtyn's Letter to this Government, ſince it is a Fact that Mr. Moſtyn's Letter does ſay that a Revolution had actually taken place in the Poona Government: It ſays only, that ree only of the Confederacy had joined their Forces, amounting to Thirty thouſand Horſe and t; that they expected to be joined by Succaram Baboo at the Village of Courey; that Fifty orſemen had been ſent into the City of Poona by Moraba Furneſe, to aſſiſt at a Proclamation made the Name of Ragoba; and that Nana Furneſe, with an Army of 5000 Men, was encamped at Foot of the Hill of Proonder, and had ſummoned all his Friends and Adherents to join him. eſe are the only eſſential Facts contained in Mr. Moſtyn's Letter, and certainly do not amount to ecided Revolution; neither can I conſider it as much more advanced by the looſe Intelligence ntained in the Letter from the Preſidency of Bombay, that a Compromiſe was likely to be effected tween the Party and Nana Furneſe. From what I know of the Situation, Intereſts, and Con-ctions of the different Parties, I am convinced, that without the Support of an Engliſh Force it ill never be accompliſhed: It is not neceſſary in this Place to detail my Reaſons; it is ſufficient only have ſhewn, that the Work, though begun with every Proſpect of Succeſs, was very far from ing accompliſhed at the Period of which we are ſpeaking, and of courſe that the Meaſure in eſtion is not rendered unneceſſary, as Mr. Francis has ſtated.

Mr. Barwell—I do not think the Reaſons aſſigned by Mr. Francis will warrant an inſtant Aſſent his Propoſition: I ſhall have no Objection to acquieſce in it as ſoon as the great political Meaſure been ſecured, which was the Object of the Expedition projected to Bombay by this Govern-ent.

The Majority of the Board being againſt Mr. Francis's Motion, it is reſolved in the Negative.

APPENDIX, N° 46.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 21ſt May 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Eſquire, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler,
} Eſquires.

RECEIVED the following Letters from Fort Saint George:

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We have the Honour to encloſe you a Copy of a Letter juſt received from Bombay, with a Copy our Anſwer, for your Information.

In conſequence of your Letter to us of the 4th of February, we ordered the Number of Troops requeſted by the Gentlemen at Bombay to be in Readineſs to march if it ſhould be thought neceſſary n a further Application from them; but the Seaſon is now ſo far advanced, that it would be impoſ-ible for them to reach Anjengo in Time to embark before the Monſoon breaks on the Malabar Coaſt: We propoſe therefore to hold them ſtill here in Readineſs to proceed to Bombay the Firſt favourable Opportunity, ſhould the Gentlemen there continue to be in want of them, and the Situation of Affairs

will

will enable us to diſpenſe with this Force: We ſhall in the mean Time be obliged to you for ſuch Information as you may think proper to afford us, regarding the Aſſiſtance which you propoſe yielding from Bengal, and the Deſigns you may have further formed in conſequence of the preſent State of the Government at Poona.

In your Letter of the 4th February you acknowledged the Receipt of our's dated the 16th January, and promiſed us your Sentiments upon it ſhortly; we hope in conſequence, that you will be pleaſed to favour us with them as ſoon as poſſible.

We have, &c.

Fort Saint George, 29th April 1778.

(Signed) Tho' Rumbold, &c. Council.

To the Honourable Thomas Rumbold, Eſquire, &c.

Gentlemen,

We have received your Letter of the 13th February, and beg Leave to congratulate Mr. Rumbold on the Appointment to the Government of your Preſidency.

The Pattamars diſpatched from Madras the Firſt of March arrived here without any Packet from you; but as ſeveral of the private Letters which they brought concur in the Intelligence, that you had ordered a Body of Forces to the Aſſiſtance of this Preſidency, in conſequence of the Requiſition we made in our Letter of the 12th December, we can only impute our not having heard from you, to your Packet having been intercepted by the Marattas; the Pattamars having informed us the Packet of Letters was ſtopt and opened near Poona.

As the Seaſon is ſo far advanced as not to allow of our waiting for more particular Advice from you, we have judged it expedient to give immediate Orders for a ſufficient Number of Veſſels proceeding to Anjengo to bring up the Troops, which according to our Accounts conſiſt of 200 European Infantry, 50 Artillery, and a Battalion of Sepoys; and we hope we ſhall not be diſappointed in our Expectations, that our Veſſels will find them at that Place ready for Embarkation.

We have thought it neceſſary to apprize the Commanding Officer at Palamcotta of our Intentions, and we beg Leave to encloſe a Copy of our Letter to him for your Notice.

Mr. Moſtyn has adviſed you of the Revolution which has happened in the Maratta Government; and in conſequence thereof we have judged it neceſſary to collect all the Force we poſſibly can to accompany Ragoba to Poona.

Sir Edward Vernon, in his Paſſage down the Coaſt having fell in with the Brilliante and another French Ship, which from the Intelligence we had received we had before ſuggeſted to him were coming with a Deſign to form a Settlement at Choul, a Maratta Port cloſe to the Mouth of our Harbour, he has again returned hither in order to prevent their Scheme taking Effect; and we hope and truſt, that in conſequence of the late Revolution we ſhall be able totally to deſtroy the French Influence at the Court of Poona, an Object of the utmoſt Importance to the Honourable Company.

We have, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 8th April 1778.

(Signed) William Hornby.

A true Copy.

(Signed) Charles Oakeley, Secretary.

To the Honourable William Hornby, Eſquire, &c.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We are much concerned to obſerve, by your Letter of the 8th inſtant, that our's to you of the 15th January had miſcarried. We now tranſmit a Duplicate, by which you will perceive, that from the Poſture of Affairs at that Time we thought ourſelves under the Neceſſity of declining an immediate Compliance with your Requeſt for ſo large a Body of Troops as 250 Europeans and a Battalion of Sepoys, to be aſſembled at Palamcottah for the Purpoſe of marching to your Aſſiſtance. This Miſcarriage of our Letter gives us the more Concern, as you have been led to ſend Veſſels to Anjengo, in the Idea that the Troops had been collected at Palamcottah as you deſired, and were ready to march to Anjengo for Embarkation.

We aſſure you, Gentlemen, that we paid every Attention to your Requeſt, and ſhould have been happy if the Situation of Affairs here had permitted us to comply with it in the Extent you wiſhed; but circumſtanced as we then were, the Meaſure appeared too unſafe and imprudent to be adopted: However, upon hearing from the Governor General and Council of Bengal, that their Sanction and Aſſiſtance would be given to your Proceedings, and upon their opening and recommending the Deſign more fully to us, we then determined, notwithſtanding the incomplete State of our Eſtabliſhment, to order the Troops you had before requeſted to hold themſelves in Readineſs to march. They are now under theſe Orders; but as the Seaſon is too far advanced to ſend them to Anjengo, we ſhall keep them in Readineſs to proceed to your Aſſiſtance the firſt Opportunity that offers, if your abſolute Want of them ſhould continue, and no material Change ſhould happen here in the mean Time: But we muſt obſerve to you, that the Number of our Europeans fit for Duty is ſo ſmall

all and diſproportionate, that we deem it unſafe, even in the moſt favourable Times, to detach any rt of them upon ſo diſtant a Service; and we wiſh therefore that Sepoys only may be required, as can with much leſs Difficulty replace their Loſs.

Private Advices from Bengal mention, that the Detachment ordered from thence were to winter at orah, and afterwards proceed on their March.

Fort Saint George,
29th April 1778.

We are, &c.
(Signed) Tho' Rumbold,
&c. Council.

A true Copy.
(Signed) Charles Oakeley,
Secretary.

The following Minutes having been delivered on the 16th inſtant on Papers circulated from the ilitary Department, are ordered to be recorded in this Place.

In Circulation, 16th May 1778, Three Letters from Colonel Leſlie, dated 26th of April, 1ſt and 3d May.

Governor General—I have to propoſe ſubmitting the Requeſts in Colonel Leſlie's Letters to the nſideration of the Commander in Chief, and his Opinion required on the Propriety of complying th them.

Mr. Barwell—I acquieſce to Colonel Leſlie's Propoſitions, as far as they may be judged proper the Commander in Chief.

Mr. Francis—I muſt acquieſce in the above Propoſal, if it be unalterably determined that the achment ſhall proceed; but I ſhould imagine the Letters received this Day from Mr. Moſtyn d Fort Saint George would naturally induce the Board to ſuſpend their March, at leaſt until the ains are over, or until ſome direct and poſitive Intelligence ſhall be received of the Deſigns im- ted to the French, and ſome overt Act of their's tending to carry ſuch Deſigns into Execution. hatever theſe may have been, the Preſidency of Bombay, in their Letter of the 8th of laſt Month that of Fort Saint George, ſay, "that they hope and truſt, that in conſequence of the late Re- volution they ſhall be able totally to deſtroy the French Influence at the Court of Poona."

This Influence, if we may believe Mr. Moſtyn, could not at any Time have been very conſide- ble, notwithſtanding any Reports to the contrary induſtriouſly circulated by a low French Agent, hoſe infamous Character is too well known in India to entitle him to the ſmalleſt Degree of Credit. r. Moſtyn, in his Letter of the 19th April, ſays, "that when the Poona Durbar demanded of him, Whether he had written to us on the Subject of their having given a Port to the French, and ap- pointed Monſieur St. Lubin to the Command of their Artillery, and whether to his Knowledge it was ſo? he replied, that he had not informed us thereof, neither did know that any thing had been yet done for the French."

As this is the Caſe, and as we know with Certainty that in November laſt there was no Expectation a Rupture between the Two Crowns in Europe, I truſt the Board will at leaſt ſuſpend the Exe- tion of a Meaſure evidently tending to a Rupture with France, and founded either on Facts which pear to have been groſsly miſrepreſented, or on the Suppoſition of Deſigns which, if they ever iſted, are defeated without our Interpoſition.

Governor General—I muſt requeſt Mr. Francis's Permiſſion to transfer the above Minute to the cret Department, to which the Subject properly belongs.

Mr. Francis—Agreed: The other Letters from Mr. Auriol came to me at the ſame Time, and I rote on this Paper by Miſtake.

A true Extract.

th May 1778.

(Signed) Robert Kyd, Secretary.

The Governor General—I cannot diſcover any thing either in the Letter from Fort Saint George, in Mr. Moſtyn's, which ought to induce us to recall the Detachment, or to ſuſpend its Operations; the contrary, the whole Tenor of the Letter proves the Neceſſity of its proceeding.

Whatever Hopes the Preſident and Council of Bombay may have entertained of the Effects of the evolution, neither was the Revolution accompliſhed at the Time in which their Letter was written, r was the French Influence in any apparent Degree leſſened by their Proſpect of it: Notwithſtanding r. Moſtyn's Remonſtrances, and the Promiſe made to him by the Miniſters on the 10th of April, at the Chevalier St. Lubin ſhould be diſmiſſed from Poona, it is certain that he was not gone on e 19th.

Mr. Francis has quoted a Part of Mr. Moſtyn's Reply to the Miniſters, to which I ſhall add the emainder, and leave it to the impartial Readers of theſe Papers to form their own Concluſions om both:

"But that from Monſieur St. Lubin's being permitted to remain here, notwithſtanding you had been informed of the Promiſes made me by the Durbar, that he ſhould be diſpatched as laſt Decera, together with the Aſſurances which Monſieur St. Lubin had given to all the French Settlements, that they had delivered Choul into his Hands, and that the French Flag was actually flying there; you, Gentlemen, might with very great Propriety imagine ſuch was abſolutely the Caſe: I then deſired they would inform me what were the real Intentions of the Durbar with reſpect to the French: When Succaram Babboo replied, That they had the diſpatching Monſieur St. Lubin

" under Conſideration: And I have ſince received Aſſurances from Moraba, that this Ma
" ſhould be ſettled agreeable to our Wiſhes."

Neither to the Suſpicions thus pointedly expreſſed by Mr. Moſtyn, nor to the direct Queſti put to them in my Letters, have the Miniſters made any Reply, except an Aſſurance given to M Moſtyn, that they had the diſpatching of St. Lubin under Conſideration, and that this Ma ſhould be ſettled agreeably to our Wiſhes. Not to deny a direct and formal Charge, preferred thoſe who have a Right to a Reply, is to admit it.

I have no Authority for the Belief, much leſs do I know with Certainty, that in November there was no Expectation of a Rupture between the Two Crowns in Europe. But why is this poſed? Neither is the Deſign which has been attributed to Monſieur St. Lubin connected with a an Event; nor can a Proviſion made by this Government, to ſtrengthen one of its Dependencies, any Reſpect tend to it. Monſieur St. Lubin may bring Men and Arms to Poona, and diſcip Half the Maratta Army; our Detachment may traverſe the whole Empire of Indoſtan; and Peace between Great Britain, and France continue uninterrupted, and inſenſible of ſuch Movements.

In the Opinion which I delivered on a former Motion made by Mr. Francis for recalling the tachment, I objected to the Grounds of it as erroneous, and I intimated my Belief that the Attr ment, which Hurry Punt Furkia, the Commander in Chief of the Maratta Forces, was known to to Nana Furneſs, would prevent a Reconciliation from being effected between Nana Furneſs and R gonath Row. A Circumſtance obſcurely related by Mr. Moſtyn, corroborates this Opinion, and aff but too much Reaſon for the Suſpicions that Nana Furneſs in the Refuſal to accept of the profic Terms of Accommodation, and in the Deſire which he has ſhewn to retire to the River Kiſtna, Station of Hurry Punt Furkia, ſtill looked to that Chief for Protection. I am informed and by Authority, that the Maratta General ſuddenly marched towards Poona on the firſt Intelligence of projected Revolution, and was followed by the Army of Nizam Ally Cawn, with the ſame Deſign I underſtand of preventing or defeating it.

As it will not be exacted from me to act upon Concluſions drawn from Premiſes which I do allow; and as the Reſolution which has been taken to ſend a powerful Military Aid to the Preſi of Bombay was founded on a ſuppoſed Neceſſity of guarding the Company's Intereſts in that ter againſt impending Dangers; while thoſe Dangers exiſt or appear to exiſt, it will be my Duty ſiſtently to ſupport and proſecute the Meaſure undertaken at my Inſtance. Theſe Dangers orig from the Intrigues of Nana Furneſs, the executive Ruler of the Maratta State, and the Chev St. Lubin, a proclaimed Miniſter of the Crown of France. Mr. Francis affirms that the Grou of this Apprehenſion are all diſſipated by a Revolution which by the Expulſion of Nana Furneſs from the Government has at once diſabled him and annihilated the French Influence in the Maratta Coun cils; and therefore he inſiſts on the Repeal or Suſpenſion of the intended Aid, as no longer neceſſa even on the Grounds on which it was propoſed to be given.

Theſe are not Mr. Francis's Words, for I have not his Minute at this Time before me, but they contain his Senſe, and I hope not diſcoloured in the Expreſſion.

To this a ſummary View of the State of the contending Parties, as it is deſcribed by our lateſt Ad vices, will be a complete Anſwer.

Ragonaut Row, the intended Chief of the new Adminiſtration, had not left Bombay nor was likely ſoon to leave it: His Friends at Proonder had proclaimed a Change of Government, but had neith reſolved on the Form of it nor prevailed on their late Competitor, even with all the Terrors wh are the uſual Attendants of new Dominion, to participate it with them. The French Miniſter remained undiſturbed at the Capital, and Two powerful Armies were marching to the Relief of Na Furneſs. Such was the Revolution which is now ſtated as a Proof that our political Affairs at Bom bay are in a State of Quiet and Security, and as a Reaſon for repealing the Meaſures which have be adopted for thoſe Ends.

(Signed) Warren Haſtings.

Seen. (Signed) Edward Wheler.

Mr. Francis—I am not ſolicitous to refute Opinions that differ from mine, when the Meaſure they relate to are unalterably determined. My Reply to the preceding Minute is intended for my own Juſtification, and to ſatisfy the Court of Directors, that if I perſiſt in a Conduct oppoſed to the decided Senſe of the Majority, it is not from Obſtinacy or Paſſion, but that I have ſome Reaſon of my Side, and that I am not ſo ill-adviſed as to endeavour to ſupport any Opinion by appealing to Evidence which proves directly againſt me.

It is ſaid that when the laſt Letter from Bombay was written, the Revolution at Poona was accompliſhed; that the French Influence was not yet leſſened by the Proſpect of it, and that Monſieur St. Lubin was not diſmiſſed on the 19th April.

The Preſidency of Bombay, in their Letter to Fort Saint George of the 28th, ſay, " Mr. Moſtyn has " adviſed you of the Revolution *which has happened in the Maratta Government*" That they were preparing to accompany Ragoba to Poona with all the Force they could collect, and that " in conſe " quence of the *late Revolution* they hope and truſt they ſhall be able *totally* to deſtroy the French In " fluence there." It appears by Mr. Moſtyn's Letter of the 10th, that the Marattas had not delivered Choul to the French, nor engaged Monſieur St. Lubin in their Service; in this State of Things it ſeems immaterial to any eſſential Intereſt of our's, whether Monſieur St. Lubin continues at Poona or not.

In ſtating the Facts, with the direct Evidence that belongs to them, I meet the Governor General's rgument on his own Principles: I admit of a Suppoſition deſtitute of all Foundation, that the reſent Expedition was undertaken to effect a Revolution in the Maratta Government, conſequently hat there is a Neceſſity for us proceeding until ſuch Revolution is accompliſhed; I allow it to be ppoſed, that the Prevalence of French Influence at the Court of a neutral Power would warrant our vading their Country and taking Poſſeſſion of their Capital, and that as long as a French Miniſter permitted to reſide there our military Operations ought not to be countermanded. If the Facts ould by any Means be accommodated to the Concluſions drawn from them, the Governor General ſtill bound to detect the Principles on which they are formed: They are ſuch as I do not think ceſſary to diſpute: Thoſe which I profeſs, and have ſteadily endeavoured to purſue, are taken from e higheſt Authority, and founded, as I believe, upon true Policy, on Juſtice, and right Reaſon: o preſerve the Peace of India; to make the Safety of Bengal the principal Object of all our Deberations; never to employ the Company's Forces in diſtant Expeditions; and in all our Treaties ith the Country Powers to take Care that they be ſo framed, as neither immediately or eventually, poſſible, to engage the Company in any Diſputes between thoſe Powers. It is not for us to exaine the Wiſdom or Weakneſs of a Syſtem eſtabliſhed on ſuch Authority; it is our Duty to conform it.

The Diſtance of Time is ſufficient to aſſure us, that in November laſt the Peace between the Two owns was not interrupted. A private Letter from Conſtantinople, dated in December, and which ery Body here has ſeen, takes Notice, that at that Time there was no Expectation of a Rupture h France or Spain. The March of an Engliſh Army acroſs India in Time of profound Peace, Meaſure too extraordinary not to attract the Attention of the French Government and excite r Suſpicions: Appearances may perhaps lead them to conjecture, that the real Object of the Exdition is only the Plunder of Poona, now ſuppoſed to be the richeſt City in India, but it will niſh them with Reaſons ſufficient to charge us with diſturbing the Peace of India; to impute Dens to us in which their own Security may be concerned; and to juſtify their taking Part in a Quarrel ich we alone have created. When a Suſpicion alone that the French are carrying on Intrigues to Prejudice of our Intereſt at Poona is ſuppoſed to warrant the March of an Army acroſs India to ntercract their Deſigns, we cannot without manifeſt Inconſiſtency affirm, that the March of this rmy gives *them* no Ground of Umbrage or Alarm, or that it has no Tendency to interrupt the ace between the two Nations.

If the Conteſts in the Maratta Government are really not ended by the late Revolution, I cannot apprehend, that by engaging in them we are laying the Foundation of a general War in India, ch cannot fail of extending to Europe. The French and Engliſh have uſually began Hoſtilities is Country as Auxiliaries to ſome of the native Powers, but they ſoon become Principals. If Defence and Security of our preſent Acquiſitions were not at all Times the only Object we ought ave in view, this certainly is not a Seaſon for provoking a Rupture with France: Every Meaſure Prudence and Moderation dictate ought to be taken to avoid it. *If our political Affairs at Bom- are not in a State of Quiet and Security*, it depends on that Preſidency to provide for their own ety, by diſengaging themſelves from Quarrels in which the Company's Intereſts are not concerned; when they tell us, that *they are collecting all the Force they poſſibly can to accompany Ragoba to Poona*, ould be the greateſt Reaſon to them not to conclude, that neither Bombay nor any of the mpany's Poſſeſſions are in Danger of being invaded in the Abſence of the Army eſtabliſhed for r Defence.

If they deceive us in aſſerting that a Revolution has happened in the Maratta Government; if it true that the French Miniſter remains undiſturbed at the Capital, and that Two powerful Armies, whoſe Exiſtence we have never been informed, are marching to the Aſſiſtance of Nana Furneſe, does not follow that an Expedition, which never had a Revolution for its Object, ſhould not be ntermanded until that Revolution be compleated. It does not follow that we have a Right to ch an Army to Poona, becauſe the Miniſter of a Crown with which His Majeſty is at Peace, ermitted to remain there undiſturbed; or that it would not be our wiſeſt Policy to ſuffer the mpetitors for the Maratta Government (if ſuch Competition ſtill ſubſiſts) to decide their internal arrels, or to waſte their Strength againſt each other without our Interpoſition.

(Signed) Philip Francis.

APPENDIX, N° 47.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 1ſt June 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler,
} Eſquires.

THE following Minute from the Governor General was ſent in ſince the laſt Council, and ci culated. The Minutes entered after it were returned upon it.

Governor General—By imputing Principles for the Purpoſe of reflecting on them, and by r peating Facts which have been denied, and Opinions which have been diſputed, without any Noti taken of the preceding Reaſonings upon them, a very ſhort and ſimple Queſtion may be drawn o to an endleſs Length, and the original Subject loſt in the Changes which are rung upon it.

I do not allow the Principles which Mr. Francis has imputed to me, and has been pleaſed to f he admits: Of courſe it is unneceſſary to reply to his Inferences from them.

Mr. Francis ſtill perſiſts in affirming, that a Revolution has been accompliſhed at Poona, b which Ragoba has been reſtored to the chief Adminiſtration of the Maratta State, the French I fluence deſtroyed, and the Deſigns of St. Lubin defeated; to this I refer for a Reply to the Rep contained in my laſt Minute on this Subject, and to Time, the beſt Arbiter in ſuch a Conteſt.

In Mr Francis's Minute of the 16th Inſtant, he ſaid, that "we know with Certainty that "November laſt there was no Expectation of a Rupture between the Two Crowns in Europe. To this I replied in my Minute of the 20th Inſtant. He now repeats the ſame Inſinuation; f what Purpoſe I can only conjecture: The ſame Reply will ſerve for both.

If the March of an Engliſh Army through a Tract of Country far remote from any Poſſeſſions the French, is likely to ſerve as a Pretext for interrupting the Peace between the Two Nations, I thi it full as likely that the ſame Effect may be inferred from any other given Act of our Government. T ſimple Operation of the Revenue, whether for the Alleviation or Increaſe of the public Taxes, may b conſtrued to aim at the Ruin of the French Commerce in this Country: The Cantonments at Barrapo may give Umbrage by their Vicinity to Ghiretty; and the unuſual Aſſemblage of our Forces i the Neighbourhood of the European Settlements may be attributed to a Deſign of plunderin Chandernagore; yet the Acts of Government ought not to be ſuſpended, becauſe ſuch arbitra Conſtructions might be put upon them; neither ought we to withhold the Aſſiſtance which the I tereſts of our common Maſters require at their Preſidency of Bombay, becauſe there is a Poſſibil that the French may take an unreaſonable Offence at it. It is ſufficient that we neither comm nor even afford the ſlighteſt Shew of committing, any Act of Hoſtility againſt them, unleſs arm ourſelves againſt any Hoſtilities which they may hereafter commit, may be termed ſuch: B to remain quiet and paſſive, and to abſtain from the neceſſary Precautions of Self-Preſervation, b cauſe hoſtile Deſigns have been imputed to the French, and therefore every ſuch Precaution mu point at them as its Object, would be to adopt a Principle of humble Forbearance, of which have never yet read a ſingle Example in the Britiſh Hiſtory; and which, for the national Honour, hope will never appear in the lateſt Annals of it. If in theſe Reflections I have miſconſtrued M Francis's Words, I have unwillingly wronged him; and therefore, for his Vindication and my ow I will here ſubjoin them.

"When a Suſpicion alone that the French are carrying on Intrigues to the Prejudice of our I "tereſts at Poona, is ſuppoſed to warrant the March of an Army acroſs India to counteract th "Deſigns, we cannot, without manifeſt Inconſiſtency, affirm, that the March of this Army gi "them no Ground of Umbrage or Alarm, or that it has no Tendency to interrupt the Peace b "tween the Two Nations."

Mr. Francis has introduced Four Quotations from the Company's Orders to juſtify his Oppoſit to the preſent Meaſures; of theſe Quotations One only appears to me to be in point. To this, an to the others, if they are ſuppoſed to imply a Prohibition to ſend a Military Aid to the Preſidency o Bombay, I ſhall oppoſe the following Extract from their Commands of the 5th February 1777, whic as the moſt recent of courſe ſuperſede all Orders of a prior Date, in thoſe Points in which the diſagree.

"His (Ragoba's) Pretenſions to the ſupreme Authority, either in his own Right or as Guardi "to the Infant Peſhwa, appear to us better founded than thoſe of his Competitors, and therefor "the Conditions of the Treaty of Poona have not been ſtrictly fulfilled on the Part of the Maratta "and if from any Circumſtances you ſhall deem it expedient, we ſhall have no Objection to an A "liance with Ragoba, on the Terms agreed upon between him and the Governor and Council o "Bombay."

To

To obviate the Inference which may be naturally ſuggeſted by this Quotation, I think it proper to erve that an Alliance with Ragoba is not the Object of the Meaſures which have been lately dertaken by this Government for the Support of the Preſidency of Bombay. Their declared ject is to give Security and Permanency to the Peace of that Settlement. It has fortunately ppened that while we were in the Purſuit of this Object Ragoba was offered to us as an Inſtru-nt; the Company have warranted us to accept him as ſuch, and he is the moſt likely to prove ctual of any that we could have choſen: We have accepted him, and while his Agency ſhall neceſſary to the above End, and can be employed with a ſacred Obſervance of every other gagement, I hope we ſhall continue to employ it.

As the Grounds and Deſign of the late Meaſures which have been ſo violently conteſted by ſſrs. Francis and Wheler, have been explained in the fulleſt Detail in my Minutes of the 22d uary, 2d February, and 6th April; I hope I may have Leave to refer to theſe for a fuller and re authentic Comprehenſion of the Subject, and even for the Correction of any Inaccuracies to ich in theſe looſer Debates I may have inadvertently fallen; for ſuch I ſuſpect.

(Signed) Warren Haſtings.

Mr. Francis—On the preceding Minute I ſhall only obſerve, that when I aſſert any thing as t, I conſtantly give the Evidence from which I draw my Concluſion. Aſſertions ſo ſupported are gratuitous. It ſeems the Object of the Expedition is to *give Security and Permanence to the Peace ombay*. Beſides that Bombay has never been attacked, the Deſcription of the Meaſure is defec-in Point of Accuracy and Preciſion, and gives no clear determinate Idea of the Thing intended. h general Declarations may eaſily be accommodated to any Event, or any Purpoſe. It is pro-the Court of Directors ſhould know that Monſieur Bellecombe, on whoſe Viſit to the French tlements on the Malabar Coaſt ſuch violent Streſs was laid, as if the moſt alarming Deſigns were to inferred and the moſt formidable Conſequences to be expected from it, is returned quietly to dicherry. I have this Fact from Captain Panton.

(Signed) P. Francis.

Governor General—It was not my Intention in theſe looſe Debates, to deſcribe the Deſign of the e Meaſures with the Accuracy and Preciſion of formal Inſtructions, but merely to ſtate their gene-and eſſential Object. For a minuter Detail I have referred to my former Minutes which were itten for that End.

I preſume that the Fact which Mr. Francis relates on the Authority of Captain Panton, was re-ed to him with many other Circumſtances which had a Relation to the Deſigns which were im-d to Monſieur Bellecombe, and it is poſſible that the Sum of their Evidence may amount to a f of it. I hope that Mr. Francis will in Candour add all the Information which he has received his Subject from Captain Panton.

(Signed) Warren Haſtings.

Mr. Francis—Captain Panton did not mention any other Particulars to me. The Concluſion I nt to draw from the Fact was, that admitting the French to have entertained Hopes of ob-ing from the Marattas an Eſtabliſhment on the Malabar Coaſt, and to have formed a Plan for ring it, ſuch Hopes and Deſigns muſt now be diſappointed.

(Signed) P. Francis.

APPENDIX, N° 48 and 49.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, 21ſt May 1778.

THE following Minutes were delivered upon the Draft of a Letter prepared by Order of the Governor General, in Anſwer to a Letter from Fort Saint George, and laid before the Board their Approbation:

Mr. Francis—Letters of this great Importance ought to be debated in Council, where the mbers of the Board may receive Information, if they want it, and any Doubts that may occur them may be cleared up.

I think the Refuſal of a Supply of Money to the Preſidency of Fort Saint George, who tell "they have none in their Treaſury, nor any Controul over the Reſources of the Carnatic," is peremptory and unqualified; eſpecially conſidering the unexampled Profuſion with which we e ſupplied Bombay. The Reaſons for which it is ſuppoſed that a Remittance to Madras may

be made at any Time, and with leſs Difficulty in Time of War than Peace, appear to me ſpeculative and uncertain; nor do I ſee any Neceſſity for aſſigning ſuch Reaſons.

As for continuing the March of the Detachment to Bombay, I have re-conſidered the Subject with the utmoſt Attention, and in every Point of View, and muſt own I am unable to diſcover a tolerable Pretence, much leſs a ſolid Argument, for purſuing that Meaſure, even on the Principle on which it was undertaken.

A Reſolution to ſend ſo conſiderable a Portion of the Force eſtabliſhed for the Defence of these Provinces, to the other Side of India, will never appear warrantable in the Eyes of the Court of Directors on any Ground but that of clear irreſiſtible Neceſſity, unleſs they ſhould have departed from their own moſt ſolemn and deliberate Declarations and Orders on this Subject. In the Letter of the 15th December 1775, Par. 4, they ſay, "We diſapprove all ſuch diſtant Expeditions "as may eventually carry our Forces to any Situation too remote to admit of their ſpeedy and ſafe "Return to the Protection of our own Provinces, in caſe of Emergency."

In our original Inſtructions they direct us, *in all our Deliberations and Reſolutions, to make the Safety and Proſperity of Bengal our principal Object.* I ſtate theſe Orders, out of many to the ſame Effect, that the Board may have an Opportunity of conſidering, before it be too late, whether it be poſſible to reconcile the preſent Meaſures to thoſe Principles of Policy which the Court of Directors have ſo ſtrongly and urgently inculcated for the particular Guidance of this Government.

(Signed) P. Francis.

Mr. Wheler—I ſubſcribe to the Opinion of Mr. Francis, on the Anſwer propoſed by the Governor General to the Letter received from Fort Saint George.

Governor General—I deſire that the Secretary will acquaint Mr. Francis if it is his Deſire that a Meeting of the Board ſhall be held to take into further Conſideration the Letter propoſed to be written to Fort Saint George; I ſhall have no Objection to the Council aſſembling To-morrow Morning for that Purpoſe. The Secretary accordingly wrote to Mr. Francis, in Conformity to the Governor General's Minute.

The Governor General having propoſed an Addition to the Letter to Fort Saint George, it was circulated, and the Opinions of the Board, which are entered after it, were delivered thereon.

Governor General—I beg Leave to recommend an additional Clauſe to the Letter propoſed to be written to the Preſident and Council of Fort Saint George, to the following Effect: That if they ſhould ſee a Proſpect of a Continuance of the Troubles at Poona, we recommend to them to aſſemble a Force near the Northern Frontier of the Carnatic, for the Purpoſe of affording either a direct Aſſiſtance to the Preſidency of Bombay, or a Diverſion in their Favour, in any Way which they may judge moſt adviſable.

(Signed) Warren Haſtings.

I diſapprove of the above Clauſe to the Letter propoſed to be written to the Preſident and Council of Fort Saint George, both becauſe I apprehend the Military Eſtabliſhment of that Preſidency is already too much weakened by the Draft of the Detachment now under Orders for Bombay, to admit of a Second Equipment; and likewiſe, becauſe I am of Opinion that our Interference in the Troubles of Poona was founded in bad Policy, conſequently, the further we engage the more we ſhall involve the Affairs of the Company.

(Signed) Edward Wheler.

The Military Eſtabliſhment of the Carnatic, including the Nabob's diſciplined Troops, is equal to that of Bengal, though the Territory which it has to defend is ſcarce equal to a Tenth Part of that which is guarded by the latter.

The Detachment now under Orders for Bombay cannot accompliſh its original Deſtination before the Month of November; it is of courſe not likely to proceed at all.

(Signed) Warren Haſtings.

Mr. Francis—I have heard of no Troubles yet at Poona, but if any have exiſted there, the late Revolution muſt have put an End to them; neither have I heard that Bombay was likely to be attacked, conſequently can ſee no Occaſion for ſending them Aſſiſtance. The Preſidency of that Settlement do not ſeem to think Bombay in any Danger, when by their laſt Letter we find that they were going to march the principal Part of their Force to Poona. I diſapprove of the Motion for theſe Reaſons, and becauſe I think it rather too arbitrary and inconſiſtent to refuſe the Preſidency of Fort Saint George a Supply of Money, when they tell us they have not a Rupee in their Treaſury, and in the ſame Letter to order them to aſſemble a Force upon their Frontiers, and perhaps to march into the Maratta Country, which we know it is impoſſible for them to do without Money.

It ſeems to be forgotten, that all the Military Operations now in Agitation muſt be executed in the Midſt of the Rains.

(Signed) P. Francis.

I agree to the Governor General's Motion.

(Signed) Richard Barwell.

Governor

Governor General—To Mr. Francis's Minute I reply, that it has been ſuppoſed that the Iſland of Bombay was in Danger of immediate Invaſion; that it will be too late to make remote Propoſitions for the Aſſiſtance of that Settlement when it is engaged in actual Hoſtilities; that Mr. Moſtyn's laſt Letter, and the other Advices from that Quarter, afford us every Reaſon to expect a Scene of great Troubles at Poona; that our Application to the Preſidency of Fort Saint George is not an Order, nor have we a Right to write to them on ſuch a Subject with the Style of Command; that by declining to ſend them an immediate Supply of Money, we have not precluded them from every Hope of ſuch Aſſiſtance; and that when our own Means and Exigencies will admit, and their Occaſions require it, I ſhall readily agree to relieve them.

I am ſorry Mr. Francis ſhould ſuppoſe me ſo inattentive to the Service which I have recommended, as not to have conſidered whether the Seaſon of the Year would admit of its Execution. I have in a former Minute declared, that I regarded the rainy Seaſon as favourable to the Expedition conducted by Colonel Leſlie: In the Carnatic it does not commence till the Month of November.

(Signed) Warren Haſtings.

The above Addition having been agreed to by a Majority of the Board, and added to the Letter to Fort Saint George, it was ſigned and diſpatched.

The Secretary lays before the Board the following Letter, which he received from Mr. Francis in Reply to his Notification of the Governor General's Offer of aſſembling a Council to take into further Conſideration the Letter to Fort Saint George:

To J. P. Auriol, Eſquire, &c.

Sir,

Having already delivered my Opinion on the propoſed Letter to Fort Saint George, and on the Addition ſince made to it by the Governor General, and having no new Matter before me, I have now no Ground for making it my particular Deſire that a Council ſhould be ſummoned for re-conſidering the Subject. I beg you will return my moſt reſpectful Thanks to the Governor for the Offer contained in your Letter.

I am, &c.

19th May 1778. (Signed) P. Francis.

N° 49.

The Governor General—As Mr. Francis, in his Minute of the 19th May, has objected to our Refuſal of a Sum of Money to the Preſidency of Fort Saint George as being too peremptory and unqualified, and as nothing was further from my Intention, nor from the plain Conſtruction of the Letter itſelf, I ſhould be very glad if the Opinions of the Board and this Point may be brought to One Point of Argument. Part of the Words of our Letter which have been conſtructed too peremptory and unqualified is as follows: "We conſider the Aid of the Company's Reſources, wherefoever they may exiſt, as due to the Exigencies of all their Settlements. On this Principle we ſhall always be ready to contribute every Means in our Power to the Relief of your's, whenever they ſhall indiſpenſably require it, and we can afford it, without ſubjecting the Intereſts of our common Employers to a greater Inconvenience in one Place than that which we ſhould attempt to avert in another." This Paſſage, and the whole Tenor of the reſt, mark the Intention of this Board to ſupply the Preſidency of Fort Saint George with Money whenever their Exigencies ſhall require it and we can afford it, but decline an immediate Supply: For this I will ſtate ſuch Reaſons to the Board as I hope will convince them of the Propriety of this Anſwer. By the State of our Two Treaſuries of Yeſterday's Date, now lying before the Board, it appears that the Amount of both was Rupees Seventy-two Lacks Seventeen thouſand One hundred and Eighty-three: — — — — — 72,17,183. From this Sum the following muſt be deducted:

Depoſits — — —	12,39,658	
Remains in the Mint uncoined —	12,22,914	
Depoſit in the new Fort — —	35,96,000	
Remaining unpaid of the Advances ordered to the Board of Trade	8,00,000	
		68,58,572
		3,58,611.

From this Account it appears that we cannot at this Time command a larger Sum than Three and a Half Lacks of Rupees, were we diſpoſed to comply with the Application from the Preſidency of Fort St. George, unleſs we were to break in upon the Fund which we have appropriated for our own

own extraordinary Occaſions. Add to this Conſideration the preſent Seaſon of the Year in which the Collections are entirely at a Stand, and it will appear that we ſhall meet with ſome Difficulty in defraying our own ordinary Expences; neither do the Preſident and Council of Fort Saint George require a pecuniary Aid to relieve their actual Wants, but only to ſerve as a Fund to anſwer the Exigencies of a War. To me it appears that ſuch a Fund will be as ſafe and as effectual in our Hands as in theirs, but if it ſhall be the Opinion of the Board that at this Time there is a Probability that the Preſidency of Fort Saint George may be preſſed for Means beyond their ordinary Reſources, I ſhall very readily join in appropriating a Sum for that Purpoſe, and in fixing a Period for advancing it either by Bills, or if theſe cannot be obtained, by Remittances in Specie; in the mean Time I recommend to the Conſideration of the Board the Advice offered to that Preſidency in our Letter of the 7th April 1777, as it points out the natural and reaſonable Means of enlarging their own Reſources, without unneceſſarily exhauſting the Currency of this Country, and I deſire that it may be entered after this Minute. I ſhall here leave the Subject thus at large, either to be determined at this Meeting of the Board; or, as it appears to me of too much Importance for ſo precipitate a Deciſion, to be more deliberately conſidered, and the Opinions of the Board taken upon it in the Interval between our Meetings.

" It appears from the general Tenor as well as the particular Paſſages of the Nabob's Letters, that " he is greatly indebted to Britiſh Subjects in the Service of the Company, or reſiding at Madras " under their Protection. We have ſtrong Grounds to conclude that he may have granted to theſe " Creditors, Tuncaws or Aſſignments of the Revenues of the Carnatic, in the ſame Manner as he " had formerly mortgaged to them the Collections of Tanjore. We cannot avoid expreſſing our " Diſapprobation of this Act, if it has really taken place, becauſe it muſt evidently tend to leſſen the " Power of the Carnatic, by depriving it of its Reſources, and thereby expoſe it to the Danger of " foreign Invaſion. In this Caſe therefore we recommend to you, to require in Form of the Nabob, " that he reſume all ſuch Grants; that he deliver to you an Account of his Debts contracted with the " Subjects of Great Britain, and ſuſpend the Liquidation of them until he ſhall have fully diſcharged " thoſe due to the Company, or until you may be furniſhed with Inſtructions from the Court of Di- " rectors reſpecting the Demands of his private Creditors, as it is poſſible that ſuch Inſtructions may " ſpeedily be received in Anſwer to the Reference which you made to them on this Subject in the " Courſe of the laſt Year."

Mr. Francis—The Letter to Fort Saint George upon the Whole amounts to a poſitive Refuſal of their Requeſt; the following Expreſſion appeared to me too harſh and peremptory, " To theſe Con- " ſiderations we muſt add, that we ſhall not think ourſelves warranted, even under the moſt preſſing " Situation of your Affairs, to offer our Relief, if it ſhall appear to us that you have the Means of " it left in your own Hands unapplied." Either the Means herein alluded to could never be in their own Hands, or their Affairs could not be in the moſt preſſing Situation.

When the Draft of the Letter was ſent round, the State of our Treaſury now preſented to the Board was not before me, nor is it mentioned or alluded to among the Reaſons aſſigned for not granting the Supply requeſted of us; if it had I ſhould have thought it unanſwerable, becauſe as I deem the Preſervation and Security of Bengal of all others the moſt important Object of Conſideration to the Company, I ſhould never have approved of ſupplying the Wants of the other Preſidencies out of the Treaſury of this Government, already ſo nearly exhauſted; on the ſame Principle I ſhould have endeavoured to diſcourage every Enterprize likely to be attended with extraordinary Expences, particularly the preſent Expedition to Poona. I conſider the Money in the new Fort as a Reſource againſt a poſſible Invaſion of theſe Provinces, and not to be employed for any other Service but their immediate Defence; deducting this Sum, and the others already appropriated from the Balance in our Treaſury, it appears that we are going to maintain a War on the other Side of India, or Military Operations at leaſt in Point of Expence equivalent to a War, with an unappropriated Surplus in our Treaſury of Three Lacks and a Half, and which from the Seaſon of the Year we are ſo little likely to encreaſe, that we ſhall meet with ſome Difficulty in our ordinary Expences. In this Situation of our Affairs I certainly ſhall not be for ſending Supplies of Money either to Madras or Bombay, and I would aſſign the true Reaſons of our Conduct to thoſe Preſidencies.

Governor General—The State of our Two principal Treaſuries is preſented to the Board every Monday Morning, and a daily Report I underſtand to be conſtantly made to every Member of the Board: It was to theſe Treaſuries only that my Minute alludes, as it is from theſe only that Remittances could be made to the other Preſidencies; but Mr. Francis has carried his Concluſions far beyond mine, and greatly miſunderſtood me if he ſuppoſes that I mean to repreſent the Company's Reſources as exhauſted. The State of our Treaſuries at the Preſidency has ever been at its loweſt Ebb in the Three firſt Months of the Year; but this does not prove that our Reſources are exhauſted; a fair State of the Company's Reſources can only be ſeen in the collective Sum of all their Treaſuries, and the Eſtimate of their growing Reſources and Diſburſements. The Caſh in the principal Treaſuries may be diminiſhed by Means which proportionably augment that of the Provincial, as is actually the Caſe in the Twelve Lacks of Rupees lately ordered to be granted to the Board of Trade at the Preſidency, in Exchange of the provincial Aſſignments formerly made to them. The general State of the Company's Treaſuries will make a Number in the Packet; and compared with that ſent Home the laſt Year near the ſame Period of Time, will better ſhew than any Argument, the Ability of this Government to ſupport all its Expences, whether external or internal.

Mr

Mr. Barwell—When I approved the Draft of the Letter to Fort Saint George, I did not decline to
the Supply required by the Gentlemen of Fort Saint George from any Idea of the Inability of
Government to give it, but becauſe I did not know, and do not at this preſent Moment know,
er what Circumſtances the extraordinary Demand we have from that Preſidency was made; their
ources were the ſame the preceding Year, and the Year preceding that, and proved a ſufficient
d for defraying the Expences of their Government. I know of no extraordinary Charges to
ch the Preſidency of Fort Saint George has been ſubjected during this preſent Year, nor do the
ident and Council ſtate any Deficiency in their ordinary Funds; I therefore cannot ſuppoſe there
ny very preſſing Call, or that there can be any real Neceſſity for impoveriſhing the Bengal
aſury to ſupply that of Madras; beſides, at this Seaſon of the Year, we have not the Means
ranſporting Bullion to the Coaſt.

Mr. Wheler—I conſider the Requeſt of the Governor and Council of Fort Saint George, of a
ply of Money from this Settlement, rather to ariſe from the Apprehenſion of ſome ſudden
ergency requiring an Increaſe of their Expences, which their Treaſury was in no Degree pre-
ed to anſwer, than from any Augmentation of their Eſtabliſhment: Under theſe Circumſtances I
ged it reaſonable to comply with their Requeſt, not being furniſhed at that Time with an exact
e of our own Treaſury, which I am now well convinced will not admit of. In a mercantile
w many Reaſons may be aſſigned in favour of an annual Supply to that Preſidency; the only
I ſhall offer to the Board at preſent is, that every Cargo from Fort Saint George to Europe,
n ſold by the Company, nearly doubles its original Coſt and Charges, while thoſe from this Set-
ent, which we are increaſing daily in moſt of the Articles which are ſuppoſed to render them
able, upon an Average loſe upwards of 30 per Cent.

We are, &c.

Warren Haſtings,
Richard Barwell,
P. Francis,
Edw[d] Wheler.

Fort William,
1ſt May 1778.

APPENDIX, N° 50 and 51.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 21ſt May 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Rich[d] Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edw[d] Wheler,
} Eſquires.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

N your Commands of the 9th March you are pleaſed to direct me to reſerve in my Hands the Sum of Ten Lacks of Rupees, for the Pay and Expence of the Detachment ordered to be in adineſs to march to Bombay, and to wait your further Orders for tranſmitting the ſame to the tachment. In conſequence of theſe Inſtructions, I immediately prepared that Sum, converting much of it as I poſſibly could into Gold Specie, and packed it up in Readineſs to be forwarded the ſhorteſt Intimation from the Honourable Board: But not receiving ſuch Intimation, and learn- from Colonel Leſlie that his final Inſtructions and Orders of March had been tranſmitted to , I conclude that ſome Accident muſt have befallen the Orders which the Honourable Board t me on this Head, or that they may not have adverted to the Injunction they gave me to wait r further Commands. I have therefore, in Compliance with the moſt preſſing Requiſitions of lonel Leſlie, taken upon me to forward to him the Sum of Twelve Lacks of Rupees (upwards Three Lacks and Thirty thouſand whereof are in Gold Mohurs) which the Honourable Board perceive from a Copy of the Colonel's Eſtimate herewith encloſed, was deemed neceſſary for the vice.

The Charge of the Nabob's Raſſaulah was neceſſarily included in Colonel Leſlie's Eſtimate, as the e of his Excellency's Finances and Reſources rendered it impoſſible for me to have attained im- diately the requiſite Advance from any other Funds than thoſe I am at preſent in Poſſeſſion of. ope however in the Courſe of the Year, to re-claim a conſiderable Part of this Sum, which for preſent I have been obliged to the Vizier's Debt with the Honourable Company, from the nds originally aſſigned for the Maintenance of Abdul-nahman Cawn's Reſſaulah.

For the further Information of the Honourable Board, I beg Leave to ſubmit to their Peruſal

Copies of Colonel Leſlie's Letters to me, regarding the Diſpatch of the Treaſure for the Uſe of Detachment; which, I truſt, will juſtify my Compliance with his Requiſition, though not th conformable to the Orders I had received.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. Middleton,
Reſident at the Vizier's Cour

Lucknow,
8th May 1778.

Copies of Letters from Colonel Leſlie to the Reſident at the Vizier's Court.

Sir,

As I have received the final Orders of the Honourable the Governor General and Council to p ceed on my March to Bombay, with all poſſible Diſpatch; and by what I learn from Mr. Chand you have not yet received the Board's Orders to remit me the Treaſure deſtined for t Service.

The Paymaſter of this Detachment (Mr. Cator) is not yet arrived, as he has been delayed Sickneſs, and I think it is probable has Orders to receive the Treaſure from you, but has negle in his Indiſpoſition to tranſmit the Order to you or to me; upon this Suppoſition I have ſent an I preſs to him, to deſire, if he has ſuch an Order, to tranſmit it to me immediately; and as I h not any Money to defray the Expence of the current Service, I am to requeſt that you will pl to remit me, as ſoon as poſſible, ſome Lacks of Rupees, or ſend me Credit for ſuch Sums as I m want for the current Service, leſt it ſhould ſuffer by Delay for the Want of it, which I ſhall h myſelf accountable to you for, till ſuch Time as you may receive the neceſſary Orders from Board, immediately from themſelves, or through Mr. Cator.

I have adviſed the Government with this Circumſtance of Delay, and of my having made Requiſition to you, leſt the Service ſhould ſuffer before their Orders can arrive.

I am, &c.
(Signed) M^w Leſlie.

Camp, near Corah,
28th April 1778.

Sir,

I have been favoured with your Letter of the 24th Inſtant on the Morning of the 27th, previ to which, on the Night of the 25th, Mr. Chandler arrived here, as did Almaſs Ally Cawn on Morning of the 26th.

I am extremely obliged to you for your Attention in ſending Mr. Chandler to this Place, order to ſee that the Vizier's Injunctions and your own are duly executed by Almaſs Ally Cawn, which I hope the Service will be furthered, and all Obſtacles removed that have hitherto reta it; and I hope, by this Interpoſition, that the Supplies I have demanded, which are very tri to the Abilities of the Country, will be ſpeedily and effectually ſupplied, in order that I may be my March without Loſs of Time.

I muſt refer you to Mr. Chandler for the Progreſs we have made with Almaſs for your furt Information.

In my Letter of Yeſterday I informed you of the Circumſtances of the Delay in the Supply of Treaſure. I now encloſe you an Eſtimate of what I think will be wanting for the current Exp of One Month, which, you will obſerve, amounts to One Lack Seventy thouſand Rupees; the fore I do ſuppoſe that not leſs than Thirty thouſand will be neceſſary for Contingencies, or Two Lacks will be barely ſufficient, excluſive of the Firſt Expence of Supply; as the Governm have thought that Six Months ought to be provided, Twelve Lacks will be neceſſary, whic hope will be ſent to me as ſoon as poſſible.

I am, &c.
(Signed) Math^w Leſlie.

Camp, near Corah,
29th April 1778.

Sir,

The Paymaſter of my Detachment (Mr. Cator) being arrived, and having no other Orders th to join me, I preſume the Governor General and Council thought my Order for your ſending Sum of Money deſtined for the Expence of my Expedition, ſufficient for your doing ſo; and they have put the Paymaſter entirely under my Controul alone, I ſuppoſe it was not conſiſtent Order ſhould be ſent to him to receive it, or in the Hurry of Buſineſs the neceſſary Orders your ſending it have been forgot; let this be how it will, the Service muſt ſuffer if the Treaſure not ſent immediately. I therefore muſt repeat my Requeſt to you, that a Sum, amounting Twelve Lacks of Sicca Rupees be ſent me with all Expedition, for which I will grant my R ceipts, and become accountable to you.

I am, &c.
(Signed) M. Leſlie.

Camp, near Corah,
30th April 1778.

True Copies,
(Signed) N. Middleton.

Eſtimate

Eſtimate of Charges of the Detachment under the Command of Colonel Leſſie, per Month.

Company of Artillery, including Field Officers, Quarter-maſter, and Adjutant, &c. —		12,000
Regiments of Cavalry — — — —	34,000	
Quarter-maſter Adjutant D° — — —	2,000	
		36,000
Battalions of Infantry — — — —	78,000	
Quarter-maſter Adjutant D° — — — —	3,500	
		81,500
Quarter-maſter General's Eſtabliſhment, &c. — —	—	3,000
Field Engineer's D° — — — —	—	4,500
General, Staff, &c. 1 Colonel, 2 Lieutenant Colonels, 2 Majors, Major of Brigade, Interpreter, Aid de Camps, Secretary, Surveyors, Pay-maſter, Commiſſary, &c.		25,000
Contingencies to Artillery, Cavalry and Infantry, allowed — —		8,000
Sonat Rupees		1,70,000

For extraordinary Supplies and Contingencies.

A true Copy.
(Signed) N. Middleton,
Reſid' at the Vizier's Court.

N° 51.

Reſolved, That the following Letter be written to Mr. Middleton:

Sir,

We have received your Letters of the 30th ultimo, and 1ſt, 6th, and 8th inſtant.

Inſtead of complying with the Aſſurances which have been made by Mr. D. Barwell to Fyzala Cawn, we think it will anſwer the ſame Purpoſe to addreſs a Letter to him, confirming the Obligation of the Government to abide by the Guarantee of the Treaty concluded by the Vizier with him, which you have engaged in by our Authority, and the Governor General will write to him accordingly.

We authorize you to receive the Amount of the Obligation which Fyzala Cawn has delivered to Mr. Barwell for One Lack of Rupees, as a complimentary Mark of his Reſpect and Attention to the Company for the Part they have taken in his Concerns.

We think it proper to expreſs our Approbation of the Conduct of Mr. Daniel Barwell in the Tranſaction of the Buſineſs on which you have deputed him to Fyzala Cawn, and we direct that he prepare and tranſmit to us through you an Account of the Expences which he has incurred by this Expedition.

Having conſidered the earneſt Requiſition of Colonel Leſſie for Twelve Lacks of Rupees, with the Eſtimate which he tranſmitted you of the Monthly Diſburſements of his Detachment, we conſent to his retaining the additional Two Lacks with which you have ſupplied him, as we are convinced that the Extraordinary Charge of the Cavalry, which was not provided for in the Firſt Eſtimate of the Expence, will require that Sum to defray it; but we muſt nevertheleſs ſignify our Diſapprobation of your having taken upon yourſelf to exceed our original Orders on this Subject without previouſly applying for our Permiſſion. Directions were tranſmitted you, under Date the 8th inſtant, for diſpatching the Treaſure which we had ordered you to prepare, to Colonel Leſſie; but you acted properly in forwarding it before the Receipt of thoſe Orders, as the Exigency of the Service required it, and you were acquainted with the Uſe for which it was intended.

We are, &c.
Warren Haſtings,
Rich[d] Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edw[d] Wheler.

Fort William,
21ſt May 1778.

APPENDIX, N° 52.

Extract of Bengal Military Conſultations, the 27th March 1778.

READ a Letter from Colonel Leſlie, dated 14th March 1778.

To the Honourable Warren Haſtings, Eſquire, Governor General and Council.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have been favoured with your Reſolutions of the 23d ultimo, through the Commander in Chi and I cheerfully embrace the Honour you conferred upon me, in the Command of ſo conſiderabl Part of the Honourable Company's Troops; and the Confidence and Reliance you have placed me demands my utmoſt Gratitude: I am very ſenſible of this Mark of your Favour, which it v be my Duty to deſerve.

I ſhall proceed with all Diligence to collect together the Equipment of this Expedition, an hope with the Power you have intruſted me, to be able to proceed upon it in due Time, and that i may anſwer the Purpoſe you intend. I beg Leave to ſuggeſt to you that it will be abſolutely neceſſary it be attended with a Corps of Cavalry, in order to eſcort my Stores and Supplies, and preſerve my Baggage and Bazaars from Inſult, and the frequent Alarms that are given on Marches of this Kind by a ſtraggling Cavalry Enemy, as well as to preſerve my Communication and Correſpondence. I am therefore to requeſt you will permit me to take the Firſt Regiment of Cavalry (now here) with me on this Service, which I flatter myſelf you will approve. I have ordered it in Readineſs and to proceed with me to Calpee, where I hope to receive your Approbation.

The Artillery you have appointed to this Command is very reſpectable, and I do not apprehend the Golundaze Company from this Brigade ſufficient to conduct it probably. You are pleaſed to add Four Officers from the Firſt Company to join it, and I muſt requeſt you will add Twenty-five or Thirty European Artillery Men, with ſome Serjeants, and One hundred Laſcars from the Firſt Company, that this Artillery and the Magazines may be properly conducted; and if you pleaſe to indulge me with a Company of Fifty Men from the Firſt Regiment, as a Guard to the Whole, it will give it the neceſſary Reſpect, and I hope you will ſee the Neceſſity of this, and concur in my Requeſt.

As you have not been pleaſed to take Notice of any attendant Staff, I preſume you will have no Objection to my taking my preſent with me, which I requeſt your Concurrence in. And as this Service will require every Aid, I muſt requeſt the Favour you will pleaſe to order Lieutenant Frith, the preſent Brigade Major of the temporary Brigade, to join this Detachment as Brigade Major, which it muſt neceſſarily have, and that another Officer be ordered to do his Duty here till his Return; I ſhall take the Liberty to take him along with me to Korah, where I hope to receive your Approbation.

I preſume you will think a Commiſſary of Muſters neceſſary to aſcertain every Thing you are pleaſed to require: A Judge Advocate alſo you may think requiſite; and I muſt requeſt your Power for aſſembling general Courts Martial on Europeans, and to qualify any Perſon to act as Judge Advocate; I requeſt alſo you will pleaſe to appoint ſome additional Surgeons, which are abſolutely neceſſary for us. I muſt endeavour to procure what Medicines I can from the Firſt Brigade.

I muſt requeſt alſo your Inſtructions and Orders relative to the neceſſary Supply of Money, and you will gratify me by putting it under the Direction of Mr. Leſlie (my preſent Secretary) as Paymaſter, and I will become anſwerable for him. I have taken the neceſſary Steps for procuring the Draft and Carriage Cattle that may be wanted, by ſending to Korah, Calpee, and Bundlecund, to provide them, as alſo to ſecure my Supplies of Proviſions, which I have no Doubt I ſhall be able to effect, but wiſh your Requeſt to the Rajah of Bundlecund to give all the Aſſiſtance in his Power. There being no Carriage Cattle here attached to the Golundazes, I have requeſted Lieutenant Colonel Wilding to procure what Number may be wanted at Allahabad, to be ſent to Suragepore; and that nothing may be wanting on my Part, I propoſe ſetting out this Night for Lucknow, to ſettle with Mr. Middleton what may be wanting on his Part or the Vizier's, and to comply with your Inſtructions relative to the Arſenal there, which I ſhall report to you.

The Vizier not having a Twelve Pounder fit for the Service we are going upon, I have wrote to Lieutenant Colonel Upton to diſpatch with all Expedition Two Twelve Pounders from Chunar, and if Cattle can be provided I hope they will be brought up by Captain M'Pherſon.

I ſhall hope for your general Inſtructions to proceed; and have the Honour to be, with the higheſt Reſpect,

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Your moſt obedient humble Servant,

Matth. Leſlie.

Camp, Futty Gurr,
14th March 1778.

Governor General—It is with much Reluctance that we conſent to any further Drafts from our Troops ſtationed in the Nabob Vizier's Dominions; but if you ſhall judge it indiſpenſably neceſſary

to

o join the 1ſt Regiment of Cavalry, or any Part of it, to your Detachment, we authorize you to o it, but we rather recommend that you apply to the Nabob for a Party of his Cavalry to attend ou on this Service.

We cannot conſent to your Requeſt that 25 Artillery Men and a Company of Europeans be added your Detachment, though we are convinced that they would prove an Addition of great Strength it. We conſent to your taking Lieutenant Frith as your Brigade Major.

The other Requiſitions contained in your Letter have been already anſwered by our Public Orders ready iſſued.

Mr. Francis—I think, that before we conſent to the detaching of a Regiment of Cavalry in Addition to the Troops already ordered to this Service, we ought to be furniſhed with the Commander Chief's Opinion, whether ſuch Detachment of Cavalry can be ſpared with Safety from the Defence f the great Line of Frontier which we have now to defend?

Governor General—I believe I already know General Stibbert's Opinion: It was in Deference to that no Mention was made of Cavalry in the firſt propoſed Arrangement; but as Colonel Leſlie ill be reſponſible for the Execution of the Service, and as the preferable Object in my Opinion is ie Intereſt of the Enterprize, not the Defence of the Nabob's Dominions, which will be eventually tter defended by it than a much larger Force acting at Home, I am of Opinion, that the diſtionary Power which I have propoſed in the above Draft of the Letter to be written to him in eply to his, ſhould be given to him. I have too great a Reſpect for General Stibbert, to aſk his dvice on a Point on which I myſelf formed a determined Opinion.

Mr. Wheler—I agree to the Draft of the Letter to Colonel Leſlie, relying upon the Foreſight and ttention of the Governor General to the Safety and Security of the Frontiers.

Mr. Barwell agrees to the Draft.

Reſolved, That a Letter be accordingly written to Colonel Leſlie.

APPENDIX, N° 53, 54, and 55.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, 8th June 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident.
Richard Barwell, Philip Francis, Edward Wheler, } Eſquires.

EAD the following Letter from Colonel Leſlie:

Gentlemen,

Although I have been arrived in this Neighbourhood ſome Days, I have delayed writing to u until I ſhould have croſſed the Firſt Diviſion of my Detachment over the Jumma.

Purſuant to your Directions every Means in my Power were uſed to reconcile the Chiefs holding the Diſtricts between Culpee and Bundelcund to my March, and I received Aſſurances of their illingneſs and ready Aſſiſtance of Proviſions. They alſo ſent a Vackeel to me for my Orders, d to receive my Declarations of Peace and Protection to the Inhabitants on my March; but Kellidar of the Fort waved acquieſcing to my Application for the Aid of his Boats, and indicated in all his Actions the Hoſtility of his Intentions.

Many Attempts and Threats were uſed to intimidate my Workmen at the Boats I had been ble to collect, and at the Inſtant their Vackeel was in my Camp, they commenced direct Acts of Hoſtility, and abſolutely fired at my People employed at the Boats, which was retorted on them by he Guard placed for their Protection. In the Afternoon they returned to the ſame Attempts, and he Officer then thought it neceſſary to puniſh them more effectually, and fired a few Rounds from Two 6 Pounders that had been ordered there to cover the landing of the Troops. This obliged hem to retreat with the Loſs of ſome Men; ſome Gabions that were thrown up before the Party at he Boats entirely ſecured them from the Effects of their Shot.

I had told the Vackeel my Intention of croſſing as Yeſterday, but he was very ſolicitous for my elaying another Day, and expreſſed his Maſter's Wiſh that I would croſs the River at 16 Coſs higher p. I could not accede to either. The Firſt was incompatible with the Declaration I had made, aving already delayed my Paſſage of the River, with the Expectation of ſeeing the Vackeel, who onfirmed to me the Promiſes I had received from the Chiefs Ballajee and Gungadur, and the latter as leading me far out of my Way, and therefore not to be complied with.

I explained theſe Objections to the Vackeel, and repeated my Profeſſions of Amity and Protection to the Country. And he left me on the Pledge of Peace to give the requiſite Injunctions to the Kellidar's Troops, and to ſend the Boats, ſeemingly ſatisfied, and promiſed to return to me in the Evening. This he did not perform, and the declared Hoſtility the Marattas had ſhewn at the Gaut, gave me Reaſon to expect ſome Oppoſition. Yeſterday Morning at Day-break the Troops reached the Gaut, conſiſting of Three Battalions and their Guns. And on the Firſt Embarkation being formed on the oppoſite Beach, the Troops that had been collected at Culpee began to aſſemble. Colonel Goddard immediately diſpatched a Meſſenger to their Chief, with a Deſire to paſs unmoleſted; and was deſired to come on. However, before One Battalion was quite formed, their Horſemen began a diſtant Fire with their Matchlocks, and finding no immediate Reſiſtance, their Inſolence was ſo great as to draw very near the Troops in ſingle Men to moleſt them, by which Means Two Sepoys were ſlightly wounded. The Security of the People then required a Reſiſtance, and the Two Guns placed for covering the Landing, with a ſmall Battery I had poſted for the Support of the Troops, in poſſeſſing themſelves of the Poſt they were to occupy, diſcharged a few Shot amongſt them which did Execution.

The Detachment marched from the Beach, and met with no Oppoſition, the Maratta Troops retreating before them the whole Way to the Village, from whence they wheeled off through ſome rugged Ground to a Plain about a Mile inland from the Fort. Colonel Goddard had detached Major Fullarton, with Four Grenadier Companies, to his Left, to prevent any Surprize in the Rear of his Detachment from the high Grounds, with Directions for their joining at the Village, but the Road being much interſected through the deep broken Ground, he was led near a Mile from the Extremity of the Village, almoſt intercepting the Retreat of the Troops from the Fort; at this Time the Parties that had gone off with their Baggage and Effects to a Poſt about Three Coſs on the Jellalpoor Road, were returning in Search of Plunder, and to aid in harraſſing our Troops, collected here to the Number of about 1,200 Men, they attacked the Grenadiers with ſome Suttrenalls and Rockets, and preſſed them ſo hard, that the 4th Battalion, with Two Guns, immediately marched from the Village to their Relief; and the 7th Battalion was ordered to follow. On the Junction of the 4th Battalion, a few Rounds decided the Conteſt, and the Enemy retreated to Etowrah, the Place where they had carried their Effects. It was too far in the Day, and the Troops too much harraſſed by being a long Time under Arms, to think of purſuing them, and the Detachment returned to the Bank of the River, taking up their Poſt between the Village and the Fort. The Fort they found evacuated; Colonel Goddard therefore poſſeſſed it immediately. In this Attack a few Grenadiers were wounded, but none dangerouſly.

I have been thus particular to point out to you, Gentlemen, that the Steps I have purſued, and the Endeavours I uſed to obtain the Acquieſcence of the Chiefs Ballajee and Gungadur, were conſonant to your Orders, and ſuch as will obtain your Approbation; and that the jealous Diſaffection of the Maratta Chiefs alone has produced this firſt Hoſtility. I do alſo aſſure you, that I will yet ſtrive to ſecure their peaceable Admiſſion of my March. The Fort of Culpee is an excellent Hoſtage; this, together with the Knowledge they now have that your Troops will not patiently bear an Inſult, may effect their ready Acquieſcence.

Another Vackeel from Ballajee is with me, who denies that the Oppoſition has been made by Authority, and ſolicits Friendſhip from me: On proper Pledges I will grant it; but the Deceit they have already uſed, will not admit of my placing too much Confidence in their Profeſſions.

I have the Pleaſure to acquaint you, that the Officers and Troops behaved with the greateſt Alacrity, at the ſame Time they obſerved the ſtricteſt Diſcipline and Regularity.

I have, &c.

Camp near Culpee,
May 20th, 1778.

(Signed) Matt^w Leſlie.

N° 54.

The Governor General lays before the Board the following Draft of an Anſwer to the above Letter, for their Approbation:

We have received your Letter, dated the 20th ultimo.

It affords us great Satisfaction, and adds to the Confidence which we before repoſed in your Conduct, to obſerve the Attention which you have ſhewn to our Inſtruction in your Endeavours to conciliate the Maratta Chiefs to the March of your Detachment, and in your Forbearance to retaliate their Hoſtilities until the Safety of your Party made it neceſſary to repel them.

We do not regret the Oppoſition which you have met with, ſince it has afforded you an Occaſion of proving the Sincerity of our Profeſſions, and the Marattas to be the Aggreſſors in this early Act of Hoſtility; at the ſame Time that the ill Succeſs which attended it cannot have failed to make an Impreſſion which we hope will diſcourage them in their future Attacks, for ſuch we ought to expect, nor can we doubt that this was made by Authority, though diſavowed by their Principals. We have leſs Apprehenſion of their open Hoſtilities than of their Treachery, and therefore although

ough you inform us that you ſhall not place too much Confidence in their Profeſſions; yet think it neceſſary to repeat the Caution, and to recommend that you do not ſuffer yourſelf by Appearances to relax from it.

We deſire that you will adviſe Mr. Moſtyn, the Company's Reſident on the Part of the Govern- t of Bombay at Poona, of your Proceedings, and of all ſuch Occurrences as may require his lanation of them to the Government at Poona, or the Interpoſition of its Authority to prevent like Attempts in others to interrupt the Courſe of your March.

We are, &c.

Mr. Francis—The Oppoſition made by the Marattas to Colonel Leſlie's Paſſage over the Jumma, me, I confeſs, an unexpected Event. I underſtood that great Reliance had been placed on the mn Promiſes given us by the Maratta Chiefs of their pacific Diſpoſition, and of their Reſolution only to permit the Detachment to march quietly through their Country, but even to give them y poſſible Aſſiſtance: At any rate I did not expect that they would have diſcovered a hoſtile In- ion to us until the Detachment was engaged further in their Country. As we at preſent know t we have to truſt to, and as it ſeems to be agreed that we ought to expect that they will do every g in their Power to interrupt the March of the Army, it is my Opinion that we ought not to mpt to proceed any further, at leaſt until the Rains are over. I think that we hazard the Safety hat Army, on which perhaps the Safety of Bengal and of the whole Britiſh Empire in India may end, by attempting to force a Paſſage from one Side of India to the other at this unfavourable ſon of the Year, and in the Face of an Enemy determined to oppoſe it. The Marattas have it heir Power to diſtreſs, harraſs, and perhaps ruin any Army that enters into their Country in theſe umſtances, without ever coming to an Engagement. I wiſh the Opinion of Military Men to be n, whether it be probable that Colonel Leſlie's Army under theſe Difficulties can make good Paſſage from Calpee to Bombay, or how it is poſſible for them to enſure the neceſſary Supplies Forage and Proviſions during ſo long a March in the Rains, if the Marattas are determined to do y thing they can to diſtreſs him? On theſe Principles I cannot approve of the propoſed Letter, pt that Part of it which recommends extraordinary Caution, which undoubtedly ought to be rved if the Expedition is to be continued.

Mr. Wheler—I agree with Mr. Francis, particularly in that Part of his Minute which recommends taking of Military Opinions upon the preſent State of the Army under the Command of Colonel ie.

Mr. Barwell approves of the Draft.

The Draft of the Letter to Colonel Leſlie being approved;

greed, That it be written and diſpatched accordingly.

Governor General—During a former Period, in which my Voice was excluded from an Influence the Reſolutions of the Board, I made it a Rule, from which I never deviated, to aſſiſt and ſupport ry Meaſure of the Council after it had received the Sanction of the concurrent Opinions of a jority of its Members, although paſſed in Oppoſition to my Opinion. It was a Duty which I ed to the Service, nor has even the Change of Influence ever induced me to depart from it: But aſures which I deemed the moſt pernicious to the Service having been allowed to take their Effect, ave ſupported them, and I do ſupport them even to this Hour. I have a Right to complain of the trary Conduct of Mr. Francis in particular, and of Mr. Wheler who has invariably joined with him, in ding every Meaſure of Government, originally undertaken againſt their Opinions, with unremitted poſition. This is I believe the Fifth Time, if not more, that Mr. Francis has urged the Recall the Detachment, after having thrown upon me and Mr. Barwell the entire Reſponſibility of its pointment. I ſhould not feel ſo ſenſibly as I do the Authority of Two Members of the Admi- tration, which ought to be applied ſolely to the Promotion of the Company's Intereſts and the ctual Proſecution of the regular Acts of Government, thus employed to impede and counteract m, if their Objections were derived from a ſtudied Knowledge of the Subjects, how erroneous ver the Concluſions from them might be: But it is my hard Lot to contend with either Miſinfor- tion or Miſrepreſentation; for I will venture to ſay, that there is not a Syllable of Mr. Francis's nute that is not built upon wrong Grounds of Fact. I will examine every Part of it in the Order which it was dictated. The Minute begins with theſe Words: "The Oppoſition made by the Marattas to Colonel Leſlie's Paſſage over the Jumma, is to me I confeſs an unexpected Event. I underſtood that great Reliance had been placed on the ſolemn Promiſes given us by the Maratta Chiefs of their pacific Diſpoſition, and of their Reſolution not only to permit the Detachment to march quietly through their Country, but even to give them every poſſible Aſſiſtance." No ſuch claration of the ſolemn Promiſes thus given by the Maratta Chiefs appears on any Part of our cords, nor can I conceive why this Aſſertion is ſo pointedly made, unleſs it be to ſuggeſt the nger of a March of the Detachment through a Country united under One Government, and com- ing all its Powers to deſtroy it from the Banks of the Jumma to Bombay. I can ſay for myſelf, t I never entertained the ſame Aſſurance of the pacific Diſpoſition of the Chiefs of the Paiſhwa's nediate Juriſdiction.

I proceed with the Words of the Minute. "At any rate I did not expect that they would have diſcovered a hoſtile Intention to us until the Detachment was engaged further in their Country. As we at preſent know what we have to truſt to, and as it ſeems to be agreed that we expect that hey will do every thing in their Power to interrupt the March of the Army, it is my Opinion that

"we

" we ought not to attempt to proceed any further, at leaſt not until the Rains are over. I think th
" we hazard the Safety of that Army, on which perhaps the Safety of Bengal and of the whol
" Britiſh Empire in India may depend, by attempting to force a Paſſage from one Side of India t
" the other at this unfavourable Seaſon of the Year, and in the Face of an Enemy determined t
" oppoſe it. The Marattas have it in their Power to diſtreſs, harraſs, and perhaps ruin any Arm
" that enters into their Country in theſe Circumſtances, without ever coming to an Engagement."
I lament that ſuch alarming Declarations cannot be confined to our Records; and I lament the d
gerous Conſequences to which the Company's Intereſts muſt be expoſed, both here and at Home, b
ſuch a Denunciation pronounced by a Member of this Adminiſtration, and of univerſal Ruin to th
Britiſh Empire, from the Effects of a partial Meaſure, which was unfortunately undertaken witho
his Concurrence. A very ſhort Reply will be ſufficient to diſſipate ſuch ill-grounded Apprehenſio
The Diſtricts which depend on the Chiefs who have commenced the firſt Hoſtilities againſt the D
tachment, extend but to a ſhort Diſtance from Calpee; Three or Four Days, or at moſt a We
will be ſufficient for it to reach the Borders of Bundlecund, a Country neither ſubject to the Gov
ment of the Marattas, nor likely to be influenced by their Example; from Bundlecund the Rou
will lie through the Diſtrict of Bopaul, which is under the Government of a Patan Chief, acknow
ledging no other Submiſſion to the Maratta State than the Payment of the Chout. I am not Mat
of the exact Geography of this Country, but I can affirm that this Diſtrict includes ſo narrow
Space, that it is neither mentioned in our Maps, nor known at this Diſtance but to Perſons who ha
occaſionally paſſed through it. The reſt of the Way, to the Borders of Candeiſh, and of t
Countries which are contiguous to Poona, lies in the Dominions of Moodajee Booſla, who is at th
Time the moſt powerful of the Chiefs who bear the Maratta Name, who holds his Poſſeſſions in h
own Right, and independent of the Government of the Paiſhwa, even by the Confeſſion of th
Members of that Adminiſtration: From him I have received the warmeſt Aſſurances of Aſſiſtance
and even Invitations, repeated to Colonel Leſlie as well as to myſelf, for the March of the Detach
ment into his Country. The Knowledge which I have acquired of his political Intereſts and Objec
is a Warrant yet ſtronger for my Confidence in his Fidelity. If the Safety of our Detachment ha
been thus far ſecured, I think there is little Danger from the Oppoſition it may meet with in the Re
mainder of its Progreſs except the Events of a War, ſhould a War be the Conſequence, which i
Defiance of the moſt guarded Precautions of human Prudence muſt ever be in ſome Degree fortu
tous; yet it is my Opinion, that this Undertaking is as little liable to adverſe Conſequences as an
Expedition that has ever yet been ſet on Foot by any one of the Engliſh Governments in India, and
I am willing to ſtake my Reputation on the Event of it. Twice is the rainy Seaſon repeated in thi
Minute as an Objection; the ſame Objection has been before Twice made by Mr. Francis, and ver
fully anſwered. It is hard to exact from me repeated Anſwers to the ſame Objections, without a
Argument urged to ſupport them: I ſhall content myſelf with appealing to my former Reply
which is contained in my Minute of

To proceed in the Words of Mr. Francis's Minute, " I wiſh the Opinion of Military Men to be
" taken, whether it be probable that Colonel Leſlie's Army, under theſe Difficulties, can make
" good its Paſſage from Culpee to Bombay, or how it is poſſible for them to enſure the neceſſary
" Supplies of Forage and Proviſions, during ſo long a March in the Rains, if the Maratta
" tas are determined to do every Thing they can to diſtreſs him?" I do not deſire to con
ſult Opinions on a Meaſure already determined; but to ſtate the Queſtion in the Terms propoſe
would be to deceive thoſe to whom it was put into falſe Opinions, the neceſſary Conſequences o
falſe Premiſes. The Minute concludes in the following Words: " On theſe Principles I cannot
" approve of the propoſed Letter, except that Part of it which recommends extraordinary Caution,
" which undoubtedly ought to be obſerved if the Expedition is to be continued." The Queſtion
before the Board is, Whether a Letter ſhall be written to Colonel Leſlie, conſiſting of Two di
tinct Points? The Firſt is an Approbation of his paſt Conduct; the Second, a Caution to beware
of Treachery. The Reply given by Two of the Members, applies only to the laſt Point included in
the Queſtion, with a total Silence on the Firſt; while the Debates of the Board have been intro
duced, and conſumed the whole Time of the Morning, on a Subject totally foreign from both.

It may ſuit the Syſtem adopted, whatever that be, by the diſſenting Members of this Council,
to continue the ſame Means which have been uſed to this Time, to defeat the Meaſures which have
been adopted againſt their Conſent. I declare in this Place my unalterable Determination to proſe-
cute it to the utmoſt of my Power to its Concluſion.

Mr. Francis—What Rules of Conduct Mr. Haſtings may have preſcribed to himſelf, in former
Times, is not a Queſtion I am concerned in. My Conduct, I truſt, will want no Apology, as
long as it is guided by my own Senſe of what my Duty demands of me, though it ſhould not
correſpond with his Example. Neither do I know, nor do I mean to enquire, what thoſe Meaſures
are, which, though taken by the late Majority in Oppoſition to his Opinion, and though of a Na-
ture the moſt pernicious to the Company's Service, he continues to ſupport; but this I do know,
that all our Meaſures were approved of by the Company, and none of them ſo ſtrongly as thoſe
which received the greateſt Oppoſition at this Board.

Admitting the Rule alluded to by the Governor to be a good one, I conceive it does not
ſtrictly apply to the preſent Queſtion. In propoſing to ſtop the March of the Detachment, I do
not properly retard or embarraſs the Execution of a Meaſure already reſolved on, while all Cir-
cumſtances continue the ſame. I propoſe a new Meaſure on the Ground of a new and unexpected

vent. With reſpect to the conſtant Oppoſition which I am charged with having heretofore given
this Meaſure, I avow the Fact, and am glad to ſee it eſtabliſhed by Teſtimony that cannot be
iſputed. In referring to the pacific Declarations of the Maratta Chiefs, I ſpoke from a ſtrong Im-
eſſion of my Memory, which I believe has not miſled me. Moodajee Booſla repeatedly pro-
iſes to furniſh the Army with all Neceſſaries, and to conduct them with Security through his
erritories. I did underſtand that Ballajee and Gungadur had given us Aſſurances to the ſame
ffect. Their Letters to Colonel Leſlie are full of amicable Profeſſions, which were continued to
m by their Vackeels in his Camp, even to the Time when their Troops were attacking his ad-
nced Parties. He now ſays, "that the jealous Diſaffection of the Maratta Chiefs alone has pro-
duced this firſt Hoſtility." I for my own Part ſee no Reaſon why all thoſe Chiefs ſhould not
t on the ſame Principles. Their general Intereſt I conceive muſt be to prevent a foreign
orce from penetrating into their Country, under any Pretences whatſoever. What the particular
onduct of Moodajee Bhooſla may be is uncertain; the Proceedings of the other Chiefs give us
Cauſe to rely on his good Faith or pacific Intentions. I for myſelf place no Confidence in
em. My Objection to the March of the Army, on account of the Rainy Seaſon, does not now
nd on the ſame Ground on which it was firſt urged; it was confined to that Conſideration only,
is now united with that of a Military Oppoſition; either of theſe Difficulties ſingly might perhaps
furmounted. It now appears that we have both to contend with.

I have no Apprehenſion that my Opinions given at this Board will reach the Marattas, or will
ve any Effect upon the Operations in the Field. They are eaſy and obvious Concluſions from
cts known to every Body. If I am ſingular in drawing ſuch Concluſions, my Opinion, though it
uld be univerſally known, can produce no Effect. I confeſs that I did not attend to the For-
lity of approving Colonel Leſlie's Conduct, which I ſhould not have objected to: My Mind was
ed with Objects of more Conſequence. To the concluding Sentence of the Governor's Minute,
hall content myſelf with ſaying, that I neither have formed a Syſtem of perſonal Intereſt, nor
I able to deviſe one, which could be promoted or retarded by ſtopping the preſent Expedition;
ther am I peremptory in ſaying, that I ſhall, at all Times and in all Circumſtances, oppoſe it
the utmoſt of my Power, becauſe a State of Facts may exiſt, to which I may be compelled
Neceſſity to accommodate my Conduct.

The Governor General—I will not lengthen a Debate, which originally aroſe from a Subject to
hich it does not regularly belong, and has run into others yet more foreign from it; but there is
ne Point which demands my Reply.

I have complained of the unfair Application which Mr. Francis has made of the general and equi-
al Term "Maratta," which in the only Senſe it will bear in his Inferences, means only that Part of
Maratta Government which acknowledges the Sovereignty and immediate Authority of the
ſhwa and his Miniſters; but the Facts from which theſe Inferences are deduced relate to a Variety
Powers and Intereſts, which are entirely ſeparated from the Paiſhwa's Government, and which
ir original Dependance on it has even converted by a neceſſary Conſequence into an Oppoſition to
The greateſt Part, at leaſt Two Thirds of the Line propoſed for the March of the Detachment,
ongs to Powers that acknowledge no Obedience to the Maratta State properly ſo called; that of
ndlecund does not bear even the Maratta Name; yet it will be impoſſible for any uninformed Per-
to read Mr. Francis's Minutes, even the latter, though dictated after he had been reminded of
eſſential Diſtinction, without concluding from them that the whole Country, lying between the
ſent Station of the Detachment and its Termination at Bombay, was occupied by One Power,
that Power ready to act uniformly againſt the Detachment in every Stage of its Progreſs.

The Promiſes given by Moodajee Bhooſla will not warrant the Suppoſition with which Mr. Francis
gins his Firſt Minute, and on which he expreſſes his Diſappointment, ſince this Chief, though
nfounded in the general Maratta Name, is not a Dependent of the Maratta Government; neither
the Aſſurances given by the Chiefs, Ballajee and Gunga Dur, juſtify Mr. Francis's Expectations
a pacific Conduct in the Maratta Chiefs, ſince their Names were never mentioned before, and
ey are now only mentioned to ſhew that neither their Conduct or Intentions were pacific.

Yet one Word more: It would lead me into a Diſcuſſion too pointed and too perſonal, were I
reply to the latter Part of the preceding Minute, in which Mr. Francis is pleaſed to ſay that he is
able to divine One Syſtem which could be promoted or retarded by ſtopping the preſent Expedi-
n: To this I ſhall briefly anſwer, that the Diſgrace of thoſe who planned the preſent Expedition;
irreparable Loſs of the Credit of this Government; and a perpetual Diſtruſt in all its future Acts,
cluſive of the Forfeiture of the Advantages for which it was originally concerted, would be the in-
lible Conſequence of ſtopping the preſent Expedition. It would ill become me to connect ſuch
onſequences with a ſuppoſed Syſtem of Party, how obvious ſoever the Tranſition may be, and
owever warranted by univerſal Practice, from the Defeat of thoſe who have the Conduct of Affairs
the Triumph of their Opponents: A conſtant Series of Oppoſition may likewiſe produce the
ffect of ſtamping on the Authors of public Meaſures the Opprobrium of every Failure of Succeſs
hich may at any Time attend them, at the ſame Time that its public and popular Influence eſſen-
ally tends to prevent their Succeſs.

N° 55.

The Governor General lays before the Board the following Draft of a Letter, which he proposes with their Approbation, to write to the Paiſhwa and his Miniſters; and he further propoſes, that Copies of it, and of the Letter juſt received from Colonel Leſlie, be tranſmitted to Mr. Moſtyn, that he be informed of the Directions given to Colonel Leſlie, to adviſe him of his Proceedings, and of all Occurrences that may require his Explanation of them to the Poona Government, on his Application to that Government for the Interpoſition of its Authority to prevent any Impediment to the March of the Detachment; that he be alſo deſired to correſpond with Colonel Leſlie, and to inform him of any Circumſtances that he may deem it uſeful for him to be acquainted with.

I ſome Time ago informed you of my Deſign to diſpatch a Body of Troops from hence to ſtrengthen the Garriſon of Bombay, and requeſted that in conſideration of the Friendſhip and Treaty ſubſiſting between you and the Company, which it was my Determination ſtrictly to abide by, you would give Orders to all your Chiefs in the ſeveral Diſtricts through which the March of the Troops lay, for their unmoleſted Paſſage, and to ſupply them with ſuch Aſſiſtance as they ſhould ſtand in need of. Notwithſtanding which, I learn from Colonel Leſlie the Commander of the Detachment, that being arrived on the Banks of the Jumna he halted, and wrote Letters to Ballajee and Gunga Dur, the Chiefs of the Diſtricts lying between their River and Bundlecund, under your Authority, aſſuring them of his pacific Intentions, and requeſting Permiſſion for the March of the Detachment through their Territory; In anſwer to which he received Aſſurances of Friendſhip and Aſſiſtance, which was confirmed to him by the Arrival of a Vackeel on their Part; that he in conſequence prepared to croſs with his Army, but before the Firſt Diviſion were fairly embarked, a Party of Horſe came down and fired on them, and on their Arrival on the oppoſite Bank they were oppoſed by a Body of 1200 Horſe, with the Kelladar of Culpee at their Head. On this the Commander of the Diviſion ſent a Meſſage to the Kelladar to deſire he might paſs unmoleſted; and receiving an Anſwer to come on, accordingly advanced, but was fired on at a Diſtance, which he in conſequence of the Orders he had received, declined returning; emboldened by which the Horſe advanced their Attack ſo near the Troops that ſeveral being wounded, it became neceſſary for their own Safety to make a vigorous Oppoſition, which was not effected without the Loſs of many Lives before the Aſſailants were put to the Flight; and our Officers finding the Fort of Culpee evacuated, took Poſſeſſion of it as a Pledge of their future good Behaviour. I am convinced that theſe Acts of Hoſtilities muſt have been employed without Authority from you or the Miniſters of your Government, becauſe of the Treaty which ſubſiſts between you and the Company. The Preſidency of Bombay is ſituated at ſuch a Diſtance from this, that any Reinforcement which is ſent them muſt neceſſarily paſs through a Variety of Diſtricts ſubject to different Chiefs; and whatever Conduct might be expected from Strangers with whom the Company have no Connection, it could never be expected from you with whom they are on Terms of Friendſhip. Neceſſity required that the Troops ſhould be ſent, and they muſt either paſs through Part of your Country, or not go at all: I was therefore remedileſs, but the moſt ſtrict Injunctions were given to the Commander, to obſerve the moſt friendly Conduct and regular Diſcipline in his March, which I am ſatisfied he will literally comply with.

I do not mean to demand Satisfaction for what is paſt, as thoſe of your People who were the Aggreſſors have received the Puniſhment due to their Temerity; but I am to requeſt that you will without Delay iſſue ſuch poſitive Injunctions to all the Officers of your Government as may effectually prevent any Thing of the like Nature in future.

(To Siccaram and Ballajee Pundit, of the ſame Tenor.)

The Board approving of the above Letters, agreed that the Governor General be requeſted to order them to be written in Perſian, and that they be forwarded in the following Letter to Mr. Moſtyn:

Sir,

Colonel Leſlie who commands the Detachment ordered to proceed to Bombay having met with Oppoſition in croſſing the Jumna at Culpee, we encloſe a Copy of his Letter to us on this Occaſion, and of a Letter which has in conſequence been written by the Governor General to the Paiſhwa, that you may be prepared to anſwer any Remonſtrances that may be made to you by the Poona Government on that Subject.

We have directed Colonel Leſlie to adviſe you of his Proceedings, and of all Occurrences that may either require your Explanation of them to the Maratta Government, or an Application for the Authority of that Government, to prevent his meeting with any further Impediment in the Courſe of his March through their Dominions: We alſo requeſt that you will be regular in correſponding with Colonel Leſlie, and that you will apprize him of any Circumſtances which you may deem it uſeful for him to be informed of.

We are, &c.

Warren Haſtings,
Rich[d] Barwell,
P. Francis,
Edw[d] Wheler.

To

To the Peiſhwa: Written 9th June.

Some Time ago informed you of my Deſign to diſpatch a Body of Troops from hence to ſtrengthen the Garriſon of Bombay; and requeſted, that in conſideration of the Friendſhip and Treaty ſubſiſting between you and the Company, which it was my Determination ſtrictly to adhere to, you would give Orders to all your Chiefs in the ſeveral Diſtricts through which the March of the Troops lay, for their unmoleſted Paſſage, and to ſupply them with ſuch Aſſiſtance as they ſhould ſtand in need of. Notwithſtanding which, I learn from Colonel Leſlie, the Commander of the Detachment, that after he arrived on the Banks of the Jumna, he halted, and wrote Letters to Balajee and Gunga Dur, the Chiefs of the Diſtricts lying between that River and Bundlecund, under your Authority, acquainting them of his pacific Intentions, and requeſting Permiſſion for the March of the Detachment through their Territory: In anſwer to which, he received Aſſurances of Friendſhip and Aſſiſtance, which were confirmed to him by the Arrival of a Vackeel on their Part; that he in conſequence prepared to croſs with his Army; but before the Firſt Diviſion were fairly embarked, a Party of Horſe came down and fired on them, and on their Arrival on the oppoſite Bank they were oppoſed by a Body of two Horſe, with the Kelladar of Calpee at their Head. On this the Commander of the Diviſion ſent a Meſſage to the Kelladar to deſire he might paſs unmoleſted; and receiving an Anſwer to come on, accordingly advanced, but was fired on at a Diſtance, which he, in conſequence of the Orders he had received, declined returning; emboldened by which, the Horſe advanced their Attack ſo near the Troops, that ſeveral being wounded, it became neceſſary for their own Safety to make a vigorous Oppoſition, which was not effected without the Loſs of many Lives, before the Aſſailants were put to Flight; and our Officer finding the Fort of Calpee evacuated, took Poſſeſſion of it, as a Pledge for their future good Behaviour. I am convinced that theſe Acts of Hoſtility muſt have been employed without Authority from you, or the Miniſters of your Government, becauſe of the Treaty which ſubſiſts between you and the Company. The Preſidency of Bombay is ſituated at ſuch a Diſtance from this, that any Reinforcement which is ſent them muſt neceſſarily paſs through a Variety of Diſtricts, ſubject to different Chiefs; and whatever Conduct might be expected from Strangers, with whom the Company have no Connection, it could never be expected from you, with whom they are on Terms of Friendſhip. Neceſſity required that the Troops ſhould be ſent, and they muſt either paſs through Part of your Country, or not go at all; I was therefore remedileſs; but the moſt ſtrict Injunctions were given to the Commander, to obſerve the moſt friendly Conduct and regular Diſcipline in his March, which I am ſatisfied he will literally comply with.

I do not mean to demand Satisfaction for what is paſt, as thoſe of your People who were the Aggreſſors have received the Puniſhment due to their Temerity; but I am to requeſt that you will without Delay, iſſue ſuch poſitive Injunctions to all the Officers of your Government, as may effectually prevent any Thing of the like Nature in future.

(To Siccaram and Ballajee Pundit, of the ſame Tenor and Date.)

APPENDIX, N° 56 and 57.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, 11th June 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler,
} Eſquires.

RECEIVED the following Letter from Bombay.

Gentlemen,

We are ſtill in the ſame State of Uncertainty as when we laſt had the Honour of addreſſing you on the 5th ultimo.

The new Durbar, after preſerving a long and myſterious Silence with reſpect to their Intentions towards Ragoba, had a Meeting with Mr. Moſtyn on the 10th, when they deſired he would accompany a Deputy, they intended ſending to Bombay with Propoſals reſpecting Ragoba, but without giving the leaſt Diſcovery that could lead to any Knowledge what Share of the Government they would admit him to, or whether they would admit him to any, which in fact is now optional with them.

They have ſtill continued to find Pretences for delaying the Diſpatch of their Agent; and the Deſign of the former trifling Propoſals committed to Mr. Moſtyn, ſuggeſted to us to hold up

to him the Propriety of his not quitting Poona without ſome adequate Commiſſion; but our Sentiments were conveyed to him in ſuch a Manner, as to leave it to his Diſcretion to act in this Point as he might judge moſt good for the Service, and we have in a late Letter given him a ſtill more explicit Permiſſion.

The Aſſurance they have given of breaking off their Connections with the French, of which you have been adviſed by Mr. Moſtyn, make us willing to hope that the Firſt and grand Object of theſe Meaſures we have propoſed to you may be accompliſhed by this Reſolution; but as Monſieur St. Lubin is not yet diſmiſſed from Poona, we ſhall not relax in our Vigilance, or ſuffer ourſelves to be lulled into Security by Promiſes which are not confirmed by their Actions; however, ſtill we can judge with more Certainty of their Diſpoſition; the Opinion we have formed on the preſent Situation of Affairs, and of our Deſire to ſave the Honourable Company from the heavy Expences, and their Troops from the Danger and Difficulties of a March from your Provinces to this Side of India, have led us to ſend an Order to the Officer in Command of the Forces you have been pleaſed to order to our Aſſiſtance, not to advance any further, until he may again hear from us.

It is proper you ſhould be acquainted, that when we came to this Reſolution, we had Expectations of a Reinforcement from Madras, which were indeed formed upon private Advices; but the Pattamers which brought theſe Letters, having been ſtopped near Poona, and their Packets opened, we concluded the public Advices from that Preſidency had been intercepted, and gave the more Credit to the Private.

Alſo that Meſſrs. Draper and Stackhouſe did not concur with us in this Reſolution, which they were of Opinion was not warrantable by any Change in our Situation, either with reſpect to the Deſigns of the French, the Conduct of the Poona Government, or our own Military Reſources.

Sir Edward Vernon, after leaving this Place, fell in with the French Ships the Brilliant and the Sartine, and immediately returned to the Northward, taking his Station off Choul, with a Reſolution to prevent the French from landing any Troops there; he continued cruizing off that Port till the 18th, when the French Ships not making their Appearance, he proceeded to the other Coaſt.

We eſteem it incumbent on us to ſend Sir Edward Vernon a Letter of Thanks for his Conduct on this Occaſion, in which he diſplayed ſo pointed an Attention to the Intereſt and Welfare of the Honourable Company.

We have ſince learned that Monſieur Bellecombe himſelf remained at Mahé, and that the Brilliant proceeded to Mangalore, where ſeveral Artillery Officers, Two hundred Men, and a large Quantity of Military Stores, were landed for the Service of the Nabob Hyder Ally; and the Ship after Sir Edward Vernon was out of Sight to the Northward of her, returned to Mahé, to carry Monſieur Bellecombe back to Pondicherry. The Sartine is gone to Goa River, where ſhe may probably remain during the Monſoon; and it is there ſaid the French were deterred from proceeding to Choul by the Appearance of our Squadron, and ſuppoſing that War was declared, and perhaps by the News of the Revolution of Poona; but we have learned that the Captain, who was at Choul, has ordered her up thither (to Choul.)

We are, &c.

Bombay Caſtle,
2d May 1778.

(Signed) William Hornby,
&c. Council.

N° 57.

Received the following Letter from Poona:

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

I did myſelf the Honour of addreſſing you laſt under the 19th ultimo; on the 25th I received a Letter from the Honourable the Governor General, incloſing Three for the Durbar, and acquainting me with your Determination to ſend a Reinforcement of Troops to Bombay. As I apprehended the March of ſo large a Body of Forces through the Maratta Dominions might greatly alarm the Durbar, I thought it neceſſary to ſend Mr. Lewis to Camp, not only to preſent the Letters, but alſo to explain the Cauſe of our Apprehenſions, from the Connection between Nana and Monſieur St. Lubin, and to apply for the neceſſary Paſſports for the free Paſſage of theſe Troops, and their being ſupplied with a friendly Bazar. He accordingly ſet out the 28th ultimo, and returned the 4th Inſtant, when he delivered me the Minutes of his Proceedings; to the encloſed Copy of which I beg Leave to refer you, from which your Honour, &c. may perceive, that no Dependance can be had on what the Durbar jointly, or the Miniſters individually, ſay; for notwithſtanding their ſo publicly diſpatching me, of which they alſo adviſed the Preſidency of Bombay, and Moraba's Aſſurances to Mr. Lewis, they have not to my Knowledge taken one Step towards compleating that Buſineſs.

I cannot account for Moraba's evaſive Behaviour reſpecting the Duſtucks, in any other Manner than the Hopes he entertains of the Troops not marching until the Governor General ſhall have received the Durbar's Anſwers, agreeable to what he declared their Vackeel had written, or that they will be recalled in conſequence of the late Change in this Government; however to leave him as

little

little room as poſſible for further Evaſions, under the 5th Inſtant I wrote Moraba a Letter, demanding a deciſive Anſwer, in Writing, and declaring him accountable for any ill Conſequences which may happen from the Want of the Duſtucks. But I am ſorry to inform you, that notwithſtanding this, and ſeveral Meſſages I have ſince ſent him, I have not been able to procure an Anſwer. Notwithſtanding Moraba's Aſſertions to Mr. Lewis, Monſieur St. Lubin has not yet been to Proondur, though it is ſaid he is now ſent for; but from the equivocating Conduct of the Durbar, both before and ſince Moraba has had the executive Authority, it is a Doubt with me whether they will diſpatch him, or even if they do, whether he will leave Poona, as from the Lateneſs of the Seaſon, he will have it in his Power to delay the Time till the Rains ſet in, when he will make the Plea of its being impoſſible for him to go any where.

In conſequence of Hurry Punt's Retreat to Miretz, Hyder has lately taken Two ſmall Forts, named Copallée and Behadurburrah, and was by the laſt Accounts attacking the Fort of Danvar, about Thirty Coſs to the Southward, after the Reduction of which it is ſuppoſed he will attack the latter Place, particularly ſhould the Reports of Hurry Punt's being on his March from thence to Proondur, by Orders from the Durbar, be true.

The encloſed Packet to your Addreſs was received Yeſterday, in Duplicate from the Preſidency of Bombay. On the 9th I received a Letter from the Chief of Maſulipatam, dated the 22d April, encloſing a Packet for Bombay, from your Honour, &c. which was forwarded immediately.

I am, &c.
(Signed) T. Moſtyn.

Poona,
12th May 1778.

APPENDIX, N° 58.—63 and 64.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 22d June 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell, Philip Francis, Edward Wheler, } Eſquires.

Mr. Lewis's Journal of his Deputation to the Maratta Camp.

Camp near Curreet, April 1778. Tueſday,

ARRIVED at Morabah's Camp about Five o'Clock P. M. I immediately ſent to inform Morabah thereof, requeſting to know when I ſhould wait on him. He promiſed to give me a Meeting at Night; but in the Evening ſent me Word he could not ſee me until To-morrow.

On Account of ſome particular religious Ceremonies Morabah was engaged in, this being a Holiday, I had not an Opportunity of ſeeing him until Seven o'Clock P. M. I found there Chintoo Wittul and Gopal Naique Tumbuckur. After delivering the Letters from the Governor General, agreeable to Mr. Moſtyn's Orders, I explained their Contents, when Morabah aſked me, whom we had to fear? I told him, that in conſequence of the Governor General and Council being adviſed of the Treaty with Monſieur St. Lubin, they had Cauſe to imagine ſome evil Deſigns were intended againſt the Company's Settlements on the Weſtern Side of India; he immediately anſwered, that there was no Treaty between this Government and that Gentleman: I replied, that I ſincerely believed there was not; but that I was convinced there was one ſubſiſting between Nanah and him, the Contents of which we had the greateſt Reaſon to ſuppoſe were greatly to our Prejudice, and that it was in conſequence of this Treaty that the Troops mentioned in the Governor General's Letters, were coming to the Aſſiſtance of Bombay, I therefore requeſted the neceſſary Duſtucks for their freely paſſing through any Part of the Maratta Dominions they might have Occaſion to come to, as well as their being properly ſupplied with a friendly Buzar. Morabah confeſſed a Knowledge of the Treaty between Nanah and Monſieur St. Lubin, but ſaid, he could not give me an Anſwer with reſpect to the Duſtucks I required, until after the Durbar met To-morrow: He then aſked me how many Battalions were coming? I replied I could not tell the exact Number, but ſuppoſed about Three or Four. I then told him that the Governor and Council at Bombay had written to Mr. Moſtyn, that they thought it very extraordinary the Durbar ſhould not have explained themſelves with reſpect to the Buſineſs they had requeſted he would accompany Tumbuckur to Bombay upon, and reminded him of the trifling Occaſion they ſent him upon in Auguſt laſt; I added that the Governor and Council would not approve of a Member of their Board being ſent upon every trivial Errand, and therefore requeſted Morabah would inform me what the Durbar had to ſay to Mr. Moſtyn, or if he did not

Wedne 29th

chuſe to explain himſelf to me, to let me know if he would order Tumbuckur to acquaint Mr. Moſtyn with the Particulars before he ſet out? Morabah replied, that he would ſpeak to me on this Buſineſs before he diſpatched me: I then told him that it would appear very extraordinary to the Governor and Council, after what had paſſed with Morabah on the 9th, and at Nanah's Tent on the 10th Inſtant, all which Mr. Moſtyn had written to Bombay, that Tumbuckur had not yet ſet out; the Reaſon of which I requeſted he would inform me; to this Morabah made no Reply.

1778. / the 1st. This Afternoon Morabah went to Sacaram Bapoo at Bury, where were alſo Nanah and Cruſtrow Belob; what paſſed between them I cannot learn, but a Hircarrah whom I ſent there informs me, that Nanah on his going away ſaid to Morabah, he might bring Dadah Saib to Poona, but he requeſted Morabah would take Care he did him no Harm. However I look on this as a mere Blind, as I am informed Morabah has told Tookajee Holkar that he does intend bringing Ragoba to Poona before Decera, and has requeſted Holkar would ſend for Anundy Bhoy and her Child immediately, and let the latter live with the young Peſhwa in the Fort; to which Holkar replied, that he had nothing to ſay to Savoy Badjeerow, (meaning Ragoba's Son,) but inſiſted on Dadah Saib's being brought directly. The public Reaſon given for the Meeting between Morabah and Sacaram, was the Beirad Rajah and Havaldar of the Matchy, coming down to pay their Compliments to Morabah; it is true they did come down, and the Hircarrah informs me that after Nanah returned to his Camp Morabah gave the Beil Bundah to the Rajah and Havaldar, and their People, in the Name of Ragoba, that they ſhould not permit any one to go into either Fort without his Permiſſion.

I am alſo informed that Ragooputrow, Nairoo Sunker's Son, who is encamped with Holkar, has declared to him that unleſs he will force the Durbar to bring Ragobah immediately into Government, he will march into the Conkan with his Troops, amounting to about Four thouſand Men.

ırday, 2d. This Afternoon Saccaram Bapoo paid a Viſit to Tookajee Holkar, from whence he came to the Pageda, in the Tope of which Morabah is encamped, and about Four o'Clock ſet off on his Journey to Ninygam, a Village about Six Coſs on this Side Settera, in order it is ſaid to be married.

I have been informed from ſeveral Perſons, that Morabah by the Advice of Bapoo, has now laid aſide all Thoughts of bringing Ragoba into Government. Buchabah Preondur particularly, on the 29th ultimo, ſent a Meſſage acquainting me that Sacaram and Morabah had totally broken the Agreement made with him and Holkar, and were reſolved that Ragoba ſhould not come to Poona, but that he and Holkar was determined on bringing him, and wiſhed much the Engliſh would aſſiſt them. And at a Viſit I paid Buchabah this Evening, he ſaid he could not give me a private Meeting on the Subject as he had Spies on him, but requeſted I would repreſent to Mr. Moſtyn he had already ſent me, and that whatever we might have to ſay on the Buſineſs may paſs through the Perſon who acts as my Linguiſt.

Not having heard any Thing from Morabah theſe Three Days, in the Evening I ſent the Linguiſt deſiring to know when he intended diſpatching me, as Mr. Moſtyn would be very deſirous of ſending the Durbar's Reply regarding the Duſtuck to the Governor General; when Morabah ſaid he would certainly ſend for and diſpatch me before Ten o'Clock in the Morning.

day the 3d. I ſent again at Noon to Morabah to aſk, when he would diſpatch me? he replied, that as Mr. Moſtyn had ſo often ſpoke to the Durbar with reſpect to diſpatching Monſieur St. Lubin, they had ſent for him in order to give him his Diſpatches, after which they would diſpatch Mr. Moſtyn to Bombay. About 6 P. M. Morabah ſent a Meſſage, deſiring my Attendance at the Durbar; I accordingly went, and found there Cruſtrow Belob, Chintoo Wittul, and Gopaul Naique Tumbucker. Morabah told me, that as the Letters from the Governor General mentioned the Troops he was ſending to Bombay to be on account of the French being here, he had ſent Monſieur St. Lubin in order to give him his Diſpatches; and requeſted to know if in ſuch Caſe we ſhould ſtill want the Duſtucks I aſked for at laſt Viſit, or whether the Troops would be prevented proceeding? I anſwered, that according to the Governor General's Letter to Mr. Moſtyn, the Troops would now have been near Twenty Days on their March, and that of courſe the Duſtucks would be neceſſary to prevent any Diſputes on the Road; to which he anſwered, that the Durbar's Vackeel had written them, the Governor General had told him the Troops would not march until the Durbar's Anſwers were received. I replied, that this was contrary to what the Governor General had written to Mr. Moſtyn, but that perhaps they might be ſtopped, ſhould the News of the Change in Government, which Mr. Moſtyn had diſpatched the Day after it happened, reach Calcutta in Time; but as this was very uncertain, I repeated my Requeſt for the Duſtucks being delivered me to prevent any bad Conſequence which might happen for the Want of them. Cruſtrow Belob then took up the Diſcourſe, and mentioned again the Letters they had received from the Governor General reſpecting Choul being given to the French, and Monſieur St. Lubin having the Command of the Tope Connah, and made ſome trifling Excuſes for Monſieur St. Lubin ſtaying here ſo long; he allowed that ſome Kind of Promiſes had been made that Gentleman, but ſaid that they were given only with a Deſign to amuſe him. I replied, that the Durbar beſt knew their own Reaſons for detaining him, but that after the many Equivocations they had been guilty of, until he arrived at ſome French or Engliſh Settlement, we could not believe they really meant to ſend him away; and that Mr. Moſtyn had already replied to the other Points. Morabah then ſaid, that the Durbar had hitherto acted very improperly in making ſo many Evaſions about him, from which the Engliſh had an undoubted Right to ſuſpect ſomething was intended againſt them, but I might however depend Monſieur St. Lubin

ſhould

ſhould be diſpatched in Two or Three Days: To which I obſerved, that we expected no leſs from him, and that it would convince he meant to preſerve the Friendſhip which had ſo long ſubſiſted between this Durbar and the Engliſh. Morabah then ſaid, that the Durbar really intended to have diſpatched Mr. Moſtyn and Tumbuckur at the Time they mentioned, but that ſomething had intervened which prevented it. I replied, that the Durbar ſhould have ſettled every Point before they ſent for Mr. Moſtyn in ſuch a Hurry to Camp; that it was not treating the Engliſh in a proper Manner, making their Reſident run backwards and forwards upon every trifling Occaſion, and it was what they would not ſuffer. Morabah immediately replied, that the real Cauſe of Mr. Moſtyn's Detention was a Letter he had received from Ragoba, deſiring that Tumbuckur might not be diſpatched for ſome Days; that Dadoo Punt arrived this Day from Bombay with Letters from Dadah Sahib, which would require a few Days to conſider of; and that then the Durbar would poſitively ſend Mr. Moſtyn to Bombay. He then aſked me if I thought it would be proper he ſhould write a Letter to the Governor, accounting for this long Delay? I told him, that he undoubtedly ought to have done it before, in order to remove any bad Opinion the Governor and Council might entertain from this trifling Behaviour of the Durbar. Morabah then ſaid, he would write, and ſend it to Mr. Moſtyn to be forwarded, as well as the Anſwer to the Governor General's Letter. I repeated my Requeſt for the Duſtucks, but he ſtudiouſly avoided giving me a Reply. After my Return from the Durbar I ſent the Linguiſt to Morabah, to know whether he would grant the Duſtucks I had applied for; when he replied, that he was obliged to go to Jeſury To-morrow, where he ſhould remain Two Days, but that on his Return he would conſider of it, and ſend his Anſwer to Mr. Moſtyn.

A true Copy.

(Signed) Wm Lewis.

N° 63.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 22d June 1778.

Received the following Letter from Colonel Leſlie:

Gentlemen,

I did myſelf the Honour of addreſſing you on the 30th ultimo, tranſmitting to you a Copy of a Letter received from the Honourable Preſident and Council of Bombay.

The Day before Yeſterday I advanced with the principal Part of the Troops that form this Detachment, with Intention to take poſt on the Banks of the Betowah River, leaving Part of the Park of Artillery, the Magazine, and One Battalion of Sepoys, at Kalpee.

Yeſterday Expreſſes arrived at my Camp from the Reſident at Poona, covering Orders under Date the 4th of May, that were diſpatched in Quadruplicate from the Preſidency of Bombay, which require the Proſecution of my March towards that Quarter, in Countermand of their former Orders of the 22d April. Their original Letter I now do myſelf the Pleaſure to lay before you, together with the Reſident Mr. Moſtyn's Letters of Advice, which accompanied it from Poona. In conſequence of theſe Inſtructions, I have diſpatched Orders to the Officer commanding at Kalpee to join my Detachment with the Magazine and Troops under his Charge, and ſhall wait his Junction on the Bank of the Betowah, from whence I ſhall proceed on my Route through Bundlecund with all poſſible Expedition.

I am ſorry to inform you, that the Backwardneſs which the Maratta Chiefs have ſhewn to the Performance of the Engagements they have entered into with me, make me dubious of their real Intentions. This Circumſtance will in ſome Shape protract my March; but you may be aſſured that I ſhall not be diverted from my direct Route through theſe Diſtricts by any Reſentment of their Duplicity, however their Conduct may merit it, more than the Security of my Detachment may abſolutely require.

I have diſpatched Coſſids in Acknowledgment of the Letters I have received from Poona and Bombay, and ſhall be punctually attentive to their Deſire of being frequently informed of my Advance.

I have, &c.

Head Quarters, Meer Gawa,
5th June 1778.

(Signed) Matt^w Leſlie.

To the Officer at Calpee, in Command of the Troops under Orders for Bombay.

Sir,

I wrote you under the 3d Inſtant, encloſing a Letter from the Preſidency of Bombay. This is purpoſely to give Cover to a Letter in Quadruplicate from the ſame Place, which is diſpatched by different Routes, as I am uncertain what Road you mean to take; I ſhall therefore be obliged

liged to you to inform me as ſoon as poſſible, that I may be enabled to place Dawk Hircarrahs between this Place and you. The Men who will deliver you theſe Letters are any of them able to inform you of the beſt and ſhorteſt Roads towards Poona. Agreeable to the Orders I have received both from Bengal and Bombay, I am uſing my Endeavours to procure the neceſſary Paſſports for your free Paſſage through the Maratta Dominions. I have not yet a determinate Anſwer from the Durbar with reſpect to them, but hope in a few Days to be able to inform you with more Preciſion; however, it will be neceſſary to be ſtrictly on your Guard, and to avoid as much as lays in your Power, the giving any Cauſe of Complaint; though, from the diſtracted State of this Government, and the Diſſentions amongſt the Heads, I do not believe they will dare to oppoſe your March. You may depend I ſhall keep you adviſed of every material Occurrence neceſſary for your Knowledge, as ſoon as I know where to addreſs you.

I am, &c.
(Signed) T. Moſtyn.

Poona,
the 11th May 1778.

To the Officer at Calpee, in Command of the Troops under Orders for Bombay.

Sir,

Notwithſtanding our Letter of the 22d ultimo, we hereby direct, that on the Receipt hereof you march forward with the Troops under your Command, agreeable to your Orders from the Governor General and Council; and that you give us the moſt conſtant and punctual Advice of your Motions, and the Route you purſue, that we may do all in our Power to provide for the Wants, and facilitate the March, of the Army.

We are, &c.
(Signed) Wm Hornby,
&c. Council.

Bombay Caſtle,
4th May 1778.

N° 64.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, 22d June 1778.

Received the following Letter from Bombay:

Gentlemen,

We have the Honour to forward a Triplicate of our laſt Letter, dated the 2d Inſtant, ſince when we have received your Letter of the 23d of March.

We have not ſince received any further Advices from the Reſident at Poona, nor taken your Letter into full Conſideration; and we only diſpatch this to acquaint you, that we have taken off the Reſtraint we had laid on the March of the Troops from Calpee, and directed the commanding Officer to advance towards this Side, agreeable to the Orders he has received from you.

We ſhall do all in our Power to facilitate his March, and to procure a ſafe and unmoleſted Paſſage for the Army, and write to you with all poſſible Preciſion, the Moment we have taken our Reſolutions.

From the friendly Intercourſe that has appeared for ſome Time paſt to ſubſiſt between the French and Hyder Ally Cawn, of which we gave an Inſtance in our laſt Letter, we think it would be a very proper Meaſure to keep a Reſident at his Durbar, to endeavour to penetrate and counteract their Schemes; we therefore requeſt to know if you approve this Meaſure, to which we preſume the Nabob can have no reaſonable Objection, as we are aſſured both the French and Dutch maintain Reſidents at his Court.

Having hitherto obtained no Satisfaction from the Durbar for the Concerned in the Aurora, notwithſtanding our repeated Repreſentations, and the Letter from the Governor General, we have fixed the Amount of their Loſs as a Claim upon the Revenues of Jambooſeer, after the Company's Demands on account the Twelve Lacks and the Country of Three Lacks are made good; and have reſolved to retain that Purgunnah until the Sum due to the Sufferers is diſcharged with Intereſt; our Proceedings, and the Papers now tranſmitted by a Sea Conveyance to Madras, will ſhew the Care we took to examine and aſcertain the Claims, and to do all poſſible Juſtice to the Poona Government; and we doubt not you will approve the Method we have taken to obtain Satisfaction for the Merchants, whom it is our Duty to protect.

It is with much Concern we acquaint you, that by the London Gazette of the 16th December, juſt received from Buſſora, we learn that General Burgoyne with his whole Army, conſiſting of 3,500 Fighting Men, was compelled to ſurrender to General Gates on the 14th of October, on Condition of being tranſported to England from Boſton, and not to ſerve again in America during the War.

General

General Howe remains in Poſſeſſion of Philadelphia, with which Place the Fleet have in vain endeavoured to open a Communication, and Three of our Ships have been deſtroyed in the Attempt, viz. the Auguſta of 64 Guns, the Roebuck of 44, and the Merlin of 16. General Waſhington was encamped within a few Miles from Philadelphia, and the Congreſs had removed to Lancaſter: General Clinton with a ſmall Army had proceeded up the River of New York, and had met with ſome Succeſs.

The Council at Buſſora have acquainted us that about the latter End of January, Two French Gentlemen arrived at Grain, from Surat in their Way to Aleppo, and not chuſing to wait for the Caravan, juſt preparing to ſet out from the former Place, had come to Buſſora, from whence they had proceeded by Water to Hilla: "They gave out that one of them was Writer to the French Chief at "Surat, and the other a Military Officer; and that they were proceeding to Europe with Letters "to the French Miniſtry regarding a new Settlement that had been lately made by their Nation at "Choul." We doubt not theſe are the individual Perſons mentioned in our Letter of the 12th December; but the Council at Buſſora add, that through their Impatience they had taken a Route which did not promiſe much Expedition.

Bombay Caſtle,
9th May 1778.

We are, &c.
(Signed) John Carnac,
&c. Council.

Ordered, That the Enclоſures in the above Letter be entered after the Conſultation.

Mr. Francis delivers in the following Minute:

Mr. Francis—As a formal Motion from me on the Subject of the preceding Letters would only be productive of uſeleſs Debate, I ſhall content myſelf with laying my Opinion before the Board, leaving it to their Conſideration to adopt any Part of it they may think proper. Theſe Letters bring new Matter, and of courſe a new Queſtion before us. On the Second of May, the Preſidency of Bombay inform us, that the Opinion they had formed of the preſent Situation, added to other Conſiderations, had induced them to ſtop the March of the Detachment. In Two Days they ſuddenly change their Reſolution without aſſigning any Reaſon for it, and order the Detachment to proceed. By this extraordinary Omiſſion, I think they have failed very much in the Reſpect they owe to this Government, and in their Duty to the Company. If they act capriciouſly and without Reaſon, common Prudence dictates to us that we ought not to leave our Army under ſuch Direction: If they have Reaſons for this Change of Syſtem, ſtrong enough to ſuperſede the Arguments on which their firſt Reſolution was founded, (which, conſidering the Shortneſs of the Interval, and that no Event of any Moment had happened in that Time, is hardly conceivable) they deſignedly leave us in the Dark with reſpect to the Motives of their Conduct; and make it impoſſible for us to act in Concert, or in Confidence with them. I can place no Reliance in the Wiſdom of Men, whoſe Councils, in the Determination of the moſt important Queſtions, appear to fluctuate without Plan, Principle, or Object; much leſs can I think it ſafe or honourable to co-operate in the Support of Men who affectedly conceal the Motives of their Actions from us, though it be one of their principal Duties to explain thoſe Motives to us. Either Way it is my Opinion, that we ought not to ſuffer the Detachment to proceed, until we are informed what Change of Circumſtances has induced the Preſidency of Bombay to revoke their Reſolution of the 2d May; that Reſolution we know was taken on ſolid Ground, becauſe their Reaſons for it were explained. We ought to be equally ſatisfied that the Reaſons for revoking it are powerful enough to juſtify the Change: It would but ill become the Dignity of the Supreme Council of India to follow blindly the Caprices of a ſubordinate Government, nor perhaps would it be quite conſiſtent with our Safety, conſidering that the Preſidency of Bombay, even in this laſt Act, endeavour to fix the Reſponſibility of it upon us. They do not take it upon themſelves to juſtify the March of the Detachment as an Act of their own: they ſay only that they have taken off the Reſtriction under which they had laid the commanding Officer, and directed him to advance, agreeable to the Orders he had received from us; we then are conſtituted the Authors of the Meaſure, and muſt be anſwerable for the Event.

On what Grounds they have proceeded I know not, but their own Letter ſtates a Fact to us which they ought to have compared with the actual Circumſtances of Colonel Leſlie's Army, and which I think ſhould have deterred them from expoſing it to a ſimilar Event. In the ſame Breath they order the Detachment to continue its March acroſs India, forgetting every thing they had ſaid of the Dangers and Difficulties of ſuch a March; and tell us a Britiſh Army, attempting a Paſſage through North America, had been obliged to capitulate. It may be Folly to draw Omens from Misfortunes; but it is equally Want of Wiſdom not to ſuffer Example and Experience to have any Weight with us. Independant of this particular Conſideration, I would wiſh the Board to conſider, whether the unfortunate Events in America ought not to have a general Influence upon our Meaſures here; whether this be a Seaſon for hazarding offenſive Operations of any Kind; and, whether Policy and Prudence do not plainly dictate to us, that while the Nation is ſo deeply engaged and preſſed on one Side, with every Thing to apprehend from the Deſigns of France and Spain on the other, we ſhould ſtand on our Defence, and not weaken or divide the Force on which the Safety of Bengal may depend.

Governor General—Whether Mr. Francis's Minute is delivered as a Motion, or merely as Reflections upon the Meaſures now before us, it equally claims the Conſideration of the Board. Mr. Francis is conſiſtent with his Conduct in repeating his Inſtances for the Recall of the Detachment; I am equally conſiſtent in propoſing, that the Meaſure which has been ſo deliberately reſolved on ſhall be proſecuted, ſince no new Circumſtances have intervened to induce me to change my Opinion; nor has Mr. Francis urged one new Argument in ſupport of his, except the Defeat of General Burgoyne in America, to which I hope he does not expect an Anſwer. The Reaſons given by the Preſident and Council of Bombay, in their Letter of the 2d May, for ſuſpending the March of the Detachment, were grounded on Circumſtances of which they were not competent Judges: The Expence, the Danger, the Reſponſibility, were ours. In effect, theſe do not appear to me to have been the Reaſons; we ſhall probably be informed of them with their promiſed Letter, containing their Reſolutions; but it is of little Moment to the preſent Queſtion, what were the Motives for their Conduct, either in ſuſpending the March of the Detachment or in directing the Proſecution of it. The original Meaſure is ours, and all our Reſolutions concerning it ought to proceed from our own Knowledge of the Circumſtances which have any Relation to it.

I hope that our Affairs in America are not in the deſperate Situation in which they are deſcribed to be; but I ſee no Connection between them and the Concerns of this Government, much leſs can I agree, that with ſuch ſuperior Advantages as we poſſeſs over every Power which can oppoſe us, we ſhould act merely on the Defenſive; and abruptly ſtop the Operation of a Meaſure of ſuch Importance to the National Intereſts, and to the National Safety, as that in which we have now decidedly engaged, with the Eyes of all India turned upon it: On the contrary, if it be really true that the Britiſh Arms and Influence have ſuffered ſo ſevere a Check in the Weſtern World, it is more incumbent on thoſe who are charged with the Intereſts of Great Britain in the Eaſt, to exert themſelves for the Retrieval of the National Loſs. We have the Means in our Power, and if they are not fruſtrated by our own Diſſenſions, I truſt that the Event of this Expedition will yield every Advantage for the Attainment of which it was undertaken. It is not long ſince one of the many Motions which have been made for the Recall of the Detachment, was ſupported by an Argument drawn from the Certainty that there was no Probability of a War with France; and the Deſigns attributed to the French in this Quarter of the World were treated as chimerical and groundleſs: Now we are told, that the Nation is deeply engaged and preſſed on one Side with every thing to apprehend from the Deſigns of France and Spain; on the other, the Concluſion drawn from this State of Appearances is, That we ſhould ſtand on our Defence, and not weaken or divide the Force on which the State of Bengal may depend. The Concluſion which I ſhould draw from ſuch Premiſes is the very Reverſe; not that we ſhould act upon the Defenſive, and wait till the Deſigns of our Enemies are ripe, and they have choſen their own Time to carry them into Execution, but that we ſhould provide for the Safety of Bengal, by obviating the impending Dangers, and by rendering their Attempts abortive, before the Time deſtined for their Birth

Mr. Francis—As I do not mean to enter further into the general Argument, I ſhall only obſerve that the new Matter which I think theſe Letters bring before us, ariſes in Part from the profound Silence of the Bombay Council on the Motives of a poſitive Reſolution: When nothing is ſaid in Support of the Affirmative of any Queſtion, that Circumſtance alone is ſufficient to juſtify the Negative.

My Language and Opinion, with reſpect to the Deſigns of France, and the Policy to be obſerved by this Government, will be found invariably the ſame. I do indeed believe that the Schemes imputed to them of Alliances with the Marattas, and of hoſtile Projects on the Malabar Coaſt, were chimerical; their Connections with Hyder Ally ſhew at leaſt that they have taken a very different Turn: But I have conſtantly urged the Neceſſity of arming in Bengal, and ſtanding in a Poſture of Security and Defence here, without provoking a Quarrel with France, as long as it could be avoided, becauſe I am inſtructed by the Company, and convinced by my own Judgment, that we ought to make the Safety and Preſervation of Bengal our principal Object.—As I find there are no public Letters before the Board, to inform us of the particular Circumſtances that attended Colonel Leſlie's March on the Firſt Day from Calpee, I beg Leave to lay before the Board an Extract of a private Letter from Camp, to which I gave Credit, and which I think deſerves our Conſideration: I underſtand there are many private Letters in Town which give the ſame Accounts:

"On their Firſt Day's March from Calpee, by the little Care that was taken to provide proper "Guides they loſt their Road; and although the Ground they propoſed to encamp upon was but "Eight Coſs from Calpee, yet they were Eleven Hours on the Road, from Midnight till Eleven "o'Clock; during this Time they marched above 30 Miles, over a burning ſandy Plain, without a "Drop of Water; between Three and Four hundred Sepoys and Followers of the Camp died ravi"ing mad with Thirſt.

"Captain Crawford, One of the beſt and braveſt Military Characters in India, died that Day, ac"cording to the Opinion of the Doctors, for Want of a Draught of ſimple Water; he died mad after "Two Hours Illneſs; Colonel Parker, Major Fullarton, Captain Aſhe, Captain Shoners, and about "Ten Subalterns, were dangerouſly ill."

Governor General—May I aſk Mr. Francis the Name of the Writer of this Letter, ſince it is delivered as authentic?

Mr. Francis—I have ſtated it to be a private Letter, conſequently cannot mention the Writer's Name; nor would I have introduced it at all, if there had been any public Letter from Colonel Leſlie, ſtating the Circumſtances that attended his March: I do not find that he has even reported the Death of

of Captain Crawford; but I can aſſure the Board with Certainty that there are many Letters in this Town to the ſame Effect.

Governor General—Of the Death of Captain Crawford I received Advice from Colonel Leſlie, written at the ſame Time with his public Letter to the Board; and confounding one Letter with the other, did believe till this Inſtant that it was mentioned in his public Letter; I have not the Letter by me, but will ſend it, or an Extract of it, that it may be entered in this Place. I believe that the Troops muſt have ſuffered from the Heat and Want of Water on the Road; I did in effect foretell it in a Minute dictated at this Board; but I believe that the anonymous Extracts produced by Mr. Francis is a groſs Exaggeration, and calculated more to conciliate the Favour of the Perſon to whom it was probably addreſſed, than to convey a ſtrict Relation of the Truth.

" I will addreſs you again To-morrow; I have ſent the requiſite Orders for the Magazine to join " me from Calpee, and can aſſure you I ſhall do my utmoſt to get on, though we have at preſent to " ſtruggle with a moſt inclement Seaſon.

" I have had the Misfortune to loſe Captain James Crawford, who commanded the 4th Battalion of " Sepoys, by a moſt violent Fever which carried him off in leſs than Two Hours; his private Cha- " racter, and acknowledged Abilities in his Profeſſion, are not unknown to you.

" I bear more than my Share in the univerſal Regret and Grief at this Accident, not only by the " Loſs the Service in general ſuſtains, but the preſent Expedition in particular.

" I have the Honour to be,
" Dear Sir,
" Your faithful humble Servant,
(Signed) " Matt^w Leſlie."

I now return to Mr. Francis's laſt Minute. I cannot agree with Mr. Francis, in terming the Silence of the Preſidency of Bombay, new Matter for a Queſtion depending ſolely on our own Reſolutions; but whatever Weight this Argument may have on one Side, it is equally counterpoiſed on the other, and leaves us juſt where we were with reſpect to the Motives of our own Actions. They were ſilent on the Cauſes which induced them to ſuſpend the March of the Detachment: They were ſilent on their Motives for repealing this Suſpenſion; and I for my own Part am better pleaſed with the Solicitude they have ſhewn, to make Colonel Leſlie acquainted with their laſt Intentions, than if they had waited; and of courſe, unneceſſarily impeded the Service, for the tedious official Formalities of a public Letter, detailing all their Reaſons.

If Mr. Francis does indeed ſtill believe, that the Schemes imputed to the French of Alliances with the Marattas, and of hoſtile Projects on the Malabar Coaſt were chimerical, I would beg Leave to aſk him, but do not inſiſt on his Anſwer, Whether he believes the Character aſſumed by the Chevalier St. Lubin of a Miniſter from the Court of France to be falſe? and whether the Atteſtations of it by Siccaram Baboo, and Nana Furneſe, the Miniſters of the Maratta State, and the formal Notification made by them to this Government, that the Chevalier St. Lubin had delivered Letters and Preſents from the King of France, were falſe, and for what Purpoſe this Colluſion was concerted? If it be admitted, that the Chevalier St. Lubin is Miniſter from the Court of France to that of Poona, What is the Object of his long Reſidence? and what was the Object of his Miſſion? When the Concluſion which I have drawn from each Appearance, and which has been ecchoed by all the World, is pronounced chimerical, I have a Right to require that ſome other be ſet up in its ſtead. Much Streſs has been laid on a former Aſſertion made by me, reſpecting the ſuppoſed Grant to St. Lubin of the Port of Choul. I had but repeated what I knew to be on our Records; but could not immediately turn to the Paſſages which related to it; and I truſted to Time, the beſt Diſcoverer of Truth, to juſtify the Opinion which I founded upon them. I now beg Leave, in this Place, to quote the following Paſſage of a Letter from Fort St. George, dated 16th January laſt, which mentions the Grant of the Port of Choul as a Fact of undoubted Notoriety. " With reſpect to any Connections which may have been formed by the " Maratta State, we can only ſpeak from Conjecture. It ſeems probable that ſome Engagements " may be in Agitation, or perhaps concluded between that State and the Soubah; and they have " lately we believe maintained a cloſe Correſpondence with the French; as appears from the " Proceedings of Monſieur St. Lubin at Poona, and the Grant which they have given to the " French at Choul on the Malabar Coaſt, of which you have lately been adviſed." I never ſuppoſed that a public Grant or Sunnud had been executed for this Purpoſe. This would not have ſuited the Policy of either Party. The preſent Uſe of the Port, and the Promiſe of it in Property, was all that the Chevalier St. Lubin could deſire, until his Deſigns were ripe for Execution. I believe moſt firmly, that ſuch a Promiſe was made him by the ruling Member of the Adminiſtration; nay, I have been informed, and by an Authority which (though I think myſelf not at Liberty to mention it) merits my entire Credit of it, that St. Lubin did make a Purchaſe of a Church ſtanding near the Shore, for the Purpoſe of eſtabliſhing a preſent Store-houſe, and of converting it, with the Ground around it, to a Fortreſs hereafter. I ſhall now produce the laſt and moſt concluſive Evidence of the Reality of the Engagements, executed between Nana Furneſe and the Chevalier St. Lubin, and even of the Deſign to grant the Property of the Port of Choul to the latter. It is extracted from Mr. Lewis's Diary. I ſhall inſert the Paſſage at large, and deſire that the Parts to which I allude may be marked by a Line drawn underneath.

" Wednesday

" Wedneſday 29th April. On account of ſome particular religious Ceremonies Moraba was engaged " in, this being a Holiday, I had not an Opportunity of ſeeing him until 7 o'Clock, P. M. I found there " Chintoo Wittul and Gopaul Naique Tumbuckur. After delivering the Letters from the Governor " General agreeably to Mr. Moſtyn's Orders, I explained their Contents, when Moraba aſked me, whom " we had to fear? I told him that in conſequence of the Governor General and Council being ad- " viſed of the Treaty with Monſieur St. Lubin, they had Cauſe to imagine ſome evil Deſigns were " intended againſt the Company's Settlements on the Weſtern Side of India. He immediately " anſwered, That there was no Treaty between this Government and that Gentleman. I replied, that I " ſincerely believed there was not; but that I was convinced there was One ſubſiſting between Nana " and him, the Contents of which we had the greateſt Reaſon to ſuppoſe were greatly to our Preju- " dice; and that it was in conſequence of this Treaty that the Troops mentioned in the Governor " General's Letter were coming to the Aſſiſtance of Bombay. I therefore requeſted the neceſſary " Duſtucks for their freely paſſing through any Part of the Maratta Dominions they might have Oc- " caſion to come to, as well as their being properly ſupplied with a friendly Buzar. Moraba confeſſed a " Knowledge of the Treaty between Nana and Monſieur St. Lubin; but ſaid he could not give me " an Anſwer with reſpect to the Duſtucks I required, until after the Durbar met To-morrow.

" Sunday 3d May about 6 P. M. Moraba ſent a Meſſage deſiring my Attendance at the Durbar. " I accordingly went and found there Cruſtrow Belol, Chintoo Wittal, and Gopaul Naique Trum- " buckar. Moraba told me that as the Letters from the Governor General mentioned the Troops he " was ſending to Bombay to be on Account of the French being here, he had ſent for Monſieur St. " Lubin, in order to give him his Diſpatches, and requeſted to know if in ſuch Caſe we ſhould ſtill " want the Duſtucks I aſked for at my laſt Viſit, or whether the Troops would be prevented pro- " ceeding? I anſwered, that according to the Governor General's Letter to Mr. Moſtyn, the Troops " would have been near Twenty Days on their March, and that of courſe the Duſtucks would " be neceſſary to prevent any Diſputes on the Road; to which he obſerved, that the Durbar's Vackeel " had written them, that the Governor General had told him the Troops would not march until the " Durbar's Anſwers were received. I replied, that this was contrary to what the Governor General " had written to Mr. Moſtyn, but perhaps they might be ſtopped ſhould the News of the Change " in Government, which Mr. Moſtyn had diſpatched the Day after it happened, reach Calcutta in " Time; but as this was very uncertain I repeated my Requeſt for the Duſtucks being delivered to " me, to prevent any bad Conſequences which might happen from the Want of them. Cruſtrow " Beloll then took up the Diſcourſe, and mentioned again the Letters they had received from the " Governor General, reſpecting Choul being given to the French, and Monſieur St. Lubin having the " Command of the Toff Counah, and made ſome trifling Excuſes for Monſieur St. Lubin ſtaying " here ſo long; he allowed that ſome Kind of Promiſes had been made that Gentleman, but ſaid they " were given only with a Deſign to amuſe him. I replied, that the Durbar beſt knew their own Rea- " ſons for detaining him; but that after the many Equivocations they had been guilty of, until he " arrived at ſome French or Engliſh Settlement, we could not believe that they really meant to ſend " him away; and that Mr. Moſtyn had already replied to the other Points. Moraba then ſaid, that " the Durbar had hitherto acted very improperly in making ſo many Evaſions about him, from which " the Engliſh had an undoubted Right to ſuſpect ſomething was intended againſt them; but I might " however depend Monſieur St. Lubin ſhould be diſpatched in Two or Three Days."

Mr. Francis—My private Belief is not ſtated as an Argument that ought to weigh with the Board, but merely to clear the Conſiſtency of my own Conduct and Opinion, in Anſwer to an Objection urged againſt it. In many of our late Debates I have formally admitted the Poſſibility of the Schemes and Negociations ſaid to be carrying on between the French and the Marattas, but at the ſame Time have contended that all ſuch Schemes and Negociations have totally failed of Succeſs. The Fact beyond all Queſtion is, that the French at this Day are not in Poſſeſſion of Choul; and I preſume it will not be diſputed that they are engaged in Connections with Hyder Ally, who is at War with the Marattas, and that they have furniſhed him with Military Aſſiſtance.

With reſpect to Monſieur St. Lubin, he is an Agent of ſo low an Order, and a Perſon of a Character ſo infamous in India, that I cannot believe he was ever intruſted with a Letter from the King of France. What his Deſigns have been, or what Inſtructions he may have received from his Employers, I know not: It is ſufficient, for the Support of every Argument in which I have taken a Part on this Subject, that his Hopes, whatever they were, have been diſappointed, and that his Deſigns are actually defeated.

Governor General—As Mr. Francis has ſhifted the Grounds of the Queſtion, I am not bound to continue the Argument, but in Anſwer to One Paſſage only which is directly applied to the preſent Subject of Debate. As Mr. Francis is now pleaſed to ſay, that he cannot believe that he was ever entruſted with a Letter from the King of France, I beg Leave to enter here for the Third Time the ſtrongeſt Proof which a Fact of that Nature can admit, the Declaration to which I have before alluded of the Miniſters themſelves, in the following Extracts of their Letters to me. With reſpect to the French Connections with Hyder Ally, thoſe I admit, and ſhall hereafter explain, as well as the Inconſiſtency imputed to what I alledged on this Subject in the Minutes delivered by me on the 11th June.

Monſieur

Extracts of Letters from the Poona Durbar to the Governor General.

"Monſieur Le Chevalier de St. Lubin, on the Part of the King of France, lately arrived on board Ship on this Coaſt, and landed at Rio Dunda belonging to the Government; from whence he tranſmitted a Letter to Seremunt Row Sahib Row Pundit Purdhan, containing a Requeſt of Audience to treat with him, which if granted, they would wait on him and fully explain to him the Subjects of their Miſſion. As Friendſhip has ſubſiſted from Time immemorial between the French Nation and the illuſtrious Family of Seremunt Sahib, and moreover in Compliance with the Duties of Hoſpitality, an Order for their Approach was ſent from the Preſence. When the aforeſaid Gentleman arrives, the Subjects of their Negociation will be explained."

"I ſome time ago wrote you Information of the Approach of a Perſon deputed by the King of France to this Quarter. Monſieur Chevalier de St. Lubin has lately been honoured with an Audience of the Pundit Purdhan Peſhwa Sahib, of ſtrengthening and confirming the ancient Friendſhip which ſubſiſted between the Two Nations, and he alſo ſpoke on the Subject of their ancient Intimacy and Connection."

"As the rainy Seaſon was ſet in violently, Mr. Le Chevalier has been delayed on this Account. The Duties of Hoſpitality, both to Friends and Strangers, are incumbent on Chiefs of high Rank."

Warren Haſtings,
Rich[d] Barwell,
P. Francis,
Edw[d] Wheler.

APPENDIX, N° 59 and 61.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, 11th June 1778.

THE Governor General—I forbear in this Place to comment upon the preceding Letters; I ſuppoſe that the Orders ſent by the Preſident and Council of Bombay to Colonel Leſlie muſt have been received; but as it is poſſible that they may have been intercepted, I propoſe that a Letter be written to Colonel Leſlie, informing him of the Subſtance of this Order, and confirming it by an Order from this Board; but that he be directed to complete the Preparations which he has been making for the Equipment of his Detachment, and that he hold himſelf in Readineſs to march on immediate Warning.

Mr. Wheler—I feel myſelf very much averſe to throwing any Difficulty or Embarraſſment upon the Subject now before the Board.

The Queſtion as it ſtands I can approve of in Part, but without ſome further Explanation, I fear I cannot entirely accede to it; the Firſt Part of the Letter, adviſing Colonel Leſlie of the Subſtance of the Bombay Letter, and the Confirmation of this Board, is acceded to, and likewiſe that he be directed to complete the Preparation which he has been making for the Equipment of his Detachment, as I have Reaſon to fear he is very ill provided and prepared for ſo long and hazardous a March: As to the laſt Part, "that he hold it in Readineſs to march on immediate Warning," I do not conſent to it, unleſs the Order ſhall previouſly receive the Sanction of this Board; I likewiſe think it ſhould be aſcertained, whether Colonel Leſlie ſhould with his Army recroſs the Jumna, or if not, where and how he is to diſpoſe of it during the approaching Rains.

Mr. Francis—Conſidering the Nature of the Advices received Yeſterday from Bombay, I own I had not the leaſt Doubt that the preſent extraordinary Council was ſummoned with a View to countermand the Expedition, and to recall our Forces to the Defence of our own Dominions. The Preſidency of Bombay tell us, "that the Opinion they had formed on the preſent Situation of Affairs, "and their Deſire to ſave the Company from the heavy Expence, and their Troops from the Dan-"gers and Difficulties of a March from our Provinces to that Side of India, had led them to put "a Stop to the March of the Army." After ſuch a Rebuff as this from the Government, in ſupport of whoſe Projects theſe extraordinary Steps have been taken here, and after ſo plain a Declaration from them, that they will not take any Part in the Reſponſibility of a Meaſure ſo expenſive, ſo dangerous, and ſo difficult, I confeſs I had no Thought that any Idea of perſevering in the Execution of ſuch a Meaſure could ſtill prevail at this Board. I was in Hopes that nothing would be required of me To-day, but to join as I ſhould have done, heartily in approving the Reverſal of Meaſures, which I had conſtantly oppoſed and condemned; the Motion by no Means anſwers my Expectations or comes Home to my Opinion.

I think we ſhould immediately ſend Orders to Colonel Leſlie to recroſs the Jumna, and to ſtation his Troops in ſuch Places as may be moſt convenient and moſt eaſily made for their Reception during the Rains; I can never agree to their halting on the other Side of the River; if it be in an Enemy's Country, the Army muſt be expoſed to many of the Dangers and Difficulties which would attend their March, and probably be forced into Acts of Hoſtility, which may produce a general War. If it be

meant that they ſhall quarter in the Territories of the Raja of Bundlecund, I ſuppoſe it may be done without Danger, but it muſt be attended with the Ruin of his Country, at the ſame Time that our Army is detained from the Defence of our own Frontier. It is in vain for me to ſay more on a Subject which has been ſo often diſcuſſed; I muſt leave it to the Majority to decide as they think proper. One Circumſtance only I think it neceſſary to point out to the Attention of the Court of Directors. We have been hitherto told that the French were engaging in dangerous Negociations with the Marattas, and this Fact has often been preſſed upon the Board as a Reaſon for the Part we have taken in their Affairs: It now appears by the Letter from Bombay, that Monſieur Bellecombe had ſent a Ship of War to Mangalore, where ſeveral Artillery Officers, Two hundred Men, and a large Quantity of Military Stores, are landed for the Service of the Nabob Hyder Ally. But Hyder Ally is at War with the Marattas, and has lately obtained ſome Advantages over them; it is impoſſible then that any Intrigues between the French and the Marattas can have taken Effect if ever they exiſted. The Concluſions therefore drawn from that ſuppoſed Fact fall to the Ground, and if we act conſiſtently with our Reaſonings, the Meaſures built on thoſe Concluſions muſt fall with them.

Mr. Barwell—It ſeems to be the Sentiments of Mr. Wheler and Mr. Francis, that the Detachment ſhould continue embodied and remain under the Command of Colonel Leſlie. The only Propoſition contained in either of the Votes, that appears at all to militate againſt the Orders propoſed by the Governor General, is that the Troops ſhall be directed to re-croſs the Jumna. Conſidering the Policy that renders it neceſſary to continue the Detachment embodied, I ſee no Reaſon for reſtricting the Officer in Command of it from chuſing that Station for the Troops he may in his Judgment conceive beſt calculated either to facilitate his Progreſs, or to enable him to return to the Provinces. From the Time that has elapſed in preparing this Force, the Readineſs in which it is to be kept to march at a Minute's Warning, is equally calculated for Offence and Defence, and whilſt it is not advanced to a greater Diſtance than Thirty or Forty Coſs from the Frontier of Oude, or Raja Cheyt Sing's Dominions, I will venture to affirm that our Powers of Defence are greatly increaſed. In giving my Opinion for the propoſed Order to Colonel Leſlie, I do not think it eſſential to go back into the Policy that gave Riſe to the Armament at Calpee, though I think it neceſſary to propoſe an Addition to the Quotation made from the Bombay Letter by Mr. Francis, following the Words "landed for the Service of the Nabob Hyder Ally;" "and the Ship, after "Sir Edward Vernon was out of Sight to the Northward of her, returned to Mahé, to carry Mon- "ſieur Bellecombe back to Pondicherry. The Sartine is gone into Goa River, where ſhe probably "may remain during the Monſoon; and it is there ſaid, that the French were deterred from pro- "ceeding to Choul by the Appearance of our Squadron, and ſuppoſing that War was declared, "and perhaps by the News of the Revolution at Poona, but we have learnt that the Captain who "was at Choul, has ordered her up thither (to Choul)."

Mr. Francis—I have not made myſelf underſtood. My Opinion is, that the Expedition ſhould be abſolutely countermanded, and Colonel Leſlie's preſent Command of courſe diſſolved as ſoon as he has quartered his Troops on this Side the Jumna, in the beſt Manner the Seaſon will permit; after the Rains, the ſeveral Detachments of which his Army is compoſed, ought to be remanded to their former Stations.

Governor General—If I had thought it neceſſary to have replied minutely to the Objections which have been made to this Queſtion, Mr. Barwell has precluded me, by anticipating all that I could have ſaid upon the Subject; but there is an Obſervation which Mr. Francis has introduced, and expreſſed as it is, to be foreign from the Queſtion of which I am compelled to take Notice, by the ſolemn Reference which he has made of it to the Court of Directors. Mr. Francis has ſaid, "One Circumſtance only I think it neceſſary to point out to the Attention of the Court of Di- "rectors; we have been hitherto told, that the French were engaging in dangerous Negociations "with the Marattas, and this Fact has often been preſſed upon the Board as a Reaſon for the "Part we have taken in their Affairs: It now appears, by the Letter from Bombay, that Monſieur "Bellecombe had ſent a Ship of War to Mangalore, where ſeveral Artillery Officers, Two hundred "Men, and a large Quantity of Military Stores, were landed for the Service of the Nabob Hyder "Ally." Mr. Barwell has properly added the Context of this Quotation, and thereby reſtored it to the proper Senſe implied and intended by both. By this Method of ſelecting partial Paſſages, and by an artificial Application or Combination of them, of which I have too frequently had Occaſion to complain in the Conteſt in which I have been unfortunately involved with Mr. Francis, it is in his Power not only to pervert the original Meaning of the Text, but to draw any Concluſions he pleaſes from them, however oppoſite to the Sentiments of thoſe who wrote them. I am in Poſſeſſion of Materials, received through Channels too remote for the Poſſibility of their having been ſuggeſted by the Knowledge of what has happened on the other Side of India, by which I learn that the Deſtination of the Troops, which were landed from the Brilliante at Mangalore, were for Choul. The additional Sentence of the Bombay Letter, which Mr. Barwell has deſired to be inſerted, may ſerve in Part to explain the apparent Inconſiſtency of Troops intended for the Service of the Marattas, being converted to that of the Enemies, nor will it be difficult to comprehend the Cauſe of ſo ſudden a Change in the Conduct of Monſieur Bellecombe, on the Difficulties preſented to him, if we ſuppoſe him to have been reluctantly compelled into the Support of a Syſtem formed independent of his Authority, and that his own Inclinations led him to prefer another Alliance, which I have Reaſon to believe was the Caſe.

Mr. Francis—I beg Leave to ſay that my Argument is not anſwered; I ſtate it as a Fact, which

is not diſputed, that the French have lately ſent Military Aſſiſtance to Hyder Ally, who is at War with the Marattas: From this undiſputed Fact I conclude that, even admitting any Negociations whatſoever to have been carried on between the French and the Marattas at a former Period, and even admitting the private Information to which the Governor General refers to be authentic (though to this Board it could be no Evidence before it was mentioned) ſtill it is true, that the French have now taken part with Hyder Ally; of courſe we have nothing to fear from thoſe dangerous Intrigues, which, to ſave Time and Argument, I will admit to have taken Place between them and the Marattas, nor any Reaſon to perſevere in the Execution of Meaſures, which were adopted with a profeſſed View to counteract thoſe Intrigues. This Argument I take to be ſtrict, and in Point; I ſubmit to Judgment, whether it is anſwered by general Complaints of unfair Quotations, which conſidering that the Letter quoted is before the Board, and will be before the Court of Directors, would be not leſs injudicious than they would be unfair.

Governor General—I will anſwer Mr. Francis's Argument in the Manner in which he requires; ſtill complaining, as I have a Right to complain, of the partial Selection of Facts for the Purpoſe of maintaining his Opinion. It is true that the Preſident and Council of Bombay write, that they had learnt that the Brilliante proceeded to Mangalore, where ſeveral Artillery Officers, Two hundred Men, and a large Quantity of Military Stores, were landed for the Service of the Nabob Hyder Ally: They do not aſſert this for a Fact, nor do they aſſert that the Report, which they thus repeat to us, went further than the Landing of the Troops, and the ſimple Intention of employing them for the Service of Hyder Ally; in Effect, this Intelligence conſiſts only of conjectural Concluſions from an unaſcertained Fact: To this obſcure Intelligence, and to this vague Inference drawn from it, I deſire Leave to oppoſe the following Extract from Mr. Moſtyn's Letter, containing the Recital of an authenticated Fact, admitting but of One Concluſion, namely, that the Chevalier St. Lubin, the public and avowed Miniſter of the Court of France, was ſtill retained at Poona in Defiance of all the Remonſtrances of our Agent there, and of the Preſident and Council of Bombay, and that the ſame Countenance was ſhewn him by the Members of the new Adminiſtration as he had before received from the ruling Members of the former Government; hence I conclude, in Oppoſition to Mr. Francis's Concluſion, that we have yet ſtronger Grounds than ever, both for the Conviction of the French Intrigues with the Maratta State, and for the Fear of their Conſequences. "Notwithſtanding Moraba's "Aſſertions to Mr. Lewis, Monſieur St. Lubin has not yet been to Proonder, though it is ſaid he is "now ſent for; but from the equivocating Conduct of the Durbar, both before and ſince Moraba "has had the executive Authority, it is a Doubt with me whether they will diſpatch him, or even if "they do, whether he will leave Poona, as from the Lateneſs of the Seaſon he will have it in his "Power to delay the Time until the Rains ſet in, when he will make the Plea of its being impoſſible "for him to go any where."

Mr. Francis—I did underſtand from the Governor General's preceding Minute, that the Facts had been admitted.

N° 61.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 11th June 1778.

Reſolved, That the following Letters be written to Colonel Leſlie, to Bombay, and to Mr. Moſtyn.

Sir,

By a Letter which we have received from the Preſident and Council of Bombay, under Date the 2d May, we are informed, that the Aſſurances given by the new Miniſters at Poona, of their breaking off the Connection with the French, had made the Preſident and Council willing to hope that the firſt and grand Object of the Meaſures thus propoſed to us, might be accompliſhed by the late Revolution in the Government of Poona; but as Monſieur St. Lubin had not been diſmiſſed, and they were uncertain whether the new Miniſtry were ſincere in their Promiſes, they did not mean to be relax in their Vigilance towards the Intentions of that Government; however, until they could judge with more Certainty of their Diſpoſition, the Opinion which the Preſident and Council had formed of the preſent Situation of Affairs, and their Deſire to ſave the Company from the heavy Expence and our Troops from the Dangers and Difficulties of a March from theſe Provinces to the Weſt Side of India, had induced them to ſend you an Order not to advance any further until you ſhould hear again from them.

We conclude, that ere this you have received their Orders, and put a Stop to the March of the Detachment in conſequence; but leſt they ſhould have been intercepted, or by ſome Accident prevented from reaching you, we think it proper to confirm them, by directing them to halt accordingly, until you ſhall receive further Orders on the Subject from the Preſident and Council at Bombay or from us; but you will nevertheleſs continue the Preparations which you have been making for the Equipment of the Detachment under your Command, until they ſhall be completed: And we further direct, that you hold it in Readineſs to march on immediate Warning.

We are, &c.

Gentlemen,

Gentlemen,

We have received your Letter of the 2d ultimo.

Leſt the Orders which you inform us you have ſent to Colonel Leſlie, ſhould have been intercepted, or by any Accident prevented from reaching him, we have confirmed them by Injunctions to halt with the Detachment under his Command where he now is, on the other Side of the Jumna but to hold himſelf in Readineſs to continue his March on immediate Notice.

We are, &c.

Sir,

We have this Day received your Duplicate Letter of the 12th ultimo, encloſing one from the Preſident and Council of Bombay, dated the 2d of the ſame Month.

For Want of the Copy of Mr. Lewis's Proceedings, which are ſaid to be encloſed in your Letter, we are much at a Loſs to comprehend the Facts which you allude to; but we obſerve, with great Concern upon the Whole, that the new Miniſters, by a dilatory and evaſive Conduct, have already furniſhed Grounds to diſtruſt the Sincerity of the Intentions which they had profeſſed to you; we therefore wait with Impatience for more clear and deciſive Advices of their Proceedings, and we requeſt you will not delay to acquaint us with them by every Opportunity.

In conſequence of the Letter from the Preſident and Council of Bombay, wherein they inform us that they had thought it proper to ſend Orders to Colonel Leſlie, not to advance any further with the Detachment under his Command, until they ſhould be able to judge with more Certainty of the Diſpoſition of the new Government, and to furniſh him with Inſtructions for his Conduct; we have confirmed theſe Orders, by directing him to halt accordingly where he now is, but to hold himſelf in Readineſs to continue his March on immediate Notice.

We are, &c.

APPENDIX, N° 60.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 11th July 1778.

Letter from Bombay.

Gentlemen,

ENCLOSED we have the Honour to forward a Triplicate of our laſt Addreſs, dated the 20th inſtant.

Having ſince received ſome material Advices from Mr. Moſtyn, we now forward Copies thereof by a Ship bound to Madras, the Conveyance by Sea being at this Seaſon the moſt expeditious.

We alſo encloſe Copies of Two French Letters which lately fell into our Hands: They are from the Commander of the French Snow, mentioned in our Letter of the 20th January to have arrived at Choul, and having been put on board a Veſſel at Damaun, of whoſe Deſtination he was ignorant, came into our Poſſeſſion, after having been carried to Buſſorah and back again. As you will now have theſe Letters before you, it is needleſs for us to make any Comments.

The Reſident at Tellicherry has lately adviſed us, that he has received certain Information that the Number of Men landed at Mangalore from the Brilliante was only 12 Artillery, 12 Infantry, and One Officer, inſtead of Two hundred Men as before adviſed.

We have received the new Cypher from Captain Roddam; and are, with Reſpect, &c.

(Signed) Wm Hornby,
&c. Council.

Bombay Caſtle,
31ſt May 1778.

APPENDIX, N° 62.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 15th June 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler,
} Eſquires.

RECEIVED the following Letter from Colonel Leſlie:

Gentlemen,

I had the Honour to addreſs you on the 20th inſtant, with the Information of the Firſt Diviſion of this Detachment having paſſed the Jumna; the Park of Artillery, Magazine, Stores, &c. with Two Battalions of the 2d Diviſion and the Nabob's Cavalry, croſſed a few Days following; and I have been delayed commencing my March from Calpee by the Negociations the Maratta Chiefs have been carrying on with me for the Re-eſtabliſhment of Peace. This Day I have received their final Acquieſcence to my free Paſſage through their Country, and their promiſed Aid of Proviſions; for their faithful Performance of which I am to be attended by a Perſon of Rank, and to retain Poſſeſſion of the Fort of Calpee, ſo long as it may be neceſſary for the Convenience of my Communication with theſe Provinces.

The Terms upon which theſe Matters are adjuſted are contained in the encloſed Paper, which I now lay before you, and ſhall be happy if in this Endeavour to effect the Spirit of your Inſtructions I may merit your Approbation.

It was my Intention to have advanced a Part of the Troops To-morrow Morning; but an Expreſs Letter, which I have received by this Day's Poſt from the Honourable the Preſident and Council of Bombay, and tranſmitted by your Reſident at Benares, poſitively forbids my Advance, as unneceſſary in the preſent State of Affairs at Poona, and directing me to wait their further Orders. Under Cover I have the Honour to lay before you a Copy of their Letter. Your Inſtructions, requiring my ſtrict Compliance with the Orders of the Preſident and Council of Bombay on my croſſing the Jumna, entirely prohibits my taking any Meaſures upon the Preſumption of what may be your Sentiments on the preſent Occaſion; but as the Situation of Calpee will not admit of my taking Poſt here ſo long as it may be before I receive their promiſed Inſtructions, I ſhall extend my Front to the Banks of the Betowa River, about 10 Coſs on the Road to Chatterpore, in which Situation I ſhall be moſt conveniently ſituated for putting in Execution any Orders you may pleaſe to honour me with, and I ſhall be ready to purſue my March if the Preſidency of Bombay ſhould require it. I eſteem my Advance thus far from Calpee neceſſary to ſupport the Appearance of my Progreſs, that the Chief of Berar may not conclude himſelf neglected, and I ſhall addreſs him to this Purport: The preſumptuous Chiefs of this Diſtrict will alſo be convinced by this Step, that their Efforts have not in any Shape tended to retard the March of the Detachment. I earneſtly ſolicit your Directions for my Conduct in this Situation of Affairs, and whatever Orders I may receive in the Interim from the Bombay Preſidency ſhall be complied with, and immediate Notice thereof tranſmitted to you.

I have the Honour, &c. &c.

Head Quarters, Calpee,
30th May 1778.

(Signed) Matt^w Leſlie.

Tranſlation of a Letter from Colonel Matt^w Leſlie to Gangadhur Pundit; dated the 27th May 1778.

Upon my Approach to Calpee I wrote to you and your Brother Balagee, informing you that I ſhould proceed to the Southward through your Country; that I had no hoſtile Intentions towards you; that I ſhould be careful in preventing my Troops and their Followers from committing Depredations or moleſting the Inhabitants during my March through your Country; that I required your friendly Aſſiſtance in ſupplying me with Grain, and ſuch other Neceſſaries as I might require of you for the Service of my Camp; and that whatever Neceſſaries I might be ſupplied with, I would pay a proper Price for them.

In your Anſwers to my Letters, you expreſs the higheſt Reſpect for the Engliſh, likewiſe your Inclination to encreaſe that Friendſhip which you had before eſtabliſhed with them; and you ſeemed happy that this Event would afford you an Opportunity of evincing your Readineſs to oblige the Engliſh Government.

After ſuch very friendly Expreſſions and Aſſurances, I little expected the Reception of an Enemy on croſſing my Troops at Kulpee Gaut: As I have already given you my Sentiments very fully on

the Conduct of your People towards me, I judge a Repetition unneceſſary; but as you have ſolicited me to make you acquainted with ſuch Circumſtances as I may deem material for my Service, I do therefore ſtipulate the following Articles:

1ſt. That my Troops are to have a free and unmoleſted Paſſage through your Country.

2d. That you will cauſe the Troops to be ſupplied with Proviſions and other Neceſſaries, during their March through your Country; for which a proper Price ſhall be given.

3d. That the Communication to and from my Camp be kept open and protected, and that you afford every Aſſiſtance required of you on this Subject.

4th. As your People of your own Accord did evacuate the Town and Fort of Kulpee, I am now in Poſſeſſion of both; I therefore judge it expedient to retain the Fort by placing a ſmall Guard in it, as a Security for the Performance of your Promiſes to me; I likewiſe require a Man of Credit, Reſpect, and of your Confidence, who ſhall proceed with me; and if upon my Arrival at Chatterpore I ſhall have experienced the Effects of your friendly Intentions and Readineſs to give me Aſſiſtance, I ſhall then direct the Return of your Friend, and order the Guard to be withdrawn from the Fort, and you put in Poſſeſſion of it.

5th. That no Bodies of your Troops are at any Time to appear near my Line of March; if they do, I ſhall conclude that their Intentions are hoſtile.

Theſe are my Demands, and as I cannot doubt your good Intentions towards the Welfare of your Country, I ſhould ſuppoſe you will immediately comply with them. I once more aſſure you that my Intentions towards you and your Country are moſt friendly, and I ſhall be attentive in preventing my Troops and their Followers from committing the ſmalleſt Irregularities during my March through your Country: I want not the Aſſiſtance of Troops, as I have no hoſtile Intentions towards any one.

(Signed) P. Hay,
P. Tranſlator.

To the Officer at Calpee in Command of the Troops under Orders for Bombay.

Sir,

From the preſent Situation of Affairs in this Quarter, we think it neceſſary to deſire that you will not advance further towards Bombay until you hear again from us.

We are, &c.

Bombay Caſtle,
22d April 1778.

(Signed) Wm Hornby,
&c. Council.

Reſolved, that the following Letter be written to Colonel Leſlie:

Sir,

We have received your Letter of the 30th ultimo.

We approve of the Intention you expreſs to move the Detachment to the Banks of the Betow River for the Purpoſe of encamping them. We leave the Choice of the Ground in that Situation to your Judgment, but forbid you to advance any further than the Line on which you propoſe to encamp, till you receive Orders to that Effect.

We alſo think it neceſſary to forbid the Application of the Treaſure conſtituting the Military Cheſt for the Expedition, which was ſent to you from Lucknow, to the Pay or any other Expences of the Detachment, until you ſhall receive Orders either from the Preſidency and Council of Bombay or from us, to continue your March; but in the mean Time you will cauſe the Diſburſements of the Paymaſter to be made from the uſual Supplies, which the Reſident at the Nabob's Court has been directed regularly to furniſh you with.

We are, &c.

Fort William,
15th June 1778.

Agreed, That the following Letter be written to Mr. Middleton:

Sir,

Having ordered Colonel Leſlie with the Detachment under his Command to halt on the Banks of the River Betowa till further Orders, we think it proper that the Treaſure conſtituting the Military Cheſt for the intended Expedition, ſhould be reſerved unapplied till he may find it neceſſary to proceed; we therefore direct that you continue to furniſh the regular and neceſſary Supplies for the Pay and Expences of this Corps during the Continuance of its Stay in that Place.

We have received your Letter of the 29th ultimo.

We are, &c.

Fort William,
the 15th June 1778.

Warren Haſtings,
Richd Barwell,
P. Francis,
Edwd Wheler.

APPENDIX, N° 65 and 66.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, dated 29th June 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell, Philip Francis, Edward Wheler, } Eſquires.

RECEIVED the following Letter from Bombay:

Gentlemen,

We have been favoured with your Letter of the 6th ultimo, encloſing Copy of your Inſtructions to Colonel Leſlie.

Our Letters of the 2d and 9th Inſtant have been already forwarded in Duplicate.

In the Firſt of theſe Letters we acquainted you of having directed the Commander of the Bengal Detachment not to advance without further Advice from us; and in the latter, of our having taken off that Reſtraint, and directed him to move forward agreeable to his Inſtructions from you.

When the late Change was effected in the Poona Government, we at firſt entertained Hopes it would be followed by all the good Conſequences our propoſed Meaſures were intended to produce, but we more particularly depended that the French Influence at the Maratta Court would be deſtroyed by that Event: for theſe and the other Reaſons mentioned in our Letter of the 2d Inſtant, we judged it beſt to ſtop the March of the Bengal Detachment till we could form a more certain Judgment of the Diſpoſition of the Adminiſtration.

Having indulged theſe Hopes as far as Probability will warrant, we think we can no longer in Prudence take our Meaſures upon ſuch Expectations; and your Letter of the 23d March more fully explaining your Views, and giving us Authority to demand proper Explanations from the Durbar on certain Points, we then judged it expedient to order the Bengal Detachment to advance; which, from the Nature of your Orders prior to that Letter, we did not think could anſwer any End adequate to the Expence and Danger of the March, for we beg Leave to obſerve, that after the Plan for Ragoba had miſcarried, it was impoſſible for us to defeat the Deſigns of the French, and not to break the Treaty of Poona.

Every Letter we have received from Poona ſince the Revolution, and the uniform Tenor of the Conduct of the new Adminiſtration, evidently prove that they ſtill mean to continue the ſame Line of evaſive Conduct ſo long purſued by that Government; we doubt not but your Advices from Mr. Moſtyn will have impreſſed you with the ſame Opinion. Though the executive Power is transferred from Nanah to Moraba, the former is ſtill in Office, and a Member of the Durbar; the latter, as far as we can judge, ſeems inclined to tread in the Footſteps of his Predeceſſor, and unwilling to part with any Share of his Power to Ragoba, may ſeek to ſecure the Whole to himſelf by the ſame Means. Monſieur St. Lubin is ſtill permitted to remain at Poona, although his Diſmiſſion was the firſt Object of our Inſtructions to Mr. Moſtyn, after the Change in the Adminiſtration took place, and he received every Satisfaction on that Head that Promiſes could give, ſo long ago as the 10th of laſt March. Notwithſtanding the Requeſt then made in public Durbar to Mr. Moſtyn, to accompany their Agent to Bombay, with Propoſals reſpecting Ragoba, we find by his lateſt Advices, that they have been only trifling with him, nor have they to his Knowledge yet taken one Step towards ſettling that Buſineſs, though the Seaſon is now ſo late. The Treaty ſtill remains on the ſame Footing on which it has ſtood theſe Two Years paſt, nor has the new Government taken any Meaſure whatever for fulfilling the unexecuted Articles.

Such being the Situation of Affairs, we could not, with your Orders before us, wait any longer in Expectation of Propoſals from Poona; we have therefore given Mr. Moſtyn Inſtructions to the following Purport, being exactly agreeable to the Directions contained in your Letters of the 23d of March.

Firſt. We have directed him in the Name of this Government, and under your Authority, to call upon the new Adminiſtration to declare expreſsly whether they conſider the Maratta State as bound by the Treaty of Poona, and to pledge their own Faith to it.

Secondly. We have directed him, agreeable to the ſaid Treaty, to demand immediate Poſſeſſion of a Country of Three compleat Lacks of Rupees, near or adjoining to Broach in the Manner ſtipulated by the Fifth Article, and in caſe the Miniſters ſhall refuſe to comply with this Demand, we further directed him to declare their Refuſal to be a Violation of the Treaty.

It is neceſſary to obſerve that we directed Mr. Moſtyn to ſignify to the Miniſters at the Time he made his Demands, that we were willing to receive, in full Completion of the 5th Article, a Country

that will produce to the Company Three Lacks of Rupees a Year in the groſs Revenue, without any Allowance being made for the Charges of Collection.

Thirdly. We have directed him to acquaint the Miniſters that we have Orders from you to keep Poſſeſſion of the Countries ceded to the Honourable Company by Futty Sing, ſince they have failed in producing the Proofs required by the Treaty, that Futty Sing Guicawar did not poſſeſs Power or Authority to make ſuch Ceſſions.

Fourth. We directed him to make a proper Remonſtrance, agreeable to the Terms of your Letter, againſt the Countenance afforded to the Chevalier St. Lubin, againſt his being permitted to continue at Poona, notwithſtanding the Promiſes we have received ſince the late Change in the Government, and to demand from them a clear and ſatisfactory Explanation of their Intentions with reſpect to the French; declaring to them, that the Governor General and Council will take ſuch Meaſures as Prudence ſhall dictate for the future Safety of the Company's Intereſt and Poſſeſſions committed to their Charge.

In this Place we think it our Duty to requeſt to be informed what Meaſures you propoſe to purſue, in caſe their Anſwer on this Occaſion ſhould not prove ſatisfactory, or their future Conduct ſhould give us Reaſon for Apprehenſion, as our being furniſhed with timely Inſtructions may be of the utmoſt Importance.

Fifthly. As we have experienced ſo much Equivocation and Delay in the Conduct of the Poona Government, we thought it neceſſary, in Addition to the Points laid down by you, to direct Mr. Moſtyn to deliver his Demands in Writing; and at the ſame Time to acquaint the Miniſters, that we expected an immediate and explicit Anſwer likewiſe in Writing; but that if ſuch an Anſwer was not returned within Fourteen Days from the Time of the Delivery of our Demands, we ſhould conſider any further Evaſion or Delay as a Refuſal, and take our Meaſures accordingly.

The Settlement made by Colonel Upton reſpecting Jambooſeer having been agreed to by us, rendered it unneceſſary to make the Second of the Demands enjoined in your Letter. You will pleaſe to bear in mind, that our Claim on Jambooſeer has been increaſed by the further Demands for an Equivalent for the Loſs the Company have ſuſtained by the Delay of the Miniſters in making over the Country of Three Lacks, and for Reſtitution of the Loſs ſuſtained by the Merchants concerned in the Aurora, which we have fixed as Charges on the Revenues of that Province.

The Reſolutions we have taken, will put the Conduct of the new Adminiſtration to a clear Teſt; and their Anſwer will enable us to form a Judgment of the Footing we are to be on with that Government.

The Anſwer Mr. Moſtyn has received from the Durbar to his Application for Paſſports and Supplies for the Bengal Detachment, amounting to a Denial, we gave him Directions, which he had anticipated, to make a direct Application for that Purpoſe to Tookajee Holkar himſelf, and to Mhadjee Scindy; to both of whom the Preſident has likewiſe written, and given them the Aſſurances directed in your Letter. Mr. Lewis's Report, tranſmitted to you by Mr. Moſtyn, will place the Conduct of the Durbar on this Point in a clear Light, and give you a further Idea of their Views and Intentions. In a Letter juſt received, he further acquaints us, that being uncertain which Route the Army would take, whether by the Road of Ugein and Indoor, or through the Toll Bopall Country, which lies upon the Nerbudda, to the Eaſtward of the two former, and is the Road generally taken by the Pattamars, he had, in order to provide as much as poſſible for our Troops having an unmoleſted March, written to the Nabob of that Country, and had been aſſured by his Vackeel at Poona, that there was not the leaſt Doubt of the Nabob readily complying with his Requeſt.

We have acquainted Colonel Leſlie with our Proceedings reſpecting the Paſſports, and directed Mr. Moſtyn to communicate conſtantly with him. We have alſo, with a further View of expediting his March, directed Colonel Leſlie to correſpond with Mr. Moſtyn, and ſhall ourſelves give him every Intelligence and Advice that can be of Service.

We beg Leave to ſuggeſt to you, that if on any future Occaſion it ſhould be neceſſary to ſupply us with a Reinforcement of Troops, the eaſieſt and beſt Method would be to ſend Troops hither directly from Madras, which can be replaced from your Eſtabliſhment if neceſſary.

Mr. Moſtyn has been inſtructed to obtain, if poſſible, a Copy of the Engagement entered into by Nana Furnele with the Chevalier St. Lubin, and a Knowledge of the Meaſures which may have been taken for its Execution. The Intelligence tranſmitted in our laſt Letter, adds much Strength to our Suſpicions, that a Grant has been given or promiſed them for the Port of Choul.

The Route by Mazulipatam appearing to be the moſt expeditious for the Conveyance of Advices, we beg Leave to recommend to you to tranſmit your original Letters through that City.

We are, &c. &c.
(Signed) Wm Hornby,
&c. Council.

Bombay Caſtle,
20th May 1778.

N° 66.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 29th June 1778.

Received the following Letter from Mr. Moſtyn:

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

My laſt Reſpects waited on you under the 12th Inſtant. On the 13th I received an Anſwer to the Letter. I therein informed you I had written to Moraba, on the Subject of Paſſports for the Troops you are ſending to Bombay, telling me, that as theſe Troops are coming on Account of the French, he had ſent for Monſieur St. Lubin, in order to diſpatch him; after which he ſays, he ſees no Neceſſity for the Troops continuing their March, or for his granting Duſtucks. Although this Letter is no direct Reply to my Requeſt, I could not but conſider it as a Refuſal; however, to avoid if poſſible all future Altercation on this Buſineſs, I thought it my Duty to write Moraba a Second Letter, deſiring he would re-conſider the Matter, and again declaring him anſwerable for any ill Conſequences which might enſue from his Refuſal; telling him, as the Troops had undoubtedly begun their March, I had not Authority to countermand them, nor would the Want of Paſſports ſtop their Proceedings. To this I received Moraba's Anſwer on the 16th, referring me to his laſt.

Finding from Moraba's Anſwer that there was no Proſpect of obtaining Paſſports from the Durbar, and as the March of our Troops may probably lay through Madjee and Tookajee Holkar's Countries, I embraced the Opportunity of a Perſon I could truſt going to Scindy, to write him a Letter, requeſting he would favour me with Orders to his Officers for our Forces having a free Paſſage through Ugein, as well as their being ſupplied with a friendly Buzar; and that no Time might be loſt in conveying them, I encloſed Scindy a Letter to the commanding Officer of our Troops, which I requeſted he would forward with the above Orders. I did intend to have made a like Application to Holkar as ſoon as I could find a proper Channel through which to apply to him, being apprehenſive a direct Application might have given Offence to this Durbar; however my Superiors having lately directed me to make immediate Application both to Scindy and Holcar for Paſſports, I wrote the latter under the 24th Inſtant, and am in hourly Expectation of receiving Anſwers from each: It being uncertain which Route our Troops will take, whether by the Road of Ugein, Indoor, or through the Toll Bhopall Country, which lays upon the Nurbedah to the Eaſtward of the Two former, and is the Road our Pattamars generally take; to provide therefore as much as poſſible for our Troops having an unmoleſted March, I have written a Letter to the Nabob of that Place, which I prevailed on his Vackeel here to forward with one from himſelf, requeſting, in caſe they take that Route, he will grant them a free Paſſage, and afford them every Aſſiſtance in his Power; which the Vackeel aſſures me, he makes no doubt his Maſter will readily comply with.

On the 13th Monſieur St. Lubin went to Camp, and the next Day had a Meeting with Moraba, who then told him, that as the Engliſh had taken amiſs his ſtaying here ſo long, it was neceſſary he ſhould go away for a Time; but that he might depend this ſhould not occaſion any Difference in the Friendſhip between the French and this Government. On the 17th in the Afternoon, Morabah, Buchabih, Chintoo Wittul, and Cruſtrow Belol, paid Monſieur St. Lubin a Viſit at his Tent; and after ſtaying with him about Half an Hour returned to Morabah's Tent, whither Monſieur St. Lubin followed them ſhortly after, and ſtaid with them ſome Hours. Morabah then made him a Preſent, and diſpatched him. On the 20th Nanah came down from the Fort, where he has reſided ſome Time paſt, to pay a Viſit to Sacarum Bapoo at Bury, when they ſent for Monſieur St. Lubin, in order to take Leave; and he accordingly waited on them: Notwithſtanding theſe Appearances of Monſieur St. Lubin being diſpatched, it is beyond a Doubt with me, that he has no real Intentions of leaving Poona, or at leaſt if he does, that he will ſpeedily return; and that the Durbar are in Hopes, by publickly diſpatching him, to lull us into a Belief of their good Intentions, whilſt they have Recourſe to the French for Aſſiſtance, a Point for which has already been opened by Monſieur St. Lubin's Negociations with Nanah, and which have been lately taken up by Morabah, as your Honour, &c. will pleaſe to obſerve by the encloſed Copy and Tranſlate of a Letter I have received from a Perſon at Camp, who, from the Knowledge I have of him, I do not think would deceive me: The Intelligence contained in this Letter of Morabah's Tranſactions with Monſieur St. Lubin, has been ſince confirmed by Two Perſons, whoſe Employs in the Government Service are ſuch as to afford them frequent Opportunities of knowing what paſſes.

Conformable to my Superiors Orders I ſhall deliver a Remonſtrance to the Durbar on the Subject of the French, and make a Demand for the immediate Compliance of the Treaty of Proondur, as ſoon as they can be properly tranſlated into the Maratta Language. I have already acquainted you, Gentlemen, that I am aſſured the French have not got a Grant for the Port of Choul; but by the Report of Mr. Lewis's Proceedings at Camp, forwarded in my Addreſs of the 12th, it appears, that Cruſtrow Belol confeſſed before him at the Durbar, a Promiſe thereof had been made Monſieur St. Lubin; and I am convinced the French will not only get that, but much more, the Moment the French can afford the promiſed Aſſiſtance. Although I have hitherto failed in my Endeavours to obtain a Copy of the Engagements entered into between Nanah Furnele and Monſieur St. Lubin,

I have lately been fortunate enough to procure the enclosed Copies of some Letters written by the latter to the Viceroy of Goa and the Governor of Damaun, which prove, that he had made some Agreements of the Kind. I am not acquainted with any Steps having been taken by the Durbar for the carrying this Scheme into Execution, excepting Monsieur St. Lubin being permitted to remain here, in direct Violation of the most solemn Assurances to us that he should be sent away, and the present Conduct of the Durbar.

On the 27th I received a Note from a Person at Camp, informing me, that in consequence of our Troops coming from Bengal, and a Report of Hyder's Army marching this Way, the Durbar had determined on sending Chintoo Wittul and Gopal Naique Tumbuckur to meet me, and request I would proceed to Bombay. They accordingly visited me Yesterday, and informed me they were sent purposely to request I would accompany the former on the Business the Durbar had already spoken to me about. I replied, that I did not see any Necessity for my going, unless the Durbar would explain themselves, which was now become the more necessary from the evasive Manner they had hitherto acted in this Affair. To this they gave me the same Answer the Durbar had before done, that it was to assure Ragoba they were his sincere Friends. I immediately replied, that I considered their present Request as a mere Finesse, intended only to stop the March of the Troops we expected from Bengal, and to gain Time; for had they been sincere, the Durbar would long since have dispatched me on this Business, and sent Monsieur St. Lubin away, but that I was convinced, from the extraordinary Attention Morabah and the Durbar had paid him, the former had taken up Nanah's Plan, and entered into some Engagements with the French. This they positively denied, though they acknowledged Monsieur St. Lubin had made a Tender thereof to Morabah, who told him, that as long as this Government continued in Friendship with the English they would not enter into an Alliance with any other European Nation, and that Morabah had absolutely dispatched him. I told them, that I considered his being publicly dispatched as done with a View to blind us, and perhaps some others; but that I was possessed of what I deemed a sufficient Proof of my Allegation, producing the enclosed Copy of a Letter written by Monsieur St. Lubin to the Viceroy of Goa, under the 26th April, which I had a few Hours before luckily procured. They answered, it was very possible Monsieur St. Lubin might have written in that Manner; but they said, they defied me to produce any Writing from the Durbar: Upon which I observed, that it was the Art of this Durbar not to give any thing under their Hands, that they might have an Opportunity of denying their own Words. It was therefore for this Reason, before I would give Credit to Monsieur St. Lubin being finally dispatched, or my Promise to accompany Chintoo Wittul to Bombay, that I insisted on the Durbar giving me a Writing, with their Sicca affixed, declaring they had not at present, nor would in future have, so long as they continued in Friendship with the English, any Treaty with the French, nor suffer them to trade in any of the Maratta Ports, being exactly conformable to the Promises made me by Sacaram Bapoo when I was dispatched by the Durbar to Bombay in August last: This they promised to deliver me, together with a Letter for the President, accounting for my being detained so long here; and requested I would send the Linguist with Tumbuckur to Camp to bring them. The Linguist accordingly set off this Morning; and if he returns in Time with the above Paper, I shall accompany Chintoo Wittul, who leaves Poona To-morrow, otherwise will follow him as soon as I receive the Paper.

From the Information contained in the Letter from Camp, mentioned in the foregoing Paragraph, it appears to me that this sudden Embassy has been set on foot in consequence of Hyder's Army advancing this Way since Hurry Punt's Retreat, and our Forces coming from Bengal, by which they judge we are determined to be no longer trifled with, and that they are in Hopes thereby to amuse us until the Rains set in, which will cause a Delay of Four or Five Months, by which Time, if ever, they suppose Monsieur St. Lubin can perform his Promises. That the Durbar have already shewn their Willingness to enter into Engagements with the French, highly prejudicial to our Honourable Employers Interest, all Accounts I have received agree; and though I do not imagine it will be in Monsieur St. Lubin's Power to comply fully with his Engagements, yet it is possible the French may be able to bring such a Force as to give them the superior Influence in this Durbar, the dangerous Consequences of which are too plain to need my pointing out.

Madjee Scindy is come from Rimutpore to Javer, a Village within Eight Cos's of Proondur. You will already have perceived, Gentlemen, from Mr. Lewis's Report, that Holkar had been very urgent with Morabah to keep his Engagement for bringing Ragoba into Government; he still continues pressing Morabah on this Subject, in which, from the best Information I can procure, Scindy heartily concurs; and it appears to me that these Two Maratta Officers are by no Means satisfied with the present Conduct of the Durbar. Hurry Punt has been for some Time past near Pundapore.

Since writing the above I have received a Letter from Madjee Scindy, informing me that he has forwarded my Letter to the commanding Officer of our Troops, with an Order to his own Officers for their free Passage through his Country, and that he had forwarded another to me by one of his own Hircarrahs; the latter however is not yet come to Hand.

I am, &c.

(Signed) Tho' Mostyn.

Poona,
the 29th May 1778.

P. S. Since

P. S, Since diſpatching the Original of this Addreſs, I have received the Paſſport from Madjee Scindy, which ſhall be immediately forwarded to Colonel Leſlie.

(Signed) T' Moſtyn.

Tranſlate of a Letter from a Perſon at Proondur; dated the 21ſt Rabellacer, and received the 19th May 1778.

At Noon I received your Note by Shahjee, and obſerved the Contents thereof. Morabah has had Two Councils regarding the French. He told Monſieur St. Lubin, that he had made an Agreement with Nanah to bring 2000 Europeans within Fifteen Months, which he has not yet complied with; but that if it is in his Power to fulfil that Engagement, Morabah deſired he would ſend for them with Ammunition, ſo as to be here before the Battalions can arrive from Calcutta; which Monſieur St. Lubin has agreed to, and diſpatched a Letter expreſs to his Place.

The Contents of the Letter wrote by the Durbar to Bengal, are as follows: "Colonel Upton "concluded a Treaty between our Two Governments; where then is the Neceſſity of your "ſending Troops into my Country? If it is on account of Monſieur St. Lubin remaining here, I "have, in Conſideration of our Friendſhip, diſpatched him; and you may depend, I never will "do any thing that ſhall injure you. The French brought Goods here to ſell, which is the Rea-"ſon of their ſtaying ſo long; but he now intends to go away, and I have accordingly "given him Leave: I therefore wiſh you would recall your Forces, and prevent a Breach in our "Friendſhip. I hope you will pay no Attention to what the Bombay Gentlemen may have al-"ready written, or ſhall hereafter write you on this Subject. With reſpect to Ragoba, I have "determined to bring him here; but as Hurry Punt is coming hither with a large Force, it is "neceſſary he ſhould be conſulted on it; for ſhould Ragoba be brought without his Concurrence, "it will probably create ſome Diſturbances. He will ſoon be here; and I ſhall ſatisfy the Troops "that are with him; after which Ragoba ſhall be ſent for. I deſire you will write to the Bombay "Gentlemen, not to make any Diſturbances."

The following is the Contents of a Letter written by this Durbar to Europe: "There is Friend-"ſhip ſubſiſting between our Governments; beſides, a Treaty was concluded with the Gentlemen "of Bengal, of which you are acquainted, and with which I am complying. Notwithſtanding "this, the Bengal Gentlemen are ſending their Forces in my Country, which will make a Difference "in our Friendſhip. This is not right; I therefore hope you will ſend poſitive Orders, both to "Bengal and Bombay, on this Subject."

The following is the Contents of a Letter from the Durbar to the Nabob: "The Engliſh are "ſending Forces from Bengal with bad Intentions: Should they make any Diſturbances, I ſhall "ſend for your Forces; and hope you will aſſiſt me with your Army. The Engliſh alſo intend to "bring Ragoba by Force, which will cauſe a Diſpute with them; therefore, in Conſideration of "our Friendſhip, it is neceſſary you ſhould attend with your whole Army."

Monſieur St. Lubin is diſpatched, and Morabah wants him to go away, in order to haſten the Troops he has promiſed; but he ſays, he will remain here, and ſend a Man with Letters for him. This they are at preſent conſidering about.

A true Copy of the Tranſlate.

(Signed) T' Moſtyn.

Minute of Mr. Francis.

It ſeems to me that the following Paragraph in the Letter from Bombay will require par-ticular Conſideration: "In this Place we think it our Duty to requeſt to be informed what "Meaſures you propoſe to purſue in caſe their Anſwer on this Occaſion ſhould not prove ſatis-"factory, or their future Conduct ſhould give no Reaſon for Apprehenſion; as our being furniſhed "with timely Inſtructions may be of the utmoſt Importance;" and I wait to hear the Governor General's Sentiments upon it. There is another Part of the Letter in which I would beg Leave to propoſe a Paragraph in Reply: "We beg Leave to ſuggeſt to you, that if on any future Occaſion it "ſhould be neceſſary to ſupply us with a Reinforcement of Troops, the eaſieſt and beſt Method "would be to ſend Troops hither directly from Madras, which can be replaced from your Eſtabliſh-"ment if neceſſary." On the 2d February I ſubmitted my Opinion to the Board on this Point in the following Words: "Suppoſing it a Point determined by the Majority, that a Reinforcement of "Troops ſhould be ſent to Bombay, I think it had better go from the Coaſt, and if neceſſary be re-"placed from hence, than directly from Bengal to Bombay; on this Principle, I yield to the "Propoſition." On the 23d February, I again urged this Opinion in the following Words: "If "a Reinforcement muſt be ſent to Bombay, I beg Leave to repeat my Opinion, that it may be "ſpared with more Safety, and proceed with greater Expedition from Fort Saint George." I would now propoſe, that we ſhould tell the Preſidency of Bombay, that we are convinced of the Propriety of their Opinions in this Particular, and conformably to their Advice, if any future Oc-

caſion ſhould make it indiſpenſably neceſſary to ſend them a Reinforcement of Troops, they ſhall be ſent directly from Madras, and not from this Place. I do not mean this Motion to be taken into Conſideration now, but defer it till the Anſwer to the Letter ſhall be propoſed.

Warren Haſtings,
Rich[d] Barwell,
P. Francis,
Edw[d] Wheler.

APPENDIX, N° 67.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 6th July 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell, }
Philip Francis, } Eſquires.
Edward Wheler, }

Colonel Leſlie, 4th June.

READ the following Letter from Colonel Leſlie:

Gentlemen,

In my former Letters I had the Honour to acquaint you, that I deemed the Poſſeſſion of the Fort of Calpee neceſſary, both for ſecuring my Communication with the Kora Province, and enſuring the Accompliſhments of the Engagements the Maratta Chiefs of theſe Diſtricts had entered into with me. With this View I ſolicited the Orders of the Officer commanding the temporary Brigade, that I might employ ſuch Part of the Battalion of Sepoys, commanded by Captain Rawſterne, which was ſtationed in the Neighbourhood of Toonga, as this Service might require. He accordingly put Captain Rawſterne under my Command, and I have directed that Officer to take poſt at Kalpee, with ſuch Part of his Battalion as are not required with the Aumil, and to wait there my further Orders. I ſhall detain him there no longer than I may conceive the Poſſeſſion of the Fort neceſſary to the Service of the Expedition; and I hope to receive your Concurrence to this Meaſure.

I am ſorry to inform you of the Demiſe of Captain James Crawford, who commanded the 4th Battalion of Sepoys, who expired ſuddenly, the 3d Inſtant, of a violent Fever. His Character and Abilities as an Officer make him a ſevere Loſs to the Service in general, and to this Expedition in particular.

I have the Honour, &c. &c.
(Signed) Matt[w] Leſlie.

Head Quarters, Jelallpore,
9th June 1778.

The Governor General—As it appears from the Poſtſcript of a duplicate Letter received from Mr. Moſtyn, that he had "received the Paſſport from Madajee Scindia, which ſhould be immediately forwarded to Colonel Leſlie," and as it is poſſible that Colonel Leſlie may chuſe the Route of Malva, which appertains to the Jagheers of Madajee Scindia and Tuckajee Holkar, I muſt beg Leave to move, that poſitive Orders be ſent to Colonel Leslie, to march through the Province of Berar, and on no Account to take any other Road, unleſs he ſhall receive a direct and expreſs Refuſal from Moodajee Booſla, the Chief of Berar, to admit the Detachment within his Territories. As that Chief may be more ſafely truſted than any other Power, lying between this and the other Side of India, on account of the long and friendly Intercourſe which has ſubſiſted between his Family and this Government, and the Detachment will continue during a conſiderable Part of its Progreſs, within the Reach of our Orders for its Recall in caſe of Neceſſity, by its Line of March in that Route inclining to the Borders of Bengal, until it ſhall have reached the Center of Berar; but if it ſhould have proceeded by the Way of Malva it may be difficult to recall it before it ſhall have marched too far; this will be better underſtood by an Inſpection of the Map than by Words: As an additional Motive for this Propoſition, it is to be obſerved, that on the firſt Application to Moodajee Booſla, for Permiſſion to the Army to march through his Country, he not only expreſſed an inſtant Compliance, but wrote Letters immediately to Colonel Leſlie inviting him to come by the Way of his Country, and ſent a Perſon

erſon of Conſequence with a Military Eſcort to the Banks of the Nurbudda, which are the Borders f his Dominions, to receive and conduct the Detachment. With Madajee Scinda this Government as had no Connection, and he has been always repreſented as a Partizan of Nana Furnaſe, which may render his Offers ſuſpicious, although I have lately received a Letter from him, being the Firſt that he has written to me ſince I have been in this Government, containing Profeſſions and Overtures of Friendſhip.

Agreed to the Governor General's Motion: And,

Reſolved, That the following Letter be immediately written to Colonel Leſlie.

To Colonel Leſlie.

Sir,

By a Letter which we have juſt received from Mr. Moſtyn, we underſtand that he has procured and tranſmitted to you a Paſſport for the Detachment under your Command, to proceed through the Dominions of Madajee Scindia: As it is poſſible that this Circumſtance may have induced you to prefer the Route of Malva to that of Berar, we think it neceſſary to give you poſitive Injunctions to purſue your March through the Province of Berar, and by no Means to follow any other Road, unleſs you ſhall receive a direct and poſitive Refuſal from Moodajee Booſla, the Chief of that Diſtrict, to admit the Troops within his Territories, which, from the long and friendly Intercourſe ſubſiſting between us, and from the Intention of Compliance expreſſed in Letters from him, we cannot ſuppoſe will be the Caſe.

We are, &c.

Fort William,
6th July 1778.

Warren Haſtings,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 7th July 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler,
} Eſquires.

The Board think it proper, before they proceed any further in the Conſideration of this Buſineſs, to annul the Letter to Colonel Leſlie prepared Yeſterday and now laid before them for Signature, and to direct him, on the Grounds of the Information now received, to proceed with the Detachment under his Command to Berar, a Country on his Road to Bombay, which is at the ſame Time contiguous to Bengal, and convenient for the Return of the Troops, if it ſhould appear expedient to recall them for the Defence of the Provinces. The following Letters are therefore written to Colonel Leſlie, and ordered to be diſpatched to him this Evening by Expreſs Pattamars.

APPENDIX, N° 68.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 9th July 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler,
} Eſquires.

THE Governor General delivers in the following Minute:

I ſtate the War with France as a Fact of undoubted Certainty. It is the Part of this Government to conſider in what Manner it is likely to affect the Britiſh Poſſeſſions in India, and to provide accordingly for their Security. This muſt comprize and limit all our Operations. In the View of this opening Scene, the relative Conditions of the Parties engaged in it will merit our firſt Attention, and cannot fail to engage it by the ſtriking Contraſt which appears between them; and I men-

tion it becauſe I think it an eſſential Point in the Conſideration of our firſt and perhaps our firſt Meaſures.

Great as the Power is which the Britiſh Nation has acquired in India, compared with that of Rival, its general Line of Action is and muſt be purely defenſive: It can gain, the French l nothing. Even the Capture of Pondicherry, and of the other Poſſeſſions of the French, will yield poſitive Advantage to the Engliſh, although it will deprive the French of their Inſtruments of Att and thereby effect our own Safety.

From this Point therefore all our Concluſions muſt originate, and all our Meaſures be ſo laid obviate or to oppoſe the probable Deſigns of our Enemies. Their firſt Attempts will be a Bombay or Fort Saint George; Bengal will be their laſt, at leaſt their diſtant Object.

The Preſidency of Fort Saint George poſſeſſes in itſelf the complete Means of Defence: W can add nothing to them but in the Effects of our political Arrangements: We have already yie it a large Supply of Treaſure: It requires no other preſent Aid.

Bombay requires every Thing. Weak *in itſelf* and entangled rather than ſtrengthened by its diſ ſipated Poſſeſſions on the Continent, it can only defend itſelf againſt a direct Invaſion, and to th is perhaps equal if it has to contend with the French alone; but this is unlikely. The laſt Ad from Poona contain ſuch Evidence as the Event itſelf muſt ſoon refute or realize, of an Engag actually made by the French Miniſter there, to bring a large Military Force to Poona, proje deſigned to act with that Government againſt Ragoba, who at that Time reſided at Bombay under Engliſh Protection.

In effect this is the obvious Policy which the French ought to adopt if they ſeek to regain th Influence in India, and it is no longer to be doubted that they have adopted it. They have beſide an ancient Claim to the Alliance of Nizam Ally, which beſides is enforced by their accidental Uni in a common Cauſe, the Defence of the ruling Adminiſtration at Poona; of which his Letters to Mr. Rumbold and the Nabob of Arcot afford an undoubted Proof.

It is then certain that the French mean to eſtabliſh a firm Intereſt at Poona. It is probable th they will effect it. The Conſequences may be the Attack of Bombay, or without it the Re-union the vaſt Powers of the Maratta State under its preſent Government, ſtrengthened by ſo formidable Alliance and a prædatory War, brought by their united Forces into the Dominions of our Ally th Nabob of Owde, or even into the Heart of our own.

To guard againſt ſuch Conſequences ought, in my Opinion, to be our firſt Object, both f the immediate Defence of Bombay, and the future Security of Bengal. We cannot ſend Succou directly to Bombay. If Bombay ſhould be attacked by the French, unſupported by a Mara Alliance, I have already ſaid, that I hope its preſent Force is equal to its Defence; but if it ſhou be attacked, or in certain Danger of being attacked by the French and Marattas in Alliance, an Offenſive War muſt be undertaken in Defence of Bombay.

The Detachment under Colonel Laſhe may be employed in this Service. It can be ſpared wit out Danger to Bengal, which is ſecure from a preſent Invaſion, and can ſoon be replaced; but it conſiſts of a Force too inconſiderable to engage ſingly in ſuch a Conteſt, unleſs it can be aſſiſted b an Ally equal in Power, or ſo nearly equal to that of the Peſhwa, as to give our united Strengt a Degree of Superiority over the Combination to which it would be oppoſed; the Undertaking w be too hazardous. Moodajee Booſla, the Chief of Berar, anſwers to this Deſcription. His Fa mily has always borne a conſiderable Rank among the Powers of India. His Father, Rugoje ſubjected the Provinces of Bengal to the Chout, under the Government of the moſt able Ch that ever ruled them. His elder Brother, Innoagee, attacked and burnt the City of Poona, at Time when the Power of the Peſhwa far exceeded its preſent State, and the Maratta Confiſtor excepting Berar, was undivided. His Dominions extend from the Sea Coaſt of Oriſſa, and from th Weſtern Borders of Bengal to the Neighbourhood of Aurengabad. His Revenue, though no proportionate to their Magnitude, is conſiderable; and his ſtanding Forces are numerous, excluſive of the Militia, which in all the Maratta States is always ready to join their regular Armies wh they take the Field. While the Conteſt prevailed between Ragonaut Row and the Miniſteri Party, Moodajee ſided with the former; his Brother with the latter. This Conduct drew on hi the Reſentment of the Miniſters, who, as ſoon as they were freed by the Interpoſition of this Government from the Dread of their great Competitor, encouraged and ſupported the Nabob Nizam Ally Cawn in an Invaſion of his Country, which at that Time had not yet recovered from the Diſtractions occaſioned by the Contention between the Two Brothers. On this Occaſion he was glad to purchaſe a Peace of Nizam Ally Cawn, with the Loſs of ſome Forts of Conſequence, the Remembrance of which he ſtill retains, with a Determination to avail himſelf of the firſt Opportunity to reclaim them.

As the Provinces which are now united under the Government of Berar, are a conſtitutional Part of the Maratta Empire, a natural Enmity muſt ever ſubſiſt between thoſe who poſſeſs the Sovereign Authority, and the Rulers of Berar; the former looking to the Recovery of their unalienable Rights, the latter jealous of their Independency: Thus Moodajee may be conſidered as the certain Enemy of the Peſhwa into whatever Hands the fluctuating State of the Parties at Poona may throw his Adminiſtration; but a late Event has given Moodajee Pretenſions to a Rank even more elevated than that of the Peſhwa. I need not inform this Board that the Power which the Peſhwa's have poſſeſſed for about Forty Years paſt, is an Uſurpation on the Sovereign Authority veſted by the Conſtitution in the Rajah; Raja Saboo, the laſt who retained it, having no Children, adopted Moodajee Booſla, and as

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I am informed, deſigned him for his Succeſſor; but Ballajee the Peſhwa, or Prime Miniſter, had the Art to deprive Moodajee of the Benefit of the Intention, and to transfer the Inheritance to Ram Raja, who was alſo an adopted Son of Raja Saboo, and an Infant at his Death. Ragoogee, the Father of Moodajee, inſtantly marched to Poona with a formidable Army, and by a Negociation of a Day obtained, for a Surrender of his Son's actual Pretenſions, a large Acceſſion of Territory, and other Advantages, ſtill reſerving a future Claim to the Rajaſhip, and refuſing to commit himſelf by any formal Deed in an Acknowledgment of the Title of Ram Raja. From that Time the Grandeur of his Family may be dated. Ragojee continued to authenticate all his public Acts by the Name of Saboo Raja, and on the Seals which have been affixed to all the Letters which I have received from Shabajee Booſla, and even ſince his Death from his Brother Moodajee, they are ſtiled the Vaſſals of Saboo Rajah. I know not with Certainty what are Moodajee's preſent Views. Ram Raja died in December laſt, and the Succeſſion is either ſtill vacant, or but lately filled; Moodajee's Rights are ſtill in Force, and unqueſtionably ſuperior to any other.

I muſt ſuſpend the Thread of this Narrative to relate a Tranſaction which brings it nearer to the Concerns of this Government. An Alliance with the Booſla Family has been long its Object, and conſiderable Advances were made to the Attainment of it in the Adminiſtration of Lord Clive. In the latter End of the Year 1773 Shabajee Booſla ſent a Vackeel to me with Letters, containing general Profeſſions of Attachment, but expreſſed with ſuch Warmth as induced me to aim at a formal Connection with him. Finding the Vackeel an intelligent Man, I ſent him back furniſhed with a Plan for that Purpoſe. Unfortunately, Shabajee fell by the Hands of his Brother a little before the Vackeel's Return, and the Negociation dropped; but Moodajee himſelf ſoon after adopting his Brother's Line, again deputed the ſame Vackeel to Calcutta; but many Cauſes, which it is unneceſſary to enumerate, prevented me from improving the Diſpoſition of this Chief. A conſtant Intercourſe of Letters, and in ſome Degree confidential, has been kept up between us. On a falſe Rumour of the Death of Ramraja, foreſeeing the Uſe which might be made of this new Diverſion in the Maratta Policy, I employed the Agency of the Vackeel to excite the Ambition of Moodajee to aſpire to the ſovereign Authority; which ſuch an Event, then probable at leaſt, from the infirm State of the Raja, and the Diſtractions at Poona, ſeemed to preſent to him, and I intimated the ſame Advice in a Letter which I wrote at the ſame Time to Dewangur Pundit, the Miniſter of Moodajee Booſla, and the Man whoſe Counſels have long guided the Affairs of that Government. While theſe Letters were on their Way the Raja died. No Anſwers were given, for the Purport required none; but every Letter ſince received from Moodajee and his Dewan has repeatedly and urgently preſſed the Diſmiſſion of the Vackeel, for the Purpoſe, as expreſſed, of communicating with him on ſome Affairs of the greateſt Importance. The Vackeel is at this Time with Colonel Leſlie.

From theſe Facts, it will appear that Moodajee Booſla is by Intereſt and Inclination likely to join in an Alliance with this Government, and that Two Advantages may be offered to him as the Inducements to it. The Firſt is the Support of his Pretenſions to the ſovereign Power, the Second, the Recovery of the Captures made on his Dominions by Nizam Ally. On our Parts, we ſhall poſſeſs a powerful Barrier on our Frontier, an Alliance which may counterbalance, and if properly employed, may totally overthrow the preſent Power of the Maratta State, and give us a laſting Aſcendant in its Operations, and for ever diſſipate all the Deſigns which the French have at this Time ſo wiſely and hitherto ſucceſsfully concerted for their Aggrandizement and our Deſtruction. A more fortunate Concurrence of Circumſtances could ſcarcely have been conceived than thoſe which appear of themſelves to draw the Two States of Berar and Bengal into a decided and laſting Union by the powerful Bonds of common Intereſt and common Danger. The Poona Government is the natural Enemy of Moodajee. It is ours by their Connection with our natural and declared Enemy the French. Nizam Ally for the ſame Reaſon is the decided Adverſary of both; and the Contiguity of our reſpective Territories in the wildeſt and leaſt valuable Parts of both, and of courſe the leaſt ſubject to Competition and Incroachment, renders their Union important and eſſential to the Strength of both.

On theſe Grounds I recommend that a Company's Civil Servant be immediately deputed to Moodajee Booſla with full Powers to form a Treaty of Alliance between that Chief and the Company on the Terms herein above ſtated. Theſe may be hereafter detailed in his Inſtructions.

The Governor General—It was my Intention, had the Time permitted it, to have extended the above Minute into other Details, immediately required for the internal Defence of theſe Provinces. I can now only ſtate thoſe which are moſt urgent in ſhort Propoſitions. The Reaſons, if neceſſary, may be given ſeparately.

Firſt, I propoſe that Three additional Battalions of Sepoys be immediately formed upon the Plan recommended by General Stibbert.

Secondly, That Raja Cheyt Sing be required in Form to contribute his Share of the Burthen of the preſent War, by conſenting to the Eſtabliſhment of Three regular Battalions of Sepoys, to be raiſed and maintained at his Expence.

Thirdly, That the Militia Corps be re-eſtabliſhed for the Defence of the City of Calcutta; and for this Purpoſe, if it ſhall be found neceſſary hereafter, I would further recommend, that the Commiſſioner of Law Suits, with the Aſſiſtance of the Company's Attorney and Standing Council, be inſtructed to prepare a Bill for its legal Incorporation.

Fourthly, That the Maſter Attendant be directed to conſult four of the moſt able Seamen of this Port upon the Means of forming ſuch an Addition to our Marine Eſtabliſhment as may be moſt effectual for the Communication of immediate Intelligence of the Approach of an Enemy's Fleet or

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ſingle Ships of War, and for cutting away the Buoys, and uſing ſuch other Precautions as may be neceſſary for guarding this Port and its Commerce againſt the Effects of a Surprize.

Fifthly, That the Opinion of the Chief Engineer be alſo taken with reſpect to the other Means which may be neceſſary to prevent or impede the Progreſs of an Enemy by the Entrance of the River.

Sixthly, That the Commander in Chief be requeſted to furniſh the Board with ſuch a general Plan of Defence as he ſhall judge neceſſary, in Addition to the preſent Diſpoſition of our Army, and in the Suppoſition that the Detachment now employed under Colonel Leſlie may not return for a Length of Time into the Provinces; and to attend the Board with it when prepared.

Seventhly, The Propoſitions with which I ſhall now conclude I offer with much Diffidence and Heſitation: it has been the conſtant Subject of my Thoughts ſince our laſt Meeting; and though I now incline to recommend it, I ſee the Objections to it in a ſtrong Light, as added perhaps to thoſe which may be ſuggeſted by other Members of the Board may induce me to change it; but I will briefly ſtate it. The War having been notified to us, though not by Authority, yet confirmed by Evidence of ſuch Strength as to amount to a Degree of Certainty next to abſolute, ſhall we proceed upon it as upon the Grounds of a War declared and notified in all its Forms? or ſhall we wait the Confirmation of it, which it is probable we may not receive for this Month or Six Weeks yet to come? The Conſequence of our Determination on this Queſtion, if in the Affirmative, will be inſtantly to detach a Military Force to guard the Approaches of Chandernagore, to demand the Surrender of that Town, and to appoint Commiſſaries to take Poſſeſſion of the public Stores, Shipping, and private Effects of the Inhabitants. This combined Queſtion I propoſe for the Determination of the Board.

The Firſt Queſtion being conſidered is agreed to. Ordered, That the Secretary to the Military Department do prepare and lay before the Board an Eſtimate of the Expence of the above Augmentation, and of that which will ariſe from the Increaſe of Men to the preſent Eſtabliſhment lately ordered in the Military Department.

The Second Queſtion conſidered.

Mr. Francis—On the Suppoſition that the Detachment now employed under Colonel Leſlie will not return for a Length of Time into the Provinces, I acquieſce in the Propoſal relative to Raja Cheyt Sing; but I think he ſhould be informed, that this additional Charge will not be impoſed on him beyond the Continuance of the preſent War.

The Governor General—The Qualification propoſed by Mr. Francis, is conſonant to my Intention in the Queſtion, and is implied in it; I ſhould have no Objection to its being expreſſed in an additional Clauſe: That our Reſolution upon this Subject may be unanimous, I agreed to add to the Queſtion the following Words, "and to be diſbanded at the End of the War;" but perceiving that the Difference in our Opinions upon the Subject ariſes not from a Diſagreement reſpecting the Requiſition ſimply conſidered by itſelf, but from a different Underſtanding of the Right of the Company, to exact under any Preſſure of Affairs more than the Sum ſtipulated by the Sunnud granted to Cheyt Sing, and the Pubbooleat given by him in Return, I muſt adhere to the Queſtion as it ſtands, wiſhing to avoid the Queſtion of Right; if however we cannot agree upon this Point, ſtill I would wiſh to have the Requiſition made in the Words of the Queſtion, and leave the Deciſion of future Right to our Superiors.

Mr. Wheler—Wiſhing to avoid the Queſtion of Right, I acquieſce in the Motion; but I think it ſhould be qualified in the Manner propoſed by Mr. Francis.

Mr. Bazwell—An Acquiſition of Revenue and Military Force I ſuppoſe to have been annexed to the Grant of the Zemindarry of Benares and Gauzipore to the Company; any Military Eſtabliſhment, independant of the Engliſh Adminiſtration, in the Heart of the Company's Dominions, may, in the Time of Danger, be turned againſt thoſe Intereſts which under another Policy it would protect. I have long regarded the Military Eſtabliſhment of Benares under the Rajah's native Officers, and not ſubject to the Diſcipline, Command, and Regulation, of our own Battalions, as a Defect: I therefore moſt heartily agree to the preſent Propoſal for Three diſciplined Battalions to be kept up, and paid by, the Rajah; and ſincerely hope the Company will direct, that the whole Force of Benares and Gauzipore under the Zemindar be placed upon the ſame Footing as the regular Military Force of the Preſidency.

The Governor General—I agree to the Queſtion in the original Terms of it, deeming it a Right inherent in every Government to impoſe ſuch Aſſeſſments as it judges expedient for the common Service and Protection of all its Subjects, and we are not precluded from it by any Agreement ſubſiſting between the Raja and this Government.

Reſolved, That Raja Cheyt Sing be required in Form to contribute his Share of the Burthen of the preſent War, by the Eſtabliſhment of Three regular Battalions of Sepoys, to be raiſed and maintained at his Expence; and the Governor General is requeſted to write to him to that Effect.

The Board agree to the Third Queſtion.

To the Fourth agreed. } Orders are accordingly iſſued by the Secretary.
Agreed to the Fifth. }
To the Sixth agreed.

APPENDIX, N° 69.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 11th July 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Eſquire, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler,
} Eſquires.

MR. Francis—In Addition to the Reſolutions already taken, and in Reply to the Governor General's Motion introduced Yeſterday, I ſhall ſtate my Opinion of the farther Meaſures which we ought to purſue in the preſent Juncture, as briefly and as clearly as poſſible; declaring at the ſame Time that I do not mean either to ſupport my own Opinion, or to oppoſe that of any other Member, by a Controverſy, which at this Time can have no good Effect.

1ſt. I am unalterably of Opinion that the Detachment under Colonel Leſlie ſhould be immediately recalled within the Provinces, becauſe I think that the Security of Bengal is the firſt and moſt eſſential of all Objects to this Government: As ſuch the Company have invariably conſidered it. I will quote one Paſſage, out of a Multitude that might be found in the Letters from the Court of Directors, to ſhew how ſtrongly they have inculcated this Object, and made it the Baſis of their whole political Syſtem in India. In a Letter to Fort Saint George, dated the 17th March 1769, they ſay, "The Preſervation of our preſent Influence in the Bengal Provinces is the great "Object of our Attention. All political Connections in the reſt of India are only important as they "may affect us there.

"Every Acceſſion of Influence or Poſſeſſion elſewhere, which by dividing our Troops may prevent "the Exertion of our whole Force, in caſe we ſhould be attacked in that Quarter, is hazarding a "Subſtance for a Shadow."

Admitting a Suppoſition, that the firſt Attempts of the French may be made in another Part of India, which can only be Matter of Conjecture, ſtill I think we are bound, by every Rule of Policy and Prudence, to make our principal Preparations of Defence in that Quarter where our moſt eſſential Intereſts are at ſtake. Conſidering the extenſive Frontier we have now to guard, I cannot think that Bengal is in a State of Defence, much leſs of Security, while the Force under Colonel Leſlie is engaged in any diſtant Operations.

2d. I think the Preſidency of Bombay ſhould be directed to make ſome Conceſſions to the Miniſterial Party at Poona, and to endeavour to come to an Accommodation with them as ſoon as poſſible. If we were to relinquiſh every one of the Points which have been in Diſpute between us ſince the Concluſion of the Treaty, we ſhould neither give up any Thing that originally belonged to us, nor indeed any Thing that is worth our keeping. Territorial Acquiſitions on that Side of India, are inconſiſtent with the Company's true Intereſt, and no leſs contrary to their avowed fundamental Policy. When we ſee that even their favourite Acquiſition of Salſette is attended with an Annual Loſs of 1,40,849 Rupees; that is, that the Expences of maintaining the different Eſtabliſhments there exceed the Revenues of the Iſland by ſo great a Sum; we ought, I think, to be deterred by this deciſive Experiment from wiſhing to gain more in that Part of India, or even to keep a great Part of what we have gained.

By purſuing even now a Plan of Moderation with the Marattas, we ſhall probably take the moſt effectual Courſe for defeating the Deſigns of the French, and inducing the Marattas to relinquiſh any Engagements they may have formed with them. To introduce a European Army, either French or Engliſh, into their Country, can never be a Meaſure of Choice with the Poona Government, much leſs can they be urged by any thing but Neceſſity to make their Country the Seat of War.

At the ſame Time that we ſend theſe Inſtructions to Bombay, I think that at all Events it might be adviſable to ſend them a Reinforcement of Two or Three Battalions of Sepoys, but they ſhould go from Madras, and be replaced from hence if neceſſary. The whole Force of Bombay, in my Opinion, ſhould be employed upon a defenſive Plan only, to which with the above Reinforcement it will be adequate; that is, to the Defence of Bombay, Salſette, and the Iſlands and Poſts immediately adjacent; for as to the Acquiſitions of Territory made by the late Treaty, in the ſuppoſed Caſe of their being attacked by the united Force of the French and of the Marattas, I would not think of defending them. For this Opinion I cannot aſſign a ſtronger Reaſon than that with which the Governor's Minute furniſhes me; viz. that "Bombay is weak in itſelf, and entangled rather than "ſtrengthened by its diſſipated Poſſeſſions on the Continent, and that it can only defend itſelf againſt "a direct Invaſion."

3d. If by undertaking an offenſive War in Defence of Bombay it be meant to continue the March of Colonel Leſlie's Detachment from our Frontier to Poona, I am entirely againſt it. I need not

repeat the Reaſons I have ſo often urged for this Opinion, but I will ſtate one which has not yet been mentioned: Admitting that the French may have intended to begin their Operations on the Malabar Coaſt, it is not unlikely that, when they ſhall have heard of our having ſtripped Bengal of ſo conſiderable a Part of its Defence, they may ſuddenly turn their Views this Way: At all Events I do not think that Detachment can be ſpared without Danger to Bengal.

If a Treaty of Peace and Alliance can be formed with Moodajee Booſla, on the uſual Terms, of having the ſame Friends and the ſame Enemies (which we may interpret and uſe hereafter as we think fit) ſome Advantage may be made of it; but I cannot think that his Friendſhip, or that of any Maratta Chief, is worth purchaſing at the Expence of ſuch Engagements as are proposed to be offered to him; viz. "to ſupport his Pretenſions to this ſovereign Power of the Maratta State, and the "Recovery of the Captures made on his Dominions by Nizam Ally." I know not whither ſuch Engagements may lead the Company's Arms, or how long they may implicate us in the political Conteſts of the Country Powers. Our general Line of Action is and muſt be purely defenſive: The Inſtructions we have given to the Preſidency of Fort Saint George to cultivate the Friendſhip of Hyder Ally are formed on this Principle, and it makes Part of the Company's fundamental Policy, repeatedly inculcated in their Inſtructions to their Servants, to avoid becoming Parties in any Diſputes between the Powers of India. On One particular Occaſion they have gone ſo far as to ſay, "that this Rage for Negociations, Treaties, and Alliances, has private Advantage more for its Object than the Public Good." This Remark is not meant to be applied to the Propoſal before us, but it ſhews the general Senſe the Company entertain of Treaties and Alliances with the Country Powers.

(Signed) P. F.

The Governor General—I ſhould be very unwilling to anſwer the above Minute under the painful Impreſſion which it has laid upon my Mind, and indeed I hope it will be altogether unneceſſary, as it conſiſts (excepting one diſtinct Propoſition) of Points of mere Controverſy, upon which every thing has already been ſaid that can be ſaid on both Sides of the Queſtion; and it is yet my ſincere and anxious Hope, that whatever Differences of Opinion may ſubſiſt on Subjects long agitated, or which may not reſpect the new State of our Affairs, our Reſolutions reſpecting every Meaſure for the Defence of the national Poſſeſſions in India may be unanimous, and our Meaſures poſſeſs that Degree of Vigour and Conſiſtency, which they can only derive from a cordial, a temperate, and a confidential Communication of Opinions. One ſingle Obſervation I ſhall make upon Mr. Francis's Minute, becauſe it applies to the eſſential Part of his Objections; namely, That the Meaſure which I have propoſed is formed on Grounds purely defenſive: Though it ſhould lead to offenſive Operations, its Objects are the immediate Preſervation of Bengal, and the Protection of theſe the moſt valuable Parts of the Britiſh Poſſeſſions in India from an Invaſion not very diſtant, if we confine all our Operations within the Boundaries of our Dominions and of our Ally the Nabob of Owde. There is One Propoſition contained in Mr. Francis's Minute which will merit the Conſideration of the Board; and although I fear that it is too late, ſince the Engagements between the Adminiſtration at Poona and the French Miniſter have been carried to too great Lengths to admit of their retracting on either Side, it may yet be given in Inſtruction to the Preſidency of Bombay, but it ought not to be the Motive for a Suſpenſion of any ſingle Meaſure which will be neceſſary for the Support of the general Intereſts of the Company committed to our Charge, on the Suppoſition that theſe Engagements have already taken place. I beg Leave to add One more Obſervation, ſuggeſted by Mr. Francis's Minute, and encouraged by the candid Declaration with which it is introduced. It is undoubtedly the Duty of every Member of this Board to contribute his Sentiments on all Affairs, but more eſpecially on ſuch as thoſe at preſent under our Conſideration; but I preſume to offer it as my Opinion, that it is equally the Duty of every Member of the Board to afford his utmoſt Aſſiſtance to the Execution and Succeſs of every Meaſure that has ever been adopted, although originally paſſed againſt his Judgment, and to proſecute it with the ſame Ardour as if it had received his primary Concurrence. I hope it is needleſs to purſue this Subject: I will leave Mr. Francis the Advantage of an undiſputed Ground in the many Objections forcibly ſtated in his Minute, rather than contribute to diſturb the Temper of our Councils by a Debate which can produce no good Effect but that of perſonal Vindication.

Now give me Leave to recall the Attention of the Board to the Subject regularly before it. The Queſtion in brief is, Shall Negociations be undertaken for a Treaty of Alliance with the Rajah of Berar? An Affirmative or Negative is all that is now neceſſary. The Conditions of this Alliance will be the proper Subject of a future Debate, and will be contained in the Inſtructions to be given to the Perſon who will be employed in the Commiſſion for conducting the Negociation. I ſhall prepare them without Delay.

Mr. Wheler—I think it abſolutely neceſſary, before I give my Affirmative or Negative, that I ſhould know the Extent and Nature of the Treaty, which the Governor General propoſes to form with the Rajah of Berar, and I am the more deſirous of an Explanation on this Head from the Queſtion being now ſtripped of that Introduction which preceded it in the Governor's former Motion, and which I fear I cannot aſſent to.

Mr. Francis—I agree with Mr. Wheler.

Mr. Barwell—I agree to the Propoſition. When the Objects of the Treaty come under Conſideration,

ſideration, I ſhall give my Affirmative only to ſuch Points as may be advantageous and uſeful to this Government.

Reſolved, that Negociations be undertaken for a Treaty of Alliance with Moodajee Booſla, the Rajah of Berar.

The Governor General—I beg Leave to recommend Mr. Alexander Kynynnround Elliott to be employed on this Commiſſion. Independantly of the perſonal Confidence of which from long Experience I think him worthy, I have made choice of Mr. Elliott for this Service, on account of his intimate Knowledge of the political State of this Government, in relation to the other Powers of the Country; having given him, under the preſcribed Oath of Secrecy, an early and continued Acceſs to the Official Records of this Department, and employed him in an eſpecial Manner in all my Communications with the Government of Berar, ſince his Return to Bengal. I flatter myſelf that his general Abilities, and the Qualifications which he poſſeſſes for a Truſt of this Kind, will not need my Recommendation of him to the Members of this Board.

Reſolved, that Mr. Elliott be accordingly appointed the Miniſter and public Agent of this Government at the Court of Moodajee Booſla, Rajah of Berar, for the Purpoſe of negociating a Treaty of Alliance with that Chief.

APPENDIX, N° 70.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 18th July 1778.

THE Governor General lays before the Board Inſtructions for Mr. Elliott, which are as follow; viz.

Copy of Inſtructions to Mr. Alexander K. Elliott.

We hereby appoint you our Agent and Miniſter, and inveſt you with full Powers to negociate and to conclude a Treaty with Moodajee Booſla, the Rajah of Berar, or the Rajah for the Time being; and that you may be completely enabled to accompliſh our Intentions in this Commiſſion, we give you the following Inſtructions, leaving it to your Diſcretion to effect them in any Mode which your Judgment, formed on the actual State of that Government, and the Intelligence which you ſhall receive concerning the neighbouring States, and from the Preſidency of Bombay, ſhall ſuggeſt; and to agree to ſuch other Conditions as are not expreſſed in theſe Inſtructions, but ſhall be conformable to their general Tenor, or not contrary to them; and you are to obſerve this Diſtinction in the Articles of Agreement which you ſhall conclude with the Rajah of Berar; viz. That although all are to be, and we hereby declare that they ſhall be, immediately binding on this Government, and on every other of the Company's Preſidencies, yet ſuch as are in their Nature permanent muſt be referred to us for their Confirmation; but ſuch as are intended for preſent or temporary Purpoſes, are to be carried into Execution without waiting for our Sanction, and ſhall be equally binding as if they had received our ſpecific Ratification.

Firſt, It is our firſt Deſire to eſtabliſh a perpetual Alliance with the Government of Berar on the Terms of mutual Defence: To accompliſh ſuch a Connection, it muſt be conſtituted on Principles of mutual Intereſt and mutual Confidence; theſe Principles you muſt make the Ground-work of your Negociation in every Part and Stage of it, taking eſpecial Care that the Demand for our Aſſiſtance, and its Duration, ſhall be optional in the Ruler of Berar; that it may be inſtantly yielded, and that the Proviſion made for it be ſo guarded as to preclude the Dependants of this Government, to whoſe Conduct the Execution of this Part of the Treaty may be committed, from acquiring an undue Influence, or exerciſing any Kind of Authority in the Countries belonging to our Ally.

On the Principles thus premiſed the following Stipulations may be formed:

1ſt. That there ſhall be a perpetual Alliance of Friendſhip between the Engliſh Eaſt India Company and the Rajah of Berar and his Succeſſors, each Party ſolemnly engaging to regard the Friends of the one as the Friends of the other, and the Enemies of the one as the Enemies of the other; and that this Condition ſhall ſubſiſt independantly of all others in this Treaty:

2d. That a certain Force, conſiſting of Battalions of Sepoys, to which may be added a Corps of Native Artillery, be ſtationed in ſome convenient Place within our own Frontier, and in the Neighbourhood of his, to be always ready for inſtant Motion on a Requiſition in Writing from him, and for any Military Service which he may preſcribe within the Line of his Dominions, but not to paſs beyond it.

That for the Maintenance of this Corps a Monthly Subſidy be fixed, equal to their probable Expence; that is to ſay, for each Battalion of Sepoys in Quarters 10,000 Rupees per Month, and in the Field 13,000 Rupees; and for a Company of native Artillery in Quarters 4,000 Rupees, in

the Field 5,000 Rupees; that ſuch regular and aſſured Funds ſhall be aſſigned for the Subſidy as may prevent future Diſagreements on this Subject, and not leave it in his Power to withhold it.

That each Party ſhall be at Liberty to cancel this Engagement whenever it ſhall be judged inconvenient to their reſpective Intereſts, or incompatible with their Means, or to propoſe a Reduction of the Force, but not of the proportionate Rate of Subſidy for the Remainder, giving One Year's previous Notice.

3dly. That if at any Time it ſhall be neceſſary to require the Aſſiſtance of a Body of Cavalry for the Defence of Bengal, the Raja ſhall engage to afford the ſame within Two Months after the Requiſition made to him for any Force not exceeding 10,000 Horſe of the fixed Eſtabliſhment of his Sircar; their Pay, Diſcipline, and internal Command to remain ſubject to their own Officers, but the general Command ſubject to the Officer commanding the Engliſh Forces acting in junction with them; their Pay to be defrayed by the Company at a ſtipulated Rate for each Rank, from the Day on which they ſhall enter the Borders of Bengal, until the Time requiſite for their Departure from the ſame, eſtimated by daily Marches of Five Coſs from the Day of their Diſmiſſion. In the Clauſe reſpecting this Article, Care muſt be taken to diſtinguiſh the Cavalry of the Regular and preſent Eſtabliſhment from the Native Militia and Infantry of every Denomination; which muſt be totally excluded from compoſing any Part of the ſtipulated Aid; their Occupation, and all their Operations, conſiſting ſolely in Plunder. Although this Article is propoſed to complete the Syſtem of reciprocal Defence, yet if the Raja ſhall object to it, we do not regard it as an indiſpenſable Clauſe, but you may make a Merit of receding from our Claim to it.

Such are our Ideas of the general Limitations which ſhould be preſcribed for a defenſive Alliance, and we direct you to make them the Subject of your firſt Propoſitions, allowing you to change or qualify, or add to them, in any Manner which in the Courſe of your Negociation you ſhall judge fitting; provided ſuch Alterations be ſtrictly conſonant to the Principles which we have dictated as eſſential to it.

When you ſhall have mutually agreed on the Plan of propoſed Treaty, you muſt tranſmit it to us for our Confirmation or Correction, according to the Diſtinction which we have laid down in the introductory Part of theſe Inſtructions.

Second. But as it may be neceſſary to enter upon an immediate Train of active and offenſive Operations with the Aſſiſtance of Moodajee Booſla, if it can be obtained, we ſhall proceed to give you ſuch Inſtructions as may be proper for that Effect; firſt explaining the Object of our Views, and ſtating the Grounds of our Expectations from Moodajee Booſla.

By conſecutive Intelligence received from the Preſidency of Bombay, and from their Miniſter at the Court of Poona, it appears that the Chevalier St. Lubin, an Agent deputed from the Court of France, has entered into an Engagement with the ruling Members of the Maratta State, to bring a large European Force, and a Proportion of Military Stores to Poona, to be employed in their Service, or, as we may conclude, in promoting the reciprocal Advantages of the French and Maratta Nations.

War having been lately declared between Great Britain and France, it is not to be doubted, that the Preſidency of Bombay will feel the firſt Effects of this Combination; the Capture of that Place by the French, and the Recovery of the Iſland of Salſette, and the Diſtricts poſſeſſed by the Government of Bombay on the Continent, rendering ſuch an Enterprize equally eſſential to the Intereſts and Views of both. We conceive alſo, that although ſuch may be their immediate Deſign, and we are warned by the Court of Directors to expect, that the firſt Attempt of the French will be on Bombay, yet we believe, that the Principle of their Union looks to Deſigns of much greater Conſequence, though yet remote, and may affect the Peace and Safety of theſe Provinces. An early Apprehenſion of theſe Effects induced us to authorize the Preſident and Council of Bombay to carry into Execution a Plan which was propoſed to them in the Month of December laſt, by a Party formed among the Principal Members of the Maratta Government, to exclude Nana Furneſs from the Chief Authority which he then poſſeſſed, and to reſtore Ragonaut Row to the Place which he formerly held in the Adminiſtration: And for the ſame Purpoſe, the Detachment under Colonel Leſlie, which is now on its March towards Berar, was formed. The Deſign failed: A Change was effected by Means in which neither the Preſidency of Bombay nor Ragonaut Row had any Share. Nana Furneſs was divеſted of Authority; but was ſoon afterwards re-admitted into the Adminiſtration, which has ſince conſiſted of Saccaram Babboo, Morabа Furneſs, and Nanah Furneſs. Theſe Miniſters appear to have been all united in the Reſolution of oppoſing the Pretenſions of Ragonaut Row. He has now no Party left among the Marattas with whoſe Aid he could venture to aſſert them; nor under any Circumſtances could that Preſidency now afford him their Aſſiſtance, without departing from the immediate Care of their own Safety. Thus deprived of the Reſource on which we depended in the Partizans of Ragonaut Row, deeming it indiſpenſably neceſſary to prevent, or to counteract the Deſigns which may have been projected by the Miniſters and the French in their Alliance, and too hazardous to allow the Detachment to proceed on its firſt Deſtination without the Support of a Powerful Alliance; we are therefore deſirous of joining our Forces and our Intereſts with thoſe of Moodajee Booſla, for effecting that Purpoſe, or others more conducive to the Ends of it.

Our Reaſons for giving this Preference to Moodajee Booſla, and our Expectations of finding him well diſpoſed to enter heartily into our Views, are briefly theſe: His Dominions lie between Bengal and the Dependencies of the Peſhwa, and border on both: A natural Jealouſy has ever ſubſiſted

ſubſiſted between his Family and the Government of Poona. This has been heightened into a confirmed Animoſity by Acts of mutual Violence. He has ſtrong Pretenſions, if not an abſolute legal Right to the Succeſſion of the Rauje or Sovereign Authority of the Maratta State, vacant by the Death of the late Ram Raja; and the Nabob Nizam Ally Cawn, who has always been connected with the French, and is now in cloſe Union with the Miniſters of Poona, is from his Situation the natural Enemy of the Government of Berar, and perſonally that of Moodajee.

Although we have no Doubts either of the Engagements which are ſaid to exiſt between the Miniſters of Poona and the Chevalier St. Lubin, or of the Inability of the Preſidency of Bombay to engage in any new Undertaking for the Reſtoration of Ragonaut Row; yet theſe are Facts on which we wiſh you to obtain the moſt certain Knowledge, as you muſt be guided entirely by them in the Line of your Negociations.

As there is a conſtant Intercourſe between the Courts of Naugpore and Poona, you will not find it difficult to learn the actual State of Affairs at the latter; and that you may be leſs liable to Diſappointment or Deception, we ſhall give Directions to Mr. Moſtyn to keep up a conſtant Correſpondence with you, and to inform you of the moſt ſecret Tranſactions of that Adminiſtration during your Continuance at Naugpore.

If from his Advices or the Information you can collect on the Spot, you are aſſured that the Preſidency of Bombay have not entered into any new Engagements, either with Ragonaut Row or any other Party among the Marattas, which may claſh with the Tenor of the following Inſtructions; if you ſhall at the ſame Time underſtand either that a French Force is actually arrived at Poona, or is expected, or that the Chevalier St. Lubin is ſtill there; or if you are convinced from other Circumſtances of the Exiſtence of the Engagements which we ſuppoſe to have been formed between him and the Miniſters, or even if no Circumſtance ſhall have come to your Knowledge that may afford you Cauſe to doubt it; in theſe Caſes we authoriſe you to make an Offer to Moodajee Booſla, to unite with him in a direct and open War with the Miniſterial Party at Poona; and we give you a full and abſolute Diſcretion to concert with him ſuch a Plan for conducting the ſame as you ſhall judge moſt conducive to the Ends which we propoſe from it, and to which your whole Attention muſt be directed; namely, to defeat the Combination of the French and Marattas, to prevent the latter from aſſiſting the French in their Deſigns on Bombay; and further, if it can be effected, to eſtabliſh ſuch an Intereſt and Connection between our Government and that of the Marattas, as may enſure the future Support and Aſſiſtance of the Maratta State againſt the French, or any other Power that may be in Enmity with us.

But if you ſhall have Reaſon to believe that the Preſidency of Bombay have commenced any Negociation or entered into any Engagements either for the firm Eſtabliſhment of Peace with the Poona Miniſtry, or for the Reſtoration of Ragonaut Row, or for any other Purpoſe which may prove incompatible with the Operations which we have above authorized; you will in ſuch Caſe ſuſpend your Negociations until you ſhall have received authentic Information, either from Mr. Moſtyn or the Preſidency of Bombay, of the Nature of the Engagements either projected or executed by them; and you will ſo conduct yourſelf as to conform to their Meaſures if you can conſiſtently with the prior Attention which you will give to our Views; or at leaſt not to engage in any offenſive Plan which ſhall be contrary to that of the Preſidency of Bombay. Remembering that a defenſive Alliance with Moodajee Booſla being the permanent Object of your Commiſſion, you are to ſuffer no Conſideration whatever to divert you from that Object but the Refuſal or Inability of Moodajee Booſla to accede to it, or the Safety of Bombay rendering it impracticable.

You are to obſerve that the Treaty at preſent ſubſiſting between the Company and the Peſhwa, even admitted to be in its fulleſt Force, can by no Conſtruction affect our Connection with the Government of Berar, which we not only regard as poſſeſſed of a ſovereign and independant Power in Fact, but we have a Right to deem it ſuch with the Poona Government from the Teſtimony of the Miniſters themſelves, who on a Requiſition made by Colonel Upton on the Part of this Government, that Moodajee Booſla ſhould ſubſcribe to the Treaty, excuſed themſelves by declaring in effect though not in expreſs Terms, that they had no Right or Power to compel him.

And if you ſhall receive any Aſſurances from the Preſidency of Bombay, or from Mr. Moſtyn, that the Engagements between the French and the Miniſters are diſſolved, and that the latter do not entertain any Deſigns hoſtile to the Poſſeſſions of the Eaſt India Company, you muſt in that Caſe regard the Treaty between the Company and the Peſhwa as poſſeſſing full Force, and abſtain from any poſitive Engagement with Moodajee Booſla which may be contrary to it; but this, as we have already obſerved, muſt not prevent you from concluding any Engagement with him of a defenſive Kind, or even of an offenſive, with reſpect to other Powers or States who are not under their Subjection: Even in the Caſe thus ſuppoſed, it will be no Breach of our Faith with them to agree to ſtation an Engliſh Force near the Weſtern Borders of Berar; and we even recommend it as a Guard upon their Fidelity, and as a ready Means of counteracting any Attemps which they may make in Violation of it.

Having deſcribed the Ends which we propoſe to derive to the Company from an offenſive Alliance with Moodajee Booſla, we ſhall next proceed to thoſe which he may reaſonably expect in Return; for we cannot ſuppoſe that he will hazard the Peace of his own Government without Proſpect of ſome Advantage adequate to the Riſque, nor could we rely equally on his Engagements unleſs his Intereſt,

by being involved in them, were made a Pledge for his Sincerity and Zeal in the Performance of them.

The Points which appear to us the moſt likely to excite his Ambition, are the Aſſertion of his Pretenſions to the Inheritance of Ram Raja, and the Recovery of the Conqueſts which have been made from his Country by Nizam Ally.

The latter is a more diſtant Object, and at this Moment appears to us foreign from our preſent Intereſts: You may receive any Propoſitions which he may make to you upon this Subject; you may treat upon them; but you muſt refer them to us for Concluſion, unleſs he ſhall require it as an indiſpenſable Condition of his forwarding our Views in the Weſtern Part of India, and even in that Caſe your Engagements muſt be confined to the Places originally appertaining to the Government of Berar, and wreſted from it ſince the Death of Iannove. We are not unaware at the ſame Time of the Probability of our being called upon immediately to oppoſe the French in the Dominions of Nizam Ally, ſhould he openly and avowedly join the French, or ſhould he join the Miniſterial Party at Poona in declared Alliance with the French.

We authorize you to agree to ſuch Terms as may be propoſed by the Rajah of Berar, if you ſhall be perſuaded that the Execution of them will tend to the Accompliſhment of our Views in Oppoſition to the Schemes and Intereſts of our Enemies the French, and in ſuch Caſe you are authorized to fulfil your Part of the Agreement without waiting for our Sanction.

With reſpect to the former, if from the State of Moodajee's Forces, his Reſources and Connections, compared with thoſe of the Miniſters of Poona, you ſhall be clearly of Opinion that the Chances of Succeſs are conſiderably on his Side, and he ſhall require our Aſſiſtance in the Undertaking; we empower and direct you to enter into an expreſs Treaty to that Effect.

The Conditions which may be required for our Participation in an Enterprize of ſuch Magnitude muſt of Neceſſity be left to your Judgment, both in the Choice and Mode of ſecuring them. Our immediate Ends will be effectually anſwered by it, if it is attended with no other Effect than the Excluſion of the French Influence from the Maratta State, and the Introduction of our own in its Stead. But the poſitive Advantages, if it ſucceeds, will be all on his Side, and theſe will therefore, at leaſt entitle us to ſome Return, beſides the Proviſion effected by it, of Security from future Contingencies.

The Reimburſement of our Charges in this Expedition, from its Commencement to the Period of its Return, to our own Frontier, or of a Sum ſuppoſed equivalent to them, ought to be made the firſt Stipulation.

The Confirmation of the Ceſſions made to the Preſidency of Bombay by Ragonaut Row and Futty Sing Gaycwar, and to this Government, by the Peſhwa in the Treaty of Poorundur, may be demanded.

On this Subject you will receive as Inſtructions, whatever may be written to you by the Preſident and Council of Bombay, but exerciſe your Diſcretion in the Execution of them. In the mean Time the Secretary will furniſh you with Extracts of ſuch Parts of our Letters to the Preſidency of Bombay as have a Relation to this Subject, and from them you will take the general Line of your Conduct reſpecting it.

On this Side India we deſire no Acceſſion of Territory, but ſhall prefer the Improvement of our Connection with Moodajee Booſla on the Footing propoſed in the firſt Part of theſe Inſtructions to any other Stipulations.

As ſoon as you have agreed to the Plan of Military Operations to be undertaken by our Forces in Alliance with thoſe of Moodajee Booſla, you will give due Notice thereof to Colonel Leſlie, or the Officer who ſhall be in the Command of the Detachment now under his Orders, that he may carry his Part of it into Execution. To this Effect Orders will be written to Colonel Leſlie, who has our preſent Directions to continue his March till he ſhall have entered the Province of Berar, and to remain there; you will alſo give immediate Advice to the Preſidency of Bombay of the Treaty when concluded, tranſmitting Extracts of ſuch Parts as have any Relation to them, or a Copy of the Whole, unleſs it ſhall contain any Matters which may require immediate Secrecy.

We think it proper to caution you againſt encouraging any Propoſals from Moodajee, to take a Part in any Deſigns which he may entertain to the Prejudice of his Brother Bimbajee, and againſt any Interference in the Competitions of his Family.

To obviate any Miſconception of the Extent of your Commiſſion, we think it proper to explain that we do not mean to continue it to the Perſon of Moodajee Booſla, nor to the local Juriſdiction of Berar; but that it extends to his Succeſſor in the Event of his Death, or any Change in his Government before or during the Courſe of your Negociation, and to the Government dependant on him or his Succeſſors under any Change or Augmentation of it.

You will correſpond with Colonel Leſlie, or the Officer in command of the Detachment now under his Charge, concerting with him ſuch Meaſures as you may think neceſſary for the Succeſs of your Negociation, or the Safety of the Company's Poſſeſſions, and conſulting him on any Points of Information which you may require concerning the State of the Country he may paſs through, or the Views, Forces, and Circumſtances of the different Chiefs who govern it.

We have notified your Appointment to the Preſident and Council at Bombay, to Mr. Moſtyn, and to Colonel Leſlie, in Letters, of which we encloſe Copies for your Information.

You will be furniſhed with a Cypher, in which you may correſpond with the Preſidencies of Fort Saint

Saint George and Bombay, and Colonel Leſlie; obſerving, that the Words written in Red Ink, which have been inſerted for the Occaſion, are only to be uſed in your Correſpondence with us.

We are, &c.

Fort William, the 18th July 1778. (Signed) Governor General and Council.

Mr. Francis's Minute on the Inſtructions to Mr. Elliott.

Fort William, 15th Auguſt 1778.

Mr. Francis—Having already declared my entire Concurrence in one general Principle laid down by the Governor; viz. "that notwithſtanding the Superiority of the Britiſh Force in India, "its general Line of Action is and muſt be purely *defenſive*;" and having repeatedly ſtated to the Board my Opinion of the Wiſdom of thoſe Inſtructions which the Court of Directors have conſtantly given us, and which we ought to conſider as the Baſis of the Britiſh Policy in India; viz. "to make the "Defence and Security of Bengal at all Times the principal Object of our Care; never to employ "the Company's Forces on diſtant Expeditions; and never to engage the Company in Diſputes "between the Country Powers, but to leave thoſe Powers to be a Check upon one another, "without our Interference;" I cannot but expreſs the ſtrongeſt Diſapprobation of a Plan which has for its Object a Union of Forces and Intereſts with one of the Indian States againſt another, and which, in order to engage the former to unite *in a direct and open War* againſt the other, propoſes to engage the Company's Arms in an Enterprize of no leſs Magnitude and Extent than the Attainment of the Sovereignty of the Maratta State for our Ally, and the Recovery of any Conqueſts heretofore made by the Soubah of the Decan over the Rajah of Berar. I conſider the propoſed Treaty as not only ſubverſive of all the general Principles of Policy which ought to direct this Government, but as highly dangerous and inexpedient in itſelf at all Times, and more eſpecially at the preſent Criſis, at a Time when our whole Force is wanted for the Defence of the Company's Poſſeſſions, to which Object alone I conceive it is or may eaſily be made adequate. I will never conſent to ſend any Part of it upon diſtant Expeditions, far from the Protection of our Frontiers, or to employ it in ſupporting any Projects or Intereſts in which we have no Concern; Defence alone ſhould be our Object. With reſpect to Bengal and Fort Saint George, we have nothing to fear, if we make a proper Uſe of the Means in our Poſſeſſion, and apply them ſteadily to wiſe and attainable Purpoſes; that is, if we do not ſuffer the Firſt to be divided, and the Second to be waſted in ſupport of Projects in which diſtant Shadows are purſued at the Expence of ſolid and ſubſtantial Intereſt. With reſpect to Bombay, which it is ſaid *cannot now afford Ragoba their Aſſiſtance without departing from the immediate Care of their own Safety*, the true and only Way of putting that Place in a Poſture of Defence, is to ſend them a Reinforcement from Madras, and they tell us ſo themſelves. As for Colonel Leſlie's Detachment, I very much fear they will never derive any Aſſiſtance from it.

Theſe Remarks and Objections are of a general Nature. I come now to the particular Inſtructions propoſed for Mr. Elliott, and ſhall conſider them in the Order in which they ſtand.

I object to the Powers propoſed in the Preamble to be given to Mr. Elliott; and whereas his Commiſſion propoſes to have Two Objects, I cannot help expreſſing my Surprize, that our Sanction to him ſhould be thought neceſſary for coming to a Concluſion with the Rajah of Berar, upon that which is by far the leaſt hazardous and exceptionable of the Two Meaſures, I mean the Defenſive Treaty, but that he ſhould be allowed to follow his own Judgment in concluding and carrying into Execution the Terms of our *Offenſive Alliance*, for the Support of Enterprizes of uncommon Magnitude and Extent, without waiting for our Sanction. Againſt all ſuch abſolute and diſcretionary Powers I hereby moſt ſolemnly proteſt, and I declare, that I ſhall never deem this Government bound by any Agreement entered into by him in the Execution of his preſent Commiſſion, without the previous Knowledge and Approbation of this Board.

1. I object to the defenſive Treaty on the Terms propoſed, becauſe I think our preſent Frontier is as much as we are able to defend, and will not admit of our ſubjecting any Part of our Force to march beyond it at the Requiſition of the Rajah of Berar; becauſe, without paſſing the moſt diſtant Limits of his Dominions, ſuch Requiſition may carry our Army into the Heart of Indoſtan, at a vaſt Diſtance from Bengal, and to a Situation too remote to admit of their ſafe and ſpeedy Return to the Protection of our own Provinces in caſe of Emergency; becauſe, on the other Hand, I never can approve of our calling in Ten thouſand Maratta Horſe, in any Caſe, to the Defence of Bengal, being thoroughly convinced that ſuch Allies would only diſtreſs and ruin the Country, and never do us real Service againſt an Enemy; and laſtly, becauſe I have no Idea, that if Moodajee Booſla has a Ray of Underſtanding, and reflects on the fatal Conſequences which the Nabob of Owde has experienced from his Connections with this Government, and which took their Origin from a Treaty of Subſidy, he will ever ſuffer an Engliſh Army to eſtabliſh themſelves in this Country under any Pretences whatſoever.

2. The Plan of an offenſive Union with Moodajee Booſla ſeems to be founded on a Suppoſition that Ragoba has no Party left, and that the Preſidency of Bombay have or will abandon him. On my Principles it is immaterial whether this Suppoſition be well founded or not, becauſe I think it highly impolitic to implicate ourſelves in the Support of either of theſe Perſons, but is very material to the Succeſs of the Plan now propoſed that no Miſtake ſhould be made in this Matter. I do not believe

believe that the Presidency of Bombay will easily relinquish their Connections with Ragoba; if they should not, it is worth considering what our Situation may be, and what Appearance our Conduct will have in the Eyes of the World. In the First Instance, we have a Treaty with the Peshwa, which we break or renounce in Favour of Ragoba: We authorize the Presidency of Bombay to execute a Plan for restoring him to the Administration, and we send a Detachment of Troops across India to support that Plan. *The present Measure supposes a Third Distribution of Power, and a Third Competitor for it, to be supported by our Alliance; and it is not impossible, that while this Government is uniting its Forces and Interests with those of Moodajee Boosla on one Side of India, the Presidency of Bombay may be equally engaged on the other in executing the Plan which we have already authorized in Conjunction with Ragoba.*

All these Difficulties and Inconveniences are supposed to be obviated by the conditional Instructions given to Mr. Elliott, and the Confidence reposed in his Caution and Prudence. I neglect not question the personal Qualifications of any Individual, when the Trust proposed to be vested in him is such as I would repose in no Man. The Cases, in which he is authorized to unite with Moodajee Boosla, in a direct and open War against the Ministerial Party at Poona, with full and absolute Discretion to concert the Plan of Operations with him, are to depend on Mr. Elliott's Knowledge, or on his Persuasion of the Existence of many Facts, concerning which it is very possible he may be misinformed; but the Consequences of a Mistake, either in point of Judgment or Information, may be fatal.

I do not pretend to know what the Nature of Moodajee Boosla's Pretensions may be to the Succession of the Ram Raja. It is a Question of no Sort of Importance to this Government, unless we voluntarily involve ourselves in it. But if it were possible for me to entertain an Idea of engaging the Company's Arms in the Support of such Pretensions, the Precipitation with which the Conclusion of such an Engagement is pressed, and the implicit Confidence proposed to be placed in Mr. Elliott's sole Judgment and Discretion to decide upon Measures which may affect the very Existence of the British Power in India, would be sufficient to deter me from giving any Countenance to the Measure. I should be guilty of a Breach of Trust, if in an Instance of this Magnitude, I consented to surrender the Powers of this Government to the Discretion of any Individual. To that Part of the Instructions, therefore, in which we are "to impower and direct Mr. Elliott to "enter into an express Treaty for supporting Moodajee Boosla's Pretensions, *if he shall be clearly "of Opinion that the Chances of Success are considerably on his Side; and to leave the Conditions of "our Participation in an Enterprize of such Magnitude in Mr. Elliot's Judgment, both in the Choice "and Mode of securing them*;" I shall only say, that I believe such a Trust was never yet reposed in a public Minister; and that I shall never consider myself as a Party to any Terms concluded without my Knowledge.

The Second Condition relative to our Assistance against Nizam Ally, is at first stated as a Subject of Negociation, to be referred to us for Conclusion; but it is presently added, "unless "Moodajee Boosla shall require it as an indispensable Condition, &c." that is, in Effect, we tie and unbind Mr. Elliott in the same Breath. In the End, we authorize him to agree to such Terms as may be proposed by the Rajah on this Point, *if he* (Mr Elliott) *shall be persuaded, that the Execution of them will tend to the Accomplishment of our Views*; and in such Case, he is authorized to fulfil his Part of the Agreement, without waiting for our Sanction.

The First Proposition tends to lead the Company's Arms into the Heart of Indostan against the Marratta State, in the Support of Moodajee Boosla's Pretensions to the Succession of the Ram Raja. The Second may carry them into the Decan, in support of his Claims against Nizam Ally; and in both Cases, the Decision is referred to the sole Judgment and Discretion of Mr. Elliott. In my Opinion, both the Object and the Means need only to be stated to ensure their Condemnation.

After such an extraordinary Delegation of Powers to Mr. Elliott, it does not seem that farther Explanations were necessary *to obviate any Misconception of the Extent of his Commission.* The last Article, however, banishes every Idea of Limitation in this Respect; neither the Death of the Prince, with whom he is sent to treat, and on whose personal Views and Disposition towards us, great Stress has heretofore been laid, nor any Change in the Government, is to affect the Execution of the Plan. The Treaty is to be executed with his Successor, whosoever he may be, perhaps a Minor, perhaps an Usurper, perhaps a Man hostile to the English Interest; and it is to extend to the Government dependant on him, *under any Change or Augmentation of it*; that is, we conclude our Treaty with a Prince, who either may not have Half the Territory now possessed by Moodajee Boosla, or who may have extended his Dominion to the other Side of India. In the latter Case, it would be prudent at least to specify, *in the defensive Treaty*, what those Limits should be, which the Company's Troops are not to pass, and within which the Rajah of Berar may employ them on any Military Service he thinks proper.

A true Copy.
(Signed) J. P. Auriol, Secr.

Mr,

APPENDIX, N° 70.

Mr. Wheler's Opinion on the Inſtructions to Mr. Elliott.

Fort William, the 18th July 1778.

Mr. Wheler—The Minute now before the Board, and on which I am called to deliver my Opinion, was received by me in Circulation at Nine laſt Night, and I am abſolutely required to give my Opinion on a Subject of this great Magnitude before Ten this Morning: Thus circumſtanced, I believe it cannot be expected that I ſhould enter into a full Diſcuſſion of the various Articles which compoſe the Governor's Minute before us; but that it will be ſufficient for me to declare my general Sentiments on the whole Queſtion; reſerving to myſelf the Right of a fuller Diſcuſſion, ſhould I find it neceſſary hereafter.

But I muſt here obſerve, that Mr. Francis has expreſſed himſelf ſo ably and fully upon the Subject, that little more is neceſſary for me than to concur with him moſt heartily in his Diſſent and Proteſt, and likewiſe in the ſeveral Opinions delivered by him upon the Propoſitions contained in the Governor's Minute.

I am entirely againſt all diſtant Expeditions and Connections, as contrary to the Company's Inſtructions, their fundamental Policy, and particularly inexpedient at this Time.

I join heartily with Mr. Francis, in thinking that our whole Force ought to be retained here for the Defence of our own Territory and thoſe of our Ally the Nabob of Oude; and that this ſo far from being diminiſhed by Detachments ſhould be materially encreaſed on this Emergency. I have a very unfavourable Opinion of entering into Alliances with Maratta Princes, which they uſually maintain no longer than it is for their own Intereſt.

I am againſt the Detachment under Colonel Leſlie advancing further into the Maratta Territory, leaſt they either meet with ſome fatal Diſaſter, or we ſhould be unable to procure their Return, when we may want them for the Defence of Bengal.

I am at a Loſs to conceive how we ſhall be able to fulfil Stipulations with Moodajee Booſla for forwarding his Pretenſions either to the Dignity of Peſhwa, or on the Dominions ſaid to be taken from him by Nizam Ally; how our Army is to act, or be ſupplied at that Diſtance, or what good Effect ſuch Meaſures are to produce, either for the Defence of Bengal or Bombay, other than of driving thoſe States, from Apprehenſions of our ambitious Views, entirely into the Arms of the French, and compelling them to form a general Alliance for extirpating us from Indoſtan. What will then avail our Alliance with the Rajah of Berar? how are we to depend on his Faith; or to get back our Detachment, when it will be moſt material to us?

For my Part I apprehend the moſt melancholy Conſequences: With theſe Impreſſions it will not be wondered if I here enter my Diſſent and Proteſt againſt the Expedition, the Treaty now propoſed, and the Powers propoſed to be given to Mr. Elliott, to bind this Government in Meaſures, which I deem neither wiſe nor expedient, and which it is highly probable we may hereafter be unable to fulfil, and thereby add our preſent propoſed Ally to the Number of our Enemies.

A true Copy.
(Signed) J. P. Auriol, Secr'.

Mr. Barwell's Opinion on the Inſtructions to Mr. Elliott.

Mr. Barwell—I agree to the Inſtructions as they now ſtand: The Arguments oppoſed to the Policy that has dictated the intended Treaty with Moodajee Booſla do not in my Opinion weaken the Grounds on which it has been regulated. The Defence of Bengal is no leſs an Object of it than the Defence of the Weſtern Poſſeſſions of the Company on the Peninſula. The Objections urged to the Powers delegated to our Ambaſſador I conceive are fully anſwered by a Reference to the Map, at the Inſtant the Reader ſhall reaſon on the Means by which it is propoſed to effect the Safety of the Company's Poſſeſſions. The Time and Opportunity would be loſt by a Reference, in participating the Reſponſibility annexed to a Meaſure of ſuch a Magnitude. I diſclaim every other Rule for my Judgment but the very Object Mr. Francis himſelf propoſes. We differ as to the Means; I adopt ſuch as in my Opinion will prove moſt efficacious; he, ſuch as he conceives better calculated to the Security of thoſe Intereſts we have mutually in View.

A true Copy.
(Signed)
J. P. Auriol, Secretary.

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APPENDIX, N° 71.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 18th July 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Eſquire, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell, Philip Francis, Edward Wheler, } Eſquires.

THE Governor General having prepared Inſtructions for Mr. Elliott, on his Deputation to Berar, now lays them before the Board.

Mr. Wheler, Mr. Francis, and Mr. Barwell, deliver in their Opinions on this Subject.

The Governor General delivers in the following Minute:

The preſent Criſis calls for Action not for Debate. I think it improper to waſte my Time, or to conſume that of the Board in the latter, when it can be better employed, and when I know that no Argument will avail. Whenever I ſhall find it neceſſary to reply to the Objections and Proteſts of Meſſrs. Francis and Wheler, I ſhall addreſs myſelf to higher Powers. I ſhall therefore now proceed to ſuch other Propoſitions as I think neceſſary for the Concluſion of this Buſineſs.

In the Firſt Place, I move, That the Office Drafts of the Inſtructions, after they are written fair for Mr. Elliott, be ſealed and authenticated, in any Manner that the Board may think proper, and depoſited in ſome ſecret and ſecure Place; and that they be not entered in the Conſultations, until Mr. Elliott ſhall have concluded his Negociations, or ſhall have made ſuch a Progreſs in them as may make a longer Concealment unneceſſary. The ſame Caution was obſerved with the Inſtructions which were delivered to me by the late Council, in the Year 1773. When I was deputed from them to treat with the late Vizier at Benares, the Effect was anſwerable to the Intention; the Subject of my Negociation remained a profound Secret, not only to the Time of my Interview with the Vizier, but from the private Manner in which it was conducted, it was unknown, and ſcarcely ſurmiſed, till the Concluſion of the Treaty of courſe divulged it. I own I do not expect the ſame Caution on the preſent Occaſion, for I am ſorry to add, that the Subject of Mr. Elliott's Commiſſion is already known; yet it may have this good Conſequence, that what now only paſſes as a Report, wanting that Authentication which the original Documents, though but in Poſſeſſion of a few, would give them, may ſtill continue a Report, and either die away, or be little heeded. If the Board approve of this Motion, it will be equally proper, that the Minutes which have been delivered upon the Subject of the Inſtructions be alſo kept back from our Records depoſited with them. Copies may notwithſtanding be taken, to be ſent to the Court of Directors by the firſt and ſubſequent Diſpatches.

2dly. I move, That Letters be written to the Preſident and Council of Bombay, to Mr. Moſtyn, and Colonel Leſlie, to inform them that Mr. Elliott is deputed to the Rajah of Berar, to treat with him on the Part of this Government; to requeſt that the Preſident and Council of Bombay will adviſe Mr. Elliott of all Occurrences in which the political Intereſts of the Company, or of that Preſidency in particular, are concerned; and to inſtruct him upon any Points reſpecting his Negociation, which either their own Situation and Circumſtances may ſuggeſt, or on which he ſhall requeſt their Advice. That to prevent any Oppoſition of Meaſures, they refrain from any Engagements that may be hoſtile to the actual Adminiſtration at Poona; except ſuch as ſhall be neceſſary for the Defence of their own Poſſeſſions, until they ſhall have received our further Information, concerning the particular Object and Deſigns of the preſent Negociation, ſhould it be found neceſſary to require their Co-operation with them; and that Mr. Moſtyn may have their Directions to correſpond with Mr. Elliott, and to inform him conſtantly of the State of Affairs at Poona, both ſuch as reſpect the Concerns of that Preſidency with the Maratta State, and the Views, Connections, and Strength of the different Parties at Poona: That our Letter to Mr. Moſtyn require from him the ſame Communication. That Colonel Leſlie be required to conform to ſuch Engagements as ſhall be concluded in our Name with Moodajee Booſla, and as reſpect the Forces under his Command.

The Governor General's Firſt Propoſition being reſolved in the Affirmative; the Inſtructions to Mr. Elliott, and the Minute thereon, are accordingly ſealed up and depoſited in the Secretary's Office.

Mr. Wheler acquieſces to the Second Propoſition.

Mr. Francis—If the Treaty be concluded Colonel Leſlie muſt conform to it.

Mr. Barwell agrees to the Second Propoſition.

The Second Propoſition being reſolved in the Affirmative; the following Letters are written to the Preſidency of Bombay, Mr. Moſtyn, and to Colonel Leſlie:

To

APPENDIX, N° 71.

To the Honourable William Hornby, Eſquire, Preſident and Council at Bombay.

Gentlemen,

Upon a mature and full Conſideration of the different Views and Connections of the Country Powers of Hindoſtan, we think that an Alliance with Moodajee Booſla, the Raja of Berar, may be attended with the greateſt Utility in providing for the Defence of the Company's Poſſeſſions in the preſent War; we have therefore deputed Mr. A. K. Elliott with full Inſtructions to negociate and conclude a Treaty with that Chief: We requeſt that you will correſpond with Mr. Elliott; adviſe him of any Occurrences that may affect the general political Intereſt of the Company's Settlements, and of your's in particular; and inſtruct him upon any Points reſpecting his Negociation, which either your own Situation and Circumſtances ſhall ſuggeſt, or on which he may apply to you for Information and Advice.

The Succeſs of the Meaſures we have entruſted to Mr. Elliott muſt depend in a great Meaſure upon their preſent Secrecy; he will however notify to you ſuch Articles as he may agree to with the Raja; in the mean Time to prevent any Steps of a contrary Tendency on your Part, we requeſt that you will refrain from forming any Engagements of a Nature hoſtile to the actual Adminiſtration at Poona, excepting ſuch as may appear abſolutely neceſſary for the Defence of your own Poſſeſſions.

We alſo requeſt that Mr. Moſtyn may be enjoined to communicate to him conſtantly the State of Affairs at Poona, both ſuch as concern the Intereſts of your Preſidency with the Marattas, and the Views, Connections, and Strength of the different Parties in that Government.

We are, &c.

Fort William,
the 18th July 1778.

P. S. Both Colonel Leſlie and Captain Elliott are poſſeſſed of Copies of the ſmall Cypher B, formed in 1755.

To Thomas Moſtyn, Eſquire.

Sir,

Having thought it neceſſary to depute Mr. A. K. Elliott to Naguipore, to treat with Moodajee Booſla, the Chief of Berar, on certain Points which we deem eſſential to the Welfare of the Company's Settlements in India, we requeſt that you will correſpond with him, and communicate to him, from Time to Time, a particular State of the Affairs and Tranſactions at Poona, both as far as they concern the immediate Intereſts of the Company, and the Views, Connections, and Strength of the different Parties in the Maratta Government.

We are, &c.

Fort William,
the 18th July 1778.

To Colonel Leſlie.

Sir,

Having thought it neceſſary to depute Mr. A. K. Elliott to treat with Moodajee Booſla, the Rajah of Berar, on certain Points which we deem eſſential to the Welfare of the Company's Poſſeſſions in India, we direct that you correſpond with him on ſuch Subjects as may be neceſſary for his Information, as well with reſpect to the Views, Connections, and Forces of the ſeveral Chiefs who govern the Countries through which you may or have paſſed, as to their different Situations and Circumſtances; and that you conform to ſuch Articles and Engagements as he may conclude on Behalf of this Government with Moodajee Booſla, as far as they may reſpect the Forces under your Command.

We are, &c.

Fort William,
the 18th July 1778.

Mr. Francis—I agree with the Governor General, that this is a Time to act, and that none ſhould be waſted in Debate. Mr. Wheler's Minute and mine have occaſioned no other Delay than what was neceſſary for reading them. There are Two Points however, of which no Notice is taken in the Inſtructions, and which I think ſhould be provided for; I ſubmit them to the Governor's Conſideration as they occur to me.

The Firſt is, that Mr. Elliott is not inſtructed to correſpond with Colonel Leſlie, or to concert any Meaſures whatever with him; yet Caſes may occur in which Colonel Leſlie's Opinion, as well with reſpect to the State of the Country he has paſſed through, and the Views and Forces of the different Princes who govern that Country, as to the actual Situation and Circumſtances of his own Army, may be very neceſſary for Mr. Elliott's Information and Guidance in the Conduct of his Negociations.

The Second is, That no Proviſion is made for a Caſe, which, whether probable or not, deſerves Conſideration, as the Conſequences of it may materially affect the Succeſs of Mr. Elliott's Negociations: I mean the Poſſibility that Colonel Leſlie's March ſhould have been ſtopped either by direct Oppoſition, or any other unforeſeen Difficulties; or that he may have received a Check in attempting

" tempting to croſs the Cane River. In his Letter of the 24th June, he informs us, " that he is " not at preſent able to ſay what Part they will take, whether they mean to oppoſe his March or " not; their Forces are collected between Chatterpore and Pannah, on the Banks of the Kaine " River, where Anrood Sing's Forces, with Ballajee and Beſſa Pundit, have taken Poſt," we cannot be abſolutely certain of the Event. It is poſſible at leaſt that ſome Miſchance may have happened, and ſuch a Poſſibility ought to be provided for.

The Governor General—The firſt Propoſition I think very proper; although it comes within the Line of his Inſtructions, I have no Objection to its being made a ſpecific Part of them. I think it unneceſſary to make any Proviſion in the Inſtructions for the Caſe ſuppoſed in the latter Part of Mr. Francis's Minute: it is included in the former.

Mr. Wheler—I agree to the Firſt; and as the Second is a Precaution which cannot be attended with any Inconvenience by being inſerted in Mr. Elliott's Inſtructions, I ſee no Objection to its making a Part of them.

Mr. Barwell—I think both theſe Points included in the Inſtructions, and the Repetition of them unneceſſary.

Agreed, That the Firſt Part of Mr. Francis's Minute be added to Mr. Elliott's Inſtructions.

July 1778. The 20th of July the Governor General moves, That Mr. Elliott's Appointment be notified to the Preſidency of Fort St. George; that they conſider whatever Intelligence he may tranſmit to them as the authentic Intelligence of a Public Miniſter; and that they correſpond with Mr. Elliott, informing him of any Events which relate to Peace or War, but particularly of any Changes in their political Situation with Nizam ul Mulk.

The Governor General moves, That Mr. Elliott draw the ſame fixed Allowances as Colonel Upton*, viz.

1000 Sonaut Rupees per Month, — or, per Annum.		
His Pay as Lieutenant Colonel per Ann.		12,000
Double Batta as Lieutenant Colonel	—	2,920
40 Rupees per Day, or per Annum	—	14,600
500 Rupees per Month for Servants, Stationary, and every other incidental Charge not particularly ſpecified		6,000
Rupees per Month for a Moonſhie	— —	1,200
Sonaut Rupees		36,720
Batta 11 per Cent.	—	4,039
Total of Colonel Upton's Allowances per Annum while on his Embaſſy to Poona — — —	CR° or £. ſterling	40,759 4,075

N. B. The above were excluſive of the Allowances made to the Colonel's Suite.

Lieutenant Colonel's Pay and double full Batta fixed Salary, Contingencies, including Moonſhies, Servants, &c. That Mr. Farquhar attend Mr. Elliott as Aſſiſtant, and be allowed Captain's Pay and Double Batta. The Governor General ſuppoſes, that the whole Expence of Mr. Elliott's Deputation, excluſive of the neceſſary Preſents, will not much exceed his perſonal Allowances, as above ſtated, and thoſe of his Aſſiſtant; that he has every Reaſon to believe that Mr. Elliott will be attended from Cuttack to Naigpore by a Troop of the Rajah of Berar's Cavalry; but ſhould this not be the Caſe, he propoſes that Mr. Elliott be authorized to diſburſe ſuch Sums as may appear to him reaſonable in procuring a Military Eſcort. The Board agree to the Governor's Motions, and alſo to Mr. Elliott's Credentials, which are dated 20th July 1778.

* Colonel Upton's Allowances were ſettled by the Governor General and Council as follows, viz.

Letter of Credence to Mr. Alexander Elliott; written the 20th of July 1778.

To Alexander Elliott, Eſquire.

Whereas an Intercourſe of Friendſhip has long ſubſiſted between this Government and that of Berar, and it is our Deſire, and we believe it to be that of Modajee Bhooſila, the Rajah or Chief for the Time being of Berar, to confirm and perpetuate the ſame by a formal Treaty of Alliance, We the Governor General and Council, in virtue of the Powers veſted in us by the King and Parliament of Great Britain, and by the Engliſh Eaſt India Company, to direct and controul the political Affairs of all the Company's Settlements in India, relying on your Fidelity, Prudence, and Integrity, have deputed you to proceed to Naigpore, or to ſuch other Place where the Rajah ſhall reſide, and to negociate and conclude with Maha Rajah Modajee Bhooſila, or the true Rajah for the Time being of the Province of Berar and its Dependencies, a Treaty of Peace and Friendſhip between him and his Heirs and Succeſſors on the one Part, and the Engliſh Eaſt India Company on the other, on ſuch Terms as ſhall be for the mutual Benefit, Honour, and Satisfaction of both Parties; and we hereby give you full Powers to that Effect, declaring that we will ratify and confirm whatever ſhall be ſo concluded by you in our Names, and on our Behalf, according to the Inſtructions with which we have furniſhed you for that Purpoſe.

Given in Fort William, under our Hands and the Seal of the Company, this 20th of July 1778, in the Year of our Lord, or 24th of Jumma See Aſſanee 1192 Hejeree.

APPENDIX, N° 72.

Extract of a Letter from the Governor General and Council in Bengal, to the Court of Directors, dated 17th Auguſt 1778.

Par. 5. WITH ſuch circumſtantial Evidence before us we thought that no Time ſhould be loſt in proceeding upon it as Fact, and therefore agreed to take ſuch immediate Meaſures as we judged neceſſary for the Security of your Poſſeſſions committed to our Charge. We ordered Colonel Leſlie with his Detachment to halt when he ſhould arrive within the Diſtrict of Berar, and to wait there for further Orders: We wrote to the Preſidency of Fort Saint George, recommending it to them to aſſemble a ſufficient Force in the Neighbourhood of Pondicherry with all poſſible Expedition, to be ready to inveſt that Place the Moment that a Confirmation of the News ſhould arrive: We adviſed them to open a Negociation with the Nabob Hyder Ally, who lately had made repeated Applications to their Préſident to ſolicit an Alliance with the Company: We ordered the Balance of Caſh which had accumulated in the Hands of our Reſident at Owde to be immediately ſent down to the Preſidency; and called for ſuch Accounts as might enable us to determine the State of our immediate Reſources. Secret Department.

6. At the enſuing Meeting of the Council the Governor General propoſed a Plan for an Alliance with Moodajee Booſla, the Rajah of Berar, a powerful Chief, with whom a friendly Intercourſe had long ſubſiſted, and who on many Occaſions had manifeſted a Diſpoſition uniformly amicable to the Company: As the Plan is particular and worthy of your Attention, we beg Leave to refer to it, and to the Minutes which have been entered upon it; contenting ourſelves in this Place with informing you that we have accordingly appointed Mr. Alexander Elliott with full Powers and Inſtructions to negociate and conclude a Treaty of Alliance with Moodajee Booſla. As the Succeſs of Mr. Elliott's Endeavours muſt be governed in ſome Meaſure by the Secrecy in which the Powers of Conceſſion confided in him are preſerved, we have thought it neceſſary for the preſent to keep his Inſtructions from our Records; a Copy however, with the Minutes upon them, is made a ſeparate Number in the Packet for your Information.

26. The Situation of Affairs in the North Weſt Quarter is nearly as follows: Colonel Leſlie, with the Detachment under his Command, notwithſtanding the Promiſes of Friendſhip which were delivered to him from Balajee, and the other Maratta Chiefs poſſeſſing the Diſtricts about Calpee, met with ſome ſlight Oppoſition from their Troops in croſſing the Jumna. They retired before the advanced Party when they had landed, and after ſome Skirmiſhes retreated, leaving the Fort of Calpee evacuated, which Colonel Leſlie in conſequence took Poſſeſſion of. He then continued his March without further Moleſtation till his Arrival at Chatterpore, where he was obliged to halt for the Purpoſe of repairing his Gun Carriages, which had been a good deal ſhaken by the Badneſs of the Roads.

27. When the Detachment had been ſome Days at Chatterpore, the above Chief continued to manifeſt the ſame Spirit of Jealouſy and Oppoſition which he had at firſt diſcovered, by joining with the inferior Rajahs to throw every Obſtruction and Annoyance in the Way that he could accompliſh. He publiſhed the ſtrongeſt Prohibition to the Inhabitants to furniſh Grain or any Kind of Refreſhment to the Troops; harraſſed their foraging Parties; intercepted their Proviſions, and drove away their Cattle. In this State of Affairs, Colonel Leſlie received Intelligence of the unfortunate End of Captain Munro, who was cut off in his Way to join the Detachment; he therefore reſolved, from theſe combined Outrages, to attack the principal Station of the Enemy at the Fort of Mow, about Three Coſs Weſt of his Encampment, where they had about 600 Cavalry, and 2,000 Matchlock-men, with a Train of Eleven Pieces of Cannon. Lieutenant Colonel Goddard was accordingly diſpatched with Three Battalions and a Body of Horſe; and after having forced his Way through ſome Breaches in the Wall of Circumvallation, he engaged and drove the Enemy out of the Fort. The diſperſed Parties have ſince withdrawn to Rajegur, on the Banks of the River Kain, where Balajee having aſſembled his Men, ſtill declares his Intention to oppoſe the Progreſs of our Troops.

28. By our laſt Advices, per Northington, you were fully informed of the Change in the Government at Poona, by the Reverſion of the principal Direction of Affairs from the Hands of Nana Furneeſe to thoſe of Moraba Furneeſe; of the different Invitations which Moraba had given to Ragoba; and of his Propoſal to charge Mr. Moſtyn with Powers to conduct that Chief to Poona. After having amuſed our Reſident for ſome Time with reiterated Promiſes and Protractions, it evidently appeared, that the Profeſſions he made were calculated merely to deceive; while the real Object of his Intentions was nothing more than to eſtabliſh his own Authority in the Government.

29. Mr. Moſtyn, after waiting a conſiderable Time for the propoſed Overtures to be made to Ragoba, and deſpairing of them at length, from the Inſincerity of the Miniſters, and their apparent Adoption of Nana's Syſtems, which were unfavourable to the Engliſh, formally made the Demands of them which were enjoined by our Letter to the Préſident and Council of Bombay,

under Date the 23d March. He repeatedly ſolicited their Anſwer to each ſeparate Article: but ineffectually, till many Days after the Time limited in his Requiſition had elapſed.

30. About this Time another Revolution took Effect in the Adminiſtration at Poona. Nana Furneeſe, by a conſiderable Sum of Money, which he engaged to pay to Madajee Scindia and Tuccojee Holcar, having gained thoſe Chiefs over to his Aſſiſtance, wreſted the Government again from the Hands of Moraba; who, finding his Influence and Power thus failing him, applied in earneſt, as we underſtand, in concert with the principal Perſons who adhered to him (among which Number the Name of Tuccojee appears, notwithſtanding he had been induced by a pecuniary Conſideration, to ſeem to ſide with Nana, and is repreſented, in Conjunction with Madajee Scindia, in Perſon, to have compelled Moraba to ſurrender the Sicca, which was the Enſign of his Office, to Nana Furneeſe) to Mr. Moſtyn, offering preciſe Terms to fix Ragoba in the Place of Regent, if the Preſidency of Bombay would agree to bring him with the Company's Forces to join their Party; and delivering at the ſame Time, under the Seal of the Peſhwa, ſatisfactory Aſſurances in Reply to the Demands which had been inſiſted upon by Mr. Moſtyn, for the Accompliſhment of the Treaty.

31. We have juſt received, expreſs, Advices from the Select Committee at Bombay, dated 25th July, of which we ſend a Copy in the Packet, containing their Proceedings on the above Propoſals, which Mr. Moſtyn, being duly authorized by the Party, had delivered to them in Perſon; alſo other Anſwers to the Reſident's Demands, which Nana Furneſe, upon re-aſſuming the Government at Poona, had cauſed to be given to Mr. Lewis, after Mr. Moſtyn's Departure.

32. Theſe are pronounced by the Select Committee to be vague, evaſive, unſatisfactory, and amounting to a Refuſal, aggravated by a Compariſon with Moraba's Anſwers. They therefore, in virtue of the Authority given by our Letter of the 23d March, proceeded to declare the Anſwers of Nana a Violation of the Treaty; and on theſe Grounds, urged by Nana's avowed Predilection for the French, the Proſpect of inevitable War with that Nation, and the Means which they would poſſeſs, conjointly with the Marattas, to cut off the Supplies required by the Iſland of Bombay from the Continent, they proceeded to conſider and attend to the Offers made in favour of Ragoba. In conſequence of which they have reſolved to purſue the moſt practicable Way of placing him in the Regency of Poona, by Means of their own Forces, aided by Colonel Leſlie's Detachment, and ſupported by the Party and Troops of Moraba and Tuccojee, if the Advices which they may receive from Europe, or from us, before they can begin their Operations in September, ſhall not render a different Plan of Meaſures expedient.

33. The general Tranſactions of this Government with the Nabob of Owde being of ſuch a Nature as not to require Secrecy, and the Buſineſs of War furniſhing additional Matter for our private Department, we have tranſferred our Correſpondence with the Reſident at Owde, and various other Subjects, to the public Records; and ſhall only mention in this Place, that the Nabob having conſented to Captain Oſborne's Plan, for raiſing a Battalion of Sepoys for the Protection of the Douab, which we recommended to him, Captain Oſborne is accordingly employed in forming this Corps.

34. Nudjiff Cawn having made Peace with the Seicks, is again deſirous of receiving Major Hannay as an Agent from this Government; and has addreſſed the Governor General, requeſting that he may be permitted to repair to his Court. We have in conſequence directed the Major to viſit Nudjiff Cawn, with the Vizier's Conſent, and to report to us any Propoſals which he may have to offer to our Conſideration.

35. We have this Day taken into Conſideration the Advices from the Select Committee of Bombay, mentioned in the foregoing Part of this Letter; and have approved of their Reſolutions, under certain Proviſoes, which will appear in the Extract of our Proceedings, encloſed a Number in the Packet.

We have the Honour to be,
Honourable Sirs,
Your moſt faithful
humble Servants,
Warren Haſtings,
Rich[d] Barwell,
P. Francis,
Edw[d] Wheler.

Fort William,
17th Auguſt 1778.

APPENDIX, N° 73.

Perſian Correſpondence; received 20th May 1778.

From Modajee Bhoſila; received 24th May 1778.

YOUR agreeable Letter under Date the 3d of Rubbee-ul-awal reached me on the 27th of the ſame Month (26th April) and afforded me the greateſt Pleaſure. You write that you have appointed to the Command of the Detachment deſtined for the Reinforcement of Bombay, Colonel Leſlie, an Officer of Abilities, Experience, and approved Bravery, and one who is poſſeſſed of your entire Confidence, and have directed him to correſpond with me; that he will accordingly apply to me on every Occaſion where he may ſtand in need of Aſſiſtance and Support, which may probably frequently happen; and you requeſt that regarding his Letters in the ſame Light as if written by yourſelf I will afford him every Degree of Aſſiſtance he may require, and conſider him as every Way worthy of my entire Confidence, and that I will always reckon you as my moſt warm and ſincere Friend. An invariable Regard to the Duties of Friendſhip is highly commendable and praiſeworthy, and I have accordingly replied to your ſeveral Letters on this Subject in the ſame Manner which Friendſhip dictated, and hope that my repeated Letters have ſafely reached you. It is near Twenty Days ſince truſty Agents have been diſpatched from this to the Nurbudder where they wait the Arrival of Colonel Leſlie, and for the greater Security I have written to that Gentleman to give him Information of my Agents being in waiting for him there. As the Veil which ſeparated us is now removed, and we are ſo intimately connected with each other, I have regarded whatever you have written me as proceeding from the Dictates of Friendſhip, and your Wants I regard as my own. You will therefore ſend him in full Confidence, and on his Arrival on the Banks of the Nurbudder he will find every Kind of Aſſiſtance and Support from my Envoys, both with reſpect to Proviſions and other Neceſſaries as well as Inſtructions for his Route. I have not yet heard from Colonel Leſlie; as ſoon as I do, I ſhall return him a ſatisfactory Anſwer.

From Modajee Bhoſila; received 4th July 1778.

I have been favoured with your agreeable Letter in Reply to Two of mine, and expreſſing your Pleaſure at the Proofs of my ſteady Friendſhip in my ready Compliance with your Requeſt, reſpecting a free Paſſage for your Troops, in having deputed a truſty Perſon to meet them on the Banks of the Nurbudder, and invited the Commander to advance with Confidence and Security; and adding, that, by the Bleſſing of God, the greateſt Advantages will be derived to our reſpective States by our intimate Union; alſo, that you have, agreeably to my Deſire, directed Beneram Pundit to repair to the Commander of the Forces, and accompany him, and doubt not of his Compliance. This Letter reached me on the 4th of Jummadee-ul-awul, 3d of April, and made me very happy by its Contents. Your many friendly Letters, reſpecting the Diſpatch of your Forces to Bombay, which are filled with Profeſſions of the moſt ſincere and perfect Friendſhip, and of the mutual Advantages which will accrue therefrom to our reſpective States, have taken ſuch deep Root in my Mind, that I am not only perfectly convinced of them, but entertain even ſtill greater Expectations from ſo intimate an Union. With reſpect to the Intrigues and Connection of the Poona Miniſters with the French, and their Eſtrangement from the Engliſh, you obſerve, that although you do not implicitly credit all the various Reports you have received on this Subject, yet it is the Duty of a Ruler of a State to be always on his Guard, and prepared againſt every Event, and that my Remarks on this Subject were very juſt and proper. The Matter ſtands thus: It has been the invariable Practice of my Family ſteadily to purſue a Friendſhip once contracted, and to act with the greateſt Candour, and to give ſuch Friend every neceſſary Piece of Intelligence which comes to our Knowledge; this, by the Bleſſing of God, you have already had, and will have ſtill further Proofs of. The good Faith and Integrity of the Engliſh Nation is alſo become a Proverb, and are moſt firmly impreſſed on my Mind, they are clearly proved to me by the intimate and unreſerved Communications which you make in the Courſe of the Correſpondence which has been eſtabliſhed between us; God, who penetrates the Secrets of the Heart, knows the Sincerity of this Declaration, which is ſufficient.

Whilſt my Son, and my Miniſter Dewagur Pundit, were at Poorunder, all that they ſaw there was afterwards communicated to you by the latter. In your firſt Letter on this Subject, you write that the Poona Miniſters had received the French Vackeel, and granted him the Port of Choul Dunder, and a Topekana, and eſtranged themſelves from you, and formed Connections with the Enemies of the King of England; and that it was incumbent on you to guard againſt their Deſigns; I therefore, with a View of diſcovering their real Intentions, wrote Letters, in which I ſlightly alluded to theſe Matters, and now ſend you, for your Inſtruction, the Subſtance of the Peiſhwa's Reply to me and Luckmun Vackeel. You muſt likewiſe have received continual Advices

from

from that Quarter, and will receive further. The Peiſhwa informs me likewiſe, that he has written to Calcutta Aſſurances of his ſteady Adherence to the Treaty, and Information of his having given the French Vackeel his Diſmiſſion: This Letter, if it has reached you, will alſo give you further Information.

The Whole to be deduced from this is, that it is ſound Policy, and the Duty of the Ruler of a State, to attend to all the Advices he receives; to ſearch into the Truth of them; and to take his Meaſures on whatever is proved true; keeping himſelf conſtantly on his Guard, and prepared againſt every Event. You are bleſſed with Wiſdom and Experience; it is therefore unneceſſary for me to dwell on ſuch Subjects to you. I have written Two or Three different Letters to Colonel Leſlie, and have received a Letter from him, accompanying One from you. My Agents have been waiting near Two Months on the Banks of the Nurbudder, in Expectation of the Arrival of the Forces: I do not yet know if they have croſſed the Jummun. As the rainy Seaſon is at Hand, and they have a long March before them, and have not yet arrived on this Side the Jummun, I requeſt you will inform me if they are to advance or not, that I may give Inſtructions to my Agents accordingly. I am much pleaſed that you have, agreeable to my Deſire, ſent Beneram to join the Detachment; it was highly proper.

I have not replied to the Peiſhwa's Letter, but ſhall do it in whatever Manner you intimate to me. I wait your Reply, which I beg may be expeditious.

Knowing me ever anxious for your Welfare, favour me with frequent Accounts of your Health, Views, and the State of Affairs, which will be the Means of encreaſing our Friendſhip.

Encloſure in the above.

Copy of a Letter in the Hindoo Language from the Peiſhwa to Maha Rajah Modajee Bhoſila and Luckmun Row Vackeel; received at Naigpore the 5th of Jummadee-ul-Awul, 4th of April 1778.

The Particulars reſpecting the French are as follows:

This is a powerful State, and every Power is deſirous of ſending Ambaſſadors to cultivate its Friendſhip and ſeek its Connection. To refuſe Admittance to the Ambaſſadors of the French Monarch, or other Powers charged with Propoſitions of Friendſhip from their Maſter, would be highly improper, and not to hear their Repreſentations would be inconſiſtent with the Credit and Dignity of the State. It is the Duty of the Ruler of a State to make himſelf acquainted with the Affairs of every Stranger; for which Purpoſe it was neceſſary to admit the French Vackeel to an Audience, and he was treated in a Manner becoming the Dignity of this State.

When a Treaty of Friendſhip and Union has been eſtabliſhed with the Engliſh, ſo that no Shadow of Difference remains, to break this Connection for the Sake of an Alliance with the French would not only be a Proof of the greateſt Folly, but would be totally unprofitable. The Report of the Grant of a Fort to the French, and Topekanna to their Ambaſſador, is entirely groundleſs; the Matter is this: When the French Vackeel arrived, he brought with him Merchandize, and by my Permiſſion landed them at Readunda; Part of them he ſold there, and Part at Poona and Poorunder. His Stay here ſo long is ſolely to collect in the Money for the Goods.

At what Period have the French ſhewn themſelves, or what great Action have they performed, to induce any one to ſeek their Friendſhip or Connection? and for what Purpoſe ſhould a Fort and Topekanna be entruſted to them? I have given them neither one nor the other; I have of my own Accord given the French Vackeel his Diſmiſſion to his own Country; his Stay is ſolely to collect the Amount of the Merchandize he has ſold; it would be improper forcibly to drive him away; but I underſtand he will ſhortly depart: It is therefore improper that the Engliſh Chiefs ſhould form any Suſpicions of this Quarter on that Account, and I am convinced they will not give Way to any ſuch; I have not nor will ever deviate a Hair's Breadth from the Duties of Friendſhip to them. You will therefore (this is addreſſed to the Vackeel) repreſent this Matter in a clear Light to the Rajah, and cauſe him to write Letters, explaining it ſatisfactorily, to Calcutta; I have likewiſe written to Calcutta on this Subject to remove all Doubts which may have ariſen: Should this Matter be repreſented differently by any News Writer, you will pay no Degree of Credit to it.

From Dewagur Pundit: Received 6th July 1778.

I have been honoured in an happy Hour with your gracious Letter, which afforded me the greateſt Satisfaction, and by its Contents gave great Pleaſure to the Rajah. The ſending Beneram Pundit to accompany the Commander of the Detachment was highly proper; the great and mutual Advantages, which will naturally be produced by the unreſerved Communication of your mutual Sentiments in the Correſpondence which has been eſtabliſhed between you and the Rajah, by which your Friendſhip will be carried to the higheſt Pitch, will appear at a proper Opportunity. The Subſtance of a Letter from the Paiſhwa to my Maſter and Luckman Row is ſent for your Information: For further Particulars permit me to refer you to my Maſter's Letter.

APPENDIX, N° 73, 74.

To Maha Raja Modajee Bhooſila: Written 24th July.

I have already written you a full Account of the Affairs of this Quarter, and of my Deſign to depute Mr. Elliott to conclude a perpetual Treaty of Friendſhip and Alliance between you and the Company, on ſuch Terms as may be for the mutual Benefit, Honour, and Satisfaction of both Parties. That Gentleman took Leave of me on the 20th Inſtant, or 24th of Rubbee-aſſanee, and begun his Journey to Naigpore, where he will have the Pleaſure of delivering you this Letter. I have already written you ſo fully on the Abilities, Prudence, and Worth of this Gentleman, who poſſeſſes my entire Eſteem and Confidence, that it is needleſs to enlarge on the Subject. I ſhall therefore only repeat, that nothing has paſſed between you and me, either by Letters or through Beneram Pundit, but what he is informed of, and that he has full Power from this Government to negociate and conclude a perpetual Treaty of Alliance with you, in ſuch Manner that whatever he concludes in our Name and on our Parts we will ratify and confirm.

I requeſt that you will regard him as myſelf, and pay equal Attention to whatever he ſhall repreſent to you, and treat him with every Mark of Honour and Regard.

To Dewagur Pundit: D°.

Containing the Subſtance of the above Letter, with this Addition: I rely on you that you will exert yourſelf ſo warmly with your Maſter as to enſure a fortunate Iſſue to the Negociations entruſted to Mr. Elliott, which will be productive of the moſt advantageous Conſequences to both States; I am too well acquainted with the Wiſdom of the Maha Rajah's Government and of your Adminiſtration to propoſe any Thing which will not add to the Power of the Maha Rajah, and to the Reputation of his Miniſters.

To Modajee Bhooſila: Written 27th July.

I have already written you repeatedly on the Subject of my Deſign to depute Mr. Elliott to conclude a Treaty of perpetual Friendſhip and Alliance between you and the Company.

That Gentleman took Leave of me the 20th Inſtant, 24th of Rubbee-aſſaunil, and as he means to proceed with the greateſt Expedition, I doubt not but you, agreeable to my Requeſt, will uſe every Means in your Power to prevent any Delay or Obſtructions to his Journey. I hope he will arrive almoſt as ſoon as you receive this Letter.

He is a Gentleman of my own Houſe, and particularly attached to me, and of great Abilities; he poſſeſſes my entire Confidence, and is inveſted with the fulleſt Powers from this Government, which has the Controul of all the Engliſh Poſſeſſions and Forces in India, to conclude a firm Treaty with you in our Name and on our Behalf, and whatever he ſhall ſo conclude we will confirm and ratify.

I therefore requeſt that you will regard him in the ſame Light as myſelf, and pay equal Attention to whatever he ſhall repreſent to you, as if it had proceeded from my own Mouth.

The Advantages to be mutually derived from ſo intimate an Union as I propoſe to form with you, will be evident to you who are poſſeſſed of the greateſt Judgment and Penetration; and I doubt not but you will enter warmly into the Propoſals which will be made to you by Mr. Elliott, and conclude with him a Treaty on ſo firm a Baſis as may continue to our lateſt Poſterity.

APPENDIX, N° 74.

From the Nabob Nizam ul Dowla to the Governor. No Date; received 21ſt June 1778.

I Am given to underſtand, that the Gentlemen at Bengal have wrote to you to prepare Warlike Stores, &c. in order to aſſiſt Ragonaut Row; and that you are accordingly making Preparations for that Purpoſe. When the Company at Madras have entered into a ſolemn Treaty with me, that where-ever my Enemies are, their's ſhall be alſo; what Conſiſtency is there in their giving their Aſſiſtance to Ragonaut Row, my profeſſed Enemy? Either the Gentlemen of Bengal are not acquainted with the Engagements of thoſe at Madras, or if they are, they ſuppoſe that theſe Engagements are thoſe of the Company at Madras, and not of the Company of Bengal; Which of theſe Two am I left to ſuppoſe? If you have not already acquainted them with the Treaty which

ſubſiſts between us, you ought to do it now, but if the Gentlemen at Bengal in ſupporting Ragonaut Row are determined to make War with the Pundit Purdhaun Madherow, I ſhall be obliged, in conſideration of the Treaty ſubſiſting between him and me, to give him every poſſible Aſſiſtance on my Part.

You, Sir, will be pleaſed to communicate theſe Particulars to the Governor of Bengal, and acquaint me with the Reſult of it. What ſhall I ſay more?

From the Nabob Nizam Ally Khan: Received 23d July 1778.

When a Merchant of Bengal formerly came here with Rarities, and curious Productions of that Quarter, I diſcourſed with him on the Treaty which ſubſiſted between me and Row Pundit Purdhaun, Madho Narain Row, of the deceitful Murder of Narrain Row by Ragonaut Row, his Expedition againſt me, the War which enſued, his ſubſequent Defeat, and the Renewal of my Engagements on the firmeſt Baſis with Pundit Purdhaun; all which Particulars I enlarged upon to the ſaid Merchant, that he might give you a minute Detail of them, which I doubt not he did. Some Time ago, when Colonel Upton quitted Poorunder, and returned by the Route of Hyderabad, he paid me a Viſit: I took the Opportunity of diſcourſing largely with him of the bad Faith and invincible Villainy of Ragonaut Row, and of the Renewal of the Treaty between me and Pundit Purdhaun, and ſhewed him the Treaty which the Governor of Madras had contracted with me, of which (if you are deſirous of it) I will ſend you a Copy for your Inſpection. The Treaty I allude to declares, that my Enemies are the Company's, and the Company's Enemies mine; that the Company ſhall not protect the Enemies of my Government, and in like Manner, I ſhall not protect the Enemies of theirs; I therefore aſked Colonel Upton, "whilſt ſuch a Treaty ſubſiſts, what is the Motive of giving Refuge to Ragonaut Row, the inveterate Enemy of my Government, and labouring at his Eſtabliſhment?"—Colonel Upton replied, "The King of England, who has ſent out a Company to Bengal (Council I ſuppoſe he means) did it ſolely with this View, that they might fully inform themſelves of all the Treaties which had been contracted with every Power, and comply with the Terms of them."

It ſeems that the Nazim of Bengal is unacquainted with this Treaty, as I have received repeated Advice that the Deſign of eſtabliſhing Ragonaut Row is again taken up, and that he is levying Armies: What can be the Deſign of this I cannot fully penetrate. When it is clearly expreſſed in the Treaty, that the Enemies of my Government are the Enemies of the Company, and the Enemies of the Company my Enemies, to what can I attribute this Deſign, except your Ignorance that ſuch Treaty exiſts, or by ſuppoſing that the Treaty being made by the Company at Madras, is not binding on the Company at Bombay: One or other of theſe Suppoſitions I muſt abide by. My Meaning in what I have above written is this; that if you have any Quarrel with Pundit Purdhaun, on any other Account than that of Ragonaut Row, it matters not to me, I have nothing to do with it; but if you engage in Hoſtilities with Pundit Purdhaun on Account of Ragonaut Row, as I am inviolable in my Engagements, and am bound by a firm Treaty to Pundit Purdhaun in caſe Ragonaut Row makes War on him, it becomes my indiſpenſable Duty, in conſequence of ſuch Engagement, to give my Aſſiſtance to Row Pundit Purdhaun: You will in ſuch Caſe refer to the Treaty I have before alluded to. It was neceſſary to intimate theſe Particulars to you, and I have accordingly done ſo.

Should you aſk, Why did the Rulers at Poona receive a French Vackeel? the Anſwer is this: After the Departure of Colonel Upton, and his Arrival with you, freſh Advices were received, that Preparations were making at Bombay to bring back Ragonaut Row. In the mean Time a French Vackeel arriving at Poona, in conſequence of the Reports which prevailed univerſally that Ragonaut Row was again becoming formidable, the Poona Miniſters detained him with them, arguing thus: If the Peace eſtabliſhed by Colonel Upton is preſerved, it is well; in caſe it ſhould be broken, it is political to have the French Vackeel. On theſe Grounds they detained him, notwithſtanding which, when I heard it I wrote to them in the ſtrongeſt Terms, on the Impropriety of their keeping a French Vackeel with them, and they accordingly gave him his Diſmiſſion, and I doubt not he is already ſet off.

APPENDIX, N° 75.

To the Nabob Nizam ul Dowlah: Written 24th July.

YOUR friendly Letter arrived in a fortunate Hour, and made me happy by its Contents. You write— [Here follows a Repetition of the Subſtance of this Letter.]

The Fact is this: It is now more than a Year ſince an Agent from the Court of France arrived at

Poona, and commenced a Negociation with the Miniſters there, for the Formation of an Alliance between the French and the Marattas; nearly about the ſame Time we were informed, by authentic Advices from England, that the King of France had formed the Plan of an Alliance with the Marattas, for the Purpoſe of aſſiſting him in his Hoſtilities againſt the Engliſh; and we have ſince received a certain Knowledge, that Engagements have actually been executed between the Miniſters of Poona and the French Agent, in conſideration of which the latter is to bring a Force of Europeans and Military Stores to Poona; and this Engagement ſubſiſts, notwithſtanding the Friendſhip which was contracted between the Maratta State and the Company, and notwithſtanding the Changes which have taken place in that Adminiſtration; of this I repeat that I have a certain Knowledge: In the mean Time War has been declared between the Engliſh Nation and the French. The Foreknowledge of all theſe Circumſtances induced me to prepare a Force to be ſent to Bombay, not for the Support of Ragonaut Row, to whom this Government is under no Engagement, nor to make War with the Miniſters with whom we are in Friendſhip, but in Conformity to the Duties incumbent on this Government, charged with the Care and Protection of all the Engliſh Poſſeſſions in India, for the Purpoſe of ſecuring the Preſidency of Bombay, which is now expoſed to a War with our declared Enemies the French, and may be alſo involved in one with the Marattas, for ſuch are their apparent Deſigns. If theſe Deſigns really exiſt, we ſhall certainly oppoſe them with all our Power; and the Miniſters, by making themſelves our Enemies, are alſo yours, and by Treaty you are bound to oppoſe them as ſuch, not to take a Part with them: If, on the contrary, the Deſigns attributed to them have been erroneouſly ſurmiſed, or they, refraining from the Dictates of Enmity and bad Faith, ſhould relinquiſh them, we ſhall undertake nothing prejudicial to their Intereſts, but our Friendſhip and the ſucceſsful Operation of our Arms will eventually prove a Benefit to them. The Sum of all I have ſaid is this: We are the Friends of the Peiſhwa and of the Miniſters of Poona, and ſhall continue whilſt they are our Friends; we ſhall be their Enemies, if they compel us to be ſuch by becoming our Enemies; and you, by the Treaty which you have quoted, and the Precepts which you have preſcribed for my Conduct, will remain their Friend, or become their Enemy, from the ſame Cauſes.

As I wiſh to preſerve inviolable the Friendſhip and Engagements which ſubſiſt between you and the Company, I have thought proper to give you this Explanation of my Conduct, and have no Doubt but you, actuated by the ſame Motives, will adopt ſuch Meaſures as may tend to the Confirmation and daily Increaſe of our Friendſhip, which muſt be attended with the greateſt mutual Advantages.

Knowing me ever anxious for your Welfare, let me frequently have the Pleaſure to hear from you.

APPENDIX, N° 76.

From Nizam ul Dowlah: Received 28th January 1779.

I Have received the Letter you did me the Favour to write, and perfectly underſtand the Contents of what you ſay in Reply to my former Letter, as well as on the Subject of your Determination to preſerve the Faith of former Treaties; your having no Intention to ſupport Ragonaut Row, or Wiſh to engage in Hoſtilities with the Poona Miniſters.

The good Faith I have found in the Company exceeds what I have experienced from any other Power, and imagining that you might not be acquainted with all the Treaties executed by the Company, I formerly wrote you full Information on that Head, and God be praiſed you are ſteady and firm in your Adherence to former Treaties! With reſpect to what you write on the Subject of Ragonaut Row, the Conduct you have purſued is ſuch as the Faith of Treaty required.

I formerly in the ſtrongeſt Terms deſired the Poona Miniſters not to give Encouragement to the French Vackeel: They are now aſhamed of their Conduct, and have not the leaſt Idea of connecting themſelves with the French; but ſhould the leaſt Symptom of ſuch a Deſign be proved on them, I will give immediate Information to you, and withdraw myſelf from my Engagements with them; you may be perfectly aſſured of this.

Let me frequently have the Pleaſure to hear from you the Events and Occurrences of that Quarter.

APPENDIX, N° 77.

Enclosures in a Letter from Mr. Moslyn: Received 31st July 1778.

N° 1. Copy of a Letter from Balajee Jennarjam to Nizam ul Dowlah.

THE Disturbances on Foot owe their Rise to certain Persons who set Justice at Defiance, and have invited Dada from Bombay; but your sacred Mind may be perfectly satisfied that they will effect nothing, for Siccaram Baboo is joined with me: I hope that when I require Troops from you, you will dispatch Zuffer ul Dowlah Bahadre to this Quarter with the greatest Expedition, and that your Highness will repair in Person to Aurungabad, and canton there; that awed and terrified by your Vicinitude, no Person may be able to get Head; the ambitious English will not effect any Thing: We shall manage the English by Means of the French, whose Vackeel is with us, with whom we have entered into a Treaty. After the present Disturbances are quelled, we shall call in his Troops, and act in the most vigorous Manner, to be a future Example to others. You will learn further Particulars from the Arzee of Kishen Row Billal. I have nothing to add but Assurances of my Respect.

N° 2. Copy of a Treaty concluded through the Vackeel Monsieur St. Lubin, by Balajee Jennajun, as follows:

After an End is put to the Disturbances of Moojee Pundit, which will shortly be easily effected, you shall call Forces from your own Country, and in Conjunction with the Army of Seremunt Sahib, which shall join you, you will act in the most vigorous Manner; for which Service a Jaghire shall be bestowed on you from the Peshwa's Sirkar: But you must remain quiet at present; the Opportunity of acting will shortly present itself, and the Nation which has presumptuously set itself up and adopted Maxims of Injustice, and by its Influence protected many Persons who set Right at Defiance, shall be properly dealt with, and receive the Punishment due to their Actions: Dated the 15th of Rubbee Assaine in the 19th Year of the Reign, or 13th of May Anno Domini 1778.

APPENDIX, N° 78.

Intelligence from the Decan; received the 23d of June 1778.

RAGONAUT Row, before he began his March from Bombay, dispatched Ummajee Mahadar to Hyder Naig, informing him, that the English of Bombay were of his Party; and that, if he wished to promote his Interest, he would march from the Jungbudder, and join him; and by Means of their united Force, his Affairs would be satisfactorily concluded. Hyder Naig replied, That he was then engaged in a War, but that as soon as it was at an End, he would attend to his Interests. Ummajee Mahadoa is still with him, (3d of Rubbee Assance, 1st May.)

Siccaram Pundit, Nanna Purnaveese, &c. have written to Hurry Pundit Purdkea and Sindia. It appears that they can do nothing without the Concurrence of Hurry Pundit Purdkea, who is become very powerful, having near 60,000 Horse with him, exclusive of the Force under Sindia and Dhoulsa. Nanna Purnaveese and Hurry Pundit are in their Hearts united in the Design to keep the Government in the Hands of Mhadoo Row, the Son of Narrain Row, and to give the Dewanny to Bajee Row, the Son of Ragonaut Row, an Infant of Three Years old, with Moraba Purnaveese for his Naib, and to leave the Administration in the Hands of Ragonaut Row, until Madho Row and Bajee Row arrive at the Age of Maturity; but that he shall conduct the Business with the Advice of Nanna Purnaveese and Siccaram Pundit, to keep up an Union amongst the several Chiefs, and to transact the Business on the former Plan.

APPENDIX, N° 79.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 18th July 1778.

THE Governor General--As the Time will not admit of any Delay in raiſing the Three Battalions of Sepoys, which are to be maintained by Rajah Cheyt Sing, I propoſe that the Commander in Chief be deſired to give Orders immediately for that Purpoſe.

Agreed to. The following Letter is therefore written to Brigadier General Stibbert.

To Brigadier General Giles Stibbert.

Sir,

We have already acquainted you with our Reſolution, to cauſe Three Battalions of Sepoys to be raiſed and maintained at the Expence of Rajah Cheyt Sing, for the Defence of the Company's Poſſeſſions: As the preſent Criſis will not admit of Delay, we requeſt that you will give the neceſſary Orders for raiſing and forming theſe Corps with all poſſible Expedition.

We are, &c.

Fort William,
18th July 1778.

To Rajah Chite Sing: D°.

War having been declared between the Courts of Great Britain and France, by the former on the 18th of March, or 18th of Suffer, and by the latter on the 30th of March, or 1ſt of Rubbee-ul-awal 1192, Hejeree, I am to requeſt of you, in my own Name and that of the Board, as a Subject of the Company, bound to promote their Intereſt on every Occaſion, to contribute your Share of the Burden of the preſent War, which will equally affect your Intereſt and ours. It has been determined by the Board, that an Eſtabliſhment of Three regular Battalions of Sepoys, to be commanded by Britiſh Officers, be raiſed and maintained at your Expence, and employed on ſuch Service as the Situation of Affairs may require. I have no Doubt but, regarding this Meaſure equally conducive to your own and the Company's Intereſt, you will with the greateſt Readineſs comply; and I hope you will intimate your Conſent without Delay.

From Maha Raja Chite Sing; received 30th July 1778.

I have been honoured by the Receipt of your gracious Letter, communicating the Intelligence of a War having broke out between the Courts of Great Britain and France; and deſiring me to take on myſelf a Share of the Burden of Expence. My Patron, I am the Servant of the Sirkar. I will write you more fully hereafter. On all Occaſions I am hopeful of your Highneſs Favour and Support.

APPENDIX, N° 80.

From Rajah Chite Sing: Received 28th September 1778.

I HAVE been honoured by your gracious Letter, deſiring that I will as a Subject of the Company, take on myſelf the Payment of Five Lacks of Muchledar Rupees, as my Proportion of the Expence of the preſent War, and pay them to Mr. Graham: Although I have no Ability left, and the great Burden of Expence I laboured under from the Time of the Deceaſe of the late Rajah, till the Expiration of the Nabob's Vizier's Authority over me is well known to God and your Excellency; yet ſolely with a View to a Compliance with your Orders, and to prove my Fidelity, having ſold and pledged every thing belonging to me, I will make good the aforeſaid Sum in Inſtalments in Six or Seven Months. Although by parting with my Effects, which are clearly neceſſary, I am left in a

State of Inability for the future, yet you will ſhew me ſuch Favour, that I ſhall again recover myſelf.

As a Time is required for the State of my Effects, and raiſing the Money, I hope from your Kindneſs, that the Officers of Government may take from me in different Payments the ſaid Sum in Sonaut Rupees; as I ſhall not be able to procure this Sum in Muchledar Rupees; and that you will be graciouſly pleaſed to affix your Signature to my Requeſts, that I may apply myſelf with Satisfaction and Aſſiduity to the Buſineſs of the Sirkar.

To Rajah Chite Sing: D°.

I have been favoured with your Letter, intimating your Conſent to the Requiſition made to you by this Government as a Subject of the Company, to bear a Part of the Expence of the preſent War: I am pleaſed with your ready Compliance; of this indeed I could have no Doubt, as your Intereſt is equally concerned with the Company's in the Succeſs of it. The Expence of keeping up Three regular Battalions has been calculated, and found to amount to Five Lacks of Rupees per Annum, at which Rate your annual Subſidy has been accordingly fixed; I am therefore to deſire in the Name of this Government, that you will pay immediately to Mr. Thomas Graham the Sum of Five Lacks of Muchledar Rupees. Thus you will perform your Duty to the Company, and ſecure their Favour and Support.

APPENDIX, N° 81.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 4th May 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,

Richard Barwell, Philip Francis, Edward Wheler, } Eſquires.

READ the following Letters and Encloſure from the Reſident at the Nabob's Court.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I do myſelf the Honour to encloſe you Muſter Returns of his Excellency the Vizier's Body Guard, and the Three Battalions commanded by Major Hannay, for the Month of February laſt.

I have, &c.

(Signed) Nath' Middleton,
Reſident at the Vizier's Court.

Lucknow,
20th March 1778.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Encloſed I have the Honour to tranſmit you my Accounts for the Hindoo Month of Faugun, or from the 12th February to the 13th March 1778, Engliſh Stile, agreeably to the accompanying Liſt.

I have, &c.

(Signed) Nath' Middleton,
Reſident at the Vizier's Court.

Lucknow,
4th April 1778.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have been duly honoured with your Commands of the 9th March; and have the Pleaſure to acquaint you, that after being fully aſſured by Mr. Barwell of Fyzoola Cawn's neither keeping up any conſiderable Force, holding improper Correſpondence or Connections, or appearing in any Reſpect to have violated the Engagements he entered into in his Treaty with the late Nabob Sujah ul Dowla, I communicated to the Vizier the Honourable Board's Permiſſion to me to guarantee on the Part of the Honourable Company, the Treaty ſubſiſting between him and Fyzoola Cawn; provided his Excellency ſhould give his Concurrence to that Permiſſion

The Nabob having approved of the Purpoſes of Mr. Barwell's Miſſion, and being aſſured from his Report, and other concurrent Circumſtances, that Fyzoola Cawn's Conduct furniſhed no Grounds of

of Accuſation by which he could be juſtified in an Infringement of the Rights confirmed to him by Treaty, readily and without Heſitation conſented to a Renewal of the Treaty under Guarantee of the Honourable Company only, ſignifying his Expectations that ſome complimentary Preſent, conformable to conſtant Cuſtom, and ſuitable to his Rank, ſhould be made him by Fyzoola Cawn on the Delivery of the Khelaut: As I could not entertain a Doubt from Fyzoola Cawn's Anxiety for the Completion of this Buſineſs under the Sanction of the Honourable Board, but that he would of his own Accord be ready to ſhew the Vizier ſuch Marks of Gratitude and Reſpect as would manifeſt his due Conſideration of the great Obligation conferred on him, I preſumed to aſſure his Excellency he might certainly expect to receive on the Occaſion an Acknowledgment not diſparaging to his Rank and Dignity, nor betraying in Fyzoola Cawn a deficient Senſe of the Benefits he derived from an Alliance with his Excellency. From what I was able to diſcover in my Converſation with the Vizier, I have Reaſon to believe he looks not to any Sum which could be conſidered as a pecuniary Acquiſition, but confines his Expectations merely to ſuch complimentary Nuzzers as are uſually offered in Token of Reſpect by a ſubordinate to a ſuperior Power on ſimilar Occaſions: I have therefore taken upon me to deſire Mr. Barwell to repreſent this Matter in its proper Light to Fyzoola Cawn; and I have no Doubt but that Chief's Concurrence in whatever may be reaſonable and proper, will cloſe the Negociation in a Manner entirely ſatisfactory to the Vizier.

I have the Honour to encloſe for your Peruſal Copies of the Vizier's Treaty with Fyzoola Cawn, and of the Obligation which I have entered into in conſequence of the Authority you were pleaſed to delegate to me on the Part of the Honourable Company; and for your more particular Information, I muſt alſo beg Leave to trouble you with a complete Tranſcript of my Correſpondence with Mr. Barwell on the Subject of his Miſſion, commencing with my original Inſtructions, which I hope will meet with the Honourable Board's Approbation.

In Obedience to your Commands I have reſerved a Sum in my Hands amounting to Ten Lacks of Rupees, for the Uſe of the Detachment under Orders of March for Bombay, which I am converting as faſt as I poſſibly can into Gold Mohurs; but ſo ſmall is the Circulation of Gold Currency in theſe Parts, and ſo much is it the Practice among Men of Property to hoard it up, as Riches eaſily concealed, that I am afraid I ſhall not be able to procure any conſiderable Amount within the Time it may be wanted. The Honourable Board however will pleaſe to reſt aſſured that no Endeavours or Aſſiduity on my Part ſhall be wanting to ſecure as large a Sum as poſſible; as Gold Coinage, from the Facility of Carriage, muſt be infinitely preferable to Silver Specie, which would be extremely bulky and difficult of Conveyance.

The Reſervation of ſo conſiderable a Sum for the Service of the Bombay Detachment has neceſſarily fruſtrated my Intention of making the Honourable Board an immediate Remittance; however as the Seaſon of the heavy Collections is now arrived, and the Harveſt to all Appearance a very promiſing one, I flatter myſelf I ſhall ſhortly have repleniſhed my Treaſury, ſo as to admit of my carrying my former Intention into Effect, leaving a Sufficiency for the Exigencies of the Current Service.

I have, &c.

Lucknow,
10th April 1778.

(Signed) Nath[l] Middleton.

APPENDIX, N° 82.

From Nejif Khan; received 10th Auguſt 1778.

A Long Space of Time has elapſed ſince I have had the Pleaſure to hear from you, which gives the greateſt Pain to a Heart which abounds with Affection for you, and to which the News of your Welfare would communicate the greateſt Pleaſure. I hope from your ſincere Regard for me, that you will number me amongſt your moſt zealous Friends, and will frequently make me happy by your Letters.

In the Courſe of laſt Year you were kindly pleaſed to diſpatch Major Hannay, to ſtrengthen and confirm the Ties between us. The Wars in which I was then engaged with Zabita Khan, the Seiks and Marattas, would not admit of my diſmiſſing a certain Perſon, or of my inviting Major Hannay to come to me and acting agreeably to the Pleaſure of the Engliſh Chiefs. From theſe Events the Negociations commenced laſt Year were ſuſpended.

As I am deſirous at all Times and on all Occaſions to comply with the Will of the illuſtrious Chiefs, to which I will never act contrary, I requeſt that you will now give Directions to Major Hannay to repair to me without Delay. God willing, on his Arrival, every Thing ſhall be done agreeable to the Will of the illuſtrious Chiefs. My Zeal and Attachment to the Company is firmly rooted in my Heart. Your Excellency may be fully aſſured that I will never take any Step which

may be diſagreeable to the illuſtrious Chiefs; and if the Circumſtances and particular Occurrences of the Times, all the Particulars of which are well known to you, neceſſarily cauſed a Delay in my Compliance with the Wiſhes of the illuſtrious Chiefs, you muſt not impute it to me as a Fault. I am with my whole Heart and Soul attached to the Company, from whom I have alſo Expectations of great Advantages. How can it then be ſuppoſed that I would act in ſuch a Manner as to deſtroy them? Your Excellency may rely on this with the moſt implicit Confidence, and ſend Major Hannay, when every thing ſhall be conducted agreeably to your Wiſhes.

Knowing me entirely attached to you, I hope that till I have the Happineſs of a Meeting with you, you will favour me with frequent Letters and Commiſſions, which will be the Cauſe of the greateſt Joy to me.

Intelligence of Tranſactions at the Royal Durbar, from the 1ſt of Rujjub to the 4th, or from the 26th to the 29th of July; received the 20th Auguſt.

A News-paper was preſented from the Camp of Nejif Cooley Khan, mentioning, that the ſaid Khan had taken from the Fort of Shaheepore ſeveral Pieces of Artillery, and a Magazine of Grain, and had diſtributed the latter amongſt his Sepoys; that having given the Fort into the Charge of one of his Creatures, an Afghan, he marched from thence with Afraſcal Khan, againſt the Fort of Kaeſur, where the Sons of Chatter Jaut reſide, who not being able to oppoſe him, commenced a Negociation for the Payment of a further Tribute, which is not yet concluded.

An Arzie was then preſented from the Nabob Mujed-ul-Dowlah, ſetting forth, that the Nabob Zoolfikar-ul-Dowlah had conceived a Hatred to him, and was coming to the Preſence with a Determination to proſecute his evil Intentions againſt him; that this Circumſtance, joined to the Clamours of the Sepoys and the Servants of the Mohul, had placed him in the moſt alarming Situation. His Majeſty having peruſed it, replied, the Servants of the Mohul, &c. will undoubtedly inſiſt on the Payment of their Dues, and with reſpect to his Acculation of the Nabob Zoolfikar-ul-Dowlah, why does he act in ſuch Manner as to draw on himſelf his Hatred and Reſentment, he points himſelf out as the Object of his Vengeance; we are therefore remedileſs. At this Inſtant News was brought that the Sepoys had ſurrounded the Houſe of the Nabob Mujed-ul-Dowlah in a clamorous Manner, on which his Majeſty ſent a Meſſage to Litafut Ally Khan, to go and appeaſe the Diſturbance; ſoon after which an Arzie was preſented from the Nabob Mujed-ul-Dowlah, that Litafut Ally Khan had quelled the Diſturbance, but that he had no Money in his Hands from whence to pay them their Arrears, and that notwithſtanding he had made the moſt preſſing Inſtances to the Jewellers to lend Money on the Royal Jewels to receive them in Pawn, agreeable to his Majeſty's Directions for raiſing Money for defraying the Expence of the Nuptials of the Princeſſes, they had abſolutely refuſed to lend any Money on them. His Majeſty having read it, ſaid, It is plain that Mujed-ul-Dowla's evil Day is arrived. Hiſſum-ul Dowlah made Attempts of the ſame Nature, and met with the Chaſtiſement of his Demerits. Mujed-ul Dowlah has acted treacherouſly, and embezzled the Income of the Provinces, and when having no other Reſource we ordered our Jewels to be depoſited and Money raiſed on them, he has contrived to fruſtrate his Intent. It is plain from this that he deſigns to ruin himſelf after the Example of Hiſſum-ul-Dowlah.

Intelligence of Mujed-ul-Dowlah.

At a Muſter taken of the Sepoys there were great Clamours for their Arrears, and many of the Najeeb Sepoys inſiſted on immediate Payment from Roſſe Khan their Chief, over whom they placed a Guard. The Nabob being alarmed ſtationed Guards at his Houſe, with Orders to oppoſe and chaſtiſe any of the Nejub Sepoys who ſhould attempt to enter; on hearing this a Party of them went and attacked the Houſe and penetrated to the Burradery; in this Dilemma the Nabob ſent to Litafut Ally Khan, who came and appeaſed the Rioters with a Promiſe of full Payment in Three Months, and the Diſtribution of 16,000 Rupees amongſt them in Part of their Arrears.

Untajee and Babojee Holcar have excuſed their not repairing to the Preſence immediately, having their Hands full of Buſineſs, and promiſed to go as ſoon as they have Leiſure; this is a great Diſappointment to Mujed-ul-Dowlah, who told their Vackeel that if they came before the Arrival of Nejif Khan they might obtain what they pleaſed, but after that Event their coming would be needleſs.

Goolloo, the Eunuch, brought more Jewels from his Majeſty, with a Meſſage to Mujed ul Dowlah to borrow 30,000 Rupees on thoſe and the former Jewels, and to depoſit them with the Lender. The Nabob ſent for Jewellers, and again preſſed them to lend Money on them; but they would on no Account conſent, ſaying they would never agree to receive the Royal Jewels in Pawn; that they had much rather be baniſhed the City.

The Nabob Nejif Khan ſet out from Deeg for Ackberabad on the 3d of Rujjub, 28th of July, and arrived there on the 5th of Rujjub, or 30th July.

ıtelligence of the Nabob Aſoph ul Dowlah, from the 5th to the 8th of Rujjub, from 30th of July to the 2d of Auguſt.

The Nabob is highly diſpleaſed againſt Hoſſein Reza Khan and Hyder Khan: Mr. Middleton ıoke to him in their Favour, and was anſwered by the Nabob, "Theſe Two unfaithful Wretches ıve ruined both my Family and my Dominions; ſpeak not in their Favour." The Nabob then di-ɛted Meaun Ulmaus to appoint Officers of his own, and ſend them into the Diſtricts under his harge, and to pay a Nuzzir of 10 Lacks of Rupees, and he would appoint him to the Niabut in ıe room of Hoſſein Reza Khan. Meaun Ulmaus half conſented, but it is not yet certain what will ; the Event.

(Note, There is no Appendix N° 83, the Subject Matter being inſerted elſewhere.)

APPENDIX, N° 84.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 31ſt Auguſt 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler,
} Eſquires.

READ the following Letters from Colonel Leſlie:

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I beg Leave to tranſmit you herewith a Duplicate of my Addreſs to you of the 13th inſtant; ſince at Period little Alteration has happened in this Quarter.

The Troops of Anrood Sing, alarmed by the Swelling of the Kaine from the heavy Rains that ve lately fallen, precipitately croſſed the River, with Intentions to cover the Road to Panna; and ey have poſted themſelves between the Paſs of Moncaow and the Bed of the River, having thrown Entrenchments with ſtrong Breaſt Works along the oppoſite Bank, to defend the Paſſage of the ver. The Rajah himſelf is there with his principal Miniſters and Officers, and Himut Cawn, who as the Chief Sirdar at Mhow, has joined him with moſt of his Troops. By all Accounts they are great Conſternation at the ill Succeſs of their treacherous Deſigns. Their Troops are much diſ-artened by the Loſs they ſuffered at Mhow, and are much diſguſted at their being kept in the Field ring this Seaſon, labouring under the Want of Proviſions and of Caſh: They have even declared ey will not ſtand an Attack of our Troops, whatever their Chiefs may wiſh to undertake.

Ballajee is, I am informed, making Preparations to receive me on the Sagur Route; and I have had y certain Intelligence, that a Freebooter, formerly in the Service of Janoojee, is on his March to in Ballajee with a Body of near 5,000 Cavalry.

Yeſterday Evening I received an Expreſs from Mr. Boddam, Chief of Surat, covering a Letter rom the Bombay Preſidency. They contain News of a moſt intereſting Nature to the Compaany's Affairs; and leſt any Delay ſhould happen in the Conſequence of this Intelligence immediately to Calcutta, I deemed it neceſſary to tranſmit Copies of them to the Honourable the Governor General, y an expreſs Coſſid laſt Night. Authenticated Copies of theſe Letters I now do myſelf the Honour o lay before the Board.

My Train of Carriages have undergone a thorough Repair during my Stay here, and I am ıſing all Speed in compleating my Deficiencies of Draft and Carriage Cattle. A very few Days vill enable me to proſecute my March, I hope, as I now only wait the collecting the ſmall Stock of Grain to attend my Camp; which Precaution appears abſolutely neceſſary by the Steps Ballajee taking to obſtruct my Advance, and the Junction of theſe Troops will afford him a greater Op-rtunity of attempting it. You may depend on my utmoſt Attention to the Wiſh expreſſed in Bombay Preſidency's Letter in uſing all Expedition; and every Faculty of mine ſhall be exerted, effect as ſpeedy an Advance as can be made through a Tract of Country yet but little known, d the Delays I muſt expect to encounter at this Seaſon of the Year, by the Swelling of the ıny Nullas and Rivers, which this Country abounds with.

I am, with the higheſt Reſpect,
&c. &c.
(Signed) Matt" Leſlie.

Chatterpore,
25th July 1778.

Secret Department.

To Colonel Leſlie: Received July 24th Noon.

Sir,

We have received your Letter of the 14th May, and hope ſoon to hear you are well advanced on your March.

Mr. Moſtyn has obtained from Tookajee Holcar, and tranſmitted to you, Orders for the free Paſſage of the Army under your Command through his Dominions; ſo that we flatter ourſelves you will meet with no Obſtructions or Impediments in your March to this Place.

We have no further Inſtructions or Information to add to thoſe contained in our Letter of the 5th Inſtant, already forwarded by Seven different Routes, only that you will purſue your March with all poſſible Diligence, which we doubt not will be accelerated by a Circumſtance Mr. Bodcam will apprize you of, and to which you will give full Credit. We do not mention it ourſelves, there being leſs Danger of a Letter from Surat being intercepted, and it does not appear you are furniſhed with a Cypher.

We are your moſt obedient humble Servants,

(Signed)

Bombay Caſtle,
19th June 1778.

W. Aſhburner,
And[r] Ramſay,
W[m] Hornby,
John Carnac,
D[l] Draper,
Henry Moore,
N[l] Stackhouſe.

A true Copy.
(Signed) Matt[w] Leſlie.

APPENDIX, N° 85.

Letter from the Governor General and Council.

Gentlemen,

Received at Bombay, 27th Sept. 1778. Sel. Conſ.

WE have received your Letters, dated the 25th ultimo, by the Terrible.

That no Time may be loſt in conveying our Sentiments to you, we ſend this by different Routes, to acquaint you, that we approve your Reſolution of the 21ſt July, and authorize you to aſſiſt Ragoba with a Military Force, to conduct him to Poona, and to eſtabliſh him in the Regency there, on the following expreſs Proviſions:

Firſt. That it do not interfere with any Engagement formed with Moodajee Bouncello by Mr. Elliott, and previous Notice to you by him.

Second. That your lateſt Advices from Europe ſhall be equal to an Aſſurance, that the Force required for this Service may be ſpared, without endangering the Safety of Bombay, in the Event of a French Invaſion.

Third. That the Engagement you may form with Ragoba himſelf, or Moraba and his Aſſociates, be not contrary to thoſe concluded with Moodajee by Mr. Elliott, and noticed to you; nor of a hoſtile Tendency to the Government of Berar.

We are,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient Servants,

Fort William,
17th Auguſt 1778.

Warren Haſtings,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler.

P. S. We have received the Letters from the Preſident and Council, dated 31ſt May, 3, 12, 15 and 25 June, and 6th July.

APPENDIX, N° 86.

Extract of Secret Letter from Bombay: Dated 14th March 1778; received in London 29th July 1778.

Par. 2. ENCLOSED is Duplicate of our Addreſs by that Ship * in the Secret Department. We therein fully mentioned the Overtures which had been made to us through Mr. Lewis, for the Aſſiſtance of the Company to carry Ragoba to Poona, and our Reaſons for not proceeding further in the Buſineſs. * The Hawke

3. We have ſince had the Satisfaction of receiving the moſt complete Sanction and Approbation of the Governor General and Council, to the Plan and Principle upon which we had determined to proceed; which that you may the more clearly comprehend, we encloſe a Copy of our Minutes, and of the Letter and Reſolutions of the Governor General and Council in conſequence.

4. The Failure of this promiſing Scheme may in a great Meaſure be aſcribed to the Diſtruſt entertained by Ragoba's Friends, of our Want of Power to fulfil our Engagements. Moraba's Words to Mr. Lewis were "If we enter into Buſineſs, let us go through it heartily; let there be no Excuſe "on the Part of the Governor and Council afterwards, that they have received Orders to make a "Peace, *as they did before.*" This Objection may be now entirely removed, if the Party are ſincere in the Attachment they have profeſſed for Ragoba, and are really deſirous of the Company's Aſſiſtance to conduct him to Poona. We therefore tranſmitted to Mr. Moſtyn, on the 10th Inſtant, a Copy of the Reſolutions of the Governor General and Council, and have not heard from him ſince.

5. The Neceſſity of taking ſome Meaſures to anticipate the Deſigns of the French, and to counteract the Party in the Poona Government, inimical to the Company, appears every Day more imminent. The Governor General and Council's Approbation is too much confined to the particular Plan propoſed to them, without giving us any more general Latitude to act as Circumſtances might require, which we had very ſtrongly preſſed them to do; ſo that at laſt we may be obliged either to hazard the Conſequences of acting without Authority from them, or paſſively behold the very Exiſtence of the Company endangered, without making an Effort to preſerve it.

10. From Mr. Moſtyn's Advices there appears little or no Proſpect of the diſputed Articles of the Treaty being adjuſted, or of obtaining Satisfaction on any one of the Points given in Charge to him; of which indeed we almoſt give up all Hopes whilſt the preſent Government ſubſiſts.

11. Your Servants at Madras have acquainted us, in a Letter dated the 15th January, that they did not think it ſafe or prudent to ſpare the Whole or any Part of the Force we had wrote for; becauſe, as they ſay, the preſent Poſture of Affairs gives them Reaſon to apprehend a War with France, and their Eſtabliſhment was incomplete and inſufficient for the Defence of the Poſſeſſions belonging to the Nabob, the Company, and the Rajah of Tanjore, whom they had taken lately under their Protection; becauſe the unfiniſhed State of the Fortifications there and at Tanjore would render it unſafe to detach any Part of the Force ſtationed for their Security, even was their Eſtabliſhment complete.

APPENDIX, N° 87.

Bombay Secret Conſultations, the 29th March 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable William Hornby, Eſquire, Preſident, and Governor,
The W. John Carnac, Eſquire, Daniel Draper,
Nath. Stackhouſe, Wm Aſhburner,
Andrew Ramſay.

Honourable Sir,

ADDRESSED you early Yeſterday Morning, and this is purpoſely to adviſe you of the Revolution I have ſo long expected. About Noon Morabah accompanied by Chintoo Wittul and Tarro, Sunker's Son, with about 10,000 Horſe, came and encamped on the other Side of the River, nd immediately ſent 50 Horſe into Town, 25 of which went to the Palace, and the reſt, through ll the Streets, directing the Inhabitants in Ragoba's Name to open their Shops, and not to run way, on Pain of Puniſhment, for they had nothing to fear; the Appearance of ſo large a Force,

without knowing who they were, had put the Town into the utmoſt Confuſion, and every Body was moving off as faſt as poſſible; at 1 o'Clock Morabah came into Town, and went directly to the Palace to pay his Reſpects to Perwettybah, who immediately inveſted him with the Sirapan of Duan, and preſented him with the Mutalick, Sicca, Cataree, Nobut, and Terree Putca; Morabah after removing all the old Chowkies out of the Palace, and placing his own People, alſo putting a Chowkie on the Houſe of Nana's Duan, and receiving the Compliments of Viſſagee Punt Beney, Sadaſſew Ramchunder, and Janabah, the Governor of the Town, being the only People of Conſequence left, returned accompanied by them to his Tent on the other Side of the River. This Letter would have been diſpatched in the Evening, but having ſent my Man to Morabah with Compliments of Congratulation, and to learn what further Steps he intended to take, I waited for his Return. He is this Moment come, and gives me the following Particulars: On his Arrival at Morabah's Tent he found Morabah with Butchaba Pronder and Chintoo Wittul, were gone to meet Holcar, who is come and encamped about Three Coſs off; that Sacram had left Pronder and reached Cowree about Six Coſs diſtant, and would join Morabah in the Morning; that the Whole of their Forces now here amounted to 30,000; this Intelligence I have had confirmed by other Hands, with the Addition, that Cruſt Row Belal and Mhada Row Jada Roi, were both coming. On Morabah's Return from Holcar, my Man met him, but had only Time to give my Compliments, when Morabah deſired him to ſtay; that he muſt go to his Victuals, having eat nothing all Day, come 15 Coſs in the Morning, and been buſy ever ſince; my Man waited until near 11 o'Clock, and finding he did not come out, ſent to deſire to ſpeak to him; he was ſent for, but there was ſuch a Concourſe of People to pay their Reſpects, that Morabah could only return his Compliments, and requeſt I would ſend him again in the Morning. I am alſo informed, that after all the Party is met they intend to march to Pronder; it may therefore be ſome Days before I ſee Morabah, unleſs he ſends for me; in which Caſe I ſhall not heſitate going, as Sacram and in ſhort the whole of the Government except Nannah, are here. I do ſuppoſe, they will determine ſoon to ſend ſome Perſons of Conſequence to Bombay to ſettle Matters and to attend Ragoba if he comes; in which Caſe it is probable they will deſire me to accompany them, therefore to ſave Time I ſhould be glad to have your Directions on this Point. I am ſorry to find the Party are likely to ſucceed ſo eaſily, for I ſee no Reſource Nannah has but to come into Morabah's Terms, or to fly into one of his Forts, which are Logur and Perletgur, but the latter is by moſt judged to be the Place; ſhould Nannah condeſcend to make up Matters, I fear it may induce the Party to comply wholly with Ragoba's Treaty; and ſhould Ragoba refuſe to accept of their Invitation on any other Terms, Morabah and his Party may look upon themſelves as abſolved from the Oath they gave to Ragoba, which is the Reaſon of their having made this Effort, and think no more of them. Our Conſideration ſeems now to be, whether it would not be more advantageous for the Company to recede ſomething, and thereby fix Ragoba in the Government with a Body of our Troops, and remain in ſtrict Friendſhip with the Maratta State, and conſequently entirely ſhut out our natural Enemies the French, and all other Europeans, than by perſiſting in a full Compliance of the Treaty, have Ragoba thrown upon our Hands without any further Proſpect; at Variance with this Government, leave all Hopes of any future Advantage from them even by the preſent Treaty, than what we are in abſolute Poſſeſſion of, and give them an Opening to admit the French or any other Power they pleaſe. This is only conjectural, and what has occurred to me may be the Caſe; for I cannot tell what may be their ultimate Reſolutions on this Head until I talk with them.

The Revolution has ſet the French Captain at Liberty to come here; I ſaw him this Evening, and he tells me he has received a Letter from Monſieur Picott, dated Myhie the 29th January, informing him that his Ship would leave Pondicherry the 5th February, in Company with the Brilliante; that Monſieur Bellcombe was on board the latter, and purpoſes proceeding in her up the Coaſt as high as Surat, where he intends ſtaying the Rains. I know not what may be his Views, but by the Time he reaches Myhie he will have full Knowledge of Lubin's Conduct and Character here, not only from the Officer of the Veſſel he ſent up, but alſo from a Black Spy who talks French, he ſent here in the Character of a Merchant, and who found Means to get to live with Lubin, by which Means he got at all his Proceedings. He alſo learnt from the Captain every Thing reſpecting him, and what paſſed between the Durbar and Lubin. Lubin at laſt heard this Man often viſited the Captain, and ſuſpecting his Errand, acquainted Nannah therewith, who directly ordered him to be watched and if poſſible ſeized; in conſequence the Fellow was one Day purſued, but got off by running into the Captain's Houſe and deſired to be ſecreted; this raiſed the Captain's Curioſity, and he queſtioned the Man particularly; when he candidly confeſſed his Errand, and that he was employed by Bellcombe, who having heard various Reports concerning Lubin and the Captain, ſent him to know the Truth, and that he was ordered to meet Bellcombe at Myhie; the Man further told the Captain he came to Poona in Company with Two Madras Pattamars bound to Bombay, who promiſed to call on him in their Way back; one of theſe Pattamars was ſeized, ſuppoſing him to be the Man, but Nannah finding his Miſtake only kept him one Night, and next Morning ſent him with a Guard out of Town, to prevent his making a Complaint to me; this Affair happened about Twelve Days ago. Theſe Circumſtances, with the Views of the Alteration in the Government, will I hope induce Bellcombe to lay aſide his Scheme of coming up to Surat. Monſieur Lubin has already met with ſome Diſgrace by Morabah's taking away the Elephant lent him to carry his Colours; and I flatter myſelf he will ſoon be glad to quit Poona, unleſs detained by the Captain, who has Thoughts of complaining to Morabah for Money owing to him by Lubin,

bin and get him made a Priſoner; if the Captain cannot do this, he is in Hopes Bellcombe, who is a Relation to Belfond the Owner of the Sartine, will ſtop at Choul and demand of the Government that Lubin be delivered up to him. I will uſe my Endeavours that Lubin be ſent away before this can happen, otherwiſe it may lead to an Intercourſe by no Means for our Intereſt.

As I do not intend to addreſs you publicly until I have talked with Morabah or Saccaram Bappoo, or ſomebody for them, I beg you will be pleaſed to lay before the Board ſuch Parts of this Letter as you may judge neceſſary and proper.

I am very reſpectfully,
Honourable Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
Tho' Moſtyn.

Poona,
the 27th March,
One o'Clock, Morning.

The following Letter to Mr. Moſtyn was immediately ſigned and diſpatched from the Council Table.

Sir,

The Preſident has laid before us your Letter dated the 27th, at One in the Morning.

In the preſent unſettled State of the new Government, and until we receive more particular Advices from you, we cannot give any preciſe Directions for your Conduct; but as you are well acquainted with our Views and Sentiments, we do hereby empower you to act as you may think moſt conſiſtent with thoſe Views and the Intereſt of the Honourable Company, until we can give you more particular Inſtructions.

As it will be of the utmoſt Importance to effect the Diſmiſſion of Monſieur Lubin from Poona before the Arrival of Monſieur Bellcombe, you will uſe your utmoſt Addreſs to effect this Point; but in ſuch a Manner as not to appear too anxious about it, which the new Government might endeavour to take Advantage of.

We are,
Your loving Friends,
William Hornby, &c.

Bombay Caſtle,
29th March 1778.
6 P. M.

APPENDIX, N° 88.

Bombay Secret Conſultations, the 6th April 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable William Hornby, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor,
The W. John Carnac, Eſquire, Daniel Draper,
Nath. Stackhouſe, Willm Aſhburner,
Andrew Ramſay.

READ the Letter received Yeſterday from the Governor General and Council, &c.

If the French ſhould now ſucceed in getting an Eſtabliſhment at Choul, the Conſequence muſt reſt entirely with the Governor General and Council, as we have done every thing in our Power to defeat their Deſigns; not only by our repeated Repreſentations at the Court of Poona, and our Application to Sir Edward Vernon, but by the Reference we made to the Governor General and Council, whether we ſhould not purſue more active Meaſures, to prevent the Execution of a Plan ſo replete with Dangers to the Company's Poſſeſſions. Their Anſwer, now before us, confines our Efforts to an Appeal to the Maratta Government; and if that ſhould fail of Succeſs, the Conſequences, as we ſaid before, muſt reſt with them.

The Preſident lays before us, a Letter to him from Mr. Moſtyn, as entered hereafter; by which we find there was to be a Meeting of the principal Members of the new Government about the 4th or 5th of this Month, when we may expect to receive Propoſals reſpecting Ragoba, and be at more Certainty with regard to their Intentions, until when we cannot come to any direct Reſolutions.

However, if the Terms expected by the Company ſhould become a Subject of Diſcuſſion between Mr. Moſtyn and Morabah, he muſt conſtantly give him to underſtand that we ſhall expect a

full Confirmation of the Grants made by Ragoba; it will be Time enough hereafter to relax in our Demands, if we ſhould find it neceſſary.

The Preſident acquainting us that Ragoba expreſſes much Impatience to go over to the Continent, and talks of ſetting off in a few Days, a Deputation muſt be ſent, to repreſent to him the Impropriety of ſuch Precipitation, and that Matters are not yet arrived at ſuch a Stage, as to admit of his quitting Bombay with Prudence or Decorum; no Forces having yet marched from Poona to meet him, nor any Perſon of Conſequence come to invite him. They muſt alſo obſerve to him, it will be proper to ſettle ſome Terms previous to his Departure, and receive what Offers he may make on the Occaſion.

Meſſrs. Carnac and Ramſay are appointed a Committee for that Purpoſe, through whom our Intercourſe with Ragoba muſt be conducted till Matters are ſettled.

Mr. James Sibbald is to act as Interpreter to the Committee, after being previouſly ſworn to Secreſy.

Adjourned.

Edwd Ravenſcroft,
Secretary.

Wm Hornby,
John Carnac,
D. Draper,
N. Stackhouſe,
W^m Aſhburner,
Andrew Ramſay.

Honourable Sir,

My laſt Reſpects were dated the 28th, and informed you Morabah, with the whole Army, had marched to Cowree to meet Sacram. Yeſterday Morning they all proceeded to Currut River in Front, and about Two Coſs from Pronder, and this Night at Eleven o'Clock, to my very great Mortification, I am from ſeveral Hands aſſured all Matters are accommodated; but in what Manner, they all are or chuſe to appear ignorant, except a Carcoon belonging to Tombacker, who was directed to inform me of all that paſſed. He ſends me Word, a Man from Tombacker arrived this Afternoon, and acquaints him, Nanah has agreed to every thing Morabah propoſed regarding Ragoba; but inſiſted Sacram and Morabah ſhould ſtand Security that his Life ſhould be ſafe; that they were all to meet, and a general Reconciliation to take place this Afternoon, and To-morrow Afternoon the Child would be brought down to receive the Compliments of Morabah (who has never ſeen him) and of the other Miniſters and Officers; and for this Purpoſe, Morabah To-day ſent to Town for ſome Jewels and Clothes to preſent him; and in Three or Four Days after, he expected they would all come to Poona. He further ſays, that Sacram wanted to appoint People to the different Offices now, but Morabah deſired it might be deferred until Ragoba came, when he would appoint whom he pleaſed. If this Man's Information is true, which I ſhall know To-morrow Night or next Morning, I do not expect to hear any thing from them until they come to Poona.

At Nine o'Clock this Evening I was honoured with your's and the Board's Command of the 29th. Be aſſured, Sir, I will exert every Nerve for the Benefit of my Employers. I am perfectly convinced of the Importance and Utility Baſſein would be to us; but I very much fear this Government will not, on any Conſideration, be brought to relinquiſh it; and we muſt wait and watch for a future Opportunity to accompliſh this Point. The diabolical Scheme of Nanah to introduce the French, the moſt deſtructive one ſurely that could have been thought on for us, has totally changed our Syſtem of Politics; and it ſeems to me beſt at preſent, if we cannot do as we will, to do as well as we can; therefore I have been thinking, if we cannot do better, to endeavour to get Jambooſeer made over in Perpetuity, in lieu of all Demands we have upon this Government, both for the Company on account of the late War, and for the Merchants Loſſes, and get rid of this endleſs Source of Diſpute; as much more as we can for our Expences and Trouble on account of Ragoba ſince the War, and Security in Hand for any Troops we may aſſiſt Ragoba with; for they have not Money to give us. All this I mean excluſive of Upton's Treaty: I mention theſe Particulars, that no Time may be loſt when I come to talk with Morabah, and wiſh to be favoured with your Sentiments on this Head.

I would wiſh that you would not permit Ragoba to come over, until I have talked and ſettled Matters with Morabah; but the Objection ſhould appear to come from Ragoba, which he can with great Propriety make, by obſerving, that no one of ſufficient Conſequence was come over to accompany him; and I know no Force is yet come down to receive him. I am alſo pretty clear Morabah (if he can be believed) will not take any further Steps in this Buſineſs, without acquainting us; nor does he expect Ragoba will come over, without proper People being ſent to receive him, or that he will truſt himſelf without a Body of our Troops to accompany him the whole Way, and I think to remain. I judge Two Battalions and a Train. As to Dada Punt, he wiſhes to diſtinguiſh himſelf; but Tombacker told me he was only ſent with the Letters, and no Doubt he may be directed to ſound the Ground, and poſſibly ordered to wait and come with Ragoba, but who I hope will not be in too great a Hurry; if he is, our Buſineſs may be ruined. I hope in a few Days to give you all Particulars, and think the Whole may be accompliſhed in a little more than a Month. I will take Care the neceſſary Orders are given for Bullocks, &c. I know not well what to do with the Chickley, &c. Purgunnahs: I could wiſh to have them deferred being ſettled for the preſent, as I know Morabah and

and Holkar mean to place Govind Row in the Guzerat Country. Poſſibly ſome lucky Circumſtance may turn up from the Change, or that Ragoba will have Influence enough with Govind Row, to let us keep them.

You may depend I will uſe every Endeavour for the Knight's being diſpatched, and with the neceſſary Precaution. Morabah, the Day he marched for Cowree, removed the old Guard, and placed one of his own, with Orders not to ſuffer any thing to be carried out of the Garden where he lives, but not to prevent his going about where he pleaſes. I hear he is keeping People at his own Expence; but this I believe is to protect himſelf againſt the Captain, who ſwears Vengeance againſt him.

The Letter from Morabah is delivered to Tombacker's Carcoon, who will forward it To-morrow Morning at Gun-fire.

I remain with much Reſpect,
Honourable Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
Thomas Moſtyn.

Poona,
31ſt March,
Midnight.

Bombay Secret Conſultations, the 7th April 1778.

ſigned the following Letter to the Reſident at the Durbar:

The Preſident has laid before us your Letter, dated the 31ſt March; in conſequence of which we think it neceſſary to direct that you do not at preſent give the Durbar any Hopes that we will recede in the leaſt Degree from the Stipulations made for the Company, in the Treaty with Ragoba. It will be ſoon enough to relax from our Demands ſome Time hence, if we ſhould find the ſame neceſſary.

We do not doubt your Diligence or Addreſs; but our Anxiety on account of the French leads us to repeat our Directions, that you exert yourſelf to the very utmoſt to defeat their Deſigns. The Conduct of the new Members of the Durbar on this Occaſion will be a Criterion to us to judge of their Diſpoſitions towards the Company.

We are
Your loving Friends,
William Hornby, &c.

Bombay Caſtle,
7th April 1778.

APPENDIX, N° 89.

Bombay Secret Conſultations, the 10th April 1778.

RECEIVED the following Letter from Mr. Moſtyn at Poona:

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

My laſt Reſpects were dated the 6th, and early this Morning I was favoured with your Commands of the 7th.

On the 8th I received a Letter from the Durbar, ſealed with the Maratta Sicca, requeſting I would repair to his Camp with all poſſible Expedition; I accordingly arrived the ſame Evening. Yeſterday Afternoon I had a Meeting with Morabah, when he informed, that the Reaſon for the Durbar ſending for me, was to requeſt I would accompany Gopul Naigue Tumbacker, who they were going to ſend to Bombay with Propoſals regarding Ragoba; to which I replied, I thought it was proper the Durbar ſhould inform your Honour, &c. thereof in Writing; which he promiſed ſhould be done. This Afternoon Morabah ſent to requeſt I would meet him at Saccram Bappoo's Tent; accordingly, a ſhort Time after he had paſſed I ſet out, but before I had reached Saccram's Camp they had gone to Nannah's Encampment cloſe to Pronder Hill, whither Tumbacker deſired I would alſo go. On my Arrival Nannah received me in the Public Tent, where he deſired I would wait a few Minutes, as the Durbar were in Council. In a ſhort Time I was introduced, when I found the Durbar aſſembled in Form, viz. Butchaba Pronder, Sacram Bappoo, Morabah Furneeſe, Nannah Furneeſe, Cruſt Row Belil, Nuda Row Sadá Roi, Gopal Naigue Tumbacker, Buchaba's Brother, and Cruſt Row's Son. After the uſual Compliments, Sacram began the Converſation by ſaying, that the Durbar had formerly requeſted I would go to Bombay on ſome Buſineſs for them, and they now made a Requeſt I would accompany a Perſon they were going to ſend to Bombay on the Buſineſs which Morabah had already acquainted me with; to which I made the ſame Anſwer as I had done to Morabah,

when

when they delivered me the enclosed Letter for the Honourable the President, referring me to Mo rabah for further Particulars on this Business. Sacram then said, that the Durbar had received Letter from the Governor General, mentioning his having been informed that this Government h given a Port to the French, and appointed Monsieur St. Lubin to the Charge of the Tope Kont here; he therefore asked me, if to my Knowledge such was the Case? I replied, that no such C circumstances had to my Knowledge taken place, but that I was not surprized the Governor Gen and Council, finding the Durbar, notwithstanding their solemn Promises to dispatch us last Decem had detained him until this Time, should believe such was the Case. I then desired they would in form me what were their real Motives with respect to the French; when Sacram replied, that th then had under Consideration the dispatching Monsieur St. Lubin. I have also received Assuranc from Morabah, both Yesterday and this Evening, since his Return to his Tent, that this Point sh be settled as we wish.

I shall strictly obey your Commands, with respect to not giving the Durbar any Hopes of you Honour, &c. receding in the least from the Treaty entered into with Ragoba; indeed, I have eve endeavoured to instil this Idea into the Minds of the Ministers, and have always recommended, a the most eligible Method, their sending a proper Person to settle Affairs both with your Honour, &c and Ragoba at Bombay; which you will please to observe by the foregoing I have effected, and hop my Conduct will meet with your Approbation.

I am, very respectfully,
Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,
Your most obedient humble Servant,
Thomas Mostyn.

Camp near Curret,
10th April 1778.

APPENDIX, N° 90.

Bombay Secret Consultations, the 16th April 1778.

RECEIVED the following Letter from Mr. Mostyn.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

I have been honoured with your Commands of the 8th Instant.

Before the Receipt of your Letter, a Pair of Pattamars, dispatched from the Presidency of Madra on the 3d, acquainted me that they had been stopped at Baramooty, and sent from thence to Mora bah, who had ordered them to me. I immediately sent the Linguist to represent to him that this wa the Second Time our Pattamars had been stopped since the late Change in Government, and requested he would prevent the like in future; to which he replied, that he was extremely sorry it had so happened, but that he having given Orders to stop all Letters, to prevent an improper Correspondence from the other Party, and his having forgot in the Hurry of Business to except English Letters, his Chowkies had of course intercepted them; he had however issued the necessary Orders for our Pattamar's passing freely. The Pattamars, your Honour, &c. mention to have been stopped at Barramooty, came to me at Poona; I asked them particularly if any Letters had been taken out of the Packet? when they declaring there had not, and that only the Wax-cloth Covering had been opened, I directed them to proceed to Bombay; however on the 12th Instant, in conformity to your Orders, at a Meeting I had with Morabah, I made a Second Representation to him, and asked him if he had taken any Letters from those Pattamars? when he repeated his Assurances of the foregoing Day, and declared he had not taken any Letter, nor did he know of any one else doing so.

The Durbar having been much engaged for some Days past, I had not an Opportunity of meeting with Tumbacker until this Morning, when he assured me, that he should be invested with full Powers to settle both with your Honour, &c. and Ragoba; that a full Durbar is to be held To-morrow for his final Instructions and Dispatch; that he is to leave this Place To-morrow Night, and after staying a Day or Two at most at Poona, shall proceed with all Expedition to the Presidency by the Way of Tannah, in order to avoid going in a Boat.

I am, very respectfully,
Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,
Your most obedient humble Servant,
Thos Mostyn.

Camp near Curret,
14th April 1778.

Bombay Secret Conſultations, the 20th April 1778.

Received the following Letter from the Reſident at Poona.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

I addreſſed you laſt on the 14th Inſtant, and not having heard any Thing from Morabah concerning Tumbacker's leaving the Camp, notwithſtanding his Aſſurances that he ſhould do ſo as the next Evening, on the 16th at Night I ſent to requeſt Morabah would inform me the Reaſon thereof; when he replied, that Matters were not fully adjuſted with the Durbar; but that they were all to meet the next Morning at his Tent, and deſired I would meet them. Accordingly Yeſterday, about Eleven o'Clock, I waited on the Durbar, where I found aſſembled Butchaba, Morabah, Chintoo Wittal, Sookojee Holcar, Narroo Punt, (Holcar's Duan) Dadoo Punt Pootneſs, Gopal Naigue Tumbacker, and one of Holkar's principal Officers. Morabah began the Diſcourſe by telling me, that every Body preſent requeſted I would ſhew Ragoba they confirmed the Agreement formerly made with him, and to deſire that he would not believe what any malicious Perſons might write to the contrary.

The Durbar not mentioning any Thing of empowering Tumbacker to ſettle Terms with your Honour, &c. agreeable to what he had aſſured me on the 14th; I endeavoured to ſound the Intentions of the Durbar with reſpect to what they meant to do for the Company, by obſerving to them that there had been Two Treaties entered into, and the other by Colonel Upton, with the late Durbar; when Morabah replied, that this Point would be eaſily ſettled after Dada Sahib's Arrival at Poona; and indeed this Method, which I hope will meet with your Approval, will in the preſent Situation of Affairs, I am of Opinion, be moſt for the Intereſt of my Employers, as well as Ragoba's Credit, who I make no doubt will for his own Honour conſider the Treaty made with him as the only legal one: It is true he may perhaps at Firſt be under ſuch Reſtrictions as not to be able immediately to comply therewith; yet if he acts with Prudence, and endeavours to conciliate the Minds of the Miniſters, and convince thoſe who have been in the Oppoſition that he means faithfully to obſerve any Agreement he ſhall make now for the Safety of their Perſons and Property, I make no doubt he may in a ſhort Time have the uncontrolled Management of Affairs.

No Notice being taken at the above Meeting with the Durbar of Tumbacker's Departure, I ſent the Linguiſt to deſire he would inform me when he was to ſet off; he replied, that he did not ſuppoſe it would be until Morabah's Man, Daddoo Punt, who arrived from Bombay in the Morning, and was immediately returning thither, ſhould either return to Camp, or write to them; but that he would ſend me Word as ſoon as he could ſpeak with Certainty. The Arrival of Daddoo Punt explains in ſome Shape the Durbar's Reaſon for detaining me ſo long, he having brought a Letter with him from Ragoba, and I apprehend ſome Terms to be ſettled with his Friends here, to which he is carrying their Anſwers.

In the Evening I took my Leave of Morabah, when he delivered me a Letter to be preſented to the Honourable the Preſident on my Arrival.

I am with Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
Tho' Moſtyn.

Poona,
8th April 1778.

APPENDIX, N° 92.

Extract of Secret Letter from Bombay: Dated 26th April 1778; received in London 21ſt December 1778.

2. THE ſeveral Letters from Mr. Moſtyn, entered in our Ship Diary ſince the Departure of the Hawke, will inform you of his Proceedings, and all material Occurrences at Poona, till the 29th ultimo; when the Preſident received Advice from him of a Revolution which had taken place in that Government on the 26th.

3. On that Day Morabah Furneeſe and his Party, after having marched from their different Stations, met and encamped cloſe to Poona, which they immediately took Poſſeſſion of, and without any Oppoſition or Bloodſhed, removed the Guards placed by Nannah Furneeſe at the Palace, and other Officers of Government, making Proclamation in the Name of Ragoba for reſtoring Peace and good Order in the City.

4. Morabah, after having aſſumed the Office of Duan, and made his Arrangements at Poona, proceeded to have an Interview with Sacaram Bappoo, the late Chief Miniſter, with whoſe Concurrence he

he appears to have proceeded from the Beginning, as you will recollect Morabah made uſe of his Name in his Firſt Overtures to us, and they have acted in concert ever ſince.

5. Nannah Furneeſe, the other Miniſter, after heſitating for ſome Time what Conduct to purſue, we are aſſured has agreed to all the Terms Morabah has propoſed reſpecting Ragoba, on Condition that Morabah and Saccaram would be Security for his perſonal Safety.

6. The Confederacy having thus accompliſhed their Purpoſe without our Aſſiſtance, and having no further Oppoſition to expect from Nannah Furneeſe, preſerved a long and moſt myſterious Silence with regard to their Intentions towards Ragoba. Morabah had indeed, a few Days before he took Poſſeſſion of Poona, ſent an Agent to Ragoba, to preſs him to join the Party without a Moment's Delay, but did not make any Propoſals of any Kind either to him or us.

7. It was not till the 10th of this Month that Mr. Moſtyn was deſired to meet the Durbar, when he was acquainted they were going to ſend Gopal Naigue Tumbacker (who is a Perſon of Conſideration) to Bombay, with Propoſals regarding Ragoba, and a Requeſt made to him to accompany this Perſon. We were in daily Expectation of their Arrival till the 20th, when we received Advice from Mr. Moſtyn, that the Durbar had not yet given Gopal his final Inſtructions, and it ſeemed even then very uncertain when he would ſet out, though they profeſſed Sentiments of great Reſpect and Regard towards Ragoba.

8. We can draw no very favourable Concluſions from this dilatory Conduct of the Durbar; and as we do not think it conſiſtent that the Company's Reſident ſhould come to Bombay upon every Requiſition from the Durbar, before he is ſatisfied ſuch a Meaſure is really neceſſary, or may be attended with Benefit to the Company's Affairs, we have expreſſed our Wiſhes to Mr. Moſtyn, but in ſuch a Manner as not to lay an abſolute Reſtraint upon him, that he ſhould not quit Poona before he is convinced his coming here will anſwer ſome Buſineſs of Importance; and we have obſerved to him, that he may with great Propriety demand from the Durbar, before he ſets out, the Nature of the Buſineſs they want to intruſt to him, that he may judge whether it is of ſufficient Conſequence to require his Preſence here. The Recollection of the trifling Propoſals they committed to him on his laſt Journey to Bombay makes this Precaution the more neceſſary.

9. In this uncertain Situation are Affairs at preſent: We can neither write or determine any thing deciſive, until we know the Terms Morabah and his Party mean to offer to Ragoba.

10. It is a moſt unfortunate Circumſtance, that whilſt we, through the Want of Powers and Sacaram Bappoo's extreme Caution, were prevented from taking a Part, Morabah and his Party have found their own Strength ſufficient to gain their Point without our Aſſiſtance. We did, as adviſed in our Addreſs by the Cormorant, do all we could to remove their Scruples the Moment we received the Sanction and Approbation of the Governor General and Council to our Plan, and Morabah promiſed to give us the deſired Inſtrument, under the Hand of Sacram Bappoo, the Chief Miniſter, without whoſe expreſs Solicitation we were prohibited from engaging in their Scheme; and are not without Suſpicion, that when the Confederacy found they might be certain of our Aſſiſtance in caſe of Neceſſity, they reſolved to make Trial if they could do without it; and unhappily they have met with Succeſs.

11. It now ſeems to be optional with them to what Share of the Government to admit Ragoba, or whether they will admit him to any Share at all. Their Fears for the Stability of their Government ſo long as Ragoba remains with us, and the Demonſtrations we have given of our Attachment to him, are now his beſt Security, and we ſtill hope will lead them to offer conſiſtent Terms to him. All that we can write about the Terms for the Company muſt be mere Conjecture, though we have inſtructed Mr. Moſtyn not to give the Durbar the leaſt Hopes we will recede from Ragoba's Treaty. We can only aſſure you, that we will endeavour to procure the moſt advantageous ones we poſſibly can; and we firmly believe, if Ragoba is admitted to a ſufficient Influence in the Government, he will confirm his former Grants made by the Treaty of Surat.

12. Immediately on receiving Advice of the Revolution, we gave Orders for our Forces and Military Apparatus to be held in Readineſs, to accompany Ragoba to Poona, the Moment Matters are advanced to that Stage.

13. Ragoba is extremely ſanguine on the Occaſion, and betrays ſo much Impatience to move towards Poona, that we find it neceſſary to ſend Meſſrs. Carnac and Ramſay, as a Deputation from us, to expoſtulate with him on the Precipitancy of his Conduct, and to endeavour to moderate his Impatience. Their Conferences with him are recorded; to which we beg Leave to refer you.

22. Two of Ragoba's principal Domeſtics having applied to us for a Loan of Rupees 15,000, we complied with their Requeſt, as they ſtand high in his Confidence, and might be of Service to the Company, in the Turn Affairs were then likely to take.

23. Ragoba, at one of his Conferences with Meſſrs. Carnac and Ramſay, took Occaſion to expreſs his Wiſhes, that when he was reinſtated at Poona, the Company would afford him their Aſſiſtance to recover the large and valuable Territories diſmembered from the Maratta Dominions, during the Weakneſs of the late Adminiſtration, by Grants to the Nizam and other Powers. He was acquainted, we could give no Anſwer to ſuch a Propoſition; and it is at his particular Deſire we mention this Matter to you, and requeſt your Orders and Sentiments on the Subject.

24. Having hitherto received no Satisfaction from the Durbar to the Sufferers by the Wreck Aurora, notwithſtanding our repeated Repreſentations, we have fixed the Amount of their Loſs as a

Claim

Claim upon the Revenues of Jambooſeer, after the Company's Demands on Account the Twelve Lacks, and the Country of Three Lacks, are made good; and have reſolved not to reſtore the Perunnah till the Sum due to the Sufferers is diſcharged, with Intereſt. Our Proceedings will ſhew the Care we took to examine and aſcertain the Amount for which the Poona Government was anſwerable, according to Treaty, with all poſſible Juſtice to both Parties; and we doubt not you will approve the Method we have taken to obtain Satisfaction for Merchants trading under your Protection.

25. The Governor General and Council, in purſuance of their Reſolution for ſupplying us with Money to ſupport the Engagements they concluded we ſhould form in favour of Ragoba, have remitted us Bills to the Amount of Nine Lacks and a Half out of Ten Lacks, the propoſed Supply; ſo that if Matters at Poona turn out to our Wiſhes, we ſhall leave a ſufficient Command of Money to anſwer every Purpoſe.

APPENDIX, N° 91 and 93.

Bombay Select Conſultations the 22d April 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable William Hornby, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor,
The W. John Carnac, Eſquire, D. Draper,
Nathaniel Stackhouſe, Willm Aſhburner,
Andrew Ramſay.

CONSIDERING the Station Mr. Moſtyn holds at Poona, we think it is not conſiſtent that he ſhould come to Bombay upon every Intimation from the Miniſters of ſuch a Deſire, unleſs he is firſt ſatisfied that ſuch a Meaſure is neceſſary, or may be of Benefit to the Honourable Company's Affairs. In the preſent Caſe we do not wiſh Mr. Moſtyn ſhould quit Poona before he is convinced that his coming here will anſwer ſome Purpoſe of Conſequence; and we think he may with very great Propriety demand from the Durbar before he ſets out, the Nature of the Buſineſs they now want to entruſt to him, that he may judge whether it is of ſufficient Importance to require his Preſence here. This Precaution appears the more neceſſary from the Recollection of the trifling Propoſals they committed to him on his laſt Journey to Bombay; though we do not mean by the above to reſtrain Mr. Moſtyn from acting in this Point as he may judge moſt for the Honourable Company's Intereſt.

From the preſent Situation of Affairs, we do not think there is any Proſpect of our having Occaſion for the Bengal Troops this Seaſon; and therefore in order to ſave the heavy Expence that will be incurred by their marching forward, it is agreed to write to the Commanding Officer at Culpee to remain there till he hears further from us.

Meſſrs. Draper and Stackhouſe are clearly of Opinion that the Governor General and Council having been induced, by our Advices of the 7th of December laſt, to order a Body of Troops to the Aſſiſtance of this Preſidency, and they do not think our Situation is ſo much altered either with reſpect to the Marattas, the probable Deſigns of the French upon Choul, or our own Military Reſources, as to juſtify the countermanding the March of theſe Troops; they do not therefore concur in the above Reſolution, which will throw the whole Reſponſibility upon us in caſe of Accidents. Another Reaſon for their Opinion is, that it ſeems very uncertain whether any Reinforcement will be ſent from Madras, no public Advices having been yet received of any ſuch Intention in the Preſident and Council, though a public Pattamar arrived laſt Night.

The Majority hereupon eſteem it neceſſary to obſerve further in Vindication of their Reſolution, that the Difficulties of the March from Culpee to Bombay are ſo great as to make the Attempt next to impracticable, and they would not upon any Account expoſe the Company's Troops to ſuch Dangers without the moſt abſolute and imminent Neceſſity. Beſides, it is totally out of our Power to procure Supplies of Proviſions for them on the March, or Paſſes from the different Powers through whoſe Countries they muſt come, as deſired by the Governor General and Council. The Majority allow that the Governor General and Council may have in a great Meaſure been led to that Reſolution by our Advices, but at the ſame Time their Apprehenſions of a French War muſt have been a further inducement to them to order ſo conſiderable a Body of Troops, which by our Advices from Europe of a much later Date than they could have at Bengal, we do not ſee any Reaſon to apprehend: And therefore the Majority think the ſubjecting the Honourable Company to ſo heavy an Expence would unavoidably attend the March of the Bengal Troops, would not be warrantable.

Meſſrs.

Meſſrs. Carnac and Ramſay lay before us a Report of their late Conference with Ragoba, which is ordered to be entered after this Conſultation.

Adjourned.

Edward Ravenſcroft, Secretary.

Wm Hornby,
John Carnac,
D. Draper,
N. Stackhouſe,
Wm Aſhburner.

N° 93.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 22d April 1778.

The Subject of a Conference between the Committee and Ragoba, 10th April 1778.

The Committee acquainted Ragoba, That for material Reaſons the Board would wiſh him to poſtpone his Intentions of moving to Mahim on Monday next, unleſs he was very much bent upon ſo doing. They informed him, that the Honourable the Preſident had juſt received a Letter from Mr. Moſtyn, of the 8th Inſtant, adviſing, that he was that Evening to have an Interview with Moraba, who had Propoſitions to make on the Part of the Miniſtry, and that, until the Reſult of the Conference was known, he could wiſh that no freſh Steps ſhould be taken either by Ragoba or the Board. Ragoba replied, that he did not regard deferring his Intentions of moving a few Days, would the Board but poſitively fix upon a Time for his March; and hoped that the Reſult of the Interview with Moraba would occaſion no material Alterations in the Reſolutions of the Board, as he well knew that unleſs the Engliſh would declare in the moſt open Manner their Determination to ſupport him in his juſt Rights, and take ſome immediate Steps to convince the preſent Faction at Broach of ſuch our Intentions, that even thoſe who had already declared in his Favour, would begin to waver through Dread of Reſentment from the other Party; and he would aſſure the Board that the Propoſitions they would receive would be very unbecoming his Dignity to accept. The Committee aſſured him he might rely upon the Friendſhip of the Company, and in having their Support in all his juſt and legal Rights and Pretenſions; but that at the ſame Time the Board thought it adviſable to wait the Overtures that might be expected in conſequence of the aforeſaid Interview. With this he appeared ſatisfied; but expreſſed a Wiſh of moving on Monday next to a Spot of Ground near the Mount, provided the Board approved of it. The Committee acquainted him that the Board by no Means wiſhed to put any Reſtraint upon his Inclinations, and would make known to them his Deſire in this Particular. He took Occaſion to mention his earneſt Deſire of ſeeing the Company in Poſſeſſion of the Places ſtipulated for in his late Treaty with them; and obſerved that his principal Motive for wiſhing to march by the Way of Callian was, that Viſſagee Punt would moſt probably be thereby induced to make an early Acknowledgment of Obedience to his Government, when he meant to embrace the Opportunity of putting the Company in Poſſeſſion of Baſſein. He alſo expreſſes a Deſire of ſeeing a Statement of his Accounts with the Company, as he was unacquainted with the Expences and Charges incurred by the Aſſiſtance of their Troops in the late Service; as alſo of the Collections made from the Purgunnahs aſſigned over to the Company. The Committee acquainted him his Requeſt ſhould be complied with, and then took their Leave, aſſuring him, that the Moment any freſh Advices arrived from Mr. Moſtyn, that they ſhould be made known to him.

APPENDIX, N° 94.

11th July 1778.

To the Honourable William Hornby, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Members of the Select Committee at Bombay.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

MY laſt Reſpects were dated the 17th Inſtant.

By a Hircarrah whom I keep at Camp, I learn that Morabah, Buchabah, Chintoo Vittul and Cruſtrow Belol, on the 17th in the Afternoon, paid Monſieur St. Lubin a Viſit, and that ſhortly

ſhortly after their Return to Morabah's Tent, Monſieur St. Lubin followed them, where he ſtaid until Eight o'Clock, when Morabah made him a Preſent; that on the 20th Nanah came down from the Matchy to pay Succaram a Viſit at Bury, when they ſent for Monſieur St. Lubin to take Leave, and accordingly waited on them. Notwithſtanding theſe Appearances of Monſieur St. Lubin being diſpatched, it is ſtill a Doubt with me whether he will leave Poona, but even if he does, it will only be in order to lull us into a Belief of the good Intentions of this Durbar, whilſt they have Recourſe to the French for Aſſiſtance, a Door for which has already been opened by Monſieur St. Lubin's Negociations with Nanah, and which have been lately taken up by Morabah; as you will pleaſe to obſerve by the encloſed Copy and Tranſlate of a Letter I have received from a Perſon at Proonder, who, from the Knowledge I have of him, I do not think would deceive me; but as he is not in the Government's Service, and might poſſibly be deceived by the Perſon from whom he received his Intelligence, therefore, though this Letter was received the 19th, it containing Matters of ſuch Importance I thought it proper to wait until I could receive a Confirmation thereof from ſome other Quarter, that the Loſs of a few Days would not be attended with ſo much Prejudice as a Miſrepreſentation.

From a Perſon, whoſe Employ in the Government's Service is ſuch as to give him frequent Opportunities of knowing what paſſes, I have received Information that when Cruſtrow Belol was laſt in Town, it was agreed between him and Monſieur St. Lubin to make the ſame Propoſal to Morabah as he had formerly done to Nanah with reſpect to the French aſſiſting him; that in conſequence thereof Cruſtrow went firſt to Proonder in order to prepare Morabah; and that Monſieur St. Lubin on his firſt Viſit accordingly made the Propoſal, when Morabah replied, He would conſider of it; but that in the mean Time receiving Intelligence from Moodajee Bouncello of our Troops coming from Bengal being near Naugpore, Morabah diſpatched Monſieur St. Lubin at his Second Viſit.

I am informed by a Man, who ſays he is a Doctor in Scindy's Employ, but has for ſome Time paſt reſided in Poona, that Senhor Norronho a few Days ago wrote a Letter to the Perſon who tranſacts his Buſineſs in Poona, acquainting him of his having received Information from Cruſtrow Belol, that Monſieur St. Lubin had engaged with Morabah to bring Five hundred Europeans hither in Forty Days, and that Morabah had promiſed him, Lubin, the Command of the Toff Counah. The Man farther added, that in conſequence of this Promiſe, Monſieur St. Lubin had inveigled away almoſt all Norronho's People, by advancing them from Fifteen to Twenty Rupees a Man, and promiſing to make good the Arrears of Pay due to them, but at the ſame Time ordered them to remain quiet in Poona, until he ſhould call for them; however, that Senhor Norronho getting Intelligence of this Tranſaction, has, by paying out of his own Pocket the Arrears due to them from Government, induced all his People to return to his Service, and they accordingly went to him at Proonder on the 21ſt. This Man further tells me, that Eight Europeans, who have lately deſerted from our Service, entered into that of Monſieur St. Lubin on the 20th, that he has Two Men, one a French Man named Le Bourchadiez, who came from Mahé, the other a Portugueze, at Bombay, purpoſely to entice our Europeans to deſert, and that theſe People ſent them to Panwell in Two Boats, which Monſieur St. Lubin has provided for that Purpoſe, and which are conſtantly employed between that Place and Bombay. It will undoubtedly appear ſomewhat ſtrange that Cruſtrow Belol, who is Monſieur St. Lubin's Agent, ſhould give the Information above-mentioned to Senhor Norronho; it is therefore neceſſary, in order to explain this Point, to inform your Honour, &c. that as Cruſtrow was the Perſon who brought Norronho from the Mogul's into this Government's Service, he has always conſidered him as immediately under his Protection.

I have thought it neceſſary to be thus particular in mentioning the different Accounts I have received of Morabah's Tranſactions with Monſieur St. Lubin, and the Honours paid the latter ſo far ſuperior to any they have ever ſhewn the Engliſh, in order that you may, Gentlemen, be better enabled to judge of the Probability of his having formed a Connection ſo highly prejudicial to our Honourable Employers Intereſts. I am convinced of the Impoſſibility of the French ſupplying Two thouſand Men; but at the ſame Time I think it is very probable that they may have it in their Power to ſend Five hundred at leaſt, as ſoon as the Seaſon will admit: At any rate, all Accounts agree, that the new Adminiſtration have entered into ſome Engagements with the French very dangerous to our Exiſtence on this Side India.

On the 22d, I received your Commands of the 16th; and, conformable to your Directions, immediately forwarded the Letters encloſed therein for Colonel Leſlie, with one from myſelf, by different Routes.

The Remonſtrance and Demands you have been pleaſed to order me to make to the Durbar, is drawn out, and ſhall be ſent as ſoon as it can be properly tranſlated into the Gentoo Language. I have already acquainted you, Gentlemen, that I am aſſured the French have not got a Grant of Choul; but that Promiſe thereof was made to Monſieur St. Lubin, appears from Cruſtrow Belol's Confeſſion at the Durbar before Mr. Lewis; and I am convinced they will not only get that, but much more, the Moment they can afford the Aſſiſtance Monſieur St. Lubin has promiſed. I have uſed every poſſible Means to obtain a Copy of the Engagement entered into between Nanah and Monſieur St. Lubin; but as no other Perſon than thoſe Two, with the Linguiſt of the latter, were employed in drawing it up, it is totally impoſſible; nor do I know of any Steps having been taken for the carrying it into Execution, excepting Monſieur St. Lubin being permitted to remain here, in direct Violation of the moſt ſolemn Aſſurances to us, that he ſhould

be ſent away, and the preſent Conduct of the Durbar. Conformable to your Orders, I have written a Letter to Holkar, on the Subject of Paſſports, and am in hourly Expectation of receiving his Anſwer, as well as one from Madjee Scindy, to the Letter I formerly adviſed I had written him.

On the 23d, one of the Pattamars diſpatched by the Honourable the Preſident with Letters to Holkar and Scindy, came and informed me that they had all been ſeized at Culvern, immediately on their croſſing Tanna River, and carried to Billapore, the Subadar of which Place ſent them to one Dandaker, the Officer commanding the Troops at Gallican, who diſpatched Three of the Pattamars under Charge of Two of his own Sepoys with the Letters to Morabah, detaining the other a Day longer; and after plundering him of the Trifle he had, being Five Rupees, told him he might go about his Buſineſs, when the Man made the beſt of his Way to me. I have acquainted Holkar of this Circumſtance, deſiring he would apply to Morabah for the Letters. I have likewiſe written to Morabah, expreſſing my Surpriſe at this Conduct, deſiring, ſhould he not have delivered the Letters, that he would ſend them to me.

Monſieur St. Lubin returned from Proondur laſt Night, being ſupplied by Morabah with Twenty-five Peons, Two Jaſſoods, and Four Camels, which it is given out are to attend him as far as Surat.

I am, &c.
(Signed) Thomas Moſtyn.

Poona,
the 25th May 1778.

Tranſlate of a Letter from a Perſon at Proondur; dated the 21ſt Rabellacar, and received the 19th May 1778.

At Noon I received your Note by Shirhjee, and obſerved the Contents thereof. Morabah has had Two Councils regarding the French. He told Monſieur St. Lubin, he had made an Agreement with Nanah to bring 2,000 Europeans within Fifteen Months, which he had not yet complied with; but that if it is in his Power to fulfil that Engagement, Morabah deſired he would ſend for them with Ammunition, ſo as to be here before the Battalions can arrive from Calcutta; which Monſieur St. Lubin agreed to, and diſpatched a Letter expreſs to his Place.

Monſieur St. Lubin is diſpatched, and Morabah wants him to go away in order to haſten the Troops he has promiſed; but he ſays he will remain here and ſend a Man with Letters for them; this they are at preſent conſidering about.

A true Copy.
(Signed) Thomas Moſtyn.

Received at Bombay
the 28th May 1778.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

I late laſt Night received the Secretary's Letter of the 22d, and ſhall obey your Orders for forwarding the Packets to the Governor General and Council.

After cloſing my laſt Addreſs to your Honour, &c. I received a Note from Morabah, encloſing Three Letters for the Governor General, being Anſwers to thoſe delivered by Mr. Lewis, which he requeſts I will forward.

This Morning I received a Note from Proondur, acquainting me, that in conſequence of our Troops from Bengal advancing, and a Report of Hyder's Army marching this Way, Morabah Sacaram and Holkar had a Conſultation; when they determined on ſending Chintoo Wittul and Gopal Naigue Tumbuckur to meet me: The latter arrived this Morning, and the former was to leave Proondur about Noon. This Evening Gopal Naigue ſent a Meſſage, deſiring I would ſend the Linguiſt to him; who on his Return informed me that he confirmed the Note ſo far that they will meet me To-morrow, to requeſt I will accompany Chintoo Wittul to Bombay with Propoſals reſpecting Ragoba: You may depend, Gentlemen, I ſhall adviſe you of the Particulars of the Converſation as early as poſſible.

I am very reſpectfully, &c. &c.
(Signed) Thomas Moſtyn.

Poona,
the 27th May 1778.
Received the 30th.

True Copies.
(Signed) Edw[d] Ravenſcroft,
Secretary.

APPENDIX, N° 94.

Extract of a Letter from Mr. Moſtyn to the Preſident; dated Poona the 26th May, and read in Council the 2d of June.

The Remonſtrance the Board have been pleaſed to direct me to make to the Durbar I could wiſh had not been ſent; I have adviſed them it ſhall be delivered as ſoon as tranſlated; but for the following Reaſons I intend to detain it until I can be favoured with your Anſwer to this Letter: Firſt, Becauſe the Durbar to purſue their preſent Plan of amuſing you and gaining Time to carry their Views reſpecting the French into Execution, will undoubtedly promiſe to comply therewith: Secondly, Becauſe it entirely debars us from all further Expectation either for ourſelves or Ragoba, and we may be ſaddled with him as long as he lives: Thirdly, Becauſe the Durbar are amongſt themſelves much divided; Holkar urging them to bring Ragoba, in which Scindy will moſt likely concur; and alſo ſeeing us determined to be no longer trifled with, ſhould they be inclined to make any Offers worth our Acceptance, this Remonſtrance will certainly put a Stop to them.

Laſtly, Becauſe the Time fixed for the Durbar to deliver their Anſwer, and by the Time it can be tranſmitted to you, the Rains will be ſet in, therefore the Delay of a few Days can be of no material Conſequence, in caſe you ſhould ſtill think it proper to be delivered. Therefore I flatter myſelf you will approve my Conduct, and ſpeedily favour me with your Commands on it. Excuſe me, Sir, for having given my Sentiments thus freely, and I beg Leave to intreat you will put a favourable Conſtruction on them; my only Wiſh being, that you ſhould be informed of every Thing that can be of any Uſe in your Deliberations upon this important Matter. Scindy is advanced within Twelve Coſs of Proonder; I hourly expect an Anſwer from him and Holkar regarding the Diſtricts; your Letters to them you will perceive by the public Addreſs are ſtopt and carried to Morabah; I have wrote both Morabah and Holkar about it. By a Note from Proonder this Evening, I am informed the Durbar have Intelligence that the Bengal Forces are on the Banks of the Nerbedah, and taking the Road for Brampore, but as I have had repeated Reports of this I don't give entire Credit to their being advanced ſo far, as I think I ſhould have heard from them by this Time if they were. From Butchaba I learn to Night that the Durbar has wrote to Moodajee Bouncello, to deſire the Officer of our Troops in a friendly Manner to return; if he will not, then to endeavour to make him by Force, and ſhould he want any Aſſiſtance to adviſe them (the Durbar) but I am under no Apprehenſions on his Account, as I hear he ſtands well with the Bengal Gentlemen. The only Danger I think to be apprehended for the Army is their Want of Proviſions, from their having no Horſe with them to forage.

To the Honourable William Hornby, Eſquire.

Honourable Sir,

Agreeable to what I wrote you laſt Night, this Morning both Tombiker and Chintoo Wittul waited on me, when they informed me they were ſent on purpoſe to requeſt I would accompany Chintoo Wittul to Bombay, with ſome Propoſals to Ragoba; I made the ſame Objections I had done to the Durbar before, that I did not ſee any Neceſſity for my going unleſs the Durbar would explain themſelves, particularly after the evaſive Manner they have behaved with reſpect to this Buſineſs. They made me the ſame Anſwer the Durbar had done, that it was to aſſure Ragoba of their good Intentions towards him. I told them that I conſidered this all Fineſſe, only intended to gain Time and ſtop our Troops from Bengal advancing, for had they been ſincere the Durbar would long ſince have diſpatched me, and ſent away Monſieur St. Lubin, but that I was convinced from the extraordinary Attention Morabah and the Durbar had paid him, the former had taken up Nana's Plan, and entered into the ſame Engagement with Monſieur St. Lubin. This they poſitively denied, though they acknowledged Lubin had made the Tender to Morabah, who replied, as long as they were in Friendſhip with the Engliſh this Government would not enter into any Alliance with any other European Nation, and that he, Morabah, had abſolutely diſpatched him. I replied, that it was very true, Monſieur St. Lubin had been publicly diſpatched, but it was only with a View to blind us, and perhaps others; however, that I had in my Poſſeſſion what I eſteemed as a ſufficient Proof of my Allegation; and produced Copy of a Letter written by Monſieur St. Lubin to the Captain General of Goa, by Monſieur De Sauty, which I luckily this Morning procured. They anſwered it was poſſible Monſieur St. Lubin might have written in that Manner, but denied my being able to produce any Writing from the Durbar: Upon which I obſerved it was the Art of this Durbar not to give any Thing under their Hands, that they might have an Opportunity of denying it, and that it was for this Reaſon, before I could give Credit to their having finally diſpatched Monſieur St. Lubin, on a Promiſe to proceed to Bombay with Chintoo Wittul, that I inſiſted on a Writing from the Durbar with their Seal affixed, to the following Effect; "That in order to ſatisfy the Engliſh Company, they declared they "had not at preſent, nor would have ſo long as they continued in Friendſhip with the Engliſh, any "Treaty with the French, or ſuffer the French to trade in any of their Ports," being exactly conformable to the Promiſes made me by Saccaram Bappo, Nanah Furneſe, Madah Roe Jadee Roe, and Byro Punt, when I was diſpatched to Bombay in Auguſt laſt. This they promiſed to deliver me, with a Letter for the Preſident, accounting for the Durbar's having kept me here ſo long; and re-

queſted I would ſend the Linguiſt in Company with Tumbicker, who returns this Evening to Carr to bring them, which I conſented to. Chintoo Wittul informed me he ſhould ſet off on the 30th If the Linguiſt returns with the above Papers in Time I ſhall accompany him, otherwiſe will follow as ſoon as I receive them, agreeable to the Permiſſion the Board have already given me. Incloſed is a Copy of the Letter from Lubin to the Captain General of Goa, mentioned above; Mr. Lewis being taken ill, and I having been much employed in ſeeing a Number of People To-day, I take the Liberty to requeſt you will favour me in laying the above before the Board.

Chintoo Wittul informs me he ſhall be Four Days in going to Panwell, where he will wait Two Days for me, by which Time I hope you will order a proper Boat to carry him over.

I have not been able to procure the written Intelligence from B——— To-day, but he has promiſed to ſend it me in the Morning.

I remain very reſpectfully,
Honourable Sir, &c.

Poona,
the 28th May 1778, Midnight.

(Signed) Thomas Moſtyn.

APPENDIX, N° 95.

Letter from Bombay to Bengal.

Gentlemen,

Bombay, June 1778. SINCE cloſing our Letter of the 31ſt ultimo we have received further Advices from Mr. Moſtyn Copies of which, and of the Correſpondence between Monſieur de St. Lubin and the Portuguese Governments of Goa and Damaun, now wait on you.

By his laſt Letter to the Captain General at Goa, written long after the late Change in the Poona Government, it is indiſputably evident that Nana's Engagements with the French have been taken up by the new Adminiſtration.

Upon the Inſpection of theſe Letters, we reſolved to make a Repreſentation to the following Effect to the Governors of Goa and Damaun:

"That we have Reaſon to believe Schemes are concerting between the French and the Poona "Government, which have for their Objects the Annoyance and Detriment of the Britiſh Nation "but that, from the Alliance and good Harmony ſo happily ſubſiſting between His Moſt Faithful "and His Britannic Majeſty, we have every Reaſon to hope, and ſhall rely, that the Portugueſe will "not in any Shape interfere or take any Meaſure that may promote the Succeſs of the French "Schemes, which in the End would prove equally ſubverſive of the Portugueſe Influence in India."

You will obſerve Mr. Moſtyn's Reaſons for deferring to make his Demands on the Durbar, and our Orders to him to abide by his former Inſtructions, which we doubt not you will approve. Any Offers the Durbar may now make to Ragoba can only be intended to gain more Time, and the more important Objects we have in View cannot be put to the Hazard upon the mere Hopes of Advantage to him.

We have no certain Accounts of the Bengal Detachment; Reports at Poona ſay it has reached the Nerbudda: We have however thought it neceſſary that the commanding Officer ſhould have timely Inſtructions whither to direct his March; and as Surat, in point of Situation, Accommodation, and every other Reſpect, appeared to us the moſt eligible Place, we have reſolved to ſend Inſtructions to Colonel Leſlie to direct his March to that City, unleſs from Circumſtances he ſhould think it expedient, or it ſhould prove more convenient to him to proceed to Broach; in which Caſe we have given him a diſcretional Power for that Purpoſe.

The Chiefs of Surat and Broach will be directed to ſpare no Expence to open a Correſpondence with Colonel Leſlie, and to afford him all poſſible Aſſiſtance to expedite his March.

We are, &c.

Bombay Caſtle,
3d June 1778.

(Signed) Wm Hornby,
&c. Council.

P. S. We have juſt received Advice from Mr. Moſtyn, that he has obtained and tranſmitted to Colonel Leſlie Paſſports from Mhadjee Scindia, for the ſafe Conduct of the Bengal Detachment through his Country, as well as Orders for their being properly ſupplied with Proviſions.

Ordered, That the Letters from Bombay lie for Conſideration.

Warren Haſtings,
Richd Barwell,
P. Francis,
Edwd Wheler.

APPENDIX, N° 96.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 13th July 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell, }
Philip Francis, } Eſquires.
Edward Wheler, }

To Colonel Leſlie.

Sir,

WE have been acquainted, by the Governor General and Council, of your being the Officer appointed to the Command of the Forces ſent by them to our Aſſiſtance; and have received a Copy of your Inſtructions.

On the 4th inſtant we diſpatched a Letter to you by Four different Routes, countermanding our Order of the 22d April, and directing you to proceed on your March to this Side of India. We hope ſoon to hear from you what Route you have taken, when we ſhall ſend you more particular Directions for your Guidance; this being diſpatched to acquaint you that we have not been able to procure Paſſports for your Army from the Poona Miniſters, or Orders for your being ſupplied with Proviſions; but we have ordered Application to be made directly to Tookajee Holkar and Mhadajee Scindia, the Jaghiredars through whoſe Dominions you muſt paſs, and ſhall as ſoon as poſſible adviſe you of the Reſult.

It is neceſſary to obſerve to you, that the rainy Seaſon on this Coaſt may be expected to ſet in about the 10th or 15th of June.

We direct, that you correſpond punctually with Mr. Thomas Moſtyn, the Company's Reſident at Poona, who has our Orders to give you every Advice, and to do every thing in his Power towards facilitating your March.

We are, &c.
(Signed) Wm Hornby,
&c. Council.

Bombay Caſtle,
the 16th May 1778.

Extract of Bombay Secret Conſultations, the 5th June 1778.

Signed the following Letters to Colonel Leſlie, the Chiefs of Surat and Broach, and to Mr. Moſtyn. Friday Col Le Letter

To Colonel Leſlie.

Sir,

Our laſt Letter, dated the 16th of May, has been tranſmitted by Four ſeparate Conveyances, and we hope has come ſafely to your Hands.

We therein directed you to proceed on your March to this Side of India, promiſing ſoon to ſend you more particular Inſtructions; and we accordingly now deſire, that you will direct your March to the City of Surat, which, in point of Situation, Accommodation, and in every other Reſpect, appears to be the moſt eligible Place.

You will therefore bend your March with all Expedition to that City, unleſs from Circumſtances you ſhould think it expedient, or it ſhould prove more convenient to you, to proceed to Broach; in which Caſe we hereby give you a diſcretional Power for that Purpoſe.

Mr. Boddam, the Chief of Surat, and Mr. Gambier, the Chief of Broach, are directed to ſpare no Expence to open a Correſpondence with you, and to give you every Information reſpecting the Roads, and every other Aſſiſtance that may be neceſſary; and you will not fail to communicate conſtant and punctual Advice of your Situation and Wants to either or both of theſe Gentlemen, accordingly as you may reſolve to proceed, in conſequence of the diſcretional Power we have now given you.

We have the Pleaſure to acquaint you, that Mr. Moſtyn, the Reſident at Poona, has obtained from Mhadjee Scindia, and tranſmitted to you, the proper Paſſports for the ſafe Conduct of the Army under your Command through his Country, as well as Orders to his Officers for all neceſſary Supplies of Proviſions. We hope ſoon to obtain the like Orders from Tookajee Holcar, and flatter ourſelves you will in conſequence have an unmoleſted and well-ſupplied March through the Dekan.

We muſt ſtrongly recommend and enjoin your finding ſome Method to correſpond either with us or ſome of the Gentlemen above named, as we cannot but be under Anxiety until we receive ſome certain Advice of your Situation, and are apprehenſive your Letters muſt be intercepted.

We are,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
William Hornby,
&c. Council.

Bombay Caſtle,
5th June 1778.

Extract of Bombay Secret Conſultations, 18th June.

Signed, the following Letters to Colonel Leſlie, and the Chiefs of Surat and Broach.

Col. Leſlie, Letter to.

To Colonel Leſlie.

Sir,

We have received your Letter of the 14th May, and hope ſoon to hear you are well advanced on your March.

Mr. Moſtyn has obtained from Tookajee Holkar, and tranſmitted to you Orders for the free Paſſage of the Army under your Command, through his Dominions; ſo that we flatter ourſelves you will meet with no Obſtructions or Impediments in your March to this Coaſt.

We have no further Inſtructions or Information to add to thoſe contained in our Letter of the 5th Inſtant, already forwarded by Seven different Routes, only that you purſue your March with all poſſible Diligence, which we doubt not will be accelerated by a Circumſtance Mr. Boddam will apprize you of, and to which you will give full Credit; we do not mention it ourſelves, there being leſs Danger of a Letter being intercepted from Surat, and it does not appear you are furniſhed with a Cypher.

We are,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient, humble Servants,
William Hornby,
&c. Council.

Bombay Caſtle,
19th June 1778.

APPENDIX, N° 97.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 17th Augt. 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Eſquire, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler,
Eſquires.

RECEIVED the following Letters from Mr. Moſtyn, and from Mr. Lewis his Deputy, at Poona.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

I did myſelf the Honour of addreſſing you laſt under the 29th May, and the next Day forwarded the Paſſport and Order from Madjee Scindia, therein-mentioned, to Colonel Leſlie.

My Linguiſt having written me from Camp, that Morabah did not ſeem inclined to deliver the Writing reſpecting the French, which he was ſent in Company with Gopal Naigue Tumbuckur to receive, but that Morabah ſaid, if he did give it, I muſt likewiſe give one, certifying that the Enemies of this Government were thoſe of the Engliſh; I directed him to acquaint Morabah, that what he demanded was unneceſſary, it being already ſettled by Treaty, and that the one I demanded related merely to the French, who were not thought of when the late Treaty was made, ordering him at the ſame Time to make another Application, and if Morabah refuſed, or made an Evaſion, to return to me without Loſs of Time; he accordingly arrived here the 3d, but I am ſorry to inform your Honour, &c. without the Writing; and though Morabah told him he would forward it to me either as that Day or the next, I have not heard any thing further about it, nor do I believe the Durbar have any Intentions of delivering it.

APPENDIX, N° 97.

In conſequence of a Letter from the Preſident of Bombay, Madjee Scindy on the 3d ſent me another Duſtuck and Order to his Officers for the free Paſſage of our Troops through his Country, which have alſo been forwarded to Colonel Leſlie. I have not yet received any from Tookajee Holkar, though I have ſtill Hopes thereof.

On the 5th in the Evening Saccaram Bapoo had a Meeting with Madjee Scindy, as had Hurry Punt, who is arrived from Pundapore, the ſame Night, and the next Day Morabah likewiſe met him. Yeſterday I received a Letter from Camp, informing me that Madjee Scindy and Hurry Punt arrived at Proondur the Day before, when they paid a Viſit to the Peſhwa, who came down from the Fort for that Purpoſe, at which were alſo preſent Sacaram Bapoo, Nanah Furneſe, Cruſtrow Belol, and Madahrow Jahdahroi: From Buchabah, Morabah, and Holkar, not attending, it appears to me that a Party is formed by the former againſt the latter: It is not yet in my Power to ſay how Affairs will turn out, but it is poſſible the executive Part of Government may again revert to Nanah; though I imagine it will require ſome Time before it can be carried into Execution, and that it will not be decided without Bloodſhed.

Notwithſtanding the Aſſurances from the Durbar that Monſieur St. Lubin was diſpatched, he is ſtill permitted to remain here, and within theſe few Days has pleaded Sickneſs in order to delay Time until the Rains ſet in.

The encloſed is Copy of the Paper I have delivered to the Durbar in conſequence of my Superior's Orders.

I am, &c. &c.

Poona, the 10th June 1778.

(Signed) T' Moſtyn.

To the Miniſters of the Poona Durbar.

It is now upwards of Two Years ſince Colonel Upton concluded a Treaty with you, and yet nothing has been done on your Part towards the accompliſhing it; I am therefore directed by the Governor and Council of Bombay, and under the Authority of the Governor General and Council, to call on you, in the Name and Behalf of the Honourable Company, for explicit Anſwers to the following Articles:

Firſt. I demand to know, whether you conſider the Maratta State as bound by the Treaty made at Proondur by Colonel Upton, and whether you will pledge your own Faith to the due Obſervance thereof?

Second. Agreeable to the ſaid Treaty I demand immediate Poſſeſſion of a Country of Three Lacks of Rupees, near or adjoining to Broach, in the Manner ſtipulated by the Fifth Article, by which we mean Three Lacks Groſs Revenue, that is, without any Allowance for Charges.

Third. I am alſo directed by the Governor and Council of Bombay to acquaint you that the Governor General and Council have directed them to keep Poſſeſſion of the Countries ceded to the Honourable Company by Futty Sing Guicawar, ſince you have failed in producing the Proofs required, that Futty Sing Guicawar did not poſſeſs Power or Authority to make ſuch Ceſſions, and that they will accordingly keep Poſſeſſion of thoſe Countries.

Fourth. I have made frequent Remonſtrances to the Durbar on the Impropriety of their Conduct in countenancing Monſieur St. Lubin, and have as often received Aſſurances from them that he ſhould be ſent away; notwithſtanding which, I am ſorry to obſerve, you ſtill permit him to remain here: In a Letter I lately received from you, you ſay Monſieur St. Lubin is diſpatched; but this I cannot conſider as a ſufficient Anſwer, and therefore do now, in conſequence of Orders from the Governor and Council of Bombay, demand of you a clear and ſatisfactory Explanation of your Intentions with reſpect to the French; that is, whether in future you mean to admit any of their Ships into your Ports, or have any further Connections with them? declaring to you that the Governor General and Council will take ſuch Meaſures accordingly as Prudence ſhall dictate for the future Safety of the Company's Intereſts and Poſſeſſions committed to their Care.

Fifth. As the Honourable Company have ſuſtained a Loſs of Two Years Revenue by your Delay in making over the Country of Three Lacks, conformable to the Treaty made with Colonel Upton, and you have failed in making good to the Merchants concerned in the Ship Aurora, the Loſs they ſuſtained by that Ship, amounting to R' 1,97,705. 3. 84. with Intereſt from the 27th Auguſt 1776, being the Date of Colonel Upton's Letter, adviſing you had agreed to reſtore the Ship and Cargo; I am directed by the Governor and Council of Bombay to inform you they will charge the Amount of theſe Two Articles to the Revenues of Jambooſeer, and that when the Sum, for which it was originally mortgaged, with theſe Two Aſſignments, are paid off, they will be ready to reſtore the ſaid Purgunnah to you.

We having experienced ſo much Equivocation and Delay in all your Proceedings, I am ordered to [illegible] you this in Writing, to which I have ſigned my Name and fixed the Company's Seal, and demand from you an explicit Anſwer likewiſe in Writing with your Sicca affixed thereto; which, if not [illegible] me in Fourteen Days from the Date hereof, the Governor and Council will conſider any further [illegible]ſion or Delay as a Refuſal. Dated in Poona this 4th Day of June 1778.

A true Copy.

(Signed) Tho' Moſtyn.

Honourable

APPENDIX, N° 97.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

My laſt Reſpects waited on your Honour, &c. under the 10th inſtant.

In the Evening after I had diſpatched the above Addreſs, I received Intelligence that Madajee Scindia, having ſent 5,000 Men to eſcort him, Nanah had fled to him, conveying with him his own People, amounting to about 2,000 Men and his Bazar, &c.; that Nanah, ſoon after his Arrival at Scindia's Camp, wrote to Morabah, requiring him to deliver over the Sicca Cuttary and Jerry Putkey, which the latter refuſed complying with; and that ſeveral of Morabah's inferior Officers had received Notes from Nanah, ordering them to attend him; but that they, ſo far from obeying theſe Orders, had all declared their Reſolution to ſtand by Morabah.

On the 20th, one of my own Hircarrahs informed me, that it was reported in Morabah's Camp, Nanah had promiſed Nine Lacks of Rupees each to Holkar and Scindia, Five Lacks of which was immediately paid to either, and the Remainder was to be paid as the next Day; in conſequence of which, Holkar, who was encamped in the Rear of Morabah, advanced to his Front, and Scindia, who was the Front of the other Party, alſo advanced; and theſe Two Officers joining, now form One Camp between Morabah and Nanah. What may be the real Motives for this Junction, I cannot pretend to ſay, though I make no Doubt they have ſome Scheme in Agitation againſt ſome of the Miniſters.

On the 12th at Noon, I received a Letter from Morabah, deſiring that I would ſend him a Copy of the Papers regarding the French; the one delivered by my Linguiſt having been miſlaid, and at the ſame Time earneſtly requeſting I would go to him at Camp. To this I replied, that having delivered the Durbar a Paper on the 4th, in which every Thing neceſſary was mentioned, and to which a plain and direct Anſwer would be expected in the Time limited, the Paper he requeſted was of no Conſequence: I at the ſame Time excuſed myſelf from waiting on him, for the Reaſons I had formerly given him through Gopaul Naigue Tumbuckur; but told him, if he had any thing particular to offer, and would deliver it in Writing, I would forward it to Bombay, and obtain him an Anſwer as ſoon as poſſible. The Reaſons here alluded to, were the evaſive and trifling Treatment, both myſelf and Mr. Lewis had met with at the different Times we went to Camp, and the extraordinary Attention paid by the Durbar to Monſieur St. Lubin; but I was more particularly led to evade going, by a Letter I had received that Morning from a Perſon in Scindia's Camp, informing me, that Nanah either had written or would write me, to requeſt I would go to him; and being convinced from the Situation the Government is in, that the Parties in general would take for granted, the Engliſh would ſupport whichever I ſhould viſit, it appeared of too much Conſequence for me to decide. Having received the Letter from Nanah, I immediately addreſſed my Superiors, requeſting their Orders on the Subject; in the mean Time excuſing myſelf in the politeſt Manner to Nanah. On the 22d, I was favoured with my Superior's Anſwer, dated the 18th, wherein they ſay, they think no Objection could lay againſt my viſiting Morabah, as the Miniſter with whom I have lately tranſacted all Buſineſs in Behalf of the Maratta State, without any Reference to them.

On the 17th I received another Letter from Morabah, expreſſing his Concern that I did not wait on him, he having ſome particular Buſineſs to ſpeak to me about, which he ſaid he had ſent a Man to explain to me. The Man told me he was empowered to promiſe an immediate Compliance with the Paper I delivered the 4th; for which Purpoſe Sunnuds ſhould be accordingly inſtantly given for the Country of Three Lacks, and the other Articles agreed to in every Point, and to deſire that we would bring over Ragoba with our Forces. I replied, that it was not in my Power to give an Anſwer to this Requeſt; but if they were ſincere in this Application, Morabah and his Party ought to loſe no Time in writing to the Preſidency of Bombay. I added, that in caſe of Compliance it would be expected that the Treaty made with Ragoba ſhould be adhered to: To which the Man replied, that neither Morabah nor any of his Party would make mention of the Treaty; for as it had been made by their Maſter, it reſted entirely with Ragoba to act therein as he thought fit. On the 21ſt the Man returned to me, bringing with him Letters from Morabah and Bucheba to the Honourable the Preſident and me, Anſwers to the Paper I delivered the 4th, and Duſtucks for the free Paſſage of the Forces you are ſending to Bombay through the Maratta Dominions; but there being ſome Alteration neceſſary in the Anſwers to the Articles, I propoſed to the Man his returning with them to Camp, and obſerved to him, that as the above Letters mentioned Holcar being joined with them, it would be better if he alſo wrote: Upon which the Man conſented to return, and deſired my Linguiſt might accompany him to ſee the Papers were properly drawn out. The Interpreter accordingly ſet out the 23d, and returned the 26th in the Evening, when he informed that Morabah had conſented to every Point of the Articles which he had ſeen the Sicca affixed to, as alſo to the Sunnuds for the Country of Three Lacks; that Holcar had alſo written Letters, in which he declares he is firmly attached to Morabah, and agrees to whatever they do, and expreſſes his earneſt Deſire that we will aſſiſt with our Forces in bringing Ragoba hither; and that though theſe Papers and Letters were all ſealed in his Preſence, neither Morabah nor Holcar choſe to truſt them with the Interpreter to bring down, as the Government they ſaid would in a few Days be entirely in Nannah's Hands, by whose People the Gauts between this and Proonder were already ſo ſtrictly watched, that not a Man could paſs without being ſtripped and ſearched, which indeed happened to the Interpreter; but they added, as it had been agreed by the Parties that Morabah ſhould retire to the Village of Bhole, about 10 Coſ to the Northward of Poona, for which Place he ſhould paſs through the Town in Two or Three Days, he would take that Opportunity of ſending theſe Papers and Letters to me by one of his own People

ople. The Interpreter further tells me, that on the 25th Moraba and Buchaba paid Holcar a ſit; that Scindy in the mean Time coming in, the Two Officers retired to a private Room, where, er conſulting ſome Time, they ſent for the Two Brachmans, when they told Moraba he muſt deliver the Sicca Cuttary and Jerry Putkey to Nanah; which Moraba refuſed, ſaying, that as he had ceived them from Perwetty Bhoy he ſhould return them to her.

On the 25th Madarow Jadary, who came into Town the Day before, ſent me a Letter from Nanah, itten in the Name of the Peſhwa, which referred me to Madarow for ſome Circumſtances he was dered to tell me, and deſired I would go to his Camp. Upon my ſending to Madarow to know hat theſe Circumſtances were, and what Nanah had to ſay to me that he required my Attendance, mentioned the Excuſe I ſent to Nanah, as already recited in the former Part of this Letter, that boo and Nanah thought it very extraordinary my delivering a Letter directed to all the Peſhwa Miſters with the Company's Seal affixed at the Top, and that the Miniſters only wanted to talk with me the Subject thereof. I have therefore written to the Peſhwa in Reply, that as we found ſo much vaſion and Prevarication in his Miniſters ever ſince the late Treaty, it was abſolutely neceſſary every hing ſhould be done in Writing: I had therefore on the 4th Inſtant delivered certain Articles, not a etter, to which I had ſigned my Name and affixed the Company's Seal, to ſhew that their Anſwer muſt have both the Sicca and Mortab affixed thereto, and to which, agreeable to the Orders I reived from my Superiors, I had demanded a plain and poſitive Anſwer in Fourteen Days from that date; but notwithſtanding they had exceeded that Time by Ten Days, I had not yet received one; nd that, as it would therefore only be loſing Time to talk about the Articles, not having it in my ower to ſay any thing until I received the Miniſter's Anſwers, I hoped the Peſhwa would excuſe my ttendance; adding, if the Miniſters had any thing particular to ſay, I requeſted they would give me in Writing, when if I found it material enough I would readily wait on them.

On the 12th I received Paſſports from Tuckojee Holcar for the free Paſſage of our Troops rough his Country, which were forwarded the next Day to Colonel Leſlie, and on the 22d alſo forarded him the Duſtuck from the Durbar mentioned above.

Having procured Copies of a Letter Nana has lately written to the Nizam, and of a Paſs he livered to Monſieur St. Lubin, when that Gentleman viſited him under Pretence of taking Leave the 20th ultimo, I now encloſe Copy of them for your Notice, and which as they have been exained to me, ſhew Nana's real Views with reſpect to Ragoba, the Engliſh, and the French; but t being able to get them properly tranſlated here, I am under the Neceſſity of forwarding their Perſian Copies.

All Roads being ſtopt by Nana's People, who have ſtrict Orders to ſeize all Letters, I have written this on Country Paper for the greater Convenience of Conveyance, and its great Safety.

Moraba paſſed the Town Yeſterday, and in his Way ſent me the Letters, &c. agreeable to what is entioned above, with a Paper containing ſundry Articles to be ſettled between his Party and Ragoba, which he requeſts the Board's Mediation in. The whole Party having requeſted I will go to Bombay on this Occaſion, and I having my Superiors Permiſſion for ſo doing, whenever I may find it neceſſary, I ſhall accordingly proceed thither as ſoon as I poſſibly can without giving Umbrage to the preſent Adminiſtration.

I am, &c. &c.

Poona, (Signed) T. Moſtyn.
The 30th June 1778.

Read the following Letters from Bombay:

Gentlemen,

We encloſe Duplicates of our Letters of the 31ſt ultimo, and 3d and 12th Inſtant, and likewiſe another Copy of Mr. Baldwin's Letter.

Colonel Leſlie has adviſed us of his having arrived oppoſite to Kalpey the 14th ultimo, and of his Intention to proſecute his March in a few Days. We do not apprehend he can reach this Coaſt until after the Rains, but as his early Arrival will be of the utmoſt Importance, we ſhall direct him to expedite his March as much as poſſible. Mr. Moſtyn has ſucceeded in obtaining Paſſports from Tookajee Holcar as well as Mhadajee Scindy, which he has tranſmitted to Colonel Leſlie.

We find, by Mr. Moſtyn's Advices, that a Party is now formed againſt Moraba, and that it is poſſible the executive Part of Government may again revert to Nanah, though not without Oppoſition. Both Parties have deſired an Interview with Mr. Moſtyn, who on that Occaſion referring to us for Inſtructions, we thought, that as Moraba held the Sicca, and was the acting Miniſter with whom he had lately tranſacted all Buſineſs on the Part of the Maratta State, there would be an Impropriety in his viſiting Nanah, and that it might have a bad Effect; whereas no Objection could be againſt his viſiting Moraba, whenever he might find it neceſſary, without any Regard to their petty Diſputes. On the 19th, the Term we have limited for receiving the Durbar's Anſwer will expire.

As the Preſence of His Majeſty's Squadron at this Place might be our Preſervation in caſe of an attack, and it can be of little Service, and is only expoſed to Danger from a ſuperior Fleet, on the Coaſt of Coromandel, we now write to Sir Edward Vernon, by a Veſſel expreſs, deſiring he will

immediately come round to Bombay by the Southern Paſſage; in which Caſe he may arrive here [illegible] all Auguſt.

Encloſed is a General Return of our Forces for laſt Month.

We are, &c. &c.
(Signed) Wm Hornby,
&c. Council.

Bombay Caſtle,
18th June 1778.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 17th Auguſt 1778.

Copy of a Letter from Mr. Moſtyn to the Honourable William Hornby, Eſquire.

Honourable Sir,

The foregoing is Copy of my Addreſs under the 17th, which unfortunately was ſeized near [illegible] Top of the Gotts, and carried to Logur, and the Letter ſent to Nanah. I hope to recover it [illegible] opened, otherwiſe it will irritate him exceedingly. When I diſpatched it, I knew not that [illegible] Chowkies extended far beyond the Town; but Jaſſoods are now ſpread all over the Country, [illegible] in all the Bye Roads. Mr. Farmer diſpatched a Pair of Pattamars Yeſterday; they proceeded as [illegible] as the Gotts in the Night, but finding every Avenue guarded, they were obliged to ſecrete his Let[illegible] and One returned this Evening to acquaint us thereof. I am alſo informed, that Five Pair of [illegible] Pattamars, with One from Chintoo Wittul, and another belonging to Naro Sunker, who were com[illegible] from Bombay, were all ſtopped on the Gotts; One Man only belonging to us got off; but the Let[illegible] are all carried to Logur, from whence they will be ſent to Nanah. Theſe Impediments will make [illegible] Correſpondence tedious, not only from the Neceſſity of every thing being wrote in Cypher, but [illegible] Pattamars will alſo be obliged to go much round about, and can only travel by Night. Let me [illegible] queſt, Sir, your Letters may be made up as round as poſſible, and that you will ſend them by [illegible] Poona Pattamars, and I will venture my Life they will come ſafe, though perhaps take a little [illegible] Time.

I can add nothing but what the public Addreſs will inform you, for it is paſt my Power to g[illegible] what are the real Intentions of Scindia and Holkar; every thing ſeems to depend upon them. H[illegible] ever, I do not believe Morabah's Affairs are ſo deſperate as the Junto make them; if they were, [illegible] would not remain quiet at Proondur, nor his Family in Poona. I am rather inclined to think ſo[illegible] thing is intended againſt the other Party; but the better to blind them into a Belief of Scin[illegible] Tookajee and Scindia permit them to go on. From the general Letter you will learn how the [illegible] ferent Armies are ſituated. I cannot think they can long remain in this State; and I have Hop[illegible] Monacjee Ponercah, and Badjee Punt Burba, who are hourly expected, will turn the Table in Fav[illegible] of Morabah; and I think Scindia's Scheme, in moving from Sacaram and Nana, is to afford th[illegible] Officers an Opportunity to attack them. I have juſt now received a Chit, informing me, that the M[illegible] from Morabah, who was to have come Two Days ago, will be with me this Night; therefore pra[illegible] me to requeſt your ſpeedy Determination, with reſpect to my proceeding to Bombay. The putt[illegible] into Cypher, and copying the Letter to the Committee, has taken up ſo much Time, it could not [illegible] ready laſt Night; I was therefore obliged to keep it until now. The Persian Papers enclosed to [illegible] Board are in a Character: Mr. Farmer could not take upon him to tranſlate, and I was afraid to t[illegible] them with any one elſe. I think they are inconteſtable Proofs of Nana's Intentions; and it behov[illegible] us ſeriouſly to determine to fruſtrate them. I hope you will ſoon have a fair Opportunity. I rem[illegible] with much Reſpect,

Honourable Sir,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
(Signed) Thomas Moſtyn.

Poona,
the 21ſt June 1778.

P. S. The Man is arrived, and I make no Doubt Matters will be ſettled in Two Days, agreeab[illegible] to what is mentioned under the 17th. If you loſe this Opportunity, I have no Hopes of any [illegible] hereafter joining you, or making any more Offers.

Bombay Secret Conſultations, the 17th of June 1778.

The Preſident and Council of Bombay wrote to the Court of Directors as follows: viz.

" On the 26th of March a Change was effected in the Adminiſtration at Poona by Morabah F[illegible]
" neeſe, who, without Oppoſition or Bloodſhed, took Poſſeſſion of that City, aſſumed the exec[illegible]
" Power from Nanah Furneeſe, and appeared to act in all Affairs of Government in concert wi[illegible]
" Saccaram Bappoo; they had ſo taken their Meaſures, as to impreſs, we may ſay, a general Beli[illegible]
" that this Revolution was intended in favour of Ragoba.

" We for ſome Time entertained Hopes that this Change would be followed with the moſt fa[illegible]
" vourable Conſequences to the Company and to Ragoba, and we more particularly depended tha[illegible]
" the French Influence at the Maratta Dubar would be deſtroyed by that Event.

" T[illegible]

" The following Extract of our Letter to the Governor General, dated the 20th of laſt Month, " will in a few Words ſhew you how far theſe Expectations have been realized, the Terms we are " likely to be on with the Poona Government, and the Inſtructions laid down for our Conduct by thoſe " Gentlemen, which, though given before the Revolution, were ſtill applicable to our then Situa- " tion.

" Every Letter we have received from Poona ſince the Revolution, and the uniform Tenor of the " Conduct of the new Adminiſtration, evidently prove, that they ſtill mean to continue the ſame " Line of evaſive Conduct, ſo long purſued by that Government; we doubt not but your Advices " from Mr. Moſtyn will have impreſſed you with the ſame Opinion: Though the executive Power is " transferred from Nanah to Morabah, the former is ſtill in Office and a Member of the Durbar; " the latter, as far as we can judge, ſeems inclined to tread in the Footſteps of his Predeceſſor, and " unwilling to part with any Share of his Power to Ragoba, may ſeek to ſecure the Whole to him- " ſelf by the ſame Means.

" Monſieur de St. Lubin is ſtill permitted to remain at Poona, though his Diſmiſſion was the very " firſt Object of our Inſtructions to Mr. Moſtyn after the Change in the Adminiſtration took place, " and he received every Satisfaction on that Head that Promiſes could give ſo long ago as the 10th " April. Notwithſtanding the Requeſt then made to him in public Durbar to accompany their Agent " to Bombay with Propoſals reſpecting Ragoba; we find by his lateſt Advices, that they have " been only trifling with him, nor have they to his Knowledge yet taken one Step towards " ſettling that Buſineſs, though the Seaſon is now ſo late: The Treaty ſtill remains on the ſame " Footing on which it has ſtood theſe Two Years paſt, nor has the new Government taken any " Meaſures whatever for fulfilling the unexecuted Articles.

" Such being the Situation of Affairs, we could not, with your Orders before us, wait any longer " in Expectation of Propoſals from Poona; we have therefore given Mr. Moſtyn Inſtructions to the " following Purport, being exactly to the Directions contained in your Letter of the 23d of March:

" Firſt, We have directed him to demand from the new Adminiſtration an expreſs Avowal of the " Treaty concluded by Colonel Upton:

" Secondly, The immediate Poſſeſſion of a Country of Three Lacks ſtipulated by the 5th Article " of the ſaid Treaty, and to declare a Refuſal to be a Violation of the Treaty.

" Thirdly, To acquaint the Durbar, we have Orders from Bengal to keep Poſſeſſion of the [illegible] Fort, ſince they have failed in producing the Proofs required by the Treaty, that [illegible] had a Right to poſſeſs Power to make ſuch Ceſſions.

" Fourthly, To make a Remonſtrance againſt the Countenance afforded to the Chevalier de St. Lubin, and to demand a clear and ſatisfactory Explanation of their Intentions with reſpect to the French; declaring to the Miniſters, that the Governor General and Council will take " ſuch Meaſures accordingly, as Prudence ſhall dictate, for the future Safety of the Company's " Poſſeſſions.

" We thought it neceſſary to direct Mr. Moſtyn to deliver theſe Demands in Writing, and to " acquaint the Miniſters, that we expected an immediate and explicit Anſwer likewiſe in Writ- " ing, but that if ſuch an Anſwer was not returned within Fourteen Days, we ſhould conſider any " further Delay or Evaſion as a Refuſal, and take our Meaſures accordingly.

" Mr. Moſtyn delivered his Demands on the 4th Inſtant, when it was ſignified to the Miniſters, " that Sanbooteer would be reſtored, on their making good the Balance of the Twelve Lacks, " the Loſs you have ſuſtained by their Delay in making over the Country of Three Lacks, and " the Amount due to the concerned in the Aurora.

" The Governor General and Council, on the Poona Government refuſing to comply with " theſe Demands, or in any other Shape infringing the Treaty, have authorized us to conclude an " Alliance with Ragoba.

" We have lately obtained from Mr. Moſtyn very ſtrong Evidence, that Nanah's Engagements " with the French have been taken up by the new Adminiſtration; and the ſame Gentleman diſ- " covered, that Application had been made by Monſieur de St. Lubin to the Government of Goa, " for Permiſſion for Two French Regiments to paſs through the Portugueze Territories to the " Aſſiſtance of the Poona Miniſters; on which Head we have made a proper Repreſentation to the " Governor of Goa

" Our lateſt Advices from Poona inform us, that a Party is formed againſt Morabah; and " that it is not unlikely the executive Part of Government may again revert to Nanah Furneeſe. " Both Parties ſeem preparing to come to Extremities; and it is not improbable but one or both " may make Application to us for Aſſiſtance. In this critical Situation, you may aſſured we ſhall " proceed with the utmoſt Caution and Circumſpection, and take no Steps but what may appear, " on the moſt attentive Conſideration of every Circumſtance, as beſt ſuited to enſure the Safety " and Welfare of your Poſſeſſions."

The 8th of July 1778, the Board at Bombay addreſſed the Court as follows; viz.

" By the Advices received from Mr. Moſtyn ſince that Period, we now find, that the Change " we then had Reaſon to think would take place in the Poona Government, has really hap- " pened; the Adminiſtration having reverted into the old Channel, and the executive Power " veſted in Nanah Furneſe; in conſequence of which, that Government is now again in the ſame " Situation it was at the Time the Treaty was concluded by Colonel Upton.

" Our laſt Letter from Mr. Moſtyn is dated the 3d Inſtant, in which he informs us, that not
" having received from the new Adminiſtration an Anſwer to the Demands he made under the
" 4th ultimo; and having received from the other Party every neceſſary Paper and Credential for
" ſettling our Demands upon that State, and bringing Ragoba again into Government, he had
" at their Requeſt determined to proceed immediately hither, to lay the ſame before us, and
" propoſed ſetting off as ſoon as he had received the proper Paſſports for that Purpoſe."

APPENDIX, N° 98.

Extract of Bombay Secret Conſultations, the 6th July 1778.

RECEIVED the following Letter from the Reſident at Poona.

Poonah, Letter from.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

My laſt Reſpects were dated the 29th ultimo: The ſame Evening I received another Letter from Nanah, requiring my Attendance at Camp in the Name of the Peſhwa; as alſo one from Mhadjee Scindia, telling me that he underſtood there was ſome Difference between the Durbar and us with reſpect to the late Treaty, he would get it ſettled, and therefore requeſted I would go to him; to the former I have made the ſame Reply as formerly adviſed, and to the latter, that I ſhould be very happy to meet him; but as this could not be done without diſguſting the Miniſters whom I had for certain Reaſons refuſed, I hoped he would excuſe me for the preſent.

Yeſterday I received in the Evening a Note from Keſſorow, the Son of Mhaderow Jaderow, requeſting I would ſend the Linguiſt to him as he had ſomething to ſay; the Linguiſt accordingly went, when Keſſorow told him, that as Morabah had got Poſſeſſion of the Articles I delivered the 4th ultimo, he was directed to requeſt I would deliver another Copy thereof; to this I replied in Writing, that I did not underſtand this Behaviour, being certain that the Paper is in Nanah's Poſſeſſion, if not, it was very extraordinary that he did not apply for a Second Copy, when he deſired I would go to Camp purpoſely to talk on theſe Articles on the 25th ultimo, or that Mhaderow at a Viſit he paid me the 27th, ſhould not have aſked for a Copy, but on the contrary repeated the Articles to me verbatim, and preſſed me to go to Camp, to talk upon them; and that it thereby appearing perfectly clear to me, the Durbar ſo far from meaning to give an Anſwer, only wanted to triſle with me, and by obtaining another Copy, have it in their Power to ſay they did not receive the Articles until the 2d Inſtant, when they would expect a further Time of Fourteen Days to anſwer; I could not comply with their Requeſt; to this, Keſſorow replied in Writing, that in Conſideration of our Friendſhip, I ought to deliver the Copy in queſtion.

From the above Meſſage I make no Doubt it will appear clear to your Honour, &c. that the Durbar have no real Intention of replying to that Paper; and as I have received every neceſſary Paper and Credential from the other Party for ſettling our Demands and bringing Ragoba into [illegible] with which they have earneſtly requeſted I will proceed to the Preſidency, and lay before the Honourable Board for your final Determination, I judge it neceſſary to comply with their Requeſt, and intend ſetting out as ſoon as I can receive the proper Duſtucks, which I hope will be in a few Days.

I was in hopes of receiving an Anſwer from the preſent Durbar to the Paper delivered the 4th ultimo, which would have afforded me an Opportunity of leaving Poona under Pretence of laying them before you, without giving the leaſt to ſuſpect the real Motive of my Journey; but being diſappointed therein, I have been under the Neceſſity, as the only Means left to prevent Suſpicion, of making uſe of your Honour, &c.'s Name by writing to the Peſhwa, it is by your Order, I proceed.

I am informed that Holcar and Scindia are preſſing Nanah for the Balance of the Money promiſed them as mentioned in my Addreſs of the 20th ultimo, which Nanah is endeavouring to evade by ſaying that he has no Money with him, but will come to Poona to raiſe it. To this, however, the Officers object, and inſiſt on its being paid there; Nanah has in conſequence ſent for all the Shroffs both Bramins and Guzarattees, to Proonder, but I underſtand they have agreed amongſt themſelves not to lend a Rupee, and it is imagined this will bring on a freſh Diſpute.

Monſieur St. Lubin left this Place the 9th inſtant, with an Intent as it is publicly given out of proceeding to Damaun, though I am privately aſſured that he will not go further than Damaun where I ſuppoſe he will remain until Nanah is ſatisfied whether he can comply with his Engagements.

I am, very reſpectfully,
Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
Thomas Moſtyn.

Poona,
3d July 1778.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX, N° 99.

Letter from Mr. Moſtyn, dated 13th July 1778.

Bombay Sel. Conſ. 21 Jul 1778.

To the Honourable William Hornby, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Select Committee, Bombay.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

CONFORMABLE to what I wrote you under the 3d inſtant I left Poona the 6th, and have now the Honour to lay before you ſundry Letters and Papers from Morabah and his Party, as per incloſed Liſt, and hope my Conduct in the whole of this Buſineſs will meet with your Honour, &c.'s Approbation.

On the 5th I received another Letter from Scindia, requeſting I would go to him, as he wanted to ſettle the Articles; but as I had ſo often refuſed both him and the Durbar, telling him that it was not in my Power to talk on the Articles, as your Honour, &c. required a plain and direct Anſwer in Writing, and being convinced it was a Scheme of Nannah's to delay Time, I thought my going to Camp at Scindia's Requeſt might appear as if I meant to triſle only with them: I therefore wrote to Scindia, deſiring that he would ſend me the Duſtucks, for which I told him I ſhould ſtay that Day only; I alſo added, that if he had any thing particular to ſay, and would deliver it me in Writing, I ſhould lay it before your Honour, &c. and procure him an Anſwer.

I likewiſe encloſe Copy of my Addreſs to the Honourable the Governor General and Council under the 30th ultimo.

I am, very reſpectfully,
Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,
Your obedient humble Servant,
Thomas Moſtyn.

Bombay,
13th July 1778.

Liſt of ſundry Letters and Papers brought by Mr. Moſtyn from Poona.

N° 1. Letter from Mahiput Row Trimbuck, or Butchebah Pronder, to the Honourable the Preſident, dated 22d Rabillaker.
2. Letter from Morabah Furneſe to D°, of the ſame Tenor and Date.
3. Letter from Mhaderow Narrain to D°, dated the 2d June 1778.
4. Letter from Tookajee Holcar to D°, dated the 20th June 1778.
5. Letter from Mora Babarow to D°, without Date.
6. Letter from Mora Babarow, or Moraba, to Ragoba.
7. Letter from Tookajee Holcar to D°.
8. Letter from Mahiput Row, or Butchebah Pronder, to D°.
9. Three Sunnuds, in the Name of Maderow Narrain Peſhwa, to deliver to the Engliſh of Bombay the Purgunnahs of Deſborah, Hanſood, and Ahmood, dated 15th Rabilliker.
10. Demands made by Mr. Moſtyn on the Part of the Government of Bombay, with the Anſwers.
11. Anſwers under the Sicca and Mortab to the Paper delivered by Mr. Moſtyn to the Poona Durbar on the 4th June 1778.
12. Tranſlation of a Memorandum delivered to Mr. Moſtyn by Morabah.
13. Memorandum of Articles given in by Mr. Moſtyn, and anſwered under the Sicca.
14. Articles of a Treaty propoſed by Mora Babarow and Mahiput Row Trimbeck.

Tranſlation of a Letter from Mahiput Row Trimbuck, or Butchebah Pronder, dated 22d Rabillaker.

After Compliments:

The Row Saheb State has fallen into Diſorder, which cannot be ſettled without the Preſence of the proper Maſter; the Row Saheb being a Minor, your Honour, &c. will therefore join your Army with Dada Saheb, and ſee him come to Poona. I have communicated ſome Matters regarding the coming of Dada Saheb to Thomas Moſtyn, Eſquire, and have diſpatched him to your Honour, by whoſe verbal Information you will know all. Your Honour, &c. will have no Scruples in your Mind, and manage ſo that Dada Saheb's coming may take place immediately.

The Letter from Morabah Furneſe, exactly of the ſame Date and Tenor as the preceding one.

Tranſlation of a Letter from Mhaderow Narrain Peſhwa, dated 2d June 1778.

After Compliments.

Mr. Moſtyn has repreſented to me, that there is a Treaty in Force between the Circar and the Company,

pany, and they continue in Terms of Friendſhip; for that Reaſon it is proper no Manner of Agreement ſhould be made or entered into with Monſieur St. Lubin, a Frenchman, who is come to this Circar, and is permitted to reſide at Poona. To this I anſwer, that hitherto no Agreement has been concluded between him and this Durbar; neither ſhall any be made hereafter; and I never will hold with him or his Nation any ſort of Friendſhip, or permit the French Ships to come into any of my Ports, either for Trade or otherwiſe: This will continue ſo long as the Honourable Company and I remain in Friendſhip. I have not any Occaſion to depend on the French Nation. Your Honours, &c. will alſo act agreeable to the Treaty.

Tranſlation of a Letter from Tookajee Holcar, dated 20th June 1778.

After Compliments:

Diſorders have ariſen in the Government of Row Saheb Pundit Pradhan, owing to which ſome Enemies of the State have grown powerful; therefore, without the Preſence of Dada Saheb, theſe Diſorders cannot be put a Stop to, nor can the Government be ſettled. I have had a Conference on this Head with Morabah Dada and Butchebah, wherein we have agreed to bring Dada Saheb to Poona; and both the aforeſaid Perſons have communicated the ſame to Mr. Moſtyn, and written Letters to him on the Buſineſs. We are heartily agreed, ſo that your Honour will ſee that Dada Saheb comes here immediately with your Forces; and entertain no Doubts reſpecting us; but do what is ſettled by Mr. Moſtyn with the Two Government's Officers. I want very much to have the Government properly ſettled; and your Honour is likewiſe a Friend to this State. You will know the reſt of the verbal Information of Mr. Moſtyn. I am hearty in the Buſineſs, and ſo are the Two abovementioned Chiefs.

Tranſlation of a Letter from Mora Babaro, or Moraba, without Date.

After Compliments:

I have delivered to Mr. Moſtyn a Liſt of every Article of my Terms, which he will communicate to you, and you will take the ſame into Conſideration, and ſee every Article agreed to. Your Honour will mediate between the Parties, and get the Articles confirmed under the Seal of the Company, and ſend them to me; all which, and other Matters, I have communicated to Mr. Moſtyn, who will acquaint you of the ſame. I have not any other Intention than to be on friendly Terms with you, and your Honour will do the ſame on your Part.

Tranſlation of a Letter from Moraba to Ragoba.

After Compliments:

Moraba ſends his Reſpects. I have communicated every thing to Mr. Moſtyn; all of which you will underſtand from his Repreſentation. I have no other Dependance beſides you, God is my Judge.

Tranſlation of a Letter from Tookajee Holcar to Ragoba.

After Compliments:

I Tookajee Holcar, your Servant, ſend you my Reſpects, and hope you will act agreeable to the Requeſt of Mora Babarow, who now writes to you. Some Differences have happened, to which you might take Exception; but I hope you will not, becauſe we are all one; this you may rely on. Dated the 5th Jamadillaker.

Tranſlation of a Letter from Mahiput Row, or Butchebah, to Ragobah.

After Compliments:

I your Child, Mahiput Row Trimbuck, ſend you my Reſpects. I have communicated to Mr. Moſtyn all Matters on our Part, which he will inform you of; and you will, without any Heſitation, undertake the Buſineſs. I ſwear that no Obſtacle will ariſe on our Side. Three Sunnuds, in the Name of Maderow Narrain Peſhwa, to deliver to the Engliſh of Bombay, the Purgunnahs of Dabara, Hanſood, and Ahmood. Dated 15th Rabillaker.

APPENDIX, N° 99.

Demands made by Mr. Moſtyn, on the Part of the Government of Bombay; with the Anſwers.

1ſt. The Six Articles already delivered are to be agreed to, and anſwered under your Sicca, in the Column oppoſite to each Article. Should Dada Saheb beſides give us an additional Grant of Territory, you will aſſiſt therein, and ſend Sunnuds accordingly.

Anſwer. The above mentioned Six Articles have been already determined on, and anſwered by an Inſtrument which is ſealed and delivered and ſhall be obſerved; you will do the ſame on your Part. Beſides which, we agreed to Dada Saheb's giving you additional Jaghire.

2d. The Pay and Expence of the Engliſh Troops, who will come with Ragobah, are to be diſrayed in ready Money, according to the Terms ſettled with Ragonaut Row in the Treaty of Surat, which Treaty you will agree to; or if ready Money is not paid, particular Countries ſhall be aſſigned over for the ſame Purpoſe.

Anſwer. You will ſhew the Article in the Treaty of Surat reſpecting the Pay of the Troops to Chintoo Wittul; if he approves of it we will abide by what he may ſettle; whatever may be ſettled we will either pay in ready Money, or aſſign over Countries near the Sea Coaſt, which you will reſtore on the Money being paid; we agree to Dada Saheb's Treaty.

3d. On Dada Saheb's Arrival either at Bellapore or Panwell, Butcheba and the Subedar's Son are to come and compliment him.

Anſwer. Conſidering the preſent Situation of Affairs, none of us can conveniently come. You will bring him over the Ghauts, and we are ready for his Service in all Things. You will do the Buſineſs without fail.

We agree to the above as it is written. Dated 15th Rabillekar.

L. S.

Anſwers under the Sicca and Mortab to the Paper of Demands delivered by Mr. Moſtyn to the Poona Durbar, the 4th June 1778. N

Sicca.

Firſt. We agree to obſerve the Treaty of Poorunder, and will willingly perform the ſame; you will do the ſame on your Part.

Second. Sunnuds are iſſued for the Country of Three Lacks, according to the Treaty. You alledge there is a Difference between the Cahmil Jumma and the preſent Revenues; into which we ſhall hereafter enquire and do what may be neceſſary. If it appears on a juſt Examination, that the Revenues fall ſhort of Three Lacks, Villages will be given from the Purgunnah of Occlaſeer to make up the Difference: If on the contrary there ſhould be an Exceſs, you will diſmember Villages from the Purgunnah of Hanſood, and reſtore them to the Circar.

Third. The Proofs from Futty Sing mentioned in the Treaty of Poorunder not having been produced to this Day, we now agree to your keeping the Country of One and a Half Lack of Rupees, given the Company by Futty Sing Guicawar.

Fourth. Monſieur St. Lubin, the Frenchman, is already diſpatched. No Treaty is concluded with him, nor will any be hereafter, ſo long as we are in Friendſhip with you. A Letter is written to the Governor on this Subject.

Fifth. You ſpeak of the Stipulations made by Colonel Upton reſpecting the Country of Three Lacks, to which we anſwer that we ſhall obſerve the Agreement made by the Circar. The juſt Amount due on that Account, according to the Treaty, ſhall be paid in ready Money, or out of the Revenues of Jambooſeer, as may be ſettled; which Purgunnah ſhall be reſtored after the Amount is paid.

Sixth. We have anſwered your Five Articles oppoſite to each other, agreeable to which we will not.

We agree to the Six Articles, in the above Manner.

Mortab.

Tranſlation

N° 12. Tranſlation of a Memorandum delivered to Mr. Moſtyn by Morabah.

A true Friendſhip ſhould ſubſiſt between us; regarding which, a Letter to me, under the Company's Seal, is required to the following Purport:

That ſeveral Points have been agreed to between us by an Inſtrument under the Company's Seal, which we will obſerve: You will have no Objection or Doubts in your Mind about the ſame; our Friendſhip will be continued to the End of Time, and you will cultivate the ſame on your Part.

N° 13. Memorandum of Articles given in by Mr. Moſtyn, and anſwered under the Sicca.

Futty Sing has given the Company a Territory of One Lack and a Half of Rupees, to which you will have no Objections.

Anſwer. This Article is anſwered in the Reply to the Paper of Demands given in to the Durbar by Mr. Moſtyn.

You will ſettle reſpecting the Pay of the Troops that are to accompany Ragoba, in the ſame Manner as ſtipulated by the Treaty of Surat; or leave the ſame to be adjuſted by Chintoo Punt, giving him a proper Power for that Purpoſe.

Anſwer. Chintoo Punt has Authority and Inſtructions on this Point, as mentioned in a former Paper. We agree to the Treaty made with Ragoba.

The Circar have given us, by the Treaty concluded by Colonel Upton, a Country of Three Lacks of Rupees. The Pergunnahs ſhall be Ahmood, Deſborah, and Hanſood. Any Difference there may be in either of the Revenues of theſe Diſtricts ſhall be ſettled, as mentioned in Paper N° 11.

Anſwer. This Paper has been alſo already anſwered.

We have mutually agreed to reſtore Ragoba; it now remains to be ſettled, to what Place we ſhall bring him, and where you will come and join him. We will come to the Foot of the Gauts; but it is very difficult to get above them. After we have got above the Gauts, there can be Obſtacle; but that Enterprize will be very difficult.

Anſwer. The principal Officers and the Armies are now here, and when it is convenient we will adviſe you thereof. You may now go to Bombay; and when you have ſettled every Thing, let us know; and ſend the Articles according to our Agreement. All our Time and Attention are taken up in the Buſineſs. We have given you full Powers; but the Matter muſt be kept a Secret.

Holkar is equally engaged with you in this Buſineſs; you will therefore deſire him to confirm the ſame to one of my People.

Anſwer. The Subedar has had a Meeting with Bapoojee, and ſatisfied him, and given him his Letters.

To tranſport the Artillery, Stores, &c. Ten thouſand Biggaries, and Two thouſand Bullocks will be wanting. We will bring as many Laſcars as our Bundar can afford; but the reſt muſt be ſupplied by you.

Anſwer. You have every thing. We on our Part will aſſiſt with as many as our Situation will permit; but you muſt not make any Delay on this Account.

I will endeavour to get your Articles confirmed; but you muſt ſend ſome Perſon with Letters for the Governor and Chintoo Punt.

Anſwer. I have delivered to you Letters for the Governor, and deputed a proper Perſon; but no Letters for Chintoo Punt; your being there will be ſufficient.

Our Treaty is not to be diſcovered to any Perſon, not even to Chintoo Punt.

We agree to the above, the 29th Jamdillowah.

Seal.

Articles

APPENDIX, N° 99, 100.

Articles propoſed for a Treaty by Mora Baberow and Mahiput Row Trimbuck.

Article 1ſt. The Peſhwa being a Minor, the State has fallen into Diſorder, for that Reaſon we have agreed that Dada Saheb ſhall come, in order that the Government may be ſettled; but the Sicca, &c. ſhall be continued in the Name of Maderow Narrain, and until he comes of Age Dada Saheb ſhall conduct the Government, through our Hands as the principal Miniſters.

2d. Dada Saheb will not keep any of his preſent Attendants near him, nor liſten to their evil Counſel; he may ſettle on them reaſonable Appointments, but not let them approach near him.

3d. In conſequence of the Diſorders that have prevailed in the State for theſe Four Years paſt, Ragoba may have Intentions to puniſh particular Perſons; he muſt not entertain any Thoughts of that kind, but baniſh all Enmity from his Heart in a general Amneſty. If any one hereafter ſhall raiſe Diſturbances againſt the State, Dada Saheb, in Conjunction with us, will inflict the proper Puniſhment; and the Engliſh ſhall never at any Time interfere with us in this Point; the Engliſh ſhall not, without our Advice, make an Alliance with any Power that may affect us.

4th. The Engliſh Army that will accompany Ragoba, ſhall remain ſo long as we may have Occaſion for it, and be diſmiſſed when he may think proper; to which you will make no Objection.

5th. Whenever we may hereafter at any Time require your Aſſiſtance, you will ſend an Army well equipped for our Service.

6th. Whatever Grants have been made to any Perſon for Services to Government, ſhall be confirmed by Ragoba.

7th. We will on our Parts faithfully obſerve the Treaty concluded during the Government of the late Nanah and Row Saheb.

8th. The ſeveral principal Officers belonging to the Peſhwa's Government, and the Dependants on him, are to be provided with ſuitable Appointments, according to their Rank; but State of the Governments Finances muſt be conſidered.

9th. We confirm the Treaty concluded by Colonel Upton, and agree to the further Demands made by Mr. Moſtyn, according to what is wrote in our Anſwer to thoſe Demands.

10th. Should any Chiefs of the Government want to bring in Dada Saheb, without our Participation, you will not conſent thereto; you muſt bring him in through our Interpoſition alone, and not through any other: The late Mhaderow took the Government as Chief Miniſter out of our Hands; but you will uſe your Intereſt to reſtore us to our Places, and will not ſupport any Perſons that may endeavour to prejudice us in Ragoba's Favour, but ſupport us.

11th. You will without fail bring Dada Saheb to Poona, according to our Wiſhes, aſſiſting him with Troops and warlike Stores as may be neceſſary to accompliſh it.

12th. The King and other Chiefs in Hindoſtan have made Encroachments on the Territories belonging to the Circar and its Officers, which you will get reſtored by Force, and aſſiſt us in our Endeavours for that Purpoſe.

13th. Govind Row and Futty Sing having made an equal Diviſion between them of the Guicawar's Country, you will ſee this Agreement punctually complied with. Govind Row ought to receive the Revenues of his Share from the Time the Diviſion was firſt made, but Futty Sing has withheld it. An Equivalent thereof muſt therefore be given and continued to Govind Row. You will not favour Futty Sing, who ought not to charge Govind Row with Half of the Countries he gave to the Engliſh. You will aſſiſt Govind Row in all Things.

14th. This Circar has ſuſtained a Loſs on Account of the Diſturbance raiſed by Sudabah. The Effects, &c. he had in his Poſſeſſion ought to revert to the Circar. You will aſſiſt in this Buſineſs, and not protect whoever may be in Poſſeſſion thereof.

15th. The Management of the Guicawar Buſineſs is to be in the Hands of Gopal Naigue.

APPENDIX, N° 100.

Copy of a Letter from Mr. Moſtyn, dated 27th June 1778.

To the Honourable William Hornby, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Select Committee Bombay.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

ON the 22d Inſtant I was honoured with your Commands of the 18th.

On the 21ſt, the Man mentioned in my laſt to be ſent by Morabah, returned to me with Letters from Morabah and Butchebah both to the Honourable the Preſident and me, with the

Anſwer to the Paper I delivered the 4th, and Duſtucks for the free Paſſage of our Troops coming from Bengal through the Maratta Dominions. The Letters from Morabah and Butchebah were to requeſt we would bring over Ragobah with our Forces, and to aſſure that Holcar was ſtrictly joined with them; but there being ſome Alterations neceſſary in the Anſwer to the Paper, and not having received any Letter from Holcar on the Subject, which I told the Man was likewiſe abſolutely neceſſary, he agreed to return to Morabah, at the ſame Time deſiring that my Linguiſt might accompany him to ſee that the Papers were drawn out in a proper Manner, to receive the Sunnuds for the Country of Three Lacks, and Letters from Holcar to the Honourable the Preſident and myſelf, which I conſented to. The Linguiſt accordingly ſet out on the 23d, and returned laſt Night, when he informed me that Morabah had agreed to the Articles in every Point, which he had ſeen properly ſealed, as alſo the Sunnuds for the Country of Three Lacks, and Letters from Holcar to the Honourable the Preſident. That Holcar had alſo written the Letters declaring he is firmly attached to Morabah and Butchebah, and that whatever they do he agrees to, and expreſſing his earneſt Deſire to bring Ragobah here; that Morabah had drawn up ſundry Articles which he wiſhes to have ſettled between his Party and Ragobah, through the Mediation of your Honour, &c. and that though theſe Papers were all ſealed, neither Morabah or Holcar choſe to truſt them with the Linguiſt to bring down, as the Government would in Two Days be in the Hands of Nannah, by whoſe People they were ſo ſtrictly watched that not a Man could paſs without being ſtopped and ſearched, which indeed happened to the Linguiſt; but ſaid as it had been agreed between the Parties that Morabah ſhould reſide at the Village of Bhole, about Ten Coſs Northward of Poona, for which Place he ſhould paſs through the Town on Sunday, he would take that Opportunity of ſending theſe Papers to me by one of his own People. Morabah requeſted, that the utmoſt Secrecy might be obſerved, until Matters were entirely adjuſted, and we began to act; and ſaid, that he would acquaint us when he and Holcar were ready to co-operate with us, but could not now take upon himſelf to ſay the exact Number of Troops he could join us with. The Linguiſt further tells me, that the Day before Yeſterday Morabah and Butchebah viſited Holcar; that whilſt they were with him, Scindia came in, when the Two Officers retired to a private Tent; that after conſulting ſome Time, they ſent for the others, and told Morabah that he muſt give up the Sicca Cuttary and Jury Purkey to Nanah; which he refuſed, ſaying that as he had received them from Perwetty Roy, he ſhould return them to her. The Linguiſt alſo ſays, he heard at Camp that Badjee Punt Burwah and Monackjee Phaneria hearing of the Junction of Holcar and Scindia, imagined that Morabah was left entirely to himſelf; and fearing that the Kiſtnah would fill ſo much by the Rains, as to prevent their Retreat, they had haſtily retired to the Southern Bank of that River, from whence they are plundering the Country round.

On the 25th Mhaderow Jaderow, who came into Town the Day before, deſired I would ſend a Man to him, as he had ſomething particular to ſay. I complied therewith by ſending my Genoa Writer, to whom he delivered the following Meſſage; viz. That when I came from Bombay he ſent a Jaſſood to pay his Compliments to me, who I ſaid was not a proper Perſon; that ſome Time ago I delivered a Letter, directed to all the Miniſters of the Peſhwa, with the Company's Seal affixed at the Top, at which Nannah and Bappoo were much ſurprized, but that he had excuſed this to them, by telling them I was unacquainted with their Method of affixing Seals; that the Peſhwa had lately ſent me a Letter, deſiring I would go to Camp, but inſtead of anſwering it in the Manner I ſhould have done, I had written an Anſwer to Ballajee Janourdeen (alias Nannah) that I ſhould not go without Orders from Bombay, which they thought very extraordinary, as there could be no Objection to my Vackeel attending the Government; that Nannah Bappoo and Madajee Scindia having ordered him to preſent their Compliments to me, and deſire my Attendance at their Camp, he had repreſented to them that it was neceſſary they ſhould write a Letter to me on the Subject, which they have accordingly done; he now ſent it to me, requeſting I would take into Conſideration and fix a Day for going to them, when he would accompany me. This Letter, written in the Name of the Peſhwa, and ſealed with the Muttalic Sicca, mentions, that Mhaderow will acquaint me with ſome Circumſtances, and deſires I would accompany him to Camp. As I ſuppoſed the Circumſtances he alluded to were no other than the Meſſage above recited from Maderow Jaderow I ſent him the following Reply: That I could not conſider a Jaſſood as a proper Perſon to meet me on my firſt Arrival (which was the Caſe when I came here in March 1777) particularly as I was convinced the Durbar knew better from their Behaviour to Monſieur St. Lubin; that ſo many People being in Poſſeſſion of the Muttalic Sicca, it was impoſſible for me to know from whom Letters ſealed therewith came; if therefore there was not ſome fixed Rule for my Conduct, I might attend upon any Officer poſſeſſed thereof, who might chuſe to write me in the Peſhwa's Name; and as Morabah was the Perſon to whom the Durbar laſt referred me for tranſacting Buſineſs with the Government, I did not conſider myſelf at Liberty to obey the Summons mentioned by Maderow; that the Durbar having ever ſince the late Treaty acted in ſo evaſive a Manner, it was become abſolutely neceſſary to have every thing in Writing, which was the Reaſon of my delivering the Paper the 4th inſtant; that it was not a Letter, but certain Articles to which I ſigned my Name and fixed the Company's Seal, to ſhew them that their Anſwer muſt have both the Sicca and Mortab affixed thereto; and with reſpect to the Seal being at the Top of that Paper, and my Name at the Bottom, I obſerved to him that it was exactly conformable to their own Method of affixing the Sicca at Top and the Mortab at Bottom, and not through Ignorance of their Cuſtoms, as he pretends to ſay. As the Circumſtances mentioned by Mhaderow appeared to me too trifling to need my Attendance at Camp, I this Morning ſent a

another Meſſage to him, deſiring to know if he had any further Particulars to inform me of, and what it was Nannah wanted to talk to me on; telling him, if only on the Articles, it was unneceſſary, becauſe they explained themſelves, and I was directed to demand an Anſwer in a certain Time, which had now been exceeded Eight Days; but if Nannah had any other particular Buſineſs, I deſired he would deliver it in Writing; when, if it appeared of Conſequence ſufficient, I would immediately wait on him: To which Mhaderow replied, that he had no further Particulars to inform me of, and that the Buſineſs Nannah wanted me for was to talk on the Articles and the Increaſe of our Friendſhip. This more fully points out their View in ſending for me to be nothing more than to delay Time, and to evade giving an Anſwer to the Paper in Writing; and as from the Exceſs of Time your Honour, &c. may judge it a Refuſal, I have thought it moſt prudent to evade going, and from Experience I am convinced it is the only Method of drawing any thing from them in Writing. Nannah having again got the Power of Government, I make no Doubt but the ſame, if not greater Obſtructions, will be thrown on our Communication with the Town as formerly, which will of courſe render my future Intelligence very imperfect.

The Letter mentioned in my laſt to have been ſtopped by Nannah, has in conſequence of my Application been returned to me unopened; as have alſo a large Packet coming from Madras for Bombay, which was immediately forwarded by a Pair of Pattamars, thoſe from Madras being taken ſick and unable to proceed; and a Packet with the Honourable Company's Seal for the Captain General at Goa, with ſeveral private Letters from that Place; which were all immediately forwarded.

I am informed that Nannah has lately ſent an Order to Monſieur St. Lubin to leave Poona, and that he has in conſequence been ſupplied with Camels, Bullocks, &c. for his Baggage, and a Guard; but he now pleads, that his Linguiſt being at Nannah's Camp, he cannot ſet out until his Return. Notwithſtanding Nannah has given this Order, I am convinced it is only done with a View to blind us; for where can he go at this Seaſon of the Year?

The Duſtucks mentioned in the former Part of this Letter, were forwarded to Colonel Leſlie on the 22d.

I am, very reſpectfully,
Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
Tho' Moſtyn.

Poona,
27th June 1778.

APPENDIX, N° 101.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 17th Auguſt 1778.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

CONformably to what Mr. Moſtyn wrote under the 30th ultimo, he proceeded to the Preſidency the 6th inſtant; a few Hours after he had ſet out, a Government's Carcoon came to the Factory, with the Durbar's Anſwers to the Paper delivered the 4th ultimo; but on finding Mr. Moſtyn was gone, refuſed to deliver them, ſaying, he had received poſitive Orders to follow him, and deliver them into his own Hands; however, the next Evening he returned, telling me he had received freſh Orders from his Maſter to deliver them to me. The Original I have forwarded to Bombay, and now encloſe Copy of Tranſlate for your Obſervation.

Your Commands of the 8th, and Duplicate of thoſe of the 11th June, have been received, the former on the 9th and the latter on the 11th inſtant; immediately on Receipt of the firſt, I wrote a Letter to the Peſhwa, requeſting to know how I ſhould convey that from the Honourable the Governor General to him; and on the 18th received an Anſwer, deſiring I would ſend it to Proondur, which I have accordingly done, with another from myſelf, requeſting, as the readieſt Way to prevent all Diſputes between your Troops and thoſe belonging to this Government they may meet with on their March, that he would ſend me a Duſtuck for their free Paſſage through the Maratta Dominions, which I would forward to Colonel Leſlie; but Nanah Furneſe being now the only Miniſter, I cannot ſay I have the leaſt Hopes of this Requeſt being complied with, as he views the March of theſe Troops with a very jealous Eye. It is neceſſary to obſerve here, Gentlemen, that in the Month of January laſt, the Honourable the Preſident of Bombay forwarded a Letter from the Peſhwa to me, with Directions to deliver it myſelf, but both Nanah Furneſe and Saccaram Bapoo refuſed receiving it, unleſs I ſent it through the Hands of the Two People appointed to tranſact the Engliſh Buſineſs with the Durbar; and that at the Time of the Receipt of the Honourable the Governor General's Letter, one of theſe People was at Nanah's Camp, and the other ſaid he was ſo ill as to be unable to tranſact Buſineſs; in order therefore to avoid all Diſputes on this Head, and to prevent my receiving a Second Inſult, I judged it the beſt Method to write the Peſhwa as before recited, and hope it will meet with your Approbation. The Copy of my Proceedings,

ceedings,. mentioned by your Honour, &c. to be wanting, was forwarded in the original Packet of the 12th May, via Benares.

On the 1ſt Monſieur St. Lubin left Poona, with an Intent, it is publicly given out, of proceeding to Damaun, but Mr. Moſtyn received private Aſſurances that he would not proceed any further than Damaun, where it is imagined he will remain until Nanah ſees whether he is able to perform his Engagements.

On the 10th Madjee Scindy, at the Requeſt of Nanah Furneſe, ſent Two thouſand Men to the Village of Bhole, to ſeize Morabah, and the next Day they arrived, and encamped with him on a Plain about a Mile without the Town. Nanah and Scinday not agreeing what ſhall be done with him, Morabah ſtill remains encamped, guarded by Three hundred Horſe, the reſt having rejoined Scindy.

A Perſon in Scindy's Camp informs me, that Holcar has been obliged to deliver up his Duan and Two of his Officers, to Nanah; that Nanah and Scindy have appointed another Man to be Holkar's Duan; and that every one, whether Brahmins or Officers, who joined Morabah, had been ſeized, and conſiderable Fines demanded from them; amongſt the reſt is Buchabah Proondur.

From the beſt Intelligene I have been able to procure, I learn that Saccaram Bappoo has not been in the leaſt conſulted on the late Tranſactions; and I am even aſſured, that it is Madjee Scindy's Intention ſhortly to ſeize and confine him; in which Caſe I much doubt whether Scindy's Ambition will not lead him to take the Government entirely into his own Hands.

I am, &c. &c.

Wm Lewis.

Poona,
the 20th July 1778.

Tranſlation of the Poona Durbar's Replies to the Paper delivered by Mr. Moſtyn on the 4th July received the 7th July.

Firſt. A Treaty was made between the Circar and the Engliſh, to which they affixed their Seals; the Engliſh ought to keep it faithfully, and the Circar will do the ſame.

Second. Conformable to what is written in the 5th Article of the Treaty, I have offered you a Country, but you would not ſettle and take it. There is no Agreement to give you a Groſs Revenue of Three Lacks, according to the Treaty. You may ſettle and take it To-day, and the Circar will ſettle and deliver it. The Delay is on your Part, not on the Circar's.

Third. It is mentioned in the Treaty, that when Proofs ſhall be produced, under Futty Sing's Hand, that he has no Power to give away any Country; the Engliſh would deliver up Chickly, &c. Country. Futty Sing ſent Two Letters, directed to Colonel Upton; alſo Copy of the Peſhwa's Sunnud, with his Seal, which were delivered to Colonel Upon, ſhewing that this Power is not with the Guicawar, but with the Peſhwa. A Receipt for the ſaid Letters and Papers was taken from Colonel Upton, with his Seal affixed thereto, which is in the Poſſeſſion of the Circar. Conformable to the Treaty, Chickly, &c. Purgunnah ought to be reſtored to the Circar. What you now write being contrary to the Treaty, is very extraordinary, and much ſurprizes me.

Fourth. There is no Agreement between Monſieur St. Lubin and this Government.

Fifth. You would not receive the Country of Three Lacks, agreeable to the Treaty; if you will now receive the Country, I have this to obſerve about the Two Years Arrears of the Revenues: You muſt debit the Amount of the Collections that have been made theſe Two Years from that Country, and whatever Collections have been made in the Purgunnahs of Chickley, &c. muſt remain depoſited with the Engliſh: And further, that, according to what is written in the Treaty, you muſt deduct the Value of the Chickley, &c. Purgunnahs; and whatever may be the Difference, either on one Side or other, ſhall be paid. I do not perfectly underſtand what you have wrote about the Ship. I have ſent to call you, and after your Arrival I ſhall talk with you, conformable to what I have written to Colonel Upton.

A true Copy.

Edward Ravenſcroft,
Secretary to the
Select Committee.

APPENDIX, N° 102.

Extract of Bombay Select Conſultations, the 26th July 1778.

RECEIVED a Letter from Mr. Lewis at Poona.

Lewis, Mr. Willm. Letter from.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

My laſt Reſpects were dated the 11th Inſtant: The ſame Night I received Information, that Morabah had been ſeized by Two thouſand Men belonging to Scindy; and that they were encamped with him on the Plain cloſe to the Town, from whence they were to proceed next Day to Poorunder. That he ſtill remains upon the Plain, guarded by Three hundred Horſe only, the reſt being returned to Camp.

By Meſſages I have lately received from a Man at Camp, I learn that Holcar has been obliged to deliver up his Duan; and that every one, whether Bramins or Officers, who joined Morabah, have been ſeized, and conſiderable Fines demanded from them: Amongſt the reſt are Viſſajee Punt and Lutchebah Proondur; the latter was taken the 14th Inſtant. The ſame Perſon Yeſterday ſent me Word, that Nannah had the Day before ordered a Body of Men to ſurround our Factory; and that Scindy getting Notice thereof, immediately ſent to him to deſiſt, which Nannah was obliged to comply with.

I have not received an Anſwer from the Peſhwa, to the Letter I wrote, informing him of my having received one for him from the Governor General and Council, as mentioned in my laſt Addreſs. I have not therefore yet been able to deliver it; indeed, at preſent there does not appear to be any proper Government. Nannah, it is true, has the Name, but Scindy is in fact the Miniſter, for the former dares not do any thing without his Permiſſion; Sacaram is not even conſulted; and I was told Yeſterday, that it is Scindy's Intention to confine him in a very ſhort Time; in which Caſe I make no Doubt he will go a Step further, and by alſo confining Nannah, ſeize the Government.

I am, very reſpectfully,
Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
William Lewis.

Poona,
17th July 1778.

APPENDIX, N° 103.

Appointment of a Select Committee at Bombay, by the Court of Directors, 10th April 1778.

To the Honourable William Hornby, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor of Bombay,
John Carnac, Eſquire,
Colonel Charles Egerton, and
Daniel Draper, Eſquire.

HAVING appointed George Wombwell, Eſquire, Chairman of our Court, William James, Eſquire, our Deputy Chairman, and William Devaynes, Eſquire, to be a Committee of Secrecy, we hereby direct that all Orders and Inſtructions which you ſhall receive from our ſaid Committee of Secrecy, be obſerved and obeyed with the ſame Punctuality and Exactneſs as though they had been ſigned by Thirteen or more Members of the Court of Directors.

And having alſo thought proper to appoint a Select Committee for tranſacting all Political, Military, and Naval Affairs, and likewiſe all ſuch as may require Secrecy at our Settlement of Bombay, it is our Order, and we hereby direct, that the ſaid Select Committee do conſiſt of William Hornby, Eſquire, our Preſident and Governor, or our Preſident and Governor for the Time being, John Carnac, Eſquire, the Second Member of our Council, or the Second Member of our Council for the Time being, Colonel Charles Egerton, our Military Commander in Chief, or our Military Commander in Chief for the Time being, and Daniel Draper, Eſquire, the Fourth Member of our Council, or the Fourth Member of our Council for the Time being.

Four Military Commander in Chief ſhall at any Time be abſent from the Preſidency, then our Order is, that our Preſident and the Second and Fourth Members of our Council ſhall be a Select Committee for the Purpoſes aforeſaid, during the Abſence of the Commander in Chief from the Preſidency.

We direct that all Orders and Inſtructions ſhall be iſſued in the Name of the Preſident and Select Committee, and that all ſuch Orders be implicitly obeyed by every Perſon in Service, or enjoying our Protection, Civil or Military, on pain of Suſpenſion from the Service, or of forfeiting our Licence and Protection.

If our Select Committee ſhall think fit to ſuſpend any Perſon or Perſons from our Service, ſuch Perſon or Perſons ſhall not be reſtored, otherwiſe than by the ſaid Committee, except by Order of the Court of Directors.

We direct that at every Meeting of our Select Committee, when all the Members ſhall be preſent, the Preſident ſhall have a caſting Vote, and that in all Caſes where the Committee ſhall not be unanimous, the Minority ſhall co-operate in carrying into Execution the Reſolutions of the Majority.

In caſe of a Vacancy by the Death or Removal of any of the Members of our Select Committee it is our Order that every ſuch Vacancy be forthwith filled up by the next Member of our Council in Rotation, except in Caſes where we may think fit to make particular Exceptions.

We are,

Your loving Friends,

London,
the 10th April 1778.

R. Hall,
Rich. Becher,
Chas Boddam,
Saml Peach,
L.. Sulivan,
W. G. Freeman,
T. B. Rous,
Jno Woodhouſe,
W. Devaynes,
H^{y} Fletcher,
G. Wombwell,
W. James,
Ben. Booth,
Wm Mills, Junr,
Jno Michie,
Geo. Tatem,
Thos Cheap,
Robt Cregory,
J. Stables,
John Roberts.

APPENDIX, N° 104, 105, and 106.

Bombay Select Conſultations, the 21ſt July 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable William Hornby, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor,
John Carnac, Eſquire,
Colonel Charles Egerton,
Daniel Draper, Eſquire.

THIS Meeting being appointed to take into Conſideration the Situation of Affairs with the Mahrattas;

Reference being made to Mr. Moſtyn in the ſeveral Letters from Moraba, Butcheba, and Tooljee Holcar, and it being alſo judged neceſſary to conſult him on ſome other Points before we take Reſolutions on the Papers before us, he is now ſummoned to attend the Committee.

Mr. Moſtyn attending accordingly, and being made acquainted with the Cauſe of his being ſummoned, delivered himſelf to the following Purport:

He refers to his former Letters and to the Papers he brought from Poona, for an Explanation of the Views of Morabah and his Party, which are in ſhort to place Ragoba in the Government as Regent, on this expreſs Condition, that the Sicca ſhall continue in the Name of the Peſhwa Mhaderow Narrain and with ſome other Reſtrictions which they conſider neceſſary for their own Safety and Continuance in Office, and for the internal Peace and good Order of the Government: Theſe Reſtrictions he doubts not will alſo appear to us, from a Knowledge of Ragoba, to be both juſt and requiſite. He particularly enforces to our Attention, that theſe Papers were regularly executed under the Seal during the Time Morabah was the acknowledged Miniſter, though the Change in Favour of Nanah Furneeſe took place immediately after. With reſpect to Nanah's Views and Intentions, he doubted not they muſt be very apparent to the Committee, from the whole Tenor of his Conduct ever ſince the Treaty of Poorunder; and that his Anſwer now before us, to the Paper of Demands, will prove beyond Contradiction that he never means to comply with that Treaty: That his Deſigns with regard to the French will appear obvious upon a Review of the Advices from Poona, and more particularly by the Paper he delivered to Monſieur St. Lubin the Day he had his Audience of Leave; Copies of which have been already tranſmitted to the Committee and to the Governor General and Council.

Mr. Moſtyn then proceeds, That on an attentive Survey of the different Parties at Poona, their Views and Intentions with reſpect to us, the French, and Ragoba, there appears to him no Alternative but to take Part with Moraba; and that it ſhould be done without the ſmalleſt Delay, conſidering the preſent Situation of Affairs with France, for ſhould we be attacked at this Place in the Courſe of the War, and the executive Power of the Maratta State remain in the preſent Hands, there is not a Doubt but the French will receive every Aſſiſtance in the Power of Nanah to give, whilſt we ſhall be confined in our own Settlements, and deprived of every Supply whatever from the Continent.

Should we determine upon taking Part with Moraba, Mr. Moſtyn thinks it neceſſary to obſerve to him, that at preſent the greateſt Part of the Maratta Forces are aſſembled on Poonah under Plains; but that they muſt neceſſarily ſeparate in all next Month, on Account of the Rains and the Want of Forage, and the Neceſſity of Nanah's ſending the Forces immediately depending on him to oppoſe the Progreſs of Hyder, whoſe Army is now actually inveſting Meritz: That the uſual Time for their again aſſembling is about Deſſera, or the Beginning of October, when it generally takes up near Two Months before they are collected; but of the Motions of the Armies, Morabah can beſt keep Mr. Lewis well informed, who may alſo be directed to be attentive thereto himſelf. If the Army ſhould diſperſe as he ſuppoſes it will, he recommends the Beginning of September for the Commencement of our Operations, of which Moraba alſo ſhould have Advice that he may be ready to co-operate.

To facilitate our Meaſures, and prevent as far as may be all Oppoſition, Placards might be iſſued in proper Time by Ragoba, declaring his Intentions are to continue the Sicca in the Boy's Name, and to preſerve the Peſhwa Government without doing Injury to any one who does not oppoſe his juſt Deſigns, or fly; commanding all Officers to join him, and ſummoning the Miniſters to attend him: To give the greater Weight the Honourable Company's Seal may be affixed thereto.

Mr. Moſtyn having concluded what he had to ſay, the following Queſtions are put to him by the Committee:

Queſtion. What Service can be rendered by Morabah, Butchebah, and Holcar, equivalent to the Conceſſions they demand on the Part of Ragoba?

Anſwer. He doubts not they will be able to aſſiſt him with a Body of Thirty thouſand Horſe; and that having Chiefs of ſo much Power and Influence to co-operate with us in our Plan for reſtoring Ragobah, and openly eſpouſing his Cauſe, will enſure a ſpeedy and ſucceſsful Iſſue; whereas it would otherwiſe be more difficult and take up much Time: He further ſignifies his Belief, that if we proceed in concert with the above Chiefs, Mhadjee Scindia will not oppoſe Ragoba, or ſeparate himſelf from Tookajee Holkar.

Queſtion. If Nanah Furneeſe remains in the chief Management of the Maratta State during ſo long a Minority, what are the Conſequences reaſonably to be apprehended?

Anſwer. Every Injury to the Company it can be in his Power to offer, and an Aſſociation with the French for their Annoyance and Deſtruction.

Queſtion. What are his Reaſons for believing the Paper delivered by Nannah to Monſieur St. Lubin, and Nannah's Letter to the Nizam, to be genuine and authentic?

Anſwer. He procured them by Means of the Vackeel of the Rajah of Toll Bhopall, who obtained them from the Pharanovees, or Perſian Writer to the Government, to whom he pays an Annual Penſion of Rupees 5,000 for Intelligence: Their Contents were afterwards in Part confirmed by the Gentoo Writer to the Government. Mr. Moſtyn deſires theſe Circumſtances may be kept inviolably ſecret, as the Parties would certainly loſe their Lives if any Diſcovery was made that this Information was obtained from them.

Mr. Moſtyn was alſo particularly queſtioned reſpecting the Country about Poona, and the Roads and Paſſes between that Place and Bombay. He ſays, that Rajemathy is the only one of the Paſſes defended by a Fort; that the others have no other Obſtacles but what are raiſed by Nature; and that the principal one, called Bhore Gaut, may be approached by Water, within the Diſtance of Six Coſs, and may be eaſily ſecured, by advancing a ſingle Battalion, with light Field Pieces, the Ground being ſuch that the Maratta Horſe cannot act, if any Oppoſition ſhould be intended; but ſo little Difficulty does he apprehend, that he would have no Objection to accompany the Battalion himſelf.

He is deſired, with the Aſſiſtance of ſuch Charts as he may have, and ſome capable Perſon out of the Engineer's Office, to frame the beſt Map he can of the Country Fifty Coſs round Poona; and having given us very clear and diſtinct Information on the ſeveral Subjects propoſed to him, he is permitted to withdraw.

N° 105.

The Committee then proceeded to the Conſideration of the Durbar's Anſwers to the Paper of Demands preſented by Mr. Moſtyn, and tranſmitted by Mr. Lewis, ſince Nanah Furneeſe reſumed his Place in the Adminiſtration.

Theſe Anſwers having been carefully compared with the Demands, and conſidered with the utmoſt Deliberation; Reſolved, by an unanimous Vote, That the Anſwers are in the higheſt Degree vague, evaſive,

evaſive, and unſatisfactory, and amount to a Refuſal, which is aggravated on a Compariſon with the Anſwers given by the preceeding Adminiſtration, as per N° 11.

Reſolved, unanimouſly, That we are authorized, by the Letter from the Governor General and Council, dated the 23d of March, to declare the Durbar's Anſwers to be a Violation on their Part of the Treaty of Poorunder, and that conſequently we are freed from all Obligation laid on us by that Treaty, and at full Liberty to purſue whatever Meaſures we may deem expedient and ſafe, for the Subverſion of a Party in that Government, connected with the French in Schemes hoſtile to the Company, and for eſtabliſhing an Adminiſtration at Poona with which we can maintain a ſecure and permanent Alliance.

Reſolved unanimouſly, That the Situation of Public Affairs in Europe, and the Reſtoration of Nanah Furneeſe to the executive Power of Government at Poona, render it a Caſe of indiſpenſable Neceſſity that Meaſures ſhould be taken with all poſſible Expedition to effect theſe Two Points.

Reſolved unanimouſly, That for the Accompliſhment of theſe Purpoſes we purſue the moſt practicable Meaſures for placing Ragoba in the Regency at Poona, with this ſpecial Proviſo, that the Government and Sicca be conducted in the Name of the Peſhwa during his Minority, and ſo rendered on his attaining the legal Age.

N° 106.

The Meaſures to be purſued being next diſcuſſed, the Articles propoſed by Morabah and his Party are conſidered; when it is agreed, That it will be proper and requiſite to make equitable and ſecure Terms for them with Ragoba, but that it will be better to ſettle the Articles reſpecting the internal Management of the Government when Ragoba is eſtabliſhed at Poona. The Articles reſpecting the Diſputes between the Guicawars will be determined with more Propriety by Ragoba and Morabah, without our Interference; and that reſpecting the Recovery of the Territories loſt by different Powers during the late Troubles, might lead us into Meaſures totally inconſiſtent with our Plan, and repugnant to Treaties formed by other Preſidencies.

Upon the moſt attentive Conſideration of every Circumſtance, the moſt ſafe Plan, the moſt promiſing of Succeſs, and the leaſt liable to Diſappointment, appears to be;

To aſſure Morabah and the Party, of our good Diſpoſition towards them; that we ſhall heartily join in the propoſed Plan; and that they may depend on our paying the utmoſt Regard to their Intereſt and Pretenſions in whatever Engagements we may make with Ragoba, provided they on their Part faithfully perform their Promiſes:

To revoke our Orders to Colonel Leſlie, for marching the Army into Quarters at Surat and Broach, and to direct him to move to the Southward, quitting the Guzerat Country, and purſuing the moſt eligible Route to the Town of Juneir, about 30 Miles to the N. E. of Poona, and near to a Fort in the Intereſt of Moraba, diſtinguiſhed in Jeffries's Map by the Name of Zinc. He muſt be directed in his March to avoid approaching Aurungabad or Part of the Nizam's Dominions, and rather to take the Brampore Road, and through the Country of Buglana. By the Time he approaches Ziner we can ſend him Orders either to act in Protection of our Plan, by ſecuring the Paſſes and effecting a Junction with our Force and Ragoba, or to proceed on to Bombay, according as our Advices from Europe may render expedient, which, about the Beginning of September, when it will be proper to begin our Operations, we may expect to receive, to a very late Date, by the Way of Suez; and by that Time we may alſo obtain the Sentiments of the Governor General and Council:

To direct Mr. Lewis to ſend us conſtant and punctual Advice of the Motion of the Mahratta Armies.

To recommend to the Governments of Bengal and Madras, to demand of Mhodajee Bourcah and the Nizam to obſerve a ſtrict Neutrality at leaſt, if they will not aſſiſt Ragoba:

To proceed in our Preparations, without communicating our Reſolutions to Ragoba, till Matters are more ripe; and in the Terms to be made with him for the Company, to look to nothing further than the Performance of the Treaty of Surat, the total Excluſion of the French, and the Payment of our Expences.

Theſe ſeveral Heads of our Plan are all unanimouſly agreed to, and the Secretary is directed immediately to prepare the neceſſary Advices agreeable thereto.

APPENDIX, N° 107.

Copy of a Letter from the Select Committee of Bombay to Colonel Leslie.

To Colonel Leslie.

Sir,

THE Honourable the Court of Directors having been pleased to invest us as a Select Committee, with full Powers for conducting all Political and Military Operations, you will in future receive all Instructions from us, and are to address your Correspondence accordingly.

Since the Letter from the Board of the 19th ultimo, we have received your Letters of the 6th and 14th.

We hope you have already effected a Passage over the Nerbuddah; for the Situation of Affairs is such, that instead of continuing your March through the Guzerat Province to Surat or Broach, we now find it expedient to direct, that you proceed more southerly, and pursue the most eligible Route to the Town of Juneer, about Thirty Miles to the North-east of Poona, and near to the Fort distinguished in Jefferies's Map by the Name of Ziner. By taking this Course, you will find the Weather more moderate, and the Road more practicable than in the Guzerat Province; but we would recommend to you to avoid approaching Aurungabad, or any Part of the Nizam's Dominions; and rather to take the Brampore Road, and through the Country of Buglawa.

Exclusive of the Dustucks already sent from Tookajee Holkar and Mhadjee Scindy, Mr. Mostyn has lately forwarded to you Passports from the Poona Durbar; so that we hope you will have an unmolested March through the Whole of the Maratta Territories; but you are nevertheless to be strictly on your Guard.

The Chief of Surat and Mr. Lewis at Poona will have Orders to send you the best Information they can obtain respecting the Road you are now directed to take; and we shall send you further Instructions as you approach, or as we may see necessary.

We shall rely on your advising us frequently of your Progress; and are,

Sir,

Your most obedient humble Servants,

Dated July 21st 1778.

(Signed) William Hornby,
John Carnac,
Charles Egerton,
Daniel Draper.

A true Copy.

(Signed) Edw[d] Ravenscroft,
Secretary to the Select Committee.

APPENDIX, N° 108.

Extract of Bombay Select Consultations; the 25th July 1778.

SIGNED the following Letter to the Governor General and Council, to be transmitted by the Terrible Bomb Ketch.

To the Honourable Warren Hastings, Esquire, Governor General, &c. Council at Fort William. Fort Wil Letter

Gentlemen,

The Honourable the Court of Directors, in their Commands of the 10th April last, having been pleased to appoint us a Select Committee for the Management of all Military and Political Business at the Presidency, we enclose for your Information an Extract from their said Commands, and request that your future Instructions on these Subjects may be addressed to us.

The Advices from the Board here and from Mr. Mostyn, will have acquainted you of the late Transactions at Poona, by which Matters are brought to such a State, that it became absolutely necessary to take the most speedy and decisive Resolutions for our Conduct.

Having therefore seriously considered the Situation of Affairs with the Marattas, the Prospect of an approaching Rupture with France, and every other Circumstance necessary to be attended to,

the Reſult of our Deliberations is contained in the encloſed Copy of our Proceedings, which we loſe not a Moment in tranſmitting to you by a Veſſel expreſs, with Copies of every neceſſary Paper.

We flatter ourſelves you will approve theſe Reſolutions. The Monſoon has been ſo uncommonly ſevere, that we ſhall ſcarcely be able to begin our Operations ſooner than the Beginning of September; by which Time we hope to receive your Sentiments.

We requeſt, if you think it neceſſary, that you will apply to Mhodajee Bouncello and the Nizam, to obſerve a ſtrict Neutrality in the Diſpute.

We have ſubjoined to the Extract of the Company's Letter, the Paragraph reſpecting the Situation of Public Affairs in Europe, though we are adviſed a Packet for you was forwarded at the ſame Time with ours.

The Service of this Veſſel (the Terrible) being much wanted, we requeſt ſhe may be immediately returned.

We are, with Reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
William Hornby,
&c. Select Committee.

Bombay Caſtle,
25th July 1778.

The 31ſt of July 1778, the Select Committee at Bombay wrote to the Court as follows; viz.

"Mr. Moſtyn arrived here from Poona the 12th Inſtant, with Letters from Morabah, Butcheba, "and Tookajee Holkar, and a moſt ſatisfactory Reply to the Demands made on the Durbar, accom- "panied with Sunnuds for the Country of Three Lacks, and Propoſals for our Aſſiſtance on placing "Ragoba in the Government. Theſe were all regularly executed under the Sicca, whilſt Morabah "was chief Miniſter, but ſoon afterwards Nannah Furneeſe, by the Aſſiſtance of Madew Scindia, re- "gained the chief Place in the Adminiſtration, and deprived Moraba of his Office and the Sicca.

"A few Days after Mr. Moſtyn had quitted Poona, and after Nannah had reſumed the ex- "cutive Part of Government, another and a very different Reply to our Demands was ſent to Mr. "Lewis by the Durbar, and by him tranſmitted to us, of which a Copy is now encloſed.

"By this Second Revolution at Poona, and the Proſpect of an approaching War with France, "Affairs were brought to ſuch a State that it became abſolutely neceſſary for us to take the moſt "ſpeedy and deciſive Reſolutions for our Conduct; and after proper Tranſlations had been made "of the Papers brought by Mr. Moſtyn, and Colonel Egerton, who had not hitherto aſſiſted at our "Secret Conſultations, had referred to the Records to inform himſelf fully on the Subject; we on the "21ſt Inſtant, after full Conſideration of every neceſſary Circumſtance, unanimouſly agreed to the "following Reſolutions, which we think it proper to convey to you in the moſt expeditious Man- "ner.

"That the Anſwers delivered by the Durbar ſince Nannah Furneeſe reſumed the Adminiſtration "are in the higheſt Degree vague, evaſive, and unſatisfactory, and amount to a Refuſal; which "aggravated on a Compariſon with the Anſwers given by the preceding Adminiſtration.

"That we are authorized by the Letter from the Governor General and Council, dated the 25th "March, to declare the Durbar's Anſwer to be a Violation on their Part of the Treaty of Poorunder "and that conſequently we are free from all Obligation laid on us by that Treaty, and at full Liberty "to purſue whatever Meaſures we may deem expedient and ſafe, for the Subverſion of a Party in "that Government, connected with the French in Schemes hoſtile to the Company, and for eſta- "bliſhing an Adminiſtration at Poona, with which we can maintain a ſecure and permanent Al- "liance.

"That the Situation of Public Affairs in Europe, and the Reſtoration of Nannah Furneeſe to the "executive Power of Government at Poona, renders it a Caſe of indiſputable Neceſſity that Mea- "ſures ſhould be taken with all poſſible Expedition to effect thoſe Two Points.

"That for the Accompliſhment of theſe Purpoſes, we purſue the moſt practicable Meaſures for "placing Ragoba in the Regency at Poona with this ſpecial Proviſo, that the Government and Sta- "te be conducted and continued in the Name of the Peſhwa during his Minority, and ſurrendered to "him on his attaining the legal Age.

"At this Seaſon of the Year it is impoſſible for us to take any Steps in Proſecution of theſe Reſo- "lutions, further than making the neceſſary Preparations. In the Beginning of September, when it "will be the proper Time to commence our Operations, we may expect to receive Advices from "Europe to a very late Date, by the Way of Suez, by which we ſhall be able to judge how far it "may be prudent to detach any Part of our Force from Bombay, and in the mean Time we have "ſent Orders to Colonel Leſlie to march with the Army under his Command to a Place called "Zinni, about 30 Coſs to the N. E. of Poona, inſtead of proceeding to Surat or Broach, as before "ordered. That Officer, by Advices juſt received, dated the 3d of this Month, was then advanced "no further than Chatterpore in the Bundlecund Country, at no great Diſtance from Coulpy; and "that the Order we have given him, cannot give any further Alarm to the Poona Miniſters, than "our Plan is ripe for Execution, and our Forces ready to act on this Side in Conjunction with "Ragoba.

"Moraba and his Party had engaged to join Ragoba with all their Forces, as ſoon as he had "paſſed the Ghauts; but we cannot place much Dependance upon them, at leaſt for any immediate "Aſſiſtance, as Nanah Furneeſe upon Suſpicion of their Deſigns, has ſeized and confined moſt of "this Party, and even ſecured the Perſons of Moraba and Bucheba themſelves; yet ſo much is "the Poona Government weakened by the inteſtine Diviſions which have ſo long ſubſiſted, that we "hope we ſhall be able to effect our Point without much Difficulty, even if Moraba ſhould not be "able to join us; and we doubt not when it is ſeen that we openly eſpouſe Ragoba's Cauſe, but "many principal Maratta Officers will declare for him, as his Claim and Family are in general "favoured by them, and Nanah's oppreſſive Government deteſted.

"In the Terms to be made with Ragoba for the Company, we propoſe to look to nothing "further than the Performance of the Treaty of Surat, the total Excluſion of the French, and "the Payment of our Expences."

The 29th of December 1778, the Select Committee addreſſed the Court as follows, viz.

"Our Addreſs of the 31ſt of July will have informed you how Matters then ſtood with the "Poona Government. In purſuance of the Reſolutions then communicated, we on the 12th of "October, on the Motion of Mr. Carnac, gave Orders for proceeding forthwith in the Execution of "our Plan for reſtoring Ragoba. The Limits of an over-land Addreſs will not permit us to enter "into a Detail of the ſeveral Circumſtances of our Preparations and Negociation, which will be "communicated by the firſt Sea Conveyance. It will be ſufficient to acquaint you, that on the "25th ultimo, we concluded a Treaty with Ragoba, by which the Honourable Company were "bound to aſſiſt him with a Body of 4,000 Men to conduct him to Poona, and to place him in the "Regency of the Maratta Government during the Minority of the Infant Peſhwa."

We have the Honour to encloſe a Copy of the Treaty, and of the Manifeſto, publiſhed when our Forces landed on the Continent, which we hope will be approved of by you; and we beg Leave moſt heartily to congratulate you on the Proſpect of retrieving thoſe valuable Acquiſitions loſt by the Treaty of Poorunder, and of reſtoring ſuch a Government at Poona as will greatly contribute to the general Security of your Poſſeſſions in India.

APPENDIX, N° 109.

Extract of Bombay Select Conſultations, the 28th September 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Will[m] Hornby, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor,
John Carnac, Eſquire, Colonel Cha[s] Egerton,
Dan[l] Draper, Eſquire.

READ the Letter received Yeſterday from the Governor General and Council.

This Letter, and the Reſolutions to be taken in conſequence, being of the moſt important Nature, the Subject was very ſeriouſly conſidered; but it is judged beſt to defer for a few Days fixing upon any preciſe Meaſures, as we have every Moment Reaſon to expect ſome Intelligence of the ſucceſs of our Operations againſt Pondicherry, as well as Advice from Colonel Leſlie and other Quarters.

It is remarked as extraordinary in the Governor General and Council having kept us ſo much in the Dark, reſpecting the Object of their Negociation with Moodajee Bouncello, and the Nature of the Commiſſion they have given to Mr. Elliott, eſpecially when it appears by their Letters, the Intereſts of this Preſidency may be ſo conſiderably affected thereby.

APPENDIX, N° 110.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 28th September 1778.

READ the following Letter from Mr. Lewis at Poona:

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

I did myſelf the Honour of addreſſing you laſt, under the 20th ultimo.

Nanah Furneeſe having made Madjee Scindy a Preſent of Three Lacks of Rupees, in order to induce him to conſent to Morabah's being ſent a Priſoner to Amdanagur, it had the deſired Effect for on the 24th July, Scindy removed his People, giving Morabah into Charge of Five hundred Horſe, and Two hundred Foot, belonging to Nanah, who ſet off with him the ſame Evening to the above Place. It was at one Time determined on ſending Buchabah Proonder Priſoner to Portabgur cloſe to Pundapore; but Scindy afterwards objected thereto, as it belongs to Nanah, and propoſed his being ſent to Solahpore, on the Kiſtna; but Nanah being apprehenſive that Hyder's Troops would releaſe him, it was finally determined on confining him in Chundur, cloſe to Settora; but on his being ſent there, the Kelledar refuſed to take him in, alledging that Buchabah was as much his Maſter as either Sacaram or Nanah: He has therefore at laſt been ſent to Wundun, a Fort cloſe to the before mentioned, belonging to Bhimrow Panſee.

Nanah Furneeſe, Sacaram Bapoo, Madjee Scindy, Tookajee Holcar, Hurry Punt, and Purſohram Bhow, have all lately come from Proondur, and encamped on the Plain juſt without the Town, with their Forces, amounting in the Whole to about Twelve thouſand Men; and I am aſſured, that within a few Days the Durbars have been conſulting how they ſhall oppoſe Colonel Leſlie's March, but are much puzzled what Officer to ſend; for Sacaram and Nanah, being mutually afraid of each other will not conſent to Scindy's going, as they conſider him as the Umpire between them. Hurry Punt has declared his Reſolution of not ſtirring from hence without the Miniſters, who are afraid to truſt Holcar with a Command; and Purſeram Bhow muſt return to Meritz, Hyder's Army being encamped on the other Side of the Kiſtna, with a determined Reſolution of attacking it as ſoon as the Seaſon opens. However, in order to do all in their Power to prevent Colonel Leſlie's advancing, they have ſent private Orders to the different Rajahs and Officers through whoſe Diſtricts the Colonel will be obliged to march, to uſe every Endeavour, without coming to Action, to harraſs him, and prevent his proceeding; particularly recommending the his receiving Supplies of Proviſions at the ſame Time telling them, ſhould they find their Efforts to oblige him to retreat ineffectual, they are to deny having Authority from this Government for the Oppoſition they may make, which the Durbar will likewiſe do, in caſe of a Complaint of their Behaviour from your Honour, &c. I have already acquainted Colonel Leſlie with theſe Orders, and recommended to him not to truſt any Proffers of Service from Madjee Scindy's Officers; being apprehenſive, from his general Character for Deceit, that he may have given the like Orders.

I am alſo informed, that the Durbar, in order the more ſecurely to carry on the above Scheme, have determined on ſending a Perſon of Conſequence to Bombay, with Propoſals to Ragobah; though, as far as I can learn, they are to be nearly the ſame as thoſe ſent by Mr. Moſtyn laſt Year.

Encloſed I have the Honour to forward Three Letters from the Durbar, in Anſwer to thoſe from the Honourable the Governor General, received with your Commands of the 8th June; and beg Leave to obſerve, Gentlemen, that I have not received an Anſwer to the Application I made for a Duſtuck for the free Paſſage of your Troops through the Maratta Dominions, as mentioned in my laſt Addreſs.

I am very reſpectfully, &c.

(Signed) Wm Lewis.

Poona,
the 6th Auguſt 1778.

APPENDIX, N° III.

Extract of Bombay Select Conſultations, the 12th October 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable William Hornby, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor,
John Carnac, Eſquire, Colonel Charles Egerton,
Daniel Draper, Eſquire.

THE Committee being aſſembled, Mr. Carnac delivers in the following Minute:

Mr. Carnac is ſorry to obſerve, that "although we had by an unanimous Vote pronounced the Treaty of Poorunder to have been infringed in almoſt every Article, not a ſingle Step has yet been taken in Proſecution of our Reſolution of the 21ſt July, and to avail ourſelves of the Opportunity afforded by the Diſtractions in the Bramin Miniſtry, to exclude Nanah from any Share in the Peſhwa Government, who, ever ſince he has had the Lead thereat, has been inceſſantly plotting Miſchief againſt us, and to inveſt in his room, during the Minority of the Peſhwa, Ragonaut Row with the chief Adminiſtration of the Maratta State, to which he has the fairеſt Claim, and whoſe Pretenſions good Policy requires us to ſupport, on account of the cloſe Connections we have had with him, and of his known favourable Diſpoſition towards us. The Times will not allow of further Delay; and if we do not ſoon openly eſpouſe the Cauſe of Ragonaut Row, there is great Danger that the happy Moment for eſtabliſhing his Authority, ſo eſſential to our Welfare, will be irrecoverably loſt. It is not to be doubted that the French have been invited to Choul by Nanah, and ſhould he be joined by Four or Five hundred Men of that Nation (which it may be expected will be the Caſe) it is to be apprehended he will with their Aid acquire ſuch a Preponderancy in the Government, as to be able to baffle our utmoſt Efforts, and perhaps to uſurp the Dignity of Peſhwa. The Degree of Power Nanah actually poſſeſſes is already ſo conſiderable, that if he be ſuffered to retain it, the moſt ſerious Evils muſt enſue to the Company from his avowed Enmity to the Engliſh, and the French will be admitted to the excluſive Trade and Intercourſe with the Marattas, which by a timely Exertion we might have ſecured, and without which our Poſſeſſions on this Side of India are ſcarcely worth our holding. Mr. Carnac entertaining theſe Sentiments, is inclined to believe we were warranted, by the moſt urgent Plea of Neceſſity in Behalf of the Company's [illegible], to give our moſt ſtrenuous Aſſiſtance to Ragonath Row, for procuring him the Office of [illegible], even independantly of the Governor General and Council; how much more then muſt be the Duty incumbent upon us ſo to do, when we have their expreſs Sanction of the Meaſure; eſpecially as in the preſent State of Affairs there is no Riſque likely to be incurred by the Settlement, during the ſhort Time the Troops may be ſuppoſed to be employed in effecting this Service? We do not conceive we ought to be deterred from our Purpoſe, as it has been argued we ſhould, by the Paragraph in the Governor General and Council's Letter to us, dated 17th Auguſt, reſpecting any Engagements formed with Moodajee Bouncello by Mr. Elliott, and previous Notice to us given. By a ſtrict Attention to the Words and to the Context, nothing more ſeems to be meant, than that we ſhould enter into no final Engagements with Ragonath Row, which may be contrary to ſuch as ſhall be concluded with, or of a hoſtile Tendency to the Government of Berar. If the Letter is to be underſtood as containing a Direction that we are abſolutely to undertake nothing till we have Advices from Mr. Elliott of the Nature, Progreſs, and Reſult of his Commiſſion with the Bouncello, it would be tantamount to a Prohibition of the Expedition we had meditated, and which they have approved, by ſuſpending it to ſo diſtant a Period as to leave us little or no Hopes of Succeſs.

"It will be proper here to remark that there is no Reaſon to believe Moraba's Party is ſo depreſſed but that, in Conjunction with the other Favourers of Ragoba, they may render us material Service in the Execution of our Plan; however, at all Events Mr. Carnac deems it our indiſpenſable Duty to uſe every Endeavour to anticipate, if poſſible, the French in ſo important a Point, as the having the prevailing Influence at the Maratta Durbar.

"Our Conduct muſt appear ſtrangely inconſiſtent to our Honourable Employers, if, after having ſo earneſtly and repeatedly lamented to them, as we have done, our Misfortune in being precluded by the controlling Power of the Bengal Government, from taking Advantage of theſe lucky Circumſtances which have occurred, we ſhould now remain wholly inactive, when that Government has given us a full Latitude to act, and has provided us with the neceſſary Reſources to do it with Vigour and Effect."

The Subject of this Minute being taken into Conſideration, it is thought neceſſary, before we come any Reſolution, to conſult Mr. Moſtyn on ſome Points; who attending accordingly, the Subject of Debate was communicated, and the neceſſary Papers read to him, he delivers himſelf as follows:

"If the Committee are determined to take any Meaſures for placing Ragoba in the Regency of the Poona Government, it evidently appears to me the ſooner it is undertaken the better; the

" leſs Oppoſition you will meet with, therefore the greater Certainty of Succeſs, of which indeed
" have not in my own Mind a Doubt, and I do not conceive there can offer a more favourable
" than the preſent, and for the following Reaſons:

" Firſt. The Army is at preſent diſperſed, and though this is the Time for their beginning
" join, it will be at leaſt Six Weeks before they are aſſembled; and even then I do not ſuppo
" Man will move until they are in ſome Meaſure ſatisfied for the Arrears due to them, now
" Years, except a few partial Payments, and the Advance of a further Sum for the enſuing
" which is uſually Two Months Pay: This, it is well known, the Government is in no Capacity to
" and the Diſunion amongſt the Party now in Power, particularly Saccaram Bappoo and N
" which you Gentlemen are well acquainted with, will prevent their adopting any effectual M
" remove this Difficulty: They will not advance any Money themſelves; none but Nanah is indee
" able to do it, and no one elſe, while their Diſſentions continue, will lend.

" Secondly. Another very material Reaſon why it ſhould be deferred as little as poſſible is, th
" Holcar, with ſeveral other Maratta Officers, now Adherents of Moraba, will naturally conclude
" you let ſlip this Opportunity, that you have quite given up Ragoba's Cauſe, and be under
" Neceſſity, for their future Support and Security, to take Part with Nanah: It may occur to
" Gentlemen, that Morabah being under ſome Reſtraint in Ahmednagur, little Aſſiſtance can be
" pected from him; but I have Reaſon to believe, and from pretty good Information, that w
" ever he is convinced of your Determination to eſpouſe Ragoba's Cauſe, and are landed on the Co
" tinent, he can eaſily effect his Enlargement, and join you on the other Side of the Gauts with
" Friends.

" Thirdly. That with reſpect to the Diſtance of Colonel Leſlie's Detachment, though it m
" be of more Utility if nearer, yet I am of Opinion, they may in their preſent Situation render
" terial Service, by keeping Madjee Scindy (in the Neighbourhood of whoſe Capital they now
" in Awe, ſhould he be inclined to oppoſe us; but this I think, from his known Character, he
" not venture to do, when he finds a reſpectable Engliſh Army along with Ragoba; but be one
" the Firſt to make his Submiſſion, not only from the immediate Danger he will apprehend
" count of Colonel Leſlie's Army, but in future, from his Knowledge of the Influence the Eng
" have over the King, which might deprive him totally of his Jaghier North of the Nerbedah; and
" ſooner you begin, the ſooner, in my humble Opinion, will Colonel Leſlie be able to advance,
" will no Doubt put an immediate Stop to the Oppoſition and Delay he has and will otherwiſe co
" tinue to meet with.

" Fourthly. But what appears to me the moſt weighty Reaſon of all is, that by any further D
" the Danger there is of the French gaining an Influence at the Maratta Court, which I took
" Liberty to mention under the 21ſt July, and which is fully ſtated by Mr. Carnac; and I can
" you, Nanah will ſpare neither Pains nor Expence to procure Aſſiſtance from them; in which
" I much fear it will render any future Attempts very hazardous, if not wholly impracticable.

" As you have been pleaſed to favour me with the Peruſal of the Governor General and Coun
" Letter of the 17th Auguſt, it is my Duty to inform you, from what Knowledge I have of the M
" ratta Government, I do not apprehend any Engagement you may have formed with Ragoba,
" interfere with the Treaty Mr. Elliott may enter into with Moodajee Bouncello, unleſs in one
" ſtance, that of placing Moodajee in the Rajaſhip. They are both Miniſters of the Rajah, and
" Government entirely diſtinct; however, to prevent a Poſſibility of the Two Treaties claſhing,
" Article may be inſerted in your's, with Ragoba to provide againſt it."

On full Conſideration of all Circumſtances, It is Reſolved by a Majority of the Committee, Mr. Draper only diſſenting thereto, That we forthwith carry into Execution the Plan agreed to under the 21ſt July laſt, for conducting Ragoba to Poona, and placing him in the Regency during the Minority of the young Peſhwa; and that the neceſſary Meaſures for that Purpoſe be undertaken as ſoon as poſſible.

APPENDIX, N° 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, and 117.

Bombay Select Conſultations the 19th October 1778.

MR. Draper acquaints us he will deliver in his Reaſons in Writing for diſſenting to the abo Reſolution.

At a Select Committee; Preſent, as in the preceding one.

Mr. Draper now lays before us his Reaſons in Writing for diſſenting to our Reſolution of mediately conducting Ragoba to Poona, as entered at Length after this Conſultation.

" A

To the Honourable William Hornby, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Select Committee at Bombay.

"Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

"I am concerned that after concurring with your Honour, &c. not only in the Reſolutions of the 21ſt of July, but with the Board at large in every other ſince the 10th December laſt, for conducting Ragonath Row to Poona in quality of Regent, I ſhould think it my indiſpenſable Duty, from the Difference of Circumſtances ſince the firſt-mentioned Period, to diſſent to the Reſolution you came to the 12th Inſtant for doing it at this Juncture, and which I have been further induced to from thinking it a Meaſure, all Circumſtances conſidered, the moſt important which has ever been agitated at this Preſidency, and for the following Reaſons.

"Firſt. Becauſe of the expreſs Conditions contained in the Governor General and Council's Letter of the 17th Auguſt.

"Secondly, Becauſe of the Reſtraint Moraba, Bucheba, and their Adherents, ſtill appear to be under.

"Thirdly, Becauſe of the remote Diſtance of Colonel Leſlie's very conſiderable Reinforcement.

"Fourthly, Becauſe of the very great Deficiency in our European Force, to the laſt Eſtabliſhment ordered by the Honourable Company.

"As to the Firſt Point, Becauſe though the Governor General and Council have approved the Plan of the 21ſt July, it is only on the following expreſs Conditions:

"That it do not interfere with any Engagement formed with Moodajee Bouncello, and previous Notice to you by him.

"On this it muſt be obſerved, that we have not yet received a ſingle Line from that Gentleman; but may ſhortly expect it, conformable to the Governor General and Council's Letter of the 18th July, wherein they tell us, that Mr. Elliott would ſend us ſuch Articles as he might agree to with the Rajah; that in the mean Time, to prevent any Step of a contrary Tendency on our Part, they requeſted we would refrain from forming any Engagements of a Nature hoſtile to the Government at Poona, except ſuch as may appear abſolutely neceſſary for the Defence of our Poſſeſſions. Mr. Moſtyn remarks in his Minute, delivered the 12th Inſtant, that he does not apprehend any Engagement we may have with Ragonath Row, can interfere with the Treaty Mr. Elliott may enter into with Moodajee, except that of placing him in the Rajaſhip, which poſſibly may be the very Object they may have in View; as we have had Reaſon to think, from what the Governor and Council have communicated to us, that it is a Negociation of a very extenſive Nature, and meant to comprehend the Company's general Intereſts. Mr. Moſtyn, to prevent their and our Treaty cloſhing, propoſes, that an Article may be inſerted in ours to provide againſt it; but I refer it to your Honour, &c. whether, conſiſtently with the Secrecy the Governor General and Council have enjoined us in this Reſpect, and much leſs without exciting the Jealouſy of the Maratta Government, any ſuch Article could be propoſed? The Words contained in the latter Part, are ſo very expreſs and ſignificant, and ſo much enforced by being repeated in the Third, that I cannot adopt any other than their literal Meaning, eſpecially as by doing it, the whole political Syſtem the Governor General and Council may intend to eſtabliſh, may be entirely unhinged.

"Second Condition, That our lateſt Advices from Europe ſhall be equal to an Aſſurance, that the Force required for executing the Plan of the 21ſt July, may be ſpared without endangering the Safety of Bombay in the Event of a French Invaſion.—Your Honour, &c. will I hope excuſe my differing with you on this Point, as I know of no ſuch Advices; on the contrary, you will give me Leave to remark, that the general Tenor of the Honourable Company's Commands this Seaſon, ſtrongly inculcate our merely attending to our own Defence, without intimating the leaſt Idea that they expect we ſhould be able to undertake any offenſive Meaſure. The Governor General and Council have certainly been equally attentive to our Defence; as they, near a Twelvemonth ago, recommended our withdrawing our Europeans from the Subordinates, which has accordingly been done; and your Honour, &c. are ſenſible, that in their Letter of the 11th July, they even recommended our evacuating Tannah, and the other Forts on Salſette for the ſame Purpoſe; and with reſpect to our aſſiſting in the propoſed Reduction of Myhie, ordered us to do it in a Manner conſiſtent with our Safety; which, they added, muſt be particularly attended to. I am in Hopes we ſhall not be attacked by the French the current Seaſon; but it is no more than Hope; and ſo far am I from concurring with your Honour, &c. that a ſufficient Force for the intended Service can be ſpared from Bombay, without endangering the Safety of it in the Event of a French Invaſion, that I apprehend we ſhall have few more than the Bandarees and miſerable Militia to depend on; for as to recalling any Part of the deſtined Force, after it has left the Iſland; in caſe of ſuch an Event, I think it cannot, in common Prudence, be truſted to.

"Mr. Moſtyn in his Minute, delivered the 12th inſtant, ſeems very preſſing for our embracing the preſent Juncture; but if I miſtake not, he has been equally ſo ſince the 10th December laſt, and I conclude it muſt have eſcaped him, that on the 21ſt July, in Anſwer to the firſt Queſtion put to him by your Honour, &c. he replied, that he judged Moraba, Bucheba, and Tookajee Holkar,

"might

" might aſſiſt us with 30,000 Horſe: Such a conſiderable Aſſiſtance, conſidering that the Two
" former are under Reſtraint, and the latter greatly ſuſpected, I think cannot now be reaſonably ex-
" pected; in which Caſe, according to Mr. Moſtyn's Opinion at that Time, the Service will be-
" come more difficult and tedious; which is corroborated by the 4th Article of the Treaty pro-
" poſed by Moraba and Maheputt Row Trimbuck, even on the Suppoſition of the above mentioned
" Aſſiſtance, viz. " The Engliſh Army that will accompany Dada Sahab ſhall remain as long as
" we may have occaſion for it, and be diſmiſſed when we may think proper, to which you will make
" no Objection;" alſo to Part of the 10th Article, viz. " If the Undertaking ſhould take up Time
" you will afford ſuch an Encreaſe of Men and Stores as may be neceſſary to accompliſh it, which,
" after the main Body is gone, I apprehend we ſhould be much at a Loſs to make good."

" Third Condition. That the Engagement you may form with Ragonath Row himſelf, or
" Moraba and his Aſſociates, be not contrary to thoſe concluded with Moodajee by Mr. Elliott,
" and noticed to you, nor of a hoſtile Tendency to the Government of Berar.—Having fully re-
" marked on the firſt Condition, to which this is ſimilar, I have only to allow that it would be eaſy to
" avoid entering into any Agreement with Ragonath Row or Moraba, of a hoſtile Tendency to
" the Government of Berar, but for the Objections noticed under the firſt Condition.

" Regarding the Second Point, Becauſe it appears by a Letter received from Mr. Lewis, a few
" Days after tranſmitting our Plan of the 21ſt July to the Governor General and Council, that they
" were then only acquainted that Moraba and Buchebah were ſeized and confined by Nanah Furneeſe,
" and that their Adherents, whether Bramins or Officers, had been ſeized, and conſiderable Fines de-
" manded of them; alſo that Tookajee Holkar had been much diſgraced by the Appointment of
" a Duan contrary to his Inclination, which the Governor General and Council could not be appriſed
" of for ſome Time after the 17th Auguſt, nor of their ſubſequent Alteration of Confinement,
" otherwiſe that they might not have approved the Plan in the Manner they have done: And as
" Mr. Moſtyn's Remark, that Holkar with ſeveral other Maratta Officers, now Adherents of Moraba,
" will conclude that your Honour, &c. have quite given up the Cauſe of Ragonath Row, and are
" under the Neceſſity of taking Part with Nanah Furneeſe, I imagine it may be eaſily obviated by
" giving them Intimation to the contrary.

" With reſpect to the other Point, Becauſe it was reſolved the 21ſt July, and Orders ſent to
" Colonel Leſlie the Day following, to bend his March to Junieer, about 30 Miles N. E. of Poona,
" by which Time we could order him to act either in Proſecution of the Plan, by ſecuring the Paſſes
" and effecting a Junction of our Forces and Ragonath Row, or to proceed on to Bombay, accord-
" ing as our Advices from Europe might render it expedient.—But it ſeems that your Honour, &c.
" as well as Mr. Moſtyn, are now of a different Opinion, notwithſtanding that the Colonel in his
" laſt Letter from Rajee Ghur, dated the 25th of Auguſt, aſſures us that he ſhall be attentive to the
" Alteration we had thought it expedient to direct in his Route from the Nabedah, and notwithſtanding
" that his Deſtination hither is in conſequence of an urgent Repreſentation of a Want of Aſſiſtance
" for this very Service.

" Fourthly. Becauſe, although I am not acquainted with the exact Deficiency in our European
" Force, I am ſenſible that it is a lamentable one, compared with the laſt Eſtabliſhment ordered by
" the Honourable Company in April 1775, of 312 Artillery and 1200 Infantry, and indeed it cannot
" be better deſcribed than in our Letter of the 8th ultimo to Sir Edward Vernon; and I beg leave
" to remind your Honour, &c. that when you propoſed conducting Ragonath Row to Poona
" December laſt, you judged it abſolutely neceſſary to requeſt the Preſident and Council at Fort
" Saint George to hold in Readineſs a very conſiderable Body of European Artillery and Infantry
" with a Battalion of Sepoys to repair hither to aſſiſt in our then intended Operations, and we have
" ſince that Period received no Reinforcement of Europeans, but what has been recalled from our
" Subordinates.

" But notwithſtanding the foregoing Reaſons, which have induced me to differ from your Honour's
" &c. Reſolution of the 12th Inſtant, I beg Leave to aſſure you I am too well convinced of the Ne-
" ceſſity of removing Nanah from the Adminiſtration of Affairs in the Maratta Government, and
" reinſtating Ragonath Row in Quality of Regent, for the Welfare of this Preſidency, and the cer-
" tain Advantages we may expect to reap from it, in conſequence of the Treaty concluded at Surat,
" not to concur in it, whenever it can conſiſtently and ſecurely be done; and which it appears to me
" may be effected with more Propriety, and a much greater Probability of Succeſs, in about Two
" Months, as we may by that Time hope the Reſolutions, with reſpect to Mr. Elliott's Negotiation,
" may be removed, that Colonel Leſlie may arrive at the Deſtination ordered him in July, and that
" the Honourable Company's expected Ships, as alſo the Squadron, may then be with us; but at
" any rate, I moſt ſincerely wiſh the Plan your Honour, &c. have adopted, may be attended with
" all imaginable Succeſs.

" Being with Reſpect,
" Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
" Your moſt obedient and moſt humble Servant,
" Daniel Draper."

Bombay,
10th October 1778.

N° 113.

Extract from a Conſultation held the 26th October.

Preſent the ſame as the foregoing.

In Reply to the Reaſons alledged by Mr. Draper, for diſſenting from the Reſolution of the Committee under the 12th Inſtant, the other Members who concurred therein have only to obſerve, that in their Opinion the Succeſs of the Meaſures determined upon, the abſolute Neceſſity whereof Mr. Draper admits, depend upon its being immediately undertaken; and the Execution will become much more difficult, if not altogether impracticable, by being ſuſpended to ſo diſtant a Period as that Gentleman propoſes: It is certain that very advantageous Offers have been made by Nanah through Monſieur St. Lubin to the French Nation, in order to engage their Aſſiſtance in Support of his uſurped Authority; and if a Junction of their Forces with him be once effected, they will acquire ſo predominant an Influence at the Poona Durbar as will occaſion a perpetual Warfare between the Marattas and us, whereby the Company's Poſſeſſions on the Weſtern Side of India muſt be rendered inſecure and unprofitable; they therefore deem themſelves bound in Duty to their Honourable Maſters to prevent (if poſſible) an Accident ſo ruinous to their Intereſts, by a timely Interpoſition of the only Reſource that is left, namely to take Advantage of the preſent Diviſions amongſt the Bramin Miniſters, to eſtabliſh Ragonath Row in the Regency, and to aſſiſt him with as conſiderable a Part of our Force as we can ſpare for that Purpoſe. Although it is near Two Months ſince we had the firſt Advice from the Governor General and Council, of their having deputed Mr. Elliott on an important Embaſſy to the Government of Berar, we have as yet no Information whatever of or from him, and it is hard to gueſs when we may; but it is no way likely the Degree of Support we mean to give Ragonath Row can be at all affected by any Negociation that may be concluded with Moodajee Bouncello, for even ſuppoſing it ſhould be recommended to him to aſſert his Pretenſions to the Rajaſhip of Sattara, and that he ſhould in conſequence aſſume that Dignity, it is moſt probable he would continue the Huſht Prandaun Government, taking Care to reduce them to their original Subjection to the Rajah; and the Sovereignty being in the Perſon of Moodajee, who is in Friendſhip with the Bengal Adminiſtration, it would perhaps be more for the general Intereſt, that the Huſht Prandaun, a Council of Eight, ſhould be dependant.

N° 114.

The Secretary now lays before us a Draft of the Letter from Ragoba to the principal Maratta Officers to be circulated on his landing on the Continent; which being approved, is ordered to be explained to Ragoba, and if approved by him a proper Number of Copies muſt be made in the Country Language, and the Company's Seal and Ragoba's private Seal affixed thereto.

N° 115.

Extract from a Conſultation held in Bombay, 4th November 1778.

Preſent as before.

As we hope the Forces will be ready to move the next Spring, about the 20th of the Month, it is thought neceſſary to fix the Method of carrying our Plan into Execution; and as the Appointment of a Committee is thought beſt ſuited for the Purpoſe, the Preſident propoſes, that Meſſrs. ıac, Egerton, and Moſtyn, ſhould be the Committee appointed; and they are appointed accord-

he ſaid Committee will conſider of the further Arrangements neceſſary for the intended Service, wait upon Ragoba to communicate our Intentions to him, and the Conditions to be previouſly ılated with him; in which they muſt enjoin him to obſerve the utmoſt Secrecy.

N° 116.

7th November 1778.

At a Committee; Preſent as before.

The Preſident acquaints us, That he has ſummoned this Meeting at the Deſire of Colonel Egerton; who acquaints us, that having through Miſapprehenſion aſſented to the Appointment of the Committee to accompany the Army to Poona, he now withdraws his Aſſent, and Diſſents thereto, for which he explains his Reaſons in Writing as follow:

" A Committee having been appointed a few Days ago, of Mr. Carnac, myſelf, and Mr. Moſtyn, " to treat with Ragoba, as I conceived, for the immediate Tranſaction of Buſineſs on this Iſland, " I gave my Conſent thereto; but having ſince diſcovered by Accident, that it is the Intention of " the ſaid Committee to accompany me in that Capacity on the intended Expedition; I deſire to know " if that was the Honourable the Governor's Deſign, when he made the Propoſal for forming it at " the Board; and ſhould that be the Caſe, to declare, that I find myſelf neceſſitated not only to " withdraw my Aſſent to the Meaſure, but even to enter my Proteſt againſt it, for the following " Reaſons:

" Firſt, Becauſe I deem it diametrically oppoſite to the Intentions of the Honourable the Court of " Directors.

" Secondly, Becauſe it is morally impoſſible any Negociation can take place on the Road, on " which the commanding Officer, with the Poona Ambaſſador (who will of courſe proceed with the " Army to his Station) cannot immediately receive the Orders of the Honourable the Governor and " Select Committee.

" Thirdly, Becauſe it appears very clearly, from the Commands of the Honourable Directors of " the 10th April laſt, received per Ship Caranja, Paragraph the 3d, that in the commanding Officer's " Abſence, the Select Committee is to conſiſt till his Return, of the Honourable the Governor, the " Second and Fourth in Council. This can, I think, bear only one Interpretation, viz. that the " Perſons abovementioned, and not a Part of them, are competent to act in that Capacity."

After the Diſcuſſion of this Matter, the Preſident puts the following Queſtion, in which Meſſrs. Carnac and Egerton decline voting:

Whether Two Members of this Committee can be detached from the Preſidency at the ſame Time, upon any temporary Service? and whether the Two remaining Members are, in their Abſence, competent to form a Committee?

Mr. Draper votes in the Negative on this Queſtion, being of Opinion it is the Company's Meaning, that none of the Civil Members of the Committee ſhould be detached from the Preſidency when the commanding Officer will likewiſe be abſent, as it would occaſion the ſame Inconvenience they have guarded againſt in the Paragraph reſpecting the commanding Officer.

The Preſident is of Opinion, that from the laſt Paragraph, in Caſes of great Emergency, as in the preſent, Two Members may be abſent, or even he himſelf, if the Service ſhould require it; and that the Remainder can form a Committee in the Abſence of the other Two.

The Queſtion being therefore determined in the Affirmative by the Preſident's caſting Vote, it is the Reſolution of the Committee, That the remaining Two Members, in the Abſence of the other Two, are competent to form a Select Committee; and therefore our former Appointment of the Committee to accompany Ragoba ſtands confirmed.

N° 117.

11th November 1778.

At a Committee; Preſent as before.

Mr. Carnac delivers in his Opinion on the general Queſtion propoſed at our laſt Meeting, as follows:

" It having been judged highly neceſſary, that our utmoſt Endeavours ſhould be exerted to effect " the Removal of the preſent Miniſters of the Infant Peſhwa, who are avowedly and inveterately " hoſtile to us, and to place the chief Adminiſtration of Affairs in the Hands of Ragonath Row, of " whoſe good Diſpoſition towards us we have every Reaſon to be aſſured; Mr. Carnac is of Opi- " nion, the Company are ſo deeply intereſted in the Event of ſuch a Meaſure, that the conducting of " it cannot with Propriety be entruſted to any ſingle Perſon, but that a Committee ought to be

appointed for the Purpoſe; and as there can ſcarcely be any other political Buſineſs of equal Importance, he thinks One of the Civil Members of the Secret Committee ought to be nominated for that Service. He does not conceive that the temporary Abſence of One of the Civil Members, during the Space of Time that may be required for the Accompliſhment of the Buſineſs we are now about to undertake, can be conſtrued into a Vacancy, or that the Powers of the Secret Committee are to be ſuſpended during the Abſence of ſuch Members."

When Mr. Draper acquaints us, that he likewiſe apprehended, from our Minute of the 4th November, that the Object of the Committee's Appointment was only confined to ſettle the Arrangements of Ragoba, previous to his quitting the Iſland, and was not meant to accompany the Army to Poona, as he thought the Committee for that Purpoſe was hereafter to be appointed; he alſo begs leave to obſerve, that in the Opinion he gave on the 7th Inſtant, he did not mean to imply that the Committee was not competent to tranſact Buſineſs in the Sickneſs or accidental Abſence of Two of the Members, but only that it was not according to the Meaning of the Company's Orders, if any Two of the Members ſhould be detached from the Preſidency on any temporary Service.

18th November 1778.

At a Committee; all Preſent.

Colonel Egerton now delivers the following Minute, in Reply to Mr. Carnac's, entered under the 11th Inſtant.

Colonel Egerton entirely agrees with Mr. Carnac, that the placing the chief Adminiſtration of the Poona Government in the Hands of Ragoba, is a Matter of ſuch important Concern to the Honourable Company, that it ought by no Means to be entruſted to the Management of any One Perſon ſingly; and therefore moſt heartily acquieſces in the Appointment of a Committee for modelling the Buſineſs on the Spot, before any Steps were taken publicly and avowedly for his Support; and when it may be effected and ratified with the Sanction and Approbation of the Select Committee, nothing more can remain to be done, but to effect their Orders by the due and vigorous Exertion of the Military Power; for which Purpoſe he flatters himſelf the Honourable Directors deem the Services of the Committee needleſs.

"The Colonel's Objection was ſolely to the Deviation from the Honourable Directors plain Order, that in the Abſence of the commanding Officer the Select Committee is to conſiſt of the Honourable the Governor, the Second and Fourth in Council; he therefore wiſhes you ſeriouſly to conſider beforehand, what diſagreeable Conſequences ſuch a Deviation will be liable to, particularly in the preſent Caſe, when it may be thought unneceſſary, as any unforeſeen Occurrences can in a Couple of Days be communicated to the Select Committee, whoſe Powers ſhould not be ſubject to the ſmalleſt Shadow of Cavil or Diſpute."

APPENDIX, N° 118, 119, and 120.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 11th November 1778.

At a Committee; Preſent as before.

THE Circular Letter intended to have been iſſued by Ragoba on his landing on the Continent having been explained to him by the Committee, he at firſt made ſome Exceptions againſt it, particularly to that Clauſe reſpecting his carrying on the Government as Regent only during the Minority, and the Sicca being continued in the Peſhwa's Name. After the proper Arguments on the Occaſion had been urged by the Committee, and afterwards by Mr. Moſtyn, his Objections appeared to ſubſide and he ſeemed very ready to agree to the Terms, on Condition we would lend him Three Lacks of Rupees, and indulge him in ſome other Articles of warlike Stores; but having expreſſed a Deſire that the Letter might be left with him for further Conſideration, it was accordingly left with him; and to our great Surprize it was returned Yeſterday to the Preſident, accompanied with a Paper containing ſundry Alterations of a very material Nature, which he propoſed ſhould be made therein. The Letter will appear by the Letter itſelf as drawn out by the Secretary, and the Letter altered as propoſed by him, both entered hereafter. The Alteration he has made in the very Title is itſelf an inſurmountable Objection. Mr. Moſtyn acquaints us that Mookia Purdhan is the Title only due to the Peſhwa

Peſhwa himſelf; but when we obſerve that he has totally omitted the Clauſe reſpecting the Foo... on which he is to aſſume the Government, and promiſing to continue the Sicca in the Boy's Na... we cannot heſitate a Moment in declaring that we cannot proceed further without entirely renounc... the Principles we have acted upon, and upon which we obtained the Sanction of the Governor G... neral and Council: Reſolved, therefore, That the Committee be deſired to wait upon Ragoba, and... acquaint him expreſsly that unleſs he will accede to the propoſed Conditions we muſt immediat... give up his Cauſe, and proceed no further in the Buſineſs; that the Alterations above noted, ... the Omiſſion he propoſes, are totally inadmiſſible, but that we will agree to his being ſtiled Punt Pe... han, which Mr. Moſtyn acquaints us will be his proper Title, and was the Title uſed by Badjua... the Treaty of the Year 1739; and that we cannot pay any Attention to his other Requeſts until ... Point is firſt ſettled. The Committee muſt alſo expreſs our Surprize at his having ſo greatly rec... from what he had declared both to them and to Mr. Moſtyn, reſpecting thoſe Points, which we ... not account for otherwiſe than by imputing it to the Advice of evil Counſellors, who are in the ... tereſt of his Enemies, and have prevailed on him to raiſe thoſe Objections, purpoſely to defeat ... Expectations from us. They muſt alſo obſerve to him, of how much Importance it is that no Ti... ſhould be loſt in moving with our Forces, as our Preparations cannot much longer be kept ſec... and when diſcovered to the Miniſters muſt greatly encreaſe our Difficulties, if not defeat the wh... Scheme.

In ſhort the Committee muſt be very explicit with him, and give him plainly to underſta... his Compliance with the Terms offered is a ſine qua non.

Circular Letter as drawn out by the Secretary from Ragonath Row Ballajee Badjuar, to all ... Mootſeddees, Sirdars and Subjects of the Maratta State.

You will no Doubt hear with Pleaſure that the Government of Bombay, with the Sanction ... Concurrence of the Governor General and Council of Calcutta, have now determined to ſuppo... Cauſe with Vigour, and with the Aſſiſtance of the Almighty to place me in the Regency of the M... ratta Empire, which you all know is my juſt Right. The Governor and Select Committee have b... moved to this Reſolution in my Favour by the unjuſt Conduct of the preſent Adminiſtration at Poo... who have violated in almoſt every Article the Treaty concluded with the Honourable Company ... March 1776, and by their great Deſire to ſee Peace and good Order reſtored to the Maratta Emp... which has been ſo long involved in Troubles and Confuſion, and experienced ſo many Calamitie... Miſmanagement and the Diſcord of oppoſite Factions.

That no Officer or Subject of the Maratta State may be deterred from following the Dictate... his Duty by any Suſpicion of the Rectitude of my Intentions, I do in the moſt ſolemn Manner a... and declare thus in the Face of the World, that my only View is to remove the Government ... the preſent improper Hands, and to take upon myſelf the Regency during the Minority of the you... Peſhwa Madarow Narrain; in the mean Time I ſhall conduct the Affairs of Government as Regen... and continue the Sicca in the Peſhwa's Name, without doing Injury to any one who does not opp... my juſt Deſigns, or endeavour to abſcond, and ſhall bury in Oblivion all paſt Injuries from eve... Perſon whatever, unleſs provoked by any new Act of Enmity after this Notice.

I now call upon you, and require you immediately to join my Forces and the Engliſh Army, a... to attend me to Poona, where I hope, by the Divine Bleſſing, to ſettle the Government upon a fir... and ſolid Footing, and aided by the Advice of upright and wiſe Miniſters, to reſtore the Mara... Empire to its former Happineſs and Splendor.

In further Confirmation of what is herein contained, the Governor and Select Committee of Bo... bay have cauſed the Seal of the Honourable Company to be affixed.

N° 119.

Circular Letter (as propoſed by Ragoba) from Ragonath Badjerow Mookia Purdhan, or Hea... Miniſter.

To all the Modſeddies, Sirdars, Jaghierdars, and Subjects of the Maratta State:

You will no Doubt hear with Pleaſure that the Government of Bombay, with the Sanction a... Concurrence of the Governor General and Council of Calcutta, have determined now to ſupport m... Cauſe with Vigour, and with the Aſſiſtance of the Almighty to place me in the Regency of t... Maratta Empire, which you all know is my juſt Right. The Governor and Select Committee ha... been moved to this Reſolution in my Favour by the unjuſt Conduct of the preſent Adminiſtratio... at Poona, who have violated in almoſt every Article the Treaty concluded with the Honourab... Company in March 1776, and by their Deſire to ſee Peace and good Order reſtored through m... Hands to the Maratta Empire, which has been ſo long involved in Trouble and Confuſion, and ex... perienced ſo many Calamities by the Miſmanagement and Diſcord of my Servants.

That no Officer or Subject of the Maratta State may be deterred from following the Dictates o... his Duty by any Suſpicion of the Rectitude of my Intentions, I have in the moſt ſolemn Manne... granted this, and declare thus in the Face of the World, that my only View is to remove the Go... vernmen...

vernment out of the preſent improper Hands, and to take upon myſelf the Regency, without doing Injury to any one who does not oppoſe my juſt Deſigns or endeavour to abſcond, and ſhall bury in Oblivion all paſt Injuries from every Perſon whatever: But after this Notice you will, without making any freſh Acts of Enmity, come and join my Forces, and attend me to Poona, where I hope, by the Divine Bleſſing, to ſettle the Government upon a firm and ſolid Footing, and reſtore the Maratta Empire to its former Happineſs and Splendor.

In further Confirmation of what is here contained, the Honourable the Governor and Select Committee of Bombay have cauſed the Seal of the Honourable Company to be affixed.

N° 120.

16th November 1778.

At a Committee; all the Members Preſent except Colonel Egerton, indiſpoſed.

Mr. Carnac lays before us a Report of the Committee's Conference with Ragoba in conſequence of the Reſolution of our laſt Meeting; and further acquaints us, that Ragoba had at laſt agreed to wave his Demand for having it ſtipulated in the Treaty, that if the Child ſhould be proved ſpurious he, Ragoba, ſhould be declared Peſhwa; and had put his Sicca to the Circular Letter as drawn out by the Secretary, after a few Alterations of no material Conſequence, on Condition that we would engage to repreſent to the Honourable Company, in the ſtrongeſt Terms, his moſt ſolemn Declaration that the Child is ſuppoſititious, and that he can produce the real Father and Mother, and alſo that he will point out to them the extreme Injuſtice of his being obliged to hold the Government in the Name of ſuch ſuppoſititious Child, and that he will requeſt to receive their explicit Orders by the earlieſt Conveyance, how we are to proceed in caſe he ſhould produce unqueſtionable Proofs of his Allegation, and whether they will permit him then to aſſume the Government in his Name, which on ſuch Proof will be his undoubted Right. That Ragoba further requeſted it might be mentioned to the Honourable Company, that in caſe the Child ſhould prove to be really the Son of Narrain Row, he wiſhed in ſuch caſe an equal Partition might be made of the Government and Country, agreeable to what he ſays is the Gentoo Law.

Reſolved, ſince Ragoba is ſo earneſt in his Requeſt, That a Repreſentation to the above Effect be made to the Honourable Company.

Ordered, That a proper Number of Copies of the Circular Letter be made in the Gentoo Language, and that it be entered after this Conſultation in the Form it now ſtands.

Ragoba's Relation of the Tranſaction between him and Mr. Shaw, reſpecting the Grant of Ahmood, ſtated in the Committee's Conference, being next conſidered, the Broach Records are referred to, where we cannot diſcover any Trace of the Promiſe Ragoba mentions, but on the contrary, it appears by the Proceedings of the Chief and Council, under the 8th June 1775, that the Ceſſion of Ahmood was a voluntary Gift from Ragoba to the Honourable Company, and that the Grant paſſed through the proper Forms, by which a conſiderable Expence was incurred; the Grant itſelf is entered upon the Broach Records, under the 25th September of the ſame Year; Reſolved, therefore, That Ragoba has no Right to expect from us the Performance of the Promiſe ſaid to be made by Mr. Shaw on that Account, but that we will conſent to receive the Ceſſion of Ahmood on the ſame Terms he has offered Hanſood, namely, as a Mark of the Regard to the Honourable Company; and mention it to them in that Light.

As a Supply of Money will be abſolutely neceſſary to enable Ragoba to proceed; Reſolved, That a Loan be made him of Three Lacks of Rupees; which the State of our Treaſury at Bombay and Surat will enable us to make without Inconvenience, and the Seaſon for Collection now coming on.

His Requeſt for a Supply of Military Stores, as ſpecified in the annexed Liſt, being next conſidered, it is agreed to let him have 1,500 Stand of Arms with their Accoutrements, and Four or Five Guns and their Carriages, with the particular Gun he points out, and the Flints and Gunpowder. We cannot ſpare any Howitzers, but it muſt be repreſented to Ragoba, that our Army will carry a ſufficient Train and Ammunition, and that any Thing further will only be an Incumbrance; and therefore ſuch only of the Articles as he may have Occaſion for will now be delivered, and the Remainder afterwards.

APPENDIX, N° 121, 122, 123, and 124.

Bombay Select Conſultations, the 18th November 1778.

THE Draft of the propoſed Treaty with Ragoba is now laid before us by the Secretary; and having been ſeriouſly and deliberately diſcuſſed, Article by Article, it is, after a few Alterations, approved.

Ordered, That a Tranſlation thereof, in the Maratta Language, be immediately made, and ſent to Ragoba for his Inſpection, who muſt be deſired to fix a ſhort Day to meet us, to execute and exchange the Treaty.

Articles of Agreement and Treaty between the Honourable William Hornby, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, and the Select Committee of Bombay, on the Part and Behalf of the Honourable United Engliſh Eaſt India Company, on the one Part, and Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan, on the other Part; done and concluded at Bombay this Day of November, in the Year of our Lord 1778.

Article 1ſt. The Treaty concluded by Colonel Upton with Siccarany Pundit and Ballajee Pundit, Miniſters, in Behalf of the Peſhwa and the Maratta State, having been violated by thoſe Miniſters in almoſt every Article, the Governor and Select Committee of Bombay, with the Sanction and Concurrence of the Governor General and Council, do hereby engage and agree in Behalf of the aforeſaid Company, to aſſiſt Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan to the utmoſt of their Power, to put him in Poſſeſſion of Poona, and to place him in the Regency of the Maratta Empire during the Minority of the young Peſhwa, Maderow Narrain, hereby declaring that the true Intent and Meaning of this Treaty is not to alter the Form of Government, or to interrupt the Peace between the Honourable Company and the Maratta State, but only to remove the Adminiſtration out of the preſent improper Hands, and to place in the Regency the Man who has the juſteſt Title to that Office.

2d. Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan, on his Part, doth hereby engage and agree to accept the Office of Regent, which he is to exerciſe with full Power during the Minority of the Peſhwa Maderow Narrain, in whoſe Name he further engages to continue the Sicca and conduct the Government; but Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan, having expreſſed his Doubt of the Legitimacy of the Peſhwa Maderow Narrain, the Governor and Select Committee of Bombay do hereby engage, on Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan his ſtrong Solicitations, to requeſt explicit Orders from the Company, whether in caſe he ſhould prove to their Satisfaction that the Child is ſuppoſitious they will place him in the Peſhwaſhip, which, on ſuch Proof, will be his unqueſtionable Right; or whether in caſe the Child ſhould prove to be really the Son of Narrain Row, they will guarantee him an equal Diviſion of the Government and Country, on the Peſhwa attaining the Age of Seventeen, agreeable to what Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan ſays he is entitled to by his Birthright according to the Gentoo Law.

3d. The Governor and Select Committee of Bombay do hereby ſtipulate, and Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan, for their Satisfaction, and that his upright Intentions may appear manifeſt, doth hereby engage and agree, that the Perſon of the Peſhwa Madarow Narrain ſhall be kept under the Charge and Cuſtody of ſuch Perſons as may be agreeable to the Select Committee.

4th. Morabah Furneeſe, Butcheba Pronder, and Tookajee Holcar, having invited Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan to take upon himſelf the Government as Regent, and promiſed the aſſiſtance of Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan doth hereby engage, upon their performing their Promiſe to him and the Select Committee's Satisfaction, that he will ſhew Favour to them according to their Ranks, in ſettling the Offices of Government, and that their Perſons and Fortunes ſhall be unmoleſted.

5th. Any Articles reſpecting the internal Management of the Government, or the Appointment or Removal of Officers, can be better ſettled by Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan on his Part, faithfully promiſing to obſerve the Terms mentioned in the Circular Letter, with reſpect to the perſonal Safety of thoſe whom he may be of Opinion have injured him.

6th. In Conſideration of the Aſſiſtance to be afforded by the Honourable Company for placing Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan in the Regency at Poona, Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan doth hereby engage to confirm and ratify the former Treaty concluded with him at Surat in March 1775, and to cede and make over to the Honourable Company for ever, the ſeveral Places and Territories granted by the ſaid Treaty, which were reſtored by the Treaty of Poorunder, and Baſſein and its Diſtricts, and the Iſland of Kennery, which were not put in Poſſeſſion of the Company. The ſeveral Acquiſitions which will devolve to the Honourable Company by virtue of this Treaty are as follow:

Baſſein Fort and Town, and the whole of its Diſtricts and Dependencies in the fulleſt Extent, according to the juſt and fixed Boundaries of that Province.

Jambo

Jamboofier and Orpad. In the ſame full and ample Manner as ceded by the Treaty of Surat.
The Iſland of Kennery.
An Aſſignment upon the Purgunnah of Occlaſier for the Sum of Rupees 75,000 per Annum, as ſettled by the 8th Article of the Treaty of Surat.

There being ſome ſmall Places known by the Name of the Autgoms, always annexed and actually making a Part of the Iſland of Sallette, which have been withheld from the Company by the Poona Miniſters, Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan doth hereby engage and agree that the ſaid Autgoms ſhall be ceded to the Honourable Company.

7th. In Addition to the ſeveral Grants and Ceſſions hereinabove ſpecified, Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan doth hereby engage and agree to cede and make over for ever the Purgunnah of Ahmood and Hantood; which Grants are to be conſidered as an Inſtance of his Good Will and Affection to the Honourable Company.

8th. All the Places herein ceded to the Honourable Company are to be conſidered as their ſole Right and Property from the Day this Treaty is executed, without any Claim of Chout to the Maratta Government, or any other Demand whatever, and may be taken Poſſeſſion of by the Company's People whenever they think proper; for which Purpoſe Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdham doth with theſe Preſents deliver the neceſſary Orders to the Maratta Officers to ſurrender the ſaid Places. Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan doth further promiſe and engage, that immediately after taking Charge of the Regency at Poona, he will execute and deliver to the Government at Bombay regular Sunnuds, under the Peſhwa's Sicca, for the ſeveral Ceſſions granted to the Honourable Company by this Treaty.

9th. Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan engages to pay and make good the Charges and Expences of the Army and Stores with which he is now to be aſſiſted, which he hereby faithfully promiſes to make good in ready Money, as ſoon as the Situation of his Affairs will poſſibly permit; and for the further Security of the Honourable Company, till the Account due for the Expences of the Army is fully diſcharged when all Right and Title thereto on the Part of the Honourable Company will be relinquiſhed.

10th. Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan engages to pay in full for the Body of Forces, conſiſting of 4000 Men, with which he is to be aſſiſted, the Sum of Two Lacks and a Half of Rupees per Month, which the Governor and Select Committee of Bombay agree to accept without further Account in full of every Expence attending the Army, and is to commence from the Day the Forces leave Bombay.

11th Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan faithfully promiſes to diſcharge his preſent Debt to the Honourable Company, as ſoon as the State of his Finances will permit, agreeable to an Account which will be delivered to him.

12th. The Engliſh Forces are to continue with Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan until the Object of this Treaty is accompliſhed, which is to place him in the Regency of Poona; and when that is effected, they are to be at all Times ready to aſſiſt Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan with their Forces, ſo far as may be conſiſtent with their other Engagements, or the Situation of their own Affairs will permit.

13th. The ſeveral Treaties and Agreements ſubſiſting between the Government of Bombay and the Maratta Government are hereby ratified and confirmed in as full Force, as when they were firſt concluded, unleſs otherwiſe provided for in the Treaty.

14th. After the Eſtabliſhment of Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan in the Regency at Poona, there ſhall be a firm Peace and Alliance between the Honourable Company and the Maratta Government: Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan engages never to aſſiſt the Enemies or moleſt the Dominions of the Company in any Part of India, nor to make War or commit Depredations in the Carnatic, or any other Part of the Dominions of their Ally the Nabob of Arcot: The Governor and Select Committee of Bombay in like Manner engage in Behalf of the Honourable Company, not to aſſiſt the Enemies of Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan.

15th. Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan hereby engages and agrees that no European Settlements ſhall be allowed to be made on the Maritime Coaſts, or any other Parts of the Maratta Dominions, without the Conſent of the Company, or of their Repreſentatives being previouſly obtained, and that no Manner of Intercourſe or Connection ſhall be maintained between the Maratta Government and the French Nation; any Failure in which Stipulation will be conſidered as a Breach of the Alliance between the Maratta Government and the Honourable Company.

16th. When the contracting Parties have mutally interchanged this Treaty, it will be ſent to Bengal for the Ratification of the Governor General and Council.

17th. Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan, doth hereby ſtipulate and engage, that the Engliſh ſhall enjoy all their former Privileges and Freedom of Trade within the Maratta Dominions without Interruption; and he further engages to give all poſſible Encouragement to the Honourable Company's Trade, and to promote as far as he can, an excluſive Vend to the Engliſh for European Commodities in the Maratta Dominions.

18th. If any Article of the preſent Treaty ſhould interfere with any Engagements formed by Governor General and Council, not yet known to the Select Committee of Bombay, ſuch Article may be altered or amended as may be neceſſary.

The foregoing Articles having been mutually agreed to by the Governor and Select Committee of Bombay, on the Part of the Honourable Company, and Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan, the

the Contracting Parties have interchangeably affixed their Hands and Seals, and the Seal of the Honourable Company, in Bombay Caſtle, the Day and Year above written.

19th November 1778.

The Secretary, by the Preſident's Order ſent round the following Note to the Members; on which they gave their Opinions ſubjoined to the Note.

To the Worſhipful John Carnac, Eſquire, &c. Members of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

The 16th Article of the propoſed Treaty, as ſettled Yeſterday by the Committee, appearing to the Preſident, on further Reflection, to be a greater Conceſſion than the Gentlemen at Bengal are by Law entitled to, and not only unneceſſary in this Caſe, but a Precedent which may be very dangerous to the Influence and Dignity of this Preſidency; he has therefore ordered me to new model this Article, and I have the Honour to ſend it round for your Opinion.

I am, with Reſpect,
Gentlemen, &c. &c.
Edward Ravenſcroft, Sec^y

Thurſday,
19th November 1778.

I conceive the Act of Parliament obliges us to ſubmit the ſuppoſed Treaty to the Controul of the Governor General and Council; and therefore prefer the Article approved of Yeſterday to that now propoſed to be ſubſtituted for it.

Daniel Draper.

I in a great Meaſure agree with the Preſident; however, as our Determination of this Matter may be attended with ſerious Conſequences, I think it ſhould be fairly debated in the Committee; and after hearing a full Diſcuſſion of the Arguments in favour of the ſeveral Opinions, we ſhall be better able to reſolve.

John Carnac.

I have this Moment received the Act; and therefore will not delay giving my Opinion; viz.

That in this whole Affair, we are bound to proceed with the Sanction and Approbation of the Supreme Council, which is already obtained for our private Juſtification; but it is needleſs to make any public Mention thereof in the Treaty.

Charles Egerton.

N° 122.

Extract from a Conſultation held in Bombay, 21ſt November 1778.

The Committee, except Mr. Draper, indiſpoſed, aſſembled in the Preſident's Chamber, who is alſo much indiſpoſed; when he communicates to them a Letter from Mr. Lewis, and one from Ragoba to the Gentoo Tranſlator; by which it appears, and which is likewiſe confirmed from various Quarters, that the Miniſters have got Intimation of our Intentions, and are making Preparations to oppoſe us.

Reſolved, upon this Intelligence, That it is neceſſary no Time ſhould be loſt in moving the Forces: And as the Spring Tides now ſerve, and the Colonel acquaints us the Preparations are in ſufficient Forwardneſs, Reſolved, That the Firſt Diviſion, under Captain Stewart, be embarked with To-morrow Night's Tide, and proceed to Apta, to ſecure Bhore Gaut; and that another Diviſion proceed immediately after, to ſecure Bellapore Fort for a Magazine, and ſupport the Firſt Diviſion, in caſe of Neceſſity; and that the Remainder of the Forces proceed afterwards with all Expedition.

The Preſident deſires that Mr. Carnac will take upon him the Execution of the neceſſary Meaſures to forward the intended Service; and acquaints him, that he has given Orders for ſecuring all the Boats and ſmall Craft of this Iſland and Salſette; and deſires that Mr. Carnegie may be immediately ordered to ſend the Boats from Caranja, which, being beſt acquainted with the Navigation of Apta River, will be moſt proper to tranſport Captain Stewart's Diviſion.

The Boats are to be arranged in Diviſions, under the Command of Marine Officers.

Ordered, That all Communication between this Iſland and the Continent be immediately ſtopped, and Advice ſent to Mr. Lewis, that he may take the neceſſary Meaſures for his own Security.

The ſeveral neceſſary Points muſt be adjuſted with Ragoba as ſoon as poſſible; for which Purpoſe Mr. Moſtyn will immediately wait on him.

The 16th Article of the propoſed Treaty being now re-conſidered, the Act of Parliament is re-viſed to; wherein we find it laid down, "That it ſhall not be lawful for any Preſident and Council, &c. to make any Orders for commencing Hoſtilities, or declaring or making War, againſt any Indian Princes or Powers, without the Conſent and Approbation of the Governor General and Council firſt had and obtained." It therefore certainly follows, that it is lawful for us to do and perform the Things aforeſaid, when we have obtained ſuch Conſent and Approbation, which is the preſent Caſe: And the propoſed Article appears the more unneceſſary and ſuperfluous, after the Recital in the Firſt Article, that we have proceeded with the Sanction and Approbation of the Governor General and Council. Such a Stipulation muſt create much Diſtruſt and Doubt in Ragoba; and certain we are, that it would entirely deſtroy the Conſequence and Dignity of this Government in the Eyes of the Country Powers, and be attended with many bad Conſequences to the Company's Intereſts; for after we have proclaimed in our Negociation, that we have obtained the Conſent of the Governor General and Council, which is neceſſary to be done, as their controlling Power is univerſally known, if, when we come to the Point, we declare that we have no Authority to conclude a final Engagement, in what trifling Light muſt we appear, and what Power will waſte Time in treating with us? Reſolved, therefore, for the above Reaſons, and thoſe recorded in our Proceedings under the 9th Inſtant, and becauſe we have adhered ſtrictly to the Principles upon which we obtained the Sanction of the Governor General and Council, That the 16th Article of the propoſed Treaty, as it now ſtands, is highly improper and unneceſſary; and that the following be ſubſtituted in lieu thereof, which will provide equally well againſt our Treaty interfering with the Engagement Mr. Elliott may form with Moodajee Bouncello, and which was our ſole Object in the Article as firſt drawn out.

Amended Article. If any Article of the preſent Treaty ſhould interfere with any Engagement formed by the Governor General and Council, not yet known to the Governor and Select Committee of Bombay, ſuch Article may be liable to be altered or amended, as may be neceſſary.

N° 123.

22d November 1778.

At a Committee; all Preſent but Mr. Draper, indiſpoſed.

Meſſrs. Carnac and Egerton, Mr. Draper being indiſpoſed, met in the Preſident's Chamber, who ſtill continues very indifferent; when Mr. Moſtyn reports that he had a Conference with Ragoba, on the Subject of the propoſed Treaty, who objected to ſeveral Parts thereof, and promiſed to ſend ſome of his People this Morning to meet Meſſrs. Carnac, Egerton, and Moſtyn, in order the more fully to explain his Objections.

If the final Execution of the Treaty ſhould take up more Time than we expect, Ragoba muſt be deſired in the mean Time to put his Sicca to ſome of the Letters to be ſent over with Captain Stewart's Party, which we before agreed is to embark this Evening.

Immediately on the Committee's breaking up, Meſſrs. Carnac, Egerton, and Moſtyn, had a Meeting with Four Agents from Ragoba, with whom they had a tedious Conference of upwards of Four Hours, which ended without any Thing concluſive being ſettled. The principal Objections made by the Agents were, Firſt, to the Article providing for the Security of the Child's Perſon; in which they want to have ſpecified, the Place of his Reſidence, the Perſons Names who were to have the Charge of him, and alſo the Fort wherein he might be kept, ſhould he be under Ragoba's Orders. Secondly, To the Article reſpecting Moraba, &c. which they wanted to have altered in ſuch Manner as to leave him entirely dependant on Ragoba's Pleaſure, and to be conſidered by him in the Diſtribution of the Offices, as he might think their Services might merit. Thirdly, They inſiſted an Expreſs Article ſhould be inſerted, ſtipulating that the Select Committee ſhould not in any Shape interfere in ſettling the internal Government.

The Agents declaring they had no Power to relax from theſe Demands, and Meſſrs. Carnac, Egerton, and Moſtyn's Arguments being ineffectual, the Conference broke up.

The Poona Committee particularly deſired the Agents to get ſome of the Circular Letters, ſigned by Ragoba, to be ſent with Captain Stewart's Party; and the Company's Linguiſt waited on him for that Purpoſe, but Ragoba refuſed to ſign the Circular Letter till he executed the Treaty.

The Committee ſend a Meſſage to Ragoba, deſiring him to meet them at 10 o'Clock To-morrow Morning; which he agrees to.

At 11 P. M. Captain Stewart's Diviſion, having embarked in the Afternoon, weighed with the Tide, and ſtood over to the Apta River.

23d November 1778.

At a Committee; all the Members Preſent.

Ragoba now meets the Committee according to Appointment, when, after a Conference of near ſeven Hours, he agreed to execute the Treaty, with ſome ſmall Alterations which were made at his earneſt Deſire, and promiſed to put his Sicca to ſome of the Circular Letters this Evening.

Previous to his taking Leave, he requeſted the intended Loan might be enlarged from Three to Four Lacks of Rupees, pleading, as he had obliged us in the Affair of Ahmood, he had a Right to expect that Favour; which being a very juſt Plea, it is agreed to grant his Requeſt, and cannot doubt but the Honourable Company will approve the Loan, conſidering the valuable Acquiſitions we ſhall gain from them by the Treaty.

Ragoba deſiring that the Treaty, when fair copied, may be ſent to him to execute, the Secretary is ordered to get it ready with all Expedition, when it will be ſent to him by a Deputation.

N° 124.

Ragoba then took his Leave of the Committee with the uſual Ceremonies.

The Second Diviſion of the Troops, under the Command of Lieutenant Colonel Cay, proceeded to Bellapore.

Ragoba returned Six of the Circular Letters, executed under his Sicca, which were immediately counterſealed with the Company's Seal, and Four of them ſent over to Captain Stewart.

Colonel Charles Egerton proceeded in the Yatch to Billapore.

The Committee met in the Preſident's Chamber, and executed the Treaty, which in the Evening was ſent to Ragoba by Mr. Moſtyn.

The Committee, except Colonel Egerton, with the Army, aſſembled in the Preſident's Chamber.

Mr. Moſtyn reports, That Ragoba, notwithſtanding his Promiſe at the Meeting with the Committee, after the Treaty had been fully canvaſſed, and every Article particularly explained to him, ſtill refuſed to ſign it, unleſs an Addition was made to the Third, more fully providing for the Charge of the Child's Perſon, in caſe Perwettyboy ſhould decline the Offer; and that he likewiſe objected to the Article ceding over the Autgoms, alledging, that they were not anciently annexed to the Diſtrict of Salſette, and inſiſting, that the Value of this Ceſſion ſhould be aſcertained, and not to exceed a certain Sum.

As we much wiſh to remove all Doubts from Ragoba, and to give him Satisfaction, ſo far as we conſiſtently can; Reſolved, That we conſent to the following Additions being made to the ...puted Articles:

To the 3d. "In caſe Perwettyboy ſhould refuſe to undertake the Charge, the Child ſhall be "put under the Care of any of his Relations by the Mother's Side."

To the 6th. "But although the Governor and Select Committee have even underſtood that the "Autgoms made a Part of the Iſland of Salſette, yet if the contrary ſhould be made plainly to ap"pear, they will give up their Claim."

But as we have experienced ſo much Evaſion and Delay on the Part of Ragoba; Reſolved, That the following Meſſage be ſent to him, if he ſhould not agree to the Treaty with the above Additions:

"That we are determined not to permit of any further Additions being made in the Treaty. "That if he refuſed to execute it in its preſent Form, we ſhall drop all Connection with him, and "take Poſſeſſion of the Government at Poona, in the Name of the Peſhwa, and carry it on in his "Name, until we receive Orders from Bengal whom to appoint Regent; and that in the mean "Time we ſhall not permit of his continuing ſuch a Number of armed Men on the Iſland, but "ſhall inſiſt on their being immediately diſmiſſed."

N° 125.

27th November 1778.

At a Committee, PRESENT;

The Honourable the Preſident and Mr. Carnac,
Colonel Egerton being with the Army, and Mr. Draper indiſpoſed.

MR. Moſtyn reports that Ragoba is not ſatisfied with the Addition made to the 3d Article, and wanted to have it ſtipulated, that in caſe the Perſons ſpecified therein ſhould decline the Charge, the Child ſhould then be put under the Charge of ſuch Perſons as may be agreeable to him (Ragoba) and to the Select Committee.

As

As the dangerous Tendency of this Clauſe is obvious, by giving Ragoba an abſolute Negative in the Choice of Guardians for the Child, and we cannot be too guarded in every Stipulation that regards its Safety; it is reſolved at all Hazards to reject the propoſed Addition: But ſtill, as we are very anxious to have the Treaty concluded, and unwilling it ſhould be known at Poona that any Diſagreements ſubſiſt between us and Ragoba; it is agreed to conſent to the following Addition being made to the 3d Article, which is the furtheſt we can go to ſatisfy Ragoba: And in this Place we judge it proper in Juſtice to him to declare, that we firmly believe the many Objections he has raiſed to the 3d Article do not proceed from any evil Deſigns againſt the Child, but occaſioned entirely by his Fears that we ſhould place the Child under the Charge of Moraba, or ſome of the great Officers, which would give them too great an Aſcendancy; for if any of them ſhould have the Child in their Hands they will in fact have the Government.

Further Addition to the 3d.

"But in caſe all theſe ſhould decline the Truſt, the Child ſhall then be diſpoſed of in ſuch Manner as may be deemed moſt adviſable for his Security, and for the Honour of the contracting Parties."

Mr. Moſtyn acquaints us that he delivered the Meſſage to Ragoba agreed to Yeſterday, as he ſtill hoped the Matter would be accommodated, which is approved.

In the Afternoon Mr. Sibbald, the Company's Interpreter, was ſent out to Ragoba with the propoſed Addition to the Article; which after much Argument he agreed to, and the neceſſary Alterations having been made to the Treaty, Ragoba put his Sicca to it this Night.

The Treaty with Ragoba as finally ſettled and executed is as follows.

A true Copy.

Edwd Ravenſcroft,
Secretary to the Select Committee.

N° 126.

Ragoba's Sicca.

Seal of the Company.

(Signed)
Edward Ravenſcroft,
Secretary to the Select Committee.

Articles of Agreement and Treaty between the Honourable William Hornby, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, and the Select Committee of Bombay, on the Part and Behalf of the Honourable United Engliſh Eaſt India Company, on the one Part, and Ragonath Row Badejerow Purdhan on the other Part, done and concluded at Bombay this Twenty-ſeventh Day of November in the Year of our Lord One thouſand Seven hundred and Seventy-eight, or the 3d Day of Jeclud Soohurſun Tiſſah Subein Miah wa Alluff, or Year 1179 Mahometan Style, or according to the Gentoo Æra, the 5th Day of Manguaſhier Sood, in the Year Vellamby 4,700.

Article 1ſt.

THE Treaty concluded by Colonel Upton with Siccaram Pundit and Ballajee Pundit, Miniſters, in Behalf of the Peſhwa and Maratta State, having been violated by thoſe Miniſters in almoſt every Article, the Governor and the Select Committee of Bombay, with the Sanction and Concurrence of the Governor General and Council, do hereby engage and agree, in Behalf of the aforeſaid Honourable Company, to aſſiſt Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan to the utmoſt of their Power, to put him in Poſſeſſion of Poona, and to place him in the Regency of the Maratta Empire, during the Minority of Mhadarow Narrain, the Infant Peſhwa; hereby declaring, that the true Intent and Meaning of this Treaty is not to alter the Form of Government, or to interrupt the Peace between the Honourable Company and the Maratta State; but only to remove the Adminiſtration out of the preſent improper Hands, and to place in the Regency the Perſon who has the juſteſt Title to that Office.

Article 2d.

Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan, on his Part, doth hereby engage and agree to accept the Office

Office of Regent, which he is to exerciſe with full Power during the Minority of the Peſhwa Mhadarow Narrain; in whoſe Name he further engages to continue the Sicca and conduct the Government: But Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan having expreſſed his Doubts of the Legitimacy of the Peſhwa Mhadarow Narrain, the Governor and Select Committee of Bombay do hereby engage on Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan his ſtrong Solicitation, to requeſt explicit Orders from the Company, whether, in caſe he ſhould prove to their Satisfaction that the Child is ſuppoſititious, they will place him in the Peſhwaſhip, which, on ſuch Proof, will be his unqueſtionable Right; and whether, in caſe the Child ſhould prove to be really the Son of Narrow Row, they will guarantee him an equal Diviſion of the Government and Country, on the Peſhwa's attaining to the Age of Seventeen, agreeable to what Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan ſays he is entitled to by his Birthright, according to the Gentoo Laws.

Article 3d.

The Governor and Select Committee of Bombay do hereby ſtipulate, and Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan for their Satisfaction, and that his upright Intentions may appear manifeſt, doth hereby engage and agree, that the Perſon of the Peſhwa Maderow Narrain ſhall be kept under the Charge and Cuſtody of ſuch Perſons as may be agreeable to the Select Committee, who wiſh that the Child may be committed to the Charge of Perwettybhoy, if ſhe will undertake the Charge; and in ſuch Caſe the Matchy of Poorunder where the Child is kept muſt be guarded with a Party of the Company's Troops, and Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan may keep a Chowkey on the Outſide of the Gate to ſee that no improper Perſons be admitted; but no Perſon whatever muſt have Admittance to the Child's Preſence without Permiſſion of Perwettybhoy. In caſe Perwettybhoy ſhould refuſe to undertake the Charge, the Child ſhall be put under the Care of any of his Relations on the Mother's Side; but ſhould all theſe decline the Truſt, the Child ſhall then be diſpoſed of in ſuch Manner as may be deemed moſt adviſable for his Security and for the Honour of the contracting Parties.

Article 4th.

Morabah Furneeſe, Butchebah Pronder, and Tookajee Holcar, having invited Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan to take upon himſelf the Government as Regent, and promiſed their Aſſiſtance, Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan doth hereby engage, upon Condition of their performing their Promiſes to his and the Select Committee's Satisfaction, and behaving like faithful obedient Servants, that he will ſhew Favour to them according to their Ranks and Services in ſettling the Offices of Government, and that their Perſons and Fortunes ſhall be unmoleſted.

Article 5th.

The Governor and Select Committee engage not to interfere in the Appointment or Nomination of Officers to the Forts, Army, Artillery, or Revenues, or in the Management of the Government, provided nothing be done in breach of any of the Articles of the preſent Treaty, Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan on his Part faithfully promiſing to obſerve the Terms mentioned in the Circular Letter, with reſpect to the perſonal Safety of thoſe whom he may be of Opinion have injured him.

Article 6th.

In Conſideration of the Aſſiſtance to be afforded by the Honourable Company for placing Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan in the Regency at Poona, Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan doth hereby engage to confirm and ratify the former Treaty concluded with him at Surat the 6th March 1775, and to cede and make over to the Honourable Company for ever the ſeveral Places and Territories granted by the ſaid Treaty, which were reſtored by the Treaty of Poorunder and Baſſein, and its Diſtricts, and the Iſland of Kennery, which were not put in Poſſeſſion of the Company. The ſeveral Acquiſitions which will devolve to the Honourable Company by virtue of this Article are as follows:

Baſſein Fort and Town, and the whole of its Diſtricts, and its Dependencies in their full Extent, according to the juſt and fixed Boundaries of that Province.

Jamboler and Orpad, in the ſame full and ample Manner as ceded by the Treaty of Surat.

The Iſland of Kennery.

An Aſſignment upon the Purgunnah of Occlaſeer for the Sum of 75,000 Rupees per Annum, as ſettled by the 8th Article of the Treaty of Surat.

There being alſo ſome ſmall Places known by the Name of the Outgoms always annexed, and actually making a Part of the Diſtricts of Salſette, which have been withheld from the Company by the Poona Miniſters, Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan doth hereby engage and agree that the ſaid Outgoms ſhall be ceded to the Honourable Company: But although the Governor and Select Committee have ever underſtood that Outgoms made a Part of the Diſtricts of Salſette, yet if the contrary ſhould be made plainly to appear they will give up the Claim.

Article 7th.

In Addition to the ſeveral Grants and Ceſſions herein ſpecified Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan doth

doth hereby engage and promiſe to cede and make over the Purgunnahs of Ahmood and Hanſood, which Grants are to be conſidered as an Inſtance of his Good-will and Affection to the Honourable Company. The Conditions upon which they were formerly granted not having as he declares been fulfilled.

Article 8th.

All the Places herein ceded to the Honourable Company are to be conſidered as their ſole Right and Property from the Day this Treaty is executed, without any Claim of Chout to the Maratta Government, or any other Demand whatever, and may be taken Poſſeſſion of by the Company's People whenever they may think proper; for which Purpoſe Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan doth herewith theſe Preſents deliver the neceſſary Orders to the Maratta Officers to ſurrender the ſaid Places. Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan doth further promiſe and engage, that immediately after his taking Charge of the Regency at Poona he will execute and deliver to the Government at Bombay regular Sunnuds under the Peſhwa's Seeca for the ſeveral Ceſſions granted to the Honourable Company by this Treaty.

Article 9th.

Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan engages to pay and make good the Charges and Expences of the Army and Stores with which he is now to be aſſiſted, which he hereby faithfully promiſes to make good in ready Money as ſoon as the Situation of his Affairs will poſſibly permit, and for the further Security of the Honourable Company he by theſe Preſents aſſigns over the Purgunnah of Verſal and the Remainder of Cecklaeer, the Revenues of which are to be collected by his Aumildars, and paid to the Honourable Company till the Amount due for the Expences of the Army is fully diſcharged; but in caſe of Failure wherein theſe Purgunnahs are to be put in Poſſeſſion of the Company, and the Revenues collected by them, till the ſaid Amount is fully diſcharged, when all Right and Title thereto on the Part of the Honourable Company will not interfere with the ſaid Purgunnahs.

Article 10th.

Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan engages to pay in full for the Body of Forces, conſiſting of 3000 Men, with which he is to be aſſiſted, the Sum of Two Lacks and Half of Rupees per Month; which the Governor and Select Committee of Bombay agree to accept with all further Account, in full of every Expence attending the Army, and is to commence from the Day the Forces leave Bombay.

Article 11th.

Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan faithfully promiſes and engages his preſent Debt to the Company, as ſoon as the State of his Finances will admit, agreeable to an Account which will be delivered to him.

Article 12th.

The Engliſh Forces are to continue with Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan until the Object of this Treaty is accompliſhed, which is, to place him in the Regency at Poona; and when that is effected, they are to be at Liberty to return to Bombay. The Company will be at all Times ready to aſſiſt Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan with Forces ſo far as may be conſiſtent with their other Engagements, or the Situation of their own Affairs will permit.

Article 13th.

The ſeveral Treaties and Agreements ſubſiſting between the Government of Bombay and the Maratta Government, are hereby ratified and confirmed, and ſhall be held and continued in as full Force as when they were firſt concluded, unleſs otherwiſe provided for in this Treaty.

Article 14th.

After the Eſtabliſhment of Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan in the Regency at Poona, there ſhall be a firm Peace between the Honourable Company and the Maratta Government. Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan engages never to aſſiſt the Enemies, or moleſt the Dominions of the Company in any Part of India; nor make War or commit Depredations in the Carnatic, or any other Part of the Dominions of their Ally the Nabob of Arcot. The Governor and Select Committee in like Manner engage in Behalf of the Honourable Company, not to aſſiſt the Enemies of Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan.

Article 15th.

Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan hereby engages and agrees that no European Settlements ſhall be allowed to be made on the Maritime Coaſts, or in any other Part of the Maratta Dominions, without the Conſent of the Company, or of their Repreſentative, being previouſly obtained; and that no Manner of Intercourſe or Connection ſhall be maintained between the Maratta Government and the French Nation, any Failure in which Stipulation ſhall be conſidered as a Breach of the Alliance between the Maratta Government and the Honourable Company.

Article 16th.

Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan doth hereby ſtipulate and engage that the Engliſh ſhall enjoy all their former Privileges and Freedom of Trade in the Maratta Dominions without Interruption, and he further engages to give all poſſible Encouragement to the Honourable Company's Trade, and to promote as far as he can, an excluſive Vend to the Engliſh for European Commodities in the

Maratta Dominions; but the Honourable Company will make no Settlement therein without Permiſſion from Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan.

Article 17th.

If any Article of the preſent Treaty ſhould interfere with any Engagement formed by the Governor General and Council, not yet known to the Governor and Select Committee of Bombay, ſuch Article may be liable to be altered or amended as may be neceſſary.

The foregoing Articles having been mutually agreed to by the Governor and Select Committee of Bombay, on the Part of the Honourable Company and Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan, the Contracting Parties have interchangeably affixed their Hands and Seals, and the Seal of the Honourable Company, in Bombay Caſtle, the Day and Year above-written.

William Hornby,
John Carnac,
Daniel Draper.

A true Copy.
Edwd Ravenſcroft,
Secretary to the Select Committee.

Ragoba's Sicca.

Company's Seal.

APPENDIX, N° 127.

Bombay, 7th December 1778.

The Diary and Proceedings of John Carnac, Eſquire, Colonel Charles Egerton, and Thomas Moſtyn, Eſquire, appointed by the Honourable the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay a Committee to accompany Ragonath Row to Poona.

Monday, 7th. A Packet from the Honourable the Select Committee directed to John Carnac, Eſquire, Colonel Charles Egerton, and Thomas Moſtyn, Eſquire, the Committee proceeding to Poona, having this Day been delivered to Meſſrs. Carnac and Moſtyn, they embarked on board the Yacht for Panwell, in order to meet Ragoba, and proceed with him from thence to join the Army under the Command of Colonel Egerton, now on its March towards Bhore Gautt.

Tueſday, 8th. Landed at Panwell at Six A. M. and hearing that Ragonath Row had paſſed that Place in his Way from Callian, determined alſo to proceed with the utmoſt Expedition: The Want of Bullocks, &c. for the Tranſport of our Baggage, prevents our ſetting out this Day; but expecting a Supply from the Commiſſary of the Army, hope to be able to proceed early To-morrow. Learnt that the Army was laſt Night at Chowke: The Inhabitants of Panwell had moſtly deſerted with their Effects.

Burwa, 9th December.

Wedneſday, 9th. Proceeded to Burwa; where finding that Ragonath Row was up in the Fort of Purbull, where he had been Three Days, ſent him a Meſſage acquainting him with our Arrival. He ſent Word in Return that he ſhould come down To-morrow Morning: That Amrut Row with all his Baggage, Guns, &c. were ordered to march from Panwell to Burwa, and when they arrived he would accompany us to the Army.

At Eight P. M. received a Letter from Amrut Row directed to Mr. Carnac, wherein he informed him, he had his Father's Orders to march and join him at Panwell, but the Want of Bullocks for the Tranſport of his Baggage had prevented him; that the Bullocks which he had hired had been taken for our Army; that he was endeavouring to procure others, and would march to join him To-morrow Morning. A Village near the Fort of Purbull deſerted.

Chintoo

Chintoo Wittol waited on us, and acquainted us in the Name of Ragonath Row, that he requeſted we would remain at Burwa this Day; that To-morrow he would certainly come down and ſettle with us about proceeding to the Army: Though our preſent Delays do not appear in the leaſt to retard the Marching of the Army, yet in purſuance to the Injunctions of the Honourable the Select Committee to expedite as much as poſſible our March to Poona, it was thought fit to avail ourſelves of this Opportunity to urge to Ragonath Row the Neceſſity of this Point; and therefore a Letter was written by Mr. Carnac in Return to this Meſſage, acquainting him, that from his Meſſage of Yeſterday it was hoped he would have come down this Morning, and therefore that he (Mr. Carnac) had propoſed to proceed to Chowke this Afternoon; but that in conſequence of his Meſſage by Chintoo Wittol, that he would certainly come down To-morrow, and deſiring he would wait till then, he had determined to remain where he was, but carefully cautioned he would have no Time, as his Affairs required the utmoſt Diſpatch; and any further Delays might be attended with Inconveniencies by giving his Enemies Time to ſtrengthen themſelves, that he therefore depended on having the Pleaſure of ſeeing him To-morrow Morning. Thurſday, 1

This Afternoon Amrut Row came from Panwell on a Viſit. The Receipt of his Letter was mentioned to him, and he was deſired to be expeditious in forwarding the Baggage of his Father Ragonath Row from Panwell. He ſaid it would be here To-morrow, and that he ſhould return inſtantly for that Purpoſe.

At about One, P. M. Ragonath Row came to us. After previous complimentary Diſcourſe, the Utility of his ſpeedy Appearance above the Gautts being repreſented to him, he acquieſced therein; and it was ſettled, that as ſoon as Amrut Row had joined him, he would proceed directly with us to Condolah, and there remain till the Army and heavy Baggage had come up, and act in purſuance to the Advice we might give him, relative to the remaining Point of reaching Poona. He deſired we would proceed on to Colipore, where he would follow us To-morrow, with Amrut Row, whom he expected at Burwa this Morning. In Conſequence of this, we determine to proceed on to Chowke, in our Way to Colipore. Arrived in the Evening, and found it almoſt deſerted. Many Complaints made of our Sepoys plundering. Friday, 11

At about Two, P. M. decamped from Chowke, where Ragonath Row was juſt arrived, and proceeded on to Colipore. At Half paſt Ten at Night, a Meſſage came from Ragonath Row, informing us that ſome of his Cannon and heavy Baggage not being come up, would prevent him from proceeding on to Colipore To-morrow. Colipore chiefly deſerted, and Complaints brought of our Sepoys plundering. Saturday, 12

Colipore, 12th December 1778.

This Morning Intelligence was received that Ragoo Ram of Vambory, Tapkeer, and Bandy, left Poona laſt Monday, with 1,500 Horſe and 3,000 Foot, in order to come down Dew Gautt, towards Tully Gonſalah, which is about Twelve Cos to the Southward of Bhore Gautt. As it ſeems probable that the Enemies of Ragonath Row, if they mean to act with Vigour, ſhould advance a Body of Men into the Conkan, as well to diſtreſs us for Proviſions on our March, by cutting off our Communication with Panwell, as to endeavour to ſeize the Perſon of Ragonath Row, whom they may have heard has not yet joined our Army, we think it requiſite to apprize him of this Intelligence, and deſire that he will immediately move forwards to the Army at Campoly. It is alſo neceſſary that Colonel Egerton ſhould be acquainted with the Receipt of this Intelligence, and to direct Lieutenant Harvey at Panwell to be on his Guard, and to have Boats ready for ſhipping off any Stores at a Moment's Warning. Sunday, 13

From John Carnac, Eſquire, to Ragonath Row.

I received your Meſſage laſt Night, acquainting me, that ſome of your heavy Cannon being ſtill behind, you ſhould not be able to leave Chowke this Day, and requeſted I would therefore remain at Colipore till you could join me.

It is neceſſary to inform you, that I this Morning received Intelligence, that Ragoo Ram of Vambory, with 1,500 Horſe and 3,000 Foot, together with Tapkeer and Bandy, left Poona on Monday laſt, with an Intention of coming down Dar Ghautt, into the Conkan. As your perſonal Safety is the firſt thing that muſt be attended to by your Friends, I muſt take the Liberty to adviſe you to ſecure it, by joining the Engliſh Army at Campoly as ſoon as poſſible. In full Confidence that you will follow my Advice, I ſhall immediately proceed towards that Place, and hope at fartheſt to have the Pleaſure of ſeeing you there To-morrow.

J. Carnac.

Colipore,
13th December 1778.

To

APPENDIX, N° 127.

To Colonel Charles Egerton, Commander in Chief of the Engliſh Forces, Campoly.

Sir,

Meſſrs. Carnac and Moſtyn have directed me to acquaint you, that Intelligence has been received this Morning, of the March of 1,500 Horſe and 3,000 Foot from Poona, on Monday laſt, with the Intention of coming down Dew Gautt, towards Gonſalah, about Twelve Coſs to the Southward of Bhore Gautt. If the Enemies of Ragonath Row mean to oppoſe him with Vigour, it ſeems probable that they ſhould advance a Body of Men into the Conkan; and therefore they have thought it requiſite to appriſe you of this Intelligence having been received, that you may take ſuch Meaſures in conſequence as may appear to you expedient.

They further direct me to inform you, that they mean to proceed from hence this Day, towards Campoly; and that they hope to be able to join you, with Ragonath Row, To-morrow or next Day at fartheſt.

I am
Your obedient humble Servant,
W. G. Farmer,
Secretary to the Council.

Colipore,
13th December 1778.

To Lieutenant Harvey, at Panwell.

Sir,

Meſſrs. Carnac and Moſtyn have directed me to acquaint you, that Intelligence has been received of the March of a Body of Troops from Poona towards the Conkan; and they have thought it to adviſe you of this, that you may be on your Guard, and have Boats in Readineſs to tranſport to Billiapore the Detachment with you, and ſuch Stores as may be at Panwell.

Should not the armed Boats which you mentioned to them when at Panwell, have yet been with you; you will pleaſe immediately to forward a Copy of this Letter to Bombay, as an Inſtance of the Expediency of its being ſent forthwith.

I am, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
W. G. Farmer,
Secretary to the Council.

Colipore,
13th December 1778.

Hull, 13th December 1778.

At Six in the Evening arrived at a Tope near the Village of Hull, about 3 Miles from Campoly. The Inhabitants of the Village all fled.

No Anſwer being yet received from Ragonath Row to the Letter addreſſed him by Mr. Carnac, and, contrary to our Hopes, no Appearance of his advancing this Evening nearer to our Army than Colonel Egerton, the following Reflections occur on the Retardment that ſeems ſtudiouſly to have been made of his Junction with our Forces. There is no Point which his Enemies have ſo much aimed at as to poſſeſs themſelves of his Perſon, for many evident Motives. In the Situation which Nanah Furneeze appears to be, to us it ſeems probable, that he would attempt this as his ſafeſt and moſt certain Reſource for retaining the Government, and for defeating the Hopes of the Party that may be formed in favour of Ragonath Row. It ſeems beyond a Doubt, that he receives certain Intelligence of every Thing that paſſes relative to Ragoba, and perhaps ſome of the Perſons in his Confidence may be engaged with Nanah Furneeze to embrace any Opportunity to ſeize and carry him off. It muſt be owned, that if the Conduct of Ragonath Row has been regulated by his treacherous Adviſers, it concurs ſtrongly with other Circumſtances, to warrant the Suppoſition that a Deſign is formed for ſeizing him. He was firſt led to Callian; from thence to the Fort of Purandar, where he remained 4 Days. When he came down, he promiſed to leave his heavy Baggage behind him, and proceed directly to our Army. This was almoſt a Propoſal of his own. The next Day he ſent Word, that one of his heavy Cannon being retarded, he ſhould remain at Chowke a Day longer; and now, notwithſtanding the Advice that was this Day ſent him, he ſtill remains at Chowke, which is at leaſt 11 Miles from our Army at Campoly, a Diſtance that renders it impracticable to afford a timely Aid, ſhould any Deſign be formed by his Enemies to poſſeſs themſelves of his Perſon. Theſe ſeveral Circumſtances concurring with the Advice received at Noon, of the March of a Body of Men on Monday laſt towards the Conkan, render it our Duty to take the beſt Means in our Power for effectually ſecuring the Perſon of Ragonath Row, whoſe Seizure would be equally ungraceful, diſtreſſing, and diſadvantageous to us, in the preſent State of our Connection, with him. This may be done, we apprehend, by advancing a further Guard inſtantly for his Protection, and acquainting him inſtantly with our Apprehenſions and our Intentions to advance this Guard. It was therefore reſolved to ſend Mr. W. G. Farmer directly to Colonel Egerton at Campoly, to ſtate our Ideas to him, and recommend it to him, to order a further Guard of not leſs than 500 Sepoys, to be immediately advanced to Chowke, for the Protection of Ragoba. A Meſſage was alſo ſent to Ragonath Row as above ſtated.

At 10 at Night Mr. Farmer returned from Campoly, and informed us, that having ſtated to Colonel Egerton fully with our Opinions, as above ſet forth, the Colonel returned for Anſwer, that

he Army was but juſt come to its Ground, and that it would be harraſſing the Men too much to arch them back 10 or 11 Miles to Chowke; that he apprehended the Guard now with Ragonath ow was ſufficient for the Security of his Perſon, and if it was not thought ſufficient, it would be uch eaſier for Meſſrs. Carnac and Moſtyn to advance the Guard with them, than to ſend one from he Army.

No Anſwer being yet received from Ragoba to the Letter ſent him Yeſterday, Mr. Sibbald was Monday, 14th. nt at about 9 A. M. to repreſent ſuitably to him our Apprehenſions of what might poſſibly be the eſigns of his Enemies; and to engage farther to him our Wiſhes, that he would effectually ſecure is Perſon by advancing nearer to our Army.

Received the following Letter at 9 A. M.:

To W. G. Farmer, Eſquire, Secretary to the Committee appointed to accompany Ragonath Row.

Sir,

I am directed by Colonel Egerton to acquaint you, that he has received your Letter of this ate, and that he is much obliged to Meſſrs. Carnac and Moſtyn for the Intelligence they have nt him. He thinks there is nothing to be apprehended from any Oppoſition the Enemies of agonath Row may attempt againſt him in the Conkan; but he will however take ſuch Meaſures n conſequence as to him ſhall appear neceſſary.

The Colonel is very glad to hear he may ſo ſhortly expect the Pleaſure of ſeeing Ragobah and Meſſrs. Carnac and Moſtyn, at Campoly.

I am, Sir,
Your obedient humble Servant,
M. Murray,
Secretary to Colonel Egerton,
Commander in Chief.

Campoly,
13th December 1778.

At about 10 A. M. an Anſwer was received from Ragonath Row to the Letter written him Yeſterday, of which the following is a Tranſlate:

To John Carnac, Eſquire.

After Compliments:

You ſent me a Letter, in which you mention News being received of the March of the Horſe, &c. of the Bharobies to the Conkan, and recommend me to move on to Campoly. I alſo got Intelligence that their Horſe was come to the Gautt; but now they are gone back: Should they perhance come down, I will ſeize them; there is nothing to fear. I have great Trouble to get Bullocks and People for my Cannon and Baggage; but I will uſe my beſt Endeavours, and To-morrow or Tueſday will arrive at Campoly: You will pleaſe to ſend me 300 Men. Why ſhould I write more?

13th December.

At about Six in the Evening Mr. Sibbald returned from Ragonath Row, and brought an Anſwer in Subſtance the ſame as the foregoing Letter. He further expreſſed himſelf much obliged for the Attention ſhewn to his Safety; and though, by the Detachment with him and his own Guards, he apprehended no Danger, yet if convenient he would farther wiſh to have the Force ſent him propoſed by Mr. Carnac. Mr. Sibbald had perſuaded him to advance beyond Colipore; as he is now within about a Mile from hence, it does not appear requiſite to advance any further Guard for his Protection.

At about Eight this Evening the following Letters were received, under Cover, to Mr. Wm Lewis, from the Camp at Campoly:

To William Lewis, Eſquire, at Poona.

Sir,

This is purpoſely to encloſe you Duplicate of a Letter to the Honourable Select Committee, together with one wrote yourſelf on the 31ſt ultimo.

Since my laſt, I have left Ballagee's Territories, and am arrived within Four Coſs of Seronge, which I leave upon the Right, and proceed towards Bhopall.

I have met with no material Interruption ſince my laſt Letter: Upon the Day of quitting Ballagee's Territories, his Troops made their Appearance, and made repeated Attempts to carry off our Baggage, &c. in all which they were however baffled; for knowing the deceitful Character of the Maratta, I had, notwithſtanding his peaceful and amicable Profeſſions, obſerved the moſt particular Precautions againſt any treacherous Deſigns he might intend to me.

The Nature of the Service I am engaged in requiring me to avoid all unneceſſary Delays, I am proceeding towards Narbuddah, and ſhall at preſent defer giving the Chaſtiſement due to Ballagee's Conduct.

I am, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
Thomas Goddard.

Camp, 4 Coſs from Seronge,
12th November 1778.

To Captain James Stewart.

Honoured Sir,

A Letter came from Goa, dated the 3d of October, written by William Bolts, and directed to Monſieur St. Lubin: He mentioned in his Letter, he ſent what News he could pick up, viz. The French have acknowledged the avowed Independency of the Americans, but Spain will not join them. Pruſſia has declared War with Auſtria for their Pretenſions in Bavaria; the Ottoman Porte has declared War with Ruſſia: Some ſay 16, others 22, Ships of War have ſailed from Toulon, which ſome ſay are deſtined for America, others ſay for India; that Hyder Ally has given him a Factory at Billeapatam, one at Mangalore, and one at Canvaar, in the Neighbourhood of Goa; the Nabob of Scindy has given him a Factory at Tattah and Shabunda; he deſires St. Lubin to acquaint Nana Furneeze that he was very willing to ſerve Nanah if he pleaſes, in making an Union between the Poona Durbar and Hyder Ally; and promiſes the utmoſt Secrecy, Fidelity, and Obedience to Nanah's Command and Inſtructions; he alſo mentions, that if Nanah does not employ him in this Affair, he will ſhortly return to Bombay. The Eaſt India Company ſend out 21 Ships under Convoy this Year, and Two Regiments of Infantry are deſtined for Bombay: He deſires St. Lubin to ſend him Nanah's Determination concerning the Affair of Gogah, but he is not anxious about it, becauſe Scindy and Dumaon will be ſufficient for him in this Part of India. Thomas Barnes explained this Letter to the Durbar, and gave me this Extract.

Dadajee Adoujee.

Addreſſed the Honourable the Select Committee as follows:

To the Honourable William Hornby, Eſquire, Preſident, &c. Select Committee, Bombay.

Gentlemen,

The Occaſion of the preſent Diſpatch is to forward you a Letter from Colonel Goddard, ſent under Cover to the Reſident at Poona; as a Letter he writes at the ſame Time to Mr. Lewis informs us generally of the Contents of his Diſpatch to you, and as we have not your expreſs Permiſſion to open Letters directed to you, we have forborn to take that Liberty at preſent, but beg Leave to ſubmit to you the Propriety of having this Permiſſion in future, as a ſpeedy Knowledge of the Contents of Advices both from the Governor General and Council, and from Colonel Goddard, may hereafter be very important to us in our Negociations.

We have alſo thought fit to forward to you without Loſs of Time, Copy of a Lettter from Dadajee Adowjee at Poona to Captain Stewart; becauſe as it ſeems this Mr. Wm Bolts means ſhortly to proceed to Bombay, you will be able to judge of the Danger of admitting to an Engliſh Port a Man who under neutral Colours appears to be immediately connected with our moſt dangerous Enemies, both in Europe and this Country: The Mode in which this Intelligence was obtained by Dadajee Adowjee appears to be through Thomas Barnes, an Engliſhman, who has been long in the Service of the Poona Government, and is uſually employed by them to explain intercepted Letters written by Europeans.

Although we arrived at Panwell ſo long ago as the 8th Inſtant, yet owing to the various Delays of Ragonath Row, whom we wiſhed to keep as near to us as poſſible, we have not yet joined Colonel Egerton: As theſe Delays have in no Shape we believe retarded the March of the Army, they cannot have had any material Conſequence; but as the Appearance of Ragonath Row above the Gautts muſt tend to encourage his Partizans, and to expedite the Accompliſhment of what the Committee have in charge, by inducing thoſe Partizans either to join him or to act openly and deciſively in his Favour, we have never ceaſed to urge to him the Propriety of proceeding expeditiouſly; and having once brought him to conſent to leave his Cannon and heavy Baggage to come on at Leiſure, we hope in a Day or Two to be able to adviſe you of his being at Condolah.

The 13th Inſtant we received Intelligence of the March of 1500 Horſe and 3000 Foot from Poona towards the Conkan. If the Enemies of Ragonath Row mean to act vigouroufly it ſeemed to us they would endeavour to intercept our Communication with Bombay, as well in the Hope of diſtreſſing us by cutting off our Supplies of Proviſions and Stores, as perhaps with a View to attempt ſomething againſt the Perſon of Ragonath Row, whom they muſt have known went firſt to Callian and afterwards up to the Fort of Purbule; we therefore adviſed Colonel Egerton of the Receipt of this Intelligence, and have perſuaded Ragonath Row to advance nearer to our Army: There has yet been no

Advice

Advice of theſe Troops having entered the Conkan; on the contrary, it appears to us by a Letter Yeſterday from Ragonath Row, that they had advanced to the Gautt, but retired again.

Dadajee Adowjee alſo writes to Mr. Lewis under the 11th Inſtant, that Sacaram and Nanah have diſpatched one Amrut Row to Sattarah, with Orders to proclaim a new Rajah, and to procure from him a Succa to Mhadoo Row Narrain. Tueſday, 15th

We are with Reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
Jn° Carnac,
Tho' Moſtyn.

Hull, One Coſs from Campoly,
15th December 1778.

P. S. We are juſt adviſed that Two 6 Pounders were Yeſterday got up the Gautts by Hand, and are now with the Detachment at Condolah under Captain Stewart.

Campoly, 15th December 1778.

At Six in the Evening arrived at the Camp at Campoly: The Secretary to the Committee ſent the following Summons to Colonel Egerton and Mr. Moſtyn:

To Colonel Charles Egerton, and Thomas Moſtyn, Eſquire.

Gentlemen,

I am directed by Mr. Carnac to requeſt you will pleaſe to meet him at his Tent To-morrow at Ten o'Clock, in order to open and peruſe a Packet from the Honourable the Select Committee of Bombay, addreſſed to John Carnac, Eſquire, Colonel Charles Egerton, and Thomas Moſtyn, Eſquire, the Committee proceeding to Poona.

I am, with Reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
W. G. Farmer,
Secretary to the Committee.

Camp at Campoly,
15th December 1778.

Received a Letter from Dadajee Adowjee at Poona to Captain Stewart, dated the 14th Inſtant, forwarding one from the Nabob of Tall Bopaal to Mr. Lewis, which he could not read; but that he had learned that Colonel Goddard was arrived at Tall Bopaal, and had ſtaid there Eight Days; that the 13th Inſtant a new Rajah was proclaimed at Sattarah, but that the Sicca was not yet arrived; that ſome Perſon had deſired him to acquaint Mr. Lewis that Ragojee Angria, who was a Relation of Scindia's and entirely devoted to the Miniſters, intended to offer Ragoba 1000 Horſe for his Service, with a View to betray him.

The Letter from the Nabob of Tall Bopaal mentioned the Arrival of the Bengal Army in the Diſtrict of Bopaal, and that agreeable to what had been written him, he (the Nabob) ſhould furniſh the Colonel with Grain, and afford him any other friendly Aid in his Power.

In conſequence of the Contents of the Letter received Yeſterday from Dadajee Adowjee, Mr. Carnac at Nine A. M. ſent Mr. Sibbald to Ragoba, to adviſe him of the Intelligence received relative to the treacherous Deſigns of Angria; to caution him againſt thoſe Deſigns; and to adviſe him to advance nearer to our Army. Wedneſday, 16th

At a Meeting of the Committee; PRESENT,

John Carnac, Eſquire,
Colonel Charles Egerton.
Mr. Moſtyn indiſpoſed.

Opened a Packet from the Honourable the Select Committee at Bombay, directed to John Carnac, Eſquire, Colonel Charles Egerton, and Thomas Moſtyn, Eſquire, the Committee proceeding to Poona, containing the following Papers:

Inſtructions, dated 5th December 1778.
Commiſſion to the Committee.
Gentoo Copies of Ragonath Row's Circular Letter.
Copy of the Tranſlation of D°.
D° of the Treaty concluded between the Select Committee and Ragonath Row.
D° of the Cypher framed for Colonel Leſlie.
D° of the Treaty of Surat.

Peruſed

Peruſed the Commiſſion and Inſtructions directed to the Committee.

Reſolved, That the Copy of the Commiſſion be ſent to the Commander in Chief of the Army, who is directed to publiſh it in General Orders.

Colonel Egerton requeſting it, the Secretary is alſo directed to furniſh him with a Copy of the Inſtructions to the Committee.

Mr. Moſtyn being indiſpoſed, and no further particular Buſineſs offering;

Adjourned.

John Carnac,
Ch. Egerton

We the Preſident and Select Committee for all Political, Military, and Naval Affairs of the Honourable United Company of Merchants of England trading to the Eaſt Indies, on the Coaſts of India, Perſia, and Arabia, and of His Majeſty's Caſtle and Iſland of Bombay;

To all to whom theſe Preſents ſhall come, Greeting.

By virtue of a Power given us by the Honourable Court of Directors of the ſaid United Company, and derived unto them from the Authority of our Sovereign Lord George the Third, and His Royal Predeceſſors, do nominate and appoint you, John Carnac, Eſquire, Colonel Charles Egerton, and Thomas Moſtyn, Eſquire, a Committee for concerting and conducting all the neceſſary Operations, Political and Military, for conducting Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan to Poona, and for placing him in the Regency of the Maratta Government; hereby giving you full Power to execute and perform all Matters and Things in any way appertaining or conducive to the due Diſcharge of the Truſt repoſed in you, agreeable to the Inſtructions herewith delivered to you. And we hereby require and order all Factors, Officers, Servants, or others, in the Service of the Honourable Company, that may be employed on this Service, to conform, ſubmit, and pay due Obedience to you, John Carnac, Eſquire, Colonel Charles Egerton, and Thomas Moſtyn, Eſquire; you following all ſuch Directions as ſhall be given you by us, or by the Preſident and Select Committee for the Time being, purſuant to the Truſt hereby repoſed in you. Sealed with the Seal of the aforeſaid Honourable Company, and given under our Hands in Bombay Caſtle, this Fifth Day of December, in the Nineteenth Year of the Reign of our Sovereign Lord King George the Third, and in the Year of our Lord One thouſand Seven hundred and Seventy-eight.

L. S.

Edwd Ravenſcroft,
Secretary to the
Select Committee.

Wm Hornby,
Jn° Carnac,
D. Draper.

To John Carnac, Eſquire, Colonel Charles Egerton, and Thomas Moſtyn, Eſquire.

Gentlemen,

You are well informed of the ſeveral Steps that have led to the Concluſion of a new Treaty with Ragonath Row, by which the Honourable Company are bound to aſſiſt him with a Body of Forces, to conduct him to Poona, and to place him in the Regency of the Maratta Empire.

As the Welfare, and we may almoſt ſay the Exiſtence, of this Preſidency, will depend on the Succeſs of the Meaſure we have embarked in, we have thought it proper to commit to you the Execution of our Plan; and you are appointed a Committee, and by the accompanying Commiſſion veſted with the neceſſary Powers to concert and conduct all Political and Military Operations in the Courſe of this Expedition; relying upon your Zeal, Addreſs, and Judgment, to bring the Buſineſs to a ſpeedy and happy Concluſion.

Upon Receipt hereof Meſſrs. Carnac and Moſtyn are to proceed with all convenient Expedition to Panwell, where the Army intended for this Service is now encamped, under the Command of Colonel Egerton. Ragobah proceeds by the Way of Tannah; and as ſoon as he has joined the Army, we direct that you urge him to march without Loſs of Time to Poona, a Meaſure which we truſt will be effected with little Difficulty or Oppoſition, as the Paſſage of the Ghauts is already ſecured by Captain Stewart's Diviſion; and we have ſtrong Reaſons to believe that a very general Diſpoſition prevails amongſt the Maratta Officers and People in favour of Ragobah and his Pretenſions.

You will not fail ſtrongly to inculcate to Ragobah the Neceſſity of his making himſelf Maſter of Poona without a Moment's Loſs of Time, and take the utmoſt Care to keep him ſteady to this Point, which ought to be and muſt be his firſt Object; for according to the Treaty we are only bound to put him in Poſſeſſion of Poona, and to place him in the Regency of the Maratta Empire; and it is equally for his Intereſt and the Company's, that it ſhould be accompliſhed in the moſt expeditious Manner poſſible.

We

APPENDIX, N° 127.

We ſhall deliver to you herewith a Number of circular Letters under Ragobah's Sicca and the Company's Seal, and a Tranſlation thereof for your Notice: Theſe are to be ſent to the principal Officers, and diſperſed over the Country, that our Intentions in bringing over Ragobah may be made known to all Ranks of People; and if after this Declaration your March ſhould be oppoſed by the Poona Miniſters, or their Adherents, we hereby authorize you to repel Force by Force, and to conduct Ragobah to Poona againſt all Oppoſition.

If Overtures ſhould be made on the March to Poona by any of the Maratta Chiefs or Miniſters, you will aſſiſt Ragobah with your beſt Advice, and promote to the utmoſt of your Power any Accommodation that you may judge favourable to our Views, which are to connect Ragobah with Men of Influence and Eſtimation in their own Country, and well inclined to the Honourable Company; and in this Light we muſt regard Moraba Furneeſe, Tookajee Holcar, and Butcheba Pronder, in the foremoſt Rank.

We flatter ourſelves that from the Experience Ragobah has had of our Attachment, and his Confidence in your Judgment and Regard to his Intereſt, that he will pay great Attention to your Advice upon all Occaſions; and the better to ſecure your Influence, we recommend to you to cultivate his good Opinion by every conſiſtent Method: We are likewiſe very earneſt in our Injunctions, that you uſe every Means in your Power to conciliate the Minds of the People in general to the Engliſh, and to the Undertaking we are engaged in; for which Purpoſe no Violence muſt be offered to the Perſons or Property of thoſe who remain quiet in their Habitations, and every Act that can give Offence to the religious Scruples of the Gentoos muſt be carefully avoided.

After Ragoba is put in Poſſeſſion of Poona, you are to ſee him placed in the Regency, and the Sicca put into his Hands, with all the uſual Forms and Ceremonies, and upon the Terms ſtipulated in the 2d Article, from which we cannot admit the ſmalleſt Deviation: Our Part of the Treaty will then be performed; but here will begin a Taſk, in which the utmoſt Delicacy and Judgment will be neceſſary on your Parts, to ſecure on a firm and permanent Footing the Advantages by which we were attracted to this Expedition, and on which the Safety of this Preſidency will ſo much depend; namely, the entire Subverſion of the Party in the French Intereſt, and filling the Offices of Truſt under the Poona Government with Perſons well diſpoſed towards the Honourable Company.

By the Copy of our Treaty with Ragoba, now put into your Hands, you will ſee the Limitations we are under with regard to our Interference, in the Appointment or Nomination of the Officers of Government. You are well acquainted how much Ragoba's Jealouſy was excited by our Stipulations in favour of Morabah Furneeze, Butcheba Pronder, and Tookajee Holcar, which you will ſee duly performed; and for the reſt, it muſt be your Rule, by a Line of judicious Conduct, to make the Perſons you approve of, the Men of Ragobah's own Choice. We could wiſh, and we imagine, Morabah will expect to be Ragobah's Dewan, though it is not improbable that Ragobah may for ſome Time at leaſt conduct the executive Part of Government himſelf, but this is entering upon a Matter ſo much depending upon future Circumſtances, that we ſhall wave ſaying any Thing further at preſent, as we ſhall have ſufficient Time to give you more expliciť Inſtructions when we are better informed.

It will be particularly requiſite that Ragobah ſhould, as ſoon as poſſible, place the Forts in the Conkan, and upon the Sea Coaſt, under the Charge of Perſons we can depend upon for Obedience to his Orders, and that will oppoſe the Admiſſion of the French into any Part of the Maratta Dominions; on which Head you muſt deſire Ragobah to give them immediate and particular Inſtructions, according to the Terms of the Treaty.

The perſonal Safety of the young Peſhwa is a Point wherein our own Reputation and the Honour of the Nation are ſo deeply concerned, that we give it you in Charge, with the moſt implicit Confidence of having our Intentions faithfully executed, and that every Precaution be taken your Prudence can ſuggeſt, or the Treaty will warrant, to prevent any Poſſibility of Injury happening to him.

The other Parts of the Treaty that will reſt with you to ſee executed, are to receive from Ragobah the Monthly Stipend for the Payment of the Forces, and the Sunnuds under the Peſhwa's Seal, for the ſeveral Places ceded to the Honourable Company, which we ſhall rely on your Care to ſee punctually performed as ſoon as Ragobah's Circumſtances will permit.

As it is highly proper that this Garriſon, conſidering the State of Affairs with France, ſhould be in a reſpectable Situation, we recommend it to you, and hereby give you a diſcretional Power, to return to Bombay ſuch Part of the Forces as you may think can be ſpared, whenever you may judge the Objects of this Expedition are brought to ſuch a Point as to admit of the Force being leſſened with Propriety.

We recommend and enjoin as a Point very eſſential to the Succeſs of this Expedition, that the utmoſt Harmony and good Underſtanding be obſerved among yourſelves; and in order to avoid all Miſtakes or Miſconceptions, we think it proper to deſcribe the following Line between the Powers of the Committee and the Commanding Officer, which muſt be ſtrictly obſerved by both.

All political Intercourſe with Ragobah muſt be confined entirely to the Committee, who are to have the ſole Management of all Matters of Negociation.

The Execution of the general Plan of the Expedition, being as before mentioned entruſted to the Committee, it is our Intention and Order that the Deciſion and Determination on Points that may appear to them conducive to the Accompliſhment thereof, ſhall reſt ſolely with the Committee, and the Commanding Officer hereby enjoined punctually to comply with all Requiſitions made to him in Writing by the Committee on all ſuch Points.

On the other Hand, the Committee is hereby expreſsly prohibited from interfering in the Detail of the Duty of the Army, or from preſcribing to the Commanding Officer, in reſpect to the Mode of March or Encampment, or the Method of carrying any Military Meaſure into Execution; all of which are the diſtinct Province of the Commanding Officer.

We have given Orders to the Commanding Officer agreeable to the above, and directed him to appoint a Guard, and treat the Committee with all proper Reſpect.

The Correſpondence with this Board muſt be conducted ſolely by the Committee, who muſt likewiſe adviſe the Governor General and Council of all material Tranſactions. Mr. Lewis left the Company's Cypher buried at Poona, but we now furniſh you with a Copy of one we framed in our Correſpondence with the late Colonel Leſlie, which will ſerve your Purpoſe till your Arrival at Poona.

A regular Diary muſt be kept of all your Proceedings and the Motions of the Army, in which every Circumſtance of Moment muſt be punctually recorded, and Two Copies thereof delivered to us on your Return.

Your Expences will be defrayed by the Honourable Company, and we permit you to keep a Table at their Charge ſuitable to your Station.

The Accounts of your Paymaſter and Commiſſary of the Army muſt be ſubject to your Superintendance and Controul, and you will take Care they are forwarded to the Preſidency, at ſtated Times as you may judge reaſonable. The Paymaſter has been furniſhed with a Lack and a Half of Rupees; and ſhould that Sum be expended before you can obtain a Supply of Money from Ragobah, we have given Authority to thoſe Officers to paſs their neceſſary Drafts upon us, ſubject to your Approbation.

Mr. Wm Gamul Farmer is appointed your Secretary and Maratta Tranſlator, for both which Offices he is to be paid an Allowance of Three hundred Rupees per Month. Mr. James Rivett is ordered to the Aſſiſtance of Mr. Farmer, in his Buſineſs of Secretary, and is likewiſe to act as Chaplain to the Army.

Mr. James Sibbald, who is under Order for an Embaſſy to Hyder Ally, is to act as your Interpreter, and is to be diſpatched to Hyder's Court from Poona, whither we ſhall ſend his Inſtructions in due Time.

We wiſh you all poſſible Succeſs and Honour in the Diſcharge of your important Commiſſion, and are,

Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servants,
Wm Hornby,
Jn° Carnac,
D. Draper.

Bombay Caſtle,
5th December 1778.

Circular Letter from Ragonath Row Budjerow Punt Purdhan.

To all the Mootſeddees, Sirdars, Jaghiredaars, and Subjects of the Maratta State.

You will no doubt hear with Pleaſure, that the Government of Bombay, with the Sanction and Concurrence of the Governor General and Council of Calcutta, have now determined to ſupport my Cauſe with Vigour; and, with the Aſſiſtance of the Almighty, to place me in the Regency of the Maratta Empire, which you all know is my juſt Right. The Governor and Select Committee have been moved to this Reſolution in my Favour by the unjuſt Conduct of the preſent Adminiſtration at Poona, who have violated, in almoſt every Article, the Treaty concluded with the Honourable Company in March 1776; and by their Deſire to reſtore, through my Hand, Peace and good Order to the Maratta Empire, which has been ſo long involved in Trouble and Confuſion, and experienced ſo many Calamities by Miſmanagement and Diſcord.

That no Officer or Subject of the Maratta State may be deterred from following the Dictates of his Duty, by any Suſpicions of the Rectitude of my Intentions, I have in the moſt ſolemn Manner granted this Circular Letter; and declare thus in the Face of the World, that my ſole View is to remove the Government out of the preſent improper Hands, and to take upon myſelf the full Power of Regent, during the Minority of the young Peſhwa Madoo Row Narrain, without doing Injury to any one who does not oppoſe my juſt Deſigns, or to endeavour to abſcond; and I ſhall bury in Oblivion all paſt Injuries from every Perſon whatever, unleſs provoked by any new Acts of Enmity after this Notice.

I now call upon and require you immediately to join my Forces and the Engliſh Army who are with me, and to attend me to Poona; where I hope, by the Divine Bleſſing, to ſettle the Government upon a firm and ſolid Footing, and to reſtore the Maratta Empire to its former Happineſs and Splendour.

In further Confirmation of what is herein contained, the Honourable Governor and Select Committee of Bombay have cauſed the Seal of the Company to be affixed.

A true Copy.
Edwd Ravenſcroft,
Secretary to the Select Committee.

Purſuant

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Purſuant to the Reſolutions of the Committee this Day, the Secretary wrote the following Letter to the Commander in Chief of the Army.

To Colonel Charles Egerton, Commander in Chief of the Engliſh Forces at Campoly.

Sir,

I am directed by the Committee appointed to proceed with Ragonath Row to Poona, to encloſe you a Copy of the Commiſſion from the Honourable the Select Committee at Bombay, veſting them with the neceſſary Powers to concert and conduct all political and military Operations in the Courſe of the preſent Expedition; and to require you to publiſh the ſaid Commiſſion in the General Orders to the Army under your Command.

I am, with Reſpect,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
W. G. Farmer,
Secretary to the Committee.

Campoly,
December 16th 1778.

APPENDIX, N° 128.

Extract of Secret Letter from Bombay to the Court of Directors, dated 29th December 1778.

OUR Addreſs of the 31ſt of July will have informed you how Matters then ſtood with the Poona Government. In purſuance of the Reſolutions then communicated, we, on the 12th of October, on the Motion of Mr. Carnac, gave Orders for proceeding forthwith in the Execution of our Plan for reſtoring Ragobah. The Limits of an overland Addreſs will not permit us to enter into a Detail of the ſeveral Circumſtances of our Preparations and Negociations, which will be communicated by the firſt Sea Conveyance; it will be ſufficient to acquaint you, that on the 25th ultimo we concluded a Treaty with Ragobah, by which the Honourable Company were bound to aſſiſt him with a Body of 4000 Men, to conduct him to Poona, and to place him in the Regency of the Maratta Government, during the Minority of the Infant Peſhwa.

We have the Honour to encloſe a Copy of the Treaty, and of the Manifeſto publiſhed when our Forces landed on the Continent, which we hope will be approved by you; and we beg Leave moſt heartily to congratulate you on the Proſpect of retrieving thoſe valuable Acquiſitions loſt by the Treaty of Poorunder, and of reſtoring ſuch a Government at Poona as will greatly contribute to the general Security of your Poſſeſſions in India.

According to the Plan we had concerted, a Detachment of Grenadier Sepoys was ſent off the 22d of laſt Month, under the Command of Captain Stewart, who fortunately ſecured the Paſſage of the Ghauts without Oppoſition on the 25th, and took Poſt there; the Remainder of the Forces left Bombay the 23d, and took Poſſeſſion of the Fort of Bellapore, which guards the Entrance of Panwell River, where they were joined by Colonel Egerton, who took on him the Chief Command of the Army.

The Force detached on this Service conſiſts of 172 Artillery, 549 European Infantry, and 2689 Sepoys, all Officers included, together with 800 Artillery Lascars; which we truſt, all Circumſtances conſidered, will be able to bring the Buſineſs to a happy Concluſion.

By our lateſt Intelligence from the Army, we find them, on the 26th of this Month, at Captain Stewart's Poſt at Condiſh, on the Summit of the Gauts. They have hitherto met with no Oppoſition; but we are adviſed that the Miniſters are aſſembling an Army to oppoſe their March, when they make their Appearance about the Gauts.

Ragobah left Bombay a few Days after our Forces, and is now with them, and a ſmall Body of his own Troops, at Condiſh. We hear he is already joined by a Party of Horſe; and we flatter ourſelves, that when he is a little farther advanced, a Number of the principal Maratta Officers will declare in his Favour.

The Management of the Expedition, and the Settlement of the Government at Poona, is entruſted to a Committee, conſiſting of Meſſrs. Carnac, Egerton, and Moſtyn, who are entruſted to conduct Ragobah to Poona with all poſſible Expedition, and to place him in the Regency, on the Terms mentioned in the Treaty. They are then inſtructed to uſe their utmoſt Judgment and Addreſs in ſettling the Government upon a firm and permanent Footing, and effecting the Subverſion of the Party in the French Intereſt, and filling the Offices of Truſt with Perſons well diſpoſed towards the Honourable Company.

We have the moſt ſanguine Hopes of a happy Iſſue to this Undertaking, as we have ſtrong Reaſons to believe a very general Diſpoſition prevails amongſt the Maratta Officers and People in Favour

of

of Ragobah, and of his Pretenſions; and the Fall of Pondicherry muſt damp the Expectations of Nannah Furneeſe, of Aſſiſtance from the French. The Approach of the Bengal Detachment will alſo greatly diſtract the Efforts of that Party, in the ſame Degree that it will give Encouragement to the Friends of Ragobah; and if the Enterprize ſhould prove more difficult than we expected, we ſhall be able, with their Aſſiſtance, to overcome all Oppoſition.

APPENDIX, N° 129.

Extract of Bombay Select Conſultations, September 5th 1778.

SIGNED the following Letter to Sir Edward Vernon.

To Sir Edward Vernon, Knight, Commodore, and Commander in Chief of His Majeſty's Ships in the Eaſt Indies.

Sir,

We were extremely concerned to obſerve by your Letter of the 15th July, that the Neceſſity did not ſtrike you ſo forcibly as it did us, of the Squadron's being removed immediately to this Place, which, on the Suppoſition of a War with the French Nation, is moſt likely to be the firſt Object of their Operations in India.

As you have taken the Letter from the Preſidency at Madras, as the Ground for your Determination of continuing on the Coaſt of Coromandel, we think it material to ſtate to you in Reply our Reaſons for being of Opinion that the Squadron could render more important Service to the Nation, and to the Company, by making Bombay its preſent Station; and if they appear to you of ſufficient Weight to occaſion an Alteration in your Sentiments, we cannot doubt but you will ſtill comply with our former Requeſt.

The moſt favourable and probable Opportunity for the French to attack Bombay, will be undoubtedly early in the Commencement of a War, before the Arrival of a Britiſh Fleet in India ſufficiently powerful to contend with them at Sea, and whilſt we have no other Reſources for Defence than our own Garriſon; ſuch is exactly our preſent Situation, if the War is commenced, with this further diſadvantageous Circumſtance, that our Force conſiſts almoſt wholly of Sepoys, though we have drained every European we poſſibly could from our ſubordinate Settlements.

Thus circumſtanced, if the French proceed upon a Plan of Surprize, and proportion their Armament to our Garriſon, the Strength of which muſt be pretty well known to them, the Preſence of His Majeſty's Squadron under your Command, even in its preſent Force, might be the Means of preventing an Attack, but it cannot poſſibly be denied that it would in any Caſe be greatly inſtrumental in repelling it; and the Number of Men which could be landed from the Ships would be of the moſt important Service in the Defence of our Works, and prove the Preſervation of the Place, eſpecially when it is conſidered, as before obſerved, that our Force in Europeans is very ſmall.

The Governor and Council at Madras are pleaſed to allow, if we rightly comprehend their Meaning, that it is probable the French will early form a Deſign upon Bombay, before they proceed to what is conceived to be their main Object in caſe of War, namely, a powerful Attack upon the Company's Poſſeſſions at Madras or Bengal, which they add would be rendered much more difficult and hazardous by proceeding with reſpect to Bombay upon any other Plan; it therefore certainly follows, that the Safety of this Place, which is of ſo much Conſequence in itſelf, and ſo eſſential to the Security of the Company's other valuable Poſſeſſions, ſhould be the Firſt Object of Attention, in Preference we think to the Annoyance of the Enemy's Poſſeſſions.

We will allow the Protection your Squadron will afford to the Company's Shipping on the Coaſt, to be an Argument of much Weight in Support of your Reſolution, but ſtill we hope you will think the Safety of this Settlement a ſuperior Conſideration.

We hope we ſhall ſtand excuſed for expreſſing our Apprehenſions for the Safety of His Majeſty's Squadron if you perſiſt in your preſent Reſolution; for as we are informed by the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, that the Three Ships of the Line for Madras would not fail before the Beginning of Auguſt, we think it very poſſible, before they can arrive in India, the French may obtain ſo decided a Superiority by Sea as to make your Continuance on the Coaſt extremely hazardous, and Bombay the more eligible Situation, where we expect a Ship of 64 Guns, which we are informed by the ſame Authority was to convoy the Company's Shipping to this Preſidency.

We have the Honour to encloſe Two Packets, received from England by the Way of Buſſora on the 3d of this Month; and are, with Reſpect,

Sir,

Your moſt obedient Servants,

William Hornby, &c.

Select Committee.

Bombay Caſtle,
8th September 1778.

APPENDIX, N° 130.

Campoly, 16th December 1778. Wednesday, 16th.

THIS Day received the following Letter from Colonel Goddard, directed to Mr. Lewis at Poona, and forwarded from thence by Dadajee Advioſſee:

William Lewis, Eſquire.

Since my laſt of the 12th Inſtant, from within Four Coſs of Seronge, I have been favoured with both yours of the 9th October and 1ſt November, written in Cypher. As the Figures do not in any reſpect correſpond with thoſe of the Cypher tranſmitted me by the Select Committee, I have not been able to diſcover the Meaning of your Letters; I muſt wait therefore for a Key to them, till I receive the Cypher compoſed by the Honourable the Supreme Board, which I expect in a few Days, and which I am led to believe will anſwer to the Figure of your Letters.

I have the Pleaſure to encloſe you a Letter for the Honourable Select Committee, informing them of my Arrival at Bhopal, from which Place I propoſe marching To-morrow Morning towards the Nerbuddah, and croſſing near the Gauts of Huſſengabad, diſtant about 18 Coſs. I have acquainted them with the treacherous Conduct of Ballajee, and the ineffectual Attempts made by him in Conjunction with the Troops belonging to the Bilſah Chief, to carry off the Baggage, and cut off the Supplies of Proviſions.

They have alſo uſed their Endeavours, by Threats and Menaces, to prevail upon the Nawab Mahomet Huat Ghawn to concur in their Views of preventing our Paſſage acroſs the Nerbuddah, which they affirm to be in Obedience to the Orders of the Peſhwa Purdhan Maderow.

Hitherto I have experienced the moſt friendly Behaviour from the Nawab, and if he adheres to his Engagements of ſupplying me with Grain, &c. I ſhall have every Reaſon to be ſatisfied with his Conduct. I ſhall write you again ſoon; and remain,

Sir,

Your moſt obedient humble Servant,

Tho' Goddard.

Nov. 26th, 1778,
Camp at Bhopal.

Received alſo at the ſame Time a Letter from Dadaja Adowja at Poona, to Captain Stewart, dated the 13th Inſtant; in which he mentions the Receipt of Two Letters from Colonel Goddard, One for Mr. Carnac and One for Mr. Lewis, both which he then forwarded. That by the Reports at Poona, Scindia and Holcar had taken an Oath to act with the Miniſters; Nanah having further prevailed upon Scindia, by a Preſent of Three Lacks, that Mhadjee Scindia was firſt to go againſt the Engliſh Troops, and if he was worſted, Holcar was to aid him; that on the 11th Inſtant Nanah had diſpatched Bhimrow Ponſia, and Ramchund Gunneſs, with ſome Guns, to Fullegaon: That the Miniſters were deſirous to try their Succeſs in an Engagement with us; and if they were defeated, it was then to be left to Saccaram to make the beſt Peace he could with us: That Nanah Furneeſe was for diſpatching Troops through the different Gauts into the Conkan. For the Information of the Committee, Mr. Lewis delivered different Letters received by him ſince his Departure from Poona; One from Colonel Goddard, dated Camp near Rimlaſſy, October 31ſt 1778, received at Bombay 1ſt December 1778.

To Wm Lewis, Eſquire, Reſident at Poona.

Sir,

Incloſed I have the Pleaſure to tranſmit you a Letter for the Honourable the Governor and Select Committee at Bombay, which I requeſt you will forward to them with all Expedition. Nothing very material has occurred ſince my laſt of the 4th Inſtant, which I hope has arrived ſafe; it contained Accounts of the Death of Colonel Leſlie, and of my Intention to proceed on my March from Raje Ghur, which I did on the 8th in the Morning; and am now near Rimlaſſy, a Town belonging to Ballajee, about 12 Coſs from Gunge Berondah, which you will find laid down in Mr. Smith's Route about the ſame Diſtance from Bilrah, by which Road I mean to march.

A Vackeel, named Ragoo Ram, Yeſterday waited upon me from the Poona Durbar, with a Letter in the Name of the young reigning Peſhwa Pundit Purdhan Mhadoo Row; which, after mentioning the Friendſhip exiſting between himſelf and the Engliſh, and expreſſing a Surprize at the Hoſtilities committed at Kalpy, requeſts to be informed of my Intentions in marching through the Maratta Empire. In Reply to this I have told him, that in Obedience to the Orders of my Maſters I am marching from one Engliſh Settlement to another; and that my Wiſh and Object is to preſerve Peace and Amity with every State and Chief I may meet with on my Route. I have explained to him the Conduct of Gungahder at Kalpy, which drew upon him the Engliſh Arms, and of that Force having

having been again reſtored to him, as a Proof of our friendly and pacific Views. I conceive the Embaſſy muſt have been ſent unknown to you from Poona, having before received no Intimation of it; and I learn the Vackeel left Poona near Two Months ago. This however muſt have been much about the Time of your laſt Letter, which is dated September 2d. I hope ſoon to hear from you, and beg you will communicate to me any Circumſtance you can relative to the Poona Durbar, by which my Operations may be poſſibly effected.

I am,
Sir,
Your obedient humble Servant,
Tho' Goddard.

Camp near Rimlaſſy,
October 31ſt, 1778.

Different Letters from Dadajee Adowjee, dated 27th and 29th November, and 2d December 1778.

At about Noon Mr. Sibbald returned with a Meſſage from Dada Saheb to Mr. Carnac, thanking him for his friendly Caution; that he thought he had nothing to apprehend from Ragojee Angria, who had preſented him with an Elephant and 25 Horſe; that he ſhould advance, and encamp within a Mile of us.

At a Committee; PRESENT,
John Carnac, Eſquire,
Colonel Charles Egerton.
Mr. Moſtyn indiſpoſed.

Read, and approved, the Minutes of the laſt Committee.

Colonel Charles Egerton now delivers in to the Committee the following Minute:

"The Commiſſion granted to the Committee appointed to attend Ragoba to Poona, bearing Date Bombay Caſtle, December 5th, 1778, being in my Opinion highly contradictory to a Paragraph in the Inſtructions accompanying the ſaid Commiſſion, and repugnant to the military Powers veſted in me as Commander of the Forces of the Preſidency of Bombay, and now in the Field, I do moſt ſtrenuouſly proteſt againſt publiſhing the ſame at preſent in General Orders.

"I do alſo proteſt againſt this Commiſſion veſting military Authority, and alſo to the Mode which it was granted; together with many Articles of the Inſtructions appertaining to the ſaid Commiſſion, for ſuch Reaſons as I ſhall hereafter exhibit at a more reaſonable Opportunity."

For the foregoing Reaſons the Colonel is of Opinion, that the Commiſſion ſhould not at preſent be publiſhed in General Orders to the Army; and farther, that according to the Letter of the Commiſſion appointing the Committee, he holds any Meeting incomplete and informal without the Preſence of every Member, and therefore the Order iſſued to him in conſequence of the Reſolution paſſed at the laſt Meeting of Mr. Carnac and himſelf, was in his Opinion of no Validity, till he ſhall have received farther Inſtructions from his Superiors at Bombay, or till the Recovery of Mr. Moſtyn permits him to attend in Committee.

Mr. Carnac is of Opinion, that the Sickneſs of one of the Members of the Committee diſabling him to attend, does by no Means render the Proceedings of the other invalid. According to the general Rules of the Company's Service, a Majority of any Board can form a legal Meeting of it; that therefore the Colonel was bound to have obeyed the Requiſition ſent to him in conſequence of the Reſolution paſſed at this laſt Meeting; however, being unwilling to enter into any Diſcuſſion of the Subject, he conſents to refer the Matter to the Judgment of our Superiors at Bombay, and therefore propoſes that the Minutes of the laſt Committee, relative to the publiſhing the Commiſſion, together with the Minutes now made, ſhould be inſtantly forwarded, with an Addreſs to our Superiors requeſting their inſtant Deciſion on theſe ſeveral Points, as, according to the Opinion entertained of the Colonel, it ſeems to him (Mr. Carnac) of no Utility to meet again in Committee; and that of courſe the Buſineſs committed in Charge to them muſt remain at a Stand till ſuch Deciſion arrives, till the Recovery of Mr. Moſtyn, which he is ſorry to obſerve, by the Accounts of the Surgeons, is very doubtful, and at beſt not likely to be for ſome Days.

The Colonel concurs in Opinion with Mr. Carnac, relative to the tranſmitting, with an ſubſtantial Addreſs to our Superiors, the Minutes he makes mention of; but differs in Opinion with him as to his general Concluſion; for though he (Col. Egerton) thinks fit to inſiſt that the Point which immediately relates to himſelf, viz. the Publication in General Orders of the Commiſſion to the Army under his Command, ſhould be diſcuſſed in a full Committee, yet he is far from thinking that this Propoſal can give any Impediment to the Conduct of Affairs committed in Charge to the Committee, as Mr. Carnac and himſelf can meet, deliberate, conduct, and give final Anſwers to Ragoba relative to thoſe Affairs.

Mr. Carnac obſerving that from the Accounts of the Surgeons there is great room to apprehend Mr. Moſtyn may not recover, thinks it requiſite to obſerve to our Superiors the very great Loſs the Company

Company will ſuſtain at this critical Juncture by his Death, and how much it may probably impede the Execution of the material Points they have in Charge, both from the Want of local Knowledge, and particular Ability and Acquaintance Mr. Moſtyn poſſeſſes in Maratta Affairs; and becauſe that moſt of the Engagements formed at Poona were immediately formed with him; and that the Perſons to be treated with, looking immediately to him, may now be backward in making freſh Overtures to the Committee. To which the Colonel concurs.

Mr. Stubbald now lays before the Committee a Paper, as entered hereafter, containing Intelligence tranſmitted from Ragoba, with which he was made acquainted by Naro Gopal and Trimbuck Ballerow. With reſpect to his Propoſal of having a Body of Men from Bombay, we are ſenſible that from the State of the Garriſon it is impoſſible to accede to it.

Mr. Carnac lays before the Committee the following Minute:

"As the ſpeedy Arrival of the Army upon the Ghauts, and their being puſhed forwards as quickly as poſſible, is very eſſential to the eaſier Accompliſhment of the Service on which the Army is now employed, the Enemy having thereby ſo much the leſs Time to prepare and collect themſelves; and as our Troops have been hitherto but very ſlow in their Progreſs, they having diſembarked at Panwell 25 Days ago, and yet are little more than the ſame Number of Miles diſtant from it, it is much to be regretted that a more expeditious Mode had not been found out for conveying to the Top of the Ghauts the Ordnance Stores and Baggage, than the one at preſent purſued. It appears to Mr. Carnac, that much Labour, Time, and a conſiderable Expence, are unneceſſarily waſted in the making a Carriage Road up the Gaut; and that with the ſame Number of People now employed for this Purpoſe, every Thing intended to be caſted up might have been carried up by Hand with more Eaſe, Security from Accident, and Diſpatch; and from the Converſation he has had with many on the Subject, he is inclined to believe this to be the general Opinion. The Commander of Artillery has actually paſſed ſome of his Guns beyond the Road conſtructed by Major Snaith, and by a Route wide of it, which may be adduced as a Teſtimony that this Part of the new-made Road at leaſt was wholly needleſs."

As an Anſwer to Mr. Carnac's Minute might be productive of Altercation and Argument, the Colonel defers ſaying any Thing on the Subject till he has an Opportunity of having his Conduct properly ſcrutinized by his Superiors at Bombay.

(Adjourned.)

John Carnac,
Chas Egerton.

Campoly, 20th December, 1778. Sunday, 20th

This Morning Ragoba ſent Naroo Gopal and Trimbuck Ballerow to Mr. Carnac, to inform him of the following Intelligence he had juſt received from the Enemy's Camp:

That the Miniſterial Forces, under the Command of Bhim Row Ponſia, Badjee Punt Joſey, and Guneiſh Punt, conſiſting of 10,000 Horſe, 15 Pieces of Cannon, and a large Number of Bhondaars, were encamped at Wurgaon, 3 Coſs on this Side Tullagaong, in order to harraſs our Troops and obſtruct their March, ſo ſoon as they might make their Appearance above the Ghauts; and that a Body of 5,000 Horſe were ordered to proceed down Kurſora Gaut, with an Intent to cut off our Communication with Panwell.

That Nanah Furneeze, Saccaram Bapoo, Madjee Scindia, and Tookajee Holcar, were encamped near Poona with 5,000 Horſe; but whether they meant to join the main Body at Wurgaon, was not yet known.

Ragoba deſired the above Perſons to acquaint Mr. Carnac, that he ſubmitted it to his Conſideration, Whether it would not be adviſable to have a Detachment of Sepoys, with 2 Guns, ſent from Bombay, to be kept below the Gauts, in order to protect our Convoys of Proviſions, and to keep the Communication open with Panwell?

Ragoba is confident that the Miniſterial Party have adopted the above Plan, as they make no Scruple to declare that it is the only likely Mode of harraſſing and diſtreſſing the Engliſh Troops; being unequal to an actual Engagement with ſuch a Body of Forces as we have now in the Field.

Diſpatched the following Addreſs to the Honourable the Select Committee at Bombay. Monday, 21st

To the Honourable William Hornby, Eſquire, Preſident, &c. Select Committee at Bombay.

Gentlemen,

On the 15th Inſtant Meſſieurs Carnac and Moſtyn arrived at this Place, and on the Evening of that Day, Mr. Carnac directed the Secretary to the Committee to deſire the Attendance of Colonel Egerton and Mr. Moſtyn at his (Mr. Carnac's) Tent on the following Day, in order to open a Packet from you, directed to Mr. Carnac, Colonel Egerton, and Mr. Moſtyn. The latter Gentleman being indiſpoſed, the Meeting was held by Mr. Carnac and Colonel Egerton only.

Mr

Mr. Moſtyn being ſtill indiſpoſed, thoſe Two Gentlemen only again met this Day, confer[red] Summons ſent by Mr. Carnac, when it was agreed immediately to tranſmit the Whole of both [the] Proceedings for your Conſideration. From the Nature of the Doubts and Queſtions that have [arisen] you will no Doubt perceive the Neceſſity of favouring us with your Deciſions as ſpeedily and [explicitly] as poſſible, as, from the Nature of the Service, and the Accidents common to all Ma[rches] may frequently happen that only Two of the Members can attend in Committee.

The Particulars of the Intelligence received from Ragoba are, That the Miniſterial Forces, [under] the Command of Bhim Row Ponſia, Badjee Punt Joſey, and Gunnels Punt, conſiſting of [15,000] Horſe, 15 Pieces of Cannon, and a large Number of Bhondaars, were encamped at Wu[rgaon] Corſe on this Side Tullagaon, in order to harraſs our Troops, and obſtruct their March to [Poona] they might make their Appearance above the Gaut; and that a Body of 5,000 Horſe were [ordered] to proceed down Kurſora Gaut, with an Intent to cut off our Communication with Panwell. [Moraba] Nanah Furneeze, Sacceram Bappoo, Mhadjee Scindia, and Hurry Punt, were encamped [near] Poona with about 5,000 Horſe; but whether they meant to join the main Body at Wurgaon [is] not yet known.

Ragoba ſays he is confident the miniſterial Party have adopted the above Plan, as they [have] Scruple to declare, that it is the only likely Method of harraſſing and diſtreſſing the Engliſh [Army] being unequal to an actual Engagement with ſuch a Body of Forces as we have now in the Field. [For] he therefore directed the Perſons whom he ſent with this Intelligence to acquaint the Committee [that] he ſubmitted it to their Conſideration, Whether it would not be adviſable to have a Detachment [of] Sepoys ſent with Two Guns from Bombay, to be kept below the Gaut, in order to protect our [Convoys] voys of Proviſions, and to keep the Communication open with Panwell?

The above Intelligence from Ragoba generally correſponds with the Contents of a Letter [received] from Dadajee Adowjee, at Poona, except that he mentions the Miniſterialiſts were determined [to] gage us, and that Holkar had engaged to aſſiſt them; which latter Circumſtance we hope [and] will prove untrue. If the Miniſterialiſts mean to act with Vigour, it ſeems to us probable [they] adopt the Plan mentioned by Ragoba.

For theſe Two Days paſt, Ragonath Row has been encamped cloſe to us: He had determined [to] have proceeded up the Cocinda Gaut, and had abſolutely marched for that Purpoſe; but, fearing [from] the Conſequences of his being widely ſeparated from us, and from the whole Tenor of his Conduct [lately], lately, having Reaſon to apprehend that treacherous Deſigns were formed relative to the Safety of [his] his Perſon, Mr. Sibbald was deputed by Mr. Carnac to repreſent to him the Apprehenſions entertained, and the unneceſſary Riſque he at beſt expoſed himſelf to, by proceeding up another Gaut [whilſt] whilſt we had one open, and guarded by our own Troops. He paid due Attention to the Repreſentations; and this Night, at Midnight, being a lucky Hour, he has determined to march up the [Kurſora] Gaut to Condolah.

We are, with Reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
Jn° Carnac,
C. W. Egerton.

Camp at Campoly,
20th December 1778.

P. S. Laſt Night Ragonath Row proceeded up the Gaut.
December 21, 1778.

At about ½ P. M. received the following Letter from the honourable the Select Committee at Bombay:

To John Carnac, Eſquire, Colonel Charles Egerton, and Thomas Moſtyn, Eſquire.

Gentlemen,

We have received a Letter from Meſſrs. Carnac and Moſtyn, dated the 15th Inſtant, and [deſire] you to open any Packets addreſſed to us, which may come to your Hands.

Having juſt received a Letter of Importance from the Governor General and Council, we [ſend] an Extract of all the material Parts for your Information; and we have in conſequence ſent Orders to Colonel Goddard to move forward with all poſſible Expedition, although we doubt not he will already have proſecuted his March, in conſequence of our former Orders.

Our lateſt Advices from Colonel Goddard are dated the 26th ultimo, from Bhopaul, within 18 Coſs of the Nerbuddah, which he hoped to croſs in Five or Six Days at Huſſengabad, and in Ten Days more enter the Country of the Berar Rajah.

We hope ſoon to hear of your having aſcended the Gauts, with the Army and Stores; and ſtrongly recommend to you to proceed with all poſſible Expedition, and to urge Ragoba, ſo as that no Delay may ariſe on his Part.

You will correſpond with Colonel Goddard on all neceſſary Points, and we have directed him to ſend you Advice of his Motions. A Packet is now incloſed for him in Duplicate, which is to be

for your Perusal; and you will forward it by separate Conveyances, in the most secure and expeditious Manner.

We now return Five Paces of Pattamars, arrived from the Army with Advices; and are,

Gentlemen,

Your most obedient humble Servants,

Bombay Castle, 19th December 1778.

Wm Hornby,
Danl Draper.

Signed by the Secretary, for and by Order of the Governor, who is unable to hold a Pen.

Edward Ravenscroft, Secretary.

Extract of a Letter from the Governor General and Council; dated the 15th October 1778, and received the 18th December following, per Terrible.

We advised you in our last of the Appointment of Mr. Elliot to the Court of Moodajee Bouncello, the Rajah of Berar, with Instructions to negociate and conclude a Treaty of Alliance with that Chief; but we are sorry to inform you of the Demise of Mr. Elliot, in his Way to Naguipore, at a Place called Sarungur. The Rajah having expressed great Satisfaction at the Overtures which we made for a Connection with him by this Deputation, and being, as we have every Reason to believe, firm in his Attachment to the English, we conclude, as soon as he hears of the unfortunate Event of Mr. Elliot's Death, that he will take an active Part in prosecuting the intended Negociation, either by deputing a proper Minister to us on his Part, or by soliciting our Alliance on such Terms as may prove a general Advantage to the Company's Possessions. For these Reasons, we do not mean to appoint any one to succeed Mr. Elliot, until our Advices from the Rajah shall enable us to determine on the Expediency of that Measure.

We have thought it incumbent on us to remove Colonel Leslie from the Command of the Detachment of Forces which was ordered to march for the Support and Assistance of your Presidency, on Account of the little Progress it had made under him; as we understand he was advanced no further than Rajgur on the 25th ultimo, and of his manifest Disobedience also of our positive Orders, in forming and concluding a Treaty of perpetual Peace and Friendship, in the Name of the Company, with the Rajahs Gomaun and Comaun Sing, Chiefs of a Part of the Bundelcund District.

Colonel Thomas Goddard is now appointed to the chief Command of these Troops, and we have ordered him to prosecute his March, without further Loss of Time, into Berar, where on his Arrival he will apply to Moodajee Bouncello; and if that Chief shall agree to join him with a sufficient Body of Forces for the Purpose, he is to continue his Route in Conjunction with them; but if he shall not have received any fresh Directions for his March, or if the Rajah shall decline or refuse to grant him his Assistance, we have then vested in him a discretionary Power to suspend his Proceedings.

If the Plan which you had resolved to adopt and to carry into Execution in September, for the Restoration of Ragoba, and which you notified to us in your Letter of the 25th July, still subsist; or if you shall have formed any other for the same End, consistently with the Terms prescribed for our Assent to that Measure; or if you shall judge a strong Reinforcement immediately and indispensably necessary to ensure the Safety of Bombay against a French Invasion, and shall deem it requisite or advisable in either of these Cases, to command the Detachment at all Hazards to proceed further towards Bombay, even without the Junction of the Troops of any Power in Alliance with us; you will in such Cases, and such only, require Colonel Goddard to advance with it; but in all other Cases you will give him Notice of your Intentions, and leave him to act under our Directions.

A true Extract.

Edward Ravenscroft,
Secretary to the Select Committee.

To Colonel Goddard.

Sir,

The Governor General and Council have advised us of their Resolution to have removed Colonel Leslie, before they heard of his Death, and of their having appointed you to the chief Command of the Detachment of Forces ordered for the Support of this Presidency. They have also apprized us of the Orders they have given for your Conduct on your Arrival in the Berar Country. We congratulate you on this Mark of Distinction conferred on you by the Governor General and Council; and though we hope this will meet you well advanced on your March, in consequence of our Letters of the 13th November and 6th Instant; yet to prevent all Disappointment, and that you may not be at any Loss in your Proceedings, we judge it proper to repeat to you, that our Forces have actually taken the Field, in Prosecution of the Plan communicated to the Governor General and Council, for the Restoration of Ragoba, and that we deem it requisite and advisable that the Army under your Command should move forwards towards Bombay. We therefore hereby require you to advance

according to our former Orders, even without the Juncture of the Troops of any Power in Alliance with the Honourable Company; and we likewiſe deſire and enjoin you to conduct your March with all poſſible Expedition.

The Settlement of the Government at Poona is committed to Meſſrs. Carnac, Egerton, and Mollyn, with whom we deſire you will correſpond; and we flatter ourſelves, the Movement of our Forces will facilitate your March in like Manner as we expect the Advance of your Detachment will leſſen the Oppoſition to our Forces.

We Yeſterday received your Letter, dated at Bhoſſall the 26th ultimo, and we now ſend a Copy of our Letter of the 6th Inſtant.

We are,
Sir,
Your obedient humble Servants,
Wm Hornby,
D. Draper.

Bombay Caſtle,
19th Dec. 1778.

Signed by the Secretary, for and by Order of the Governor, who is unable to hold a Pen.
Edward Ravenſcroft, Secretary.

Tueſday, 22d. This Morning Thomas Moſtyn being dangerouſly ill, ſet off for Bombay.

It is worthy Obſervation, that by the Accounts taken this Day, either in or after the Attack on Captain Stewart's Poſt at Condolah, it appears that the Body of Men which made this Attack firſt went to Corindah Gaut, where they were purpoſely diſpatched to ſeize the Perſon of Raganath Row, whoſe Intentions to proceed up that Gaut his Enemies at Poona had been well adviſed.

Wedneſday, 23d. The Army proceeded up the Gaut to Condolah. In the Evening received a Letter from Pandjee Adaujee at Poona, to Mr. Lewis, informing him that he had learnt from Mhaderow Jadoojee, Nana Furneeze would not permit of his (Adaujee's) remaining in Poona; requeſting to know what was to be done with the Company's Effects at Poona, the Removal of which would coſt very dear on Account of the People having moſtly deſerted Poona. It was ſaid Nanah expected ſome Troops from Goa, French and Portugueſe, who were to ſet out this Day from Cudkey; that our Factory was given to the French Gentleman who before lived in Curril Row Bullol's Stable.

Friday, 25th. At 3 P. M. received the following Letter from the Honourable the Select Committee at Bombay

John Carnac, Eſquire, Colonel Charles Egerton, and Thomas Moſtyn, Eſquire.

Gentlemen,

We have received the Letters from Meſſrs. Carnac and Egerton, dated the 20th Inſtant.

We are ſorry to obſerve, that any Occaſion of Difference has already ariſen, and at the ſame Time ſurprized to find an Idea could be entertained, that the Powers of the Committee were ſuſpended by the Sickneſs or accidental Abſence of one of the Members, when it is ſo obvious, that the Practice in all Communities or Bodies of Men aſſociated in any public Service, is directly and univerſally the Reverſe. But ſince ſuch an Opinion has prevailed, we find it neceſſary to explain and lay it down as our poſitive Order, that whenever any one of the Members of the Poona Committee is by Sickneſs, or any other accidental Cauſe, unavoidably abſent the full Exerciſe of the Powers granted to the Committee, ſhall be veſted and continue in the remaining Two; and in caſe of a Difference of Opinion, the Senior Member muſt, as always uſual, have a Caſting Voice.

To prevent any further Diſſatisfaction, we could wiſh that the Point of publiſhing the Committee's Commiſſion, was waved.

We are, Gentlemen,
your moſt obedient humble Servants,
Wm Hornby,
Danl Draper.

Signed by the Secretary, for and by Order of the Governor, who is unable to hold a Pen.
Edwd Ravenſcroft, Sec^y.

Received

APPENDIX, N° 130.

Received the following Letter from Colonel Goddard to the Select Committee at Bombay, at Sunday, 16th, A. M. in Original and Duplicate.

To the Honourable William Hornby, Eſquire, Preſident, &c. Members of the Select Committee, Bombay.

Gentlemen,

I wrote you the 26th from Bhopall, ſince which Time I have croſſed the Nerbuddah, at Hoſhingabad, and am encamped on the South Bank of it.

Not having been favoured with any Letter from you of a later Date than the 21ſt July, I am in daily Hopes of receiving one, informing me of many Circumſtances highly neceſſary at this Time to determine the Meaſures proper to be purſued, and the Plan of my future Operations.

It appears from every Intelligence I can obtain, that the Peiſhwa and his Miniſters have taken the Alarm, and are aſſembling Troops in every Quarter to oppoſe my March, conceiving, that the Intention of it is to aſſiſt your Government in advancing the Pretenſions of Ragoba. It becomes therefore expedient that ſome vigorous Steps be immediately taken to counteract their Deſigns and cauſe a Diverſion from different Quarters, in order to prevent their aſſembling their whole Force, which I am apt to believe will be ſtrengthened by that of the Nizam, againſt me.

I learn that Hyder Ally is in the Field with a large Army; and how far his Views might concur or his Motions be made to co-operate with ours, you muſt be beſt able to determine. I am perſuaded that every neceſſary Precaution will have been uſed by you; but their not being communicated to me deprives me in a great Meaſure of the Opportunity a Knowledge of them would furniſh for regulating my future Operations.

I ſhall have a few Days in this Place in determining the Route, which I expect will be by Burhampore, and in the intervening Time I hope to be able to prevail on Moodajee Bounſello, the Rajah of Berar, to join me with a Body of Troops, by which Means the Inconveniences I might otherwiſe experience reſpecting the Supplies of Proviſions may be obviated.

I hope alſo to be favoured with Letters from you during my Stay here, and as ſoon as I have fixed upon any Route from this Place, I will ſend off a Diſpatch informing you of it.

I think it proper to acquaint you, that Two Letters received within this Month from Mr. Lewis at Poona, being written in Cypher different from the one you ſent me through Mr. Boddam, I have not been able to underſtand their Contents.

I have the Honour to be, with the greateſt Reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servant,
Tho' Goddard.

Camp, near Hoſhingabad,
on the South Side of the Nerbuddah,
December 6th 1778.

Received at the ſame Time, a Letter from Dadajee Adowjee at Poona, dated the 23d Inſtant, mentioning, That he now ſends Letters received from Colonel Goddard's Army; that 5 Days before he had ſent 2 Madras Packets with 4 Pr of Pattamars; that Mhadoo Row Jadooſey acquainted him Nanah Furneeze would not ſuffer any Engliſh Vackeel there, or have any thing to do with the Engliſh; that the Agent to the Nabob of Tall Boppal informed him he had aſked Holkar whether he meant to obſerve his Word paſſed to Mr. Moſtyn? who ſaid, he ſhould till Death.

On Wedneſday laſt the Troops marched from Condolah to Mount Snarl; on Thurſday, from Mount Snarl to Dungergaon Plain; on Monday, from Dungergaon Plain to Corla, where Captain Stewart was unfortunately killed by a Cannon Shot; proceeded from Corlah on the Wedneſday following to Mondhurna Plain. Wedneſday, 6

Mondhurna Plain, 6th January 1779

At a Committee; PRESENT,

John Carnac, Eſquire,
Colonel Charles Egerton.

Colonel Egerton now repreſents to the Committee, that having borne up as long as he could againſt an Illneſs with which he has now for ſome Time paſt been afflicted, he at length finds himſelf under the diſagreeable Neceſſity of acquainting the Committee, that the Surgeon Major is of Opinion, that the Fatigues of a Campaign co-operating with his Indiſpoſition certainly endangers his Life, and that at any rate he cannot hope to have the requiſite Strength to attend properly to the many Avocations of the Commander in Chief; for theſe Reaſons he requeſts Permiſſion to reſign

reſign the Command to Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, and proceed immediately to Bombay, which is agreed to.

The Committee taking into Conſideration the Neceſſity of having an able and experienced Officer to command the Army now in the Field in caſe of Accidents to Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, think proper to recommend it to the Commander in Chief, to appoint Major Dagon of the Artillery, to act as Lieutenant Colonel till the Pleaſure of the Honourable the Select Committee at Bombay ſhall be known; and that it ſhall further be recommended to our Superiors, to continue the Appointment.

The Departure of Colonel Egerton, the unfortunate Loſs of Lieutenant Colonel Cay, and of Captain James Stewart, the Firſt wounded and returned to Bombay, and the latter killed, and the Proſpect there is that the preſent Service may be much more ſevere, and of much longer Continuance than was expected, render it very expedient that the Army ſhould be ſupplied with as many Officers of Experience as can be ſpared from Bombay; and it is therefore reſolved to recommend it to the Honourable the Select Committee, to ſend up Major Hopkins, Captains Hartley and Jamieſon, to join the Army as ſoon as poſſibly can be done with Safety to them.

We reflect with ſome Concern, on the Difference between the Expectations we were flattered with on our Arrival at the Top of the Gauts, and the actual State of Affairs. We were given to hope, that immediately on the Appearance there of the Standard of Ragonath Row, Holcar and many other Chiefs of Rank and Reſpect would join him with a numerous Body of Horſe; and there was every Reaſon to hope we might have terminated ſpeedily the Object of our Commiſſion. Inſtead of theſe reputable Partizans, none but a few Mercenaries have yet joined us; and Ragonath Row, in a Meſſage Yeſterday by Mr. Sibbald, gave us plainly to underſtand he had been deceived; that unleſs we could convince his Friends of their Safety in joining us by the ſpeedy Defeat of his Enemies, he had no Hope of being joined by any one; and that our Situation would rather prove worſe than better as we advanced towards Poona, by being cut off from all Communication with the Conkan, from whence we may now be ſupplied with Proviſions and Stores. The Mode adopted by the Enemy, of retiring before us, and ravaging the Country, ſeems to render the Reaſoning apparently juſt; but we ſtill hope as we advance towards Poona, Holcar, on whoſe Junction there may be ſome Dependance, will be enabled and encouraged to keep firm to the Promiſes he has given us through the late Mr. Moſtyn. It is further obſervable, there is too much Reaſon to apprehend that Ragonath Row, truſting to ſubdue every one by our Arms, has not only neglected the fit Means to conciliate the reſpectable Chiefs to his Cauſe, but has acted in ſuch a Manner as will naturally tend to unite them againſt him. The Grounds of this Suſpicion are these, The Agent of Moraba in our Camp, informed Mr. Lewis, that he had learnt from his Maſter that Ragoba, inſtead of taking the proper Means for his Releaſe from Ahmednague, had ſecretly ſent Directions to the Killedar not to releaſe Morabah till he got poſitive Orders from him on his Arrival at Poona. This is in direct Violation of his Agreements with us, and could the Fact be clearly proved, it would have been ſo ſignified to him.

Reſolved, That we do immediately acquaint our Superiors at Bombay with the foregoing, that they may ſend requiſite Orders, in caſe it ſhould appear that the Extent of our Military Operations in the Cauſe of Ragoba may be very indefinite and uncertain: At any rate aſſure them, that at preſent we ſee no Proſpect of their terminating on our Arrival at Poona, which, by their Inſtructions to us, they ſeem moſt confidently to expect.

By the Death of Mr. Moſtyn and the Departure of Colonel Egerton, the Powers of this Committee may ſeem ſuſpended for the preſent: It is however recommended to Mr. Carnac to continue ſtill to act when it may be requiſite, till explicit Orders may arrive from our Superiors at Bombay. Adjourned.

John Carnac,
Charles Egerton.

To the Honourable William Hornby, Eſquire, Preſident, &c. Select Committee, Bombay.

Gentlemen,

On the 25th ultimo we received your Commands of the 24th.

We are ſorry to acquaint you, that this Day Colonel Charles Egerton repreſented to us in Committee, That having borne up as long as he could againſt an Illneſs with which he has been for ſome Time paſt afflicted, he at length found himſelf under the Neceſſity of acquainting the Committee, that the Surgeon Major is of Opinion that the Fatigues of a Campaign co-operating with his Indiſpoſition, would certainly endanger his Life; and that at any rate he cannot ſoon hope to have the requiſite Strength to attend properly to the many Avocations of the Commander in Chief in the Field; for which Reaſons he requeſted Permiſſion to reſign the Command of the Army to Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, and proceed immediately to Bombay; which being complied with, he now accordingly proceeds.

Taking into Conſideration the Neceſſity of having an able and experienced Officer to command the Army now in the Field in caſe of Accidents to Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, we thought it advisable to recommend it to the Commander in Chief to appoint Major Gaſpar Dagon, of the Artillery,

bay, to act as Lieutenant Colonel till your Pleasure shall be known; and having by this Means secured as far as in us lies, a fit Commander on the Event above stated, we hope for your Approval on this Occasion, and that you will be pleased to direct this Appointment to be continued.

The Return of Colonel Egerton, the unfortunate Loss of Lieutenant Colonel Cay and Captain Stewart, the former wounded and returned to Bombay, and the latter killed, together with the Price of those to that the present Service may be much more severe and of longer Duration than was at first expected, render it very expedient that the Army should be supplied with as many Officers of Experience as can be spared from Bombay, having first had Reference to the Opinion of the Commander in Chief, we therefore take the Liberty to recommend, that you will be pleased immediately to direct Major Hopkins, Captain Eames, and Captain Jamefon, to proceed to Bhore Gaut, in order to join the Army, in case it shall appear to them practicable with any Degree of Safety; regarding which they will be furnished with such Information as we can send to them, and proper Guides sent to meet them at the Gaut.

It is with some Concern we must now acquaint you with the Difference between the Expectations we were flattered with on our Arrival at the Top of the Gauts, and the actual State of Affairs. We were given to hope, that immediately on the Appearance there of the Standard of Ragonath Row, Holcar and many other Chiefs of Rank and Respect were to join him with a numerous Body of Horse. With these, in case of Resistance from his Adversaries, we might at least have been able to have secured Provisions and Forage from this Country; and there was every Reason to hope that we might speedily have terminated the Object of our Commission. Instead of these reputable Partizans none but a few Mercenaries have yet joined us; and Ragonath Row Yesterday, in a Message by Mr. Sibbald, gave us plainly to understand he had been deceived; that unless we could convince his Friends of their Safety in joining us, by the speedy Defeat of his Enemies, he had no Hope of being joined by any one; and that our Situation would rather prove worse than better as we advanced towards Poona, by being cut off from all Communication from the Conkan, from whence we may now be supplied with Provisions and Stores. The Mode adopted by the Enemy of returing before us, and ravaging the Country, seems to render his Reasoning apparently just; but we still hope, as we advance towards Poona, Holcar, on whose Junction there may perhaps be some Dependance, will be enabled and encouraged to keep him to the Promises he made us through the late Mr. Mostyn. We must further observe to you, there is but too much Reason to apprehend that Ragonath Row, trusting to subdue every one by our Arms, has not only neglected the fit Measures to conciliate the respectable Chiefs to his Cause, but has acted in such a Manner as will naturally tend to unite them against him. The Grounds of this Suspicion are these: The Agent of Moraba Furneeze in our Camp, informed Mr. Lewis, that he had learnt from his Master that Ragoba, instead of taking the proper Measures for his Release from Ahmednague, had secretly sent Directions to the Killedar not to release him (Moraba) till he got further positive Orders from him on his Arrival at Poona. This is in direct Violation of his Engagements with us; and could the Fact be clearly proved, it would have been of significe to him. We have thought it necessary to be thus explicit as to our Situation, that you may reflect on the necessary Measures to be pursued, and send explicit Orders, in case it shall hereafter appear to you that the Field and Extent of our military Operations in the Cause of Ragoba may be very indefinite and uncertain; and we are sorry to assure you, that at present we see no Prospect of their terminating on our Arrival at Poona, which, from your Instructions to us, you seem most confidently to have expected.

By the Death of Mr. Mostyn and the Departure of Colonel Egerton, the Powers of this Committee may seem suspended: It has however been recommended to Mr. Carnac to act as Occasions may require in the several Points entrusted to us, till explicit Orders may arrive from you, which Mr. Carnac requests may be as speedily as possible.

The Army marched this Morning from the Village of Kosla. During the March, the Guns of the Enemy opened on our Line from the Wood of Mondhurna in our Front; and a large Party of Horse seemed inclined either to take us in Flank, or to enter in our Rear among the Baggage. They were however prevented from both, driven from the Wood of Mondhurna into the Plain below. Our Army still advancing, drove them from a Height near the Ridoramy, which we now possess. This Party sent to harrass us, we are informed is commanded by Bhim Row Ponsia, and may consist of about 5000 Horse and Seven Guns. We have the Pleasure to inform you, that both Officers and Men behaved on this, and all Occasions, with the greatest Chearfulness and Intrepidity.

We are, with Respect,
Gentlemen,
Your most obedient
humble Servants,
Jn° Carnac,
Ch. Egerton.

Camp, near the
Indoramy, 6th January
1779.

P. S. After writing the above, Colonel Egerton, who had set off for Bombay, was obliged to return, on the Receipt of certain Intelligence from the Officer at the Pass at Condolah, that a large Party of Horse were in the Conkan, some of which he could perceive at Campoly. On this Account Colonel Egerton is compelled to proceed for some Time with the Army; his Return however makes no Change in the Purport of the foregoing with regard to the Command of the Army, which still remains with Colonel Cockburn.

APPENDIX, N° 130.

Tullegaon, 9th January 1779.

Saturday, 9th. The Army on Thurſday laſt moved from Mondhurna Plain to Carculla; on Friday, from Carcul[la] to Wurgaon; and on Saturday, from Wurgaon to Tullegaon.

At a Committee; PRESENT,
John Carnac, Eſquire,
Colonel Charles Egerton.

Read, and approved, the Minutes of our laſt Committee.

The Apprehenſions expreſſed in the Minutes of our laſt Meeting ſeem verified now beyond Doubt. So far from any Perſon of Conſequence having yet joined Ragoba, Holkar, the only [one] from whom there appeared the leaſt Aſſurance of Support to his Cauſe, is now in Arms against [us] and joined with Scindia and other Chiefs, whoſe Guns have been firing on our Camp, and who [are] now before us with a large Army. The Burning of the large and populous Town of Tullegaon [also] confirms our Suſpicion, and the general Information we daily receive from all Sides, of their intended Mode of Procedure, viz. by the Deſtruction of the Country, by harraſſing us, and cutting us off [from] all Supplies of Proviſions. In ſhort, there appears to be a general Determination to oppoſe the Eſtabliſhment of Ragoba with that Degree of Authority, which from his confident Aſſurances of effectual Support, and from the Repreſentations of the late Mr. Moſtyn, the Honourable the Select Committee have been led to engage for.

This Diſappointment in our Expectations opens to us a Scene very widely different from that we had in View at our firſt ſetting out from Bombay. From the open Diviſions amongſt the Brahmins, and from poſitive Engagements with the Party in Oppoſition to Nanah Furneeze, we were given moſt confidently to expect immediate and effectual Aid, if we once openly and declaredly entered on Meaſures for the Subverſion of his Government, a general reputed Indiſpoſition to that Government amongſt the Maratta Officers and People alſo afforded good Grounds of Expectation for effectual Aid: The Words of our Inſtructions warrant theſe Suppoſitions: From all which it was concluded that the March to Poona would be attended with little Difficulty or Oppoſition; that little Time would be employed in Military Operations; and that our great Difficulty would not lie in reducing the Maratta Officers to Obedience, and placing the Government of the Country with Ragoba, but in ſettling the different Pretenſions of theſe Chiefs, and bringing Ragoba to form his Government from Men on whom he might depend for effecting the great Object of this Expedition, namely, the entire Subverſion of the Party in the French Intereſt. After having thus conducted him to Poona and ſettled his Government, there remained only to receive the Sunnuds for the Grants that were to form the Rewards of our Aid, and the monthly Stipend for the Expence of our Army. It ſeems never to have been doubted that all this would have been effected, and the Army returned to Bombay Time enough for its Defence.

Inſtead of this definite and limited Scheme, it appears to us that we are engaged in an indefinite Scene of Military Operations, without any Reſources but our own, againſt the moſt reſpectable Chiefs of the Maratta Empire, and againſt an Enemy with whom we cannot hope to bring Matters to the only Iſſue from which we can obtain reaſonable Aſſurance of Succeſs; viz. the Trial of Arms. We muſt repeat that we are confirmed by the Deſtruction of Tullagaon, as to their intended Mode of Procedure, a Mode which muſt infallibly force us back in a ſhort Time to Bombay without reaping the leaſt Benefit in any one Point, both from the great Exertions and Expence of the Governor General and the Government of Bombay. It is requiſite here alſo to obſerve, that from every Information we can obtain from Deſerters, Priſoners, and others, it is determined to burn Chemſwer, a Town ſtill more large and populous than Tullagaon, and that Meaſures are alſo taken even for the Deſtruction of Poona, ſo bent are thoſe now in Oppoſition to Ragonath Row to avail themſelves of every poſſible Means in their Power, in order to fruſtrate the Plan we are now proceeding on in Conjunction with him,

From all theſe Circumſtances it appears to us, that the Plan of eſtabliſhing Ragonath Row even but in the Regency of the Maratta Empire, without the immediate Co-operation of a reſpectable Party in that State, is impracticable, with any Probability of Succeſs; and having decided this Point in our own Minds, the preſent State of our Army with reſpect to Proviſions, and the total Improbability of a Supply, render it neceſſary to turn our Attention immediately towards the Means of compaſſing, as well as in us lies, the main Object which led towards our Engagements with Ragoba, the Defeat of the Deſigns of the French.

From every Experience we have had of the Marattas, and particularly in this Buſineſs, it appears clear to us, that the Tie of their own Intereſt is the only one to be depended on. From all the late Mr. Moſtyn's Advices, and from every Information we can obtain, it appears that Saccaram Pundit and Nanah Furneeze, though at Times apparently united, have each been aiming, though by different Modes, to ſecure to themſelves the effectual Power in the Poona Durbar. As Nanah, from ſeveral Circumſtances, ſeems peculiarly to look to the French, and is indeed the very Man whoſe Subverſion is the Object we now aim at, we are of courſe precluded forming any Connection with him: It therefore appears to us, that Saccaram Pundit is the only Man with whom we can hope to form the Engagements

ements that muſt lead to our main Object; Moraba Furneeze and Butcheba Pronder, the Two ſons mentioned in our Inſtructions, being at preſent impriſoned, and, as far as we can perceive, olly incapable of affording us any effectual Aid, whatever their Intereſts may incline them do.

The Two next Perſons who ſtrike our Attention, are the Jaghirdars Holkar and Scindia, whoſe oops form the chief Force of our Enemies, and whoſe Deciſions, if favourable to us, muſt, to all ppearance, enable us effectually and ſpeedily to cruſh the Powers of Nanah Furneeze and his Party. ring the Diviſions amongſt the Brahmins, we are given to underſtand, they have made great Acions to their Jaghires; and was the Poona Durbar once in Power to enforce their Demands, they uld probably inſiſt on the Reſtitution of theſe, as well as the Arrears due from them for the untry they hold. Theſe are Conſiderations that muſt ever influence them to prevent the uncondinal Reſtoration of ſuch Power amongſt the Brahmins; and therefore it ſeems they are naturally led oppoſe the Eſtabliſhment of Ragoba, which great Line of Intereſt ſeems on the Trial now to inence them both, notwithſtanding any Promiſes or Writings they may have given, relative to a nction with Ragoba.

The Mode of ſecuring theſe ſeveral Perſons and their Partizans, appears to us as follows: To ſſure them that we mean the Government ſhall go on in the Name of Mhadoo Row Narrain, leaving ly to Ragoba the Naibſhip, as in the Time of the Minority of Mhadoo Row; to aſſure Saccaram of the Duanſhip, of our Support to him in the real Powers of it, and of the Aid of our Army, in Conjunction with Scindia and Holkar, againſt Nanah Furneeze; to offer to the Two Jaghire Daars our Guarantee, ſecuring to them their Jaghires, free from all Demands for Arrears from the Poona Durbar.

Agreed therefore, that Mr. Sibbald, who was deſired to be preſent at this Meeting, ſhould acquaint Ragoba, in a ſuitable Manner, with our Sentiments relative to the Cauſe we are embarked in—To remind him we have been led into this diſtreſſed State by too great a Reliance on his Promiſes and Aſſurances, relative to a plentiful Supply of Proviſions when we got above the Gauts, and to the Junction of Tookajeee Holkar, which he acquainted Mr. Sibbald on the 22d ultimo, he was confident would be in Eight Days—That the ſingle Circumſtance of having now but ſufficient Proviſions to conduct our Army back into the Conkan, added to the total Impoſſibility of procuring a Supply in a Country laid waſte all round us, muſt infallibly force us to retire, which would be the total Ruin of his Cauſe poſſibly for ever—That the only probable Mode to remove this Diſtreſs was to make immediate Overtures of Accommodation to Scindia, and to Holcar, and to Saccaram, which muſt be done by committing to us the Power of negociating for him, ſignifying to theſe different Perſons his Conſent to any Agreements we might conclude for him—That we ſee no Alternative between this and an inſtant Retreat to Condolah; and that, unleſs he conſents to it, our Army muſt perforce immediately retire, in order to prevent a total Diſtreſs from the utter Want of Proviſions—That we muſt leave to him the Mode of opening this Negociation; and that during the Courſe of it, we ſhould be guided as much by his Advice and Intereſt as we conſiſtently could.

Adjourned.

John Carnac,
Charles Egerton.

Tullagaon, 10th January, 1779. Sunday, 10th

At a Committee; PRESENT,
John Carnac, Eſquire,
Colonel Charles Egerton.

Read, and approved, the Minutes of our laſt Committee.

Mr. Sibbald now delivers in Writing his Report of his Conference held Yeſterday with Ragonath Row, which is entered hereafter.

The Commiſſary, Mr. Holmes, being ſent for, and aſked, How long he can depend for a Certainty on ſupplying the Army with Proviſions? informs the Committee, From his Stock now in Hand, which is all he can depend on, he can ſupply the Army till the 28th incluſive, barring the Accidents which on our further Advance into the Country we may expect, having met with ſome Loſs on our March of Yeſterday: And the Commander in Chief, Colonel Cockburn, being called on, further acquaints the Committee, that without a Body of Horſe he thinks it impoſſible, as we advance further into the open Country, to ſecure our Baggage from the numerous Cavalry, and that of courſe the Proviſions are equally expoſed with the reſt of it.

Upon duly weighing theſe Circumſtances, it appears clearly that the Prediction Ragonath Row mentioned in our Proceedings of the 6th Inſtant, relative to the Multiplication of our Diſtreſſes as we advance forward, are now certainly verified; and that even ſhould we proceed to Poona during the Courſe of any Negociation that might be opened, the Army would moſt probably be reduced to ſuch Diſtreſs as would compel us into any Terms the Party we might treat with ſhould think fit to impoſe upon us, for it is certainly not preſumable that they would fail to avail themſelves of a Circumſtance ſo ſignally favourable as our total Dependance on them for Proviſions, which they muſt very ſoon perceive.

With

With reſpect to the confident Aſſertion of Ragoba relative to the Junction of Holcar, and to ſupplying our Army with Proviſions for ſome Days from this Place, we muſt obſerve from the Information of Mr. Holmes, who has examined into the Probability of this with his own Eyes, that Ragoba, whatever he may be led to believe by the People about him, muſt be ſo totally deceived in this Point of Supply that there is no Dependance on him. It appears that what Grain the Enemy could not carry off from the Plunder of this Place, they have ſcattered in the Streets, and mixed with pernicious Seeds ſo as to render it almoſt wholly uſeleſs. As to the Junction of Holcar, it appears wholly imprudent to ſuffer ourſelves to be led into a Scene of Diſtreſs by this ſo long protracted Hope; but as from the Report of the Commander of Artillery it appears requiſite to remain here one Day longer, we may make a Virtue of this Neceſſity by a Compliance with his Requeſt, and at the ſame Time acquaint him if we are now deceived, this Compliance he muſt feel to be the laſt we can poſſibly give into; and farther, to do as much as in us lies towards fulfilling the Hope he entertains of the Junction of Holcar: It is reſolved, immediately to write that Chief a ſuitable Letter, reminding him of his Promiſe made to Mr. Moſtyn, and expreſſing our Surprize, that inſtead of joining us he appears now in league with our Enemies, and acting hoſtilely againſt us; as we mean to oblige Ragoba to fulfil all the Promiſes and Engagements which had been made him relative to the Jaghire.

Mr. Lewis preſents to the Committee a Paper, containing Information relative to the [illegible] Body of Troops belonging to Moraba Furneeze into the Conkan. On this we muſt obſerve, that however uſeful this Body might be, it does not appear to us that this Circumſtance can effectually relieve our preſent main Difficulty, which conſiſts in the total Improbability of any further Supply of Proviſions but through the Conkan.

Upon due Conſideration of every Circumſtance, it is reſolved inſtantly to ſend off Copies of the Minutes of Yeſterday's and this Day's Conſultation, for the Information of our Superiors at Bombay. And unleſs the Army of Tookajee Holcar does join us conformable to the Aſſurances of Ragoba, it is farther reſolved, however diſpleaſing the Circumſtance may be, to ſecure effectually the Preſervation of our Army, by falling back ſo far from this Place as is requiſite to ſecure our Communication with the Conkan, and that the Commander of the Army muſt be inſtantly acquainted with our Reſolution, in order that he may have Time to concert the requiſite Means for putting it in Execution.

As to the Troops of Moraba, ſaid to be below the Gauts, they will be of infinite Service, conducting our Supplies of Proviſions through the Conkan, and therefore the Officers who command them muſt be directed by the Agent of Moraba Furneeze to remain at Campoly till he receive further Directions from him. Mr. Frazer muſt be immediately acquainted with the Circumſtances of theſe Troops being friendly to us, but directed not to ſuffer them to aſcend through the Paſs he commands till further Orders.

Adjourned.

John Carnac.
Charles Egerton.

Mr. Sibbald this Evening waited upon Ragoba by the Committee's Directions, to make known to him the Reſolutions of this Day, which he delivered to the following Effect: That Ragoba muſt be ſenſible that when the Governor and Select Committee firſt engaged, by Treaty, to ſupport him and place him in the Regency of the Maratta Empire, that they were induced thereto by the Aſſurances of being joined by a conſiderable Body of Troops belonging to Holcar, and other Maratta Chiefs who had entered into Engagements with the late Mr. Moſtyn to this Effect, and which Aſſurances had been repeatedly confirmed to the Committee by Ragoba himſelf, at their different Meetings ſince leaving Bombay, till within theſe Two Days paſt; but that he himſelf now allowed Matters were ſo ſenſibly altered, that he did not expect to be joined by any one, unleſs a Defeat could be given to the Miniſterial Army now in our Fronts, which by their Mode of Proceeding, in retreating as we advanced, appeared impracticable: That he muſt therefore allow that we are greatly deceived and diſappointed in his Aſſurances and Repreſentation; and that ſo far from having any Friends in the Empire, that the whole Empire was in Arms againſt him, and Holcar amongſt the reſt, who was the Perſon he ſeemed to have the moſt Dependence upon: That it was with Concern the Committee muſt obſerve that they had too good Reaſon to believe that there ſubſiſted a total Want of Confidence on the Part of the Maratta Chiefs in his Promiſes and Aſſurances; and that no Negociation would ever be ſet on Foot with them, unleſs commenced by us. In this Situation of Affairs (as he was acquainted we had only 16 Days Proviſion for the Army) the Committee ſaw an abſolute Neceſſity of taking ſuch Meaſures as appeared to them eligible, without further Dependance on him, and had therefore ſent to adviſe him, that they were determined, in the Name of the Engliſh Company, to invite Holcar, Scindia, and Saccaram, to a Conference, and upon their ſhewing an Inclination to join the Engliſh in the preſent Buſineſs, that we would guarantee to them their reſpective Jaghires, together with all their other Pretenſions, as Officers of the Maratta State.—After deliberating ſome Time upon the Subject of the Committee's Meſſage, he allowed that their Reaſons for their Determinations were juſt; that he certainly did give us the ſtrongeſt Aſſurances of being joined by a large Body of Troops, in which he had found himſelf deceived: He allowed that Holkar appeared in Arms againſt him, and that he had this Day Two Guns firing upon our Camp, but that conformable to his

Aſſurances

ſurances all their Shot had fallen ſhort. He however earneſtly requeſted the Committee would de- r for One Day writing to any of the Maratta Chiefs but Holcar, as he expected in the Courſe of o-morrow a Vackeel from Scindia, which a Letter from the Committee might probably prevent, as e would from thence infer that we began to deſpair of Succeſs, which would of courſe encourage e Whole of the Miniſterial Party to hold our. Mr. Sibbald obſerves to him, that the Loſs of a ay would be a Matter of no great Conſideration, had we any Proſpect of meeting with Supplies of roviſions for our Army; but as that was not the Caſe, we had not an Hour to loſe. To this he re- lied, that the Care of ſupplying the Army with Proviſions was his, and that he would furniſh the ommiſſary from this Town with a ſufficient Quantity for ſome Days, and that we ſhould get more the next Village.

To the Honourable William Hornby, Eſquire, Preſident, &c. Select Committee, Bombay.

Gentlemen,

We addreſſed you on the 6th inſtant, and now ſend a Duplicate of that Addreſs.

On the 7th in the Morning the Army moved from the Plain below Mondhurna to Carculla, on the 8th from Carculla to Wargoan, and on the 9th from Wargaon to this Place, where we were given to expect they had aſſembled their whole Force, and were determined to make a Stand and oppoſe our Advance; the Event however has proved to us their Determination of adhering to their Plan of burning the Towns, ravaging the Country, harraſſing us, and cutting off our Supplies of Proviſions. We are informed, that on Friday laſt the 8th, about Noon, this Town was given up firſt to be plundered, and on the Evening of that Day it was ſet on Fire. We found it Yeſterday in Flames as we entered, which was with ſo little Oppoſition, that we are convinced they do not mean to hazard an Engagement with us, but under ſome manifeſt Diſadvantage on our Side. The Mode they have invariably purſued is a very diſtant Cannonade, and by Movements with their Horſe, harraſſing our Men by conſtantly engaging our Attention on every Side.

For the Sake of Expedition, we determined to ſend you immediately Copies of the Minutes of our Conſultations when met in Committee Yeſterday and To-day, which will fully inform you of our Situation and Intentions. We are informed, that Saccaram, Nanah, Holcar, Scindia, Bhim Row, Ponſia, and Hurry Punt, with other Chiefs, are now in the Field, and that the real Number of their Troops is about 25,000 Horſe.

We are, with Reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servants,
Jn° Carnac,
Cha' Egerton.

Tullegaon,
10th January
1779.

To Tookajee Holcar.

After Compliments:

The Agreements which you made with Mr. Moſtyn are well known to you. The Engliſh Army is now come to this Place in their Way to Poona, and I am much ſurprized that you have not yet acted according to your Promiſe; if you have any Doubts about what was promiſed you by Mr. Moſtyn, on the Part of the Company, I muſt tell you that the Government of Bombay has given the full Powers to ſettle theſe Matters into my Hands. I know what Mr. Moſtyn told you; and I write this Letter under the Seal of the Company, to acquaint you, if you comply with your Agreements, I will ſecure to you fully all that was promiſed by Mr. Moſtyn, and the Engliſh Friendſhip to you will laſt for ever. What can I ſay more?

J. Carnac.

At a Committee; PRESENT, Monday,

John Carnac,
Colonel Charles Egerton.

Read, and approved, the Minutes of our laſt Meeting.

The Committee met to conſider on the following Report from Mr. Sibbald:

That Ragonath Row had told him, that finding the Neceſſity of gaining over Scindia to his Party, he had Three Days ago written him a Letter, ſignifying to him, that though the Miniſters had confederated againſt his Government, and were deſtroying the State, yet it was ill in him and Holcar, the Two ancient Officers of the Circar, to abet them; that he wiſhed to end every Thing amicably with them, and therefore offered them his Friendſhip; and that if Scindia would ſend Two Perſons to talk with him, whom he named, he truſted by their Means to accommodate all Differences: That he muſt not think he made this Overture from any Senſe of an Inability to oppoſe his Enemies, as he held himſelf equal to it by the Aid of the Europeans only, but that theſe Europeans, in taking

Part in his Quarrels, ſought only their own Aggrandizement, and to obtain the Country; which neither ſuited his Views or Scindia's. That Scindia had returned an Anſwer, the Purport of which was, that he had ſent Two Perſons who would communicate what he had to ſay on the Subject; and if it then pleaſed Ragoba, he might ſend his Orders, and the Two Men he requeſted ſhould come: That Ragoba had ſent back theſe Two Men, deſiring Scindia's Vackeels might be ſent, as that he expected them this Evening; he ſaid his Scheme in this was, by a total Compliance with the Demands of Scindia, to gain him over for the preſent, and afterwards he would do as he pleaſed; that he meant even to deſire the Company's Guarantee to his Agreement with him —Whilſt the Committee was debating on this Buſineſs, a Meſſage arrived from Ragoba to Mr. Sibbald, who on his Return acquainted the Committee, that Ragoba now told him, that the Two Men he had ſent back to Scindia had been prevented from going by a Party of Horſe, and that therefore he could not expect the Vackeels of Scindia To-night; but as the People were gone in the Habit of Joguys, and it was now Two Hours ſince he had ſent them, he hoped they might get ſafe, and that he ſoon ſhould have an Anſwer.

Whatever Importance the gaining over Scindia may be in our preſent Situation, yet this is not Ground we do not think ſufficient to warrant any Departure from our Reſolutions of Yeſterday, particularly as it is now certain, that though Holcar may not act againſt, yet that he cannot act for us. This Ragoba plainly declares; and in further Confirmation, Mr. Carnac now lays before the Committee a Letter from Lieutenant Richardſon, this Inſtant received.

Reſolved therefore, That the Commander of the Army, Colonel Cockburn, who was preſent at this Committee, and concurred in Opinion with us, be directed to march back the Army this Night towards Condolah.

John Carnac,
Charles Egerton.

Adjourned.

To Colonel Goddard, commanding the Engliſh Forces from Bengal.

Sir,

You will no Doubt ere this have received Advice from the Select Committee at Bombay, of our being appointed conjointly with Mr. Thomas Moſtyn, who is ſince deceaſed, a Committee for conducting Ragonath Row to Poona, and their Directions for your communicating with us on all important Occaſions.

Within theſe Two Days paſt the Face of our Affairs is ſo changed with reſpect to the primary Cauſe that led to directing your March towards Kineer, a Fort in Poſſeſſion of Moraba Furnaeſe, that we muſt now give you the following Advice:

If you are joined by ſuch a Body of the Forces of Moodajee Bouncello, that you can advance forward in ſpite of an Enemy, who with a large Body of Cavalry will keep hovering round you on all Quarters, aiming at the Seizures of your Baggage and Proviſions; and if you have alſo a ſufficient Quantity of Proviſions to laſt you till you can either reach Broach or Surat, we would then adviſe you to proceed forward to either of thoſe Places, as may be moſt convenient for your ſpeedy Arrival there, but if you think you cannot proceed forward in Face of ſuch an Enemy as we have deſcribed, without imminent Hazard of Diſtreſs on your March, from Accidents happening to your Proviſions, or a Supply of which you may not be certain till your Arrival either at Broach or Surat, we then adviſe you to remain on the Borders of Berar, or wherever you think you can ſecure Proviſions, till you may receive further Directions from the Select Committee at Bombay.

We are,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
Jn° Carnac,
Ch. Egerton.

Camp at Tullegaon,
11th January 1779.

To Lieutenant Colonel William Cockburn, commanding the Engliſh Forces now at Tullegaon.

Sir,

Having maturely deliberated upon the Neceſſity of the Meaſure, you are hereby directed to march back the Army under your Command towards the Paſs at Condolah, as expeditiouſly as poſſible.

We are, Sir,
Your obedient humble Servants,
J. Carnac,
Ch. Egerton.

Tullegaon,
11th January 1779.

Wedneſday, 12th. The Army fell back to the Village of Wurgaon.

Receiv

APPENDIX, N° 130.

Received the following Letter from the Honourable the Select Committee at Bombay. Wednesday, 13th.

To John Carnac, Eſquire, and Colonel Charles Egerton.

Gentlemen,

Having thought proper to promote Major Gaſpar Dagon to the Rank of Lieutenant Colonel: I now encloſe a Commiſſion for him, ſigned by the Board, which you are accordingly to deliver him.

We are very ſorry to adviſe you that Mr. Moſtyn departed this Life, the 1ſt Inſtant, at this place.

We are,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servants,
William Hornby,
Daniel Draper.

Bombay Caſtle,
7th January 1779.

Addreſſed the Honourable the Select Committee at Bombay, in the following Letter.

To the Honourable William Hornby, Eſquire, Preſident, &c. Select Committee, Bombay.

Gentlemen,

Agreeable to what was written to you under the 9th Inſtant from Tullegaon, we fell back with the Army to this Place on Yeſterday Morning; and the Enemy having by ſome Means got Intelligence of our moving, attacked us on the March before Day-light, which they continued with great Vigour until 2 o'Clock in the Afternoon. Their numerous Bodies of Cavalry rendered it impoſſible to protect our Baggage, a Part of which conſequently fell into their Hands, as the commanding Officer foretold would be the Caſe; and it is with Concern we acquaint you, that in the Courſe of the very long Attack our People Yeſterday ſuſtained, we ſuffered ſome Loſs, the Particulars of which ſhall be hereafter tranſmitted. In Juſtice to our Troops, both Europeans and Sepoys, we have the Pleaſure to acquaint you, that they behaved with the utmoſt Intrepidity and Alacrity during the whole Attack.

We ſhall continue our March to Condolah with all poſſible Expedition, in the Purſuit of which we expect to be much harraſſed; but to render our Baggage as little troubleſome as poſſible, and our Body as compact as Circumſtances will admit, the Commanding Officer means to reduce every Part of the Baggage that is not abſolutely neceſſary.

We are, with Reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servants,
J. Carnac,
Ch. Egerton.

Wurgaon,
13th January 1779.

A Committee held to deliberate relative to Overtures for the peaceable Return of the Army to Bombay. No Minutes taken, being in a ſevere Cannonade, and a Number of Perſons ſtanding round.

Letter to the Peſhwa.
Ditto from Ditto, in Anſwer.
Ditto to Ditto, at Night.

This Morning Mr. Farmer was ſent to the Maratta Camp to propoſe an Accommodation, which we judged might be brought about by Ragoba's going over to Scindia, which he ſeemed determined to do, rather than run the Riſk of another Day's March with our Army, as he declared his Fears of its proving fatal both to him and us, ſo great an Idea does he ſeem to entertain of the Enemy's Strength. We directed Mr. Farmer to deliver the following Meſſage to the Durbar "that having had Aſſurances given us, that the Eſtabliſhment of Ragoba in the Regency of the Maratta Empire, was a Meaſure much wiſhed for by many of the Sirdars of the Maratta Sircar, as well as by the Country in general, we had conſented to conduct him with an Engliſh Army for that Purpoſe; but contrary to our Hopes and Expectations, we found his Eſtabliſhment oppoſed by the whole Empire: That we had ſeen with infinite Concern the Country laid waſte and deſtroyed at our Approach, which being ſo very contrary to our Intentions by eſpouſing the Cauſe of Ragoba, that we were determined to be the Occaſion of no further Deſolation, and were therefore reſolved to march back with the Army to Bombay: That after this Declaration, we expected all Hoſtilities ſhould ceaſe, and by ſo doing, Peace and Friendſhip would be eſtabliſhed between the Engliſh and the Maratta State; if on the other Hand ſhould we experience the leaſt Act of Hoſtility on our part, we ſhould conſider it as a Declaration of War againſt the Engliſh Nation." Thurſday, 14th.

Received

APPENDIX, N° 136.

Received the following Letter, with a Note written in Cypher, from Mr. Farmer,

To John Carnac, and Charles Egerton, Eſquires.

Gentlemen,

I was conducted to the Topa High Hill, where I was preſented to Mhadja Scindia, Nana Furneeze, and Hurry Punt Furkia, as to the Durbar, and delivered them your Letter. They appointed Hurry Punt Furkia, and Badjes Punt Ponſia to talk with me, and deliver their Anſwer. I explained the Cauſe of our coming in the Manner you directed, and the Reaſon of our Return; and I left it to them to accept on one Hand the Friendſhip of the Engliſh Nation, by ſuffering us to return peaceably, or their Enmity by moleſting us on our March. After many Exclamations at our coming thus uninvited, and repreſenting the great Charges and Loſs their State had ſuſtained by the Aid given to Ragoba, their final Anſwer is this, That if we wiſh to remain at Peace with them, Ragonath Row muſt be delivered up, and then we may return quietly; otherwiſe, we may do as we pleaſe. I write ſurrounded with People, not permitted to go down to my Cheſt for Paper, and hardly permitted to have my Palankeen brought up, and I am to wait your final Anſwer regarding which, I dare not venture any Opinion.

I am with Reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servant,
W. G. Farmer.

Maratta Camp,
14th January, 12 A.M.
1779.

The Purport of the Note received from Mr. Farmer, written in Cyphers.

They are fully informed of your State. I ſee no Remedy, but either to give Scindia to underſtand, through Ragoba, that you ſhall puſh on with him in your Hand at all Perils, or to treat with them whilſt you have him, which muſt ſtill be on their own Terms. Of Proviſion there are no Hopes.

As Ragoba has already intimated his Intentions of delivering himſelf up to Scindia rather than run the Riſk of marching with our Army, and has in Conſequence carried on a Correſpondence with Scindia for Two Days paſt, we think in the preſent Situation of Affairs it is moſt adviſable to write to Mr. Farmer, that all Difficulty of Accommodation is removed by Ragobah's Deſign of going over to Scindia; and that we expect in conſequence the proper Securities from the Durbar for our proceeding unmoleſted on our March.

Sent off the following Letter to Mr. Farmer at Ten o'Clock this Morning.

To Mr. William Gamul Farmer.

Sir,

We have juſt received your Letter; and have in Anſwer to acquaint you, that we do not conceive there will be any Difficulty in complying with the Propoſition of the Miniſters, as Ragoba has juſt informed us of his Deſire to deliver himſelf up to Madjee Scindia at Nine o'Clock To-morrow Morning, in conſequence of a Conference he had this Morning with his Vackeels; and upon his ſo doing we have no Doubt that the Miniſters will give us proper Security on their Part for a due Performance of the Terms now propoſed, and that you will return with them. Mr. Sibbald will accompany Ragoba to Scindia's Encampment.

We are,
Sir,
Your obedient Servants,
J. Carnac,
Ch. Egerton.

Wurgaon Camp,
14th January 1779.

This Morning Mr. Farmer's Servant returned with the following Letter diſpatched laſt Night.

To John Carnac, Eſquire, and Colonel Charles Egerton.

Gentlemen,

I waited on the Top of the Hill where the Durbar ſat till near Sunſet, when I received your and having ſent to acquaint Hurry Punt Furkia with an Anſwer being come, he conducted me Nanah Furneeſe: I there told them, That the Difficulty which I apprehended was removed, by Determination of Ragoba to ſurrender himſelf to Madjee Scindia; and I now imagined the Durbar would preſerve the Friendſhip of the Engliſh Nation, by ſuffering our Army to return quietly Bombay. Nanah Furneeze ſaid, as we had broken the Treaty concluded by Colonel Upton, before our Army moved we muſt agree to remain as we were by our Treaty formed with the late Peſhwa Nanah. I obſerved, that in the Morning the only Difficulty that was ſtarted was relative to Ragoba who had ſmoothed it by conſenting to ſurrender himſelf; that I deſired at once an explicit Anſwer whether or not Hoſtages would be given for the March of the Army to Bombay, if Ragoba ſurren-

rrender himſelf? They then ſaid they muſt conſult Madjee Scindia. I then withdrew; and after nie Time Hurry Pundit came again to me, and told me I might go to my Tent To-night, and at an Anſwer would be delivered to me in the Morning; but I inſiſted on a clear and poſitive Anſwer inſtantly to that Queſtion relative to Hoſtages for our proceeding unmoleſted, if Dada Saheb as permitted to ſurrender himſelf to Scindia. Hurry Punt went back, and I was ſoon after introduced to a Durbar, where Madjee Scindia entirely preſided. Hurry Punt was there, and other Perns whom I did not know. After ſtating the Buſineſs which I came on this Morning, which related ly to the Two Queſtions, whether they would ſuffer us to proceed peaceably to Bombay? or, ether they would declare what, by moleſting us? and reminding him of the Objection relative to e Perſon of Ragoba being removed, by his voluntary Conſent to ſurrender himſelf, I deſired an plicit Anſwer. He ſaid, that as to the Surrender of Ragoba, it mattered little; that we muſt ſettle new Treaty with the Maratta State, the One made by Colonel Upton being entirely broke by the reſent Invaſion of their Country. In a few Words, they ſeem to me to feel themſelves in that uation with reſpect to us, which the Turkiſh Vizier felt himſelf in with reſpect to Peter the Iſt, the Time the Empreſs Catherine ſent in her Jewels to the Vizier. I dare not ſpeak any plainer; ut by their Language you may judge what they think: In any Situation whatever, they could not eak in a higher Tone. The Reſult of my Converſation with Scindia was juſt this, that whether ere was Peace or War, it was equal to him; but that having broken the Treaty made with Colonel pton, we muſt now on the Spot ſet about forming a new one, to ſerve as a future Guide between e Maratta State and the Engliſh. I told him, that my Buſineſs at firſt related only to the Two oints, of their permitting us to proceed peaceably, or not; that I had then further to deſire an explit Anſwer relative to the wilful Surrender of the Perſon of Ragoba. To both which he replied, that cluſive of this, a Peace muſt now be ſettled betwixt the Maratta State and the Engliſh on the Spot. hat I had no Directions about this; but I would communicate to you this Night what he ſaid, and t an Anſwer To morrow Morning. Although my Heart is full, yet I muſt reſtrain my Pen; nor re I by any Means, in ſo nice a Caſe, offer any *Mark* to guide you by. I beg a ſpeedy Anſwer to is, and remain with Reſpect,

Your obedient humble Servant,
W. G. Farmer.

P. S. I waited on the Hill where the Durbar met till paſt 7; and where I was then led, and how conducted, the Bearer will inform you. I am afraid no good Effect will come from my Deputation, though I riſk my Life: By what with Want of Food, and Watching, I am fatigued to Death; ſo you will excuſe my writing. 11 o'Clock, 14th January.

Colonel Cockburn being called upon by the Committee to give his Opinion in Writing, relative to the Practicability of marching back the Army to Bombay, delivers in the following:

Being called upon for my Opinion on the Poſſibility of making a Retreat to Bombay, I muſt declare that I think the ſame utterly impracticable. Our Troops are already much harraſſed and diſpirited from the Neceſſity we were under of retiring from Tullegaon; and were we to ſuſtain another Attack from the Maratta Army, I am of Opinion the Troops would not ſtand it; and that conſequently the whole Army, with its numerous Followers, would be cut to Pieces. But the Diſtance from Panwell being about Forty-five Miles, it is not the Attack of One Day we ſhould have to ſuſtain, as I think, were it poſſible to move from hence, that we could not gain that Place in Twenty Days; and it is therefore chimerical to the laſt Degree to ſuppoſe that our ſmall Army could ſupport themſelves from the daily Attacks they would be certain of for ſo long a Period. I therefore cannot charge myſelf to conduct the Army under theſe Circumſtances to Bombay; and Humanity muſt prompt ſome other Method than an Attempt to retire in the Face of the whole Strength of the Maratta Empire with ſuch a Handful of Men, who muſt in ſuch Caſe be ſacrificed.

Wm Cockburn.

Camp, at Wurgaon,
15th January 1779.

We obſerve with Concern, that the Enemy appear too ſenſible of our preſent very diſagreeable Situation from the dictatorial Strain in which they now deliver themſelves. It is however neceſſary, we think, to adviſe Mr. Farmer that we have no Powers to enter into or conclude any Treaties, ſuch Powers being lodged ſolely with the Governor General and Council of Bengal; but if the Durbar will abide by their firſt Propoſal, we are ready to agree to it on our Parts.

To Mr. William Gamul Farmer.

Sir,

We received your Letter of laſt Night only an Hour ago, the Harcarrahs having been detained ſome Accident. In Anſwer to which you muſt acquaint the Durbar, that they demand what have no Power to agree to, the entering into and concluding Treaties being ſolely confined to Governor General and Council of Calcutta, to whom therefore they muſt ſend their Vackeels. e only Power left to us, is the giving up the Cauſe and Perſon of Ragonath Row, which done,

muſt certainly put an End to all Diſputes between the Engliſh and the Maratta State, and there is no Doubt that Peace and Friendſhip will then ſubſiſt between us from henceforwards.

You muſt inform them, ſhould we enter into any Treaty we ſhould only deceive them, having no ſuch Powers; we therefore deſire they will immediately acquaint us, whether upon our abiding by the Conditions firſt propoſed, of delivering up Ragoba, they will comply on their Parts by ſuffering us to march unmoleſted to Bombay, and for which Purpoſe to give us the neceſſary Securities.

We are, Sir,

Your moſt obedient Servants,

Jn° Carnac,
Ch. Egerton.

Wurgaon,
15th January 1779.

As we have good Reaſon to believe, that a Gentleman being ſent from us to Madjee Scindia, is more likely to produce an Accommodation than a Deputation to the Durbar in general;

Reſolved, immediately to diſpatch Mr. Thomas Holmes, who has offered himſelf for that Purpoſe; and to give him full Powers to ſettle with the Durbah for the peaceable Return of the Army to Bombay, on ſuch Conditions as he may be able to obtain, ſince it is the Opinion of the Commander in Chief that a Retreat is impracticable.

At Noon To-day received the following Letter from Mr. Farmer, dated this Morning, which it is now unneceſſary to anſwer, as Mr. Holmes is diſpatched with full Powers.

To John Carnac, Eſquire, and Colonel Charles Egerton.

Gentlemen,

I am this Inſtant arrived at the Durbar, where your Letter was delivered to me by Ajeet Bawn, on the Part of Mhadjee Scindy: As repreſenting the Durbar, he deſired to be informed of the Contents; when I explained what you ſaid relative to the want of Powers, and deſired an explicit Anſwer relative to the ſingle Propoſition, whether on the Delivery of Ragoba, Securities would be given for our ſafe and unmoleſted Arrival at Bombay? He obſerved in Anſwer, That if you had not Powers to make new Treaties, he wiſhed to ſee by what Powers you broke that made by Colonel Upton, by the Aid given to Ragoba, and deſired an explicit Anſwer, whether or not it was by virtue of any direct Authority from the Governor General and Council, that if it was he deſired to ſee that Authority, in order that he might look to them about it. I told him, this was foreign to the Buſineſs, and that I requeſted the explicit Anſwer mentioned in your Letter; but ſtill he inſiſts firſt knowing by what Authority you acted, becauſe, if you acted on your own Authority you muſt anſwer it, and make a new Agreement. A true Tranſlation of your Letter was demanded, and I was given to underſtand, that if I did not give one, there were People in the Camp who underſtood Engliſh. I am rather ſorry for it, becauſe your own Declarations ſeem to preclude all peaceable Arrangements. After much Talk, I brought the Matter to this Point, That in reſpect to what was paſt, we expected every Thing to be forgot in conſequence of our returning back; that Dada Sahab had coſt us many Lacks of Rupees; that all we had now left of him was his Perſon; that I deſired to know, whether on the Delivery of his Perſon, our Army ſhould be permitted to proceed quietly to Bombay without further Diſpute, and whether Securities would be given for that Purpoſe? the Anſwer I received is plainly this, That Dada Saheb may be ſurrendered, or not, as we pleaſe; but till a new Treaty is made between the Engliſh and the Maratta State, our Army muſt remain where it is, whatever may be the Conſequence.

I am,

Gentlemen,

Your moſt obedient
humble Servant,

W. G. Farmer.

Maratta Camp,
15th January 1779.

This Night about 10 o'Clock Mr. Holmes returned from the Maratta Camp, and adviſes us that he has ſettled Matters with Mhadjee Scindia, and the reſt of the Durbar, for the peaceable Return of the Army to Bombay on the only Conditions they would hear of, and which are ſuch as cannot fail to fill us with the deepeſt Concern, being humiliating in the higheſt Degree, and which nothing but the avowed Opinion and Declaration of the principal Officers, as to the Impracticability of effecting our Retreat, could juſtify our acceding to. We muſt however obſerve, that Madajee Scindia and the whole Durbar, cannot plead Ignorance of our want of Powers to conclude ſuch a Treaty as they have now preſcribed to us; they having demanded both a true Explanation and Tranſlation of our Letter of Yeſterday to Mr. Farmer, wherein we expreſsly direct him to acquaint them, that we have no Powers to enter into any Treaty whatever; that were we to pretend ſuch Powers, we ſhould be only deceiving them, ſo they have evidently compelled us to enter into a Treaty, they were apprized we had no Powers to agree to.

Wurgaon, Saturday, 16th. Mr. Holmes returned this Morning to Scindia's Encampment, in order to finiſh the Agreement, of which a rough Sketch was Yeſterday drawn out.

APPENDIX, N° 130.

This Evening Meſſrs. Farmer and Holmes returned from the Maratta Camp, with Scindia's Vacceels, in order for their having an Interview with us, and to ſee the Treaty entered into duly executed; of which a Tranſlate is hereafter entered, as alſo of a ſeparate Article in Favour of Mhadajee Scindia, which Meſſrs. Farmer and Holmes adviſe us they were obliged to conſent to.

Tranſlation of the Articles of Agreement between Seremunt Mhaderow Narrain, Pundit Purdhan, on one Part, and the Engliſh Company on the other Part.

In the Time of the late Seremunt Pundit Purdhan Mhadoo Row Bullol, Matters went on peaceably; ſince then, the Engliſh obtained Poſſeſſion of ſeveral Places belonging to the Sircar, ſuch as the Iſlands of Salſette and Ouram, Jambooſeer, and the Mahaals and Purgunnahs of Broach, both belonging to the Sircar and the Guicawar; and the Engliſh gave their Aid to Ragonath Row Dada Saheb. Upon which, War having commenced, Colonel John Upton came from Calcutta with full Powers, and made an Agreement; and according to that Agreement Matters were to go on between the Company and the Maratta Sircar. But on the Side of the Engliſh this Agreement was not adhered to; they having given Aid to Ragonath Row, and making Preparations for War, mounted the Gauts, invaded the Diſtricts of the Maratta Sircar, and began to make Hoſtilities; upon which the Sircar alſo prepared for War. At the Diſtrict of Wurgaon, near Indonny Tulligarn, Mr. John Carnac and Colonel Charles Egerton, of the Select Committee of Bombay, being fully empowered, did depute Mr. Thomas Holmes and Mr. Farmer. Further, from the Beginning there was a Friendſhip between the Sircar and the Engliſh; which being interrupted, Colonel John Upton made an Agreement, according to which Treaty Matters did not proceed, and therefore that Treaty is annihilated; and in the ſame Manner, and on the ſame Footing, as the Engliſh and the Sircar were in the Time of the late Mhadoo Row, in that Manner are they now to remain, the Aid and Cauſe of Ragoba to be given up, no Protection to be afforded him, nor any Aid to be afforded to the Enemies of the Maratta Sircar. The Iſlands of Salſette and Ouram, and the other Iſlands and Places, as Jambooſeer and the Mhaals of Broach, formerly belonging to the Maratta Sircar, and the Guicawar, ſuch as Chickly, Veriow, &c. were taken Poſſeſſion of; theſe we give up, and agree to go on and remain as we were in the Time of the late Peſhwah Mhadoo Row Bullol. Upon which this Agreement is made with the Sircar. That in the Time of the late Mhadoo Row Bullol Pundit Purdhan, Matters went on peaceably; and ſince then different Places belonging to the Sircar, ſuch as the Iſlands of Salſette and Ouram, and other Iſlands, and further Jambooſeer and other Mahaals, and the Aumils of Broach, belonging to the Sircar and to the Guicawar, the Engliſh got Poſſeſſion of; theſe muſt be delivered back to the Sircar, and no Aid or Protection muſt in future be afforded to Ragonath Row, or to any of the Enemies of the Sircar. In this Manner do we faithfully promiſe to perform; and on the Part of the Sircar good Faith is alſo to be obſerved. Ragonath Row Dada Saheb was with us; he by his own free Conſent committed himſelf, with all his Effects, to the Care of Tookajee Holcar and Madjee Scindy. The Engliſh Army with us is now at Wurgaon: It muſt be permitted to proceed, with all its Effects and Appurtenances, to Bombay; and as Security for this on the Part of the Sircar, Two Perſons will proceed, belonging to each of the Sirdars, by Name Nazo Gunciſh and Wiſſajee Samaſh, Ballanow Govind and Rana Cawn, to conduct the Army to Bombay; and for this Purpoſe Troops ſhall be ſent with you, or not, as you pleaſe. The Engliſh Army that is with us ſhall not offer any Moleſtation to any Perſon on the Road. The Antrewede and Bundlecund Provinces, and their Sardars, being always under the Sircar, no Damage is to be done to them; and the Engliſh Army from Calcutta having croſſed the Nerbuddah, is now at Huſſengabad: It is not to be permitted to proceed forwards, but is to be ſent back to Calcutta; and on the Road no Moleſtation is to be given to any one. The before-mentioned Agreement is formed by the Mediation of Tookajee Holcar and Madjee Scindy, and according to it Matters are in future to proceed, without any Kind of Failure. This we pledge the Engliſh Faith to obſerve; and the Sircar is alſo to obſerve it. No Aid or Protection is to be afforded to the French.

Signed in the Maratta Camp,	D° in the Engliſh D°,
by	by
Thomas Holmes,	Jn° Carnac,
and	and
W. G. Farmer.	Ch. Egerton.

Agreement of John Carnac, Eſquire, Counſellor, and Colonel Egerton, an Engliſh Committee of Bombay, with Madjee Scindia.

That after falling out with the Sircar of Mhaderow Narrain Pundit Pradhan, we with an Army came upon the Gaut, and remained at Tullegaon; on which you ordered a fighting, and we both parties did fight, in which we were defeated; returned back, and encamped at Wurgaon with Dada Saheb. We could hardly reach Bombay with our Army and Stores; conſidering which we ſent Meſſrs. Farmer and Holmes to you, deſiring you would come between us, and get the Sircars and the Treaty ſettled as before, and conduct us and the Army to Bombay: You came between us and the Sircars and Engliſh Treaty ſettled, and you promiſed to conduct us and the Army to Bombay,

bay, without Moleſtation from any body: You made our Eſcape entirely; all which we took into our Conſideration and were very glad: You are a principal Officer and Well-wiſher to this Government, which has induced us to keep a Friendſhip with you; this came into our Mind, and we were ſatisfied: That you made us free from the Sircar's and every body's Moleſtation, and got the Factory ſettled as before, without any Diſpute from the Sircar; therefore we thought we ſhould ſerve you, and for which Reaſon have of our free Will and Accord agreed, under the King's and Company's Seal, to deliver up to you the Fort of Broach, with its Government, in the ſame Manner the Mogul did hold it; which Fort is now in our Poſſeſſion, and which we have given you. We further agree that we will on our Arrival at Bombay obtain the Governor's Duſtuck under the King's Seal to the Killedar of Broach, and deliver the Fort and its Country in the Manner the Mogul did hold it, unto you. Under Oath no Diſpute ſhall ariſe in this: This we promiſe ſolemnly; and we have left Mr. Farmer and Mr. Charles Stewart with you as Hoſtages for the Performance of this Agreement; we will let no Diſpute ariſe: This we agree to in Writing.

Wurgaon near Fullegam, 27th Julheze.

N.B. The above was tranſlated by a native Linguiſt, and is an exact Copy thereof.

Sunday, 17th. This Moring Mr. Farmer returned to the Maratta Camp with Madjee Scindia's Vackeel, with the Papers executed, and by whom we ſent Madjee Scindia a Preſent of a Horſe. He came back to our Camp about Noon, with a Party of Horſemen who are to accompany the Army to Panwell, and acquaints us we may march immediately, and that the Hoſtages mentioned in the Treaty will be taken us before we reach the Village of Korta.

The Army marched this Afternoon at One o'Clock, and reached Khamſetta about Six in the Evening

Monday, 18th. At Five this Morning the Army marched from Khamſetta, and arrived at Condolah about Ten o'Clock.

Tueſday, 19th. This Morning diſpatched the following Letter to Colonel Goddard:

To Colonel Goddard.

Sir,

We diſpatched you on the 16th a Letter, containing Orders which, upon Recollection, we do not think ourſelves authorized to give you, you are therefore to pay no Regard thereunto.

We are, Sir,

Your obedient humble Servants,

Jn° Carnac,
Ch. Egerton.

Campoly,
19 January 1779.

The Letter which we mention in the foregoing to have written Colonel Goddard under the 14th Inſtant, is not entered upon our Diary, as Mr. Farmer carried the original Letter with him to the Maratta Camp, and it eſcaped him to leave a Copy. The Purport however was to adviſe Colonel Goddard that the Face of Things was ſo materially altered ſince writing to him laſt, as to ſuppoſion our marching back to Bombay, and that in conſequence of an Agreement entered into here with the Maratta State, we now directed him to march back with the Army under his Command to Bengal.

This Morning the Army moved down the Gaut to Campoly.

Wedneſday, 20th. This Evening arrived a Pair of Hircarrahs with the following Letter from the Honourable the Select Committee:

To John Carnac, Eſquire, and Colonel Charles Egerton.

Gentlemen,

We have received your Letter of the 6th Inſtant, and having fully conſidered your Repreſentation of the State of Affairs, we are of Opinion, that the beſt and moſt effectual Way to improve your own Situation, and to induce Ragoba's Friends to declare openly in his Favour, will be for our Army to advance with Vigour and Expedition towards Poona; and we accordingly now ſend Inſtructions to that Effect to Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, to whom we find Colonel Egerton has delivered over the Command. Colonel Egerton's bad State of Health, and the Death of Mr. Moſtyn, rendering it neceſſary to make a new Arrangement in the Poona Committee, we have reſolved to appoint Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn and Mr. James Sibbald to ſupply the Places of the aforeſaid Gentlemen in the Committee, with the ſame Powers and Inſtructions as given to the former Committee, by our Commiſſion and general Letter, bearing Date the 5th of laſt Month; and hereby appoint John Carnac, Eſquire, Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, and Mr. James Sibbald, to be a Committee accordingly for the Uſes and Purpoſes mentioned in our ſaid Commiſſion and Letter of Inſtructions; obſerving nevertheleſs, that this Appointment is not to take place unleſs Colonel Egerton's bad State of Health ſhoul

ould ſtill continue to diſqualify him for public Buſineſs, or oblige him to return to Bombay; in ei-
ber of which Caſes Mr. Carnac is to act jointly with the above named Gentlemen in Manner afore-
id, and this Letter will be to them a ſufficient Warrant. Our Appointment of Major Dagon to
e Rank of Lieutenant Colonel, has anticipated your Application on that Subject; but we cannot
onſent to ſend to the Army the other Officers you mention. The Preſident has written very plainly to
agoba our Sentiments reſpecting the Circumſtances mentioned in your Letter; and we think a very
ood Method to bring the Matter to a Proof would be for you to deſire Ragoba to deliver to Mo-
bah Furneeze's Vackeel an Order to the Killadar Ahmadoraſut for his Releaſe, and to open the
ommunication through the Conkan, by affording Relief to the Port at the Head of the Gauts, which
e are much ſurprized, has been left deſtitute of all Kinds of Supplies. We have determined on
nding a Detachment of a Company of Europeans, Three of Sepoys, with Two Field Pieces, and
Party of Artillery Men, under the Command of Captain Richard Eames, to clear the Roads be-
ween Panwell and Campoly of the Maratta Horſe, which we learn are hovering in thoſe Parts, and
convoy a Supply of Proviſions to that Port. The Party is to be a ſeparate Command, and not to
e conſidered as belonging to the Army now above the Gauts.

We have juſt received a Letter from the Governor General and Council, of which we ſhall ſend
ou a Copy when the Roads are open. The Contents in ſhort are, That they have given Colonel
Goddard full Powers to conclude a Treaty with Moodajee Bouncello, for which Reaſon they think it
eceſſary to revoke the Controul they had given us over that Detachment, though they obſerve their
ntention is not to withdraw the Services of the Detachment entirely from the Support of any Mea-
ures we might have formed in Reliance of ſuch Support, if thoſe Meaſures ſhall not prove incom-
patible with the Inſtructions given to Colonel Goddard, and with the Engagements he may form in
conſequence. We ſhall however immediately deſcribe our preſent Situation to Colonel Goddard, who
on the 22d ultimo was ſtill at Huſſengabad, and preſs him to march towards Poona.

We are,

Bombay Caſtle,
11th January 1779.

Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
Wm. Hornby,
Daniel Draper.

19th January 1779.

The Pattamars diſpatched with this Letter having returned, it is neceſſary to acquaint you, that Lieutenant Fraſer has abandoned his Poſt at Condolah, and which it is reported is now in Poſſeſſion of the Enemy.

The following Letter to Colonel Cockburn was encloſed in the foregoing one to the Committee:

To Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn.

Sir,

As we find Colonel Egerton has been obliged by bad Health to reſign to you the chief Command of the Army, we judge it proper to obſerve to you, that from the Repreſentation we have received of the State of Affairs, it appears very neceſſary the Army ſhould advance with the utmoſt Vigour and Expedition towards Poona, in order to give Spirits to Ragoba's Friends, and ſecure Proviſions for our own Troops; we ſhall therefore truſt to your Activity and Zeal for the Service, that no Time be loſt in moving forwards, or Meaſure neglected to diſtreſs and fruſtrate the Attempts of the Enemy.

We are
Your loving Friends,
Wm. Hornby,
Dan'. Draper.

Bombay Caſtle,
11th January 1779.

Chowke, 21ſt January 1779.

Thurſday, 21ſt

At Half paſt Five this Morning, the Army marched from Campoly, and came to their Ground at Chowke at One o'Clock.

Received on the Road the following Letter from Mr. Farmer:

To John Carnac, Eſquire, and Colonel Charles Egerton.

Gentlemen,

The Durbar have appointed on their Part Gunneiſh Hurry, and Tookajee Holcar and Mhadjee Scindia on their Part Apajee Savajee, to ſee the different Articles in the late Agreement performed; they bring with them the requiſite Letters from your Durbar and from theſe Sudars; and they farther deſire one from me to introduce them to you, and ſignify their being the Perſons ſo appointed.

In the Articles of Durbar Expences, which formed Part of the late Stipulation for the unmoleſted March of the Army to Bombay, it was ſettled, that a Thouſand Rupees ſhould be paid to Chubdars, &c. belonging to the Durbar of Mhadjee Scindia, and the like Sum to the Durbar Servants of Nanah Furneeze; you will pleaſe to pay the whole Amount immediately to Apajee Savajee, who

is responsible to them; and for the other Sums settled for such Service, I could wish the Notes should it possible be returned to me.

Madjee Scindia sent Yesterday to acquaint me, that as he was Security to the Durbar for the due Performance of the late Stipulations, he desired that Mr. Stewart and I would accompany him wherever he went. The Change is very agreeable to me in every Shape, as he treats us with great Civility and Attention; and the cultivating a proper Connexion with him seems to me the only Mode to retrieve the sad Sacrifices we have been compelled to make in capitulating for the safe and unmolested Return of our Army to Bombay. Whatever he may have to propose I believe will be through Appajee Savajee, who seems to possess much of his Confidence, and to whom I would therefore venture to propose a particular Attention should be shewn, keeping every Thing that he may propose or mention a Secret from the Agent of the Durbar.

I could with that a P^r of Pattamars should be sent me as soon as possible to dispatch with any Advices I may have to send. I am, with Respect,

Gentlemen,

Your most obedient humble Servant,

Camp near Tullegaon,
19th January 1779.

W. G. Farmer.

Friday, 22d. This Morning Mr. Carnac and Colonel Egerton took their Leave of the Army, and set out for Panwell, where they arrived about Noon, and reached Bombay the same Evening.

It escaped us to notice under the 16th Instant, that we found the prevailing Custom of giving Presents amongst the Officers and others of the Durbar, was not to be dispensed with, and that their Expectations were very considerable; we however settled this Charge by Means of Appajee Savajee, for the Sum of 41,000 Rupees to be paid to him on his Arrival at Bombay; and he made himself answerable to the Dependents of the Durbar for this Amount.

Report from Lieutenant Richardson to Colonel Egerton, as noticed in Committee under 11th Instant.

Sir,

Agreeable to your Desire I send you the Information that I received last Night on examining Two Men that Ragoba had sent to Tookajee Holcar. They told me there was no Hope of his joining us till we had beat the Ministerial Army; that Holcar declared himself thoroughly acquainted with our Situation; that our Force did not exceed Four Battalions, and with that Number we could never expect to reduce the Maratta Empire; that his Force added to ours would give us very little more Weight; that by joining Ragoba he risked every Thing, without the smallest Prospect of Advantage to himself: Therefore all that he could promise was to be neutral; and though he might be obliged to bring his Troops into the Field, yet he engaged that they should not fight against Ragoba. I have further to inform you, that in a private Conversation with Ragoba, Two Days ago, he told me he had deceived the Governor, in the Hopes he had given of People joining him; but that he had been deceived himself, and that he was ashamed of it, as he now found he had been led into an Error by false Promises.

I am,
Sir,
Your most obedient humble Servant,

Tullagaon,
11th January 1779.

William Richardson.

Bombay, 22d January 1779.

These Minutes are omitted in the proper Place, through the Misapprehension of the Committee's Secretary, and without the Knowledge of Mr. Carnac. Minutes of the Consultation held by the Poona Committee at Wurgaon, the 15th January, which Colonel Egerton disavows and protests against; and to authenticate which Mr. Carnac has brought the Evidence of Mr. Sibbald the Secretary, Colonel Hartley, and Mr. Holmes, as per their Letter forwarded in the Packet.

Camp at Wurgaon, 15th January 1779.

At a Committee; PRESENT,

John Carnac, Esquire,
Colonel Charles Egerton.

The Committee now meet to take into their serious Consideration the Measures necessary to be immediately pursued to extricate the Army from its present very critical Situation, surrounded as it is by the whole Strength of the Empire, and with only about Ten Days Provisions in Camp.

It is judged necessary to have the Opinion of Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, now in Command of the Army, as to the Practicability of effecting our Retreat to Bombay: Who is accordingly called in.

Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn delivers in his written Opinion as entered hereafter.

Colonel Egerton's Opinion being also required, declares his Sentiments are the same as those of Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn; that a Retreat in our present Situation is impracticable; and if attempted, the Consequences must be the Loss of the whole Army.

Mr. Carnac is ſo confident the Army is ſufficiently numerous, and ſo well provided with Artillery, as to be able to force their Way back againſt all Oppoſition, if the Officers and Men will do their Duty; that there is no Doubt with him, the Attempt ought to be made at all Events, rather than ſubmit to the Terms preſcribed by the Enemy, by which we have no Authority to bind our Employers; and for his own Part, he declares he would much ſooner run his Share of the Riſk than that they ſhould be complied with. However, as Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn have given it as their poſitive Opinions that the Troops will not ſtand, and conſequently muſt be cut to Pieces, Mr. Carnac dares not take upon himſelf ſingly to preſs a Retreat, which it is pronounced will be inevitably attended with Conſequences that cannot fail endangering the Preſervation of the Settlement; he therefore, however reluctantly and contrary to his own Sentiments, finds himſelf obliged to concur in the Acceptance of whatever Conditions can be obtained. Allowing therefore that the Opinions of Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn to be well-founded (in which we are given to underſtand many Officers of the Army concur) there ſeems to be no other Reſource left, but to accept of ſuch Conditions as can be obtained from the Enemy.

Adjourned.

For Colonel Cockburn's Opinion, vide before.

(A true Copy.)
Edwd Ravenſcroft,
Sec^y.

Letter from the Preſidency of Bombay to the Court of Directors; dated 27th March 1779.

To the Honourable the Secret Committee, &c. &c.

Gentlemen,

1. We had the Honour to addreſs you the 29th December, by the Way of Buſſora; and on the 8th of laſt Month Colonel Capper arrived by that Route with your Commands dated 31ſt Auguſt.

2. It gave us infinite Satisfaction to find by your ſaid Commands, that our Vigilance reſpecting the Tranſactions of the French has met with your Approbation; and we flatter ourſelves that you will do equal Juſtice to the Motives on which we undertook the late Expedition in favour of Ragonaut Row, which, we are deeply concerned to acquaint you, has been brought to a moſt unſucceſsful Concluſion.

3. This Diſpatch is intended to convey to you, in the quickeſt Manner poſſible, an Account, ſufficiently circumſtantial, of the unfortunate Affair, accompanied with every neceſſary Paper, to enable you to form a Judgment of the Conduct of the concerned in this Expedition, and of our preſent Situation.

4. The Letters from the Board in their Secret Department, dated the 17th of June and 8th of July, and our Letter of the 31ſt of that Month, Tranſcripts of all which are in this Packet, will inform you of the Steps which more immediately led to the Reſolution we formed on the 21ſt of July, to purſue all practicable Meaſures, with the utmoſt Expedition, for placing Ragoba in the Regency at Poona; and under N° 1 we now tranſmit a Copy at length of our Proceedings on that Day, in order the more fully to explain the Grounds upon which we acted.

5. Subjoined to the Minutes of the 21ſt July, is a Copy of the Anſwer delivered by the Poona Durbar, upon Nanah Furneeſe being reinſtated in the Adminiſtration, to the Paper of Demands preſented by Mr. Moſtyn, as mentioned in the Letter above referred to, dated 17th June.

6. The firſt Letter we received from Mr. Lewis at Poona, after we had taken our Reſolutions, adviſed us that Moraba had been ſeized by Madjee Scindia, and that Tookjee Holcar had been obliged to deliver up his Diwan, and Two of his Officers, to Nannah, who together with Scindia had appointed another Diwan for Holcar, and that every one, whether Brahmin or Officer, who had joined Moraba, had alſo been ſeized, and amongſt the reſt Buchoba Pronder; Scindia was ſoon after induced, by a Preſent of Three Lacks of Rupees from Nannah, to deliver Moraba into his Charge, who immediately ſent him Priſoner into the Fort of Aſhmednagur; and Buchebah was likewiſe confined in another Fort belonging to Nannah.

7. On the 1ſt of July Mon^r. St. Lubin left Poona, and proceeded to Damain, where it was given out he intended to remain, until Nannah diſcovered whether he was able to fulfil his Engagements, and where we underſtand he now is.

8. Our Advices from Poona at this Juncture tended to perſuade us that Nannah Furneeſe and Madjee Scindia had the chief Direction of the Government, and that Saccaram Bappoo was not conſulted, but even kept under a Degree of Confinement. Scindia's Influence appeared the moſt predominant; and it was ſurmiſed that he had Views to the Enlargement of his own Power at Poona, independent of Nannah, or of Saccaram Bappoo.

9. We were ſoon after given to underſtand, that the Poona Durbar had not only refuſed to grant Duſtucks for the Paſſage of the Bengal Detachment, but ſent Orders to the different Officers through whoſe Diſtricts Colonel Leſlie would be obliged to paſs, to uſe every Endeavour to moleſt and harraſs him in his March; and the Army at Poona was then ſaid to conſiſt of about 12,000 Men, which was to be diſmiſſed in a few Days, with Orders to aſſemble again at Deura, or about the Beginning of October, as they could not procure Provender for their Cattle at that Seaſon of the Year.

10. Colonel

10. Colonel Leſlie appearing to make but a ſlow Progreſs in his March, we wrote to him in the moſt preſſing Manner to advance as quick as poſſible, aſſuring him that the early Arrival of the Army under his Command would be of the utmoſt Importance to the honourable Company's Affairs.

11. At this Time Madjee Scindia acquainted Mr. Lewis, that the Miniſters had given him full Powers to ſettle Affairs with the Engliſh, and promiſed to ſend a Perſon to Bombay for that Purpoſe, who accordingly did arrive ſome Time afterwards; but, as the Preſident lately acquainted us, he did not open himſelf on the Buſineſs for which he was ſaid to be deputed, thinking perhaps that our Connection with Ragoba did not ſuit his Maſter's Views.

12. Mr. Lewis alſo adviſed, that the Durbar, in order to amuſe us, intended ſending a Perſon of Conſequence with Propoſals to Ragoba; and the Preſident, at our Meeting on the 15th Auguſt, reported that Propoſals had been made to him verbally, by an Agent for Nannah Furneze, to bring Ragoba into the Government nearly on the ſame Terms as propoſed by Moraba and his Party, which will appear by the Papers annexed to our Proceedings of the 21ſt of July; but as we had Reaſon to ſuſpect that every Propoſal from that Quarter was inſidious, and only meant to amuſe us, we returned for Anſwer to the Agent, that we could not give his Propoſals any Conſideration, unleſs they came before us authenticated under the Sicca of Nannah himſelf; after which we had no farther Overtures on the Part of Nannah Furneze.

13. On the 16th of Auguſt we received Advice from Mr. Lewis, that he was informed from very good Authority, that it had been determined by Nannah and Scindia to ſend Two principal Officers to oppoſe Colonel Leſlie's March; and that Nannah had ſent to recall Mons'. St. Lubin from Damaun, where he had reſided ſince the Beginning of July, giving out that he intended employing him againſt Hyder. We immediately ſent this Intelligence to Colonel Leſlie, that he might be prepared to take his Meaſures with the proper Caution and Vigour; and the Chief of Surat adviſed us, under the 9th of September, that Chokeys had been placed on the Brampore and Ugien Roads, in order to intercept all Letters.

14. Under the 8th September Mr. Lewis adviſed the Preſident, that he had been informed by the Nabob of Arcot's Vackeel, that the Killedar of Ahmednagur Fort, in which Moraba was confined, had not only refuſed complying with an Order from Nannah for delivering that Fort to Scindia, but had ſeized ſome Treaſure to a great Amount belonging to Nannah, and declared he acted in Behalf of Ragoba. The Vackeel further added, that though Moraba was not abſolutely Maſter of the Killa, yet he and the Killedar underſtood one another perfectly; and that it was entirely by the Advice of the former the latter had acted. Mr. Lewis cloſes his Letter with theſe Words: "Not a Man is yet "come in, and the few who remained here belonging to Hurry Punt's Army are ſo very importunate "for their Arrears of Pay, that the poor Man is afraid of ſtirring out of Houſe." In a Letter to us, dated 24th September, he ſays, "Purſo Ram Boſe is ſtill here, not being able to raiſe a Man for "Want of Money, which the Government is either unable or unwilling to advance him."

15. In the laſt mentioned Letter, Mr. Lewis acquaints us, that on 20th September, a Frenchman arrived at Poona, with Letters for Nannah, but notwithſtanding his utmoſt Endeavours, he could not learn until the Night before the Date of his Letter, who the Frenchman was, or from whence he came; when he was informed it was Monſieur Le Roy from Surat. This was one of the Gentlemen mentioned in the Secret Letter of the 15th January 1778, to have been landed on Choul from Pondicherry, and he now brought Letters to Nannah from Monſieur St. Lubin, with whom he had a Meeting at Damaun, and from Monſieur Briancourt, the French Conſul at Surat; the Contents of which Mr. Lewis learnt were to deſire Nannah not to liſten to any Terms of Accommodation with the Engliſh, at leaſt for One Month, as he made no Doubt the Aſſiſtance promiſed by Monſieur St. Lubin would arrive by that Time.

16. On the 27th Auguſt we received the firſt Advice from the Governor General and Council, of their having deputed Mr. Elliot to the Court of Moodajee Booſla, the Rajah of Berar, with full Inſtructions to negociate and conclude a Treaty with that Chief, acquainting us no farther with the Object of their intended Treaty, than expreſſing their Opinion in general Terms, that an Alliance with him might be attended with the greateſt Utility, in providing for the Defence of the Honourable Company's Poſſeſſions in the preſent War. They deſired us to correſpond with Mr. Elliot, and to adviſe him of any Occurrences that may effect the general political Intereſts of the Company's Settlements and of our own in particular, telling us, that the Succeſs of the Meaſures entruſted to Mr. Elliot, muſt in a great Meaſure depend upon their preſent Secrecy; that he would however ſend us ſuch Articles as he might agree to with the Raja, and in the mean Time, to prevent any Step of a contrary Tendency on our Part, they requeſt we would refrain from forming any Engagement of a Nature hoſtile to the Government at Poona, except ſuch as might appear abſolutely neceſſary for the Defence of our own Poſſeſſions.

17. From the very general Information the Governor General and Council gave us of their projected Alliance with Moodajee Booſla, we could not form any Judgment in what Manner this Preſidency might be affected thereby, nor did it ſtrike us that we could receive either Injury or Benefit from the Raja of Berar, unleſs he ſhould aſſert his Claim to the Rajaſhip of the Maratta Empire, to which he has ſome Pretenſions, and reſtore the ancient Form of the Maratta Government. We did not pretend to judge what Advantage a Connection with him might afford to your Bengal Provinces to which his Country is contiguous, but ſo far as we might venture an Opinion, we conceived them ſo little liable to Danger, that an Alliance with Moodajee Booſla merely for

for their Security, ſo far as he could contribute to it, which appeared by their Letter to be the Object of Mr. Elliot's Deputation, did not ſeem to be a Conſideration equivalent to the Injury your general Intereſt would ſuſtain, were we to forego the Proſecution of the Plan reſolved on the 21ſt July.

18. Theſe were the Sentiments we expreſſed on the 31ſt Auguſt, when this Letter came under Conſideration; and as we were then every Day in Expectation of Advices from Europe by the Way of Suez, which would place us at a Certainty with reſpect to the War with France, we did not think it proper to take any deciſive Reſolution for the Proſecution of the intended Meaſures, though the Neceſſity thereof ſtill continued to ſtrike us in the moſt forcible Manner.

19. On the 9th September Mr. William Moore arrived from Suez, having left London 16th June, and Marſeilles the 2d July. By him we received Intelligence next to a Certainty, that the Count D'Eſtaing's Squadron was gone to America, and that Admiral Byron had ſailed in Purſuit of him, nor had we any Reaſon to apprehend the French intended ſending any Armament to India this Seaſon.

20. On the 27th following we received a Letter from the Governor General and Council, dated 17th Auguſt, in which they acquainted us, That they had approved our Reſolution of the 21ſt July, and authorized us to aſſiſt Ragoba with a military Force to conduct him to Poona, and to eſtabliſh him in the Regency there, on the following expreſs Proviſions:

Firſt, That it do not interfere with any Engagement formed with Moodajee Booſla by Mr. Elliot, and previous Notice to us given.

Second, That our lateſt Advices from Europe ſhall be equal to an Aſſurance that the Force required for this Service may be ſpared without endangering the Safety of Bombay, in the Event of a French Invaſion.

Third, That the Engagement we might form with Ragoba himſelf or Moraba, and his Aſſociates, be not contrary to thoſe concluded with Moodajee by Mr. Elliot, and noticed to us, nor of a hoſtile Tendency to the Government of Berar.

21. On the 30th, we received Advice from Colonel Leſlie, that he had on the 15th Auguſt left Chatterpore, or Chunderpore as it is called in the Maps, where he had remained on Account of the heavy Rains ſince 3d July, in order to proceed on his March to the Nerbuddah, and after Two Days March had arrived at Raje Gur, from whence he dated his Letter the 25th Auguſt. By this Letter it appeared he had had a ſlight Skirmiſh with the Troops of one of the Bundella Chiefs, but was in Treaty for a Pacification, and at the ſame Time taking Meaſures for croſſing a River between him and the Enemy, that if drawn to that Extremity, he might by diſperſing them ſecure his March from further Moleſtation.

22. We have now brought our Detail down to the 12th October, and Matters were circumſtanced as ſtated in the foregoing Sheets, when Mr. Carnac delivered in a Minute, urging the Danger of loſing any further Time, and preſſing us immediately to undertake the Meaſures reſolved on under the 21ſt July.

23. Before we came to any Reſolution on Mr Carnac's Minute, we thought it neceſſary to take the Advice of Mr. Moſtyn in ſome Points; and that Gentleman being accordingly conſulted, gave it ſtrongly as his Opinion, that if we did intend to take any Meaſures in Favour of Ragoba, the ſooner they were undertaken the better, the leſs Oppoſition we ſhould meet with, and therefore the greater Certainty of Succeſs; of which indeed, he ſaid, he had not in his own Mind the leaſt Doubt; and upon the Whole he ſaid he did not conceive there could offer a more favourable Criſis than the preſent; for which he fully explained his Reaſons, as will appear by our Proceedings on that Day.

24. After full Conſideration of all Circumſtances, it was reſolved by the Majority of the Committee, Mr. Draper only diſſenting thereto, forthwith to carry into Execution the Plan agreed to under the 21ſt July, for conducting Ragoba to Poona, and placing him in the Regency there, during the Minority of the young Peſhwa; and that the neceſſary Meaſures for that Purpoſe be undertaken as ſoon as poſſible.

25. That you may have our whole Proceedings on this Subject before you in as ſmall a Compaſs as poſſible, we now ſend in the Packet a Copy of our Minutes from the 12th October to the Time the Army left Bombay, and the Treaty was executed by Ragoba, collected in One Paper, under N° 2.

26. Mr. Draper's Reaſons for not concurring in the Reſolution for immediately putting our Plan into Execution, will appear at Length in the Paper mentioned in the preceding Paragraph.

27. Our whole Proceedings previous to the Army's leaving Bombay being comprized in that Paper, it appears unneceſſary to repeat them here; and we chearfully ſubmit them to your Candour and Judgment.

28. For our future Guidance we muſt requeſt your Opinion and Inſtructions on the Point debated at our Meeting of the 7th November, whether Two Members of the Committee can be detached from the Preſidency at the ſame Time, upon any temporary Service; and whether the Two remaining Members are in their Abſence competent to form a Select Committee.

29. Every Argument that was advanced on either Side of the Queſtion is contained in the Extract from our Proceedings.

30. UNder N° 3. we tranſmit a Copy of the Treaty as executed by Ragoba.

31. To avoid ſwelling the Extract of our Proceedings, we ſend in a ſeparate Number, Copy of a Letter from the Executors of the late Mr. Willm Shaw, on the Subject of the Loan to Ragoba, with our Minutes thereon; and we are perſuaded, that when you reflect how we were circumſtanced with

Ragoba at the Time, and the flattering Proſpect then opening to the Company, you will approve our Determination to diſcharge the Debt, and not to ſuffer him to be embarraſſed with Demands from the Executors at ſuch a Juncture.

32. Ragoba having afterwards ſtated his Account with Mr. Shaw's Eſtate in a different Manner from the Executors, we ſent his Statement to them, and demanded them to refund the Overplus according thereto. In Reply to which we received another Letter from them, controverting Ragoba's Statement, and ſupporting their own. A Copy thereof is annexed to the other Letter. And Ragoba departing a few Days afterwards to join the Army, we had not Time to obtain from him the neceſſary Proofs, even if he had any to produce, which we much doubt.

33. We hope and truſt likewiſe that, conſidering how Affairs were then ſituated, you will approve the Loan of Four Lacks of Rupees, which it was abſolutely neceſſary to make to Ragoba, to enable him to make the neceſſary Preparations for the Expedition. We alſo thought it for the Good of the Service to make a further Loan of Rupees 15,000 to Two principal Officers of Ragoba's, to whom we acquainted you, in our Addreſs by the York, we made a Loan of the like Sum when the Reſolution in March 1778 took place.

34. We beg Leave to mention that Ragoba's Jewels depoſited on executing the Treaty of Surat, are ſtill in our Poſſeſſion at Bombay.

35. Our Addreſs, 29th December, of which a Triplicate is now incloſed, informed you briefly of the Progreſs of the Army to that Time; however, to bring their Operations before you in One Point of View, we will begin our Account from the Day the Forces left Bombay.

36. Captain James Stuart, who had been previouſly ſent to Poona to make himſelf acquainted with the Roads and Paſſes, embarked from this Place the 22d November, with a Detachment of Grenadier Sepoys and ſome Light Artillery, as mentioned in the Extract of our Proceedings, and proceeding up Apta River by a Route different from what was taken by the Remainder of the Army, ſecured the Paſſage of the Ghauts, and took Poſt on the Summit of Condella the 25th following, the 3d Day from his leaving Bombay, where he was to remain till joined by the Army.

37. The Remainder of the Forces left Bombay the 23d, and were followed the next Day by Colonel Egerton, who took on him the chief Command. After ſecuring the Fort of Bellapore, which commands the Entrance of Panwell River, the Army proceeded to Panwell, where it arrived the 25th.

38. To prevent, as far as we could, any Diminution from the Strength of the Army, the Fort of Bellapore was ſoon afterwards garriſoned from Bombay.

39. The Army remained at Panwell the 25th November to the 4th December, waiting the Arrival of their Stores, Proviſion, Oxen, &c. and employed in clearing the Road in Front for their Advance. On the 4th they began their March, and on the 13th arrived at Campoly, at the Foot of the Gauts. Here they were joined by Meſſrs. Carnac and Moſtyn, who, with Colonel Egerton, formed a Committee for the general Conduct of the Expedition, and the Settlement of the Government at Poona. Their Commiſſion and Inſtructions are entered at Length in their Diary now tranſmitted.

40. Mr. Moſtyn only remained a few Days at Campoly, when he was obliged to return to Bombay by a violent Diſorder, which put an End to his Life on the Firſt of January. In him you loſt a very faithful, valuable Servant; but it was an inexpreſſible Misfortune to be deprived of his Services juſt at the very Time when they were ſo particularly requiſite for the Accompliſhment of a Plan which he had been ſo very inſtrumental in bringing to bear.

41. At a Meeting of the Poona Committee held at Campoly on the 26th December, Mr. Carnac delivered in a Minute, remarking on the ſlow Progreſs hitherto made by the Army, and the Time loſt by making a Carriage Road up the Gauts, inſtead of carrying up the Stores by Hand. This Minute will appear under its proper Date in the Poona Diary; and with the other Papers hereafter mentioned, we tranſmit a Copy of Colonel Egerton's Reply, delivered ſince his Return, and of a Letter from the Commandant of Artillery, and the other Papers on the ſame Subject, which we beg Leave to ſubmit to your Judgment.

42. At length, on 23d December, the Troops and Artillery were got up to Condilla, at the Top of the Gaut, but ſome further Time was employed in bringing up the Commiſſary's Stores, and compleating the Proviſions to a Stock for 25 Days.

43. Till this Time there had been no Appearance of an Enemy, but on the 22d they made a trifling and unſucceſsful Attack on a ſmall Party of Ragoba's Sepoys, which with Three of his Guns had been poſted in Front of Captain Stewart's Detachment. They were however beat off by Ragoba's People, with the Aſſiſtance only of Two of our Artillery Officers to point their Guns. Captain Stewart judged that the Number of the Enemy exceeded Ten thouſand Horſe and Foot.

44. From this Time the Enemy daily cannonaded our Camp at a Diſtance, with a very trifling Effect till the 31ſt, when, after they had withdrawn their Guns, a ſmall Party concealed in a Gully threw ſome Rockets, one of which mortally wounded Lieutenant Colonel Cay, who died at Bombay the 14th January.

45. After ſeveral ſmall Movements towards the Edge of the Plain, the Army, equipped with a Stock of Proviſions for 25 Days, began the March for Poona on the 4th January, having left a fortified Poſt at the Head of the Gauts to ſecure the Paſs, under the Command of Lieutenant Fraſer. On the ſame Day they met with a very heavy Loſs by the Death of Captain Stuart, who was a moſt active, gallant, and judicious Officer, and poſſeſſed of the true Military Spirit.

46. On the 5th the Army halted.

47. On

47. On the 6th the Army resumed its March, and in the Profecution thereof the Guns of the Enemy opened on the Line from a Wood in Front, and a large Party of Horfe feemed inclined either to take them in Flank or Rear; they were however prevented from both, driven from the Wood into the Plain, and afterwards from an Eminence which our Troops took Poffeffion of.

This Party fent to harrafs them the Committee were informed was commanded by Bhim Row Ponfia, and might confift of 5000 Horfe, with Seven Guns.

48. On the fame Day Colonel Egerton repreſented in Committee, that having borne up as long as he could againſt an Illneſs with which he had been for ſome Time paſt afflicted, he found himſelf under the Neceſſity of acquainting them, that the Surgeon Major was of Opinion, that the Fatigues of a Campaign co-operating with his Indiſpoſition would certainly endanger his Life; and that at any rate he could not ſoon hope to have the requiſite Strength to attend properly to the many Avocations of a Commander in Chief in the Field; for which Reaſons he requeſted Permiſſion to reſign the Command of the Army to Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, and to proceed immediately to Bombay. He accordingly did ſet off, but was obliged to return upon the Receipt of Intelligence that a large Party of the Enemy's Horfe were in the Conkan; the temporary Command of the Army however remained with Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, though Colonel Egerton continued to act as a Member of the Poona Committee.

49. It was at this Time judged neceſſary to promote Major Dagon of the Artillery to the Rank of Lieutenant Colonel, in order to provide a fit Officer to hold the Second Command of the Army, or to ſucceed to the chief Command, in caſe of Accidents to Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn.

50. The Poona Committee at the ſame Meeting expreſſed their Diſappointments on the Difference between the Expectations they were flattered with on their Arrival at the Top of the Gauts, and the actual State of Affairs. Inſtead of Holkar and many other Chiefs of Rank and Reſpect, who it was hoped would have joined them with a numerous Body of Horfe immediately on the Appearance there of the Standard of Ragoba, none but a few Mercenaries had yet come in, and Ragoba in a Meſſage to the Committee gave them plainly to underſtand that he had been deceived, that unleſs they could convince his Friends of their Safety in joining him by the ſpeedy Defeat of his Enemies, he had no Hope of being joined by any one, and that their Situation would rather prove worſe than better as they advanced towards Poona, by being cut off from all Communication with the Conkan, from whence they could then be ſupplied with Proviſions and Stores.

51. Though the Mode adopted by the Enemy of retiring before our Army, and laying waſte the Country, ſeemed to render Ragoba's Reaſoning apparently juſt, the Committee ſtill hoped that as they advanced towards Poona, Holcar, on whoſe Junction there might be ſome Dependance, would be enabled and encouraged to keep firm to the Promiſes he had made through the late Mr. Moſtyn; and they further obſerved, there was too much Reaſon to apprehend that Ragoba, truſting to ſubdue every one by our Arms, had not only neglected the fit Means to conciliate the reſpectable Chiefs to his Cauſe, but had acted in ſuch a Manner as would naturally tend to unite them againſt him; in Proof of which they adduced an Information given by the Agent of Moraba then in our Camp, that Ragoba had ſecretly ſent Directions to the Killedar of Ahmednagur, not to releaſe Moraba till he got further poſitive Orders from him on his Arrival at Poona.

52. The Army continued to advance till the 9th January, when it arrived at Pellagom, a conſiderable Town about 18 Miles from the Summit of the Gauts, and 16 Miles from Poona. Pellagon was burnt and abandoned before our Troops arrived: and here they found a very numerous Army aſſembled to oppoſe them, under the Orders of the Miniſters Saccaram and Nannah, Madjee Scindia, Lookajee Holkar, and other principal Officers.

53. The Committee finding ſo general an Oppoſition to Ragoba, and no Hopes of being joined by any conſiderable Chief, were of Opinion that the Plan of eſtabliſhing Ragoba in the Regency of the Maratta Empire would be impracticable, without the immediate Co-operation of a reſpectable Party in that State; and conſidering likewiſe the total Improbability of procuring any further Supply of Proviſions, or even of ſecuring their own Stock as they advanced, came to the Reſolution to fall back with the Army ſo far as might be requiſite to ſecure their Communication with the Conkan, or the Country below the Gauts. The Meaſure taken by the Committee, previous to and in Conſequence of this Reſolution and Situation of the Army at the Time, are fully deſcribed in their Proceedings under the 9th, 10th, and 11th January, to which we beg Leave to refer.

54. At this Place the Committee received Information that a Body of Horfe belonging to Moraba had marched into the Conkan to join Ragoba.

55. The Army accordingly began to fall back on the Night of the 11th; and the Enemy having by ſome Means got Intelligence of their moving, attacked them on the March before Day-light, which they continued with great Vigour until Four o'Clock in the Afternoon, before our Troops could make their Retreat good to Burragom or Wargaum, which they effected at laſt with much Difficulty and Danger. The Committee's Account of the Action is entered on their Diary under the 13th January; and Colonel Cockburn's is tranſmitted with the Copies of his other Letters during the Service under N° 9. Both Accounts agree that a Part of the Baggage fell into the Enemy's Hands, and that the Troops during the whole Attack behaved with the greateſt Intrepidity. The Particulars of the Loſs ſuſtained in the Action will appear by the Return annexed to Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn's Letter; and in killed, wounded, and miſſing, of Artillery, Infantry, and Sepoys, and Artillery Laſcars, amounted to 362.

56. Some ſtraggling Sepoys and Laſcars having eſcaped from the Action to the Head of the Gauts,

brought

brought the moſt dreadful Accounts of the entire Deſtruction of the whole Army; upon which Lieutenant Fraſer immediately abandoned his Poſt. We had the ſame alarming Accounts, which filled us for ſome Days with great Apprehenſions.

57. On the 13th, the Day after the Action, the following Minute appears in the Committee's Diary:

"At a Committee held to deliberate relative to Overtures for the peaceable Return of the "Army to Bombay;—No Minutes taken, being in a ſevere Cannonade, and a Number of "Perſons ſtanding round.

"Letter to the Paſhwa, ſent by Ram Sing.

"D° from D°, in Reply.

"D° to D°, at Night."

58. Theſe imperfect Entries the Committee afterwards explained were owing to their Separation from their Secretary, Mr. Farmer.

59. On the 14th Mr. Farmer was ſent to the Maratta Camp to propoſe an Accommodation, which the Committee judged might be brought about by Ragoba's going over to Scindia, which he ſeemed determined to do, rather than run the Riſk of another Day's March. The Meſſage ſent to the Durbar by Mr. Farmer will appear at length on the Poona Committee's Diary.

60. The Anſwer given by the Durbar to Mr. Farmer's Meſſage was ſimply this: "That if we "wiſhed to remain at Peace with them, Ragonaut Row muſt be delivered up, and then we may re-"turn quietly, otherwiſe we might do as we pleaſe."

61. The Committee wrote to Mr. Farmer in Reply, That all Difficulty of Accommodation was removed by Ragoba's Deſign of going over to Madjee Scindia, and that they expected in conſequence proper Securities from the Durbar for proceeding unmoleſted on their March.

62. On the 15th appears a Letter from Mr. Farmer, containing the Reſult of his Conference with the Durbar, on his making known Ragoba's Determination of going over to Madjee Scindia. Their Language then was, that excluſive of this, a new Treaty muſt be made on the Spot between the Engliſh and the Maratta State, the one made by Colonel Upton being entirely broke by the Invaſion of their Country. Mr. Farmer in a few Words conveys a very expreſſive Idea of the Senſe entertained by the Durbar of the Advantage at which they held our Army. "They ſeem to "feel themſelves (he ſays) in that Situation with reſpect to us, which the Turkiſh Vizier felt himſelf "in with reſpect to Peter the 1ſt, at the Time the Empreſs Catherine ſent in her Jewels to the "Vizier."

63. On the ſame Day is entered an Opinion, ſubſcribed by Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn then in Command of the Army, with reſpect to the Practicability of making good their Retreat, which he deſcribes as utterly impoſſible. He concludes with theſe Words, "I therefore cannot charge "myſelf to conduct the Army under theſe Circumſtances to Bombay, and Humanity muſt prompt "ſome other Method than an Attempt to retire in the Face of the whole Strength of the Maratta "Empire, with ſuch an Handful of Men, who muſt in ſuch Caſe be ſacrificed."

64. The Committee directed Mr. Farmer to acquaint the Durbar, in Anſwer to the further Condition they inſiſted on, that they demanded what the Committee had no Powers to agree to, the entering into, and concluding Treaties being ſolely confined to the Governor General and Council; that the only Power left them was to give up the Cauſe and Perſon of Ragoba, which done, muſt certainly put an End to all Diſputes between the Engliſh and Maratta State. The Committee further deſired Mr. Farmer to inform the Durbar, that ſhould they enter into any Treaty they ſhould only deceive them, having no ſuch Powers.

65. All their Applications having been hitherto directed to the Durbar in general, it appeared to the Committee that a Gentleman being ſent to Madjee Scindia would be more likely to produce an Accommodation, and Mr. Holmes the Commiſſary was accordingly deputed with full Powers to ſettle for the peaceable Return of the Army to Bombay.

66. In the mean Time the Committee's Letter was delivered to Mr. Farmer in the Durbar, by Apajee Bhow, on the Part of Madjee Scindia: As repreſenting the Durbar, he deſired to be informed of the Contents; when Mr. Farmer explained what the Committee had ſaid relative to want of Powers, and deſired an Anſwer to the ſingle Propoſition, Whether on the Delivery of Ragoba, Securities would be given for the ſafe and unmoleſted Return of the Army to Bombay. After further Argument on the Subject, the Durbar ſtill inſiſted that a new Treaty ſhould be made, and demanded a true Tranſlation of the Committee's Letter, at the ſame Time giving Mr. Farmer to underſtand, that if he did not comply, there were People in the Camp who underſtood Engliſh. Mr. Farmer appeared concerned at this, becauſe the Committee's Declaration ſeemed to preclude all peaceable Arrangements; but however the Durbar ſtill continue to inſiſt that till a new Treaty was made the Engliſh Army muſt remain where it was.

67. Late in the Evening of the 15th, Mr. Holmes returned from the Maratta Camp, and reported, that he had ſettled Matters with Madjee Scindia and the reſt of the Durbar, for the peaceable Return of the Army to Bombay, on the only Terms they would hear of, which in ſhort were the Surrender of all the Poſſeſſions under this Preſidency, acquired ſince the Reign of Madarow, and the Retrogreſſion of the Bengal Army. The Committee however remarked in their Diary, that Madjee Scindia and the whole Durbar could not plead Ignorance of their want of Powers to conclude ſuch a Treaty, they having demanded both a true Explanation and Tranſlation of their Letter to Mr. Farmer, in which they ſo ſtrongly diſclaimed all ſuch Power.

68. Under

68. Under the 16th is entered a Tranſlation of the Treaty, as alſo of a ſeparate Article in Favour of Madjee Scindia, which Meſſrs. Farmer and Holmes adviſed the Committee they were obliged to conſent to. A Copy of the Treaty, and of the ſeparate Article, is alſo tranſmitted in the Packet, under N° 42.

69. Mr. Carnac has minuted on our Proceedings, that having ſince his Return peruſed the Tranſlation of the Treaty and ſeparate Article, he finds them conceived in ſuch Terms, that he ſhould certainly have objected thereto at the Time of Signature, had they been literally explained to him; but that he only underſtood the Contents in general Terms, and indeed was the more indifferent as to the particular Wording of them, as he always bore in his Mind the Idea that they were of no Validity, and would never be ratified by our Superiors.

70. Mr. Farmer and Lieutenant Charles Stewart were left with Madjee Scindia as Hoſtages for the Performance of the Agreement with him.

71. The Committee delivered to Madjee Scindia's Vackeel, a Letter addreſſed to Colonel Goddard, which does not appear in the Diary, Mr. Farmer not having kept a Copy: The Purport however was to adviſe him, that the Face of Things was ſo materially altered ſince their writing to him laſt, as to occaſion their marching back to Bombay; and that in conſequence of an Agreement entered into by them with the Marattas, they directed him to march back with the Army under his Command to Bengal. This Letter was dated the 16th January. On the 19th the Committee adviſed Colonel Goddard, that upon Recollection not thinking themſelves authorized to give the Order contained in their Letter of the 16th, he was to pay no Regard thereto.

72. On the 17th Mr. Farmer returned to the Maratta Camp with the Papers executed, and a Preſent of a Horſe for Madjee Scindia. He came back to our Camp about Noon with a Party of Horſe, who were to accompany the Army to Panwell. The Army accordingly began their March on the 17th in the Afternoon, and in Seven Days reached Panwell, from whence they were tranſported to Bombay.

73. The Select Committee then at Bombay, beg to take Notice in this Place, that the Reſolution for retreating, the Difficulties the Army was brought into, and the Negotiation commenced in conſequence, were tranſacted and concluded before we had any Knowledge thereof, the Communication with the Army being ſtopt by the Enemy.

74. The Poona Committee on making the Agreement found themſelves under a Neceſſity, in Compliance with the Cuſtom of the Eaſt, to make Preſents amongſt the Officers of the Durbar, to the Amount of Rupees 41,000, for which Notes were given.

75. Under the 20th January are entered on the Poona Committee's Diary the Orders we gave under the 11th, on being apprized of their Situation and Proſpects when they arrived at Mondhurna Plain, as deſcribed therein under the 6th; which Orders, owing to the Stoppage of the Roads, did not reach them till the Army was on its Return.

76. Before the Committee arrived at Panwell, they received a Letter from Mr Farmer, adviſing, that Madjee Scindia had acquainted him, that as he (Madjee Scindia) was Security to the Durbar for the due Performance of the late Stipulations, he deſired that Mr. Farmer and Lieutenant Stewart would accompany him wherever he went; and Mr. Farmer added, the Charge was very agreeable in every Reſpect, as he treated them with great Civility and Attention.

77. We have now brought the Account of this Expedition to a Concluſion; in which we have confined ourſelves to a mere Narrative of Facts, as ſtated in the Committee's Diary and Colonel Egerton's Letters to the Preſident, avoiding an Opinion, or entering into Particulars more than neceſſary to connect our Account, and give you a general Idea of the Matters repreſented. Any Judgment offered by us might be imputed to the Feelings naturally ariſing from the Diſappointment of a Scheme which we had promoted with ſo much Zeal, and by the Event of which we, Mr. Draper excepted on Account of his Diſſent, are ourſelves liable to be affected; and it has for theſe Reaſons appeared the moſt equitable and impartial Method to ſend only a general Statement to you and to the Governor General and Council, accompanied with every Voucher that can tend to illuſtrate the Subject, and make your Information as compleat as poſſible, leaving to you to form your own Judgment from the Materials before you, to what Cauſes the Failure of the Expedition is to be attributed, and on whom Cenſure ought to fall.

78. In purſuance of this Plan we ſhall lay before you in Order, the ſeveral Letters and Papers that have been delivered in relative to this Expedition, the Particulars of which will be mentioned in the Sequel of this Addreſs, as many of them are connected with Matters not yet mentioned, which have taken place ſince the Expedition.

79. In the 21ſt Paragraph our Advices, brought down to the 30th September, left Colonel Leſlie at Rajegur the 25th Auguſt, and, as we then thought, preparing to continue his March. We had no further Accounts of the Bengal Army till the 28th October, when we received a Letter from Colonel Goddard, dated the 4th of that Month; by which we obſerved with Concern that the Army ſtill remained at Rajegur. Colonel Goddard therein adviſed, that Colonel Leſlie had died on the preceding Day; and that the Command having thereby devolved on him, he ſhould march from that Place in Three or Four Days. In our Reply to this Letter, dated the 13th November, we repeated the Directions before given to Colonel Leſlie, for the Army to march towards Poona with all poſſible Expedition; at the ſame Time giving to underſtand that his early Arrival might be very eſſential to the Succeſs of the important Scheme we had then in Agitation. By his next Letter, dated the 31ſt October, and received the 30th November, we found him advanced to Kemlaſſy, on the Road to the

Nerbudda; and after the Treaty had been concluded, and our Forces had actually landed on the Continent, we then more fully explained our Plan, and again urged him to purſue his March with all poſſible Expedition.

80. On the 18th December, whilſt our Army lay at the Foot of the Ghauts, we received Advices from Lieutenant Colonel Goddard in Twenty-two Days, dated at Bopaul, within 18 Coſs of the Nerbudda, which he hoped to croſs in Five or Six Days, and in Two Days more to enter the Territories of the Berar Rajah.

81. The ſame Day we received a Letter from the Governor General and Council, dated the 15th October, adviſing us of their having removed Colonel Leſlie from the Command, on Account of the little Progreſs the Detachment had made under him, and of his manifeſt Diſobedience of their poſitive Order, in concluding a Treaty with Two Chiefs of the Bundelcund Country; that they had appointed Colonel Goddard to the chief Command, and ordered him to proſecute his March without further Loſs of Time into Berar, where, on his Arrival, he was to apply to Moodajee Booſla, and if that Chief ſhould agree to join him with a ſufficient Body of Forces for the Purpoſe, he was to continue his Route in Conjunction with them, and to obey all Orders he might receive from us; but if he ſhould not have received any freſh Directions for his March, and if the Rajah ſhould decline or refuſe to grant his Aſſiſtance, they had then veſted in Colonel Goddard a diſcretionary Power to ſuſpend his Proceedings.

82. The Governor General and Council to our great Satisfaction added, that if the Plan we had reſolved in July to carry into Execution in September, for the Reſtoration of Ragoba, ſtill ſubſiſted, or if we ſhould have formed any other for the ſame End, conſiſtently with the Terms which they had preſcribed for their Aſſent to that Meaſure; or if we ſhould judge a ſtrong Reinforcement immediately and indiſpenſably neceſſary to inſure the Safety of Bombay againſt a French Invaſion; and ſhould deem it requiſite and adviſable in either of thoſe Caſes to command the Detachment at all Hazards to proceed further towards Bombay, even without a Junction of the Troops of any Power in Alliance with the Company; they gave us the Power in ſuch Caſes, and in ſuch only, to require Colonel Goddard to advance, but in all others, to give him Notice of our Intentions, and to leave him to act under their Directions.

83. They likewiſe acquainted us of the Death of Mr. Elliot, and that as the Rajah had expreſſed great Satisfaction at the Overtures made for a Connection with him, by that Deputation they concluded he would take an active Part in proſecuting the intended Negociation, either by deputing a proper Miniſter to them on his Part, or by ſoliciting an Alliance on ſuch Terms as might prove a general Advantage to the Company's Poſſeſſions; for theſe Reaſons, they did not mean to appoint any Perſon to ſucceed Mr. Elliot, until their Advices from the Raja ſhould enable them to determine on the Expediency of the Meaſure.

84. Upon Receipt of this Letter, though we concluded that Colonel Goddard having by this Time received freſh Inſtructions from us, would according to the Clauſe in his Orders from Bengal continue to advance to this Coaſt, yet, to prevent all Diſappointment, and that he might be at no Loſs in his Proceedings, we immediately acquainted him in the Terms of the Letter from Bengal, that we deemed it requiſite and adviſable the Detachment under his Command ſhould move forwards towards Bombay; and therefore directed him to advance according to his former Orders, even without a Junction of the Troops of any Power in Alliance with the Honourable Company; hoping, that the Movement of our Forces would facilitate his March in the ſame Degree that the Advance of his Detachment would leſſen the Oppoſition to our Forces.

85. On the 28th December we had the Pleaſure to receive a Letter from Colonel Goddard, dated the 6th, adviſing of his having croſſed the Nerbudda, and his being encamped at Huſſeingabad on the South Bank of that River. He acquainted us, that he ſhould halt there a few Days to determine his future Route, and that in the intervening Time, he hoped to be able to prevail on Moodajee Booſla to join him with a Body of Troops, by which Means the Inconveniences he might otherwiſe expect, reſpecting his Supplies of Proviſions, would be obviated.

86. In theſe Letters, Colonel Goddard further urged the Expediency of immediately taking ſome vigorous Meaſures to counteract the Oppoſition of the Miniſters to his March, and to cauſe a Diverſion in order to prevent their employing their whole Force againſt him, which he was apt to believe would be ſtrengthened with that of the Nizam.

87. The March of our Forces had already anticipated his Wiſhes in that Reſpect; and on Reference to our Proceedings of the 12th October you will pleaſe to obſerve, that the facilitating the March of the Bengal Detachment was a ſtrong Conſideration with us for immediately undertaking the Expedition. Matters now wore rather a pleaſing Aſpect; our Troops had juſt aſcended the Ghauts, and we had Reaſon to expect that Colonel Goddard would ſoon make good his March; and that every Step both Armies advanced, would be a mutual Advantage to both, by dividing the Efforts of the Enemy.

88. We have already acquainted you how fatally we have been diſappointed in the Hopes we entertained from the Advance of our Troops; and Colonel Goddard received Advice of the Miſcarriage of our Army a ſhort Time before we had been put under ſuch Reſtrictions, that we began to be apprehenſive he would loſe the Advantage of the Exertion we had made, and that we ſhould even be entirely deprived of the Services of his Detachment, at leaſt for this Seaſon; for on the 10th January we received a Letter from the Governor General and Council, dated the 23d November, referring to a Letter of the 16th of that Month, which we have never yet received, wherein they had informed us of

of their having veſted Colonel Goddard with full Powers to conclude a Treaty with Moodajee Booſla, the Rajah of Berar, on the Grounds of their Inſtructions to the late Mr. Elliott; a Copy of which was ſaid to be encloſed, but which has likewiſe never come to Hand, ſo that we are to this Moment totally uninformed as to the particular Points of the intended Alliance with that Chief. But the Governor General and Council acquainted us, that the Event of that Negociation was likely to cauſe a very ſpeedy and eſſential Change in the Deſigns and Operations of the Detachment; and as the Plan which they had choſen to ſupply the Place of that originally recommended by us, rendered it neceſſary that they ſhould retain in their own Hands the Means of effecting it, they therefore revoked the Power which they had given us in their Letter of the 15th October, and ſhould direct the commanding Officer of the Detachment to obey only ſuch Orders as he might hereafter receive from them. This Letter was tranſmitted by Colonel Goddard, who adviſed that he ſhould regulate his Conduct accordingly.

89. They further acquainted us, that although the Circumſtances into which they had been thrown by the Failure of the Plan for which the Detachment was originally formed, had rendered it neceſſary to make that Alteration in the Controul and Direction of it, their Intention was not entirely to withdraw the Services of the Detachment from the Support of any Meaſures we might have formed in Reliance on them, if ſuch Meaſures ſhould not prove incompatible with the Inſtructions given to Colonel Goddard, and with the Engagements which he might conclude in conſequence of them; that they ſhould therefore leave him ſtill ſubject to our Inſtructions under thoſe Proviſions; and they requeſted we would communicate to them ſuch Points as we might judge proper to be included in the Operations to be concerted with the Rajah of Berar.

90. We have recited at Length the Letter from the Governor General and Council, and when our Situation at the Time is conſidered, you may eaſily conceive the Perplexity we were thrown into by the Intelligence it conveyed to us; we had then juſt received the Advices from the Army entered in the Poona Committee's Diary under the 6th January, when Affairs above the Ghauts ſeemed not to wear an Appearance as we had expected, and the Aſſiſtance of the Bengal Detachment, on which we had always depended, appeared abſolutely neceſſary on that Account; excluſive of this Conſideration, we reflected that there was only an Interval of little more than Four Months left him to perform his March before the Monſoon would ſet in, and that it was highly proper he ſhould reach this Coaſt before that Time, in order to ſecure Bombay in caſe of an Attack by the French at the Opening of the Seaſon, which it might be out of his Power to perform if any conſiderable Time was employed in the Negociations. Uninformed as we were as to the Object thereof, or of the Plan ſaid to be ſubſtituted in lieu of ours, we could not judge what Points it might be neceſſary to include reſpecting this Preſidency in the Alliance to be concluded with Moodajee Booſla; all we could do in ſuch a Situation was to explain to Colonel Goddard our Views in the Engagement we had formed with Ragoba, and to ſend him a Copy of the Treaty, that he might judge how far our Meaſures were compatible with his Inſtructions from Bengal; and we at the ſame Time ſtrongly urged to him the Neceſſity of his advancing to this Coaſt as ſoon as poſſible, explaining the Difficulties we ſhould be under in caſe he ſhould not think himſelf at Liberty to comply with our Requiſition.

91. We think it proper to tranſmit Copies of the Letters we wrote on this Occaſion to Colonel Goddard and to the Governor General and Council, which wait on you under N° 5; and leſt we ſhould be diſappointed in the Arrival of the Bengal Detachment, we deſired the Gentlemen at Madras in ſuch Caſe to give us a Latitude to detain a Part of the Forces deſtined for the Expedition againſt Mahé, after that Service ſhould be brought to an Iſſue.

92. On the 21ſt January we again found this Detachment returning to its former Deſtination, Colonel Goddard informing us, under the 3d, from his Camp at Huſſengabad, that the Rajah of Berar wiſhed at preſent to delay the Buſineſs that was to have been concluded with him, urging, that our Forces having taken the Field obliged him to wait for Anſwers from the Governor General and Council to Letters he had wrote them, before he could take any further Steps: That in this Situation he had reſolved to march with all Expedition towards Zenor, by the Way of Brampore; but that it would be a Week before he could commence his March, as he was waiting for the Arrival of ſome Money from Naigpore to pay his Army, then Two Months in Arrears.

93. At this Time we knew no more of the Situation of Affairs above the Ghauts, than that there had been an Action, in which we had ſuffered ſome Loſs; and that the Army was on the Return to Bombay, after ſome very diſagreeable Compromiſe; and as in ſuch Circumſtances it might be improper and dangerous for Colonel Goddard to proceed to Zenor, and we concluded from his Letter he was then actually on the March, we reſolved to ſend him immediate Orders to direct his Courſe to Surat; which Order we repeated on the 3d February. By Colonel Goddard's ſubſequent Letters, we learnt that he had left the Nerbudda the 17th January, and after a March of Eleven Days, excluſive of Three he had halted, Two of which were on account of the Illneſs and Death of Lieutenant Colonel Fortnom, arrived in the Neighbourhood of Brampore the 30th January, on which Day he received the Letter from the Poona Committee dated the 19th, revoking their Orders of the 16th; which Letter, though delivered to Madjee Scindia, had not then reached Colonel Goddard, which is a remarkable Circumſtance, conſidering that Madjee Scindia, if he had been anxious for the quick Diſpatch, could have conveyed the Letter to the Army in leſs than Half the Time employed by our Patamars. Colonel Goddard left Brampore on the 6th February, and on the 8th received the Letter from the Poona Committee, dated the 16th January, with one from the Durbar to the ſame Effect; and proceeding without Interruption or Intermiſſion, arrived at Surat the 25th February, after a

March performed with wonderful Rapidity from the Time of his leaving the Nerbudda, through a Tract of Country almoſt unknown, and not leſs in Extent than 500 Miles; and for which much Merit is due to Colonel Goddard.

94. We truſt to your Candour and attentive Conſideration of all Circumſtances relative to this Detachment, that you will not, drawing your Concluſion from the Event, impute Error or Temerity to us in undertaking the Expedition before its Arrival. We had beheld its ſlow Progreſs, and the Obſtructions it met with under Colonel Leſlie, and could foreſee the increaſed Dangers and Difficulties it would have to encounter in the Paſſage through the Maratta Dominions, which, conſidering the Temper of the Durbar, might be termed a hoſtile Country. We therefore judged, and we conceive with good Reaſon, that by ſending our Forces into the Field, we ſhould facilitate the Approach of Colonel Goddard. We hope it will ſtill be allowed, that this Meaſure did at leaſt produce that good Effect; and that by drawing off the Enemy's Forces to another Quarter, we ſecured an unmoleſted March to the Bengal Army, whoſe Arrival has inſured Safety to our Poſſeſſions, and put us in a Condition to act as Circumſtances may render neceſſary. At the ſame Time, in Juſtice to Colonel Goddard, we muſt obſerve, that he made the proper Uſe of the Advantage given him, and by his ſingular Activity, did not allow the Enemy Time to take Meaſures for giving him any material Interruption, even if ſuch had been their Intention, after the Convention of Wurgaum.

95. If our Army had been found unequal ſingle to the Accompliſhment of the Undertakings we had engaged in, and not ſufficiently formidable, whether with reſpect to Numbers or the Vigour of its Operations, to give Confidence to the Partizans of Ragoba to declare openly in his Favour, we never could entertain a Doubt but that it would be able to keep the Field againſt any Country Enemy, in which Opinion, we are perſuaded, we ſhall have the Suffrage of all Perſons converſant in Indian Service; and a Space leſs than a Month from the Concluſion of their Operations would have brought Colonel Goddard ſo near, that the Enemy muſt have divided their Force, Poona being nearly the ſame Diſtance from Brampore as Surat; and a Junction once effected, the Expedition might have been brought to a happy Iſſue.

96. It is impoſſible to ſay whether Colonel Goddard could have made his Way through ſo large a Tract of Country adverſe to his March, had it not been for the Diverſion made by our Troops, which took up the whole Attention of the Enemy; but this being a Matter not decided by Experiment, we ſhall ſubmit to your Judgment.

97. Had we been apprized in Time that the Negociation with Moodajee was to affect the Operations of the Bengal Detachment, or that in the intended Alliance with him was comprehended a Plan to ſupply the Place of the one originally recommended by us, and to anſwer the ſame Purpoſes; we certainly ſhould not have proſecuted our Plan for the Reſtoration of Ragoba, and thereby have avoided the Confuſion inſeparable from a complicate Scheme, when ſo great a Diſtance lays between the Parties. But we appeal to you, whether from the Letters from Bengal of the 17th of Auguſt and 15th October, we had any Reaſon to entertain ſuch an Idea of the Negociation with Moodajee? on the contrary, in the laſt of thoſe Letters the Governor General and Council, after they knew of the Reſtraint laid on Moraba, and the Members of his Party, gave us Reaſon to conclude, that they did depend on us for the Accompliſhment of thoſe grand Objects we both had in View, by their giving us the Controul over Colonel Goddard's Detachment, whether the Plan formed in July exiſted, or "whether we had formed any other for the ſame End, conſiſtently with Terms they had preſcribed "for their Aſſent."

98. We never viewed the Negociation with the Rajah of Berar in a Light ſo intimately affecting this Preſidency, till the Receipt of the Letter from Bengal on the 10th January, and then it was too late for us to retract; and as we could not conceive it to be very material to the Company, whether the ſame Purpoſe was effected by an Alliance with Moodajee Boofla, or by a Connection with Ragonath Row, we immediately urged Colonel Goddard to advance to the Support of our Meaſures in Favour of Ragoba, which he ſaw the Propriety of complying with; Moodajee having made a Plea therefrom to protract the intended Negociation with him. With reſpect to the political Sentiments of Moodajee, Colonel Goddard obſerved, that he did not think him partial to the Cauſe of Ragonaut Row, but he was convinced he was amicably inclined to the Engliſh.

99. We ſhall now proceed to a Detail of our Proceedings after the Return of the Troops from the Expedition.

100. At our firſt Meeting, held on the 29th January, when Meſſrs. Carnac and Egerton reſumed their Seats, the Diary of the Poona Committee was laid before us, and read through with Attention, in the Courſe of which Colonel Egerton made ſundry Remarks, as noticed in the Copy of our Proceedings on that Day, and in particular proteſted againſt and diſavowed the Minutes of a Meeting noticed in the Diary to have been held by the Poona Committee on the 15th January, alledging, that to the beſt of his Knowledge no Meeting was held on that Day. The ſeveral Papers delivered in reſpecting this Point are in the Packet; and when the Peruſal of the Diary was finiſhed, the Preſident laid before us a Minute, ſtating generally, that the Cauſes of the Failure of the Expedition might be a Matter of future Conſideration, but that no Time ought to be loſt in determining on the Means neceſſary for ſupporting and retrieving our Affairs; for which Purpoſe he meant ſoon to deſire another Meeting, when he hoped to be able to propoſe ſome Plan of Conduct for extricating us from the Difficulties of our preſent Situation. In this Minute, after giving due Praiſe to the Bravery and Merit of our Troops on the late Service, who he doubted not, under proper Conduct, would be fully ſufficient to ſecure your Poſſeſſions under this Preſidency againſt all Attempts of the moſt formidabl-

table Country Enemy. He proceeded to ſhew the Neceſſity of keeping up the gallant Spirit of the Army, which could not be done without diſtinguiſhing thoſe whoſe Behaviour had done them Honour, and marking the Men who had been wanting in their Duty, and whoſe Example could not fail of corrupting our Military Eſtabliſhment in all its Branches. He noticed the Miſbehaviour of Three Subaltern Officers who were to be tried by a General Court Martial; but obſerved he did not think an Example made of them ſufficient, and that he had accordingly intimated to Colonel Egerton on his Arrival, that his Conduct, as well as Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn's, as Officers, appeared to him ſo far impeached, that he judged it would be proper for them both to decline acting in any Military Character. That Colonel Egerton having thought proper to inſiſt on taking the Command of the Garriſon, unleſs a formal Charge was delivered againſt him; the Preſident did then deliver in a formal Charge againſt him, and againſt Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, for refuſing to charge themſelves with conducting the Army from Worgaum to Bombay; grounding the Accuſation on the written Opinion ſubſcribed by Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, in which Colonel Egerton did on the ſame Day declare (and again at this Meeting) he entirely concurred.

101. The Preſident then giving it as his fixed Opinion, that nothing could juſtify Officers in their ſtation for giving in ſuch an Opinion of the Troops under their Command but an open Mutiny in the Army, declared he would not conſent to their continuing in the Command. That their own Orders of Thanks to the Troops for their Behaviour on the 12th, ſufficiently ſhewed how totally void of Foundation the Opinion was, "That our Troops would not ſtand a ſingle Attack;" yet that the fatal Influence and Infection of ſuch Opinions, when adopted and avowed by the Superiors in Command, were well known, and would not ſuffer us to wonder if Sentiments of the like Kind did gain ſome Ground under ſuch a Sanction. That this however could not be admitted as an Extenuation, much leſs as a Juſtification of the Conduct of Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, and was beſides a Circumſtance ſo big with Danger, that they could not be allowed to ſupport their extraordinary and unſoldier-like way of thinking, by the Authority of the inferior Officers. Thus circumſtanced, the Preſident obſerves he ſhould think himſelf juſtified in moving for ſuſpending both thoſe Officers from the Service; but that they might prevent that Extremity, if they choſe to decline all Military Duty, till their Conduct, together with the reſt of the late Tranſactions, had been ſtated to Bengal, and the Opinion and Advice of the Governor General and Council with regard to them were received. The Preſident acquainted us his Intention was to be guided by the Sentiments they might expreſs as to the Propriety of continuing Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn in the Service, or the Expediency of diſmiſſing them from it.

102. If they did not chuſe to accept this Propoſal, the Preſident moved, that they might both be immediately ſuſpended the Service.

103. It was agreed this Minute ſhould lie on the Table; and at our next Meeting on the 1ſt of February, the Preſident acquainted us, that Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn had declined all Military Duty till our further Orders; and he then deſired the Senſe of the Committee might be taken, whether according to your Commands, Colonel Egerton was entitled to hold his Seat in the Select Committee, ſince he had relinquiſhed all military Command?

104. It was voted by the Majority and reſolved accordingly, that Colonel Egerton had no Right, and was not to be conſidered as a Member of the Select Committee, until he might reſume the Exerciſe of his Office as Commander in Chief; and he in conſequence was ſuperſeded.

105. A Copy of our Proceedings on that Day is tranſmitted in the Packet, wherein is ſtated at Length the Opinion of each Member on the Queſtion of Colonel Egerton's Right to his Seat in the Committee; and we alſo tranſmit a Copy at Length, of the Governor's Minute, and of the Correſpondence between him and Colonel Egerton, in the Interval between our Meetings of the 29th of January and the 1ſt of February, and of the General Order given out in conſequence; which it is neceſſary to recommend to your Attention, as Colonel Egerton has ſince denied his having accepted the Alternative offered him by the Preſident.

106. Colonel Egerton has wrote us ſeveral Letters on the Subject, and inſiſting upon reſuming the Command of the Army; but we continued in our Reſolution not to admit of his retracting, or of his taking the Command, until we received the Sentiments of the Governor General and Council on his Conduct.

107. A Copy of his Letters, and of our Anſwers in their proper Order, is tranſmitted in the Packet, alſo of a Proteſt he thought proper to deliver, and a Minute made by the Preſident, in conſequence, with an Addreſs from the Colonel to you, and a Copy of his Addreſs to the Governor General and Council; all of which, agreeable to our before-mentioned Reſolution, we beg Leave to ſubmit to your Judgment.

108. Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn having delivered in a Letter relative to his own Conduct on the late Service, a Copy thereof is tranſmitted in the Packet with the other Papers, the Particulars of which will be mentioned in the Sequel.

109. The Predicament in which Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn now ſtand, and the Death of Lieutenant Colonel Cay, rendered it a Caſe of indiſpenſable Neceſſity to make ſome immediate Arrangement for the Command of the Army; Lieutenant Colonel Nelſon, the Chief Engineer, as the ſenior Officer on the Eſtabliſhment, received the Command of the Garriſon, when Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn declined all Military Duty, and Lieutenant Colonel Dagon held the Command of the Artillery, but we had no Field Officer for the Command of the Infantry Eſtabliſhment, in whoſe Abilities or Experience we had ſufficient Confidence to in-

truſt ſo important a Charge at a Time like this. We had before, whilſt the Army was in the Field, when Colonel Egerton gave up the Command to Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, been under the Neceſſity of appointing Major Dagon of the Artillery a Lieutenant Colonel, in order to ſecure a fit Officer for the Second Command, or to ſucceed to the Chief Command in caſe of Accident to Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn; our Reaſons for which are fully ſtated in our Proceedings of the 5th of January, a Copy of which waits on you under N° 17.

110. At this Time Major Emanuel Henney was the ſenior Officer, and in Command of the Infantry; who, on his firſt Appointment as a Field Officer, was barred from further Promotion, and was the Officer whom we judged it our Duty to ſuperſede in the Field, by the Promotion of Lieutenant Colonel Dagon as abovementioned. We deemed it, therefore, in no Shape proper to continue Major Henney in Command of our Infantry Eſtabliſhment.

111. Major Charles Frederick was the next Officer in ſtanding. He had been but lately arrived from England, and, as we underſtand, had borne a Commiſſion in the Guards, but had never ſeen actual Service before the late Expedition. When you ſent him out as the youngeſt Brevet Major, we preſume you did not expect he would ſo early arrive at the Succeſſion to an advanced Rank, and a Poſt of the firſt military Charge; and as by an unforeſeen Chain of Circumſtances, it had devolved to us to make the Appointment of an Officer for the Command of the Infantry, we conſidered ourſelves as reſponſible for the Choice we made, and on that Principle we did not think we ſhould do Juſtice to the Charge repoſed in us by promoting Major Frederick.

112. However it was abſolutely neceſſary that we ſhould have an Officer at the Head of the Infantry, on whoſe Conduct we could ſafely rely, and it was at the ſame Time highly incumbent on us, conſidering the State of the Army, to confer the moſt honourable Marks of Notice on thoſe Officers who had particularly diſtinguiſhed themſelves on the late unfortunate Expedition; both theſe Conſiderations ſtrongly united in pointing out Captain James Hartley, who of all the Officers on our military Liſt appeared the moſt fit for this Command: His Behaviour in a Courſe of Fourteen Years Service has been unexceptionable, and his Conduct and Intrepidity in the Action of the 12th of January, when he commanded the Rear Diviſion, merited every Reward in our Power to beſtow, and, as far as we can judge, proved the Preſervation of the whole Army. His Merit, and the Judgment he ſhewed on that Occaſion, are acknowledged in the general Orders given out by Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn and Colonel Egerton immediately after the Action, wherein Captain Hartley is the only Officer particularly commended, except Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn himſelf.

113. Under theſe Circumſtances, we reſolved to appoint Captain Hartley a Lieutenant Colonel of Infantry, and we do moſt earneſtly ſolicit you to confirm this Appointment, to convince the Army that we ſhall meet with your Support when the Good of the Service makes it requiſite that we ſhould diſtinguiſh particular Officers. We are very ſorry that we have been obliged to act contrary to your Orders reſpecting the Promotion of Field Officers, but we truſt the Neceſſity will plead our Excuſe. On the Terms we are with the Marattas, and in a Time of actual War with France, it would have been highly unjuſtifiable in us to have ſuffered our Military to remain for any Length of Time without an Officer to command them, qualified either to preſerve them in proper Diſcipline, or lead them into the Field; and we hope that the Reluctance we muſt naturally feel to all Kinds of Supercceſſion, and the Complaints we foreſaw we ſhould expoſe ourſelves to from Individuals, will be a Conviction to you of the Ground and Neceſſity for the Promotion of Lieutenant Colonel Hartley.

114. Captain John Weſtphall, the ſenior Captain of Artillery, having alſo particularly diſtinguiſhed himſelf on the late Service, we reſolved unſolicited to appoint him a Major of Artillery, to which he had a Title by Seniority; and the Promotion of Lieutenant Colonel Dagon was a Reward due to his Ability and Merit.

115. We alſo conferred Marks of our Attention on Captain Bellas, of the Artillery, Captain Cadger, of the Infantry, and Lieutenants Dawſon, Bowles, Jackſon, Thomas, Waddington, Bannatyne, Macpherſon, and Burchall, and the Six Companies of Grenadier Sepoys, who compoſed the Rear Diviſion under Captain Hartley; the Particulars of all which are mentioned in the Copy of our Minutes under the 1ſt ultimo, tranſmitted under N° 17.

116. Lieutenant John Rattray of the Bengal Eſtabliſhment, who arrived from England in the Royal Henry, and went a Volunteer on the Expedition, where he gave ſtrong Proofs of his Skill and Conduct as an Officer, we returned him our public Thanks for his Services; and as we were glad of the Opportunity of adding ſuch a valuable Officer to our Eſtabliſhment, we offered him a Commiſſion as youngeſt Captain, which we doubt not you will approve.

117. As in India Service in general, and particularly in our ſmall Army, the Charge and Reſponſibility of each Captain is very great, and the moſt dangerous Conſequences may ariſe from improper Perſons being promoted to that Rank, we judged it for the Good of the Service to make it a Rule, and ſignified accordingly to the Army, that the Lieutenants will not in future be promoted in Rotation to the Rank of Captains, either in the Infantry or Artillery, unleſs they ſhall be judged fully qualified for that Station.

118. Agreeable to this Rule, we have ſet aſide Captain John Holebrook from the Command of a Company of Artillery, to which he was next in Succeſſion; the Commandant of the Corps having repreſented him ſo much addicted to Liquor, as to be unfit for that Charge. Lieutenant Colebrook of the Infantry, and Lieutenant Layton of the Artillery, have alſo been paſſed over in a late Promotion;

motion; but we ſhall re-conſider the Caſe of the latter, if we diſcover proper Signs of Amendment.

119. We have received Repreſentations on the Subject from ſeveral of the Officers who were ſuperſeded by the Promotion of Lieutenant Colonel Hartley; and Major Frederick has reſigned his Commiſſion, and ſet out for England by the Way of Suez. In his Letter he aſſumes to himſelf the chief Part of the Merit attributed to Captain Hartley, in the Action of the 12th; and we therefore think it neceſſary to mention, that although Major Frederick was ſent to reinforce Captain Hartley, he has made a great Miſtake in reſpect to the Time when he was ſent, which is confirmed by the Evidence of Captain Rattray and other Circumſtances; it muſt be obſerved, though not taken Notice of by Major Frederick, but which is confirmed by Captain Rattray, and in Part allowed by Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn himſelf in his Letter to us, that when Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn ſent him down to ſupport the Rear Diviſion, he was ordered, though the Superior Officer, to act in concert with Captain Hartley, and not to make any Movement without his Advice. This is a very particular Circumſtance, and ſtrongly expreſſive of the commanding Officer's Confidence in Captain Hartley, to which we may add the General Orders given out at the Time, when no other Impreſſion prevailed but the Senſe of Captain Hartley's diſtinguiſhed Services. In theſe Orders not a Word is mentioned of Major Frederick; but ſince the Promotion of Lieutenant Colonel Hartley we have received Commendations of Major Frederick.

120. In the Packet we ſend Copies of the Letters we have received from Majors Frederick and Hopkins, and Captains Jackſon, Fewtrell, Campbell, and Turner, and of our Anſwers. The laſt-mentioned Officer is in the Engineer Corps, and is not ſuperſeded by Colonel Hartley, but thought himſelf reflected on in the General Orders. This Point we cleared up and did him Juſtice.

121. It is a Plea much inſiſted upon by our Officers, That if we have any Fault to find with their Conduct, and think it neceſſary to ſuperſede them, they ought to have a Trial by a General Court Martial. To this we anſwer, That many Officers may paſs through the Service without laying themſelves open to the Military Law, and yet may be very unqualified to riſe to the higheſt Stations in their Line. The Times required an Officer who had ſomething more to plead than merely not having committed a Fault: We wanted an Officer of active and approved Merit, and on whoſe Ability and Conduct we could depend for the Execution of any Service committed to him.

122. It is ſcarce poſſible to give you an adequate Idea of the Deficiency of our Military Eſtabliſhment in Point of Officers. In the Artillery and Engineer Corps indeed we are ſo fortunate as to have a Number of well-formed, active, deſerving Officers; but in the Infantry we ſee a very ſmall Proportion of our long Liſt of Captains, from whom we can flatter ourſelves with any extraordinary Expectations, in caſe of their ever riſing to a ſuperior Command, and even of this ſmall Number we muſt look for the greater Part amongſt the junior Captains. You will ſee on Reference to the Correſpondence between the Preſident and Mr. Carnac during the late Service, and by the Preſident's Letter to Colonel Cockburn upon his taking the Command, how much was thought to depend on the Abilities of Captain Hartley and Captain Stewart, and how eſſential a Point to fix them in Colonel Cockburn's particular Confidence. The very ſtrong, natural, and acquired Qualifications of Captain Stewart as an Officer, had given us the moſt flattering Hopes of ſeeing him in the Liſt of thoſe Names that have done the greateſt Honour to your military Service, and his Loſs is one of thoſe Circumſtances which in our preſent Situation we moſt ſenſibly feel. The unhappy Termination of the Expedition, on which he was cut off, together with the general Opinion entertained of the different Succeſs that would have attended our Army had Captain Stewart's Rank been ſuch as to have enabled us to have given him the Command, are Circumſtances that juſtly augment our Regret.

123. Captain Hartley's Merits cannot be ſeen in a more favourable Point of View than in the Choice that was made of him to ſucceed Captain Stewart in the Command of the advanced Diviſion of the Army, and his Conduct in that Charge was in every Inſtance ſuch as did him Honour, and will we hope juſtify the Diſtinction to which we have thought it entitled him. On the Day of the 12th there is Reaſon to think, that had his ſpirited and judicious Counſels been followed, of moving up the Line to ſupport him, inſtead of his retreating to the Line, the Fortune of that Day might have been ſuch as to have ſecured our Honour, if not our Succeſs; and as it was, his keeping his Ground with his Diviſion till his Repreſentation of the inevitable bad Conſequences of ſuch a Meaſure induced Colonel Cockburn to revoke his Orders for retreating, was probably the chief Circumſtance to which the Preſervation of our divided Forces was due.

124. Many Particulars will appear in the Papers to which we have referred in this Letter, to ſupport and confirm the Opinion we have given with regard to the Merit of Captain Hartley, and to juſtify our Motives in advancing him to his preſent Rank. Yet we are ſenſible we muſt ſtill truſt much to your favourable Interpretation of our Conduct, and to your Confidence in the Motives by which we were governed in taking this Step.

125. At a Time when the Two chief Officers on our Eſtabliſhment are under Cenſure for a Conduct totally oppoſite to that we think ourſelves bound to promote, and to that Spirit which it is our Duty to encourage among your Troops; when ſo great a Number of Perſons find an Intereſt in maintaining, by any Means, the Claim of Seniority to Promotion, in Preference to diſtinguiſhed Merit and Services; it is impoſſible for us to produce thoſe general and deciſive Teſtimonies of our Aſſertions and Opinions which we always wiſh ſhould accompany. There is a Tenderneſs due to moderate Talents and Exertions of Perſons of ordinary Merit, which does not allow us even to point out to themſelves the Inſtances in which we judge them deficient, or in which we think their Junior far ſurpaſſes them.

them. Our Anſwers therefore to the ſeveral Complaints of Superceſſion have been of a general Kind; but we would not therefore have you to ſuppoſe that we have not particular Reaſons, founded on the perſonal Knowledge of Characters, for preferring Captain Hartley to every one of thoſe Gentlemen: It would be to no Purpoſe to enter into them here, ſince however minute we might be, the whole Weight of what we might urge would depend on the Authority you might be willing to allow to our Capacity and Integrity in forming our Judgments of the Men, and in the faithful Communication of our real Sentiments; we will therefore only beg Leave to remind you, that in the preſent critical Circumſtances our own Intereſt is too much complicated with that of the Public to ſuffer us to be ſwayed by Motives of partial or private Regard. The Opportunities we likewiſe have of acquiring an intimate Knowledge of the Characters of your Servants, we hope will entitle our Opinions of them to ſome Conſideration; and we will only obſerve further, that the Abilities, Integrity, Temper, and the general Eſtimation each Perſon ſtands in in his reſpective Branch of Service, are commonly well underſtood on the Spot; and that while we are conſcious of being guided by ſuch Qualities, we feel that we have paid that Attention to your Intereſt which our Duty exacts from us, and ſhall rely on that Support from you which the Performance of it requires, and warrants us to hope for.

126. There are Two Circumſtances which in this Place we cannot paſs over, both as they are material for your Information and are Inſtances of the Neceſſity of the Meaſure we have adopted in the Military Line, and of the Occaſion we have for your Support and Confidence: The Firſt relates to the ſeveral Complaints of the Perſons ſuperſeded by Colonel Hartley's Promotion; the Second to the Caſe of Major Frederick, who would have it thought that he was particularly injured by it.

127. You will ſee by Colonel Cockburn's Letter to us of the 16th February, in what Manner he endeavours to exculpate himſelf, and juſtify that written Opinion of his, on which the Governor has formed his Charge againſt him, in his Minute of the 29th January. This you will find he attempts, by referring to the Reports of Deſertion amongſt the Sepoys, and Panic amongſt the Europeans, brought to him by ſeveral un-named Officers; and we have Reaſon to think that much of this Spirit had ſpread through the Army; and it is no ſmall Occaſion of the Diſſatisfaction we expreſs at the Conduct of Colonel Cockburn, that he does not ſeem to have at all exerted himſelf to repreſs that Deſpondency, or to revive and ſupport the Spirits and Courage of his Troops. Had he ſhewn the Firmneſs, Vigour, and Example, ſo eſſentially requiſite in a Commander on ſuch an Emergency, we have no Reaſon to ſuppoſe but that a Retreat might have been effected; for neither the Loſs on our Side in the Action of the 17th, nor any Advantage gained by the Enemy on that Day, were ſuch as can be termed deciſive. At any Rate, the Trial ſhould have been made, and a few Marches would have put it out of the Power of the Enemy materially to annoy them.

128. The bad Conſequences of a contrary Conduct have been too ſeverely felt in their Effect to need further Deſcription; but we are aſſured that Captain Hartley, in that trying Situation, notwithſtanding the Contagion of bad Example, diſtinguiſhed himſelf more honourably, becauſe in a Manner more uncommon, than he had before done in Action. He inſiſted he could depend on the Men he had commanded; and ſome Deſertion having appeared in his own Battalion, from which he had been removed to command the advanced Diviſion of the Army, he joined that Diviſion to his Battalion, whilſt the Army remained at Worgaum, and at once put a Stop to the Evil, ſo far as the Limits of his Command extended. When he was conſulted on the Occaſion, he urged every Argument to attempt the forcing a Retreat, rather than ſubmit to the humiliating Terms preſcribed by the Enemy, he even formed a Diſpoſition, and preſented it to Colonel Cockburn, for conducting the Retreat, and avoiding the Inconveniencies reſulting from a Night March, and the Diviſion of the Troops. Theſe are Circumſtances we have every Reaſon to believe; and yet you will plainly perceive, that in the preſent Situation of Affairs, we cannot expect to have them vouched for by thoſe, from whom any formal Teſtimony could with moſt Propriety have been received; and indeed they imply a Comparſon ſo unfavourable for the Generality of our Officers, that Prudence requires us in ſome Degree not to promulgate them.

129. With regard to Major Frederick, we muſt take the Liberty, in Addition to what we have already ſaid of his military Talents, to advance, that we conſider his Reſignation, not only in that, but in every other Reſpect, as a very fortunate Event for the Service. He came out recommended very powerfully, and the Reſpect entertained for the Friends who had intereſted themſelves in his Favour, ſecured him every Attention that could be ſhewn him; but we are ſorry to ſay, that he has waſted and exhauſted the good Offices of his Friends, in ſcreening him from the bad Conſequences to which the Violence of his Temper, and other Qualities, muſt have ſubjected him; ſo that there is hardly a Magiſtrate in the Place who has not in Turn had Cognizance of his Exceſſes. The Idea of his Intereſt in England being uſeful to thoſe who now make a common Cauſe with him in the Complaint of Superceſſion, has ſince the Promotion of Lieutenant Colonel Hartley united more Perſons to him than before; and we believe he is now gone to England as a general Solicitor for the ſuperſeded Officers. But our Opinion of Major Frederick was ſo little in his Favour, that when his Pretenſions in the Service became ſuch as could not be allowed, without ſacrificing the Intereſts of the Company and of the Settlement, we ſhould have thought ourſelves highly culpable, had we not rejected them: We have, notwithſtanding, in our Reply to his Letters, confined ourſelves to theſe general Anſwers, which we apprehend are fully ſufficient in the public Line of Buſineſs; but to you, to whom we owe a more circumſtantial Explanation of our Conduct, and ſuch Information as may ſerve to guard you againſt Miſapprehenſions and Miſrepreſentations, we find it neceſſary to open ourſelves without Reſerve, even on the tender Point of perſonal Character; a Subject which if poſſible

we

we ſhould avoid, but cannot in this Caſe, without making ourſelves anſwerable for the Errors into which you might be naturally led by the ſpecious and bold Plea of irreproachable Service, unleſs furniſhed by us with a Knowledge of Circumſtances and Character, which have been the Ground of our Proceedings, and will, we truſt, influence yours. This Communication we think at leaſt our Duty, and ſuch a Taſk as we can expect no Perſon to take on himſelf, who is not called on by the ſame Principle; and therefore, however neceſſary, it muſt have been left undone, unleſs performed by us.

130. From the above Repreſentation, we truſt you will be convinced of what Importance it is, and what diſagreeable Meaſures it will relieve us from, that the Gentlemen ſent out for Field Officers ſhould be Officers of Service and Experience, and of known Merit and Character; and we make it our earneſt Requeſt that you will attend to thoſe Qualifications, in any you may think proper to ſend to Bombay in future.

131. On the Promotion of Lieutenant Colonel Dagon, a Doubt occurred to us, whether, according to the Tenor of your Orders, we are abſolutely prohibited from promoting a Field Officer from one Degree to another, when there is an actual Vacancy, and the firſt Appointment has been approved and confirmed by you; both of which were the Caſe with reſpect to Lieutenant Colonel Dagon. We requeſt an Explanation of your Intentions, to ſerve us for a Guide in future.

132. At our Meeting on the 1ſt February, it was agreed to diſpatch a Veſſel to Bengal, with Copies of all neceſſary Papers, and a full Account of the late Tranſactions and our preſent Situation, and that in the mean Time a ſhort Addreſs ſhould be diſpatched over Land, to adviſe the Governor General and Council, in Abſtract, of the unfortunate Iſſue of the Expedition, and to requeſt them to ſuſpend their Judgment and Determination till the promiſed Detail was laid before them. A Letter on that Plan was accordingly diſpatched, ſubſcribed by the preſent Members of the Committee, but Mr. Draper having, at our next Meeting, expreſſed his Diſſent and Diſapprobation of that Letter, and of one of the ſame Date to Colonel Goddard, terming them partial and fallacious; this Proceeding drew Minutes from the Preſident and Mr. Carnac, and Replies from Mr. Draper, all of which, with the Letters objected to, are collected in one Paper, and tranſmitted under N° 18.

133. Shortly after the Return of the Army, a Vackeel from the Poona Durbar, and a ſeparate Vackeel on the Part of Madajee Scindia, demanded in Form the Poſſeſſion of the ſeveral Places ſtipulated to be ſurrendered by the Agreement at Worgaum. The Anſwer we reſolved to give them, was in Effect as follows: That Meſſrs. Carnac and Egerton had no Authority whatever to form any Treaty or Engagement binding on the Honourable Company, which their Principals were given clearly to underſtand before the Paper upon which they ground their Demands was ſubſcribed by thoſe Gentlemen; and that we likewiſe had no Authority to take any Steps in Conſequence until we received the Sentiments of the Governor General and Council, to whom we ſhould diſpatch a Veſſel expreſs with a full Account of the whole Tranſaction, and wait their Determination.

134. The Preſident was deſired in the Delivery of this Anſwer, to make uſe of ſuch Terms as would leave an Opening for further Negociation or Overtures from Madajee Scindia, which we furmiſed from ſome Part of his Conduct might be expected, and that he had even Views to a Connection with us upon Principles of mutual Intereſt.

135. According to the Intimation given us by the Preſident in his Minute of the 29th January, of his Intention of ſhortly propoſing ſome Plan of Conduct for extricating us from our preſent Difficulties, he on the 19th ultimo laid before us a Minute of Review of Maratta Affairs, and containing ſundry Reſolutions propoſed by him in conſequence. A Copy thereof is tranſmitted in the Packet, with the Remarks made by Mr. Draper and our Deciſions on the Propoſal, and will exhibit ſo extenſive a View of our political Situation as leaves us little to add on the Subject. He therein ſtrongly ſet before us the great Probability that Nanah's Determination on our Anſwer to the Demand made by the Durbar for the Surrender of our Poſſeſſions, would be hoſtile to us, if he could prevail on the Chiefs who had acted with him againſt Ragoba to ſupport him in a War againſt us; that we had therefore no Time to loſe in guarding againſt ſuch an Union, and that it would be expected from us, that we ſhould exert ourſelves in extricating our Affairs from their preſent Embarraſſment according to the Powers already given us by the Governor General and Council, and not ſupinely to throw on them Difficulties which it was our Duty to meet, and if poſſible to overcome. The ſeveral Meaſures propoſed for this Purpoſe will appear by the Reſolutions; and after full Conſideration of the Advantages of a Connection with Madjee Scindia, and the Grounds we had to hope that Overtures from us would be well received, determined to take the Step recommended by the Preſident for putting his Diſpoſition in our Favour to the Teſt, by writing to him in Terms mentioned in his Minute. But we are ſorry to add, he does not ſeem to meet our Advances in the Manner we hoped for. Whether it may be his Idea, that he ſhall find his Advantage in keeping us in our preſent Situation, and that we cannot extricate ourſelves without his Aſſiſtance, or whether he may think himſelf able to effect his own Purpoſes at Poona without our Aid, we cannot determine; but however, we ſtill think it will be good Policy to obſerve ſuch a Conduct towards him as if we did not conſider him connected with Nannah in any Deſigns againſt the Engliſh, and as having ſeparate and diſtinct Views, which appears to be really the Caſe; and we hope we ſhall derive Advantage from his Conduct in any Meaſures we may find it neceſſary to purſue at the Poona Durbar.

136. The Reſident at Fort Victoria having ſent Intelligence that the Marattas at Sevendroog were making Preparations for the Attack of that Fort, and requeſted a Reinforcement, we ſent down a Company of Sepoys in a Bomb Ketch, and in the Interim, on the 13th Inſtant, an Attack was made, the Particulars of which we are not yet acquainted with, the Reſident's Letter having been intercepted; but in a ſubſequent Letter referring thereto, he deſired the Reinforcement might be ſent without a Moment's Delay.

137. We had before received ſeveral Letters from the Durbar, demanding a Compliance with the Terms of the Convention of Worgaum, and complaining of the Reference to Bengal; and we had alſo received Intelligence of an Attack being intended againſt Sallette and Caranja at the ſame Time, but we conclude the Meaſures immediately taken for the Security of thoſe Iſlands, prevented the Marattas from making any Attempts in that Quarter. But by this open Act of Hoſtility committed at Fort Victoria, it appeared the Durbar were reſolved not to keep Terms with us; and we therefore reſolved, on the 19th Inſtant, to meet on ſome early Day, that after due Conſideration we might determine what Conduct to purſue with the Marattas, and in what Manner to diſpoſe of the Bengal Detachment, and to provide Funds for its Support, as well as our other Charges; an Eſtimate of which, and of our Reſources, we directed to be laid before us, and in the mean Time we deſired the Preſident to write a ſuitable Letter to the Durbar on this open Act of Hoſtility.

138. We ſhall communicate the Reſult of our Deliberations on this important Subject, and the Meaſures we ſhall fix upon, in the moſt expeditious Manner we can; but as the Seaſon draws late, we cannot detain this Veſſel any longer without defeating the Intent of her Diſpatches, and hazarding her ſpeedy Arrival in England.

139. That we might obtain a full Account of the State and Objects of the Negociation with Moodajee Bouncello, and alſo of the Condition and Wants of the Bengal Detachment, we deſired Colonel Goddard to come down to Bombay to give us Information on theſe Particulars; and alſo that we might have the Benefit of his Advice in our Proceedings at this Criſis. By a Return he preſented on his Arrival, we find his Force conſiſts of upwards of 4000 Sepoys, Rank and File; about 300 Horſe, being Part of a Regiment of your Cavalry; 500 of the Vizier's Cavalry, which accompanied him on the March; and a Company of Native Artillery, with proper Eſtabliſhments of Laſcars, Artificers, and Labourers, attached to the Artillery and other Branches of the Army.

140. As the Expence of this Detachment on its preſent Footing muſt be very conſiderable, we thought proper to conſult Colonel Goddard on that Head; and whether it might not be poſſible to make ſome conſiderable Reduction therein; and upon his meeting us in Committee for that Purpoſe, he acquainted us that the monthly Iſſues for his Detachment amounted to Two Lacks and Ten or Twenty thouſand Rupees; and that this Sum might be reduced to far as Twenty five or Thirty thouſand Rupees a Month, by ſending back the Cavalry, and cutting off ſome of the Eſtabliſhment for the Staff; but ſubmitted to us how far any Meaſure of that Kind might be proper, in caſe we had any near Proſpect of Employment for the Troops, and eſpecially how far it might be prudent to part with the Cavalry, whoſe Services would be of the utmoſt Importance in caſe of any Operations againſt a Country Power, which he obſerved we muſt be ſenſible of from the great Difficulties our Army lately experienced from the Want of ſuch Aſſiſtance.

141. He informed us, that he had Authority from the Governor General and Council to draw on them for the Expences of the Army, and ſeemed to think that for ſome Time at leaſt he might be able to ſupply his Wants without Aſſiſtance from us, by Means of the Surat Shroffs; but this does not appear to us a Reſource on which he can long depend.

142. He gave us an Account of the State in which he left his Negociation with the Rajah of Berar, which appears to be ſtill in a Train; and as we had a few Days before received from the Governor General and Council a Copy of their Inſtructions to the late Mr. Elliot, dated the 18th July, we are now poſſeſſed of full Information with reſpect to their Views and Deſigns in the propoſed Alliance with that Chief, which will be a grand Advantage to us in our Councils, and enable us to frame our Meaſures correſpondent with their Plan of Politics; an Advantage we regret was not ſooner given to us. We preſume you muſt long ago have received Mr. Elliot's Inſtructions; but we now tranſmit in the Packet a Copy of Colonel Goddard's Letter above mentioned.

143. Colonel Goddard has had the Materials put into his Hands to inform him fully of the late Tranſactions; and as we ſhall entruſt to him the Execution of whatever Meaſures may be adopted, we deſired him to attend at our future Meetings, in order that he might obtain a proper Inſight into our political Proceedings.

144. We ſhall conclude our Letter with ſome general Matters of Detail not immediately connected with our Proceedings above related.

145. Upon the Firſt Notice of an approaching War with France, which was received in June laſt, Orders were given for our Fortifications being carried on with all poſſible Vigour; and we have the Pleaſure to inform you, that our Works towards the Sea are in great Forwardneſs. The Royal Admiral, now under Diſpatch, the Plans and Eſtimates ordered by the honourable Court in their Commands of the 19th March, will be tranſmitted, and a full Reply ſent thereto by the Governor and Council.

146. Conſidering the Importance of Tellicherry, and its Vicinity to Myhee, we thought it highly incumbent on us to take Meaſures for its Security, and accordingly permitted of ſome ſmall Additions to the Fortifications, and formed an independant Corps, conſiſting of Three Companies of regular Sepoys drafted from the other Battalions, to compoſe the Garriſon. The Drafts were replaced by

the Recruits, ſo that by this Plan our own Force was not diminiſhed; and we gave ſtrict Orders to the Factors at Tellicherry to attend only to the Defence of their own Settlement, and not to engage in offenſive Operations.

147. Colonel Egerton having frequently preſſed this Government to make Trial of a Corps of native Portugueze Infantry, with their own Officers, on the Footing of a Sepoy Battalion, and urging our great Deficiency in Europeans, we, on 15th Auguſt, conſented to raiſe a ſmall Body, conſiſting of 400 Privates, to be divided into Five Companies, with Portugueze Officers anſwerable to the Black Officers of the Sepoys, an European commiſſioned Officer to each Company, and the Whole to be commanded by One European Captain. If it is poſſible to make good Soldiers of theſe People, this Plan gives them all poſſible Encouragement, which they never received before; and this poſſibly may be the Reaſon why they have not hitherto been in much Repute; and it was upon that Principle Mr. Carnac gave his Aſſent to the Meaſure. In our Proceedings, which will be ſent Home by the Royal Admiral, you will find under the above Date the Particulars of the Eſtabliſhment of this Corps; which however we may perhaps find it neceſſary to retain, when our European Battalions are compleated, even if it ſhould be found to anſwer the Expectations formed from it, which we begin to doubt.

148. A general Return of the Troops on this Eſtabliſhment is forwarded under N° 43.

149. Agreeable to your Directions a Sheer Hault has been fitted up for the Uſe of His Majeſty's Ships; and under N° 39 we tranſmit Copy of a Report from the Committee appointed to ſurvey our Docks, and of the Liſt therein referred to, the Purport of which was mentioned in our Addreſs of the 29th of December.

150. We have not come to any Determination on the Propoſal for building additional Docks, capable of admitting 74 Gun Ships.

151. In our Addreſs of the 29th of December, we adviſed of our having taken Poſſeſſion of the French Factory at Surat, and ſeized the Perſons of the Conſul, and of every other Frenchman in that City. This Step, we doubt not, from your Commands of the 31ſt Auguſt, will be approved; and we removed all the French Gentlemen to Bombay, except the Conſul and his Family, whom we permitted to remain at Surat upon his Parole. Amongſt the Priſoners removed to Bombay was a Prieſt, who ſometime after his Arrival ſent to inform the Preſident that he had Intelligence of an important Nature to communicate; and being accordingly examined, gave Information, and which was confirmed by another of the Priſoners, that a Plan had been concerted between Monſieur Briancourt, the French Conſul, and Monſieur St. Lubin, for bringing down a Body of Muratta Troops to ſeize and plunder the City of Surat, whilſt our Troops were employed on the Expedition; in which Scheme they had engaged ſome of the Nabob's Officers. A Copy of the Narrative of what was declared by the Prieſt and the other Priſoner Monſieur Charleval, now wait on you under N° 40; and the Preſident preſerving the moſt profound Secrecy, immediately ſent up the latter to Surat, in Hopes of his being able to find the Box of Papers mentioned in the Narrative, which contained the Particulars of the Conſpiracy. He however did not ſucceed, and no farther Diſcovery has yet been made, though we have offered a Reward of Ten thouſand Rupees, and directed Mr. Boddam to trace this Matter with all poſſible Diligence; but as it appeared very improper under ſuch a Suſpicion to permit the Conſul to remain any longer at Surat, we have removed him with his Family to the Fort at Tannah, where we propoſe to keep them till they are ſent to Europe.

152. In our Diary, which will be ſent by the Royal Admiral, is entered under the 18th Auguſt, a Letter we received from Sir Edward Vernon, in Anſwer to our Requiſition for his bringing round the Squadron to Bombay by the Southern Paſſage, which we mentioned in our Addreſs of the 31ſt July; and under the 8th September, you will find our Reply to the Reaſons urged by the Commodore in Support of his Reſolution for remaining on the Coaſt; and circumſtanced as Affairs then were, we flatter ourſelves you will think our Reaſoning well founded. We alſo, upon an Application from the Merchants of the Place, made a Requeſt to Sir Edward Vernon to ſend a Convoy into the Straits of Malacca, to ſecure the returning Ships from China; which the Strength of his Squadron would not admit of his complying with; but the Governor General and Council diſpatched your Ship the Reſolution on that Service, and ſhe has ſince arrived on this Coaſt with ſome of the China Ships, and is now under the Orders of Sir Edward Vernon, on the Expedition againſt Mahé.

153. We have long thought it would be for your Intereſt to have a Reſident at the Durbar of Hyder Ally, to endeavour to counteract and penetrate into the Schemes of the French, and to bring him into a Diſpoſition more favourable to the Honourable Company: And in the Beginning of May laſt we propoſed this Meaſure to the Governor General and Council; who ſeemed to have ſome Doubts how far it might be agreeable to the Nabob of Arcot; and accordingly wrote to the Preſident and Council at Madras, deſiring them to acquaint us with the Nabob's Sentiments on the Subject, leaving us nevertheleſs in a great Meaſure to act in this Point according to our own Judgment. Not hearing from the Gentlemen at Madras for a conſiderable Time, we on the 4th November, upon Receipt of Advices from the Reſident at Tellicherry, of ſome particular Inſtances of the Nabob's Attention to the French, in affording liberal Supplies of Proviſions, and even Money, to their Settlement at Mahé, and exciting ſome of the petty Rajahs dependant on him to aſſiſt them with their Forces, we came to the Reſolution of deputing Mr. James Sibbald to his Durbar, to make the proper Remonſtrances on that Head, and to endeavour to detach him from the French Intereſt; judging that the Reduction of Pondicherry, which we daily expected to be informed of, would be a favourable Opportunity for effecting our Point. Being afterwards informed that the Nabob had given

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the Governor of Mahé Permiſſion to hoiſt his Colours in caſe of the Place being attacked by the Engliſh, and that he intended ſending his Fleet with Supplies of Grain to the French Iſlands, we have judged it beſt, as theſe will be ſuch decided Inſtances of his Attachment to them, not to diſpatch Mr. Sibbald till we are at a Certainty with reſpect to the Part the Nabob will take when Mahé is attacked; which we hope you will approve, and we took Care to give Notice to the Preſidency of Madras and Sir Edward Vernon, of the Intelligence we had received of the Nabob's Intentions, that they might be prepared to regulate their Conduct accordingly, in caſe the Nabob ſhould openly aſſiſt the French.

154. We have actual Advice that a Veſſel of the Nabob's, formerly the Salamander Bomb Ketch, ſailed for Mauritius the 16th ultimo, with ſome French Gentlemen, and a few Articles of Merchandize, and 40,000 Pagodas in Money.

155. On the 18th December we received a Letter from the Select Committee at Madras, dated the 8th November, acquainting us that they deemed it ſo important to acquire Poſſeſſion of Mahé before the Arrival of any French Armament from Europe or Mauritius, that they then wrote purpoſely to concert with us the neceſſary Meaſures for the Attainment of that Object, and they deſired to know what Aſſiſtance we could afford in Troops or Stores; acquainting us likewiſe, that as their Loſs before Pondicherry in Europeans, and particularly in the Artillery Corps, had weakened them very conſiderably, any Aſſiſtance we could give in theſe would be very acceptable, and that if we could ſupply any Part of the heavy Cannon, Mortar, and Stores, it would be a great Relief to them.

156. They alſo deſired us to take the neceſſary Meaſures for ſecuring Proviſions for the Troops, and engaging in our Intereſt the Country Powers adjoining to Mahé, and ſignified their Intention that the Troops ſhould leave Madras, in December, if nothing ſhould happen to prevent it.

157. We did not loſe a Moment in acquainting the Gentlemen at Madras that we ſhould immediately ſend down to Tellicherry a Train of Battering Cannon and Mortars, with all their Apparatus and Appurtenances compleat, ſpare Carriages, and a proper Quantity of Shot, Shells, and Gunpowder, which we accordingly diſpatched the 25th of December in the Revenge and Bombay Grab; and at the ſame Time ſent the neceſſary Orders to your Servants at Tellicherry on the other Points, and alſo the Reſident at Anjengo, to take all neceſſary Meaſures for facilitating the Tranſportation of the Troops from thence to Tellicherry, if the Squadron under Sir Edward Vernon, which we learnt was to come round, ſhould not be found ſufficient.

158. Our Troops were at that Time in the Field with Ragoba, and it was not in our Power to promiſe to ſpare a Man for the Siege of Mahé.

159. Whilſt we were anxiouſly expecting to hear of the Arrival of the Madras Troops on the Coaſt, we received on the 11th February another Letter from the Committee at Madras, dated the 7th January, acquainting us of their Troops having marched, but that it was out of their Power (even had they Conveyances) to ſend more than Half of the Stores neceſſary for the Expedition, ſo great had been their Iſſues for the Siege of Pondicherry; they therefore ſent us a Liſt of the Stores they could not furniſh, and requeſted we would immediately diſpatch them to Tellicherry, as the Expedition could not otherwiſe go on; though the Demand made upon us was very heavy we inſtantly reſolved to comply with it, and being unprovided with any other Conveyance, we made Application to the Commander of His Majeſty's Ship Aſia, then under Orders to join the Commodore, to receive them on board, which he readily agreed to, and arrived with them at Tellicherry the 2d of this Month.

160. The Force deſtined for this Service conſiſts of

One Battalion of Europeans,	—	—	439	
Three Companies of Artillery,	—	—	150	
				589
Three Battalions of Sepoys, each	—	—	750	2,250

under the Command of Colonel Braithwaite; who is inſtructed, in caſe of Succeſs againſt Mahé, to avoid if poſſible entering into any Agreement for preſerving the Fortifications.

161. Sir Edward Vernon, with the Rippon and Sartine, arrived at Tellicherry the 9th of February, having left at Anjengo the Seahorſe and Coventry with your Ships the Revenge, Bombay Grab, Royal Charlotte, and Reſolution, and the Ravenſworth Country Ship taken up at Anjengo for that Purpoſe, to tranſport the Troops from thence to Tellicherry. He acquainted us he ſhould endeavour to prevent any Reinforcement being thrown into Mahé, and give every Aſſiſtance in his Power towards the Reduction of that Fortreſs; after the Performance of which Service, he ſhould proceed to Bombay to clean and refit the Squadron. In the mean Time he deſired we would afford all poſſible Aſſiſtance in refitting the Aſia and Sartine, by which we conclude he had revoked his Orders for the Aſia's joining him; and the Sartine arrived here the 18th Inſtant, and will ſhortly come into Dock.

162. By our lateſt Advices from Tellicherry, dated 9th Inſtant, we learn that Two of the Battalions of Sepoys were arrived there with Major Kelly, who acts as principal Engineer; and that the Remainder of the Forces, with Colonel Braithwaite, were expected to arrive at Anjengo, in the Month of February. As the Seaſon begins to grow late, it will give us great Pleaſure to hear of their having commenced their Operations.

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163. The Kings of Cotidee and Cartinaddee, and the Samorine, are now in Arms to recover their Dominions, of which they were diſpoſſeſſed by the Nabob Hyder Ally, and have made conſiderable Progreſs. It was thought the latter will ſoon be in Poſſeſſion of Callicut, having already expelled the Nabob's People from ſeveral of his Forts. They have made Offers of granting to the Honourable Company any Privileges of Trade in their different Countries, provided we will take them under our Protection, or aſſiſt them with Ammunition. The Samorine's Miniſter informed Mr. Church, that his Maſter had been ſecretly ſupplied with Powder and Balls by the Dutch, who have been for ſome Time in a State of Hoſtility with the Nabob; but he hoped the Company would in future ſupply him, as being his old Ally, and whoſe Friendſhip he ſhould prefer to that of the Dutch.

164. The King of Cotidee has promiſed to give the Pepper of his Country to the Company as formerly, which, whilſt it was in the Hands of the Princes of Chinka, to whom the Nabob had made it over, was given to the French.

165. Theſe Inſurrections will be very favourable to the Operations againſt Mahé, and we hope put it out of the Power of the Prince of Cherika to impede them, for which Purpoſe we underſtand he had aſſembled a conſiderable Number of Men by the Nabob's Order. A Party of his People had ſtopped a Party from the Poſt at Mount Dilly, who were making Faſcines for the Siege, and fired upon them; but upon the Poſt being reinforced the Prince's People retired.

166. The Prince of Cherika had juſt before ſent to acquaint the Reſident that he was well-diſpoſed to be upon the beſt Terms with the Honourable Company, but that being tributary to Hyder Ally was under the Neceſſity of obeying his Orders, and that in conſequence thereof he was then at Chinibra, to give every Aſſiſtance to the French whenever our Army ſhould proceed to the Attack of Mahé: That he wiſhed the Company to defer the Attack till they heard the Reſult of a Negociation then on Foot between Hyder and the Gentlemen at Madras, to whom Hyder had promiſed a Neutrality between the French and Engliſh in India, to be guaranteed by him; and that in caſe the Negociation failed, Hyder was determined to fall upon the Carnatic, and at the ſame Time to ſend effectual Support to Mahé. The Reſident returned a ſuitable Anſwer to this Meſſage; but we cannot take upon ourſelves to ſay whether there is any Foundation for the Prince's Aſſertion of a Negociation being on the Carpet between Hyder and the Gentlemen at Madras, not having heard a Syllable from them on the Subject.

167. In the Beginning of laſt Month we were informed by the Chief of Surat, that the famous Vizier Ghazidy Cawn had been diſcovered in the Diſguiſe of a Fakier, near that City, and had been ſecured by the Nabob. He had reſided at a Moſque, and ſaid he intended proceeding on a Pilgrimage to Mecca. This Perſon is the Son of Ghazie ul Dien, eldeſt Son of Nizam ul Mulk, formerly Subah of the Decan, and at an early Age was made Buxey to the Emperor Ahmed Shaw, in the Year 1751: He afterwards became remarkable by his Abilities and Crimes, and the Murther of one Mogul Emperor, and depriving another of his Sight; after which he fled to the Jauts, in the Year 1761, and has ever ſince been wandering from one Power to another, as he could find Security.

168. When we firſt received this Intelligence, we were of Opinion, that as ſo diſtinguiſhed a Perſon had been thus thrown within our Power, it was proper to detain him until we could receive Inſtructions from the Governor General and Council, whom we apprized of this Event; and that, as he could not be entirely ſafe at Surat, and as his remaining there would be attended with other Inconvenience, we thought Bombay would be a more eligible Place for his Reſidence; with which both he and the Nabob afterwards expreſſed their Satisfaction; and he accordingly arrived here the 5th Inſtant.

169. Whilſt the Vizier remained at Surat, we received a Letter from him, containing very ſplendid Accounts of the powerful Aſſiſtance he had intended bringing to Ragoba's Cauſe, by his Connections with different Rajahs, and the moſt profuſe Expreſſions of Regard to the Engliſh. In the Concluſion, he acquainted us his Intentions were to go to Mecca; but having no Neceſſaries for that Expedition, he deſired we would conduct him thither.

170. On making Enquiry from Colonel Goddard reſpecting this Perſon, we learn he had ſome Time ago been in the Bengal Provinces, and that the Government had not thought it material to detain him; therefore, as he was very earneſt to be permitted to proceed on his Pilgrimage, and his Reſidence here would be attended with conſiderable Expence, we did not judge, from Colonel Goddard's Information, that it would anſwer any adequate Purpoſe to detain him here, contrary to his Conſent; and we reflected likewiſe, that if the Governor General and Council choſe to have him ſent round to Bengal, he would probably return from Mecca ſufficiently early for that Voyage the following Seaſon. We therefore ſent him up again to Surat in one of your Cruizers, to take Paſſage from thence in a Country Ship bound to Juddah; which we hope will be approved.

171. Mr. William Lewis, late Aſſiſtant to the Reſident at the Durbar, having acquitted himſelf with great Merit, and very much to our Satisfaction, in remaining at Poona to the very laſt Moment, with apparent Danger to his Perſon, till our Forces were actually embarked, and we had ordered him to retire, by which we had the Advantage of the lateſt Intelligence of the Proceedings of the Miniſters; and Mr. Moſtyn having likewiſe warmly recommended him for his Diligence and Attention in the Diſcharge of his Duty; we reſolved, on the 3d December, as a Mark of our particular Approbation, to augment his Salary to R' 500 per Month; but as our Intentions in his Favour have been defeated by the unhappy Iſſue of the Expedition, we think it a Juſtice due to Mr. Lewis to give this Teſtimony to you of the Satisfaction received from his Behaviour.

172. Since the Arrival of Colonel Goddard, Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn has made Application to us to have a General Court Martial for his Trial, upon the Charge given in againſt him by the Preſident. Copy of his Letter is tranſmitted under N° 15; and before we gave him an Anſwer Colonel Goddard was conſulted, who being of Opinion, that as the Reference to the Governor General and Council had been accepted by Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, there would be an Impropriety in withdrawing the Deciſion on his Conduct for their Cognizance; we returned him an Anſwer to that Effect, and at his Deſire mention this Application to you.

173. Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn having juſt ſent in a Letter, addreſſed to you, and one for the Governor General and Council, the former is incloſed, and a Copy of the latter.

174. This Veſſel, the Betſey Snow, will proceed direct to England with this Packet; and in order to multiply the Chances of our Advices getting ſafe and early to your Hands, a Duplicate of this Addreſs is put on board the Betſey, to be delivered to the Commander of any of your homeward-bound Ships ſhe may fall in with at the Cape, or St. Helena. Our Diary from Ship to Ship will be ſent Home by the Royal Admiral, and the Annual one by the Morſe; and in the mean Time we hope the Extracts now forwarded will furniſh you with every neceſſary Information.

175. We ſhall, as ſoon as poſſible after the Departure of this Veſſel, diſpatch the Panther to Bengal, with Copies of the ſame Papers we now tranſmit to you; and we ſhall then, according to the Reſolution propoſed by the Preſident after his Review of Maratta Affairs, depute Mr. George Horſley to ſupply the Governor General and Council with ſuch Information and Details of local Knowledge as they may require.

176. Agreeable to what was mentioned in a former Part of this Addreſs, we now ſet down in Order the Papers forwarded by the preſent Diſpatch, which we ſubmit to your Candour, with a firm Reliance of receiving an impartial and diſpaſſionate Judgment.

We are, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 27th March 1779. (Signed) Wm Hornby, Preſident, &c.

A true Copy.

(Signed) Edwd Ravenſcroft, Secy.

23d March 1780.

At a Committee of Correſpondence; PRESENT,

The Committee having met very often to read the Papers tranſmitted from Bombay, relative to the Expedition undertaken in favour of Ragoba in November 1778, and having alſo duly conſidered the ſaid Papers, do now, upon the moſt mature Deliberation, ſubmit to the Court the following Opinions on that Subject.

1780. *Report on Bombay Affairs.*

The Committee find, by a Letter from the Governor General and Council of Bengal, dated 23d March 1778, and received at Bombay the 3d of May following, that the Select Committee of Bombay were therein expreſsly authorized, under certain Circumſtances, to form a new Alliance with Ragoba, and to engage with him in any Scheme which they ſhould deem expedient and ſafe, for retrieving his Affairs.

That on the 21ſt of July the ſaid Select Committee reſolved unanimouſly, That they were then at full Liberty to take Meaſures for ſubverting a Party in the Poona Government, which was connected with the French in Schemes hoſtile to the Engliſh Company; and that in order to accompliſh the Meaſure, the moſt practicable Means to be uſed for placing Ragoba in the Regency at Poona, during the Minority of the Infant Peſhwa.

And the Committee find, that the Governor General and Council, by Letter dated the 17th of Auguſt, approved the Reſolution of the Select Committee at Bombay, and authorized them to aſſiſt Ragoba with a military Force, to conduct him to Poona, under the following expreſs Proviſions; viz.

Firſt, That it do not interfere with any Engagement formed with Moodajee Bouncello by Mr. Elliot, and previous Notice to the Select Committee of Bombay by him.

Second, That the lateſt Advices from Europe ſhall be equal to an Aſſurance that the Force required for this Service may be ſpared without endangering the Safety of Bombay, in the Event of a French Invaſion.

Third, That the Engagements which the Select Committee may form with Ragoba himſelf, or Moraba and his Aſſociates, be not contrary to thoſe concluded with Moodajee by Mr. Elliot, and noticed to the Committee at Bombay, nor of a hoſtile Tendency to Berar.

And the Committee find, That the above Letter was received at Bombay, the 27th of September 1778; and that no Step had been taken by the Select Committee of Bombay, in Proſecution of the Meaſures reſolved upon the 21ſt of July preceding.

The Committee alſo find, by Letters from Mr. Lewis, the Company's Reſident at Poona, entered on the Select Committee's Proceedings of the 26th and 30th of July, that ſeveral Maratta Chiefs, ſuppoſed

ſuppoſed to have been in the Intereſt of Ragoba, and capable of aſſiſting him with a large Body of Horſe, had been ſuddenly impriſoned, or laid under Reſtraint by Madjee Scindia, another Chief, who was in the oppoſite Intereſt.

And it appears, That on the 12th of October following, the Select Committee of Bombay reſolved forthwith to carry into Execution the Plan agreed to the 21ſt of July; to which Reſolution Mr. Draper diſſented.

The Committee find, That when the Governor General and Council approved the Reſolution of the 21ſt of July, they could not have been informed of the Confinement of thoſe Maratta Chiefs, who were ſuppoſed to be well inclined to Ragoba, and capable of affording him the Aſſiſtance abovementioned.

And the Committee having duly attended to the Whole of the Proceedings previous to the Expedition under Conſideration, are of Opinion, That the Reſolution of the Select Committee of Bombay, of the 21ſt of July, for placing Ragoba in the Regency at Poona, was not improper, under the favourable Circumſtances ſet forth on their Proceedings at that Period.

The Committee are of Opinion, That the Change which happened ſoon afterwards, reſpecting the Situation of Ragoba's Friends, and the Lapſe of Time from the 21ſt of July to the 22d of November, rendered it extremely imprudent to undertake the Expedition at that Period.

And the Committee find the Force allotted for the Poona Expedition conſiſted of

S. L. Conſ. 16th November, 1778.

	Artillery,		
Rank and File	—	—	143
Laſcars	—	—	500
	Infantry,		
Rank and File	—	—	448
Sepoys	—	—	2,278

hat, Officers included, the Whole are ſtated at 3,900 Men; and upwards of 400 Rank and File, ith Officers in Proportion, were afterwards ordered on this Service; and that a conſiderable Part of he additional Force conſiſted of Europeans.

The Committee are of Opinion, That the State of the Garriſon of Bombay, as repreſented to Edward Vernon by the Select Committee the 8th of September 1778, did not warrant the charge of ſo large a Force on foreign Service at the Commencement of a European War, more ſpecially as ſpeedy Succour was rendered precarious, and conſequently Succeſs very doubtful, by the diſagreeable Situation of the ſuppoſed Friends and Partizans of Ragoba.

The Committee are therefore clearly of Opinion, that in November 1778, the Expedition, under all Circumſtances, was evidently very hazardous, and not to be juſtified; that the Reaſons ſtated by Mr. Draper for diſſenting thereto at that Period, were ſolid and judicious; and that the Select Committee of Bombay ought to have waited the Arrival or nearer Approach of the Bengal Detachment under the Command of Colonel Goddard, before they attempted to reinſtate Ragoba at Poona.

But as the Majority of the Select Committee of Bombay ſeemed convinced that Delay would render the Execution of the Enterprize much more difficult, if not altogether impracticable; that the French might thereby acquire ſuch Influence at the Poona Durbar as would occaſion perpetual War with the Marattas, and render the Company's Poſſeſſions on the Weſtern Side of India inſecure and unprofitable; that they conſidered themſelves bound in Duty to the Company to endeavour to prevent Meaſures ſo ruinous to their Intereſt, by taking Advantage of Diviſions then ſuppoſed to be ſubſiſting among the Bramin Miniſters, and by attempting to eſtabliſh Ragoba at that critical Juncture, and therefore perſiſted in the Reſolutions to aſſiſt him with Forces for that Purpoſe. Under the above Conſiderations, though this Committee cannot concur in the Reaſons offered by the Select Committee of Bombay, ſo far as to approve their Conduct, they are nevertheleſs of Opinion that the ſaid Select Committee appear to have acted according to the beſt of their Judgment, in undertaking to place Ragoba in the Regency at Poona, in November 1778.

Your Committee find, that the Amount due from Ragoba to the Company, the 30th Day of April 1777, was Rupees 24,72,775.

And Your Committee find, that in November 1778, the Governor and Select Committee of Bombay paid to the Executors of the late Mr. William Shaw, 80,000 Rupees, on Account of Ragoba; alſo that in the ſame Month they lent 4 Lacks of Rupees to Ragoba, beſides 15,000 Rupees lent to Two of his Servants, amounting in the Whole to Rupees 4,95,000; and excluſive of 500 Stands of Arms, 4 or 5 Guns and their Carriages, 30 Candies of Gunpowder, 10,000 Flints, and 2000 Cannon Shot, agreed by the Select Committee to be delivered to him the 16th Day of November 1778.

S. L. Conſ. 16th November, 1778. Sel. Conſ. 23d Nov. 1778.

And Your Committee are clearly of Opinion, that the late Loan to Ragoba was unjuſtifiable, more eſpecially as ſo large a Sum as 1,50,000 Rupees was ſent with the Troops, and Authority granted to the Commiſſary and Paymaſter to paſs Draughts on the Select Committee for the neceſſary Diſburſements during the Expedition: And the Committee find that Bills have been accepted on that Account to the Amount of Rupees 2,28,529.

And your Committee ſubmit it to the Court as their Opinion, That unleſs the Select Committee

give

give better Reaſons than have yet appeared for lending the Sum of 4,95,000 Rupees in the Manner above-mentioned to Ragoba and his Servants, that the Court take into Conſideration the Propriety of rendering the ſaid Select Committee reſponſible for that Amount to the Company.

John Woodhouſe, John Purling, George Cuming, Henry Fletcher, John Manſhip, John Michie, Wm James, W. Devaynes, L. Sulivan, John Harriſon, Henry Savage.

Your Committee find that the Select Committee of Bombay appointed Mr. Carnac, Colonel Egerton, and Mr. Moſtyn, to be a ſeparate Committee for carrying their Plan into Execution, and directed them to accompany Ragoba to Poona: That the Commander in Chief proteſted againſt the Meaſure: That of courſe there remained no more than Two Members of the Select Committee at Bombay: That the Preſident, by having a caſting Vote, became, in the Abſence of the Poona Committee, poſſeſſed of abſolute Power for tranſacting all political, military, and naval Affairs, and ſuch as might require Secrecy at Bombay. And as this Tranſaction militated againſt the Letter and Spirit of the Court's Orders of the 10th April 1778, the Committee are clearly of Opinion, that the Appointment of a Member of the Select Committee at Bombay, to accompany the Commander in Chief to Poona, was altogether improper, and that the Majority of the ſaid Committee are very reprehenſible for their Conduct in that reſpect; but the Committee exempt Mr. Draper from this Cenſure, becauſe he juſtly ſuppoſed it to be the Intent of the Company, that none of the civil Members of the Committee ſhould be detached from the Preſidency, if the Commander in Chief were to be abſent alſo, and delivered his Opinion in the Select Committee accordingly.

Wm Devaynes, John Harriſon, Henry Fletcher, John Manſhip, John Michie, George Cuming, Wm James, John Woodhouſe, John Purling, Laur. Sulivan, Henry Savage.

The Committee find the Firſt Detachment of the Army embarked for the Continent the 22d of November 1778, and Colonel Egerton Two Days afterwards:

That the Army was at Panwell the 25th of November, and remained there till the 4th Day of December following.

That the 30th of November, the Quarter Maſter General proceeded with a Company of Sepoys to Bara, to mark out an Encampment for a Detachment under Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, who however was not able to proceed as was intended, for want of Bearers.

And by Letters from Colonel Egerton and Mr. Carnac to Governor Hornby, it appears, that there was an almoſt immediate and total Want of Harmony in their Proceedings during the Expedition; that the diſtinct Powers veſted in the Poona Committee and in the Commander in Chief of the Army, the Propriety of the Commiſſion granted to the Committee, the military Honours to be paid to Colonel Egerton and Mr. Carnac reſpectively, and the Propriety of keeping ſeparate Tables for them, were Objects of much Diſcuſſion and Contention.

The Committee find, that Mr. Moſtyn was compelled by a ſevere Indiſpoſition, to return to Bombay, where he died the 1ſt of January; and that Mr. Carnac thereupon claimed the Right of a caſting Vote, whenever Colonel Egerton only ſhould meet him in Committee; which was decreed and ordered accordingly by the Select Committee at * Bombay.

* Sel. Conſ. 14 Dec. 1778.

The Committee find it ſtated by Mr. Carnac, on the 20th Day of December 1778, that the Troops had, in 25 Days from their Debarkation at Panwell, marched little more than the ſame Number of Miles: That it appeared to him, that much Labour, Time, and Money, were unneceſſarily waſted in making a Carriage Road for the Artillery and Stores up the Gauts: That with the Number of People employed, every Thing intended to be carted might have been carried up by Hand, with more Eaſe, Security, and Diſpatch: That from Converſation he believed this to be the general Opinion; and that the Commandant of Artillery had actually paſſed ſome of the Guns by a different Route, wide of the new Road then making by the Engineer, which proved it to be needleſs.

Colonel Egerton deferred replying to Mr. Carnac's Minute until his Return to Bombay; when he appealed to his Diary, and to the Commiſſary of the Army, to prove the Propriety of his remaining ſo long at Panwell; he denied there having been any Languor in the Motions of the Army; he ſaid, the Commander in Chief could not take the Stores and Proviſions under his Arm at Panwell, and walk away with them to Poona; that no Guns, except Two, had been paſſed by any Route wide of the Road made by the Engineer; and he produced ſeveral Vouchers in Support of his Aſſertions.

Sel. Conſ. 3 March 1779.

The Committee find the Repreſentation and Vouchers produced by Colonel Egerton, relative to the Guns, was partial and defective; for although no more than Two Guns, as mentioned by Colonel Egerton, were actually paſſed by Major Dagon up the Gauts, in the Manner ſtated by Mr. Carnac, it appears that the Meaſure was practicable, and that the Colonel was highly diſpleaſed with Major Dagon's Activity in attempting to move the Guns up the Gauts, before the

the Road was made; that he positively forbad it, and threatened to post Centinels to prevent it. That this Conduct of Colonel Egerton dispirited Major Dagon, who has since declared, That if Colonel Egerton would have allowed him the Number of Hands employed in making the Road, he had not the least Doubt but the Whole of the Artillery, with the Stores and Ammunition, might have been carried up the Gauts in Two Days and a Half to the Post occupied by Captain Stewart.

The Committee find, That the Two Guns before mentioned were sent by Major Dagon up the Gauts the 14th Day of December; that the Road was began by the Engineer the same Day; that it was the next Day when Colonel Egerton expressed his Displeasure at Major Dagon, for attempting to carry up the Guns and Stores; that the Roads were not finished till the 23d December; and that the Troops had halted the 9th and 11th of December for the Roads.

And the Committee are clearly of Opinion, That the slow Progress of the Army was inexcusable, and very prejudicial to the Undertaking; that the Conduct of the Commander in Chief was extremely defective; that it gave the Enemy the fullest Opportunity of collecting their Strength; and must have had a direct Tendency to discourage such Maratta Chiefs as might have been friendly to Ragoba from appearing active on his Behalf; and that the most spirited Exertions on our Part were absolutely necessary, in order to afford them proper Encouragement for that Purpose.

The Committee do not find, that the Troops experienced any Obstruction from the Enemy till the 22d of December: From that Day to the 4th of January they were at Times cannonaded, with trifling Effect; except the Loss of Lieutenant Colonel Cay, by a Rocket, the 31st December, and of Captain Stuart, by a spent Shot, the 4th of January; by which Accidents the Company were deprived of Two very gallant and meritorious Officers. § Sect. Letter, 27th March 1779.

Mr. Carnac in a Letter to the Select Committee, dated the 11th of February 1779, has delivered his Sentiments as follows:

"For the Space of near Five Weeks the Army did not meet with the smallest Molestation; "and it can never be sufficiently regretted, that more Advantage was not taken of that Interval, "when the Enemy by their Conduct appeared to be wholly unprepared. However they at last "pushed a Party forwards near to Condola, where they began their Opposition. As our Troops "advanced they constantly gave way; or if they attempted to make a Stand were dislodged; "yet so soon as we had taken up our Ground, and fixed our Encampment, they never failed bringing up Cannon near enough to annoy us; and we were I believe more than Fifteen Days successively cannonaded in our Camps; to which the Enemy were encouraged to persist in, by finding they could do it with Impunity; as our Line nor any Part of it was ever moved out, to "endeavour by a vigorous Effort to get Possession of some of their Guns."

To the above Remarks of Mr. Carnac Colonel Egerton has made the following Reply:

"I shall say no more on his Remark of our Line, nor any Part, having never moved out, to "endeavour by a vigorous Effort to get Possession of some of their (the Enemy's) Guns, except "that the Commanding Officer knew the Duties of his Profession too well to give so unjustifiable "an Order, for which he would have been highly reprehensible by all Military Judges."

The 5th of January Colonel Egerton wrote as follows to the Governor:

"We have had the usual Cannonade To-day, but rather faint, and without any Loss; and I "intend trying To-morrow Morning, about 4 or 5 o'Clock, if we can catch them in their Encampment."

But the Committee find, That Colonel Egerton, the next Day, instead of persevering in his Design of seeking the Enemy in their Camp, declared to the Poona Committee, that having borne up as long as he could against an Illness, with which he had been for some Time past afflicted, he was then under the Necessity of acquainting them, that the Surgeon Major thought the Fatigues of a Campaign, co-operating with his Indisposition, endangered his Life; that he could not hope to have Strength sufficient to attend to the Avocations of a Commander in Chief; and therefore he requested Permission of Mr. Carnac and himself, to resign the Command of the Troops to Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, and to proceed immediately to Bombay; which being granted, he set out accordingly; and having obtained Intelligence of a Party of Horse being in the Conkan, he afterwards thought proper to return back to the Army, but did not attempt to resume the Command.

As Colonel Egerton's Want of Health did not prevent him from resuming his Seat at the Poona Committee, it will be necessary hereafter to state the Part which he took in the subsequent Proceedings of that Committee; but your Committee nevertheless think proper in this Place to express their unanimous Opinion, that the Conduct of the late Colonel, now Brigadier General Charles Egerton, during the late disgraceful Expedition towards Poona, was such as renders it highly improper that he should be continued in the Command of the Company's Forces at Bombay; and that he be therefore dismissed from the Company's Service.

Wm James,	Wm Devaynes,	John Michie,
Lau. Sulivan,	John Manship,	John Harrison,
John Woodhouse,	Henry Savage,	Geo. Cuming.
John Purling,	Henry Fletcher,	

And the Committee find a Minute entered on the Poona Diary of the 6th of January, ſtating the Difference between their former Expectations and the real State of Affairs. They had been given to hope, that on the Appearance of Ragoba's Standard above the Gauts, Holkar and many other reputable Maratta Chiefs would join them; that however none but a few Mercenaries had done ſo, that Ragoba acknowledged, unleſs we could convince his Friends of their Safety, by ſpeedily beating his Enemies, he had no Hope of being joined by any one; and that our Situation would be rather worſe than better, as we advanced towards Poona, becauſe the Army would be cut off from Communication with the Conkan, from whence Proviſions and Stores would be ſupplied.

The Committee allowed that the Conduct of the Enemy, in ravaging the Country and retiring before our Army, ſeemed to warrant Ragoba's Reaſoning, but they hoped as they advanced towards Poona, Holcar, on whoſe Junction they ſtill placed ſome Dependance, would be enabled and encouraged to fulfil the Promiſes heretofore made by him to Mr. Moſtyn in favour of Ragoba.

The ſame Morning, the 6th of January, the Army marched, and the Guns of the Enemy opened from a Wood on the Line. A large Party of Horſe ſeemed inclined to take the Army in Flank, or to enter the Rear, but were prevented, and driven from their high Ground by our Troops, who behaved on this and on all Occaſions with the greateſt Intrepidity and Cheerfulneſs.

And the Committee find, That on the Three ſucceeding Days the Army marched from Mondhurna to Tullagoan, 18 Miles from the Summit of the Gauts, and 16 Miles from Poona, without Moleſtation from the Enemy.

The 9th of January 1779, Meſſieurs Carnac and Egerton deputed Mr. Sibbald to Ragoba, to repreſent the Diſtreſs occaſioned by relying on his Promiſe for a Supply of Proviſions above the Gauts; and on his Aſſurance that Holcar would join the Troops in Eight Days from the 22d ultimo; and alſo to inform him, that having only Proviſions ſufficient to ſubſiſt the Army back again to the Conkan, and the Country being laid waſte, the only probable Mode of removing their Diſtreſs was to make Overtures of Accommodation to Scindia, Holcar, and Saccaram. That the Power of negociating muſt be left to the Committee; and that they ſaw no Alternative but the inſtant Retreat of the Army, to prevent a total Diſtreſs from the utter Want of Proviſions.

The next Day the Commiſſary reported, that from the Stock of Proviſions on Hand he was able, barring Accidents, to ſupply the Army with Proviſions for 18 Days; but Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn thought it would be impoſſible, without a Body of Horſe, to ſecure the Baggage from the Enemy's numerous Cavalry, as the Troops advanced further into the Country, and that the Proviſions were equally expoſed with the Baggage.

The ſame Day Information was received that a Body of Horſe belonging to Moraba had marched into the Conkan to join Ragoba; but Meſſieurs Carnac and Egerton obſerved, that however uſeful thoſe Troops might be, it did not appear that they could effectually relieve the main Difficulty of the Army, which was the total Impoſſibility of receiving any further Supply of Proviſions, except through the Conkan; it was therefore reſolved to preſerve the Army by falling back ſo far as might be neceſſary to ſecure their Communication with the Conkan, unleſs Holcar's Army ſhould join them, conformably to the Aſſurances of Ragoba.

And Your Committee find, That Lieutenant Frazer was not to ſuffer Moraba's Troops to aſcend through the Paſs where he was poſted, till further Orders.

In the Evening of the ſaid 10th of January Mr. Sibbald reported that Ragoba had earneſtly requeſted the Committee to defer their Application to any of the Maratta Chiefs, except Holcar, for One Day, leſt Scindia, from whom he expected a Vackeel, ſhould infer that they began to deſpair of Succeſs, which would of courſe encourage the Miniſterial Party to hold out; that the Care of ſupplying the Army with Proviſions reſted with him; that he would furniſh the Commiſſary from this Town (Tullagoan) with a ſufficient Quantity for ſome Days, and that we ſhould get more at the next Village.

Ragoba alſo informed the Poona Committee, that he had wrote to Scindia to endeavour to engage him in his Intereſt; but the ſaid Committee not being able to place any Dependance on Ragoba's Promiſe for a Supply of Proviſions, nor deeming the gaining of Scindia an Object of ſufficient Importance to warrant a Departure from their preceding Reſolution; and believing it certain, that though Holcar did not act againſt them, he could not act for them; iſſued Orders to Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, the 11th of January, to march back the Army towards the Paſs at Condolah as expeditiouſly as poſſible; and the 12th of January the Army fell back to Wargaon.

And the Committee find that the Order to Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, as entered on the Poona Diary, is ſigned,

"John Carnac,"
"Charles Egerton."

But in a Letter from Colonel Egerton to the Select Committee of Bombay, dated the 8th of March 1779, he ſays he never ſaw or ſigned the Letter to Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn; and in a Letter of the 16th of February Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn ſays he received Orders from Mr. Carnac, in Preſence of Lieutenant Richardſon, to retreat; that he deſired a written Order, which was promiſed to be ſent him, though it never was.

Vide Sel. Letter from, 27th March 1779, Par. 55.

And the Committee find it reported by Meſſieurs Carnac and Egerton, that the Enemy having obtained Intelligence of their Moving, attacked them on the March before Day-light, and continued the Attack with great Vigour till Two in the Afternoon; that the numerous Bodies of Horſe rendered it impoſſible to protect the Baggage, and that Part of it fell into the Enemy's Hands; that

ſome Loſs was ſuffered; that in Juſtice to the Troops, both Europeans and Sepoys, they with Pleaſure declare that they behaved with the utmoſt Intrepidity and Alacrity during the whole Attack. That they ſhall continue their March to Condolah, and expect to be much harraſſed; but the Army will be rendered as compact as Circumſtances will admit, and every Part of the Baggage not abſolutely neceſſary will be reduced by the commanding Officer.

As Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn was in Command of the Army, the Committee will ſtate his Account of the Action of the 12th of January, as tranſmitted in the following Letter to Governor Hornby, dated the 13th of January:

"To the Honourable William Hornby, Eſquire.

"Honourable Sir,

"I did myſelf the Honour of informing you of our Arrival at Tellagon on the 9th inſtant. We halted here the 10th and 11th; and it being determined by the Committee that the Army could not proceed any further, but was under the Neceſſity of retreating immediately, I accordingly gave out Orders for the March at 11 o'Clock at Night, in Hopes, by leaving our Ground at that Hour, to gain a Day's March of the Enemy, before they could know of this Step; but in this I was diſappointed, for I found they had got Intelligence of it before we moved, which muſt have been conveyed to them by ſome treacherous Perſons about Ragoba. About 2 o'Clock a large Party of Horſe firſt attacked our advanced Guard, which had got on ſome Diſtance from the main Body. On Account of the Confuſion occaſioned by the vaſt Quantity of Baggage, and the Badneſs of ſome Part of the Road, they unfortunately took a great deal of our Baggage and Camp Equipage in this Attack; however, the advanced Guard reached this Village about Day-light, with a great deal of the Proviſions and Ammunition ſafe.

"Our main Body was attacked about Four o'Clock on the Rear and both Flanks; and as we were frequently obliged to halt and fire ſome Guns at them, it retarded our March, and gave them Time to bring up their Cannon, which obliged us to form in the beſt Manner we could to oppoſe them. It was ſhortly after Day-light when the Attack became general, but the Weight of it fell principally on Captain Hartley's Diviſion, which I ſupported with Europeans and Sepoys at different Times. From the Situation of the Ground I found it impracticable to join the whole Line to Captain Hartley's Diviſion, as there were large Bodies of Horſe ready to charge us, when they found us in ſuch a Situation that we could not uſe our Guns. The Attack continued till 4 o'Clock in the Afternoon before we could retire, which was effected at laſt with much Danger. The Troops during the whole Time behaved with the greateſt Bravery. I am truly ſorry to convey ſuch diſagreeable News to you; the laſt Time I wrote I had no Thoughts of any thing of this Kind happening. I now encloſe you a Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Miſſing. They have engaged us all this Day with ſmall Arms from their Arabs, &c. and a very heavy Cannonade; fortunately we have not ſuffered much, and we obliged the Arabs to give way at laſt. It is not determined when the Army marches, I wait the Committee's Orders.

"I have the Honour to be, with great Reſpect,
Honourable Sir,
Your moſt obedient and moſt humble Servant,
William Cockburn."

Barragam,
13th January 1779.

And your Committee find the following Return made of the Killed, Wounded, and Miſſing, dated the 12th of January 1779, amounting in the Whole to 362.

| | ARTILLERY. | | | | | | | | | | INFANTRY. | | | | | | | | | | SEPOYS. | | | | | | | | | |

And the Committee find the following general Orders iſſued by the Commander in Chief, the 12th of January:

General Orders iſſued at Burgaum.

"Tueſday, 12th January 1779.

"The commanding Officer is ſo extremely ſatisfied with the gallant Behaviour of the Troops in "general, that he orders that a Week's Pay be given to the Europeans and Sepoys; and returns the "Officers his public Thanks for their cool and ſpirited Conduct, and in a particular Manner to Cap- "tain Hartley, not only on that Account, but his Judgment as an Officer.

"Colonel Egerton having by Accident been an Eye Witneſs of Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn's "Conduct this Day, cannot help expreſſing his higheſt Approbation thereof; and is willing to hope, "that this will be a ſtrong Recommendation of him to the Board.

(Signed) Rich[d] Campbell,
Adj[t] General."

And the Committee find, on the Poona Diary the 13th of January, the following Particulars:

"A Committee held to deliberate relative to Overtures for the peaceable Return of the Army to "Bombay. No Minutes taken, being in a ſevere Cannonade, and a Number of Perſons ſtanding "round.

"Letter to the Peſhwa, ſent by Ramſing.

"D° from D°, in Anſwer.

"D° to D°, at Night."

But the Committee find no Copy of the Letters ſaid to have been ſent to the Peſhwa on the 13th of January, nor of his Anſwer, in any Proceedings tranſmitted from Bombay.

And the Committee find, that Mr. Farmer, Secretary to the Poona Committee, was ſent to the Maratta Camp to propoſe an Accommodation, which they judged might be effected by Ragoba going over to Scindia; and which they obſerve he ſeemed determined to do, rather than riſque another Day's March with the Army.

The Meſſage ſent to the Marattas was as follows:

"That having had Aſſurances given us, that the Eſtabliſhment of Ragoba in the Regency of the "Maratta Empire was a Meaſure much wiſhed for by many of the Sirdars of the Maratta Sircar, "as well as by the Country in general, we had conſented to conduct him with an Engliſh Army for "that Purpoſe; but contrary to our Hopes and Expectations we found his Eſtabliſhment oppoſed "by the whole Empire: That we had ſeen with infinite Concern, the Country laid waſte and de- "ſtroyed at our Approach; which being ſo very contrary to our Intentions by eſpouſing the Cauſe of "Ragoba, that we were determined to be the Occaſion of no farther Deſolation, and were therefore "reſolved to march back with the Army to Bombay: That after this Declaration, we expected all "Hoſtilities would ceaſe; and, by ſo doing, Peace and Friendſhip would be eſtabliſhed between the "Engliſh and the Maratta State. If, on the other Hand, we ſhould experience the leaſt Act of "Hoſtility on our March, we ſhould conſider it as a Declaration of War againſt the Engliſh "Nation."

Letter from, 4th March 79, Par. 60.

The Anſwer of the Durbar to Mr. Farmer was, "That if we wiſhed to remain at Peace with "them, Ragonath Row muſt be delivered up, and then we may return quietly; otherwiſe we may "do as we pleaſe."

61.

The Committee wrote to Mr. Farmer in Reply, "That all Difficulty of Accommodation was re- "moved, by Ragoba's Deſign of going over to Mhadjee Scindia; and that they expected, in conſe- "quence, proper Securities from the Durbar for proceeding unmoleſted on their March."

Par. 62.

On the Diary of the 15th of January, there appears a Letter from Mr. Farmer, ſtating the Reſult of his Conference with the Durbar. He reports, that having informed them of the Difficulty being removed by the Determination of Ragoba to deliver himſelf up to Scindia, and that he ſuppoſed the Army would therefore be ſuffered to return quietly to Bombay, Nannah obſerved in Reply, that as we had broken the Treaty concluded by Colonel Upton, we muſt agree, before the Army moved, to abide by the Treaty concluded with the late Peſhwa Nannah.

On preſſing the Queſtion, Whether, if Ragoba ſurrendered himſelf to Scindia, Hoſtages would be given for our proceeding unmoleſted to Bombay? it was anſwered, That the Surrender of Ragoba was of little Conſequence; that a new Treaty muſt be made on the Spot with the Maratta State, becauſe the Treaty made by Colonel Upton had been broken by the Invaſion of their Country. Mr. Farmer conveys his Ideas of the Advantage obtained over our Army by the Marattas in the following Words: "They ſeem to me to feel themſelves in that Situation, with reſpect to us, which the Turkiſh Vizier "felt himſelf in with reſpect to Peter the Firſt, at the Time when the Empreſs Catherine ſent in her "Jewels to the Vizier."

It appears that Scindia preſided at the Durbar on that Occaſion; who finally told Mr. Farmer, that whether there be Peace or War, it was equal to him; but that having broken the Treaty made with

with Colonel Upton, we muſt on the Spot ſet about forming a new Treaty, to ſerve as a future Guide between the Maratta State and the Engliſh.

At this Juncture Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn was called upon by the Committee to give his Opinion in Writing relative to the Practicability of marching back the Army to Bombay; which was done in the following Words; viz.

"Being called upon for my Opinion on the Poſſibility of making a Retreat to Bombay, I muſt "declare, that I think the ſame utterly impracticable. Our Troops are already much harraſſed and "diſpirited, from the Neceſſity we were under of retiring from Tullagaon; and were we to ſuſtain "another Attack from the Maratta Army, I am of Opinion the Troops would not ſtand it; and that "conſequently the whole Army, with its numerous Followers, would be cut to Pieces. But the "Diſtance from Panwell being about Forty-five Miles, it is not the Attack of One Day we ſhould "have to ſuſtain; as I think, were it poſſible to move from hence, that we could not gain that Place "in Twenty Days; and it is therefore chimerical to the laſt Degree to ſuppoſe that our ſmall Army "could ſupport themſelves from the daily Attacks they would be certain of for ſo long a Period. "I therefore cannot charge myſelf to conduct the Army, under ſuch Circumſtances, to Bombay; "and Humanity muſt prompt ſome other Method than an Attempt to retire in the Face of the "whole Strength of the Maratta Empire, with ſuch a Handful of Men, who muſt in ſuch Caſe be "ſacrificed.

(Signed) William Cockburn."

"Camp at Wurgaon,
"15th January 1779."

At the Cloſe of the Poona Diary, immediately after the Proceedings of the 22d of January, it ſtands recorded, that the Committee met the 15th at Wurgaon, to take into Conſideration the Meaſures neceſſary to be immediately adopted for extricating the Army from its very critical Situation, ſurrounded by the whole Strength of the Maratta Empire, and with only about Ten Days Proviſions in Camp:

That Colonel Egerton's Opinion was alſo required, and that his declared Sentiments were the ſame with thoſe of Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, that a Retreat in their then Situation was impracticable, and if attempted, the Conſequence muſt be the Loſs of the whole Army.

Mr. Carnac's Opinion is then recorded as follows, viz.

"Mr. Carnac is ſo confident the Army is ſufficiently numerous, and ſo well provided with Artillery, as to be able to force their Way back againſt all Oppoſition, if the Officers and Men will do their Duty: That there is no Doubt with him the Attempt ought to be made at all Events, rather than ſubmit to the Terms preſcribed by the Enemy, to which we have no Authority to bind our Employers. And for his own Part, he declares, he would much ſooner run his Share of the Riſk, than that they ſhould be complied with. However, as Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn have given it as their poſitive Opinions, that the Troops will not ſtand, and conſequently muſt be cut to Pieces, Mr. Carnac dares not take upon himſelf ſingly to preſs a Retreat, which it is pronounced will be inevitably attended with Conſequences that cannot fail of endangering the Preſervation of the Settlement. He therefore, however reluctantly and contrary to his own Sentiments, finds himſelf obliged to concur in the Acceptance of whatever Conditions can be obtained. Allowing, therefore, that the Opinions of Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn be well founded (in which we are given to underſtand many Officers in the Army alſo concur) there ſeems to be no other Reſource left, but to accept of ſuch Conditions as can be obtained from the Enemy.

(Signed) John Carnac."

In the Margin of the Diary of the 22d of January it is noted, that the above Minutes were omitted in the proper Place, through the Miſapprehenſion of the Committee's Secretary, and without the Knowledge of Mr. Carnac.

Colonel Egerton has diſavowed and proteſted againſt the ſaid Minutes; and in regard to the written Opinion of Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, he has declared, in his Letter to the Governor General and Council of Bengal, that he never ſaw it till it was read at the Board at Bombay; but he there allows it to have been founded on ſolid Reaſons and uncontrovertible Facts. The Colonel adds, that he is much at a Loſs to conceive how he could be ſaid to have concurred in Colonel Cockburn's Opinion at a Committee which was never held, and in a written Opinion which he never ſaw, till produced at Bombay; and he has alſo declared, that the greateſt Part of the Diary was ſpurious and inadmiſſible.

Mr. Farmer, the Secretary to the Poona Committee, was on Service at the Maratta Durbar, on the 15th of January; Mr. Carnac has therefore appealed to other Perſons to authenticate ſuch Proceedings of that Day as have been diſavowed by Colonel Egerton; and the following Letters on the Subject ſtand recorded on the Proceedings of the Select Committee of the 10th of March 1779:

APPENDIX, N° 130.

Letter from Mr. Sibbald to the Secretary.

To Mr. Edward Ravenſcroft, Secretary.

Sir,

I have received your Letter of Yeſterday's Date, acquainting me that the Honourable the Select Committee require of me a clear and full Statement of the Circumſtances relative to a Meeting of the Poona Committee at Worgaum on the 15th January: In Anſwer to which I have to acquaint them,

That being deſired on that Morning to attend at Colonel Egerton's Tent, in conſequence of a Letter juſt received from Mr. Farmer of the 14th, I concluded that the Meeting was a Committee, and prepared to take Minutes accordingly, by beginning the uſual Preamble; but the immediate Diſpatch of the Anſwer to Mr. Farmer's Letter being required, I did nothing more while in the Tent that Morning, than writing the Letter to Mr. Farmer, and taking a Tranſcript of it for the Diary, but ſo ſoon after as I got a Place to write in, which I believe was the next Day, I took Minutes of what paſſed in Argument on the 15th, to the beſt of my Recollection, which I ſhewed to Mr. Carnac, and he thought them nearly expreſſive of his own Sentiments; but not deeming them ſufficiently full, he then delivered me his Opinion more at large, when a fair Copy was made of the Minutes, and ſigned by him, and afterwards preſented by me to Colonel Egerton.

I am,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servant,
James Sibbald.

Bombay,
2d March 1779.

Letter from Lieutenant Colonel Hartley to Mr. Carnac.

Sel. Conſ. 10th March 1779.

Sir,

In Anſwer to your Letter of Yeſterday, where you deſire to know if I recollect what paſſed at Colonel Egerton's Tent at Worgaum on the 15th January laſt; I have to inform you, that I perfectly remember you there declared, (where Colonel Egerton, Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, Mr. Sibbald, Mr. Holmes, and myſelf, were preſent) that you were decidedly of Opinion, that the Army ought at all Events to attempt a Retreat, and not ſubmit to the mortifying Terms propoſed by the Enemy, but that as Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn declared their Opinion, that the Army could not make good their Retreat, and that the Troops would not ſtand another Attack, you could not take upon you, under ſuch Circumſtances, to preſs a Retreat.

I have the Honour to be,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servant,
James Hartley.

Bombay,
5th March 1779.

Letter from Mr. Holmes to Mr. Carnac.

Sel. Conſ. 10th March 1779.

Sir,

I have a perfect Recollection of the Opinion delivered at the Meeting held in Colonel Egerton's Tent at Worgaum the 15th January laſt, where yourſelf, Colonel Egerton, Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, Captain Hartley, Mr. Sibbald, and myſelf, were preſent; and I well remember you declared in Preſence of us all, that you were decidedly of Opinion the Army ought at all Events to attempt a Retreat, rather than ſubmit to the extravagant Terms propoſed by the Enemy; but that as the principal Officers, Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, had declared it as their Opinion the Army could not make good a Retreat, and that the Troops would not ſtand another Attack, you could not, under ſuch Circumſtances, take upon you ſingly to preſs a Retreat.

I am with Regard,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servant,
Thomas Holmes.

Bombay,
9th March 1779.

And the Committee find the following Anſwer, dated the 15th of January, returned by Meſſrs. Carnac and Egerton to Mr. Farmer's Repreſentation of the Durbar's Demands:

To Mr. William Gamul Farmer.

Sir,

We received your Letter of laſt Night only an Hour ago, the Hircarrahs having been detained by ſome Accident: In Anſwer to which you muſt acquaint the Durbar, that they demand what we have no Power to agree to; the entering into and concluding Treaties being ſolely confined to the Governor

nor General and Council of Calcutta; to whom therefore they muſt ſend their Vackeels. The only Power left to us, is, the giving up the Cauſe and Perſon of Ragonaut Row; which done, muſt certainly put an End to all Diſputes between the Engliſh and the Maratta State; and there is no Doubt that Peace and Friendſhip will then ſubſiſt between us from henceforwards.

You muſt inform them, ſhould we enter into any Treaty, we ſhould only deceive them, having no ſuch Powers; we therefore deſire they will immediately acquaint us, whether, upon our abiding by the Conditions firſt propoſed, of delivering up Ragoba, they will comply on their Parts, by ſuffering us to march unmoleſted to Bombay, and for which Purpoſe, to give us the neceſſary Securities.

We are,
Sir,
Your obedient Servants,
J. Carnac,
C. Egerton.

Wurgaon,
15th January 1779.

And after writing the above Letter to Mr. Farmer, it was reſolved immediately to diſpatch Mr. Thomas Holmes to Scindia, with *full Powers* to ſettle with the Durbar for the peaceable Return of the Army to Bombay, *on ſuch Conditions as he might be able to obtain*, ſince it was the Opinion of the Commanders in Chief, that a Retreat was impracticable.

In Anſwer to the Poona Committee's Letter, ſtating their Want of Powers to make Treaties, Mr. Farmer [illegible] that Madjee Scindia deſires to be informed, by what Authority they had broken that in [illegible] Colonel Upton? If the Governor General and Council had authorized the Meaſure, he deſires to ſee the Authority; otherwiſe, if the Committee had acted on their own Authority, they muſt anſwer it, and make a new Agreement: That Ragoba might be ſurrendered, or otherwiſe, as we pleaded; but till a new Treaty were made between the Engliſh and the Maratta State, our Army muſt remain where it was, whatever might be the Conſequence.

At 10 o'Clock in the Evening of the 15th of January, Mr. Holmes arrived with Terms for the peaceable Return of the Army to Bombay; to which, the Committee declare, nothing but the avowed Opinion of the principal Officers, relative to the Impracticability of effecting a Retreat, would juſtify their acceding. They alſo declared, that the Durbar could not be ignorant of the want of Power in the Committee to conclude *ſuch a Treaty* as the Durbar then preſcribed, and evidently compelled them to enter into, becauſe they were already informed, that the Committee had no Powers to conclude any Treaty whatever.

In the Morning of the 16th of January, Mr. Holmes was diſpatched to the Maratta Camp, to finiſh the Agreement; of which a rough Sketch had been prepared the preceding Day. In the Evening Meſſieurs Farmer and Holmes returned with Scindia's Vackeels, to ſee the Treaty duly executed by the Committee; and alſo with a ſeparate Article in Favour of Madjee Scindia, to which Meſſieurs Farmer and Holmes had been obliged to conſent.

By the Treaty with the Durbar on the one Part, and the Engliſh Company on the other, it is ſtipulated,

That the Engliſh ſhall remain on the ſame Footing as they were in the Time of Madarow:

That the Iſlands of Salſette, Caranjah, and other Iſlands and Places, ſhall be given up:

Alſo Jamboozeer, and the Diſtricts of Broach:

Alſo Chickly, Vernow, &c.

And the Bengal Detachment ordered back to Calcutta: Which Meſſieurs Carnac and Egerton promiſe faithfully to perform; and for which Performance they pledge the Engliſh Faith.

And concerning the above Agreement, it is noted, That Mr. John Carnac and Colonel Charles Egerton, of the Select Committee of Bombay, being *fully empowered*, did depute Mr. Thomas Holmes and Mr. Farmer.

The ſeparate Article is ſtiled an Agreement between John Carnac, Eſquire, Counſellor, and Colonel Charles Egerton, an Engliſh Committee of Bombay, with Madjee Scindia.

And the Terms of that Agreement being more extraordinary and degrading than the public Treaty, the Committee have thought it right to inſert the ſame in this Place without any Abridgment.

Agreement of John Carnac, Eſquire, Counſellor, and Colonel Egerton, an Engliſh Committee of Bombay, with Madjee Scindia.

That after falling out with the Sircar of Mhaderow Narrain Pundit Purdhan, we* with an Army came upon the Gaut, and remained at Tellagaun; on which you † ordered a Fighting, and we, both Parties did fight, in which we were defeated, returned back, and encamped at Worgaon with Dada ‡ Saheb. We || could hardly reach Bombay with our Army and Stores; conſidering which, we ſent Meſſrs. Farmer and Holmes to you, deſiring you § would come between us, and get the Sircars and our Treaty ſettled as before, and conduct us and the Army to Bombay. On which you did ſuſpend the War; you came between us, and got the Sircar's and the Engliſh Treaty ſettled, and you promiſed to conduct us and the Army to Bombay without Moleſtation from any body; you made our Eſcape entirely; all which we took into our Conſideration, and were very glad. You are a principal Officer and Well-wiſher to this Government, which has induced us to keep a Friendſhip with

* The En
† Mara
‡ Regen
|| We
§ Madjee

with you: This came into our Mind; and we were ſatisfied that you made us free from the Sircar's and every Body's Moleſtation, and got the Treaty ſettled as before, without any Diſpute from the Sircar; therefore we thought we ſhould ſerve you; and for which Reaſon have, of our free Will and Accord, agreed, *under the King's and Company's Seal*, to deliver up to you the Fort of Broach, with its Government, in the ſame Manner the Mogul did hold it; which Fort is now in our Poſſeſſion, and which we have given you. We further agree that we will, on our Arrival at Bombay, obtain the *Governor's Duſtuck, under the King's Seal*, to the Killedar of Broach, and deliver the Fort and its Country, in the Manner the Mogul did hold it, up to you. Under Oath, no Diſpute ſhall ariſe in this. This we promiſe ſolemnly; and we have left Mr. Farmer and Mr. Charles Stewart with you, as Hoſtages for the Performance of this Agreement. We will let no Diſpute ariſe. This we agree to in Writing.

Worgaon, near Tullagam, 27th Julheze.

ter from, March 79, Par. 74.

And Your Committee find, that on concluding the above Treaties, Preſents were made by the Poona Committee to Officers of the Durbar, to the Amount of 41,000 Rupees, for which Notes were given.

And Your Committee find it minuted by Mr. Carnac on the Proceedings of the Select Committee at Bombay, the 16th of March 1779, "That having, ſince his Return from the Expedition, peruſed the Tranſlation of the Treaty and ſeparate Article, he finds them conceived in ſuch Terms, that he ſhould certainly have objected thereto at the Time of Signature, had they been literally explained to him; but that he only underſtood the Contents in general Terms; and indeed was the more indifferent as to the particular wording of them, as he always bore in his Mind the Idea that they were of no Validity, and would never be ratified by their Superiors."

tter from, Par. 70.

And Your Committee find, that Mr. William Gamul Farmer, late Secretary to the Poona Committee, and Lieutenant Charles Stewart, were left as Hoſtages for the Performances of the Treaties concluded by the Poona Committee.

tter from, — March 1779, 73.

And Your Committee likewiſe find, that the Whole of the above Tranſactions were compleated before the Select Committee of Bombay could be informed thereof.

After the Concluſion of the Treaty, Mr. Carnac addreſſed Governor Hornby as follows:

Sir,

It is with the deepeſt Grief and Indignation I have to inform you, the Army is returning very diſgracefully to Bombay. Indeed, the Commander in Chief, the Second in Command, and I fear too many more of the Officers are unfortunately ſo forcibly impreſſed with the Idea that the Troops would throw down their Arms, and ſuffer themſelves to be cut to Pieces if attacked on the March by the Enemy, that I am confident they would, rather than have made the Attempt, ſubmitted to any Conditions, even to the Whole of the Forces ſurrendering themſelves Priſoners of War, and remaining as Hoſtages till Bombay was delivered up, if this had been inſiſted on. I moſt certainly recommend your keeping a profound Secret what I now communicate, except that the Army is on its Way back, until I ſee you; and you may depend upon my coming forwards with Mr. Holmes, ſo ſoon as it can be done with Safety.

You will be pleaſed to order Boats immediately to Bellapore for the Reception of the Troops; and will endeavour to get a Letter conveyed to Mr. Carnegie, directing him to ſend thither what Boats can be collected at Carranjah.

tter from, th March 779, Par. 71.

And Your Committee find that Meſſrs. Carnac and Egerton, the 16th of January 1779, directed Colonel Goddard to march back with the Army under his Command to Bengal; and that Two Days afterwards countermanded that Order.

That on the 17th of January the Bombay Troops began their March back to Bombay, and were eſcorted by a Party of Maratta Horſe to Panwell, which they reached in Seven Days, and from whence they were tranſported to Bombay.

Notwithſtanding the general Character given of the Troops by Mr. Carnac, Your Committee find that he afterwards ſubſcribed to an Exception, which, in the Opinion of this Committee, would have fully juſtified his iſſuing the moſt poſitive Orders for the Army to attempt to force a Retreat to Bombay.

In the Letter of the Select Committee, dated the 27th of March 1779, Par. 128, which is ſigned by Mr. Carnac, it is ſtated, that Captain Hartley, on that trying Occaſion, notwithſtanding the Contagion of bad Example, inſiſted upon it, that he could depend on the Men which he had commanded, that he *actually* put a Stop at once to Deſertion, ſo far as the Limits of his Command extended, that when conſulted, he urged every Argument to attempt the forcing of a Retreat, rather than ſubmit to the humiliating Terms preſcribed by the Enemy; that he even *formed*, and preſented to Colonel Cockburn, the neceſſary Diſpoſition for conducting the *Retreat*, and for avoiding Inconveniencies reſulting from a Night March, and the Diviſion of the Troops.

Having ſtated the above Particulars, your Committee remark, that the Army was only 18 Miles, or about 2 Days March, from the Summit of the Ghauts, and about 16 Miles, or 2 Days March, from Poona, on the 11th of January, when Orders were given to march back towards Condolah; that

that Advice had juſt been received of Moraba's Horſe being in the Conkan to act in Favour of Ragoba; that the Commiſſary had 18 Days Proviſions in Store; and that Ragoba had promiſed a further Supply; that in every preceding Skirmiſh, the Enemy had been worſted, and compelled to retreat; that the Troops were in Spirits, and intrepid; that no Council of War was called at Tullagaon to take the Senſe of the Officers of the Army on the Neceſſity of retreating; that although the Order for the Retreat of the Army on the 11th of January was the joint Act of Mr. Carnac and Colonel Egerton, yet as Mr. Carnac had a caſting Vote in the Poona Committee, and poſſeſſed in Fact ſupreme Authority in Camp at the Time, he was more particularly reſponſible for that Meaſure. Sel. Letter from, 27th March 1779, Par. 57.

And it appears by the Return of the Commanding Officer, that our Loſs of Men in the Action of the 12th of January, was not very great; the general Orders of the Day expreſs his extreme Satisfaction with their gallant Behaviour in general; the Officers were publicly thanked for their cool and ſpirited Conduct; and Captain Hartley was particularly diſtinguiſhed for his Judgment as an Officer: It is allowed that there were Ten Days Proviſions in Camp after the Action; it is aſſerted by the Select Committee, that the Officer laſt mentioned declared he could rely upon the Men he commanded, and urged every Argument in favour of forcing a Retreat rather than ſubmit to the Terms preſcribed by the Enemy: It cannot be doubted, that Mr. Carnac continued in Poſſeſſion of Authority without Controul, except to make Treaties; he was confident, if the Officers and Men did their Duty that the Army was ſufficiently numerous, and ſo well provided with Artillery as to be able to force their Way back againſt all Oppoſition; he had no Doubt but the Attempt ought to have been made; his Words are, "at all Events rather than ſubmit to the Terms preſcribed by the Enemy;"—yet, under all Circumſtances, rather than preſs a Retreat, he ventured to pledge the Engliſh Faith, in the moſt ſolemn and ſacred Manner, for the Obſervance of Treaties, of which he owns he did not at the Time expect the Confirmation. He ſtipulated to obtain the Governor's Duſtuck for delivering up the Company's Poſſeſſions to the Marattas, and gave Hoſtages for the due Performance of extraordinary Agreements, under *mental Reſervations* and pre-conceived Ideas that they were of no Validity, and would never be ratified by his Superiors.

And your Committee do not find that any Cenſure has been paſſed on Mr. John Carnac at Bombay; nor that any Enquiry has been made by the Select Committee into his Conduct and Behaviour during the late Expedition.

And upon the moſt impartial Review of the whole Conduct of Mr. Carnac during the late Expedition towards Poona, and after duly conſidering all the Circumſtances relative thereto, the Committee are unanimouſly of Opinion that Mr. John Carnac be diſmiſſed from his Office, as one of the Council and Select Committee of Bombay.

Wm James,	John Purling,
Wm Devaynes,	John Woodhouſe,
Lau. Sulivan,	Henry Savage,
John Michie,	Henry Fletcher,
John Harriſon,	John Manſhip.
Geo. Cuming,	

Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn.

And your Committee find, That on the 29th of January 1779, Governor Hornby delivered in a formal Charge againſt Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, for refuſing to charge themſelves with conducting the Army from Burgaum to Bombay; and that the ſaid Charge was grounded on the written Opinion of Colonel Cockburn, concurred in by Colonel Egerton, abovementioned. Letter from, 27 March 1779, Par. 100. Alſo Sel. Conſ. 29 Jan. 1779.

In Support of this Charge, the Governor remarked, that the general Order of Thanks to the Troops, for their Behaviour on the 12th of January, ſufficiently demonſtrated that the ſaid Opinion was totally void of Foundation: That the fatal Influence and Infection of ſuch Opinions, when adopted by Officers in ſuperior Command, was well known: That it was not a Matter of Wonder if, under ſuch Sanction, ſimilar Sentiments had gained ſome Ground: That this however could not be admitted in Extenuation; and ſuppoſing it true, the Commanding Officers could not be allowed to ſupport their unſoldierly Sentiments by the Authority of their inferior Officers.

Your Committee do not find that any Circumſtance reſpecting the different Sentiments and Opinion expreſſed by Captain Hartley, relative to the Propriety of attempting to force a Retreat, is ſtated in the Select Letter of the 27th of March, Par. 128, was mentioned by Governor Hornby (or by any Member of the Select Committee) when the Governor delivered in his Charge againſt Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn; nor at any Time before the Date of the ſaid Letter.

And your Committee find, that Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn has acknowledged, in his Letter of the 16th of February 1779, that he gave the written Opinion already ſtated: That it contained his real Sentiments of the Army's Situation: That having remained at Burgaum the 13th of January, without any Thing being determined, cannonaded as uſual by the Enemy; an European Officer of Sepoys informed him at 8 in the Evening, that he could not get his Company to do their Duty on

on the Rear Guard; that the Black Officers would not aſſiſt him; that it was apprehended they intended to deſert in the Night:—That upon this Information, he ordered Captain Samper to join the Rear Guard, with a View to look after the Sepoys: That another European Officer, from the 6th Battalion, brought him Reports equally diſagreeable; that Ragoba informed him that 300 Sepoys intended to deſert that Night; and that Mr. Sibbald, at Midnight, communicated the ſame Intelligence; that the Language of the Europeans proved them to have been greatly alarmed, dejected, and diſpirited; that it was by no Means correſpondent with their former Steadineſs; that in ſpite of all Precautions 11 Black Officers and 155 Men, Europeans, Sepoys, and Lalcar, did deſert; that both Europeans and Sepoys continued ſo to do till after they left Burgaum; that ſuch another Attack as that of the 12th of January, would nearly have exhauſted their Ammunition; that the Army was reduced 2,138 Rank and File; that 300 Sick and Wounded were to be taken Care of; that the very Exiſtence of the Army neceſſitated him to give the Opinion he delivered; and that Colonel Egerton was convinced of the Propriety thereof.

And your Committee find, that Colonel Cockburn has denied having abſolutely refuſed to charge himſelf with the conducting of the Troops to Bombay; and declared, that all he meant was, that as he did not think it poſſible to effect a Retreat, he could not be anſwerable for the bad Conſequences which he foreſaw would follow; that if Mr. Carnac had ordered it to be attempted, he ſhould not have diſobeyed him, whatever Conſequences might have enſued; that Mr. Carnac was all powerful; that the only Reſponſibility reſting with the Commanding Officer was, for the Mode of executing any military Meaſure, but not for the Meaſure itſelf.

That Major Dagon had alſo wrote and ſigned an Opinion, which agreed with that of Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, as to the Impoſſibility of a Retreat; that ſuch Opinion was ready to be produced delivered, but not demanded by Mr. Carnac.

That he had on former Occaſions hazarded his Life in the Service, and repeatedly led the Company's Troops in Attacks which have been attended with Honour, and produced great Advantages to the Company; and that Mr. Carnac himſelf had paſſed Encomiums on his Mode of conducting the Troops, both in advancing and retreating, during the late Service; though now, for an Opinion only given to the beſt of his Judgment, he was to be ſtigmatized, and in a Manner excluded the Service.

Letter from, 17th Mar 1779, Par. 103.

And your Committee find, that when Governor Hornby preferred the Charge againſt Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn and Colonel Egerton, he would have thought himſelf juſtified in moving for their Suſpenſion from the Service, if they had not agreed to decline all military Duty until their Conduct and the late Tranſactions ſhould have been ſtated to the Governor General and Council, and their Opinion reſpecting the Propriety of continuing the ſaid Officers in, or of diſmiſſing them from the Company's Service, ſhould be received; by which Opinion he declared it his Intention to be guided. And your Committee find, that the Caſe of Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, as well as that of Colonel Egerton, together with all Proceedings relative to the late Expedition, have been tranſmitted for the Conſideration of the Governor General and Council accordingly.

Your Committee do not find that the Select Committee of Bombay have informed Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, of their being in Poſſeſſion of the Facts ſtated in their Letter of the 27th of March, concerning Captain Hartley's Opinion for attempting to force a Retreat.

And Your Committee find, that Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn entertained the higheſt Opinion of Captain Hartley's Abilities, previous to the Action of the 12th of January, as appears by the following Extracts of private Correſpondence during the Expedition.

Extract of a Letter from Governor Hornby to Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, dated the 5th January 1779.

"There is one other Point on which I muſt deſire to be no leſs preſſing; which is, my Recommendation of Captains Hartley and Stewart to you. I can aſſure you, that in this I do not mean any perſonal Mark of Favour to either of them; but that the general Good of the Service is my only Object."

Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn's Anſwer, dated the 8th of January 1779.

"You cannot have a higher Opinion of Captain Hartley than I have; and I am ſo well convinced of his great Abilities as an Officer, and exceeding Zeal to promote the Service, that he juſtly merits every Attention and Confidence from me. He was appointed by Colonel Egerton to take the Command of the Grenadier Corps, when it became vacant a few Days ago, by the moſt lamentable and unfortunate Accident of the Death of Captain Stewart."

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And Your Committee find, that on the 13th Day of March 1779, Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn entreated that a Court Martial might be ordered, to try him upon the Charge delivered in againſt him by the Governor: That he was acquainted in Anſwer, that as a Reference to the Governor General and Council had been agreed upon, and accepted by him, and the neceſſary Papers prepared for their Information, there would be an Impropriety in withdrawing the Deciſion from their Cognizance; for which Reaſon, Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn's Requeſt for a Court Martial

Martial was not granted. And Your Committee remark, that the Date of the Requeſt for a Court Martial, is Six Weeks after the Charge had been preferred againſt him by Governor Hornby.

And Your Committee having maturely and deliberately conſidered the Conduct of Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn during the late Expedition, are unanimouſly of Opinion, that he be diſmiſſed the Service of the Company.

Wm James,	Henry Fletcher,
Wm Devaynes,	John Harriſon,
Lau. Sulivan,	John Michie,
John Manſhip,	John Woodhouſe,
Geo. Cuming,	Henry Savage.
John Purling.	

Promotion of Captain James Hartley.

And your Committee find the following Obſervations and Reſolutions entered by the Select Committee of Bombay, on their Proceedings of the 1ſt of February 1779; viz.

"The great Importance in our preſent critical Situation, of having an Officer at the Head of our Infantry, whoſe Conduct we may ſafely rely; and the Juſtice we owe to the Service, of diſtinguiſhing thoſe who eminently ſignalized themſelves on the late unfortunate Expedition, unite in pointing out Captain James Hartley; who, on both Conſiderations, is intitled to our Firſt Notice in the Arrangements now indiſpenſably neceſſary to be made amongſt the Field Officers. Since Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn have choſe to decline all Military Duty and Command, and the Death of Lieutenant Colonel Cay, the chief Command of the Infantry has devolved by Seniority to Major Emanuel Hanney, who, on his firſt Appointment as a Field Officer, was barred from further Promotion, and whom, on the 5th of laſt Month, we found it neceſſary to ſuperſede in the Field, by giving a Lieutenant Colonel's Commiſſion to Major Dagon of the Artillery: It is therefore deemed in no reſpect proper to advance him to a higher Rank, or to continue him in Command of our Infantry; neither do we judge that Major Frederick, the next Officer ſtanding, poſſeſſes ſufficient Experience to qualify him for ſo important a Charge, in theſe very critical Times.

"In looking over our whole military Liſt, no Officer appears ſo fit for this Command as Captain Hartley; his Behaviour in a Courſe of Fourteen Years Service has been unexceptionable, and to his Conduct and Intrepidity are we principally indebted for the Preſervation of our whole Army in the Action of the 12th ultimo. His Merit as an Officer on the late Service is particularly acknowledged in the General Orders given out by Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn and Colonel Egerton, immediately after the Action, as entered hereafter. To which Mr. Carnac adds his Teſtimony, in a Manner much to Captain Hartley's Honour.

"In theſe Circumſtances, and prompted by our Deſire to reward ſuch diſtinguiſhed Merit, we do unanimouſly reſolve to appoint Captain James Hartley a Lieutenant Colonel of Infantry, and ſtrongly ſolicit the Honourable Company to confirm this Appointment; truſting that the Uncommonneſs of the Step, and the Reluctance we muſt naturally feel to all Supereeſſion, will be a Conviction to them of the Grounds and Neceſſity for this Meaſure.

"We alſo conſider it equally incumbent on us to confer Marks of our Notice on the other Officers, who particularly diſtinguiſhed themſelves on the late Service; and on this Principle it is unanimouſly reſolved to confer, unſolicited, a Major's Commiſſion on Captain Jn° Weſtphall, the Senior Captain of Artillery, to which he has a Right by Seniority, and the late Promotion of Lieutenant Colonel Dagon, and which he amply merits by his Ability and ſignal good Behaviour.

"Captain John Bellas, of the Artillery, having likewiſe deſervedly attracted our Notice, it is unanimouſly reſolved to appoint him Director of the Laboratory, for which he is well qualified, and which will be vacated by the Promotion of Lieutenant Colonel Dagon, and the Neceſſity of his attending to his other Avocations as Commandant of Artillery.

"Captain Alexander Cadger, of the Infantry, having alſo behaved in a diſtinguiſhed Manner, Reſolved unanimouſly, that he be confirmed in Command of the 5th Battalion of Sepoys, vacant by the Death of Captain James Stewart.

"Lieutenant Thomas Dawſon having proved himſelf a brave and active Officer on this and every other Service on which he has been employed, it is unanimouſly Reſolved, in order to convince the Army that we will ſpare no Effort to reward Merit, to give Captains Brevets to Three Senior Officers, that the Promotion may reach Lieutenant Dawſon, who is alſo to have a Captain's Brevet. The Three Officers ſo to be promoted are, Lieutenants Lendrum, Bowles, and Peche; and we are glad to mention, that Lieutenant Bowles, who was on the late Service, has by his Behaviour merited ſome Mark of our Notice.

"Lieutenant John Colbatch, who is a Senior Officer to Lieutenant Dawſon, not being eſteemed properly qualified for a Captain's Commiſſion, is not included in this Promotion.

"Lieutenant John Rattray, of the Bengal Eſtabliſhment, who arrived from England in the Royal Henry, and went a Volunteer on the Expedition, where, in the moſt trying Situations, he gave eminent Proofs of his Skill and Conduct as an Officer, Reſolved unanimouſly, that our Thanks be given him in General Orders; and as we ſhall be very glad to add ſuch a valuable Officer to the Eſtabliſh-

ment,

ment, it is further unanimouſly reſolved to offer him a Captain's Commiſſion, to rank next [illegible] Captain Dawſon.

" Lieutenants James Jackſon, and S[t] Lo Thomas, of the Artillery, having alſo merited particular Notice, the former is appointed Aſſiſtant to the Director of the Laboratory, and the latter confirmed in his Poſt of Adjutant, to which he was appointed on the Expedition.

" Lieutenants Waddington, Bannatyne, Macpharſon, and Burchall, having alſo diſtinguiſhed themſelves in the Action of the 12th, we ſhall be glad to give thoſe Officers further Proofs of our Senſe of their good Behaviour when Opportunities offer; and it is now unanimouſly reſolved to give our particular Thanks in the public Orders of this Garriſon.

" Reſolved unanimouſly, That our Thanks in general be given to the Whole of the Officers whoſe Behaviour has been commended in the above Reſolutions; and if any Inſtance of particular good Behaviour has eſcaped our Notice, we will with great Pleaſure rectify the Omiſſion.

" Reſolved unanimouſly, That our Thanks be given to the Six Companies of Grenadier Sepoys that compoſed the Rear Diviſion under Captain Hartley, for their gallant Behaviour on the 12th ultimo; and that Badges be given them to commemorate the Honour they gained on that Occaſion.

" As in India Service in general, and particularly in our ſmall Army, the Charge and Reſponſibility of each Captain is very great, and moſt dangerous Conſequences may ariſe from improper Perſons being promoted to that Rank, Reſolved unanimouſly, and it muſt accordingly be ſignified to the Army, That the Lieutenants will not in future be promoted in Rotation to the Rank of Captains, either in the Infantry or Artillery, unleſs they ſhall be judged fully qualified for that Station."

Bombay Gen. Conſ. 17th Feby 1779.

And Your Committee find, that on the 17th of February 1779, the Select Committee preſented to the Governor and Council the military Commiſſions which they had deemed it for the Good of the Service to grant to particular Officers; but the Select Committee did not think it proper to explain their Reaſons for having granted the ſaid Commiſſions, when it was recommended to the Board to ſign them.

And Your Committee find the following Minutes entered by Two Members of the Board, who were not Members of the Select Committee.

" Meſſrs. Ramſay and Moore deliver in the following Minutes on the Occaſion; and the other Members declare, that by ſigning the Commiſſions they do not mean to take any Share of Reſponſibility for theſe Appointments.

" Mr. Ramſay ſigns the Commiſſions now preſented to the Board, becauſe the Select Committee recommend it as neceſſary for the Good of the Service, and becauſe he thinks it will be agreeable to the Honourable Company, that the Board ſhould co-operate with the Committee in every Meaſure which may be thought conducive to their Intereſt; but as theſe Commiſſions appear to Mr. Ramſay to be a Deviation from the eſtabliſhed Rules of the Service, and contrary to the expreſs Orders of the Company, and as the Committee have not been pleaſed to communicate to the Board the Motives which have induced them to grant them, Mr. Ramſay cannot poſſibly be a Judge of the Propriety or Neceſſity of the Meaſures, and therefore diſclaims every Degree of Reſponſibility for the ſame, more eſpecially as he is clearly of Opinion, from the 48th Paragraph of the Company's Inſtructions to the Governor General and Council at Bengal, to which the other Preſidencies are directed to conform, that no Board in India have a Power to grant a Field Officer's Commiſſion.

" On this Occaſion Mr. Ramſay begs Leave to remark the very diſagreeable Predicament he and the other Members of the Board may be ſubjected to, by the Select Committee determining on Meaſures to which, as in the Inſtance now before us, it is neceſſary to have the Sanction of the Board's Signature, though the Members are deprived of the Means of judging of the Propriety of ſuch Meaſures. Mr. Ramſay, for his own Part, has not a Doubt that the Power of granting Commiſſions alone reſts with the Governor and Council; and conſequently that all Appointments ſhould originate with them, except in particular Inſtances, where, in the Courſe of military Operations under the immediate Direction of the Committee, it may become neceſſary to diſtinguiſh Merit. This Mr. Ramſay ſuppoſes to be the Caſe at preſent; but then he is of Opinion the Neceſſity of it ſhould be explained to the Board, and they become the Judges; for it ſeems abſurd to ſuppoſe a Member of the Board can be obliged to give his Sanction to a Meaſure on which he has not been conſulted.

" The Orders for the Inſtitution of the Select Committee are certainly in ſuch general Terms as may admit of their being conſtrued in the very extenſive Senſe the Members ſeem to have taken them. They are to tranſact all political, military, and naval Affairs, and likewiſe all ſuch as may require Secrecy. Theſe are, no Doubt, very indefinite Orders; but Mr. Ramſay, taking the Spirit and not the Letter of the Inſtitution, conceives they are meant to extend only to ſuch military and naval Affairs as may depend on political Meaſures, which the honourable Company very wiſely think it proper to confine to a few, and by no Means intended to throw the whole military Detail of the Eſtabliſhment into the Committee's Department. To effect this, the Mutiny Act muſt neceſſarily be repealed, or at leaſt amended; and the Court of Directors muſt have ſeen the Neceſſity of revoking former Orders, whereby the *ſupreme military Power* is expreſsly veſted in the Governor and Council, and they required to ſign all Commiſſions. Had they meant to tranſfer theſe Powers to the Committee, they moſt certainly would have ſaid ſo in expreſs Terms, and not have taken it for granted, that the Appointment of the Committee would ſet aſide all former Orders on the Subject. Mr. Ramſay requeſts this his Opinion may ſtand recorded; at the ſame Time declaring, that he will at all

Times, when called upon, co-operate in carrying into Execution all Meaſures which the Committee may deem for the Company's Intereſt."

" Mr. Moore begs it may be minuted, that he ſigns the Commiſſions now preſented to the Board by the Members of the Select Committee for ſigning, from the following Principles:

" 1ſt. Becauſe he has not a Doubt but the Members of the Select Committee, by giving the Commiſſions they now give to Colonel Hartley, Captain Dawſon, and Captain Rattray, are convinced that it is neceſſary for the Good of the Service that ſuch Commiſſions ſhould be given, and that they are given as Rewards of diſtinguiſhed Merit.

" 2d. Becauſe the Honourable the Court of Directors, in their Commands of the 10th April 1778, to the Board at large, expreſs themſelves, after appointing the preſent Select Committee for tranſacting *all* political, *military*, and naval Affairs, as follows:

" We direct, that all Orders and Inſtructions which ſhall be iſſued by our ſaid Select Committee, " be iſſued in the Name of the Preſident and Select Committee; and that all ſuch Orders be impli- " citly obeyed by every Perſon in our Service, or enjoying our Protection, civil or military, on Pain " of Suſpenſion, or of forfeiting our Licenſe and Protection."

" Mr. Moore further begs it may be minuted, that from the cloſeſt Conſideration of the Power veſted in the Select Committee, as above recited, he is of Opinion that the Select Committee are alone authorized to grant all military Commiſſions whatever, they alone being reſponſible for granting them. The Commiſſions now before the Board are, to Mr. Moore, Proofs that the Select Committee think themſelves ſo authorized. Mr. Moore, therefore, his ſigning Commiſſions without being conſulted as to the Propriety of granting them, Mr. Moore not only thinks unneceſſary, but abſurd, becauſe it fixes his Name to a Meaſure which conſequently carries with it the Appearance of Approbation.

" When Mr. Draper preſented Lieutenant Colonel Dagon's Commiſſion to the Board for ſigning, which Commiſſion was given by the Select Committee, Mr. Moore then mentioned to Mr. Draper, that as the Select Committee had granted the Commiſſion, he thought the Select Committee alone ſhould ſign it. Mr Moore ſigned it, however, to avoid the Appearance of Singularity, becauſe he thought the Occaſion an urgent one, and becauſe he never wiſhes to enter a Minute, whether of Diſſent or Obſervation, unleſs compelled to it from the Duty which he owes to the Company, to the Public, and to himſelf.

" The Commiſſions were then ſigned."

And the Select Committee of Bombay have moſt earneſtly ſolicited the Court's Confirmation of the Appointment of Captain Hartley as Lieutenant Colonel of Infantry, in order to convince the Army, that Support will be given to the Select Committee when the Good of the Service makes it requiſite to diſtinguiſh particular Officers. The Select Committee are ſorry to have acted contrary to the Court's Orders in the Promotion of Field Officers, but hope the Neceſſity of the Caſe will plead their Excuſe; that on the Terms they are on with the Marattas, and at a Time of actual War with France, it would have been highly unjuſtifiable to have ſuffered their Military to remain for any Length of Time, without a commanding Officer qualified to preſerve proper Diſcipline, or to lead them into the Field. Letter from, Par. 113, 27th March 1779.

That the Times required an Officer who had more to plead than merely not having committed Faults; they wanted an Officer of active and approved Merit, on whoſe Ability and Conduct they could depend for the Execution of any Service committed to him. Par. 122.

That the Loſs of Captain Stewart had been ſeverely felt. That the Conduct of Captain Hartley, who on the Death of Captain Stewart ſucceeded to the Command of the advanced Diviſion of the Army, did him Honour; that if his judicious and ſpirited Counſel had been purſued, and the Army moved up the Line to ſupport him, inſtead of ordering him to retreat to the Line, there is Reaſon to believe that the Fortune of the Day might have ſecured our Honour, if not our Succeſs; and that keeping his Ground till the inevitable Conſequence of the Meaſure induced Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn to revoke his Order for retreating, was probably the chief Circumſtance to which our Troops owed their Preſervation. Par. 123.

That when Two chief Officers were under Cenſure for Conduct oppoſite to that which the Select Committee are bound to ſupport, and to that Spirit which it is their Duty to encourage; when Seniority, maintained by any Means, is pleaded by ſo many Perſons, and claims Promotion in Preference to diſtinguiſhed Merit and Services; it is impoſſible for the Select Committee to produce thoſe general and deciſive Teſtimonies in Favour of their Aſſertions and Opinions which they always wiſh to accompany them; that in the preſent critical Circumſtances their own Intereſt is too much complicated with that of the Public, to ſuffer them to be ſwayed by Motives of partial or private Regard; and while they are conſcious of having been guided by the Abilities, Integrity, Temper, and general Eſtimation of the Perſon, they believe they have paid ſuch Attention to the Company's Intereſt as their Duty exacted; and they rely on that Support which the Performance of Duty requires, and warrants them to hope for on the Occaſion. 1254

APPENDIX, N° 130.

Extract of Letter from the Court of Directors to the Select Committee of Bombay, dated 12th April 1780.

Par. 1. Having duly attended to your Proceedings previous to the late Expedition towards Poona, we allow that your Reſolution of the 21ſt of July was not improper, under the favourable Circumſtances ſtated by you at that Period; but the Change which happened ſoon afterwards in the Situation of Ragoba's Friends, and the Lapſe of Time, from the 21ſt of July to the 22d of November, rendered it extremely imprudent to undertake the Expedition at that Time.

2. The State of your Garriſon, as repreſented by yourſelves to Sir Edward Vernon in your Letter of the 8th of September 1778, could not warrant your ſending ſo large a Force on Foreign Service at the Commencement of an European War, more eſpecially when ſpeedy Succour was rendered precarious, and conſequently Succeſs very doubtful by the diſagreeable Alteration which had happened in the Situation of Ragoba's Friends.

3. Under the above Circumſtances the Undertaking was evidently become hazardous, and not to be juſtified; the Reaſons urged by Mr. Draper againſt it were ſolid and judicious; and you ought certainly to have waited the Arrival, or near Approach of the Bengal Detachment, before you attempted to reinſtate Ragoba at Poona.

4. And although we are willing to hope, for the Reaſons offered by the Majority in Anſwer to Mr. Draper's Diſſent, that you acted according to the beſt of your Judgment in undertaking to place Ragoba in the Regency at Poona in November 1778, we nevertheleſs conſider you as having proceeded with great Indiſcretion on that Occaſion.

5. Your Appointment of a Member of the Select Committee, to accompany the Commander in Chief to Poona, was highly improper. By the Departure of the Commander in Chief and Mr. Carnac, the Governor having a caſting Vote, became poſſeſſed in Fact of abſolute Authority, for tranſacting all Political, Military, and Naval Affairs, and ſuch as require Secrecy, at Bombay. And as this Tranſaction militated againſt the Letter and Spirit of the Court's Orders of the 10th of April 1778, the Appointment of a Member of the Select Committee at Bombay, to accompany the Commander in Chief to Poona, muſt have our Diſapprobation; and we declare the Majority of the ſaid Committee very reprehenſible for their Conduct in that Reſpect. We find the Commander in Chief proteſted againſt the Meaſure; and we exempt Mr. Draper from this Cenſure, becauſe, juſtly ſuppoſing it to be the Intent of the Company that none of the Civil Members of the Committee ſhould be detached from the Preſidency, if the Commander in Chief were to be abſent alſo, Mr. Draper very properly delivered his Opinion in the Select Committee accordingly.

6. We find the Amount of Money due from Ragoba to the Company, is ſtated on your quick Stock the 30th Day of April 1777, at Rupees 24,72,775.

7. Your Payment of 80,000 Rupees to Mr. Shaw's Executors, and your Loan of 4 Lacks to Ragoba, and 15,000 Rupees to his Servants, beſides Arms and Military Stores furniſhed for his Uſe, were unjuſtifiable Meaſures; more eſpecially as ſo large a Sum as 1,50,00 Rupees was ſent with the Troops, and as Authority was alſo granted to the Commiſſary and Paymaſter to paſs Drafts on the Select Committee for their neceſſary Diſburſements during the Expedition; and we find that Bills have actually been accepted on that Account, to the Amount of Rupees, 2,28,529: Unleſs, therefore, you ſhall be able to produce better Reaſons for having made the above Loans, and Payment, amounting to 4,95,000 Rupees, than appear to us at preſent, you muſt expect to be made reſponſible to the Company for the ſaid Amount.

8. As a Select Committee, your granting of Military Commiſſions was unwarrantable; your preſenting them to the Council for ſigning, without ſtating your Reaſons for having granted them, was an Indignity to the Board; and the Council are very blameable for not rejecting every Commiſſion ſo preſented by you as aforeſaid.

9. Having noticed the above Particulars, we proceed to examine the Behaviour of ſuch Perſons as were immediately concerned in conducting the late Expedition towards Poona.

10. The firſt Object that ſtrikes us, is the ſlow Progreſs of the Army. This we deem an irreparable Injury to the Service; and in this Reſpect the Conduct of the Commander in Chief appears extremely defective. The Conſequence was obvious: The Enemy had full Opportunity to collect their Strength: The Friends of Ragoba, inſtead of being encouraged by the ſpirited Exertion of our Force to join his Standard, muſt, as we conceive, have been deterred from declaring in his Favour, by the Languor of our own Military Proceedings.

11. And upon the moſt impartial Review of the Conduct of the late Colonel, now Brigadier General Egerton, during the late diſgraceful Expedition towards Poona, we are of Opinion, that it was ſuch as rendered it highly improper for him to be continued in the Command of the Company's Forces at Bombay; we have therefore reſolved, That he be diſmiſſed from the Company's Service, and he is hereby diſmiſſed accordingly.

12. In regard to Mr. Carnac, we are very ſorry to find his Conduct not leſs exceptionable than that of Colonel Egerton.

13. We remark, that the Army was only 18 Miles, or about 2 Days March from the Summit of the Gauts, and about 16 Miles, or 2 Days March from Poona, on the 11th January, when Orders were given to march back towards Condolah: That Advice had juſt been received, of Mora-

ba's

ba's Horſe being in the Conkan, to act in favour of Ragoba: That the Commiſſary had 18 Days Proviſions in Store, and that Ragoba had promiſed a further Supply: That in the preceding Skirmiſh, the Enemy had been worſted, and compelled to retreat: That the Troops were in Spirits, and intrepid: That no Council of War was called at Tullagoan, to take the Senſe of the Officers of the Army on the Neceſſity of retreating: That although the Order for the Retreat of the Army, on the 11th of January, was the joint Act of Mr. Carnac and Colonel Egerton, yet as Mr. Carnac had a caſting Vote in the Poona Committee, and poſſeſſed in Fact ſupreme Authority in Camp at the Time, he was particularly reſponſible for that Meaſure.

14. It appears, by the Return of the Commanding Officer, that our Loſs of Men in the Action of the 12th January, was not very great: The general Orders of the Day expreſs his extreme Satisfaction with their gallant Behaviour in general. The Officers were publicly thanked for their cool and ſpirited Conduct; and Captain Hartley was particularly diſtinguiſhed for his Judgment as an Officer. It is allowed, that there were Ten Days Proviſion in Camp after the Action: It is aſſerted by the Select Committee, that the Officer laſt mentioned, declared, He could rely upon the Men he commanded; and urged every Argument in favour of forcing a Retreat, rather than to ſubmit to the humiliating Terms preſcribed by the Enemy. It cannot be doubted that Mr. Carnac continued in Poſſeſſion of Authority without Controul, except to make Treaties. He was confident, if the Officers and Men did their Duty that the Army was ſufficiently numerous, and ſo well provided with Artillery, as to be able to force their Way back againſt all Oppoſition. He had no Doubt but the Attempt ought to be made. His Words are, "at all Events, "rather than ſubmit to the Terms preſcribed by the Enemy;" yet under all Circumſtances rather than preſs a Retreat, he ventured to pledge the Engliſh Faith in the moſt ſolemn and ſacred Manner, for the Obſervance of Treaties, of which he owns he did not at the Time expect a Confirmation. He ſtipulated to obtain the Governor's Duſtuck for delivering up the Company's Poſſeſſions to the Marattas; and gave Hoſtages for the due Performance of extraordinary Agreements, under mental Reſervations and pre-conceived Ideas that they were of no Validity, and would never be ratified by his Superiors.

15. Notwithſtanding the deſpicable Character given of the Troops by Mr. Carnac, in his Letter to Governor Hornby, when the Army was on its Return to Bombay, we find that he afterwards ſubſcribed to an Exception, which in our Opinion would have fully juſtified his iſſuing the moſt poſitive Orders for the Army to attempt to force a Retreat from Wurgaon to Bombay, rather than ſubmit to the diſgraceful Conditions preſcribed by the Enemy.

16. In your Letter of the 27th of March 1779, Par. 128, which is ſigned by Mr. Carnac, it is ſtated, that Captain Hartley on that trying Occaſion, notwithſtanding the Contagion of bad Example, inſiſted upon it, that he could depend on the Men which he had commanded: That he actually put a Stop at once to Deſertion ſo far as the Limits of his Command extended; that when conſulted, he urged every Argument to attempt the forcing of a Retreat, rather than ſubmit to the humiliating Terms preſcribed by the Enemy; that he even formed and preſented Colonel Cockburn the neceſſary Diſpoſition for conducting the Retreat, and for avoiding Inconveniences reſulting from a Night March, and the Diviſion of the Troops.

17. And we do not find that any Cenſure has been paſſed on Mr. Carnac at Bombay; nor that any Enquiry has been made by the Select Committee into his Conduct and Behaviour during the late Expedition.

18. And upon the moſt impartial Review of the whole Conduct of Mr. Carnac during the late Expedition towards Poona, and after duly conſidering all the Circumſtances relative thereto, we have reſolved, That John Carnac, Eſquire, be diſmiſſed from his Office, as one of the Council and Select Committee of Bombay, and he is hereby diſmiſſed accordingly.

19. The Charge brought by Governor Hornby againſt Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn was very proper; but we do not find it noticed on your Proceedings on that Occaſion that Captain Hartley had given a different Opinion, concerning the Propriety of attempting to force a Retreat from Wurgoan; nor that you have, in any Stage of the Buſineſs, informed Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn of your being in Poſſeſſion of that Fact; which certainly you ought to have done. We find Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn has acknowledged, that he gave the written Opinion contained in the Governor's Charge againſt him: And upon the moſt mature Conſideration of his Conduct, we have reſolved to diſmiſs Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn from the Service of the Company, and he is hereby diſmiſſed accordingly.

20. We are ſorry to obſerve, that in appointing Captain James Hartley to be a Lieutenant Colonel of Infantry on the Bombay Eſtabliſhment, you have concurred unanimouſly in a direct Breach of the Company's Orders; but as you have repreſented the Merit and Services of Lieutenant Colonel Hartley in a Light ſo very favourable for that Officer, we have reſolved, rather than degrade an Officer whoſe Ability and Merit ſeems univerſally acknowledged, that Lieutenant Colonel Hartley ſhall remain the youngeſt of that Rank at Bombay; but that he ſhall, from the Receipt of this Letter at Bombay, receive the Pay and Allowances of Captain of Infantry only, until ſuch meritorious Officers as have been ſuperſeded by his Promotion, ſhall have riſen in regular Succeſſion above him, to the Rank of Lieutenant Colonel.

21. Having taken into our particular and moſt ſerious Conſideration the State of the Company's Military Force at your Settlement, we have reſolved to appoint an able Officer to the Command of the Troops at Bombay.

22. And

22. And having the higheſt Opinion of the Zeal, Experience, and Military Abilities of Colonel Thomas Goddard, we have thought fit to appoint Colonel Goddard Commander in Chief of the Company's Forces at Bombay, and granted him a Commiſſion of Brigadier General in our Service.

23. We have alſo requeſted His Majeſty to grant a Commiſſion of Brigadier General, with local Rank to Colonel Thomas Goddard, which we doubt not will be granted accordingly.

24. We feel the moſt ſenſible Concern for the Situation of Mr. William Gamul Farmer and Lieutenant Stewart, as Hoſtages for the Performance of the Convention of Wurgaon; but as we have no Doubt, but that Meaſures will have been taken, either by you or by our Governor General and Council, to procure their Liberty before this Letter can reach you, we for the preſent only add, that early Information of their Enlargement will afford us very great Satisfaction.

25. We direct that no additional Pay or Emolument be allowed to Lieutenants Dawſon, Lindrum, Bowles, and Piché, in conſequence of Brevets granted to thoſe Officers. By a future Opportunity we ſhall conſider the Propriety of revoking or of finally confirming the ſaid Brevets.

26. It is our Pleaſure, that Mr. Daniel Draper be Second of Council, and of the Select Committee at Bombay: And as a further Teſtimony of our Approbation of the Conduct of Mr. Draper, it is alſo our Pleaſure, that Mr. Draper do ſucceed, and we hereby expreſsly appoint him to ſucceed to the Office of Preſident and Governor of Bombay, upon the Death, Removal, or Reſignation of Governor Hornby.

27. It is our Order, that Brigadier General Goddard have a conſtant Seat as Third in our ſaid Council and Select Committee. We likewiſe direct, that Mr. Henry More be the Fourth Member of our Select Committee at Bombay.

28 As a further Mark of our Approbation of the Conduct of Brigadier General Goddard, we have directed, that the Pay and Allowances received by him from Bengal, as Commander in Chief of the Detachment ſent from that Settlement, be continued to him, and paid by our Governor General and Council, ſo long as thoſe Troops ſhall remain under General Goddard's Command on the Weſtern Side of India; he muſt alſo receive the Pay and Allowances of Third of our Council and Select Committee at Bombay; but if our Governor General and Council ſhall recall the Bengal Detachment, the Pay and Allowances received by General Goddard on that Account muſt be diſcontinued, and ceaſe immediately upon the Return of the ſaid Detachment, as it will then be no longer under his Authority or Command; and after that Period, General Goddard muſt receive the Pay and Allowances of our Commander in Chief of our Troops at Bombay.

APPENDIX, N° 131.

At a Committee of Secrecy of the Eaſt India Company, Friday 31ſt July 1778;
PRESENT,
Sir George Wombwell, Baronet, Chairman,
Sir William James, Baronet, Deputy,
John Purling,
and
William Devaynes, } Eſquires.

RESOLVED, That in Addition to the Military Force promiſed by Adminiſtration, a further Supply of Troops is neceſſary for the Protection of the Company's Settlements; and that the Chairman and Deputy Chairman do attend His Majeſty's Miniſters, to requeſt that ſuch additional Supply of Troops may be granted for that Purpoſe as to His Majeſty in His great Wiſdom ſhall ſeem fit.

Ordered, That Draft of Inſtructions to Bombay be prepared relative to Ragoba, to the Views of the French, and to the Situation of Affairs in that Part of India.

Thurſday 13th Auguſt 1778.

At a Committee of Secrecy; PRESENT,
Sir George Wombwell, Baronet, Chairman,
Sir William James, Baronet, Deputy,
Mr. Sulivan,
Mr. Devaynes,
Mr. Purling,
Mr. Roberts,
Mr. Booth.

Read

Read the following Draft of Inſtructions to Bombay. *(See Page 46 of the Sixth Report.)*

N. B. The above was dated the 31ſt of Auguſt, and ſigned

G. Wombwell,
Wm James,
Will. Devaynes.

Ordered, That the foregoing Inſtructions to Bombay be tranſmitted to Lord Weymouth, with the following Letter:

My Lord,

In Addition to the Orders and Inſtructions ſent over Land to our Settlements in India, a Draft whereof we had the Honour of tranſmitting to your Lordſhip with our Letter of the 11th of April laſt, we now beg Leave to lay before you the Draft of a further Letter to be written to our Preſident and Council of Bombay, if it ſhall be honoured with His Majeſty's Approbation.

The Advices of our Servants reſpecting the Proceedings of the French in India, are already before your Lordſhip; and therefore we have to requeſt, that you will be pleaſed to communicate to us His Majeſty's Pleaſure on the incloſed Orders and Inſtructions immediately, a Meſſenger being ready to proceed over Land to Bombay, by the Way of Buſſorah, as we conceive it eſſentially neceſſary that no Time be loſt, if the Meaſure be adopted.

We have the Honour to be,

My Lord,
Your Lordſhip's moſt obedient,
moſt humble Servants,

G. Wombwell,
Wm James,
W. Devaynes.

East India Houſe,
13th Auguſt 1778.

Read, and approved unanimouſly, the following Draft of a Letter to Lord Weymouth:

My Lord,

The Secret Committee of the Court of Directors of the Eaſt India Company having on the 31ſt ultimo reſolved,

" That in Addition to the military Force promiſed by Adminiſtration, a further Supply of Troops " is neceſſary for the Protection of the Company's Settlements; and that the Chairman and Deputy " Chairman do attend His Majeſty's Miniſters, to requeſt that ſuch additional Supply of Troops " may be granted for that Purpoſe, as to His Majeſty in His great Wiſdom ſhall ſeem fit:"

And the Deputy Chairman having, on the 1ſt Inſtant, in conſequence of the ſaid Reſolution, laid the Committee's humble Requſt before your Lordſhip, you will permit us further to entreat, that the King's Pleaſure may be ſpeedily communicated thereon, in order that proper Diſpoſitions may be made for the Reception, and Accommodation on board our Ships, of ſuch Troops as His Majeſty ſhall be graciouſly pleaſed to grant, for the Protection of the Company's Settlements.

We have the Honour to be,

My Lord,
Your Lordſhip's moſt obedient,
and moſt faithful humble Servants,

G. Wombwell,
Wm James,
Wm Devaynes.

East India Houſe,
13th Auguſt 1778.

Ordered, That the above Letter be wrote fair, and tranſmitted to Lord Weymouth immediately.

Wedneſday, 26th Auguſt 1778.

At a Committee of Secrecy; PRESENT,

Sir William James, Baronet, Deputy Chairman,
Mr. Devaynes, Mr. Roberts, and Mr. Sulivan.

Read the following Letter from Lord Viſcount Weymouth, dated the 22d Inſtant:

" Secret.

" St. James's, 22d Auguſt 1778.

" Gentlemen,

" Your Letters of the 13th inſtant were duly received, and laid before the King.

" The Draft of your ſecret Letter to Bombay has been taken into Conſideration. It is extremely " expedient

" expedient that every Means ſhould be uſed to prevent the French from extending their Influence
" at Poona, and getting any Footing in that Part of India; but whether the taking Ragoba by the
" Hand is the moſt proper Means, muſt be left to your Determination.

" With reſpect to your Application for an additional military Force, I have in Command to ac-
" quaint you, that in caſe the Company will pay the Expence of raiſing and maintaining a new
" Battalion, His Majeſty will have no Objection that ſuch Means may be propoſed for that Purpoſe,
" as you ſhall ſee likely to have Effect.

" I am, Gentlemen,
" Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
" Weymouth."

" Chairman and Deputy Chairman
" of the Eaſt India Company."

The Committee having taken his Lordſhip's Letter into their ſerious Conſideration, it is upon a Queſtion reſolved unanimouſly, That it is not neceſſary, in conſequence thereof, to make any Alteration in the ſecret Letter propoſed to be ſent to Bombay.

Ordered, That the Letter to Bombay be forthwith put in Cypher, and prepared for ſigning.

Ordered, That Letters be prepared in Cypher to the Governor General and Council at Fort William, and to the Select Committee at Fort Saint George, tranſmitting Copies of the Committee's Orders to Bombay, and enjoining the ſtricteſt Attention thereto.

27th Auguſt 1778.

Wrote the following Letter to Sir George Wombwell, by Order of the Deputy Chairman:

Sir,

The Committee of Secrecy, aſſiſted by Mr. Sulivan, have reſolved that no Alteration ſhall be made in the Letter propoſed to be ſent to Bombay, and directed that it be put in Cypher immediately.

As the Powers of the Committee of Secrecy had expired, and are now revived, a ſhort Letter on that Subject has been propoſed and ſigned by the Court; Copy whereof I beg Leave to enclose for your Peruſal.

Sir William James has this Morning had an Interview with Lord North, on the Subject of that Part of Lord Weymouth's Letter which ſtates the Conditions on which an additional Battalion of Men may be raiſed for the Service of the Company. Extracts of Proceedings have been ſelected, in order to aſcertain the ſpecific Allowance heretofore made, when His Majeſty's Troops ſerved in India. Theſe Extracts have juſt been tranſmitted to Lord North by the Deputy Chairman, and a Copy is preparing for your Inſpection.

As the Select Committee at Bombay have not been informed from hence of the Orders ſent by the Committee of Secrecy to Fort Saint George and Bengal, the 15th of April laſt, a Copy of thoſe Orders is now prepared in Cypher, in order to be tranſmitted by the intended Conveyance to Bombay. You will alſo receive herewith Draft of ſhort Letter to Bengal and to Fort Saint George, covering the preſent Orders wrote in Cypher to Bombay, and enjoining Attention thereto. This Draft waits your Approbation, and if approved will be ſigned by the Committee of Secrecy only.

The encloſed Letter to your Addreſs was received this Afternoon by the Hawke from Bombay.

The Subſtance of the Papers ſent to Lord North is, that the Company have allowed Levy Money, £.3 per Head; alſo a Sum of Money to the Colonels of marching Regiments, to enable them to replace the Cloathing and Accoutrements of non-commiſſioned Officers and private Men taken from their reſpective Regiments; alſo an Allowance for the Paſſage of ſuch Officers and Men as went on board the Company's own Ships; alſo an Allowance to the Field Officers for a Table, &c. in India; and finally, ſuch additional Pay to both Officers and Privates as rendered their whole Allowance equal to the Pay and Batta to the Company's Troops in India.

I have the Honour to be, with the moſt perfect Conſideration,

Sir,
Your moſt obedient and faithful humble Servant,
Sam. Wilks

Eaſt India Houſe,
27th Auguſt 1778.

Downing Street, Monday 31ſt Auguſt 1778.

At a Committee of Secrecy; PRESENT,

Sir George Wombwell, Baronet, Chairman,
Sir William James, Baronet, Deputy,
William Devaynes, Eſquire.

The Committee being met to ſign Inſtructions to the ſeveral Preſidencies in India, the following were ſigned accordingly:

Letter

APPENDIX, N° 131.

Letter from the Committee of Secrecy to the Preſident and Select Committee at Bombay, dated this Day; alſo

Letter to the Governor General and Council at Fort William, dated the ſame Day; alſo,

Letter to the Preſident and Select Committee at Fort Saint George, dated the ſame Day.

Our Preſident and Select Committee at Fort Saint George.

Encloſed we tranſmit you Copy of a Letter wrote in Cypher to the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, dated this Day, to which we enjoin your ſtrict Attention. The like Copy has been ſent to our Governor General and Council at Fort William in Bengal, with the ſame Injunction. And as we muſt ſuppoſe that our Orders of the 15th April laſt will have been duly executed before this comes to Hand, we can have no Doubt of your Ability and Readineſs ſo to co-operate with our ſaid Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, as ſhall enable them to accompliſh effectually the Meaſures recommended to their immediate Conſideration.

We tranſmit for your Information Extract of a Letter from our Governor and Deputy Governor of Saint Helena, dated the 20th of May 1778; alſo one from Captain Douglas, dated the 10th of June 1778; and from our Secretary, of this Day's Date, to the Agent and Council at Buſſorah.

We are

Your loving Friends,

London, 31ſt Auguſt 1778.

G. Wombwell,
Wm James,
Wm Devaynes.

The Letter to Bengal is ſimilar to the above, except the following Addition:

Poſtſcript. As Hoſtilities have actually commenced between Great Britain and France, and as we think it probable that our Servants on the Coaſt of Coromandel may ſtand in need of Aſſiſtance from you, we direct that you fail not, upon their Application, to afford them ſuch Aſſiſtance, in Money or otherwiſe, as the Exigence of the Caſe may require.

G. Wombwell,
Wm James,
W. Devaynes.

Ordered, That the above Diſpatches be delivered to Lieutenant Colonel James Capper.

Sir William James deſires, that the following Extracts may be entered upon the Minutes of the Committee:

Extract of a Letter from John Purling, Eſquire, to Sir William James; dated Weymouth, 29th Auguſt 1778.

"I am glad you perſevere in ſending your Diſpatches over Land.

"Your Orders relative to Ragoba are ſo guarded that, truſted to the Execution of Prudence, I "think no Harm can come of them; and I muſt ſay the Conduct of the Governor and Council of "Bombay, in all Matters concerning the Marattas, has been extremely prudent and ſenſible."

Extract of a Letter from Robert Gregory, Eſquire, to Sir William James; dated Cool Lodge, near Gort, Ireland, 12th Auguſt 1778.

"I wiſh we could bring about an Alliance with Hyder Ally, and place Ragoba on the Muſnud of "Poona; we ſhould then have little to fear from the French on the Continent of India.".

Liſt of Packet to Bombay, by Colonel Capper.

N° 1. Letter from the Secret Committee, directed to the Honourable the Preſident and the Select Committee, at Bombay, dated 31ſt Auguſt 1778. Wrote in Cypher.

N° 2. Letter from D° to the Honourable the Governor General and Council at Fort William in Bengal, dated 31ſt Auguſt 1778. Wrote in Cypher.

N° 3. Letter from D° to the Preſident and Select Committee at Fort Saint George, dated 31ſt Auguſt 1778. Wrote in Cypher.

N° 4. Letter from the Court of Directors to the Preſident and Select Committee at Bombay, dated 26th Auguſt 1778.

N° 5. Extract of a Letter from the Governor and Deputy Governor of Saint Helena, dated 20th May 1778.

D° from Captain Douglas, dated 10th June 1778.

D° from Peter Michell, Eſquire, to the Agent and Council at Buſſorah, dated 31ſt Auguſt 1778; with an Encloſure containing a Liſt of Shipping taken up for 1778.

N° 6. Copy of a Letter from the Committee of Secrecy to the Governor General and Council at Bengal, dated 15th April 1778.

N° 7. Copy of a Letter from the Committee of Secrecy to the Select Committee at Fort Saint George, dated 15th April 1778.

N° 8. Copy of a Circular Letter to all the Preſidencies, dated 15th April 1778.

N° 9. Copy of a Letter from the Committee of Secrecy to the Select Committee at Bombay, dated 15th April 1778.

Liſt of Packet to Bengal by Colonel Capper.

N° 1. Letter from the Secret Committee, directed to the Honourable the Governor General and Council at Fort William in Bengal, dated 31ſt Auguſt 1778. Wrote in Cypher.

N° 2. Letter from D° to the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, dated 31ſt Auguſt 1778. Wrote in Cypher.

N° 3. Letter from the Court of Directors to the Governor General and Council, dated 26th Auguſt 1778.

N° 4. Extract of a Letter from the Governor and Deputy Governor of Saint Helena to the Court of Directors, dated 20th May 1778.

D° from Captain Douglas, dated 10th June 1778.

D° from Peter Michell, Eſquire, to the Agent and Council at Buſſorah, dated 31ſt Auguſt 1778; with an Encloſure containing a Liſt of Shipping taken up for 1778.

N° 5. Letter from the Secret Committee, directed to the Honourable the Governor General and Council at Fort William in Bengal, dated 31ſt Auguſt 1778. Wrote in Cypher.

Liſt of Packet to Fort Saint George by Colonel Capper.

N° 1. Letter from the Secret Committee, directed to the Honourable the Preſident and Select Committee at Fort Saint George, dated 31ſt Auguſt 1778. Wrote in Cypher.

N° 2. Letter from D° to the Preſident and Select Committee at Bombay, dated 31ſt Auguſt 1778. Wrote in Cypher.

N° 3. Letter from the Court of Directors to the Preſident and Select Committee at Fort Saint George, dated 26th Auguſt 1778.

N° 4. Extract of a Letter from the Governor and Deputy Governor of Saint Helena to the Court of Directors, dated 20th May 1778.

D° from Captain Douglas, dated 10th June 1778.

D° from Peter Michell, Eſquire, to the Agent and Council at Buſſorah, dated 31ſt Auguſt 1778, with an Encloſure containing a Liſt of Shipping taken up for 1778.

N° 5. Letter from the Secret Committee, directed to the Honourable the Governor General and Council at Fort William in Bengal, dated 31ſt Auguſt 1778. Wrote in Cypher.

Extract of Letter from the Governor and Deputy Governor of Saint Helena, dated 20th May 1778.

" Having received Intelligence from Captain Moutray, that on his outward-bound Voyage to this " Iſland, he received Information at the Iſland of Palma, that there had been Two American Priva- " teers lately there; the one a Two-Deck Ship, and the other a Frigate; and on his Arrival at Saint " Jago, he was further informed, that the ſaid Two Privateers had alſo been there, and had left that " Iſland Fourteen Days before his Arrival, giving out that they were bound to the Southward.

" This Intelligence we thought neceſſary to communicate to Captain Frazer, Commander of the " Earl of Mansfield, by Letter, Copy of which goes herein encloſed for your Information.

John Scottowe,
Dan. Corneille."

APPENDIX, N° 131, 132.

Extract of a Letter from Captain Peter Douglas of the Ship Queen, to Mr. Secretary Michell, dated St. Helena, 10th June 1778, received by a Daniſh China Ship 26th Auguſt 1778.

" I beg you will acquaint the Honourable Court, that a few Days before the 17th May, when I " parted Company with the Southampton and Naſſau, in Latitude 27° South, all well, we ſpoke with " a French East India-man from L'Orient, but laſt from Madeira, who informed us of Two Ships of " conſiderable Force, commanded by a Captain La Roche, had ſailed from Boſton to the Southward, " which he was informed were intended to cruiſe off Johanna."

Extract of Letter from Mr. Secretary Michell to the Company's Agent and Council, for all the Affairs of the Engliſh Nation at Buſſorah.

A general Liſt of Ships entertained to this Time for the Company's Service is ſent under this Cover; that you communicate Copies thereof in the ſpeedieſt Manner to their ſeveral Settlements, by ſuch Conveyances as ſhall offer from your Port.

The Situation of public Affairs, ſince you was laſt adviſed thereof, renders a Rupture between the Britiſh and French Crown inevitable.

His Majeſty's Fleet, under the Command of Admiral Keppel, has actually had a ſmart Engagement with the French, on the 27th July laſt; and though the latter were compelled to retreat into Breſt, you are nevertheleſs to make the Cautions given by the Court's Orders, in my Letter of the 15th of April laſt, the Rule for exerting yourſelves, in order to ſecure the Property and Concerns of the Company committed to your Care.

The Court having received Intelligence of ſome Cruizers ſaid to have been lately on their Way to the Eaſt Indies, Copy thereof is incloſed for your Notice; and that you may immediately make the ſame known to all our Preſidencies, in order that the Company's Shipping and the Country Trade y be put well on their Guard againſt the Deſigns and Operations of thoſe Cruizers.

APPENDIX, N° 132.

Letter from the Governor General and Council, 15th October 1778.

To the Honourable William Hornby, Eſquire, Preſident and Gentlemen of the Select Committee, Bombay.

Received at Bombay 18 Dec 1778. Sel. Conſ

Gentlemen,

WE have not received any Letters from you ſince the Date of your Diſpatches by the Terrible of the 25th July laſt; but we have been informed, by Letters received from Mr. Lewis, dated the 6th Auguſt, that Nanna Furneſe had effected the Impriſonment of Morabah and Buchaba, by Means of a Preſent of Three Lacks of Rupees given to Madjee Scindia; that Nannah, Succaram, Scindia, Holkar, Hurry Punt, &c. had aſſembled their Forces on a Plain near Poona; and that the Durbar were concerting Schemes to oppoſe and diſtreſs the Detachment; and that they had actually circulated Orders to the different Raja's, to practiſe every ſecret and underhand Means in their Power to effect this Purpoſe.

We adviſed you in our laſt of the Appointment of Mr. Elliot to proceed to the Court of Moodajee Booſla, the Rajah of Berar, with Inſtructions to negociate and conclude a Treaty of Alliance with that Chief; but we are now concerned to inform you of the Demiſe of Mr. Elliot on his Way to Naguepore, at a Place called Sarungar. The Rajah having expreſſed great Satisfaction at the Overtures which we made for a Connection with him by this Deputation; and being, as we have every Reaſon to believe, firm in his Attachment to the Engliſh, we conclude, as ſoon as he hears of the unfortunate Event of Mr. Elliot's Death, that he will take an active Part in proſecuting the intended Negociation either by deputing a proper Miniſter to us, on his Part, or by ſoliciting our Alliance on ſuch Terms as may prove a general Advantage to the Company's Poſſeſſions. For theſe Reaſons, we do not mean to appoint any Perſon to ſucceed Mr. Elliot, until our Advices from the Rajah ſhall enable us to determine on the Expediency of that Meaſure.

We have thought it incumbent on us to remove Colonel Leſlie from the Command of the Detachment of Forces, which was ordered to march for the Support and Aſſiſtance of your Preſidency, on account of the little Progreſs it had made under him; as we underſtand that he was advanced no further than Rajigur on the 25th ultimo; and of his manifeſt Diſobedience alſo of our poſitive Orders, in

in forming and concluding a Treaty of perpetual Peace and Friendſhip, in the Name of the Company with the Rajahs Gomaun and Comaun Sing, Chiefs of a Part of the Bundlecund Diſtrict.

Colonel Thomas Goddard is now appointed to the chief Command of theſe Troops, and we have ordered him to proſecute his March without Loſs of Time into Berar; where on his Arrival he will apply to Moodajee Booſla, and if that Chief ſhall agree to join him with a ſufficient Body of Forces for the Purpoſe, he is to continue his Route in Conjunction with them, and to obey all Orders which he may receive from you; but if he ſhall not have received any freſh Directions for his March, and if the Rajah ſhall decline or refuſe to grant his Aſſiſtance, we have then veſted in him a diſcretionary Power to ſuſpend his Proceedings.

If the Plan which you had reſolved to adopt, and to carry into Execution in September, for the Reſtoration of Ragoba, and which you notified to us in your Letter of the 25th July, ſtill ſubſiſts; or if you ſhall have formed any other for the ſame End, conſiſtently with the Terms which we have already preſcribed for our Aſſent to that Meaſure; or if you ſhall judge a ſtrong Reinforcement immediately and indiſpenſably neceſſary to enſure the Safety of Bombay againſt a French Invaſion, and ſhall deem it requiſite and adviſable, in either of theſe Caſes, to command the Detachment at all Hazards to proceed further towards Bombay, even without a Junction of the Troops of any Power in Alliance with us; you will in ſuch Caſes, and ſuch only, require Colonel Goddard to advance with it; but in all others you will give him Notice of your Intentions, and leave him to act under our Directions.

We diſpatched the Morning Star in the Beginning of laſt Month to Fort Saint George, in conſequence of the Requeſt of the Preſident and Council there; and we take the firſt Opportunity of the favourable Seaſon for ordering the Terrible, which ought to have ſailed in Company with the Morning Star, but was prevented by the Want of Men, to return to your Port.

We are,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
Warren Haſtings,
Rich[d] Barwell,
P. Francis,
Edw[d] Wheler.

Fort William,
15th October 1778.

APPENDIX, N° 133.

Letter from Governor General and Council to Bombay, 23d November 1778.

Gentlemen,

IN our Letter of the 16th inſtant we informed you, that we had thought it proper to inveſt Colonel Goddard with full Powers to conclude a Treaty with Moodajee Booſla, Rajah of Berar, on the Grounds of our Inſtructions to the late Mr. Elliot; of which we encloſe a Copy for your Information. As the Event of his Negociation is likely to cauſe a very ſpeedy and eſſential Change in the Deſigns and Operations of the Detachment; and as the Plan which we have choſen to ſupply the Place of that originally recommended by you, has rendered it neceſſary that we ſhould retain in our Hands the Means of effecting it; we hereby revoke the Power which we gave you in our Letter of the 15th ultimo, and ſhall direct the commanding Officer of the Detachment to obey only ſuch Orders as he ſhall hereafter receive from us.

Although the Circumſtances into which we have been thrown, by the Failure of the Plan for which the Detachment was originally formed, have rendered it neceſſary to make this Alteration in the Controul and Direction of it, our Intention is not to withdraw the Services of the Detachment entirely from the Support of any Meaſures which you may have formed in Reliance on them, if theſe Meaſures ſhall not prove incompatible with the Inſtructions given to Colonel Goddard, and with the Engagements which he may conclude in conſequence of them: We ſhall therefore leave him ſtill ſubject to your Inſtructions, under theſe Proviſions; and requeſt that you will communicate to him ſuch Points as you may judge proper to be included in the Operations concerted with the Rajah of Berar.

We are,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
Warren Haſtings,
Rich[d] Barwell,
P. Francis,
Edw[d] Wheler.

Fort William,
23d November 1778.

True Copies.
Edw[d] Ravenſcroft,
Secr[y] to the Select Comm[tee].

APPENDIX, N° 134.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 19th February 1779.

The Preſident's Review of Maratta Affairs, and Reſolutions propoſed by him in conſequence.

SINCE the firſt Advice of the unfortunate Iſſue of our late Expedition, my whole Time and Attention has been employed in a careful Review of our paſt Tranſactions with reſpect to Maratta Politics, in the Conſideration of the Circumſtances of our preſent Situation, and in forming ſuch a Plan of Conduct as ſeems beſt adapted to meet the many Difficulties and Dangers that we may have to expect, and muſt guard againſt.

This laſt is ſo much my Object, that I neither intend to go into any Enquiry of the Cauſes of the Failure of our Hopes from the late Expedition, nor into any Juſtification of the firſt Undertaking. The Motives on which we determined on it were certainly no weak ones: They have been felt, acknowledged, and even preſſed on us, both by the Governor General and Council; and within theſe few Days by the Honourable the Secret Committee, in their Diſpatch of the 31ſt Auguſt. I am however well aware, that the Judgment that is to be given on Enterprizes of great Moment, muſt be expected to be formed from the Event; that Objections will hardly ever be wanting againſt Meaſures which have proved unſucceſsful; and that hardly any Anſwer can be found that will ſatisfy Objections ſo ſupported. I think it beſt therefore for every Member, according to the Share he has had in this Buſineſs, to leave the public Proceedings and Records to juſtify or condemn his Opinions and Conduct, with a general Reference to the Candour of thoſe who are to be our Judges, as to our Attention to the public Intereſt with which we are charged; the Steps we have taken for the Security of it; and the Cauſe to which our late Miſcarriage is to be attributed; the Remedy of which is the only Point I can now think of Moment, how much ſoever we may be concerned individually in the Approbation or Cenſure of our paſt Conduct.

Since the Removal of Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn from the Command of the Army, we have made ſome Promotions, and otherwiſe diſtinguiſhed thoſe Officers whoſe Merit is acknowledged to have been moſt conſpicuous on the late Service. I hope this will produce a Spirit of Emulation, that will be of the greateſt Advantage to the Army; and I truſt we have now at the Head of the Infantry and Sepoys, a Gentleman who will diſtinguiſh himſelf in Garriſon no leſs than he has done in the Field, by the ſtricteſt Attention to the Diſcipline and general Improvement of our Troops. I now propoſe further, that we apply to the Governor General and Council for a tried, experienced, and active Officer, of the Rank of Colonel, to take the Command of the Troops on this Eſtabliſhment; that it be repreſented to them how very material the Choice of ſuch an Officer is; and that we rather wiſh them to promote to the above-mentioned Rank an Officer whoſe Merit they entertain an high Opinion of, than to be guided in their Appointment by any other Rule. It would likewiſe be a conſiderable Advantage and Improvement to the Service, if they would furniſh us with a Major and Five or Six Captains of Infantry, all choice and experienced Officers, whom we might re-place with Officers of the ſame Rank, whoſe Want of Experience is the only Objection to them. Our Troops would then, I think, be on a Footing equal to any Service that might be required of them; which I fear has not for ſome Time paſt been the Caſe. Whatever is to follow from the doubtful State we are now in with the Marattas, I think we ſhould thus, even with our preſent Force alone, be well prepared for a defenſive War with them; and prepared it is neceſſary we ſhould be, as ſoon as poſſible.

The firſt and moſt important Object of our Attention Abroad is to endeavour to ſecure Colonel Goddard and his Army from Accidents: By a Letter I have had from him, dated the 26th January, I find he was then within Four Days March of Barampore, where he intended to ſtop ſome Days for further Advices from us, and to determine on his Route. I have ſince had certain Intelligence of his Arrival on the 29th at Barampore, where I flatter myſelf he will be ſecure from all hoſtile Attempts: I preſume that having ſo conſiderable a City at his Command, he will be able to furniſh his Troops with every Thing they may ſtand in need of for a long Time, and that no Enemy therefore will be able to diſlodge him, while he remains there. He ſhould I think be adviſed immediately of the preſent State of Affairs, as far as we are acquainted with them, among the Marratta Chiefs, who certainly do not ſeem united enough at preſent to concur in ſo diſtant a March as to Barampore, and each of whom has probably too important Concerns to manage near Poona to accept a Command at ſo great a Diſtance, and which they all may think too dangerous for any one to undertake alone. But however this may be, I would leave it to himſelf to take his own Opportunity for coming on to Surat or Broach; informing him at the ſame Time of the urgent Occaſion this Preſidency has for his Army, and how much we think our Safety may depend on its ſafe and ſpeedy Arrival, together with the Meaſures we are taking to facilitate this important Purpoſe.

The Conſideration of the Conduct to be purſued with the Maratta Chiefs opens a wider Field, through which, however perplexed it may be, we are now to find our Way—nor is there any Time

for Procraſtination: The Marattas are aiming at this very Moment to ſtrip us of every Thing we are in Poſſeſſion of, to the very Edge of our Iſland: They are aſſembling Troops in the Neighbourhood of Caranja and Salſette, and are ſaid to meditate an immediate Invaſion of thoſe Iſlands, if they are not peaceably yielded up to them, together with all the Ceſſions ſtipulated for in the Convention of Woorgom. I have already given Gunnis Punt, the Agent of Nannah (or of the Durbar as he is called) a general Anſwer: That his Maſter muſt have known at the Time the Convention was made, that it was not valid: That Mr. Carnac and Colonel Egerton had previouſly declared ſo to him: That he had beſides been long before informed of, and knew by his own Experience, the controlling Power of the Governor General and Council in Matters of this Kind: That I had informed that Board of the Convention, and would do nothing further in it without their Orders.

What may be the Reſolution of Nannah in conſequence of this Anſwer, I do not know, but have no Doubt of its being hoſtile to us, if he can but prevail on the Chiefs, who have been acting with him againſt Ragoba to ſupport him in a War againſt us: We have therefore no Time to loſe to guard againſt ſuch an Union; nor do I think that in ſuch an Emergency as this, we can defer coming to the neceſſary Reſolutions, under Colour of waiting for Orders from the Governor General and Council, without being wanting to the Duty we owe to the Company and to ourſelves; nor do I think it would be a fair and conſiſtent Conduct towards the Governor General and Council themſelves, who have certainly furniſhed us in their Letters of the 23d March and 17th Auguſt, with ample Powers for the War we have begun, and may juſtly expect from us that we exert ourſelves in extricating our Affairs from their preſent Embarraſſments, and not ſupinely throw on them Difficulties which it is our Duty to meet and if poſſible overcome.

The War was undertaken with the moſt flattering Expectations of Aſſiſtance from ſome of the moſt powerful Maratta Chiefs; of theſe, after our Troops had been near Two Months in the Field, and had advanced almoſt to the Capital, not one eſpouſed our Cauſe; it was thought deſperate; and indeed, ſeems to have been ſo; but, had our Troops after all been brought back to Bombay in ſpite of all Oppoſition, as I make no Doubt they might have been, the Reſpect with which every Maratta in the Enemy's Army muſt have felt himſelf impreſſed at the Inſtance of our Forces unaided by any Ally, would have been an Advantage equal almoſt to Victory; and might ſhortly perhaps been uſed to ſuch an Effect, as to leave us little to regret in our preſent Diſappointment. Humiliating as the Terms are, to which our Troops ſubmitted, I am happy to ſay, I can ſtill perceive we are not fallen wholly into Contempt. Left as we now are, to wage War alone, the Credit we yet preſerve muſt be employed, and Trial made what new Friends it will procure us, and what Enemies it may detach from the Confederacy we have drawn on us as the Allies of Ragoba.

Before I enter into Particulars with regard to theſe Objects, I muſt deſire the Purpoſe for which our laſt Treaty with Ragoba was calculated; the principal Conſideration on which the Governor General and Council approved our Plan; and the evident Motive of the Orders now before us, from the Honourable the Select Committee, may be kept in View. I hardly need ſay, I allude to the dangerous Connections forming or formed between Nannah and the French; and the abſolute Neceſſity we were under on the Principle of Self-preſervation to attempt to remove from the Chief Adminiſtration of the Maratta Empire a Miniſter whoſe pernicious Deſigns if ever ripened into Action, might end in an Expulſion from all our valuable Poſſeſſions in this Part of the World. This Neceſſity appears to me ſtill the ſame, and ought ſtill to be the leading Principles of our Conduct. The Means we have to effect our Purpoſe are indeed at preſent inadequate, but they are not perhaps unattainable; and while the Poſſibility of accompliſhing ſo important a Point exiſts, I think no Exertion is to be omitted to effect or facilitate it.

When the Refuſal of the principal Officer to charge himſelf with the Conduct of our Army to Bombay, and the Countenance given to this Refuſal by the Commander in Chief of our Forces, made it neceſſary to enter into ſome Sort of Treaty with the Enemy for the ſafe Return of the Troops, the firſt Application was made to Nannah, as the oſtenſible Miniſter. The Surrender of Ragoba's Perſon at firſt was the only Condition demanded of us; but on finding that he had already made Terms with Scindia, Nannah inſiſted on Articles ſtill more humiliating, and at laſt ſeemed determined to accept of none but the moſt rigorous of all; viz. the Detention of the whole Army as Hoſtages for the Performance of the Terms on which their Lives were ſpared. On this preſſing Occaſion, it was thought of applying to Madjee Scindia, whoſe Influence in the Maratta Durbar was reported conſiderable, and whoſe Connections now formed with Ragoba, it is to be hoped, would diſpoſe him to ſhew ſome Sort of Regard to ſo faithful an Ally as the Engliſh had proved themſelves to Ragoba.

Mr. Holmes was accordingly ſent out to him: Every thing immediately ſhewed how ſenſibly Madjee Scindia was flattered with this Acknowledgment of his Conſequence and Authority, which was at once diſcovered to be ſupreme. Mr. Holmes, in his Way to Scindia's Tent, was ſtopped by a Picket Guard of Nannah's Troops, who would have perſuaded, and even forced him, to go to Nannah inſtead of Scindia. Mr. Holmes declared poſitively that he would and muſt go immediately to the latter. The Diſpute laſted till Scindia ſent down a Party of his own, who diſperſed Nannah's People, and brought Mr. Holmes to him: He received Mr. Holmes with every Demonſtration of Kindneſs and Civility; and on his Repreſentation of the Treatment Mr. Farmer met with from Nannah, to whom he had before been ſent, and by whom he had been kept the whole Day, expoſed in the

the Open Bazar, with no other Covering than his Palanquin, from whence he had been obliged to write the Particulars of his Converſation with Nannah, and to wait the Anſwers of the Committee, Madjee Scindia immediately ſent and conducted Mr. Farmer to his own Quarters; and deſired that he, as well as Mr. Holmes, would regard himſelf as his Gueſt.

The Terms to which we muſt ſubmit were ſo far known, that tolerable ones could no longer be demanded for us; but we were however obliged to Madjee Scindia for making them as eaſy as he could, without he had abſolutely declared againſt the reſt of the Maratta Chiefs, and joined us. It was owing to him that the Point of detaining the whole Army as Hoſtages was given up, and by that Means that we have it in our Power to diſavow the Convention: This, together with Articles for the Surrender of the Caſtle of Surat and Fort Victoria, and for the Payment of the Expences of the War, were actually ſent by Nannah to Scindia, to be added to the Conditions impoſed on us: Madjee Scindia replied, that he had already ſettled the Conditions, and could not now in Honour think of adding more. It is true that a private Promiſe had been made to Scindia, of ceding to him Broach, and the Share of its Purgunnahs conquered from the Nabob; yet he could not but well know that the Performance of this Article could be no Way effectually ſecured by him, but by the very Means he rejected, the Detention of our Army as Hoſtages.

In the little while Mr. Holmes was at Scindia's Durbar, he had an Opportunity of obſerving, that Scindia concerted and determined on all Affairs of Importance; which were only referred to Nannah for the neceſſary Forms of Office, the Sicca being affixed of courſe to every Paper or Diſpatch that Scindia had once paſſed; and that Holcar, though treated with all external Marks of Reſpect by Scindia, as the head Subedar of the Empire, was entirely at his Diſpoſal. The Buſineſs of the Treaty being concluded, Madjee Scindia took Advantage of the Stipulation we made for Hoſtages to be delivered us in Exchange for thoſe we put into his Hands, to ſend a Perſon hither, whom he has deſired me to conſider as a confidential Miniſter: He even offered to ſend Rona Cawn, his chief Confidant and Favourite, whom he treats as a Brother, and is reſpected next to himſelf in his (Scindia's) Durbar. In converſing concerning the Diſcipline and Manœuvres of our Troops, he whiſpered Mr. Sibbald, that he hoped one Day to ſee them and our Forces acting together. Underſtanding that Mr. Holmes was one of my Family, he charged him with the moſt friendly Aſſurances, and ſeemed ſtudious to give him every Mark of his Confidence. Mr. Farmer is ſtill kept with Madjee Scindia, who behaves perfectly well to him; and does not allow Nannah to have any Intercourſe with Mr. Farmer, but through him. I muſt not omit to mention too, as the moſt convincing Inſtance of Madjee Scindia's good Diſpoſition towards us, that on the firſt Propoſal on our Part, for inſerting in the Convention an Article to exclude the French from all Protection and Countenance in the Maratta Empire, he admitted it, and ſupported it againſt Nannah.

Theſe are Circumſtances well known to Mr. Carnac, and perhaps to Mr. Draper too: I have however been at the Pains to collect them, as they have been communicated to me in Converſation, and as they do not appear on any public Record; owing to the Confuſion which naturally attended ſuch a State of Things as our Army was in while the Treaty laſted, and to the ſudden Departure of Mr. Farmer, the Committee's Secretary.

The Lead that Scindia has taken in the Adminiſtration, and the Condition to which he has reduced Nannah to be no more than a Creature of his, were never thoroughly known, till the Facts diſcovered themſelves on this Occaſion; yet they are to be traced in Mr. Moſtyn's and Mr. Lewis's Advices, ever ſince the Revolution effected by Madjee Scindia's Means in June laſt, when Nannah fled to him.

It was only a few Days after that Event, that Holcar obliged Moraba to deliver to him the Inſignia of Office, which he ſent to Scindia, who conſtituted Nannah Miniſter, by delivering them to him. It was Scindia who ſeized Moraba and Butcheba Prondar, and afterwards confined them: It was he who confined Holcar's Duan, and appointed him another, by whoſe Means Holcar has ever ſince been a mere Pupper, at Madjee Scindia's Diſpoſal: He too removed Saccaram Bappoo from the Adminiſtration of Affairs, and made him Priſoner in his own Houſe: Hurry Punt's Reſignation of the Command of the Troops, ſeems to have been in Compliance with Madjee Scindia's Pretenſions to the Office of Suray Putty, which he demanded at the ſame Time as he inſiſted on the Ceſſion of Ahmednagur and Aſhur. Whether that important Office has been ever conferred on him in Form, I do not learn; but being at the Head of his own and Holcar's Forces (the beſt in the Empire) he has in Fact the Command of the whole Army: He accordingly treats Hurry Punt quite in the Stile of a Dependant; and ridiculed him to his Face, before Mr. Holmes, for his ill Succeſs in his Campaign againſt Colonel Keating in Guzerat.

The ſeveral Propoſals for a Settlement of the Government among the Chiefs at Tellowgaum, ſince the Return of our Army, confirm this Repreſentation of the uncontrolled Power of Scindia. In every Change, ſtill Madjee Scindia has appeared ſupreme; and I have Advice under the 11th Inſtant, that the Arrangements are actually made at laſt in the following Manner:

Madarow Narrain, Peſhwa.

Sewajee Badjerow, Ragoba's Son, Naib.

Scindia and Holcar to act in the Name of Sewajee Badjerow.

Ragoba relinquiſhes the Government, and is to have a Jaghire, and reſide at Joſſi. This he is to ſignify in Writing to all the Powers in India.

Nannah and Saccaram to conduct the Government as Miniſters, and derive their Authority from Scindia and Holcar.

The above Settlement was paſſed in Writing. All the Maratta Officers were aſſembled, and informed, that this muſt be regarded as a concluſive Settlement; and any Attempt to oppoſe it would be conſidered as Treachery againſt the State. The uſual Rejoicings on ſuch Occaſions were obſerved.

Madjee Scindia's Diſpoſition towards us, and Averſion to the French, have in like Manner appeared in various Inſtances, ſince the Period of the June Revolution; and I cannot help feeling Reſpect for the Abilities of a Man, who has thus perſiſted in a Point, which he has, [illegible] thought it good Policy to endeavour to attain—a Connection and Alliance with our Nation, in ſpite of all the Diſappointments he muſt have met with, from the Circumſtance of our not underſtanding his Advances.

Upon Mr. Moſtyn's firſt Application for Madjee Scindia's Paſſports for the Bengal Troops, he ſent them without Heſitation, and forwarded Duplicates from himſelf to his Officers. Only Two Days after, upon Receipt of my Letters on the ſame Subject, he forwarded to me another Copy of theſe Paſſports, and Orders to his Officers; and it is remarkable, that at this very Time Mr. Moſtyn was in vain ſoliciting the ſame Mark of Confidence from Moraba, then at the Head of Adminiſtration. Theſe Paſſports ſeem to have been given with Sincerity, and to have had their Effect; ſince, by Colonel Goddard's Letter of the 26th November, it appears, that in conſequence of them he had paſſed peaceably through a Province of Madjee Scindia's. At that Time (26th November) Madjee Scindia's Officer had indeed joined Ballajee to obſtruct his (Colonel Goddard's) March; but the mere Date of Colonel Goddard's Letter ſufficiently accounts for this. A few Days after the Grant of Madjee Scindia's Paſſports the Revolution was brought about; and the very Day following Tookajee Holcar ſent Mr. Moſtyn his Paſſports likewiſe. On the 1ſt July, Lubin left Poona, and has never ſince returned. This was a Point Mr. Moſtyn had been ineffectually labouring to carry in both the preceding Adminiſtrations of Nannah and Moraba. Nannah, together with Scindia, ſent early Invitations to Mr. Moſtyn to come to the Durbar; and Mr. Moſtyn was told by Madarow Jadarow, in Anſwer to his Enquiries concerning the Buſineſs Nannah wanted to ſpeak to him on, that it was for the Increaſe of our Friendſhip. Theſe Overtures having failed, Madjee Scindia made Two to Mr. Moſtyn, directly and ſeparately from himſelf; offering to ſettle our Diſputes with the Durbar before Mr. Moſtyn left Poona in Auguſt laſt: Theſe were both rejected; and Madjee Scindia, in Alluſion to theſe, told Mr. Holmes in Camp, that he was the Man to whom Mr. Moſtyn ſhould have applied; that he had twice made Advances, but had as often been ſlighted. After Mr. Moſtyn's Departure, Madjee Scindia made the ſame Offers to Mr. Lewis; and then, on Mr. Lewis's declining to viſit him, he determined on ſending an Agent to Bombay. He did accordingly ſend this very Appajee Sabajee, his preſent Agent; who, I ſuppoſe, finding Reaſon to think that our Meaſures were already taken with Ragoba, too much beyond his Maſter's Views, confined himſelf to general Profeſſions of Friendſhip, on the Part of Madjee Scindia, without opening himſelf further.

Since his Return hither with an Army, ſuch general Profeſſions have been his chief Topic; but he has at the ſame Time given me to underſtand, that Gunnis Hurry and he are by no Means employed on the ſame Errand; and has even deſired to be ſeparated from him, in order that his Intercourſe with me may not be ſubject to the Enquiries and Obſervations of Nannah's Agent. He has even intimated, in pretty direct Terms, that his Maſter intereſts himſelf but little in the Anſwer that may be given to Gunnis Hurry, with regard to the Ceſſions ſtipulated for the Poona Circar; and that he (Appajee) had the particular Intereſts of Madjee Scindia only in his Charge. He has talked looſely of Alliances between Madjee Scindia and the Company, for reducing the Power of the Nizam and Hyder; ſtill demands the Ceſſion of Broach, ſtipulated for Madjee Scindia, but is by no Means preſſing on the Subject; and in ſhort, plainly indicates his Views on the Part of his Maſter, which however (as in the preſent Circumſtances we ſeem to have more immediate Occaſion for him than he for us) he does not ſeem diſpoſed to explain particularly, without ſome further Opening on our Part. Madjee Scindia's own Letters, which I now lay before you, are written in a Strain entirely conformable to this Language of his Miniſter: In the firſt of them it is obſervable, that he takes no Notice of the Return of the Bengal Troops; and in the laſt, though this is demanded, yet it appears from Colonel Goddard's laſt Letter, that he had not then received the Order of the Poona Committee, directing him to return, notwithſtanding the ſame had been delivered to Madjee Scindia himſelf to be forwarded to him, Three Days before a Letter of their own, which Colonel Goddard acknowledged the Receipt of.

From this State of paſt and preſent Circumſtances, I think I am warranted in the following Concluſions:

1ſt. That the actual Adminiſtration of the Affairs of the Maratta Empire is at Madjee Scindia's Diſpoſal, and that Nannah, the great Enemy of the Engliſh, is reduced, for the preſent at leaſt, to be no more than the Tool of Madjee Scindia's Power.

2d. That Madjee Scindia is not only well inclined to us, preferable to the French, but is earneſt for ſome cloſer Connection and Alliance with us.

3d. That the Accompliſhment of the Terms of the Convention, as far as they concern the Poona Circar, is not at all the Object of his Views, ſince he has in fact made it optionable with us, whether to comply with them or not.

4th. That the Performance even of the private Article in his (Madjee Scindia's) Favour, is not the firſt Object of his Conſideration; but that this, as well as the Ceſſions ſtipulated for by the Poona Circar,

Circar, is chiefly intended by him as a Fund to pay us from, in any Alliance he may enter into with us, without any real Expence to himſelf.

5th. That independant of his Views to an Alliance with us, he has ſome Motives of Policy, which render him unwilling that our Power and Poſſeſſions on this Coaſt ſhould be very materially reduced.

6th. That it is for the Intereſt of the Company, and neceſſary to their Purpoſe at this Settlement, to inform ourſelves forthwith what Madjee Scindia's real Intentions are; and to take ſuch Meaſures as we conſiſtently can, in concert with him, for the Excluſion of Nannah from all real and effectual Power in the Adminiſtration of the Maratta Empire.

I have ſaid that independent of Madjee Scindia's Views to an Alliance with us, I conclude he has ſome Motives of Policy, which render him unwilling that our Power and Poſſeſſions on this Coaſt ſhould be very materially reduced. I ground this Opinion on that very ſtriking Circumſtance, his obtaining for our Army Permiſſion to depart, without any adequate Security for the promiſed Ceſſions to the Poona Circar, or to himſelf. This was too obvious to have eſcaped his Notice; and leſt it ſhould be ſuppoſed to have paſſed through Negligence, the Propoſal for detaining the whole Army as Hoſtages, together with the further Ceſſions of Surat and Fort Victoria, was actually made to Madjee Scindia by Nannah. Whatever theſe Views of Madjee Scindia may be, they cannot yet be penetrated with Certainty, and can be only known by his future Intimation or Conduct. I will however venture to give my preſent Ideas of what may be probably the Motives for the great Attention he has paid to us and our Intereſt.

The inteſtine Diviſions among the Maratta Chiefs has effected what civil Diſſuaſions long continued have never failed to bring about in every Age and Country—the Overthrow of all Power and Dominion but that of the Sword: Of this Madjee Scindia is now in Poſſeſſion, and we may be aſſured, does not mean to part with it; his great Object therefore muſt be to ſecure it, and our's not to let ſlip the preſent Criſis, while our Alliance is ſought, and worth his Purchaſe. His Intention muſt be either to remove the Seat of his Government to Poona, or to eſtabliſh ſome Kind of Power there ſubordinate to his own.

The Firſt he muſt find very dangerous; the Chiefs, whoſe Jaghires lie neareſt Poona, will be naturally alarmed at the Thought of ſeeing the Peſhwa Domains united to the other Poſſeſſions of a Power already ſo formidable as Madjee Scindia; who by his Acceſſion will be able to cruſh the Independence they have been aiming at in common with the other Jaghierdars of the Empire. The Nizam and Hyder, whoſe Dominions bound the Peſhwa Domains to the Southward and Eaſtward, Madjee Scindia knows, will be always ready to ſupport the diſcontented Chiefs in the Southern Part of the Empire; where the Bramins muſt ſtill likewiſe be of Conſequence and Weight, from their Riches, their Intrigues, their Experience in the Revenues, and all other Departments of Government, and in a Word, from that ſacred Character which protects them at all Times from open Violence, better than any other Set of Men. Theſe Difficulties are not relieved by the State of Things in Scindia's own Jaghire. The King taking the Advantage of the Abſence of him and Holcar, is I find ſtill making ſome Progreſs, and I am informed has lately reduced ſome of the Holcars to his Obedience. Moodajee Bouncello is ſaid to have Views to the Rajahſhip, and there are Conjectures abroad of his being encouraged in them by an Alliance with the Governor General and Council. Both the King and the Bouncello, who are already formidable to Madjee Scindia, from the Situation of their Dominions with reſpect to his, muſt be conſidered by him as the moſt dangerous Enemies he can ever have, if they are aided by us, and undertake to oppoſe him in the Purſuits of his Ambition.

The Eſtabliſhment of ſome kind of Power ſubordinate to his own, ſeems a Policy more ſuitable to Scindia's Circumſtances, and more agreeable to the Conduct he has hitherto obſerved. The Difficulty in this Caſe lies in the Choice he ſhall make, and on the Means to be employed whenever he may chuſe to ſecure his Dependence. Nannah has been choſen, and hitherto employed by Madjee Scindia in the Character of Duan: His Abilities, long Experience in Buſineſs, and above all, the Appearance of Moderation diſplayed in the Continuance of a Bramin Miniſter, who has ſo long filled the firſt Civil Department of the State, juſtify this Choice. But the ſame Qualifications added to Nannah's Riches, will doubtleſs render him dangerous to Scindia, whenever he ſhall be obliged to retire for any Time to his own Dominions. Tookajee Holcar has been long deſirous of returning to Madjee Scindia has no leſs urgent Inducements to re-viſit Eugene; and the Diſtance they will be at when there, and the Power Nannah, if he continues in the Management of the Peſhwa Domains, muſt have in their Abſence, will ſoon put him in a Condition to aſſert again his Independence. Madjee Scindia is certainly not ignorant of Nannah's Connections with Lubin, and the Promiſes of Aſſiſtance he has received from that Quarter: It was one of the firſt Meaſures of Scindia's Government to ſend away this Man, no leſs dangerous perhaps in his Eſtimation to him than to us: He muſt know that a very ſhort Time may now bring Nannah the Succours that have been promiſed him; and that ſhould they arrive in his (Scindia's) Abſence, his Hopes of retaining this aſpiring Rival in his Dependance is at an End. He may perhaps, in caſe of ſuch an Event, foreſee the Probability of the Reſtoration of the Peſhwa Power in the Perſon of Nannah; and fancy the Jagheirdars of Eugene and again reduced to the State of Submiſſion in which they were held by Badjerow.

Thus circumſtanced, what may we ſuppoſe Madjee Scindia's Views with regard to us, and what the Principles on which he acts in his Endeavours to conciliate our Friendſhip, and ſecure to us our Poſſeſſions on this Coaſt?

Madjee muſt have obſerved in our Conduct with regard to Ragoba, ſince our firſt Alliance with him, Marks of the moſt hearty and honourable Attachment to his Cauſe. He will no Doubt have remarked, that though Ragoba's Affairs when in a proſperous Courſe were ſuddenly ruined by ſome Diſagreement among ourſelves, which perhaps he cannot very eaſily explain; though the Engagements of this Settlement were given up and departed from by the Governor General and Council, and the moſt declared Partiality ſhewn to Ragoba's avowed Enemies, ſo far as to proceed even to Orders for the Surrender of his Perſon into their Hands: He will, I ſay, no Doubt have remarked, that the good Faith and Honour of an Engliſhman is ſuch, that under all Difficulties, he cannot determine to withdraw Protection from the Man to whom it has been once ſolemnly promiſed: He will have ſeen that this Principle of good Faith has at laſt prevailed over all temporary Oppoſition; that we have again taken Ragoba by the Hand; conducted him with our own Forces alone almoſt to Poona; and have at laſt only quitted him, when it was evident that there was not one Chief in the Empire who would draw a Sword for him; and after he had concluded Terms for himſelf with this very Madjee Scindia.

He finds that throughout the whole Period in which we have been Actors in the Maratta Scene, our Objects in point of Acquiſition have been the ſame—a Territory on the Sea Coaſt and in the Neighbourhood of Bombay, nearly equal to our Expences. He has ſeen this Scheme of Acquiſition abided by under all Changes, with little Variation; and this muſt ſtrike him the more forcibly, as he muſt be well informed, that at the Time of the Concluſion of the Treaty of Poorunder, the Plan might have been conſiderably enlarged, if that had ever been the Intention: Our preſent Line of Territory, which we have never thought of extending beyond the Gauts, cannot be an Object of Jealouſy to Madjee Scindia; on the contrary, it may be highly uſeful to him, and that whether we are engaged to him by Alliance or not.

On account of the well-founded Jealouſy he knows we entertain of Nannah and his Connections with the French, he may be aſſured, that an Union can never take place between us and Nannah: Whilſt our Poſſeſſions and Forces continue ſuch as they now are, we are both conſiderable and near enough to keep Nannah in conſtant Apprehenſion; and yet the Barrier of the Gauts, between us and him will always be ſufficient to reſtrain us, unleſs we act in Conjunction with ſome Power above the Gauts, who can ſecure us the Paſſes, and Subſiſtence. Madjee Scindia knows too, that while we continue able to reſiſt the Attempts of the French to throw a Body of Troops into the Maratta Empire, we can never ſit ſtill and ſuffer it. The Support of our Power therefore on the Coaſt is his greateſt Security againſt Nanna's Attempts for Independence; the Succeſs of which would be almoſt inſured, if ſupported by a reſpectable Body of European Forces: Scindia has the more Reaſon to turn his Thoughts to this Point, (the Excluſion of the French) ſince a Connection with them appears to have been ſo far the Plan of Policy adopted by the Bramins, that Moraba when in Power actually proceeded on it, no leſs than Nannah, by whom it ſeems to have been firſt formed: And it is remarkable, that much of the Intelligence Mr. Moſtyn received on this Subject, which was found very exact, was conveyed to him through Perſons cloſely connected with Scindia.

Should Madjee Scindia turn his Thoughts to an Alliance with us (as I have no Doubt he has done already) he has Advantages in ſuch a Connection, far beyond any other Indian Power, to induce him to court it. The Ceſſion of a Territory of no Conſequence or Value to him is the eaſy Price he will have to pay for our Friendſhip; which Territory will ſerve him as a Frontier againſt the Introduction of an European Force, engaged to other Intereſts than to his; be a Curb upon his Delegate of the Peſhwa Domains to ſecure his Dependence; and will thus enable him to give his Attention and Preſence to his Northern Dominions, in the Proportion they demand. The Rajah of Berar and the Shaw Allum, ſituated between our Bengal Poſſeſſions and Madjee Scindia's Country, will be content to leave him in Tranquillity, if they find us ſeriouſly bent to prevent its being diſturbed. As Madjee Scindia's Poſſeſſions border no where on our's, he has leſs to fear from our Encroachments than any Prince of Hindoſtan with whom we are at preſent connected. Or if the Peſhwa Domains are already to be conſidered as his, the Mountains form a Separation between us and him, that we never can be ſuppoſed to carry our Schemes of territorial Poſſeſſion beyond them.

Thus the Opinion he may juſtly have formed of the good Faith of our Nation; the Moderation of our Views in point of Territory; his own Cauſes of Jealouſy of the Schemes of Nannah, for rendering himſelf independant, and of his Connection with the French for this Purpoſe; our mutual Intereſt to guard againſt both, and, above all, to prevent the Introduction of French Troops into the Maratta Empire: The Support our Poſſeſſions on this Coaſt will afford to his Authority at the Poona Durbar; the little Value to him of the Countries we ſeek to acquire; the Security an Alliance with us will afford him from his moſt formidable Neighbours; the Obſtacles that muſt for ever prevent us from encroaching on his Dominions or Sovereignty; theſe all ſeem juſt and concurring Arguments to diſpoſe him to an Alliance with the Company, advantageous to both Parties.

The Motives on our Side are for the moſt Part ſo connected with his, that they ſeem to be almoſt the ſame; yet they are further enforced on us by the particular Situation we are placed in by the Convention of Worgaum; a Convention forced on thoſe who had no Authority to accept of the Terms inſiſted on, and who declared ſo in the moſt poſitive Expreſſions, which were explained verbatim from Meſſieurs Carnac and Egerton's own Letter before Nannah, in open Durbar. There can be no Heſitation in declaring ſuch a Convention invalid; yet we are not to forget (as I have before

ons, remarked) that we are indebted to Madjee Scindia for our having this ſtill left in our Power. Ie, the whole Maratta Army, and we, muſt be equally ſtruck with this Fact. I do therefore think ur National Honour concerned in finding ſome Way of acquitting ourſelves to him. 'Tis impoſ- ble to proceed on ſuch rotten Ground as that of renouncing both the Engagements with the Dur- ar and with him, who enabled us to reject them: It would be breaking Faith with the whole Vorld at once, with our Friends, and with our Enemies. The Perſons who promiſed Madjee cindia the Ceſſion of Broach, and engaged for thoſe to the Poona Circar, were the ſame, and their owers in both Caſes equally incompetent: But a great Diſtinction ought to be made between the bligation we are under to Nanah and to Scindia: The firſt could and would have ſtripped us of very Thing; the latter, by relieving us from the hard Terms of the former, did in fact give a valu- ble Conſideration for what was promiſed to him. I flatter myſelf it will not be impoſſible to ſatisfy im, without parting with any of our preſent Poſſeſſions; but at any rate, I think we muſt ſhew a eal Deſire of giving him Satisfaction: For this Purpoſe, and to try further what the real Extent f his Views in relation to us is, it will be neceſſary to enter into Negociation with him, and to open urſelves to him in ſome Degree confidentially.

I cannot think that any new Powers are wanting for proceeding in this immediately, as the Neceſ- y and Emergency of the Occaſion demands. When the Governor General and Council gave their nction for our Treaty with Ragoba, and for our ſupporting his Cauſe by Arms, in that Sanction as neceſſarily included every Power which the Cauſe of Events might call for. The Governor neral and Council have a Right, as I ſaid before, to expect every Exertion on our Part, and would ſtly reproach us were we timidly to withdraw ourſelves from the Reſponſibility that belongs to our ation and the preſent Criſis.

There is a Paſſage in the Governor General and Council's Letter which, though deſigned for an- other Occaſion, ſeems perfectly applicable to the preſent Circumſtances. They tell us that they do not mean to preclude us from gaining any Advantages we can by Negociation, that a Change in the Adminiſtration at Poona will probably afford Opportunity for obtaining ſuch Advantages; and they conclude in theſe remarkable Words: "And we leave it to you to purſue ſuch a Policy as "Circumſtances require, independant of any particular Intereſts of Ragoba, whom you muſt regard, "in the great political Objects of our Government, as ſimply meriting our Conſideration, and not as "neceſſarily connected or blended with it."

We find a Change of Adminiſtration, or at leaſt of the Power on which the Adminiſtration de- pends, has actually taken place at Poona, which gives very favourable Hopes of our being able to attain at leaſt One, and that the Firſt Object of our Policy, the Excluſion of the French from the Connections they were forming by Nanah's Means in the Maratta Court. Ragoba has already re- lieved us from the Care of his Intereſts, and left us nothing to attend to but our own, which re- quire the Exertion of our beſt Talents, but depend no leſs on ſeizing the preſent Moment. With ſuch Proſpects before us, and ſuch a general Inſtruction for our Conduct, can we doubt whether to take an active Part in the very Line that Inſtruction has marked out to us?

The Governor General and Council, in their Letter of the 17th Auguſt, lay us under One Re- ſtraint, which I make no Doubt we ſhall agree in thinking it no leſs to be obſerved in our preſent Circumſtances, than in thoſe for which it was originally deſigned: I mean, that in any Engagement or Treaty of Alliance we may enter into with Madjee Scindia, or any other Power, we are to avoid all Stipulations of a Tendency hoſtile to the Rajah of Berar. I mention this now for this Reaſon only, that the Governor and Council may obſerve the Caution with which we determine to act in every Caſe wherein their Deſigns can be foreſeen. Our Object is to make what new Friends we can, and to avoid all Enmities that are not unavoidable.

Madjee Scindia is undoubtedly the Perſon from whoſe Friendſhip we have the moſt to hope, and whoſe Enmity is moſt to be apprehended. Could he therefore be determined to an Alliance with us, that would anſwer the Purpoſes of the Company, and the Nation on this Side of India, by excluding the French effectually and permanently by providing againſt their chief Abettor Nanah's recover- ing his former Power; by ſecuring to us the Territory we are deficient in to defray the Expences of this Settlement, or at leaſt preſerving that we at preſent hold: Could theſe Purpoſes be effected, I ſhall not ſcruple, if there be any Riſk of loſing the Opportunity by waiting to refer the Matter to Bengal, to give my hearty Concurrence to the neceſſary Meaſures, without delaying further Time in Expectation of other Powers than we are now furniſhed with. But I do not mean by this, that I wiſh any thing to be concluded precipitately; all I propoſe to do at preſent is, to give Madjee Scindia an Opportunity of explaining himſelf further, and put his Diſpoſition in our Favour to one more Teſt; which I think will be ſo deciſive, that if he comply with our Wiſhes in this Reſpect we may be ſatisfied that I have not gone too far in any Hopes I have entertained from him.

In the firſt Place, however, as an Inſtance of the different Light in which we regard the Stipulations made in Behalf of the Poona Circar, and the Return to be made for Madjee Scindia's friendly Offices, I would propoſe, that the Notes given among Madjee Scindia's Officers, as Durbar Charges, ſhould be immediately taken up and diſcharged; which Amount I find to be R° 41,000. This is abſolutely neceſſary, not only as a Mark of our Regard to Scindia himſelf, but as a Failure in this Article would make every Man of his Durbar our Enemy, at a Time when the leaſt important of them might be able to do us ſome Injury.

I next propoſe to write to Madjee Scindia, to acknowledge the Inſtances we have received of his Friendſhip; to make him very frank Offers of a Return on our Part; to hint generally to him, that

we wiſh much to fall on ſome Expedient to ſatisfy his Expectations from us; to explain to him that our Army, when it paſſed the Gauts, had no Deſigns inimical to him; that on the contrary, we had Reaſon to think, that he wiſhed us to undertake Ragoba's Cauſe; that we are therefore well pleaſed to have left Ragoba in his (Madjee Scindia's) Hands, as our common Friend, though we never could have conſented to put him into thoſe of Nanah, whatever Benefit we might have derived from ſuch a Bargain with him; to acquaint him, that Nanah's Views with regard to the French, and the Preference ſhewn by him of them to us (the ancient Allies of the Maratta State) had given us much juſt Cauſe of Alarm; that his (Madjee Scindia's) Profeſſions on this Subject have afforded the greateſt Satisfaction; and that we particularly confide in his Authority over Nanah, which we are now informed of, and heartily rejoice at: To inform him of the Arrival of our Bengal Army at Brampore; to remind him that he long ago granted his Duſtucks for their friendly Paſſage through his Territories; and that his Credit as well as our's is now concerned that they ſhould not turn back, after coming ſo far; that they are coming hither for the Protection of our Settlement againſt the French; and that on the Terms we would have him eſteem himſelf to be with us, we hope he will conſider that they may be ſerviceable to him, as well as to us; to deſire he will therefore now grant his Duſtucks and Letters to Futty Sing, and the other Friends he may have between Brampore and Surat, to permit our Army to paſs as Friends through their Countries; ſupplying them with Proviſions and other Neceſſaries on their March, for which they will punctually pay. I think it may be proper too to propoſe to him to ſend One thouſand of his Horſe to meet our Army, and accompany them to Surat; adviſing him, that the Object of this Requeſt is, that the World may be Witneſſes of the Friendſhip that ſubſiſts between us, which, after ſuch an Inſtance, can never afterwards be departed from on our Side. I ſhall at the ſame Time congratulate him on the Grant of Brampore, which has lately been added to his Jaghire; and inform him, that I have written to the Commander of the Bengal Army, to acquaint him of our Hopes from his (Madjee Scindia's) Friendſhip, and ordering him to conſider the Friends of Madjee Scindia as our's. With this Letter, if approved by the Committee, I ſhall ſend back his own Agent, whom I flatter myſelf I can make uſeful to us, in our Tranſactions with his Maſter.

While we are waiting for his Anſwer, I think it will be abſolutely neceſſary, in order to be prepared for every Event, that we direct the Field Train and Equipage of the Troops to be completed, and held in Readineſs for Service at the ſhorteſt Notice: For ſhould Madjee Scindia refuſe his Concurrence to the March of the Bengal Army to Surat, I am of Opinion that we muſt ſend a ſtrong Detachment into the Field, near Surat or Broach, to act in concert with Colonel Goddard, and to favour his March towards one or other of thoſe Places; on the Succeſs of which every thing now depends, and all muſt be riſked to enſure it.

A Connection with the Guicawars offers another Reſource, which in the preſent Poſture of our Affairs is by no Means to be neglected. My Sentiments with regard to this Family appear at large on our Proceedings under the 10th October 1777: Their near Neighbourhood to our Northern Poſſeſſions, their Diſcontents at the Treatment they have received from the Poona Government, the very advantageous Offers formerly made by Futty Sing for an Alliance with the Company, the Command of the Country through which Colonel Goddard's March lies, their actual Force, and the Diſtance from the Center of the Empire, which in theſe Times muſt render them proportionably more independent, point them out to us as Allies of the firſt Conſequence; yet it muſt be acknowledged that the Diviſions in their Family render it leſs conſiderable, and our Dependance on it therefore muſt be leſs than it otherwiſe might be. It is well known that Futty Sing is the Party favoured by the Poona Miniſters, as Govind Row has been that which has been hitherto moſt ſtrictly attached to Ragoba's Intereſt: Madjee Scindia is ſaid too to favour Futty Sing: Our Ground therefore in this Quarter ſhould be tried with Caution: A Paſſage for Colonel Goddard's Army may however be demanded from both, and both may be ſounded with regard to their Diſpoſition towards an Alliance with the Company. Govind Row, on our late Motions in Favour of Ragoba, made ſome Overtures to me; but, conſidering Futty Sing's ſuppoſed Connection with Scindia, to whom our preſent Views muſt be principally turned, as well as from a political Regard to his greater Authority at this Moment in the Territories dependant on his Family, his ſhould certainly be the Party to which we ſhould at preſent rather incline.

I have only One or Two Reflections more to make on the preſent State of Affairs with the Marattas.

The Schemes of the Governor General and Council with regard to the Rajah of Berar being yet unknown to us, it is impoſſible for us to found any Meaſures on them: Yet I cannot help now obſerving, that if, as has been conjectured, the Gentlemen of that Preſidency have entertained Thoughts of reſtoring in his Perſon the ancient Rajah Government, the Attempt ſeems likely to be attended with no ſmall Difficulty. The Powers who are now in Poſſeſſion of the Peſhwa Domains, together with all the Jaghierdars, however diſunited among themſelves, would probably concur in oppoſing Moodajee Bouncello, who, from every thing I have been able to learn, has for ſome Time taken no Part in theſe Weſtern Broils, nor appears to have any Party among the leading Men of this Part of the Empire. And I would wiſh to ſubmit to the Governor General and Council, whether we might not better anſwer our Views by ſupporting a formidable Chief like Madjee Scindia, who has already acquired the actual Poſſeſſion of the Peſhwa's Domains, with all the Authority of the Office, who is backed with the Reſources of his own Jaghire, and has the Perſon of Ragoba at his Diſpoſal to give a Colour of lawful Authority to that he has aſſumed, than by attempting to model the whole

State

State anew, and to place the Rule of it in Hands of our own chuſing; a Labour that is perhaps too arduous, and the Succeſs certainly dubious.

The ſame Objection lies againſt our acting upon the Orders of the Honourable Secret Committee for the Reſtoration of Ragoba to the Peſhwaſhip. However favourite an Object this was with me in 1775, Circumſtances are now entirely changed; and Councils muſt be changed with them: At that Time the Jaghierdars kept aloof from the Quarrel. Madjee Scindia who is now the ſupreme Head of the Poona Government was making Tenders of his Services from Eugene to Ragoba, then at the Head of a formidable Army; and would have been content with ſome Acceſſions of Jagheer, and ſome honorary Diſtinctions. Even the Officers in whom the Miniſters were forced to put their greateſt Confidence, were wavering, and thinking more of ſecuring themſelves than of ſupporting the Party they were ſtill engaged in. Since that Time, while Ragoba has been kept inactive, a new State of Things has taken place. Even the Forms of the Government are now hardly left, and the Command of the Army is the only real Title to the Empire. He who might then have called out at leaſt Half the Forces of the State, has not found Five hundred Horſe to aſſiſt him in the late Attempt we have made in his Favour. He has been undeceived, as well as we; and has found all, to which the Splendor of his former Fortune and the Glory of his Name can entitle him, is no more than to become the Penſioner of Madjee Scindia, and the Cloak of his Ambition.

After ſtating thus fully my Sentiments on the preſent Poſture of Affairs, it only remains for me to propoſe to the Committee that we come to the following Reſolutions:

1ſt. That the Aſſiſtance of Military Officers (mentioned in the Firſt Part of this Minute) be requeſted from Bengal.

On this, however, it is proper to remark, that in caſe of Colonel Goddard's making good his Way to Surat, our Wants on this Reſpect will moſt probably be ſupplied.

2dly. That Colonel Goddard be written to in Terms propoſed above.

3dly. That the Convention concluded by Meſſieurs Carnac and Egerton at Worgom was invalid; and that the public Faith cannot be conſidered as pledged, after their expreſs Declaration to the Maratta Durbar, that they had no Powers to accede to the Terms inſiſted on from them. That the general Anſwer however given to Nanah's Agent, is all that is neceſſary to be communicated on this Subject, for the preſent to him.

4thly. That Madjee Scindia's good Offices were of the greateſt Service in the Negociation of the Terms of the Convention, and particularly in procuring Permiſſion for the immediate Return of the Army: That he is in conſequence entitled to every Mark of Regard we can conſiſtently ſhew him; and that it will be neceſſary to find ſome Means of expreſſing the Senſe we entertain of his Attention to the Intereſt of the Company, in ſome Degree equivalent to the Ceſſion of the Mogul Share of the Broach Purgunnah.

5thly. That the Notes paſſed at Worgon to the ſeveral Offices of Madjee Scindia's Durbar as Gratification to them, amounting to Rupees, 41,000, out of Reſpect to Madjee Scindia, as well as out of Motives of good Policy, ought to be forthwith taken up and diſcharged.

6thly. That we have good Ground to hope, that Madjee Scindia is well-diſpoſed towards the Company, and will be willing to enter into a Connection with us, advantageous to the Company.

7thly. That the grand Objects to be kept in View in forming of ſuch a Connection, are,

1ſt. To exclude the French effectually and permanently from all Connection, whether commercial or political, in the Affairs of the Maratta Empire, and with all Perſons concerned in the Adminiſtration thereof.

2d. To exclude Nanah Furneze, if poſſible, from the Adminiſtration of the Poona Government: or if this cannot be, to unite with Madjee Scindia, for the Purpoſe of guarding againſt Nanah Furneze's acquiring any Sort of independant Authority in the Poona Government; and to obtain the beſt Security for the Company againſt ſuch an Event.

3d. To endeavour to obtain for the Company ſuch a Territory as may be ſufficient for defraying the Expences of this Settlement, or at leaſt to preſerve that we at preſent hold.

8thly. That it is abſolutely neceſſary to loſe no Time in the Meaſures to be taken, as well to inform ourſelves of Madjee Scindia's Intentions with regard to an Alliance with the Company, as to guard againſt the pernicious Deſigns of Nanah Furneze, and thoſe of the French.

9thly. That in any Connection to be formed with Madjee Scindia, every Engagement that may have a Tendency hoſtile to the Raja of Berar be avoided.

10thly. That nothing be finally and concluſively ſettled in way of Alliance with Madjee Scindia, until we receive the Concurrence of the Governor General and Council; unleſs the ſeveral Points ſpecified in the 7th Reſolution can be ſatisfactorily provided for.

11thly. That the Preſident write to Madjee Scindia to the Purpoſe propoſed in the foregoing.

12thly. That the Chief of Broach be ordered to apply to Futty Sing Guicawar, as likewiſe to Govind Row Guicawar, for their Paſſports and Duſtucks, for the Paſſage of the Bengal Troops through their Country; and for their being ſupplied on their March with Proviſions; for which the Commander will take Care that the Inhabitants are punctually paid. That the Chief of Broach make the ſame Profeſſions of Peace and Amity to the Guicawars as thoſe directed in the Inſtructions from the Governor General and Council to Colonel Leſlie: And that he adviſe this Committee and Colonel Goddard without Delay of his Succeſs.

13thly. That the Chief of Broach be likewiſe directed to ſound with proper Caution, the Diſ-

poſition of the Guicawars towards an Alliance with the Company of mutual Defence; and adviſe us of the Succeſs we might expect, ſhould we judge it expedient to make any Overtures for that Purpoſe.

14thly. That the Field Train and Equipage be completed, and held in Readineſs for Service at the ſhorteſt Notice.

15thly. That a Gentleman well informed in the State of the Company's Affairs under this Preſidency, and particularly inſtructed for this Occaſion in the preſent political Circumſtances of the Settlement, and in the Deſigns of this Government, be immediately diſpatched with our Advices to Bengal, in order to ſupply the Governor General and Council with ſuch Information and Details of local Knowledge as they may require, or the Support of our preſent Plan may render neceſſary.

A true Copy.

Edwd Ravenſcroft,
Sec^ry to the Select Comm^te.

Extracts from the Conſultations of the Select Committee of Bombay, relative to the Preſident's Review of Maratta Affairs.

Friday, 19th February 1779.

At a Committee; PRESENT,

The Honourable William Hornby, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor,
John Carnac, and Daniel Draper, Eſquires.

The Preſident now lays before us, a Minute containing a Review of Maratta Affairs, and ſundry Reſolutions propoſed by him in conſequence.

This Minute having been attentively peruſed, the Preſident, in conformity to the 15th of his propoſed Reſolutions, acquaints us, That he thinks Mr. George Horſley a Perſon every Way qualified to be ſent to Bengal on the intended Service, and therefore nominates him for this Commiſſion.

Mr. Draper thinks it is very unneceſſary to ſend any Perſon to Bengal, with regard to the paſt Tranſactions to this Time, excluſive of the Preſident's Minute, and therefore diſapproves of it, both on Account of the Expences that will be incurred by ſuch a Meaſure, and the Probability he thinks there is that the Governor General and Council will order an Enquiry to be made here into the late Tranſactions.

Mr. Carnac entirely concurs with the Preſident, not only in the Propriety and Neceſſity of the Meaſure, but alſo in his Nomination of Mr. Horſley, whom he thinks perfectly qualified for ſo important a Commiſſion

Mr. Horſley is therefore appointed accordingly, and muſt hold himſelf in Readineſs to proceed with the utmoſt Expedition, after our Diſpatches and the Inſtructions to him are prepared, which the Secretary is ordered to get ready with all Speed.

Mr. Thomas Shotbolt is appointed to accompany Mr. Horſley to Bengal as his Aſſiſtant.

The further Conſideration of the other propoſed Reſolutions is deferred.

Tueſday, 23d February 1779.

At a Committee; PRESENT,
As in the preceding One.

The Preſident's Review of the Maratta Affairs being now re-peruſed, Mr. Draper, in the Courſe of reading, makes the following Obſervations:

With reſpect to what is advanced of the Motives for the late Expedition being preſſed on us by the Governor General and Council and the Secret Committee, he perſiſts in thinking that the Letter from the former of the 17th Auguſt, was conditional; and the Letter's depending on the Co-operation of the other Preſidencies, which leaves us only to lament that it has been ſo prematurely undertaken.

With reſpect to the Requiſition for a Colonel from Bengal, inſtead of Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn removed, Mr. Draper has no Objection, provided they are thought by the Governor General and Council unworthy of being continued; though he remarks, We have no Reaſon to expect Colonel Goddard ſoon.

With regard to the Major and 5 or 6 Captains, he could wiſh to conſult the commanding Officer, either in the Committee or in Council. The great Difference in Emoluments ought to be conſidered, and likewiſe the Board conſulted.

He

He entirely concurs in the propoſed Meaſures for facilitating the March of Colonel Goddard's Army; but thoſe now appear unneceſſary by his near Approach.

He approves the Governor's Anſwer in general about a Reference to the Governor General and Council reſpecting the Convention of Worgaum, though he makes a Reſerve, in conſequence of the Poona Committee having deputed Mr. Farmer, and afterwards made a Declaration alſo about Mr. Holmes's being ſent with full Powers, or Carte Blanche, as declared by Colonels Egerton and Cockburn.

The Meaſures propoſed for defending ourſelves againſt the Marattas he approves.

The Reaſons why a proper Retreat ſhould have been made to or attempted from Worgaum to Bombay, he conceives are juſt.

Several Inſtances of Scindia's good Diſpoſition towards us are quoted, but Mr. Draper declares he knows nothing regarding the Excluſion of the French but from the Sequel of the Treaty, except from private Converſation, ſince the Return of the Expedition.

Mr. Draper cannot enough lament that we have ſo lately become fully acquainted with Scindia's being the principal Perſon in Power, notwithſtanding the Reſidence of Meſſrs. Moſtyn and Lewis at Poona; and does not recollect hearing any Thing of his Agent's being ſent here till ſince the Return of the Expedition.

The Six Concluſions appear plauſible; but he does not approve the 4th, which appears to him to claſh with the 5th.

He thinks the Conjectures about Scindia's Motives of Action ſhould be ſubmitted to the Governor General and Council, and that the Determination, as well reſpecting the Convention as the Point, whether we are indebted to Madjee Scindia, or not? for the Power of deciding on it, ſhould alſo be referred to the Governor General and Council.

He remarks on the Argument about the Poona Committee having no Authority to treat. Why did they then inveſt Mr. Holmes with full Powers, and ſend Mr. Farmer making a ſubſequent Declaration to the Letter?

He thinks the Negociation with Madjee Scindia may be commenced, provided nothing concluſive is done without the Governor General and Council's Approbation, and that it is put on that Footing on the Commencement, that they may not pretend we deceive them.

With reſpect to the Notes for Rupees 41,000 to Scindia's Durbar Officers, though he highly diſapproves them as exorbitant, and never heard of them till the laſt Meeting of the Committee, he is ſorry to ſay, that in our preſent Situation it ſeems neceſſary to diſcharge them.

The Propoſals for the Letter to be written by the Preſident to Madjee Scindia, appears in general proper; but he thinks that the Circumſtance of 1000 Horſe accompanying the Bengal Army had better be declined, and ſeems now to be totally unneceſſary.

The Propoſals for the Field Train and Equipage here being got in Readineſs, Mr. Draper approves, but thinks that a Detachment being ſent out to join the Bengal Army now, ſeems totally unneceſſary.

He thinks the Guicawars may be ſounded, but with Caution, leſt Scindia's Jealouſy might be excited; and that the Remarks on the Governor General's ſuppoſed Scheme concerning Moodajee Bouncello, ought to be ſubmitted to them.

He concurs in Opinion with the Preſident, that the Select Committee's late Orders regarding Ragoba, received the 8th Inſtant, cannot now prove uſeful.

The Queſtion being then put on the ſeveral Reſolutions propoſed by the Preſident, in the Order they ſtand in his Minute;

1ſt Reſolution. Mr. Draper cannot concur in the Firſt Reſolution, becauſe of Colonel Egerton's and Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn's preſent Situation; becauſe Colonel Goddard may be ſoon expected; becauſe of Lieutenant Colonel Hartley's late Promotion; and becauſe he concludes, that in caſe of Emergency, we can more eaſily get a Field Officer from the Madras Troops, intended to be employed againſt Mahé.

Mr. Carnac and the Preſident think the Neceſſity of this Reſolution in a great Meaſure ſuperſeded by the rapid Approach of Lieutenant Colonel Goddard.

2d Reſolution. Approved by Mr. Draper. Mr. Carnac and the Preſident being of the ſame Opinion as on the foregoing.

3d Reſolution. Mr. Draper is of Opinion the late Convention at Worgaun, concluded by Meſſrs. Carnac and Egerton, ſhould be referred to the Governor General and Council.

Voted in the Affirmative by Mr. Carnac and the Preſident.

4th Reſolution. Mr. Draper is of Opinion appears proper; and agreed to by Mr. Carnac and the Preſident.

5th Reſolution. Mr. Draper acquieſces therein conſidering the Reaſons above given; and agreed to by Mr. Carnac and the Preſident.

6th Reſolution. Mr. Draper is of Opinion, that we have ſome Ground to hope that Madjee Scindia is well diſpoſed towards the Company, in conſequence of the late Tranſactions, and that he may be willing to enter into a Connection with us on advantageous Terms.

Agreed to by Mr. Carnac and the Preſident.

7th Reſolution. Mr. Draper concurs with Mr. Carnac and the Preſident, in thinking the Objects mentioned under this Article the grand ones to be kept in View.

8th Reſolution. Mr. Draper concurs in, provided nothing definitive be done without the Sanction

of the Governor General and Council, and that no great Expence be incurred by ſo doing, after the immenſe Sum already diſburſed in ſupport of Ragoba, and with the Reſerve before expreſſed reſpecting the previous Declaration upon the Commencement of the Negociation;—concurred in by Mr. Carnac and the Preſident.

9th Reſolution. Mr. Draper entirely concurs in this, as do Mr. Carnac and the Preſident.

10th Reſolution. Mr. Draper in his Remarks had already declared his Opinion regarding the former Part of this Reſolution, and he thinks it will be Time enough to decide on the latter, when we find the ſeveral Points therein attended to can be obtained, and in the mean Time to apprize the Governor General and Council of them.

Agreed to by Mr. Carnac and the Preſident.

11th Reſolution. Mr. Draper agrees thereto, with the Reſerve above noticed, regarding the 1000 Horſe.

Agreed to by Mr. Carnac and the Preſident, except what regards Colonel Goddard's Army, which is now become unneceſſary by his near Approach; in which Mr. Draper concurs.

12th Reſolution. Mr. Draper agrees thereto, provided it can be done in ſuch a Manner as not to give Offence to Scindia, though not ſo neceſſary on Account of Colonel Goddard's Approach.

Mr. Carnac and the Preſident are of Opinion the Meaſure therein propoſed is not now neceſſary; in which Mr. Draper alſo concurs.

13th Reſolution. Approved by Mr. Draper as Matters ſtood before, but now unneceſſary.

Mr. Carnac and the Preſident think the Meaſure ſhould be ſuſpended for the preſent.

14th Reſolution. Unanimouſly agreed to.

15th Reſolution. Not thought neceſſary by Mr. Draper, being of Opinion we ought to be very explicit in our Repreſentations to the Governor General and Council by Letter, in conſequence of the Preſident's Minute of Review.

Mr. Carnac and the Preſident continue in the Opinion and Reſolution as they ſtand on the Minutes of our laſt Meeting.

A true Copy.
Edwd Ravenſcroft,
Secretary to the Select Committee.

APPENDIX, N° 135.

Letter from Governor Hornby to the Committee of Secrecy, dated 28th March 1779; encloſing Conſiderations on the State of Affairs at Bombay.

Honourable Sirs,

OUR Advices conveyed by this Veſſel will inform you at large of all Occurrences of Moment up to this Time; but as we have come to no Reſolutions with regard to the Meaſures neceſſary to be taken at this critical Juncture, the Letters from the Committee will ſtill leave you unſatisfied on this Subject; which of all others I preſume will be that you will be moſt ſolicitous about. My Thoughts have been much employed on it, and I now do myſelf the Honour of encloſing for your Information a Paper which is the Reſult of them. The Form is that in which I have prepared to bring the Matter before the Committee as ſoon as the Betſey is diſpatched.

I have in that Paper given my Sentiments ſo fully, as well on the preſent Poſture of Affairs, as on the Proſpect before us, between this Time and the End of next October, that I have nothing to add here on thoſe Subjects, and muſt beg Leave to refer you entirely to it. I flatter myſelf you will eſteem the Meaſures I propoſe, ſuch as are beſt adapted to remedy our preſent and future Difficulties, to provide for the Security and Proſperity of your Affairs under this Preſidency, and to enable us to take the Part which may be hereafter aſſigned us by the Governor General and Council in their general Plan, with the greateſt Proſpect of affording effectual Aid in the Execution of it.

The Royal Admiral, which will ſail about the 15th or 20th of next Month, will bring you Advice of the Reſolutions of the Committee on my propoſed Plan of Operations. As I have but juſt compleated it, I thought it beſt not to detain the Betſey, that we might be relieved from all other Buſineſs before we took this into Conſideration; for as it requres Diſpatch, ſo the Importance of it renders it the more neceſſary that our whole Attention ſhould be confined to it.

On the other Hand, I was unwilling you ſhould be left to ſuppoſe that no Plan had yet been thought of, and our future Reſolutions bear an Appearance of Precipitation for want of your receiving by this Opportunity ſome Intelligence regarding them.

Thinking it a Duty I owe to my Honourable Employers to ſtay in India until Anſwers are received to this Letter, and being confident it will be pleaſing to you, I intend doing it, though I was fully bent on leaving it this Seaſon had the Ships arrived early; but now it is abſolutely neceſſary that I ſhould ſtay till Anſwers are received, for ſeveral Reaſons, and I hope we ſhall be favoured with your Commands by the Way of Aleppo and Buſſorah, for the Conveyance of which I ſhall keep a Veſſel at Buſſorah purpoſely to receive and bring them hither in November, ſo that I hope to receive them in all December next.

Lieutenant Brice Hardie has been advanced Four hundred German Crowns ſhould he have Occaſion for them, of which he will render you an Account; he is a very truſty and good Officer.

I have the Honour to be,
Honourable Sirs,
Your moſt faithful and
obedient humble Servant,
William Hornby.

Bombay,
the 28th March 1779.

Select Conſultations, 30th March 1779.

We have now before us that Information of the Views of the Governor General and Council in their projected Alliance with Moodajee Bouncello; and in the State of which Colonel Goddard has left the Negociation with him, the Want of which has hitherto rendered it impoſſible for us to come to any final Reſolution, either with reſpect to the Steps neceſſary to be taken here, or with regard to the future Meaſures proper to be recommended and ſubmitted to the Governor General and Council for their Approbation and Sanction.

It appears that the Firſt Object of Mr. Elliott's Embaſſy to Nigapoor, was a defenſive Alliance between the Company and Moodajee Bouncello, for the mutual Security of their reſpective Poſſeſſions. The Governor General and Council charged with the Care of all the wide extended Territory of the Company have with great Judgment at the Commencement of a French War, turned their Thoughts thus early to the Cultivation of a Friendſhip with a Power, whoſe Dominions, ſituated between the Company's Provinces in Bengal, and on the Coaſt of Coromandel on one Side, and the Country under the Command of the Poona Miniſters, and the Eſtates of the Nizam, on the other, render him beſt able to any Prince in Indoſtan, to afford us Aſſiſtance, and to check the Deſigns of our Enemies, at the ſame Time that his near Neighbourhood to the Settlements where the principal Force of the Company is maintained, muſt make him ſenſible of the Intereſt he himſelf has in a hearty Union with our Nation.

The Governor General and Council proceed from this Firſt Meaſure planned for the general Safety, to point out to their Miniſter ſuch particular Circumſtances on the Affairs of the Preſidency, and in thoſe of the Poona Miniſters and the Rajah of Berar, as relate to the more immediate Security of this Settlement, to the Excluſion of the French and their Faction from the Direction of the Adminiſtration at Poona, and to the Eſtabliſhment of the Government there in the Hands of Perſons well diſpoſed to our Intereſt.

Mr. Elliott was for theſe Purpoſes authorized to enter into a Treaty with Moodajee Bouncello, to unite with him in a direct and open War againſt the Poona Miniſters, and to concert with him Plans for the Proſecution of it, for counteracting the Deſigns of the French, and for eſtabliſhing him in the Dominions and Authority of the Ram Rajah.

Theſe are the Meaſures Mr. Elliott was to purſue, under the following expreſs Limitations and Proviſos, that the Preſidency of Bombay had neither entered into any new Engagement with Ragoba, nor with any other Party in the Maratta State, with which a Connection with Moodajee Bouncello might claſh; nor had concluded a Peace with the Poona Miniſters: In either of which Caſes Mr. Elliott was to ſuſpend his Negociations relative to the Eſtabliſhment of Moodajee Bouncello in the Ram Rajaſhip, to conform to the Bombay Meaſures, and to engage in no offenſive Plan contrary to that of the Preſidency of Bombay.

The Intentions of the Governor General and Council with regard to a defenſive Alliance with Moodajee Bouncello, were communicated to us by a Letter dated on the ſame Day as Mr. Elliott's Inſtructions (the 18th of July) and received here the 27th of Auguſt; but with regard to the Union projected between the Company and Moodajee Bouncello, for the Removal of the French Faction from the Poona Durbar, and for the Eſtabliſhment of Moodajee in the Rajaſhip, we have till this * Time remained uninformed. On the 27th of September we received from the Governor General and Council their Approbation of our Reſolutions of the 21ſt July, and of the Meaſures we propoſed taking in favour of Ragoba, without any Intimation of the Deſign in favour of Moodajee Bouncello, excepting a Reſtriction from entering into any Engagements of a Tendency hoſtile to the Government of Berar, or contrary to ſuch as Mr. Elliott might have apprized us of his having concluded with Moodajee Bouncello.

Under theſe Circumſtances our Treaty with Ragoba was concluded; and we heard no more of the Negociation with Moodajee Bouncello till the 18th of December, when the Governor General and Council's Letter of the 15th of October adviſed us in general, that the Rajah's Diſpoſitions towards the Company were favourable, but that Mr. Elliott was dead; and that the Governor General and Council propoſed to wait for Advices from the Rajah, before they appointed any other Perſon to ſucceed Mr. Elliott. We were at the ſame Time authorized to give Colonel Goddard Orders for proceeding forwards, at all Events, in Support of our Plan for reinſtating Ragoba in the Regency, if we ſhould judge this neceſſary.

* Copy of Mr. Elliott's Inſtructions was firſt received at Bombay the 17th March 1779.

On

On the 10th of January the Bengal Letter of the 23d of November came to Hand, referring to one of the 16th, which enclosed a Copy of Mr. Elliott's Inſtructions; adviſing of Colonel Goddard's being inveſted with full Powers to conclude a Treaty with Moodajee Bouncello, on the Ground of thoſe Inſtructions; and informing us that Colonel Goddard was no longer under our Orders, but in a very limited Degree; and what the Limitations might be, we remained utterly ignorant, as the Letter of the 16th of November, and Mr. Elliott's Inſtructions contained in it, had miſcarried.

That of the 23d of November was forwarded to us by Colonel Goddard, accompanied by one from himſelf, which relieved us from much of the Anxiety we muſt have felt, while doubtful how far we might depend on the Support of the Forces under his Command: But the Colonel, aware of the Difficulties we might be thrown into by an Uncertainty with regard to this Point, aſſured us that he would aſſiſt with his Troops in any Meaſures we might have formed in Reliance on them, as far as *we* might deem conſiſtent with the Negociation he was then engaged in. And on Receipt of our Letters of the 6th and 19th of December, and on Moodajee Bouncello's declining to proceed further in the Treaty propoſed to him by the Governor General and Council, after he knew of the Bombay Troops being in the Field in favour of Ragoba, Colonel Goddard determined to march forward, without waiting to hear further from us.

I have entered into theſe Particulars in order to ſhew, that no over-weaning Partiality for Meaſures of our own, prevented us from paying the Attention and Deference to the Views of the Governor General and Council, to which I ſhall always think them entitled. I make no Doubt the Governor General and Council had good Reaſon to reſerve to us, with regard to fixing Moodajee Bouncello in the Rajahſhip; which Reſerve I conjecture was owing to the Preference they were willing to give to the Deſign formed here for the Re-eſtabliſhment of Ragoba in the Regency, which is evidently the Principle on which Mr. Elliot's Inſtructions are framed. The Governor General and Council probably thought, that the Communication of another Scheme of their's, while our's was under Conſideration, might ſerve only to embarraſs us, and produce a Difference in our Councils, which ought not allow us to purſue our own Meaſures with the neceſſary Degree of Confidence and Vigour. I cannot refuſe myſelf the acknowledging the Attention ſhewn throughout Mr. Elliot's Inſtructions to the Intereſt of this Preſidency, and to the Support of that Credit and Influence of the Adminiſtration here, ſo neceſſary to the ſucceſsful Management of the Affairs under our Charge. The liberal Spirit we have experienced from the Governor General and Council, as well in their Judgment of our Principles and Conduct, as in the Aſſiſtance they have offered this Settlement, is the beſt Encouragement to us to act with that Confidence in them, which, in Times of Difficulty, is neceſſary to ſupport us through our Exertions beyond the mere Line of Duty.

It is impoſſible likewiſe to paſs without noticing the great Merit of the Gentleman who has conducted the Bengal Troops with ſuch Prudence and Diſpatch to our Aſſiſtance at this critical Time. The Difficulties were very great which he muſt have been under, while charged with the Management of a moſt important Negociation from the Government of Bengal, to which he muſt have found himſelf unable to reconcile the Meaſures already taken at this Preſidency. The Delays and Doubts which the ſame Cauſe naturally occaſioned in the Reſolves of the Rajah, to whom he was deputed, rendered his Situation ſtill more embarraſſing, as they left him without any determinate Plan for his Conduct, but ſuch as he himſelf might form for the Occaſion. The preſſing Exigency of the Company's Affairs on this Side, the united Oppoſition he had Reaſon to expect from the Maratta Chiefs, in the Courſe of a very long March through an Enemy's Country, the unſucceſsful Event of our Expedition, the Stipulation for his Return, the Inſtances made him at the ſame Time, even on the Part of Moodajee Bouncello, to induce him to it, and a Regard to the future Reſolves of the Governor General and Council, were Circumſtances that all claimed a Share in his Conſideration, and rendered the Choice, whether to proceed on, to return, or to wait for further Orders, no eaſy one: His ready Determination of coming without Delay to our Aid, in my Opinion does the greateſt Honour to his Judgment. Attention to the Intereſts of the Company, Prudence, Deciſion, and Diſintereſtedneſs, were equally conſpicuous on this Occaſion; and they are ſuch as I think it becomes us to acknowledge to Colonel Goddard; and to point out, with the ſtrongeſt Expreſſions of our Approbation, to the Governor General and Council, who, I flatter myſelf, will eſteem Colonel Goddard's Conduct deſerving the ſame Degree of Commendation; and permit us to requeſt from them ſome diſtinguiſhed Mark of their and our Senſe of his Services.

The Knowledge of the State of the Negociation entruſted to Colonel Goddard with the Rajah of Berar, and the Arrival of Bengal Troops, have made a very conſiderable Change in our Affairs.

It appears that the Diſpoſition of Moodajee Bouncello towards an Alliance with the Company, on the Terms propoſed by the Governor General and Council, is ſuch as to give us Reaſon to expect that he will be ready to conclude the propoſed Treaty, as ſoon as ever he receives the Anſwers of the Governor General and Council to the Letters tranſmitted to them through Colonel Goddard. Theſe, however, it is likely may not arrive near ſo ſoon as Colonel Goddard ſuppoſes they may be expected. The Impoſſibility of cloſing with the Rajah, while our Engagement with Ragoba ſubſiſted, will of courſe be a Cauſe of Delay on the firſt Receipt of them. The Governor General and Council's Expectations of receiving the Particulars of our unſucceſsful Expedition, together with Copies of the Convention concluded at Worgom, Information of the State of our Affairs ſubſequent to that Period, and Advice of Colonel Goddard's Arrival at Surat, will probably ſtill prevent their coming to any final Reſolution, with regard to the Alliance with Moodajee Bouncello, for ſome Time longer. Yet there ſeems no Reaſon to doubt of their Determination to proceed with this Deſign, which they have

repreſented

repreſented as originally planned to ſupply the Place of the Scheme entered into here, for the Excluſion of the French Faction from the Adminiſtration at Poona. The Alliance with Moodajee Bouncello therefore is what we muſt look to as the leading Circumſtance in our political Tranſactions with the Marattas in future. The Senſe of the Honourable the Secret Committee, of the Governor General and Council, and of this Committee, with regard to the Neceſſity of ſettling the Maratta Government in ſuch a Manner as will render us ſecure of the favourable Diſpoſition of the Heads of it to our Intereſt, is perfectly uniform; I ſhall not therefore inſiſt further on this Subject, on which I take it for granted we muſt be all agreed.

In my Review of Maratta Affairs I ſtated very particularly the Reaſons I thought there were for preſuming that Madjee Scindia was favourably inclined to us, and might be diſpoſed to enter a Connexion for the mutual Advantage of the Company and himſelf. I took Notice of the Claims his Conduct towards us at Worgom had eſtabliſhed on us, and the Reaſons which his preſent Authority in the Poona Government, and the Diſpoſition he had ſhewn to avoid taking Part in the Connexion which the Bramins have formed with the French, together with the natural Oppoſition of Intereſt between him and Nannah, furniſhed for us to wiſh for ſuch a Connexion between us and him. To the Letter which I wrote to him as agreed by the Committee, I have hitherto received no Anſwer. The Two Letters from him of the 2d and 6th Inſtant are written in the Name of the Poona Durbar, claiming the ſeveral Ceſſions ſtipulated for in the Convention of Worgom. His Agent however has ſtill continued the ſame Profeſſions of Friendſhip, but has at laſt taken Leave without opening himſelf further as to the particular Views of his Maſter. Had Scindia thought proper to have met the Advances I made him in my Letter, and to have come at once to a Settlement that might have fixed our Affairs under this Preſidency on that Footing which is neceſſary to the Intereſts of the Company on this Side of India, and for the Security of the general Intereſt againſt the Deſigns of the French, and their dangerous Connexion with Nanah, I ſhould, as I before declared, have been much diſpoſed to have cloſed with him. But he has choſen to proceed in a Manner leſs open, though his Intentions I think may be eaſily ſeen into, and it is neceſſary for us to take our Meaſures accordingly.

Madjee Scindia's Idea ſeems to be, that he has already laid us under ſuch Obligations by the Aſſiſtance he gave in extricating our Troops at Worgom; and is ſo ſecure of our Jealouſy of Nanah's Connection with the French, that he may depend on our ſtill courting his Friendſhip. And he imagines, by preſerving his Claims on us for the Ceſſions ſtipulated for in the Convention of Worgom, he ſhall be able to maintain ſuch an Influence over us, as to chuſe his own Time and Terms for any Aſſiſtance he may expect from us. At preſent, he finds his Power in the Maratta Durbar ſufficiently ſecured by his Preſence, and by his Command of his own and Holkar's Troops near the Capital; and conceiving our Affairs to be more urgent than his, he hopes for a more advantageous Bargain, by waiting till he can draw Propoſals from us. He has already taken Advantage of the Ground we have given him to rely on a Diſpoſition in his Favour, by ſeizing Succaram Bappoo, and removing his Party from all Truſt and Power, and by keeping a ſtricter Hand than before on Nanah, with whom however he has ſtill refrained from coming to Extremities, probably with a View to making the moſt of him, and draining him completely of his Treaſures.

Nanah's preſent Situation is ſuch as renders his Views far leſs intelligible than Scindia's; but it is thus I think they muſt be underſtood: While the latter continues at Poona, Nanah can promiſe himſelf but a very moderate Share of real Power in the Government; yet Scindia's Troops are at preſent the chief Security he has, even for that little. Knowing that he muſt reckon on the Engliſh as his Enemies, on account of the Meaſures he has taken with the French, he ſeems to aim at maintaining himſelf by Scindia's Means, till he can receive from Europe the Aſſiſtance promiſed him by Lubin; and while he continues rich, he will probably preſerve Influence enough with Scindia to prevent him from coming to an Explanation with us: If he can manage in the mean Time to puſh Things to that Extremity as to break altogether the Connection he ſees likely to take place between us and Scindia, he may hope that the Authority and actual Force he will acquire by the Arrival of his European Allies next Seaſon, will enable him to force Scindia into his Meaſures, and to keep him in future in his Dependance.

The Attack on Fort Victoria by Moraba Bapoojee, the Subada of Sevendroog, who is the Nephew of Hurry Punt Furkia, and, as well as his Uncle, a Creature of Nanah, I make no Doubt has been concerted by Nanah with a Deſign of obliging Scindia to declare againſt us, and involving him in one common Cauſe with himſelf, as he cannot but have obſerved the Diſtinction we made betwixt them; and Scindia probably connives at the Meaſure, with a View of marking to us, that all our Dependance muſt be on him. Upon our Application to the Durbar, I take it for granted that Scindia will oblige Nanah to diſcourage the Soubah, and order him to deſiſt; thus purſuing his Scheme of keeping Things in their preſent State of Uncertainty and Suſpenſe, Nannah will probably give private Orders contrary to the public ones; and we may be ſubject ſtill to repeated Inſults and Depredations, which will be diſavowed and renewed continually, while the fair Seaſon will be conſumed in this Sort of trifling and diſgraceful Intercourſe.

Every Principle of good Policy is againſt our ſuffering ourſelves to be thus amuſed, and forbids us to loſe a Moment in Inaction. The Poona Durbar ſtill inſiſts on our yielding up all our Territories, claiming the full Execution of the Convention of Worgom. Fort Victoria is actually attacked; the Iſlands have been threatened for ſome Time paſt: We muſt therefore either chuſe Peace, on the Terms on which the Enemy preſcribe it; or we muſt take our Meaſures according to the actual State of War we are now in. While we reſolve on neither, we ſubject ourſelves to Inconveniencies which

threaten our Affairs with total Ruin; and loſe the only Opportunity that can preſent itſelf, for putting ourſelves in that forward and advantageous Situation, which will enable us either to retrieve our Affairs by an honourable Peace, or to proſecute the War with Succeſs.

The Bengal Detachment muſt already have coſt an immenſe Sum; and its Expence, while it remains here, is more than equal to the full Amount of all our preſent Revenues. Colonel Goddard has hitherto ſupplied himſelf with the Sums neceſſary for the Payment of his Troops, by the Drafts on Bengal; but this is a Reſource that cannot be depended on for more than Eight or Ten Lacks more, at furtheſt. The Colonel has likewiſe already expreſſed his Anxiety with regard to the Burthen his Expences may prove upon the Bengal Treaſury; and indeed, if we conſider the increaſed military and naval Eſtabliſhment of that Preſidency, on account of the War with France, and the Demands which have probably been already made on the Governor General and Council by the Gentlemen of Madras, whoſe Diſtreſs for Money, we have underſtood, has been the Cauſe of their delaying ſo long to carry into Execution the projected Expedition againſt Mahé, we muſt conſider it as highly probable that our Hopes of Supplies of Caſh from Bengal may fail us. In 1776, when the Governor General and Council propoſed ſupporting us in a War with the Maratta Miniſters, on a Proſpect of Colonel Upton's Negociation proving ineffectual, they had adviſed that they had reſolved to ſupply us with Ten Lacks; which Sum ſeemed all they could allow us to depend on, for they inſiſted that it ſhould be reſerved for the Purpoſes of the War only, and even ordered a ſeparate Account to be kept of it, that they might be ſatisfied it was applied to no other. If ſuch was the Caſe at that Time, how much lower muſt our Expectations be at this, when their own Occaſions, as well as the Expences of the Preſidency of Madras, muſt be increaſed much beyond what we can venture even to gueſs at? By the moſt exact Eſtimate I have been able to make, I judge that between this Time and the 31ſt October next we ſhall have Occaſion for about 50 Lacks; and all our Reſources together do not afford a Proſpect of more than 20 Lacks; great Part of which laſt, depending on the clearing of Purchaſers Goods from our Warehouſe, and on Revenues, a conſiderable Part of which is to be received in Kind, will be apt to fall ſhort of the Eſtimate; while our Expences are likely to exceed, rather than prove leſs than they are rated at. We might indeed, by putting a total Stop to our Inveſtments, apply about Four Lacks appropriated for the Purchaſe of Pepper, and the Completion of the China Ships Cargoes, to defray our unavoidable Expences; but, beſides the inadequate Proportion of this Supply to our Wants, the Remedy will I believe be thought very deſperate.

Another very alarming Circumſtance calls for our moſt ſerious Conſideration: Colonel Goddard informs us, that One Half of his Sepoys have refuſed to receive their Pay for the Month of January unleſs that for the Month of February is at the ſame Time diſcharged; and he ſeems to think that this has proceeded from a Diſpoſition among the Men to return Home, if they could furniſh themſelves with Money enough to bear their Charges to their own Country. It is true, Colonel Goddard is of Opinion, that he ſhall be able to put a Stop to this Spirit in his Return to Camp; but we have every Reaſon to fear the Increaſe of it, ſhould the Troops remain long unengaged in Service, which might divert them from ſuch Thoughts.

Whatever our Difficulties may be, from the Increaſe of our Expences, and the Neceſſity of providing for the punctual Payment of our Troops, yet the Defence of the Settlement abſolutely requires that we ſhould find Means of keeping up our preſent Force, while Things remain in the State they are now in with the Marattas, and while the War with France continues. The only Way in which this can be effected, is by ſecuring ſuch a Revenue under our own Collection, as may be nearly anſwerable to our Expences; and it is abſolutely neceſſary to think of taking Meaſures for this Purpoſe, before the Diſtreſs we foreſee arrives at ſuch a Height as to render our Efforts ineffectual. By the Month of October our Finances will be utterly exhauſted, the full Amount procurable for Bills on Bengal taken up, and a large Sum ſtill due: In this State, ſhould we have to ſupport an united Attack from the French and Marattas, in what Condition ſhall we then be to oppoſe them? Our Bond Debt is already increaſed near Eight Lacks; none of the Money expected from Bengal, for paying off that before contracted, is yet arrived; and to moſt People here it ſeems incredible, that the Subſcription opened at Bengal for raiſing the Sum neceſſary, can be filled, or any Dependance had on it for Supplies.

Let any one carry his Views forward to the Month of October next, and imagine what our Situation muſt then be, if we continue inactive to that Time; and let him tell me whether the moſt unſucceſsful War could be attended with more ruinous Conſequences than we are then to expect, without the Loſs of a ſingle Battle, and in Poſſeſſion of every Foot of Land we at preſent hold. It will then be in vain to talk of waiting for Orders or Aſſiſtance of any Sort from Abroad: When all our Hopes at Home fail us, and the Moment for providing for our own Neceſſities is paſt, the Poona Durbar will ſoon find, that the Terms of the Convention, which they ſtill inſiſt on, will be every Day leſs in our Power to refuſe; and we may depend, that with ſuch a Claim on us, which they ſtill keep up, they mean to enforce it whenever the Opportunity may ſeem favourable. After allowing for Draft of Ten Lacks more on Bengal between this and next October, which is to the full as much as we ſhall find Bills for, and I fear may be more than that Government can conveniently ſpare us, we muſt expect to be at leaſt 20 Lacks in Debt; which is ſo large a Sum, that I have Doubts whether we may be able to borrow it: But granting that Money is ever ſo plentiful, yet we have no Funds to pay even Intereſt; and if once it is ſeen that the Drains of inexhauſtible Wealth from Bengal are at an End, that our Supplies from thence are ſtopped, and our Expences more than Double our annual Revenue, our Credit muſt fail, and we may fix a ſhort Day for the Period of our

Ability

Ability to raiſe Money by Loans. The Bengal Troops, which may now give Vigour to our Operations, by the Time I allude to may become quite uſeleſs for Want of Money to pay them; or if they were to have no Cauſe of Diſſatisfaction on this Account, there is Reaſon to fear their Numbers will every Day diminiſh by their going off to their own Country, for which they will naturally be growing more impatient, the longer they are kept without Employment. We have yet between Two and Three Months of the fair Seaſon left; and during that Time and the Rains, we are ſecure from all Attempts of the French, either immediately againſt us, or in Support of their Faction at Poona: If this Time be not employed, we know not when ſuch another may occur; it is therefore of the laſt Conſequence to put ourſelves in the beſt Poſture againſt the Opening of the next Seaſon, for oppoſing a French Armament, if any ſhould arrive, and for rendering their Maratta Allies as little capable as poſſible of affording them Aſſiſtance.

Upon the fulleſt Conſideration of all Circumſtances, the following are the Meaſures I think we ought to adopt, and which, with the Concurrence of the Committee, I propoſe to enter on immediately:

Colonel Goddard ſhould, I think, be deſired to write to Moodajee Bouncello, to notify to him his Arrival at Surat; and inform him that he only waits to know the final Determination of the Governor General and Council, and of him (M. B.) with regard to the Subject of his (Colonel G.'s) Negociations, to take his Meaſures for co-operating with him in Support of our mutual Intereſt. And that no Doubts may be entertained of the Diſpoſition of this Government in the ſame Cauſe, I propoſe writing likewiſe to inform him, that our Connection with Ragoba being at an End, by his having put himſelf under the Protection of another Power, we remain entirely at Liberty to unite with him (M. B.) in any Deſign the Governor General and Council may have formed in his Favour; and ſhall be ready to act accordingly, as ſoon as ever we are informed of their having concluded with him the Terms of their propoſed Treaty.

In the mean Time, Madjee Scindia may be dealt with according to the ſame temporizing Plan of Conduct, which he purſues with us. The actual Power he at preſent poſſeſſes in the Poona Durbar, and the Poſſibility that the Scheme of a Union with Moodajee Bouncello may yet fail, require that we ſhould keep on Terms with Scindia as long and as far as we can, and maintain the Diſtinction between him and Nanah. I propoſe, therefore, ſtill to continue to treat with him for an Equivalent for the Town and Purgunnah of Broach; to receive any Propoſals he may have to make towards an Alliance with us, or for Aſſiſtance againſt the Nizam or Hyder; and to make any of theſe Particulars the Subject of Negociation in ſuch a Manner as to prevent him, as long as poſſible, from declaring againſt us; and to ſpin out Time till we can receive the final Anſwer of the Governor General and Council, both with regard to the general Syſtem of Maratta Affairs they reſolve on, and the particular Conduct they may judge moſt honourable and advantageous towards Madjee Scindia in particular; I do not think this will be difficult, as our Intention of gaining Time will be greatly forwarded when the Rains ſet in, and before the Seaſon opens we ſhall certainly receive Directions from Bengal for our Guidance.

Our Proceeding with reſpect to Nannah ought to be very different. The juſt Reaſon we have for eſteeming him our irreconcileable Enemy, and the open Abetter and Head of the French Faction, was the Ground of our Commencement of Hoſtilities. The Claims on us in conſequence of the Convention of Worgom, as they cannot be complied with on our Part, and are ſtill inſiſted on on his, render the War unavoidable, till they are departed from at leaſt. Even were this Point gained, no Dependance could be had on any Terms of Accommodation we might enter into with the Poonah Government, while Nanah continued to ſhare in the Adminiſtration, or had a Proſpect of recovering his Authority in it; ſuch Accommodation is however at preſent out of the Queſtion. His Dependants are at this Time actually attacking our Poſſeſſions, and we muſt of Force continue the War. It is however our Buſineſs to ſhew that the Quarrel is perſonal againſt him and his Faction. It will be proper therefore to profeſs our friendly Diſpoſition towards the Maratta State and Chiefs in general; declaring, that our only View is to remove from the Adminiſtration, a Party which has ſhewn an avowed Enmity againſt our Nation; and to procure a Settlement of the Maratta Government, in Conjunction with Perſons on whoſe Friendſhip to us we can depend.

The Plan of Operations I would propoſe for our Forces, and which I would wiſh to carry into immediate Execution, is as follows:

Colonel Goddard, to whom the moſt conſiderable Part will of courſe be committed, will in the Firſt Place take Poſſeſſion of the Purgunnahs of Dolpuar, Hanſoot, Occlaſeer, Deſbora, and Ahmood. This will be a Matter of no Difficulty, the Country being entirely open and unprotected, and ſituated between our Garriſons of Surat, Broach, and Jambooſeer; and it ſhould be recommended to him to effect this in concert with the Chiefs of thoſe Settlements, in order that the Perſons of the Maratta Collectors may all be ſecured at once; by which Means we ſhall be able to bring them to account for the Arrears and Balances in their Hands, which will be a Matter of great Importance, as the Difficulties of our Affairs, from the low State of our Finances, form one of the principal Objects to which our Views muſt be directed. The above Purgunnahs yield an Annual Revenue of 6 or 7 Lacks of Rupees, and the Balances collected from them I flatter myſelf will be conſiderable.

The Chiefs of Surat and Broach muſt receive Charge of theſe Purgunnahs, and endeavour to

put them under the moſt advantageous and regular Form of Management, conformable to the Mode adopted in our other Northern Poſſeſſions.

Colonel Goddard in like Manner will proceed in the Reduction of the Country South of the Tappi; which, with Oolpaar, Hanſoot, and Occlaſeer, comprehend the ancient Domain of Surat, known under the Name of The Surat Auterwuzey; obſerving the Precaution before noticed, of ſecuring the Collectors in the ſeveral Purgunnahs, or ſuch of them as he may be able. The Share of the Revenues of the City of Surat, collected by the Poona Chotea, muſt likewiſe be appropriated to the Uſe of the Company. But the Guicawar Chotea and Collectors in the Purgunnahs ſhould be ſuffered to remain unmoleſted in their reſpective Aumils, while Colonel Goddard ſhould give their Principals Notice, that he is empowered to ſettle the Province of Guzerat in Conjunction with them, without Delay.

The Revenues of the Poona Circar in this Quarter being taken into our Hands, Colonel Goddard ſhould be inſtructed to bring the Brothers Futty Sing and Govind Row to a Settlement with the Company; the Ground of which muſt be our ſecuring to them their preſent Poſſeſſions in the Province of Guzerat, independant of the Poona Government, and their engaging to ſupport us in the Share now retained in that Province by the Poona Government. It will be Colonel Goddard's Care to accommodate the Differences between the Brothers under our Mediation and Guarantee, obſerving that as Futty Sing's Authority is at preſent that which is acknowledged in the Guicawar Dominions, his Meaſures muſt be taken with him as the Head of the Family, provided he finds both equally ready to unite with us, as he probably will.

The Revenue of the Poona Circar North of the Mihi, from the beſt Account I have been able to procure of it, amounts to about Eleven Lacks: The Guicawars in the ſame Country is much more conſiderable, amounting to near 29 Lacks: The Diſtricts ſituate between the Mihi and the Tappi, will be held by us as far Eaſtward as Brodria, Dubhey, Zinnore, and Verſavee, South of the Tappi. The Country is held jointly by the Poona Circar, the Guicawars, Nabob of Surat, and Graſſius, and is uſually eſtimated to yield a Revenue of about 20 Lacks, of which a full Half belongs to the Poona Circar; the Remainder is divided among the other Shares, but the largeſt Proportion to the Guicawars. The Revenue collected by the Poona Circar North of the Mihi and South of the Tappi, according to this Eſtimate, amounts to 21 Lacks; and beſides this, the Guicawars pay a Tribute for their Jaghire in Guzerat, amounting to 27 Lacks, which makes up the Revenue of the Poona Circar from this Province, 48 Lacks, excluſive of the Purgunnahs between the Tappi and the Mihi.

The Purgunnahs North of the Mihi belonging to the Poona Circar, I would propoſe to yield to the Guicawars, in Exchange for their Diviſion of the Country South of the Tappi, for their Share in the Revenue of the City of Surat, and ſuch other Lands as might nearly make up an Equivalent: The Tribute of 27 Lacks per Annum I would propoſe to relieve them from, till ſuch Time at leaſt as the Poona Government ſhould be ſettled, and a final Treaty of Peace concluded between us and that Durbar.

As Govind Row has always ſhewn himſelf well diſpoſed to our Intereſt, it will be proper (in our Arrangements with Futty Sing) to provide for him in a ſuitable Manner, and procure a Jaghire for him more conſiderable than he has ever yet been able to obtain from Futty Sing, which has never I believe exceeded Three Lacks per Annum. This has ſtill been the Subject of Diſpute betwixt them, and is the Cauſe of their preſent Contention. Futty Sing might well afford his Brother an Increaſe, both on Account of the advantageous Exchange he would make with us, and of his being relieved from the heavy Load of Tribute he pays to the Poona Government.

It might be proper to provide ſome Gratification for the Nabob of Cambay, and procure ſome Acceſſion of Territory for him in the final Settlement of the Northern Country. But this, with all Particulars of leſs Conſequence, ſhould be given in charge to Colonel Goddard; with diſcretional Powers to adjuſt the ſeveral Intereſts in ſuch a Manner as might be moſt honourable and advantageous for this Government; obſerving always that we wiſh the general Plan of Arrangement to be ſuch as to conciliate the ſeveral Powers to our Intereſt, and detach them from the preſent Adminiſtration at Poona.

In order to enable Colonel Godddard to accompliſh this the more effectually, I would propoſe that all our Forces to the Northward ſhould be put under his Command, and a general Authority given him to treat and conclude with the Guicawars, the Nabobs of Surat and Cambay, the Rajahs of Radjpipley, Mandavie, Futtypore, Baunſda, and Magrom, the Cooley Chiefs, and all others who might be affected by our Military Operations to the Northward: I ſhould however recommend to him to refer the Adjuſtment of the Intereſt of all but the Guicawars, either to the Chief of Surat or Chief of Broach, or to the Reſident of Jambooſeer, or Reſident of Cambay, according to their reſpective Situations, in order that his own Attention might not be diſtracted from greater Objects by more minute Affairs; but I would ſtill propoſe to reſerve the final Regulation of the Affairs of the Guzerat Province in general to Colonel Goddard, guided by our Inſtructions; and the Servants of the Company to the Northward ſhould be directed to give him all the Aſſiſtance and Information that might be required for the ſucceſsful Management of this important Buſineſs.

It may be proper to obſerve likewiſe, that the Treaty to be concluded with the Guicawars, muſt contain a Reſervation with regard to the Confirmation and Approval of it by the Governor General and Council; and it is with a View to this, and to the future Meaſure to be taken by them with the Rajah of Berar, that I have propoſed that nothing definitive ſhould be concluded with the Guicawars

wars relative to their Tribute to the Poona Circar, which will be a Point of Conſideration, whenever the general Arrangements of the Maratta Government come to be thought of.

If Colonel Goddard finds it practicable, and conſiſtent with the general Plan, he might endeavour to obtain from Futty Sing the Ceſſion of Dubhey and Zinnore, which lie very commodiouſly for compleating our Line of Northern Territory, and yield together a Revenue of about Two Lacks; it will be the leſs difficult, as a conſiderable Share in the former, and ſome Part likewiſe in the latter, I believe is collected for the Poona Government.

Our preſent Poſſeſſions to the Northward, with the Additions above mentioned, would complete a Line of Country extending from the Mihi to the Borders of the Portugueze Diſtrict at Damaun; the preſent Amount of its Revenue may be eſtimated at about 37 * Lacks of Rupees, and from its Productions of Grain, Cotton, Indigo, and Timber, its Manufactures, compact Situation, and near Neighbourhood to the Preſidency, it ſeems capable of conſiderable Improvements; out of the above Sum, 24 Lacks would be an Acceſſion of Revenue, from the Succeſs of the Plan I now propoſe.

In conſequence of the Exchange propoſed to be made with the Guicawars, ſhould they requeſt the Colonel's Aſſiſtance for putting them in Poſſeſſion of the Territories of the Poona Circar North of the Mihi, he ſhould be authorized to afford it them; and it ſhould be recommended to him to exert himſelf to accompliſh this Service with all Diſpatch, in order to return at the very firſt Opening of the Seaſon to the Southward, as well to protect our own Purgunnahs, as to be ready to afford any Aid we might ſtand in need of at Bombay.

I flatter myſelf Colonel Goddard will think the Force he now commands near Surat, with the Addition of a Detachment of 100 European Artillery, would be equal to the Service I have above propoſed. The Force we at preſent have here I ſhould wiſh to keep entire, that we might not be expoſed to Inſult from the Enemy at the very Seat of Government. I am in Hopes likewiſe that our Troops might be applied to other uſeful Purpoſes, and prevent the Enemy, by a judicious Diverſion, from attempting any Oppoſition of conſequence to Colonel Goddard's Operations.

The Force remaining in Garriſon here I think will be ſufficient to enable us to make a vigorous Effort for poſſeſſing ourſelves of Baſſein, which if ſucceſsful will nearly complete our Views in this Neighbourhood; and as it will be what our Enemies will hardly expect, to find themſelves preſſed both here and to the Northward at the ſame Time, it will ſerve above all to recover our Reputation, and impreſs them with a Reſpect of our Force.

Here our Military Schemes might terminate, if it were not that all our Meaſures at this Time have ſo great a Reference to the probable Deſigns of the French, that they will ſtill be incomplete, unleſs we can diſconcert their Views by poſſeſſing ourſelves of the Port where they have propoſed to eſtabliſh themſelves; I ſhould therefore, if the Seaſon and other Circumſtances ſeemed favourable, wiſh much to attempt next the Reduction of Choul. The Arrival of the King's Ships towards the Cloſe of the Seaſon may facilitate this Enterprize, and the Accompliſhment of it would give us ſuch Advantages over our Enemies, as they could hardly make head againſt. Should the French arrive, and find themſelves prevented in this grand Scheme of theirs, on the Succeſs of which all their Projects againſt this Place are probably founded, nothing could tend ſo much to the final Defeat of them. They would be without a Port; they muſt begin all their Negociations and Intrigues anew, while their Force would be waſting away; or they muſt begin their Operations under manifeſt Diſadvantages, which they would have ſuppoſed obviated by their Poſſeſſion of Choul.

By a proper Exertion of the Force we now have, all theſe Purpoſes may, I think, with a moderate Share of good Fortune, be effected before the Opening of the next Seaſon; againſt which Time it is neceſſary we ſhould be prepared, either to repel an Attack on our Settlement by the French, or to act in Support of our Ally the Rajah of Berar, or ſuch other Party among the Marattas as the Governor General and Council may determine to unite with. Our Advantages in either Caſe are apparent: Our Forces will be paid during the Interval, without diſtreſſing ourſelves by carrying the War into the Enemy's Country; our actual Revenue will be more than doubled; the Reputation of our Arms reſtored; the grand Object of our Politics, the Settlement of the Poona Government, will be the only Point we ſhall have to attend to; and the Reſources of our Enemies reduced, by the Loſs of above 50 Lacks of Yearly Revenue.

The Oppoſition we may expect is in no Degree proportionate to the great Advantages we have in proſpect; the Union of Nanah and Scindia is evidently imperfect, their Miniſters have never acted together ſince they have been here, not even in what might ſeem a common Intereſt, the Demand of the Ceſſions they came to receive; Scindia has plainly a View of our Friendſhip, and will hardly relinquiſh it, and engage in a hazardous Enterprize ſo far from Poona as Guzerat, eſpecially while his Jealouſy of the Nizam, who is known to favour Nanah, and Hyder's Operations to the Southward, call him the direct oppoſite Way; Nanah has no other Chief, or any other Army but Scindia's to oppoſe us, and if he had, it would take more Time to collect Forces from different Parts, and march them to the Scene of our Action, than now remains between this and the ſetting-in of the Monſoons.

The Objection of want of Authority from the Governor General and Council can hardly, I think,

* Thus: Preſent Broach Revenue 10 Lacks; preſent Surat Revenue, 3 Lacks; Oolpaar, Hanſoot, Occlaſeer, and Deſbora and Ahmood, 6 Lacks; Poona Revenue, South of the Tappi, 10 Lacks; Guicawar Revenue, South of the Tappi, 6 Lacks; Dubhey Zinnore 2 Lacks.

be urged in this Caſe; we are in an actual State of War: This ſingle Fact ſeems to me an Anſwer to all Objections of this Kind, even if it were true that we had not the expreſs Sanction of the Governor General and Council for commencing Hoſtilities: But when we conſider further the eminent Danger to our Affairs from Inaction, the contrary Advantages of Deciſion, and the few real Difficulties we have to meet in a vigorous Proſecution of the War, I cannot have a Doubt of the Meaſures we ought to take: Our Powers are in my Opinion expreſs and ample; but if they were not, this I am convinced is no Time for Delay in Expectation of them; and while I have the Honour of bearing a Public Truſt, I ſhall in all Caſes of great Moment chuſe rather to riſk the Conſequence, which can only affect me individually, than to bear the Imputation of having neglected or delayed Meaſures eſſential to the common Good, for no better Reaſon than to ſecure myſelf from Blame, if they ſhould prove unſucceſsful.

Bombay,
the 28th March 1779.

Wm Hornby.

APPENDIX, N° 136.

Letter from Fort William to Colonel Leſlie.

Sir,

WE have received your Letters from the 25th July to the 9th inſtant.

The unexpected Length of Time which the Detachment under your Command has remained at Chatterpore, made it neceſſary to endeavour for our own Satisfaction to collect the Cauſes aſſigned for it in your Letters from that Place. We obſerve by your Firſt Letter, dated Two Days after your Arrival on the 3d July, that it would be neceſſary to halt for ſome Time to repair the Gun Carriages which had been much ſhaken in the March from Calpee. On the 25th July you informed us, that they had undergone a thorough Repair, and that you waited then for nothing but to complete your Complement of Cattle, and to collect a Store of Grain to carry with you in caſe of Exigency, but that you ſhould march in a few Days. On the 30th July you repeated, that you ſhould proceed on your March in a few Days, when the heavy Rains were abated; but neither of your laſt Letters, dated 9th Auguſt, though ſtill written from Chatterpore, mention your Intention of quitting that Place in the Proſecution of your March, nor do they give any Reaſon for deferring it; we cannot therefore help expreſſing the greateſt Surprize and Uneaſineſs at this unexpected Delay; and though we doubt not you will be able to aſſign a ſatisfactory Cauſe for it, we think it neceſſary to call on you for ſuch Cauſe, as we are uninformed of any ſince the 25th July.

On this Occaſion we think it proper to recall to your Attention the Caution given you in our Letter of Inſtructions, "That you do not ſuffer yourſelf to be diverted from the Proſecution of your March "by any new Object, however plauſible, except only for the Subſiſtence or Safety of your Troops "indiſpenſably requiring it." And we alſo repeat the Hope expreſſed in our laſt Letter, that you will purſue your March to Berar with all convenient Expedition, according to our Orders of the 7th ultimo.

We are, &c.

Fort William,
31ſt Auguſt 1778.

Warren Haſtings,
P. Francis,
Edwd Wheler.

APPENDIX, N° 137 and 138.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 2d September 1778.

PRESENT,
The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Philip Francis, } Eſquires.
Edward Wheler, }
Mr. Barwell indiſpoſed.

THE Governor General lays before the Board the following Letter, which he received from Colonel Leſlie laſt Night; and deſires that it may be recorded, as it may ſerve to remove the Doubts which are expreſſed in the Minutes of the laſt Conſultation, reſpecting the Proſecution of the March of the Detachment, and the Cauſes of its Detention at Chatterpore. He had Letters from Camp dated the 14th, the Day which Colonel Leſlie had fixed on for leaving Chatterpore. The Camp was ſtill there on that Day; but from the Terms of his Letter he does not entertain the leaſt Doubt that Colonel Leſlie muſt have been then on the Point of leaving it; and is equally ſatisfied, as he hopes the Board will be, that no Conſideration will have induced Colonel Leſlie to enter into Engagements of a Tendency to retard his Progreſs, or to divert the Services of the Troops under his Command a Moment from their deſtined Courſe or preſcribed Objects.

Camp Chatterpore,
Dear Sir, Auguſt 11th, 1778.

My Letter of the 4th Inſtant would inform you of the Situation of Affairs betwixt Surnet Sing Goman and Coman Sing, from the united Friendſhip of whom I thought every Difficulty at an End, as they had informed me they had ſettled all their Matters, and made a firm Connection, which I was to become the Witneſs of; but when I preſſed my Supply, and was preparing to move, I found ſome Doubts had interpoſed: I requeſted to be informed of them. Goman and Coman Sing ſuppoſed when I was gone the Whole would join againſt them, and drive them out; and I then plainly ſaw my Stay here was what they wiſhed for, to ſecure them on the Side of Surnet Sing: But if I went away, Anrood Sing being the ſtronger Party, they reſolved to accept his Propoſals, and join him: Both Surnet Sing and Anrood Sing had made the ſame Propoſals; but they had accepted the firſt and rejected the latter's. I preſſed them to come to an immediate Ratification, as I would not ſtay a Moment longer, and required their Anſwer at a certain Time. I had an Interview with their Agents the 7th at Night, and all Parties ſeemed ſatisfied, and promiſed to be with me in the Morning; but freſh Diſputes ariſing that Night, they broke through every Agreement with Surnet Sing. Goman and Coman Sing's Men came to me on the Morning of the 8th: They informed me their Maſters had ſent them with the ſtrongeſt Aſſurances of Friendſhip to the Engliſh, and of their Aid to me; and they doubted not of a reciprocal Return. In ſhort, they required that I ſhould return back to Jaitpore, drive Gudd Sing from thence, and give them Poſſeſſion of his Fort. I told them I had often informed them, that it was out of my Power, but particularly ſo now; that they did not conſider the Delay and Expence of ſuch an Undertaking, which I could not anſwer for. They then very kindly offered me Thirty Thouſand Rupees. I replied, Thirty Lack would not induce me to fire a Shot at it; and therefore I requeſted to hear no more on the Subject. I deſired to know what Agreement they had made with Surnet Sing. As I was on the Point of marching, they informed me all Agreement was at an End, as they had an Offer from Anrood Sing of the Reſtoration of their Country, taken by Hindooput, and could not be at the Expence of ſupporting Surnet Sing. I deſired them to inform their Maſters I was not only ſurprized, but ſorry for this Circumſtance; that I was obliged to them for the Trouble they had put themſelves to, to demonſtrate their Friendſhip to the Company in a Viſit to me; and as their Buſineſs was now at an End, I wiſhed them to return to their Country as ſoon as convenient. They aſked me when they ſhould go? and I replied, the ſooner the better; To-morrow, if they choſe it, as I could have no Objection: Thus we parted. As the Vackeels had informed me their Maſters would take their Leave of me, I thought no more of it, as I was to be informed from Surnet Sing the Cauſe of all this. He aſſured me they had intended nothing from the Beginning, and only acted a Part to cover a Treaty with Anrood Sing, which he had Reaſon to believe they had concluded; that he had no farther Expectation from them, and that they were better at a Diſtance; that he would give me all the Aid in his Power to forward my March, whatever Riſk he run.

On the 9th early I had a Report of Goman and Coman Sing having marched in the Night, and gave it out that it was by my Orders they had marched away; and that they were afraid to diſobey me. They were got Seven Coſs off before I was aware of it, near to Seerangur: I ſent immediately after them, to know the Meaning of ſo precipitate a Departure, without taking Leave: Soon after an Hircarrah arrived from Pannah, from Benny Hozoory, one of Anrood Sing's Miniſters, with an intercepted Letter from the Vackeels of Goman and Coman Sing, ſent by them to Anrood Sing, in

 which

which they inform their Maſters of having executed their Orders, had concluded a Treaty with Anrood Sing, entreating them to raiſe Troops at my Expence, and preſcribe a Mode of their joining Anrood's Army: Benny Hazoory, offended at this Meaſure, has quitted Anrood and the reſt; has ſecured himſelf at Pannah, and offers to join Surnet Sing whenever I ſhall deſire him. Cullock Sing has offered to quit them alſo, and join Surnet with Three hundred Horſe. They are ſuch a Set of vile Scoundrels, that in the Midſt of all this I reſolve to march from this Place on the 14th, by the Route of Rage Gurr, to induce Anrood to move to Callinger; when I ſhall turn to the Right, and purſue my Route to Sagur, by which Means I ſhall have nothing to offend me but Ballajee, who I think will acquieſce. The Rains are leſſened, and I hope pretty fair Weather till I reach Houſhenabad, which I ſhall get to with every poſſible Diſpatch; and I think I have met with no Diſadvantage or Delay by my Halt here; and I am in Hopes to have the Board's Sentiments regarding Munroe's Affair and Mhow, ere I quit it. Goman and Coman Sing's Vackeels are returned, and expreſs their Maſter's Uneaſineſs at going away without taking Leave: But to convince me of their Friendſhip, ſay they are going to chaſtiſe my Enemies, and bring the Head of Gunnaiſh Hazoory (the Kellidar of Raat) to my Feet, who all agree was the Perpetrator of the horrid Tranſaction on Captain Munroe. I find the Board's Orders for garriſoning Kalpee has reached Lieutenant Colonel Wilding and Captain Rawſtorne, and retaining it for their further Inſtructions, without any Reference to my Agreement with Ballajee and Gunga Durr.

I ſhould therefore be glad to have the Board's Inſtructions, whether upon Ballajee's future Conduct to me, I may not promiſe the Reſtitution of Calpee, according to Agreement: In this Caſe, I muſt requeſt the Board's Inſtructions to Captain Rawſtorne, to comply with ſuch Requiſition as I may make to him on that Account.

I am with the higheſt Regard, &c.
(Signed) Matt^w Leſlie.

N° 138.

Mr. Francis—As further Intelligence may naturally be expected every Day of Colonel Leſlie's March from Chatterpore, or of his ſubſequent Proceedings, I ſhall only ſay at preſent, that the Doubts which I entertain concerning the Motives of Colonel Leſlie's Conduct, and which appeared to have made the ſame Impreſſion upon every Member of the Board, at our laſt Meeting, are not removed, nor can they be removed, until I ſee ſatisfactory Reaſons aſſigned for his halting at Chatterpore, from the 3d July to the 14th Auguſt; how much longer he may ſtay there is uncertain. It appears by the preſent Letter, that he is implicated in ſome Shape or other, in the Diſputes and Intereſts of the Rajah, and other Chiefs of the Bundlecund Country; but it does not appear of what Nature his Connections with them are, or what Reaſons induced him to take Part in their Affairs: That the Prince of the Country ſhould wiſh to detain a foreign Army in the Heart of his Dominions, and in the Poſſeſſion of his Capital, and that he ſhould endeavour to prevent ſuch an Army from marching out of his Country, if it were their Inclination to do ſo, I preſume, will be thought too unreaſonable to deſerve Credit. As to the Rains to which Colonel Leſlie in part attributes his Delay, I muſt beg Leave to remind the Board, that it was conſtantly and repeatedly urged in Argument here, when the poſſible Difficulties that might attend the March were in Conſideration, that the Rains would rather relieve the Army, or at leaſt that they would be no Impediment to their March. For theſe Reaſons I muſt declare for myſelf, that the Doubts I have entertained of Colonel Leſlie's Halt at Chatterpore remain unremoved.

The Governor General—Of what Nature the Connections are which may have been formed between Colonel Leſlie and the Chiefs of Bundlecund, I know not: And I think it will ill become the Juſtice or Dignity of this Board to form their Opinion on them from public Rumours, or to pre-judge his Conduct, while the Circumſtances and Motives of it are confeſſedly unknown. I will own that I have felt the Diſappointment of his continuing ſo long at Chatterpore, at leaſt equally with the other Members of the Board, perhaps much more ſenſibly; and I have been as little pleaſed with the apparent Connection between him and Surnaut Sing, becauſe I knew not the Nature of it, nor to what it tended, and becauſe I had expected as a Right, the moſt unreſerved Communication of it: I feared the Detention of our Forces for the Purpoſe of effecting a Revolution in the Government of Bundlecund; an Event, to which he might be naturally led, if he conſulted only the Influence of his Paſſions by the ſtrong Provocation which he has received from the Rajah, and the Senſe of Obligation ariſing from the ſeaſonable Offers of Service made to him by Surnaut Sing, the Rajah's elder Brother. It is a Juſtice due to Colonel Leſlie to afford the Board ſuch Information as I am in Poſſeſſion of relative to his Connection; and it is the more neceſſary, as the Letter which I have juſt recorded refers for ſuch an Explanation to one which he had before written to me: This I ſhall therefore beg Leave to inſert.

(Duplicate.)

(Duplicate.) Camp at Chatterpore, Auguſt 4th 1778.

Sir,

Laſt Night I received by Expreſs Coſſids from Poona (which they left the 22d of June) a Letter from Mr. Moſtyn, a Copy of which I tranſmit you, with the Maratta Governor's Credentials for my free March through their Territories; which with the particular ones I am already in Poſſeſſion of, I am in Hopes I ſhall have no further Moleſtation in my March, and that I ſhall be amply ſupplied with Proviſions, as I have the voluntary Aſſurances of ſeveral of the leſſer Chiefs South of Sagur, of giving me all the Aſſiſtance in their Power.

I do not know what further Line Ballajee will take, as he is ſtill in Arms, and lying in my Way, but I apprehend he will be now ſubmiſſive, perhaps complaiſant, as Benny Ram will neceſſarily ſee him on his Journey, as he lies on his Road, and will have a Memorandum from me. I have had no late Communication with him, but I find he is anxious for the Return of his Fort of Kalpee, which I think from his Behaviour ought to be retained, unleſs his future Conduct may deſerve the ratifying the Agreement made with his Brother, which he acknowledges himſelf bound by. I have received a Letter from Goonga Durr, requeſting the fulfilling my Engagement to him, of re-delivering him Kalpee on my Arrival at Chatterpore. I have anſwered him, that from his own Behaviour I would comply with his Requiſition of the Return of Kalpee; but as I hold his Brother Ballajee equally bound by that Agreement (and which he acknowledges himſelf to be) his Breach of it by taking up Arms, and urging all the Powers around to do the like, and in Conjunction with him, to oppoſe a March they had conſented to, and by committing Acts of Hoſtility againſt me, I did not think myſelf juſtifiable in delivering back Kalpee, until I had received the further Orders of Government, whom I had informed of the Circumſtances, and his further Conduct deſerved ſuch Acquieſcence.

I ſhould be glad to know the Sentiments of the Government on this Occaſion; and whether, if the Conduct of Ballajee be friendly and hoſpitable towards us, I may not promiſe the immediate Delivery of it. Anrood Sing is ſtill in Force, and doing all in his Power, by Power of Money, to draw more Forces together; he has made large Offers to Goman and Coman Sing to join him, and extirpate us: They confeſs ſo. Saurnet Sing and they are in Agreement to ſupport one another; they will, I hope, finiſh it To-morrow (when I am to ſee it) and which they hope will meet with the Protection of your Government, which they ardently wiſh their Behaviour will merit. This over, all my Supplies are to be amply found me, and every Aid given me into Ballajee's Territories lying before me, and preventing Anrood Sing from harraſſing my Rear. The Rains are now heavy; but I hope Receſs in a few Days, when my March will be continued.

I have the Honour to be, &c. &c.

(Signed) Matt[w] Leſlie.

Governor General—As Motives have been aſſigned on Conjecture for Colonel Leſlie's Conduct, and theſe ſtrongly ſupported by the apparent Inconſiſtency of the Rajah's Oppoſition on any other Grounds, I hope I ſhall be excuſed if I take up a ſmall Portion of the Time of this Board in ſuggeſting the probable Grounds of both.

The Rajah is a Youth, I think of Fifteen Years of Age; his Judgment of courſe pliant to every Advice and Information given him by thoſe who are in Poſſeſſion of his Confidence. It is not poſſible that his Conduct can be governed by the Principles of Prudence, or by a real Knowledge of his own Intereſt. We know that Ballajee, the Maratta Chief, who oppoſed the Firſt Movement of our Troops in the Paſſage of the Jumna, and has continued his Hoſtilities to them without Intermiſſion from that Time, notwithſtanding the Accommodation concluded between him and Colonel Leſlie, very ſoon after joined the Rajah, and has been the prime Mover of all his Actions. In Effect, it is Ballajee, an Alien, and not the Sovereign of the Country, who, to uſe the Words of Mr. Francis's Minute, has endeavoured to prevent our Army from marching out of his Country. Ballajee might have obviouſly ſuggeſted to the Rajah, that the Object of this Armament, though ſpeciouſly diſguiſed under the Pretext of being deſtined for the Protection of Bombay, a Part of the World too remote for his Knowledge, was ſolely to affiſt the Pretenſions of his elder Brother to the Sovereignty of his State; and the ſubſequent Junction of his Rival with our Army, which could not but have been foreſeen by the Maratta Chief, might be eaſily made by him to appear a Proof of his Inſinuations, though in Effect a neceſſary Conſequence of his Councils; and mere Aſſertions would have been ſufficient to convince a young Prince of Fifteen Years of Age, and to induce him to regard and treat our Army as his Enemies. This may ſuffice for the probable Motives of the Rajah's Conduct. As to Colonel Leſlie, after the unprovoked Enmity which had been ſhewn him by the Rajah, and the Attempt made by him to diſtreſs the Army in the moſt important Article of Proviſions, it was an obvious Policy to embrace the Friendſhip of any Competitor, who might at the ſame Time ſerve to intimidate the Rajah to Peace, and inſure Supplies of Proviſions under his Command. If this was his Motive, it was ſo far laudable; if he had any other, or, to ſpeak more plainly, for there can be but One other, if it was his Intention to diſpoſſeſs the Rajah in being, and to raiſe his Brother to the Sovereignty of Bundlecund in his ſtead, he has diſobeyed the poſitive Orders of the Board, and proved himſelf unworthy of the Confidence which they have repoſed in him. The Truth of this will hereafter appear.

I am ſorry that Colonel Leſlie ſhould have made uſe of the Rains as a Reaſon for his Continuance at Chatterpore; it might be the Cauſe of retarding his March, but certainly could be none for fixing him for Forty-two Days together to one Spot; and it is as certain that his Infantry could, at leaſt with equal Facility, have paſſed over the Ground over which the Cavalry of his Enemies have retreated. I ſtill affirm, not as a Point of Belief, but of Certainty, that the Seaſon of the Rains was beyond all Compariſon more favourable to the March of the Troops than the dry Weather which preceded it; but as Mr. Francis has quoted my former Declarations upon this Subject from Memory, I believe and hope at leaſt that he has carried his Recollection of my Aſſertions beyond the Reality. It was ſcarcely poſſible that I could have ſaid that the Rains would be no Impediment to the March of the Army. I had made this a Subject of very minute Enquiry; and I knew that at certain Times the heavy Rains which fell would ſwell the little Rivers of that Country over which his Route lay, ſo as to render them impaſſable, but that they would preſently ſubſide, as the Cauſe which filled them ceaſed. They might certainly impede and delay, but they undoubtedly would not prove a total Obſtruction to the March. What I ſaid, reſpected the Health and Safety of the Troops, and the Conveniency of Shade and Water; the Hardſhips to which the Troops were expoſed until the Setting in of the Rains, have verified what I foretold. The Extract will be but ſhort of what I formerly dictated on this Subject; and I beg that the Secretary may be allowed to enter it after this Minute.

21. Conſ. Apr. 1778. Governor General—It was a very early Subject of my Enquiry to know what Inconvenicies our Troops would be expoſed by marching in the Rains, which at the firſt occurred to me as an inſurmountable Obſtacle. I have every Reaſon to believe, and am confirmed in my Opinion by that of Colonel Leſlie, that the rainy Seaſon ſo far from proving an Objection, will rather facilitate the March, and prove a Relief to the Troops, which will ſuffer more from the exceſſive Heats and from Drought in the elevated and open Plains, through which they will probably paſs, than by the rainy Seaſon whenever it ſhall overtake them, as it certainly will; poſſibly too they will be leſs expoſed to the Attack of Cavalry in the Rains, and in reſpect to Health, our own Records afford us one Inſtance, and I believe more, of our Sepoys, and even European Infantry, recovering from a State of Sickneſs, by a March begun in the very Height of the Rains, as was the Caſe in the laſt Campaign of Colonel Champion.

1 st May. Governor General—I have in a former Minute declared, that I regarded the rainy Seaſon as favourable to the Expedition conducted by Colonel Leſlie.

Mr. Francis. I do not mean to prejudge Colonel Leſlie's Conduct, or to aſſign any Motives whatever for his Actions. Thoſe which the Governor General has ſtated may be well founded, but they are formed upon Conjecture only: I have only ſaid that my Doubts are not removed; and I ſubmit it to the Judgment of the Court of Directors, taking Things in the Point of View in which they ſtand before us at this Moment, whether ſuch Doubts are warranted or not: I hope the Governor General will pardon me, if I ſay that it appears to me, that even his Mind is not yet quite ſatisfied on this Subject.

Governor General—I muſt beg Leave to cloſe the Debate, which I think does not require my Continuation of it; the Event will better prove, than any Concluſions drawn by Mr. Francis or myſelf upon preſent Appearances, whether Colonel Leſlie has conducted himſelf with a ſtrict Regard to his Duty and Attention to the Service on which he was entruſted.

Warren Haſtings,
Rich[d] Barwell,
P. Francis,
Edw[d] Wheler.

APPENDIX, N° 139.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 28th September 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler,
} Eſquires.

THE Proceedings of the 17th Inſtant read and approved.

Read the following Letters from Colonel Leſlie:

Honourable

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I did myſelf the Honour of addreſſing you the 15th Inſtant, encloſing Copies of Two Letters I had received from Mr. Lewis at Poona. The encloſed is a Copy of a ſubſequent Letter to the former, which reached me ſince the Diſpatch of my laſt.

I encamped here this Morning, and ſhall proceed To-morrow to Raje Gur, from whence I hope to be able to inform you further of the State of Affairs here.

I have the Honour to be, &c.

Camp at Keſſoar Gunge, 16th Auguſt 1778. (Signed) Matt^w Leſlie.

To Colonel Leſlie.

Sir,

Incloſed is Duplicate of my laſt Letter under the 18th Inſtant.

I diſpatch this purpoſely to acquaint you, that notwithſtanding the Duſtucks already granted by Madjee Scindia, for your free Paſſage through his Country, I Yeſterday received Intimation he intends ſhortly marching from hence with his whole Force, amounting to about Twenty thouſand Men, to ſtop your March; and to put you on your Guard, not only againſt his declared Deſigns, but alſo againſt any ſimilar Schemes he may have formed, in the Hopes he entertains of your repoſing a Confidence in his Duſtucks, and the private Orders he may in conſequence have given to his Officers, which in my Opinion are the moſt to be apprehended; for of all the Marattas, Scindia bears the Character of being the moſt deceitful. I would not adviſe you to place too much Confidence in Tookajee Holcar's Duſtuck, for though he may really mean well, yet in the late Change which has happened in this Government, he is ſo much reduced as to be obliged to comply with whatever Orders Madjee Scindia may give him.

I am, &c.

Poona, 26th July 1778. (Signed) Wm Lewis.

To the Honourable Warren Haſtings, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Members of the Supreme Council.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have the Honour to acquaint you, that I arrived at this Encampment in Three Days from Chatterpore, being the 17th, in the Forenoon.

I purpoſed to have encamped on the Banks of the Kaine River; but on advancing to examine the Ground with the Quarter Maſter General, the Troops of Anrood Sing, who are poſted on the oppoſite Banks of the River, immediately opened their Batteries: I therefore withdrew, and fixed my Camp about a Mile diſtant, out of the Range of their Shot. As this unprovoked Attack confirmed to me their hoſtile Intentions, I thought it neceſſary to take a nearer View of their Poſt, and as ſoon as the Troops came up, I advanced a Picquet of One Battalion with ſome Pieces of Cannon to the Banks of the River. The Enemy began a ſmart Fire upon the Troops as ſoon as they came in View, but without any Effect. I thought it neceſſary to exchange a few Shot and Shells, to ſhew my Sentiments of their Behaviour; and as I did not like to withdraw the Artillery immediately, without doing them ſome greater Miſchief than merely the Alarm of a Cannonade, I ordered a few Carcaſſes to be thrown among their Huts, which ſoon took Fire, and burnt with great Fury till Sun-ſet. As they have ſecured all the Boats on the oppoſite Banks, and I deem it unſafe to purſue my Route along the Kaine, with ſo conſiderable an Enemy in my Rear, the diſlodging them is become abſolutely neceſſary, and the Artificers of the Army are buſy at work preparing Punts and Rafts to paſs the River, and I hope to be able to make the Attempt in a Couple of Days at fartheſt.

The Rajah continues to deny that thoſe Acts of Hoſtilities are committed by his Authority, although his Troops keep up a conſtant Fire on any of our People going to the River for Water, both with their Guns and Matchlocks.

The Ceſſation of the heavy Rains is a very favourable Circumſtance for my croſſing; the River is fallen greatly, and is leſs rapid than the Firſt Day I arrived, and I am anxious to take the Advantage of the Opportunity for diſlodging the Enemy from their Poſt. I am yet doubtful of the Part Ballajee will take on my Advance towards Saugur. It is this Circumſtance that renders it more immediately neceſſary I ſhould take ſome effectual Steps to diſperſe the Army of Anrood Sing, for the Force of Sumaut Sing will not be able to withſtand him, and my Communication and Supplies muſt be inevitably interrupted.

I have the Honour to be, &c.

Camp Raje Gur, Auguſt 20th 1778. (Signed) Matt^w Leſlie.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I do myſelf the Honour to encloſe you a Duplicate of my Addreſs of the 20th Inſtant; I alſo beg Leave to forward to you an original Letter, which I received on the 22d, from the Preſidency of Bombay,

under the Signature of a Select Committee, authorized by the Honourable the Court of Directors, for the conducting all political and military Operations in that Part of Asia; in which you will perceive I am directed to change my Route, and to march by the Way of Kooranpore and Juneer, through the Bug. lana Country, instead of my former Destination to Surat or Broach; which these Gentlemen from the present State of Affairs at Poona, deem more liable to Difficulty than a more Southern Route.

On the 22d Instant Advances were made by the Ministers of Anrood Sing to come to Terms of Pacification; and Yesterday Two Messengers came across to my Camp with the most humiliating Professions from the Rajah, Anrood Sing totally denying that the Acts of Hostility committed by his Army were in any Shape authorized, and declaring they were ready to receive my Orders. I returned them with my Requisitions, comprized in a few Words, and I am promised an ultimate Answer To-day. The Situation of the Enemy's Post, and the Rapidity of the River, requires every Precaution to be taken for the Support of any Attack I may be necessitated to make; and the Artificers of the Army are busy building Boats and Rafts for this Service, which I shall not hesitate to attempt the Moment I am resolved whether their Proposals are real, or meant only to deceive and protract Time, as their whole Conduct has hitherto shewn.

The Readiness with which the other Brother, Surnaut Sing, complied with the Application of Government, to the Extent of his Abilities, and the Services he has rendered my Camp in the Article of Supplies, prompts me to secure his Independance and Property, in my Agreement with Anrood Sing; and I hope you will approve of my providing against any Jealousy of their's reaching him, after my Departure.

The Situation of Affairs at Poona, and the Advices communicated in Mr. Lewis's Letters, will, I trust, evince to you the Necessity of my destroying all Possibility of having my Communication cut off, which must have happened, had I pursued the more direct Route to Sagur, by the Way of Gool Gunge. I have now no Doubt of effecting this Advantage, either by a Treaty of Friendship with the Rajah, Anrood Sing, or the Dispersion of his Army.

I have the Honour to be, &c.
(Signed) Matt^w Leslie.

Camp at Raje Ghur,
August 24th, 1778.

To Colonel Leslie.

Sir,

Just after I had dispatched my Letter of the 26th (Duplicate of which is inclosed) I received your Two Favours of the 2d and 6th Instant, with the Packets enclosed for the Presidency of Bombay, which were immediately forwarded.

I have this Day received Information, that the Durbar have sent Orders to the Rajahs of Bundella, Coneha, Dutty, and Chunderry, to use every Endeavour to molest you on your March, and to avoid, if possible, coming to an Action; but should they find they are unable to stop your Progress, they are to deny having any Authority from this Government for opposing you. It is particularly recommended to them to prevent your receiving Supplies of Provisions.

I also now inclose the Original of a Letter from the Select Committee of Bombay to your Address, received this Morning; its Duplicate shall be forwarded in a Day or Two, or as soon as I can get any Information of the Roads between Brampore and Juneer.

I am, &c.
(Signed) Wm Lewis.

Poona,
the 30th July 1778.

APPENDIX, N° 140, 141, 142, and 143.

Extract of Bengal Secret Consultations, the 5th October 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Hastings, Governor General, President,
Philip Francis, } Esquires.
Edward Wheler, }
Mr. Barwell indisposed.

REceived the following Letter from Colonel Leslie:

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I am favoured with your Letter of the 4th ultimo; and it gives me great Satisfaction you approve of the Necessity I was under of reducing the Port of Mhow, and of inviting Surnait Sing to join me.

I have

I have with the utmoſt Caution avoided interfering with the Bundellah's Chiefs, either in their private or public Diſputes, and I ſhall perſevere in this Conduct; but in the Inſtance of Surnaut Sing, I hope you will think me juſtifiable in requeſting his Brother, Anrood Sing, to let him peaceably enjoy the Eſtate left him by his Father, and confirmed by a Treaty ſince his Death by the Miniſters of the young Anrood Sing; and that all Animoſity ſhould ceaſe betwixt them, and no Jealouſy remain for Surnaut Sing's joining me, which the young Rajah moſt readily agreed to; and the original Treaty to be finally determined by their own Agents. In fact, this is not near ſo much as they offered him not to join the Engliſh; but Surnaut Sing, wiſhing to be at Eaſe, is willing to quit all other Pretenſions to enjoy this undiſturbed; and I am induced to hope my interfering ſo far will meet with your Approbation, when I aſſure you he has rendered us the moſt ſingular Service in our Supplies, which have hitherto, by his Induſtry, been very ample. But I do not believe the Miniſters of Anrood Sing mean to have any thing ſettled, as they have evaded ſending the proper Perſons to do ſo for many Days; nor will they determine what Route I am to take, and give me Supply, until the Rain and Rivers will give me Leave to chuſe for myſelf, when I ſhall moſt certainly purſue my Route, according to your Orders.

I informed you in my Letter of the 24th ultimo, of the Proſpect I had of accommodating Matters with Anrood Sing; but on the 29th the Rains fell very heavy, and continued to do ſo all the 30th and 31ſt, which ſwelled the River exceedingly, and put a Stop to Hiera Loll, the Perſon Anrood Sing was to ſend me to determine finally my Route and Supply.

On the Evening of the 31ſt, I received Intelligence that Pudham Sing, who was ſtationed at Gool Gunge, had quitted that Place with the greateſt Part of his Forces, and had placed himſelf betwixt me and Chatterpore, with a View to ſtop my Supplies, which he ſo far ſucceeded in, as to carry off Three or Four hundred Oxen Load; and threatened Chatterpore with Pillage, if they admitted any Supply being ſent me. On this Information, I ordered Captain Popham, with his Battalion and Guns, with the Candahar Horſe, to march immediately towards Gool Gunge, to endeavour to drive Pudham Sing from his Poſt, and recover the Proviſion. He marched on the 1ſt Inſtant; on the Evening of which Day he had Intelligence of Pudham Sing's Situation, and the next Morning early he marched towards him. It was One o'Clock on the 2d before he could come up: On his Approach Pudham Sing's Troops got under Arms: Captain Popham's Grenadiers being advanced, and the Candahar Horſe on their Flanks, the Bundellahs began a briſk Fire on them; but the Grenadiers advancing with a few Vollies drove them, which gave an Opportunity to the Candahars to fall in amongſt them, and totally routed them, purſuing them near Three Coſs to Gool Gunge, where they retreated to, and near to which Captain Popham encamped. This Service was performed with the very inconſiderable Loſs of One Sepoy killed and Three wounded, One Candahar Horſeman killed and Six wounded; nor was there a Cannon Shot fired, as the Guns were not up. On the 3d, One of Captain Popham's Officers, Lieutenant Tidall, going too near the Fort, was ſhot through the Ancle with a Muſket Ball; and on this Night Pudham Sing abandoned the Fort, and is gone towards Punchumnagar, to join Bellajee.

The River has roſe again very conſiderably, which evinces a heavy Fall of Rain to the Weſtward.

My Detachment is healthy; and the very Moment the Rains will admit, I ſhall continue my Route.

Camp at Raje Ghur,
September 4th 1778.

I have the Honour, &c. &c.
(Signed) Matt^w Leſlie.

N° 141.

The Governor General lays before the Board the following Letter from Colonel Leſlie, dated 7th September:

Sir,

Nothing has happened ſince the 4th but an inceſſant Fall of Rain, and Anrood Sing's People uſing every Diligence to prevent my croſſing the River, notwithſtanding Hiera Loll ſays, in a Letter to me, he is impatient till he can ſee me.

I have this Day received a Letter from Moodajee Booſla, a Copy of which I tranſmit you, which will beſt explain his Sentiments, as he has requeſted I would communicate them. It gives me Satisfaction to find he is pleaſed at your ſending an Embaſſy to him, as I ſuppoſe he has got rid of the Jealouſy a Report of Troops marching by Cattack had given him.

I have received alſo a Letter from Lollah Judd Roy, from Houſhengabad, with repeated Offers of Friendſhip, and expreſſing his Anxiety for my coming up.

I have a Letter alſo from the Nabob of Bopal, expreſſive of his Friendſhip and Aſſiſtance. The Rains he ſays are very heavy, and Roads bad, Beneram has not got near that Country yet, as I expected, but I expect every Hour to hear from him.

I have received Letters alſo from Bellajee and Gungadur, expreſſive of their Satisfaction at the

Evacuation of Kalpy, and Declarations of Friendſhip towards us; yet I wiſh this Circumſtance had not taken place, until I had got out of Bellajee's Territory, as our retaining it a little would have kept him in Awe, but he will now ſuppoſe we are ſoliciting his Friendſhip, and he will plume himſelf upon the Condeſcenſion, and be retrograde.

Bellagee has paid no Attention to the Demand of the Vackeels of Ragoba for Five Lacks, which the Tuncaw expreſsly ſays, is for the Uſe of the Engliſh Army under my Command, but to be paid to them on their Receipt: He deſires they would come to him and confer on the Subject, but gives not the leaſt Hint of Payment or Refuſal. He ſays in his Letter to me, he has wrote to his Maſter, informing him of all Circumſtances, and will ever be obedient to his Will. I do not believe he means Ragoba.

The inceſſant Fall of very heavy Rain has prevented this Letter being ſent laſt Night, and has poured down in Torrents all this Day, and gives me an Opportunity of tranſmitting to you Copies of the friendly Engagements given me by Goman and Coman Sing, and mine on Account of the Company at their Requeſt, which I hope will meet with your Approbation, and evince how much I have endeavoured to eſtabliſh a Confidence in theſe Chiefs towards us, by every conciliatory Means in my Power, and baniſhing that Jealouſy impreſſed on them by Bellajee and others: Still his Influence makes Amrood Sing's Miniſters averſe to us, but I have the moſt ſolemn Aſſurances his Vackeel will be with me To-morrow, and I doubt not of reconciling them to my further March.

I have juſt received an Account that Twelve hundred (inſtead of Three hundred) Maratta Cavalry had advanced near to Gool Gunge, and did not go away with Puddum Sing, but ſtill remain: Captain Popham has taken a Look at them and their Situation, and will watch them narrowly; ſo that I cannot place the leaſt Share of Dependance on that ſubtle Fellow, Bellajee, who is I am confident lying by, urging every Difficulty to be thrown in my Way, until Time gives him an Opportunity of diſtreſſing me effectually himſelf. But the Inſtant the Weather and Rivers will permit, I will put him to the Teſt.

I am,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient and
faithful humble Servant,
(Signed) Matt. Leſlie.

Camp, Raje Ghur,
September 7th 1778.

Honourable Warren Haſtings, Eſquire.

Encloſures in Colonel Leſlie's Letter of the 7th September 1778; received the 1ſt October.

N° 1.

Copy of an Engagement on the Part of Maha Rajah Gomaun Sing and Rajah Comaun Sing, as follows:

We have entered into a firm and ſteady Friendſhip with the Sirkar of the Engliſh Company, through the Channel of the Nabob Shuniſh ul Dowla Mobarez ul Moulk, Colonel Matthew Leſlie Bahadre (to wit) We will ever continue ſteady and unſhaken in Friendſhip and Attachment to the Engliſh Company, and will never conſider ourſelves as in any Manner diſtinct from them. We will regard the Friends of the Engliſh Company's Sirkar as our Friends, and their Enemies as our Enemies; and whenever the Engliſh Company's Government requires our Aſſiſtance, we will certainly afford it. We have therefore written and delivered theſe few Lines in the Nature of a Treaty and Engagement, to which we have affixed our Seal and Signature to be made uſe of as Occaſion requires. Written the 26th of Rujjub 1192, Hegira, and the 20th Year of the Reign, or 19th Auguſt 1778.

A true Copy.
(Signed) P. Hay.
Perſian Tranſlator.

N° 2.

Copy of an Engagement on the Part of Shunuſh ul Dowlah Mobarez ul Moulk, Colonel Matthew Leſlie, Bahadre Sabut Jung, as follows:

In conſequence of the Engagement which Maha Rajah Gomaun Sing and Rajah Comaun Sing have executed to the Company and delivered to me, I, in the Name of the Engliſh Company, have alſo executed and delivered an Engagement, that whilſt the ſaid Maha Rajah is the Friend of the Engliſh Company's Sirkar, we are likewiſe their Friend, at all Times and on all Occaſions; nor will give any Interruption to the Country of the ſaid Maha Rajah: We deſire nothing more than Friendſhip and Union; and God grant that this Friendſhip and Union may continue to the End of Time. I have therefore written and deliver theſe few Lines, to which I have affixed my Seal and Signature,

Signature, in the Nature of a Treaty and Engagement to be employed as Occaſion requires. Written the 20th Rejjub 1192 Hegira, in the 20th Year of the Reign, or 13th Auguſt 1778.

A true Copy.

(Signed) P. Hay,
Perſian Tranſlator.

N° 142.

Mr. Francis—I know with Certainty that the Detachment was ſtill at Rajegur on the 9th September, and I believe we are not in Poſſeſſion of any Information of a later Date. Colonel Leſlie has now been at Chatterpore or in the Neighbourhood of that Place ſince the 3d July. I think the Delay is very extraordinary, and the Cauſes of it ought to be enquired into. It appears further, by his private Letter to the Governor General of the 7th, that he has entered into certain Engagements on the Company's Account with the Rajahs Gomaun and Comaun Sing; and it appears by his Letter to the Board of the 4th September, that he intends to interfere ſo far between the Two Brothers, Amrood and Surnaut Sing, as to obtain a Security for the latter for the peaceable Enjoyment of the Eſtate left him by his Father. As Colonel Leſlie had no Authority from the Board to enter into Treaties with the Princes of the Bundlecund Country; and as he is reſtricted by his Inſtructions from engaging the Company or himſelf in any Negociations with them, I think that this Part of his Conduct ſhould alſo be enquired into. The public Service may be materially affected, and poſſibly the Object of the Expedition under his Command totally defeated, while he delays his March, apparently for no other Purpoſe but to carry on Negociations, and to make Treaties with the Princes of the Country.

There is another Point which I think deſerves the Attention of the Board, though it is not regularly before us: A Difference has ariſen between Colonel Leſlie and Lieutenant Colonel Goddard the Second in Command, in conſequence of which the latter has demanded a Court Martial. The Board cannot but be ſenſible of the dangerous Conſequences of ſuch a Difference being ſuffered to continue between thoſe Officers; I muſt beg Leave to ſubmit my Opinion to the Board, that the Occaſion of it ſhould be enquired into, and our Determination given thereupon as ſpeedily as poſſible.

Governor General—It is not without great Reluctance that I have ſuffered another Member of the Board to take the lead in a Point in which I think myſelf the moſt intereſted, both on the public Account and my own. I ſhall not oppoſe Mr. Francis's Motion for an Enquiry; on the contrary, I ſhould myſelf have been the Firſt to propoſe it, if I had thought the Materials with which we are at preſent furniſhed, had brought the Subject to that State of Maturity which a Meaſure of that Kind demanded. It is not only true that Colonel Leſlie had no Authority from the Board to enter into Treaties with the Princes of Bundlecund; but the Whole of his Conduct in this Inſtance appears to be in direct Oppoſition to the expreſs Orders of the Board. I have formerly hazarded many Conjectures to account for the political Conduct of Colonel Leſlie, and have waited with the moſt anxious Impatience for ſuch an Explanation of it, as ſhould verify my Suppoſitions; but to this Hour I am equally uninformed with the Board, of the Cauſes and Particulars of Colonel Leſlie's Negociations. I have laid before the Board his Letter to me above recorded, becauſe I could not conſider it in its Nature as private, and the Board had a Right to my Communication of the Treaty concluded by Colonel Leſlie with Two of the Chiefs of Bundlecund, eſpecially as they are yet unacquainted with it by any Letter from him. The Irregularity with which the Diſpatches have been received, and the evident Miſcarriages which have attended ſome of them, induce me to believe that he has not been deficient in tranſmitting to the Board the regular Advices of ſo important a Tranſaction. Although it has not yet been received, the Treaty itſelf which has been formed with Gomaun and Comaun Sing, appears to be of little Conſequence. He has given the Board Reaſon to expect that it would have been ſoon followed by a Treaty with Surnaut Sing, the elder Brother and Competitor of the Raja of Bundlecund. I for my own Part wiſh to be in Poſſeſſion of this Treaty, which I muſt ſuppoſe will be accompanied with his Reaſons at large for taking a Part in the domeſtic Contentions of that Government, and ſuſpending the Courſe of his March for the Purpoſe, as it appears, of involving this Government in future Engagements, which he was expreſsly, and in thoſe Terms warned to avoid. On the 9th September, the lateſt Period of my Advices from the Detachment, more than Four Months had elapſed from the Commencement of its March. It had advanced 120 Miles, and I fear at an Expence of 12,00,000 Rupees; and in this Interval Colonel Leſlie has been informed of a War declared between France and Great Britain, and been urged by the Preſidency of Bombay to quicken his Progreſs for the Preſervation of the Company's Poſſeſſions on that Side of India from the Effects of a very formidable Invaſion, which they were inſtructed by Authority to expect. The Importance of the various Objects which are connected with the Operations of the Detachment, its Diſtance, and the ambiguous Appearances of the Circumſtances which have hitherto attended it, and have retarded, or ſeemed to have retarded its Progreſs, have furniſhed Grounds for a Variety of Rumours and Suggeſtions, which for the Credit of Colonel Leſlie he himſelf ought to uſe every Endeavour to efface, which it will be the Duty of this Government to ſcrutinize, and which for my own Reputation more eſpecially I moſt earneſtly wiſh to bring to the moſt

effectual

effectual Teſt. For theſe Reaſons I ſhall not oppoſe the preſent Motion, nor any other to which it muſt neceſſarily lead, if it ſhall be reſolved to act upon it immediately: Yet I muſt own I have many Objections to a Meaſure of ſuch Importance too precipitately undertaken; and my Objections are from an Experience which I believe no Member of this Board poſſeſſes in an equal Degree. I ſhall not mention the Inſtances, but I muſt expreſs it as my Opinion that this Government will hazard too much in the Proſecution of an Officer of ſuch high Rank, attended with a Circumſtance of his Removal from a Command of ſuch great and public Importance as that which Colonel Leſlie holds. The World ſeldom look beyond the Surface of Affairs; even Men of Buſineſs are often prevented from entering deeper into them, and unleſs the Proofs of Miſconduct are eſtabliſhed beyond a Poſſibility of a Doubt, the Charge may be reſented here as a common Cauſe, and at Home be converted to the Reproach of Government itſelf. I ſhall here leave the Queſtion without any further Deciſion upon it. With reſpect to the Difference that has ariſen between Colonel Leſlie and Lieutenant Colonel Goddard, the next Officer in Command, I have received the Particulars of it in a Letter from Colonel Goddard, dated 9th September, in which he mentions that he had written a Letter to the Commander in Chief, of which and its Encloſures he has ſent me Copies. As theſe contain all the Circumſtances of the Diſpute, and were expreſsly written to the General for the Information of the Board, through the regular and official Channel, and his original Letter to the General has by ſome Accident miſcarried, I ſhall here lay them before the Board, and ſincerely wish that the Explanation of Colonel Leſlie's general Conduct may prove as ſatisfactory to the Board as it will in this trivial Inſtance, from the Peruſal of the Papers now delivered.

Ordered, That the Letters from Lieutenant Colonel Goddard be referred to the public Department.

Mr. Francis—I yield to any Delay which the Governor General may think neceſſary, and not inconſiſtent with the public Safety.

Mr. Wheler—I agree to the Enquiry being poſtponed until the Governor General has received the neceſſary Papers from Colonel Leſlie.

Agreed, That this Subject lie for Conſideration.

N° 143.

Read the following Letter from Mr. Farquhar:

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

I encloſe a Duplicate of my laſt Letter; and it is now with the deepeſt Sorrow and Affliction that I am to inform you of the Death of Mr. Elliott. From the Time I wrote you on the 9th there was no Room for Hope, and laſt Night he expired, after a ſevere and painful Illneſs.

On the 8th Inſtant he deſired that your Orders and Inſtructions to him ſhould be ſealed up immediately after his Death, which has already been done in the Preſence of Mr. Anderſon. We are under the Neceſſity of proceeding immediately to Savangur, from which Place I ſhall again have the Honour of addreſſing you in a few Days.

I have the Honour, &c. &c.

(Signed) Rob[t] Farquhar.

On the Banks of a Nullah, 2 Coſs to the Eaſtward of Surangur, 13th September 1778.

Governor General—The Loſs which this Government has ſuſtained, and which I moſt ſenſibly regret in the Death of Mr. Elliott, renders it neceſſary for me to propoſe the Appointment of a Perſon to ſucceed to the Commiſſion entruſted to him. I do therefore formally move, that a Perſon be immediately appointed to repair to the Court of the Raja of Berar, and furniſhed with the ſame Inſtructions as were delivered to Mr. Elliott, for concluding a Treaty with that Government.

Mr. Wheler—The ſame Objections which were ſtarted by Mr. Francis, and acceded to by myſelf, ſtill remain in Force againſt the Commiſſion intruſted to the late Mr. Elliott; but as that Meaſure was adopted by a Majority of the Board; and as they alone are reſponſible for the Conſequences, I ſhall not now object to the Negociation being carried on.

Mr. Francis—I adhere to my original Objections to the Meaſure. I think they are greatly ſtrengthened by the Conſideration of the Time that will have been loſt by the unfortunate Event of Mr. Elliott's Death, as well as by the Loſs of that Gentleman in whoſe perſonal Qualifications the Confidence of this Government was particularly repoſed. I am therefore againſt the Continuance of the Commiſſion: At all Events I am of Opinion that it cannot be ſafely entruſted to any other Perſon with the ſame diſcretional Powers which were given to Mr. Elliott.

Reſolved, That the Commiſſion entruſted to Mr. Elliott be continued.

Governor General—The Abſence of Mr. Barwell, with whoſe Concurrence and Advice the original Commiſſion was recommended, induces me to decline the further Proſecution of this Subject until

until I can receive the Benefit of his Opinion and Aid on the further Meaſures which may be neceſſary for the Execution of it: I ſhall therefore ſuſpend for a Day ſuch Propoſitions as may be neceſſary; and in the mean Time I ſhall prepare to bring in a compleat Form before the Board.

Warren Haſtings,
Richard Barwell,
Edward Wheler.

APPENDIX, N° 144.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 7th October 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler,
} Eſquires.

MR. Barwell—I agree to the Reſolutions of the Board on the Propriety of this Government taking ſome Meaſures on the Conduct of Colonel Leſlie, and on the Suſpenſion of the Subject, provided it do not continue for an indefinite Time.

Governor General—Having more thoroughly conſidered the Subject of the Commiſſion lately given to Mr. Elliott, and the late Seaſon of the Year, from which I very much apprehend that any Renewal of it would be attended with many Difficulties, and a great Degree of Uncertainty, I now requeſt the Permiſſion of the Board to withdraw the Motion made by me at the laſt Conſultation, for the Appointment of a Perſon to ſucceed Mr. Elliott as Miniſter at the Court of the Rajah of Berar; I cannot immediately offer any other Expedient to the Board. The News of Mr. Elliott's Death muſt have reached Nagpore within little more than a Week after that unhappy Event. It cannot have eſcaped the Attention of Moodajee Booſla, that both his Intereſt and ours, ſo far as they were connected with the Deſign of that Negociation, muſt ſuffer materially from the Delay which will be occaſioned by the Appointment of a new Commiſſion; and this Conſideration will probably have ſuggeſted to him the Neceſſity of preventing it, by making immediate and ſpecific Propoſals to this Government. His Letters contain Proofs of a Deſire, and even a Degree of Impatience to enter upon the Buſineſs which was to be propoſed to him by Mr. Elliott; and I can ſee the ſtrongeſt Reaſons which ſhould induce him to ſolicit our Alliance. As a Proof that this is not a merely ſpeculative Concluſion, I beg Leave to inſert in this Place an Extract from his laſt Letter.

" The Deputation of Mr. Elliott, to conſult with me, and negociate certain Points, is highly proper " and expedient, and I now wait his Arrival. As Rajah Ram Pundit is well acquainted with the " ſtrict Ties of Friendſhip and Union between us, he has, doubtleſs, agreeable *to your* Deſire, ſecured " the French Chief, ſhould he have come that Way; yet I have, in conſequence of your Wiſh, ſent " him expreſs Orders to that Effect, directing him to make ſtrict Search throughout the Diſtrict under " his Charge, for him and his Followers, and having apprehended, to ſend them with their Papers to " you, which he will without Doubt comply with."

For theſe Reaſons, and becauſe there is always a greater Advantage in receiving Solicitations than in making Advances, I wiſh to wait for the Receipt of his Letters before we form any decided Plan for our future Tranſactions with him. The Subſtance and Complexion of theſe may ſuggeſt the beſt Means of accompliſhing the Ends propoſed by the late Deputation; and I have the greater Reaſon to hope they may, becauſe, from the Information and Inſtructions which I have formerly given to Benaram Pundit, the Rajah's Vackeel, who is lately returned to his Maſter, and was ſent back for the Purpoſe of aſſiſting in the intended Negociation, he will be able in a great Meaſure to ſupply the Place of an immediate Agent from this Government, and to ſuggeſt to the Rajah ſuch Propoſitions to be made to us for our Alliance, as will be moſt likely to receive our Concurrence. In the mean Time I think it will be ſufficient to write a ſhort Letter to the Rajah, mentioning the Misfortune which has put a Stop to the Negociation, and deſiring only for the preſent he will afford his Aſſiſtance in promoting the March of the Detachment to the Place of its Deſtination.

Mr. Wheler—If the Letter is not meant to include any thing further than a Deſire to forward the March of the Detachment, in caſe it ſhould hereafter be expedient for it to continue its Route, I have no Objection to the Motion.

Mr. Francis—Having oppoſed the original Motion, I can have no Objection to its being withdrawn. The Objects of Mr. Elliott's Negociation were ſuppoſed to be of ſo inſtant and preſſing a Nature, that he was authoriſed to come to an immediate Concluſion with Moodajee Booſla, without waiting for further Orders from this Board. If the Nature of theſe Objects be not ſince altered, the

Delay which has already happened, and the further Delay which is now propoſed, muſt annihilate the whole Plan of the Commiſſion upon its own Principles. I am therefore againſt any Intimation being given to the Rajah, that ſuch Plan will ever be renewed; I am againſt deſiring his Aſſiſtance in promoting the March of the Troops to the Place of their Deſtination, becauſe it is my Opinion that the Detachment ſhould be immediately ordered into the Provinces. They cannot be of Uſe in carrying into Execution any Object of an Alliance with Moodajee Booſla, ſince that Alliance, whatever were the Objects of it, is now put off ſine Die; they cannot be of Uſe in promoting the Views of the Council of Bombay for the Reinſtatement of Ragoba, becauſe we have Intelligence that his Party is completely overſet; and I believe every Member of this Board is convinced, as well as myſelf, that the Bombay Council have really relinquiſhed all Views of that Nature, though they have not told us ſo themſelves, as it was their Duty to have done. The March of the Detachment cannot, as I conceive, be of any Service in any other Senſe: Suppoſe, for Example, againſt the French, for that I think is the only poſſible Caſe that remains to be put; they have taken above Four Months to march from Calpee to their preſent Situation, that is about 120 Miles, and we have yet no certain Intelligence that Colonel Leſlie was making any effectual Preparations to croſs the Cain River. At this Rate of marching, I ſubmit it to the Board to conſider in what poſſible Time the Detachment is ever likely to arrive at Bombay, excluſive of any Check or Delay to which they may be expoſed by direct Oppoſition on the Part of an Enemy. I have a Right by fair Computation to conclude that they would not arrive this Twelvemonth. In the mean Time the Board will conſider to what Accidents they are liable in the Courſe of ſuch a March, and how very poſſible it is that this Part of our Force may be equally loſt in every Quarter to the Defence of the Company's different Poſſeſſions. I do not mean to make it a formal Motion, becauſe I will not trouble the Board with uſeleſs Debate, but I am glad to acquit myſelf of what I think is eſſentially my Duty in ſtating my Opinion that the Detachment ſhould be recalled, and this ſhould be done even upon the new Grounds which new and unexpected Events have created: If, nevertheleſs, it ſhould be determined to proceed, I muſt remind the Board that the Detachment is actually under Orders to halt in Berar, and that we muſt now determine poſitively whether its future Motions are to be regulated by the Orders of the Council at Bombay, or by ours. It is a Point, as I think, of very great Conſideration, not to place the commanding Officer between Two Authorities.

Mr. Barwell—I agree entirely to the Propoſitions made by the Governor General, and though I think it very poſſible that the untimely Death of Mr. Elliott may deprive this Government of thoſe great Advantages I expected from his Abilities, and the Plenitude of the Powers with which he was entruſted, yet I cannot, upon the Principle of that Policy that regulated my Aſſent to the political Meaſures planned by the Governor General, think with Mr. Francis, that becauſe I deſpair of reaping every Advantage I ſhould loſe Sight of thoſe few which, under the preſent Circumſtances, we may ſtill graſp. The Maratta Power, and that of the Decan, require to be counterpoiſed by an Influence in the Engliſh Government, which may operate by Means of Alliances, ſeparating the Powers of which it is compoſed, and uniting a Part of their proper Strength to our's. The Intereſt of the Governments at Bengal and Berar lead to a natural Union between the Two States; but as it is not my Purpoſe at preſent to enter into a long Diſcuſſion of a great political Queſtion, I ſhall content myſelf with obſerving, that in Prudence we ought to make the beſt of the Circumſtances that may preſent themſelves.

Governor General—Mr. Barwell has made it unneceſſary for me to anſwer the principal Parts of Mr. Francis's Defence; my Reply therefore will be very ſhort.

The Objects of Mr. Elliott's Negociation, though inſtant and urgent, are not therefore neceſſarily annihilated; Time perhaps may decide this Point between us.

The March of the Detachment is not unneceſſary, becauſe the Alliance is put off ſine Die. The Reaſon for this Concluſion not having been aſſigned, nor being ſelf-apparent, cannot be anſwered by other Reaſons.

It is true that we have every Reaſon to believe that the Preſidency of Bombay have really relinquiſhed all Views to the Reinſtatement of Ragoba; but the Reſtoration of Ragoba was never the Object of this Government, though it might have eventually proved a Means. My Reliance is placed on Moodajee, and on the ſtrong Connection of his Intereſt with our's, in the Event of any Operations of our Detachment.

It is not fair to draw Concluſions of future Events from paſt Errors, and the Suppoſition of their being ſuffered ſtill to prevail. The March of the Detachment from Calpee to Rajegur might have been made with Eaſe in Ten Days. I hope the Meaſures which the Board will take for the future Conduct of the Detachment, will effectually prevent ſuch Delays in the Progreſs of it.

On the Whole, whether the Detachment ſhall be required to act in the Proſecution of any Engagements with Moodajee, or for the Reſtoration of Ragoba, or in direct Oppoſition to the French, or even ſhould it be found neceſſary or expedient to recall it at a future Period, ſtill the preſent Continuance of its March is proper, until the Criſis ſhall arrive that ſhall call upon us to make our Option of its ultimate Deſtination: Its Situation in Berar will be central to all our Settlements in India; it will be a Check on the Poona Government, if it only meditates Deſigns againſt us; it will be at Hand to oppoſe them, if they ſhall be actually formed; and that ſuch Deſigns are formed, I am morally certain.

The Intimation given by Mr. Francis, of the preſent Situation impoſed on the Detachment, is an Incroachment on a new Queſtion, not before the Board. So much of the Time of this Board is waſted in Debate, that I am obliged to procraſtinate many Subjects, which I have wiſhed to bring before its immediate Conſideration, and which have required immediate Determination, becauſe the

Hour

Hour of Buſineſs was paſt. There now remains to reſolve what Orders ſhall be given to Colonel Leſlie for the future March of the Detachment, and what Information or Inſtructions ſhall be written to the Preſident and Council of Bombay. For the Firſt, I think it will be neceſſary to order Colonel Leſlie to proſecute his March, in conjunction with the Troops of Moodajee Booſla, if that Chief ſhall agree to join him with a Force ſufficient for that End; and to obey all Orders which he ſhall receive hereafter from the Preſident and Council of Bombay for his Detachment to proceed; with a diſcretionary Power to ſuſpend his March after his Arrival within the Territories of the Rajah of Berar, if the Rajah ſhall refuſe or decline to afford his Aſſiſtance, and he ſhall not have received any Orders from the Preſidency of Bombay to proceed. And for the latter, to inform them of the preceding Reſolutions; to deſire them, that if the Plan which they adviſed us in their laſt Letter of the 25th July ſtill ſubſiſts, or if they ſhall have formed any other Plan or Deſign for the Reſtoration of Ragoba, under the Conditions already preſcribed for our Aſſent thereto, which ſhall require the Aſſiſtance of the Detachment commanded by Colonel Leſlie; or if the Neceſſity of providing for the immediate Safety of their Preſidency againſt a French Invaſion ſhall require the Detachment to proceed at all Hazards to their Aſſiſtance, even without the Junction of any Power in Alliance with us; they will, in either of ſuch Caſes, and ſuch only, command the Detachment to advance, but in all others leave it to act under our Orders. Theſe are the Outlines and Subſtance of the Reſolutions which I think neceſſary for concluding the Buſineſs now before us; and I beg Leave to ſubmit them in this looſe Manner to the Conſideration of the Board, that if they ſhall meet their Approbation, they may be reduced into a more correct Form, as the Reſolutions of the Board.

Ordered, That the Governor General's Propoſition be ſent round for the Opinions of the Members of the Board.

Warren Haſtings,
Richard Barwell,
Edward Wheler.

APPENDIX, N° 145.

Letter from Governor General to Medajee Bhooſila; written 11th October.

A FEW Days ſince I received Advices of the Death of Mr. Elliott on his Way to Naigpore. This unfortunate Event, which is equally a Loſs to you and to myſelf, as he would have been the Inſtrument of cementing a Friendſhip between your Government and the Company, which would have endured for ever, has unavoidably, and to my great Concern, put a Stop to the Negociations which that Gentleman was to have conducted with you on the Part of this Government, as the preſent Situation of Affairs will not admit of a Delay which muſt attend the deputing another Perſon from hence: But I have ſtill a Reſource for effecting the important Objects of Mr. Elliott's Miſſion in your favourable Diſpoſition towards the Company; your Conviction that your Intereſts and theirs are inſeparably connected; and in the Zeal of Beneram Pundit, whom during the long Period he reſided with me, I found ſo deſerving of my Confidence, from his ſincere Attachment to our common Intereſts, that I communicated to him my Sentiments and Views with reſpect to the Engagement I wiſhed to form with you in the moſt full and explicit Manner; he will explain to you both the Conditions which I ſhould require, and thoſe to which I ſhould yield my Acquieſcence: To him therefore I refer you, and requeſt that you will give him a very attentive Hearing. You will perceive that it is not my Inteption or Wiſh to gain Advantages without a Return: I know that no public Alliance, no private Friendſhip can ſubſiſt without reciprocal and equal Advantages. It is on theſe Principles that I have long planned an Alliance with you, and the Time is now come for its Accompliſhment; for I conceive it to be equally for your Intereſt as for ours, our Countries bordering on each other, and our natural Enemies the ſame. Such being my Views, I have the ſtrongeſt Aſſurances of your ready Concurrence in my Deſigns; from you I want nothing but the Junction of your Powers with the Strength of this Government; each is ſingly conſiderable, but united they will be augmented to a Tenfold Proportion. The Detachment intended for Bombay has been impeded in its Progreſs, not by the Oppoſition of an Enemy, but by other Cauſes unneceſſary, and perhaps improper to mention; but it will now ſoon arrive in your Territories, and depend on you for its ſubſequent Operations. It is my Deſire, that you will order a ſtrong Force to join it, and accompany it to the Place of its Deſtination. I have given Orders to the Commander of the Detachment to co-operate with the Forces which you may think proper to unite with his: I require the Aſſiſtance of the Forces of your Sirkar for promoting the Ends of mine, and offer you the Forces of this Government to promote your Wiſhes: I have acquainted you with mine; and it will reſt with you to propoſe the Ends which may be attained for your Advantage in this Junction: I myſelf have ſuggeſted in Converſation to Beneram Pundit, the probable Advantages which I have ſuppoſed you would require, and I could grant;

grant; and the Knowledge of my Sentiments will therefore enable you to form ſuch a Concluſion as ſhall be equal in its Effects to a Treaty already agreed on.

It is the Character of my Nation to adhere inviolably to its Engagements, as long as Faith is obſerved by others; and it has been the invariable Rule of my Conduct to maintain that Character in all Acts depending on me; and having on good and judicious Grounds once formed any Deſign of Importance, to perſevere in it ſteadily to its Execution.

Having thus explained to you my Views and Wiſhes, I wait only to know yours, and on the Knowledge of theſe I ſhall form my ultimate Reſolutions.

To Dewagur Pundit. D°.

A few Days ſince, &c. (the ſame as the foregoing as far as) "the preſent Situation of Affairs will not admit of the Delay which muſt attend the deputing another Perſon from hence:" But I have ſtill a Reſource in your Wiſdom, your favourable Diſpoſition towards the Company, your approved Attachment to the Houſe of Bhooſila, and your Conviction that your Maſter's Intereſts and thoſe of the Company are inſeparably connected, for effecting the important Objects of Mr. Elliott's Miſſion. Beneram Pundit is fully acquainted with all my Sentiments and Views, and will explain to you both the Conditions which I require from the Maha Rajah, and thoſe to which I can yield my Acquieſcence To him therefore I requeſt you will give an attentive Hearing; and that you will jointly with him clearly ſtate them to your Maſter, and employ your Influence to procure them a favourable Reception.

You will perceive that it is not my Intention, &c. (continued to the End the ſame as the foregoing Letter, except where the different Rank and Situation of the Perſon addreſſed requires a Change in the Expreſſion.)

APPENDIX, N° 146 and 147.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 12th October 1773.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,

Philip Francis, Edward Wheler, } Eſquires.

Mr. Barwell indiſpoſed.

MR. Wheler gives in the following Minute, containing his Sentiments on the Propoſals offered to the Conſideration of the Board by the Governor General at the laſt Meeting.

Fort William, the 10th October 1773.

Mr. Wheler--When the Firſt Propoſals were made by the Governor General, for ſupporting the Government at Bombay in their Interference in the Diviſions of the Maratta State, they were uniformly oppoſed by me, becauſe I thought the Bombay Government unable from their Reſources either of Men or Money to ſupport the Alliance; becauſe I doubted the Strength of Ragoba, and his Friends; and becauſe I thought the Time peculiarly improper for diſtant Expeditions, and new Schemes of Alliance and Conqueſt, when the Nation was already involved in great Difficulties from a Domeſtic, and under immediate Apprehenſions of a foreign War; and with reſpect to one great Argument uſed, that it was neceſſary we ſhould interfere in the Maratta Diſputes becauſe the French were ſuppoſed to have made Alliances with them (though the Fact was not ſupported by Authority) I thought that ſuch Interference in us was more likely to force the Marattas into Terms with the French, from the Neceſſity of the contending Parties oppoſing one European Ally to another, from finding that we are determined, although againſt ſubſiſting Treaties, to interfere.

From theſe Motives I judged, that in good Policy we ought to leave the Marattas to ſettle their own Diſputes, to endeavour to cure rather than foment their Jealouſy of our former Interference, and to preſerve our Reſources both of Troops and Money for the Defence of our own already too extenſive Poſſeſſions, againſt our more natural Enemies.

But theſe Reaſons and Arguments were then over-ruled; and it being reſolved by the Majority of the Board to aſſiſt Ragoba, and to ſupply Bombay both with Men and Money, Colonel Leſlie, the Object of the preſent Diſcuſſion, was ordered to march thither; to this Meaſure I likewiſe more particularly

particularly objected, ſtating the enormous Expence, the Riſque of parting with ſo large a Proportion of our beſt Troops, and the Length, the Dangers, if not the Impracticability of the March; yet I was again over ruled, a Detachment in conſequence was ordered on the moſt expenſive Eſtabliſhment ever yet formed, and directed to proceed by a Route hitherto unknown and unpaſſed by our Troops.

Such being the Reſolutions of many Months ago, I will now take a View of the Effects produced by them. At Bombay, Ragoba's Affairs, notwithſtanding ſome unforeſeen Revolutions in his Favour, are not one Jot advanced; on the contrary, our laſt Advices prove to us, that his Hopes are entirely at an End, his Friends impriſoned, his Party diſperſed, and even the Governor General himſelf has formally given up his Cauſe by his Propoſal to ſupport the Pretenſions of Moodajee Boofla, and by his Anſwer to the Letter to Fort Saint George, under Date the 14th of Auguſt.

The Progreſs of Colonel Leſlie's Detachment has equally juſtified my former Opinions; the Governor General in his Minute of the 5th of October, having acquainted the Board, that from the laſt Period of his Advices from the Detachment, although more than Four Months had elapſed from the Commencement of its March, it had advanced only 120 Miles, and the Governor General fears at an Expence of 12,00,000 Rupees; that the commanding Officer had been informed of a War declared between France and Great Britain, and been urged by the Preſidency of Bombay to quicken his Progreſs for the Preſervation of the Company's Poſſeſſions on that Side of India, from the Effects of a very formidable Invaſion, which they were inſtructed by Authority to expect; nevertheleſs, our laſt public Advices leave him on the Banks of a rapid River, oppoſed by and in actual Hoſtility with a large Army of the Natives, through whoſe Country he is to paſs, having yet near a thouſand Miles to proceed to Bombay: I would therefore wiſh to be informed, how the Detachment is to ſubſiſt on the reſt of their March, which will be after they have paſſed the Cane River, at leaſt for a conſiderable Diſtance, through an Enemy's Country, before they enter Berar: whether there is not ſome Danger of their being ſurrounded, and their Proviſion cut off, or whether the Country through which they are to paſs can ſupply Proviſions for ſo large a Detachment; whether the Roads are paſſable, or how the Detachment is to croſs the Nerbudda, ſince they have met with ſuch Difficulties at the Cane River; how they are to be ſupplied with Money, Stores, and Ammunition, after they ſhall have expended what they have at preſent; how Diſpatches and Orders are to reach them; and what Aſſurances we have, that Moodajee Boofla will receive them as Friends, or join them as Allies, or give them a Paſſage through his Country?

I am likewiſe at a Loſs to diſcover, ſuppoſing the Detachment to arrive in Berar, and ſuppoſing them to meet with every favourable Reception, and that their Object is to proceed to Bombay, how the Governor General can *ſeriouſly believe* that Colonel Leſlie will effect a long March acroſs the hoſtile Part of the Maratta Territory, and in the Face of their numerous Armies, ſo expeditiouſly as to afford any Relief to Bombay, if that Place ſhall actually require it, in Conſequence of the Invaders that threaten them.

Until theſe Queſtions are reſolved to my Satisfaction, I muſt and ſhall continue uniformly againſt the March of the Detachment, and againſt any Treaty or Alliance to be made in conſequence, ſeeing no poſſible Good that can ariſe from either, but foreſeeing Dangers, Difficulties, Diſappointments, and enormous Expences from their further Attempt to proceed.

(Signed) Edward Wheler.

Mr. Francis delivers his Opinion, in the following Minute:

12th October 1778.

Mr. Francis—Having already objected to the further March of the Detachment, and having ſtated my Opinion that it ought to be recalled, I might have been content with voting againſt the preſent Motion, if other and more particular Objections to the Meaſures did not, as I think, ariſe out of the Motion itſelf.

1ſt. The March of the Army has now no fixed and determinate Object, if it ever had any; nor indeed, as far as I can diſcover, has it any Object at all. It is not poſitively to act in Conjunction with Moodajee Boofla upon the Plan of Mr. Elliott's Negociation, ſince that Negociation, with Alliance and ſubſequent Projects propoſed to be accompliſhed by it, is relinquiſhed.

It is not poſitively to co operate in the Re-inſtatement of Ragoba, ſince Caſes are put, in which it muſt either halt in Berar (with or without the Conſent of the Rajah) until further Orders from Calcutta, or proceed at all Hazards to Bombay, "for the immediate Defence of that Preſidency againſt "a French Invaſion."

Laſtly, It is not even poſitively determined that it ſhall proceed to Bombay, ſince in the Two other ſuppoſed Caſes, its March may either end in Berar, or be directed to Operations unconnected with the immediate Defence of Bombay againſt a French Invaſion. As the future Movements of the Army are to depend on different Contingencies, and as the Inſtructions to the commanding Officer muſt of Conſequence be conditional (to ſay nothing of the Perplexity in which ſuch Inſtructions may involve him) it appears plainly that this Board has no one determinate Object in View in ordering the Detachment to proceed: If the contrary be true, I deſire that ſuch Object may be ſtated in clear and preciſe Terms.

2. If this were not, as I deem it, an Objection fatal to the Meaſure, and admitting that there might be no Danger in leaving the Courſe of an Army to be determined by future Contingencies,

in a Point ſo eſſential as the ultimate Object of its Operations; ſtill the ſuppoſed Caſes which are eventually to guide the Motions of the Army, ought to be ſuch as may probably happen, not ſuch as we certainly know neither do nor can poſſibly have any Exiſtence. How is it poſſible, for Example, that Moodajee Booſla's Troops ſhould now act in Conjunction with Colonel Leſlie, who in the firſt Caſe is ſuppoſed to act under Orders from Bombay, when the Plan of Alliance, which alone could have engaged Moodajee Booſla to take ſuch a Step, is dropped? or what Motive can he now have for acting in Conjunction with Colonel Leſlie, when by the Terms of the Motion the March of the Detachment can in no Shape promote his perſonal Advantage? He has no Concern in defending Bombay againſt an Invaſion; much leſs is it his Intereſt to aſſiſt in re-inſtating Ragoba, whom he muſt conſider as his Rival and Competitor for the Government. Such at leaſt was the Principle on which Mr. Elliott's Negociation was planned and founded; if it be falſe, the whole Scheme of that Negociation, with all the Facts and Reaſonings introduced to ſupport it, falls to the Ground.—Again, It is ſuppoſed that the Bombay Council may have adhered to their firſt Project for the Reſtoration of Ragoba, and may be actually engaged in the Execution of this Project, or of ſome other of the ſame Nature, and for the ſame Purpoſe; and on this Suppoſition conditional Orders are given to Colonel Leſlie. This Part of the Motion I ſay implies a falſe Fact, and which the Governor General himſelf in ſome of his former Minutes admits to be ſo. It is well known that Ragoba's Party is annihilated, and that the Gentlemen of Bombay have dropped all Thoughts of executing the Plan of which they adviſed us in their Letter of the 25th July, or of engaging any farther in ſimilar Deſigns. But if the contrary were true, with what Reaſon or Conſiſtency could *we* reſume the Cauſe of Ragoba, whom we have renounced in the moſt formal Manner, and whom above Two Months ago, we looked upon as abandoned by the Partizans of his own Nation. In our Letter of the 14th of Auguſt we even forbid the Preſidency of Fort Saint George from taking any Meaſures in concert with Hyder Ally for the Support of Ragoba, and declared "that an Attempt to "re inſtate him in the Government of the Maratta Dominions might be attended with endleſs Diffi-"culties." Yet now Colonel Leſlie is to be ordered to co-operate in promoting the Succeſs of ſuch an Attempt.

The Third Suppoſition, on which Conditional Orders are given to Colonel Leſlie, though not amounting to an abſolute Impoſſibility, implies a Fact as nearly approaching to impoſſibleneſs the higheſt Degree of Improbability can do. The Neceſſity of providing *for the immediate Safety of Bombay* againſt a French Invaſion, is ſtated as one of the Caſes which eventually determine the March of the Army. We are now at the 12th of October; where Colonel Leſlie may be when our Letters reach him is very uncertain, I will ſuppoſe him however to have croſſed the Cane River, and to have reached Panna; Has the Diſtance from that Place to Bombay been computed? Is the Road known? Have Allowances been made for the Difficulties as well as the Length of the March? Is it certain that he will not meet with conſtant Hoſtilities and Oppoſition from the Marattas? or have we forgotten that he has already taken Four Months to march One hundred and Twenty Miles, through a Country much better known than that through which the Remainder of his March is to be proſecuted? When all theſe Circumſtances are combined, and even a moderate Allowance made for the Delay which they muſt unavoidably create, is there a Shadow of Probability left that the Detachment will reach Bombay Time enough to provide for its immediate Safety againſt a French Invaſion, ſuppoſing ſuch Invaſion to be attempted? But if there be no ſuch Probability, we plainly reſt our Meaſures upon falſe Grounds, and by Implication endeavour to juſtify the further March of the Army, by profeſſing to have in View an Object which we know, or on every rational Principle ought to believe is unattainable.

On Failure of all the preceding Suppoſitions, a Fourth conditional Inſtruction is propoſed, that if Moodajee Booſla ſhould refuſe to join Colonel Leſlie, and if Colonel Leſlie ſhould not have received any Orders from the Preſidency of Bombay to proceed, he ſhall in that Caſe halt in Berar; but it is neither determined what he is to do there, or whether he is to ſtay there againſt Moodajee Booſla's Conſent. It is not very likely that this Chief will be content to ſuffer a foreign Army to continue long in the Heart of his Dominions; but whether he be or not, Colonel Leſlie, in the Caſe ſuppoſed, muſt ſtay there at all Events, and perhaps be obliged to maintain his Ground by Force, and to enter into Hoſtilities with the very Prince whoſe Alliance we have lately ſolicited, and whoſe pacific Diſpoſition to us I deem to be eſſentially neceſſary to the Preſervation of the Detachment.

Colonel Leſlie's Situation in Berar I admit will be nearly central with reſpect to the Three Preſidencies; that is, he will be in the Center of Hindoſtan, and at ſuch a Diſtance from all of them as to make it impoſſible that the Force under his Command ſhould be of the leaſt Service to any of them.

It is out of my Power, for Want of Time, to put theſe Obſervations in a more regular Form. I ſtate them as they occur to me. The Governor General, in whoſe Hands the abſolute Diſpoſition of all Meaſures is now veſted, will conſider not only the Conſequences of the Meaſure itſelf, but the Appearance which it is likely to carry in England; and whether it be not probable that the Court of Directors, having in their View all the Events that have happened ſince the Detachment was firſt ordered, its manifeſt Departure from the direct and open Route to the other Side of India, the circuitous and ſlow Proceeding of the Army, the Inſtructions now intended, and the various Reaſonings which have been recorded at this Board upon the whole Tranſaction, may not conclude that it never was really and ſeriouſly intended that the Detachment ſhould go to Bombay?

(Signed) P. Francis.

Governor

Governor General—I hope it will not be expected from me to reply to all the Objections contained in the preceding Minutes, by the unprepared Reflections that may occur upon them at this Board, and under an Anxiety of Mind which I confess I feel, and which I wish to shake off before I enter into the customary Field of Debate. I am weary of verbal Contention. I feel for the Situation of the Public, and I feel too much for my own, to be solicitous about any Conclusions that may be formed upon my Conduct in the past Measures of this Government, which have been so severely canvassed by the present Members of this Board. If there are in England Men so devoid of common Sense as to suppose it possible for me to have formed a Plan ostensively professed for the Assistance of Bombay, but really meant as a Cover for other Designs, let them: Whoever they be, or in whatever Relation they may stand to this Government, such Opinions will give me no Kind of Concern.

It has been the Will of God to blast my Designs by Means which no human Prudence could have foreseen, and against which I had therefore provided no Resource. We were called upon by the Presidency of Bombay to assist them in a Plan which both their Peace and future Prosperity, the Company's Orders, and the general Interests of the British Nation in India, combined to recommend. It came further justified to us by the evident Facility of its Execution, and our Assistance was only required to support it, and render its future Consequence permanent. I was not privy to their Design; it came as new to me as to the other Members of the Board. I instantly proposed, and the Board agreed, to give our Sanction to the Plan, and our Assistance to its Execution. A large Supply of Money (10 Lacks of Rupees) was immediately remitted to them, and this was shortly after followed by an Order for forming a large military Force to march to their Assistance. There was no other Way of sending this Force but that which I recommended; neither would the Season of the Year admit of their being transported by Sea; and the Ill-treatment to which our Sepoys have been invariably exposed, whenever they have been conveyed from this Presidency by Shipping, will render that Mode of Transportation impracticable, until Time shall have effaced the Memory and Tradition of those Injuries. There remained therefore no other Way, but to send the Detachment by Land. I knew it to be practicable, and I knew the Officer whom I recommended for the Conduct of the Expedition eminently qualified to accomplish it.

Had I had Occasion to recur to the Detail of this Undertaking, at a Period something distant from this, I should have had a Pleasure in joining Mr. Barwell's Name with my own, in mentioning the Formation of the Measure; and should have been contented with that separate Share of Credit only, which was due to me from it. I am less scrupulous now on this Point, as I see nothing left to either but a dangerous Responsibility, which is become the more so from the System which seems to have been lately adopted in England, of condemning every public Act, which would be imputed to us. Having taken the decided a Part in Support of the Presidency of Bombay, nothing remained for us but to leave it to operate; the rest depended on the Presidency of Bombay: They have done nothing: They attempted nothing. The Influence alone of our Measures produced the Revolution which had been projected with the Presidency of Bombay; but they had no Part in it, nor appear to have availed themselves, or to have wished to avail themselves, either of the successive Revolutions, or of the continued Anarchy which have since prevailed in the Maratta State. The Supineness on their Part, and perhaps the slow Movement of the Detachment, have afforded Time to the Opponents of Ragoba to recover their lost Authority, and utterly to destroy the Influence of those, on whom the Presidency of Bombay had placed their Hopes of his Restoration. Their Power, it is true, still continues as weak and divided in itself, as it was at the Time in which the first Suggestion was made to us to assist in its Subversion, but without an Instrument left for that Presidency to employ, and without any Inclination in it to seek for any.

Thus embarked in a Scene of Difficulties, which were rendered such only by the Presidency of Bombay, and into which we were drawn by their urgent Solicitation, and thus abandoned by them after all that we had done for their Relief, we laid hold of the Resource which next presented itself, in the Disposition which the Chief of Berar had shewed, not only to co-operate with us, but to make our Cause his own, by uniting his Interests with it. Mr. Elliott was therefore deputed to his Court, with Instructions to form a Treaty with him, both for a Plan of immediate Operations in Conjunction with him, and for a future and permanent Alliance. Here I shall close the Narrative. Colonel Leslie, the Officer whom I had selected from the rest of the Army, in the fullest Confidence both in his military Skill, Integrity, and personal Attachment, that he would most effectually accomplish the Designs which had been committed to his Charge, has been lingering with the Detachment, I know not why, within the Distance of 120 Miles from the Place where it was formed, and is perhaps to this Hour no further advanced. This is the fifth Month of his Campaign; a Period within which I had formed the Hope that he would have reached the Place of his ultimate Destination, and in which I still think that he might have reached it. He has had no Enemy to impede him; for the very few Troops who have stood in his Way were confessedly inferior to his Army in Numbers, and have been routed and dispersed whenever he approached them. The Weather could be no Impediment, since every Inconvenience which the Troops could have suffered from it in Motion and in the Field, must have been doubly felt by them in their Encampments; and the little Streams, denominated Rivers, which have intersected their Route, have, as I believe it will appear even from Colonel Leslie's own Letters, and as I know to be Fact, been fordable even in the greatest Height of the Rains, subsiding as suddenly as the Torrents rushing from the Mountains have swelled them. It could not have been the Want of Provisions that detained them, for that would have been most severely felt while the Troops were confined to one Spot, and the Enemy at Leisure to surround and cut off their Supplies; besides

beſides that I know, and it is within the Compaſs of every Member of this Board to obtain the beſt Knowledge from Enquiry, that Chatterpore and its Neighbourhood, to which the Detachment has been ſo long fixed, draw all their ordinary Supplies of Proviſions from the Diſtricts of Benares on one Hand, and from the Country of Sauger, which lies in the Line of March, on the other; yet they have this hot ſeaſon remained in that unfavourable Situation, and have not wanted Subſiſtence. Here my Deſign thereto has moſt unexpectedly failed; and Mr. Elliott, on whoſe uncommon Abilities and Integrity I had placed my greateſt Aſſurance of Succeſs, has been unfortunately cut off by Death, before he could accompliſh the Journey which was neceſſary for his executing the Commiſſion aſſigned him.

Under theſe concurring Misfortunes, I by no Means admit that we are deprived of all Reſource. On the contrary, I have the ſtrongeſt Conviction ſtill remaining, that, under a proper Conduct, the Effects of the Detachment will ſtill anſwer my moſt ſanguine Hopes; and as for its Safety, I would with Pleaſure pledge my Life for it.

If it was neceſſary to ſtrengthen the Preſidency of Bombay when the firſt Idea of it was ſuggeſted, it is much more ſo now, when we had been told by the higheſt Authority, that a powerful Armament has been prepared in France, the firſt Object of which was an Attack upon Bombay; and when we know with moral Certainty, that all the Powers of the adjacent Continent are ready to join the Invaſion. The Strength of Berar, which not long ſince ſhewed itſelf ſuperior to the whole Force of the Mhratta Government, in the Time of its greateſt Proſperity, and reduced the City of Poona to Aſhes, is ſurely able to execute any Deſign made in Conjunction with ſo formidable a Body of diſciplined Troops as that of which our Detachment conſiſts. Whether the Rajah will chuſe to engage in any ſuch Deſign, muſt ſoon be known by his Declarations of the Receipt of the Intelligence of Mr. Elliott's Death: In the mean Time, nothing is precipitated by the Reſolutions which I have recommended to the Board; it is only propoſed that the Army ſhall proceed to the Country of a Friend, and from that Station either proſecute the original Deſign of marching to the Aſſiſtance of the Preſidency of Bombay, or ſhould it then become neceſſary (of which I have no Idea) to return, it may return by a leſs circuitous and nearer Route, than by retracting that which it hath already paſſed.

I muſt finish these Reflections by complaining of the uncandid Advantage which has been taken of the Situation into which I have been thrown by the Miſconduct of others, and particularly of Colonel Leſlie. At one Time I am called upon to relent the total Suſpenſion of the Operations he was ordered to perform, and to remedy the Effects of his Diſobedience; and at another, this Suſpenſion, and the Effects of his Diſobedience, are quoted as Proofs of the radical Defects of the Meaſure, confeſſedly defeated by his Management of it. I know not what to gather from this Oppoſite of Sentiment. Do the Members of the Board judge him culpable in the little Progreſs he has made, or do they attribute it to natural and inevitable Cauſes? On this Point I ſhall wait for an Explanation before I proceed to the diſagreeable Duty which ſeemed to be laid on me in this Day's Meeting, by the concurrent Sentiments and Wiſhes which were expreſſed at the laſt. As to the Propoſitions themſelves, which I ſuppoſe to be the Objects of theſe Minutes, though dictated without Premeditation, I have ſince given them all the Attention they can require, and I now give my entire Aſſent to them.

Mr Francis—Much might be ſaid in Anſwer to the preceding Minute; but this is not the Time for it. I only deſire it to be underſtood that Propoſitions or Arguments, not immediately controverted, are not therefore meant to be admitted. In general I may obſerve, that the Plea of ill Fortune will hardly be allowed in the Extent in which it is employed, unleſs it can be proved that the Events which have defeated the Meaſure were ſuch as no human Prudence could foreſee, and againſt which no Reſource could have been provided. The Validity of ſuch a Plea may be examined hereafter. The Court of Directors, I am perſuaded, will find no Inconſiſtency in the various Opinions which I have delivered on this Subject. I have no Ground of judging of the Wiſdom of Meaſures in the Formation of which I am not conſulted, or of the Motives of ſuch Meaſures, or of the Execution of them, but the Facts as they ariſe in Succeſſion before me. It is far from impoſſible, that an unwiſe Plan may be executed without Judgment or Activity. Both may be true. I have executed my Duty at every Stage of the Tranſaction; firſt, by objecting to the Meaſure on its own profeſſed Principles, and afterwards by conſtantly obſerving and giving my Opinion to the Board of the Execution of it. With reſpect to the Mode of ſending Aſſiſtance to Bombay, ſuppoſing the Meaſure neceſſary, the only Courſe which in my Opinion, and in that of the Gentlemen of Bombay then here, would have been adviſable, is not ſtated by the Governor General. On this Point I muſt refer the Board to our Conſultation of the 29th June laſt.

But waving all Conſiderations of the Steps already taken, the Queſtion before us is, what Reſolution ſhall we take in the preſent Circumſtances? Is Colonel Leſlie, after ſuch repeated Condemnation of his Conduct, to be continued in the Command of this important Expedition? I did underſtand that ſome Propoſitions on this Subject would ere now have come before us from the Governor General himſelf? Is the preſent Motion to be decided by the Votes of the Members preſent? Mr Barwell's Abſence need not have prevented his giving his Opinion; and I muſt deſire that the Queſtion may ſtill be left open for him, becauſe I will not take upon myſelf to interrupt any connected Syſtem of Meaſures by a temporary Vote, until I can be aſſured that the Principle on which ſuch Vote ſhall paſs, will be adhered to. For the ſame Reaſon I do not propoſe the Recall of Colonel Leſlie.

Admitting it to be neceſſary to ſtrengthen Bombay againſt an Invaſion, it remains ſtill to be proved by fair Argument ſupported by a clear State of the March which it is intended the Detachment ſhall

ſhall purſue, with a reaſonable Allowance for the Difficulties they may meet with) that the Detachment will probably arrive in Time at Bombay to anſwer the End propoſed. No ſuch Proof has yet been offered to the Board. In my Opinion a much more ſafe and even expeditious Method of reinforcing Bombay may be purſued. The Enterprize againſt Pondicherry, if not now decided, muſt aſſuredly have failed or ſucceeded before Letters from hence can reach Madras. A Detachment from General Munro's Army might be ſent to Bombay. This is the Courſe which the Preſidency of Bombay themſelves recommended to us as *the beſt and eaſieſt*. If ſuch a Detachment muſt be replaced, the Force now ſtationed in the Circars might move down towards Madras, and that Force, if neceſſary, be replaced from hence. I throw this Plan out for Conſideration, becauſe it ſeems to me ſimple and eaſy of Execution. I do not affirm that it may not be liable to ſome Objections, but I do firmly believe that much greater will occur to any other Mode of ſending a Reinforcement to Bombay.

Governor General—I did not examine the Mode recommended by the Preſidency of Bombay for granting them Aſſiſtance, becauſe I did not think it deſerved ſo much Conſideration; but as it has been propoſed by a Member of the Board, it becomes me to allow it a greater Degree of Weight; yet I muſt beg Leave to obſerve, that it is liable to every Objection, and in a greater Degree than has been urged againſt the preſent Expedition. The Diſtance from Culpee to Bombay, meaſured in a right Line on the Map, is exactly equal to that of Pondicherry from Bombay; but there is this Difference in the Two Routes, the former muſt be traced along the Coaſt to the South, and round the Country to Anjengo, and from thence, either by a dangerous Navigation along the Malabar Coaſt, or continued by Land through the Dominions of Hyder Ally Khan, the moſt powerful of all the Sovereign Chiefs of India; whereas the Road from Culpee deviates but little from the right Line: Without purſuing this Argument I ſhall refer to the Map for the Truth of my Aſſertion, that with ſuperior Difficulties the former would exceed the latter in Length by One Third of the Diſtance, beſides the March of a Body of Troops from Bengal to replace thoſe detached from the Carnatic. I muſt further obſerve, that this Government cannot command the Forces of the Carnatic; we made a Trial of our Influence, in default of Authority, to attain this very Point, and we failed to accompliſh it; it is therefore wrong to impute to this Government a Neglect of the Means which it cannot command. I do not ſuppoſe that on a deliberate Reflection it would be recommended by any Body of Men who ſhould ſucceed to the Adminiſtration of the Affairs of this Government, and ſhall find another Plan in train which promiſed at leaſt equal Succeſs, and which ought to be deſperate before it were abandoned for the Choice of another.

When I ſpoke of my own Diſappointments, and the Misfortunes which attended the Meaſures hitherto taken for the Aſſiſtance of Bombay, I affixed a very different Senſe to thoſe Words from that which ſeems implied in the Repetition of them by Mr. Francis. The Detachment is at this Time as capable of effecting the Ends of its Formation, and the Meaſure itſelf is in my Opinion as adviſable now, and more ſo, than when it was firſt adopted; it has met with no real Misfortune, I regret only that it has not already attained the Ends which it is ſtill equally capable of accompliſhing.

I ſhall now return to ſuch Parts of Mr. Francis's Minute as regard the Queſtions immediately before us. Mr. Francis ſays, "Is Colonel Leſlie, after ſuch repeated Condemnation of his Conduct, to "be continued in the Command of this important Detachment?" I anſwer, No, if it be the Opinion of the Board that he has adopted a Train of Meaſures, which in their Conſequences muſt obviouſly tend to defeat the Deſign of the Expedition. I obſerved in my laſt Minute, that I came prepared to give my Sentiments upon this Subject, urged to it by the repeated Calls of the Board, and by the Belief that every Member of it had before joined in the Condemnation of Colonel Leſlie's Conduct, but that I heſitated to execute it, becauſe I thought I ſaw in the Minutes which were brought to the Board by the Members preſent, Opinions which neceſſarily inferred an Acquittal of his Conduct; and I deſired them to declare, whether they judged him culpable in the little Progreſs he had made, or whether they attributed it to natural and inevitable Cauſes. Mr. Francis has replied to this Queſtion, though not in direct Terms by thoſe of the Queſtion which I have above quoted. I will conclude that Mr. Wheler's Sentiments alſo remain unchanged: And on theſe Grounds I move, That the Opinions of this Board be taken, whether Colonel Leſlie ſhall be continued in the Command of the Detachment from the 1ſt Brigade, or ſhall he be removed from it? Though prepared to give my immediate Vote upon this Queſtion, yet I have no Objection to leave it in Suſpence until that of Mr. Barwell can be taken upon it, and the Reſolution of the Board be, as I believe it will prove, unanimous.

For the Reaſons properly urged by Mr. Francis, I alſo agree, that the Queſtions propoſed by me at the laſt Meeting of the Council, ſhall in like Manner remain ſuſpended until Mr. Barwell ſhall have given his Opinion upon them: Indeed I think this neceſſary in Point of Regularity, as I recollect, that Mr. Barwell expreſſed himſelf prepared at that Time to deliver his Opinion upon them, although it was afterwards agreed, that the Members of the Board ſhould deliver their Minutes in Writing, and his only remains to be received.

Mr. Francis—Colonel Leſlie is not at Calpee, nor is it now in his Choice to proceed by the uſual Route from thence to Bombay: It would certainly have been the eaſieſt, at leaſt it would have been the moſt direct: I hear there are Letters from Camp as late as the 17th of laſt Month, and that he was ſtill at Rajegur. Whatever our Influence or Authority over the Preſidency of Fort Saint George may be, I cannot conceive it poſſible that they would refuſe to concur in a

Plan for the Defence of Bombay, when ſuch Plan is propoſed to be effected without any Diminution of their own Force; but it is in vain reaſoning on a Caſe which does not exiſt. To the Queſtion now propoſed, I have no Difficulty in ſaying that if a Propoſition had been made by the Governor General for Colonel Leſlie's Removal, I ſhould have agreed to it, becauſe, waving my Opinion of the Service committed to him, I deem it morally impoſſible that his March from Calpee to his preſent Station could have taken up the Time it has done, if his Attention had not been fixed on other Objects, equally incompatible with our expreſs Orders, and with the Proſecution of his March. He has aſſumed a Power with which the Legiſlature has not thought fit to inſtruſt the Preſidencies of Fort Saint George and Bombay, and from the Exerciſe of which he was particularly reſtricted by our Inſtructions: After this Declaration, I preſume it cannot be a Doubt, whether I think Colonel Leſlie culpable or not: It is certainly my Opinion, that he ought to be recalled; but unleſs it concurs with that of the Governor General, I will never conſent to its deciding the Reſolution of the Board: My Reaſons for this Caution are ſufficiently obvious, but as we are likely to be unanimous on the Queſtion, it is unneceſſary to enter into them.

Governor General—This Caution I think unneceſſary on the preſent Occaſion. I have given ſufficient Indications of the Part which I ſhould take in the Queſtion before the Board; but I will put it beyond a Doubt, by declaring it formally to be my Opinion, that Colonel Leſlie ought to be recalled.

Mr. Francis—I agree with the Governor General.

Mr. Wheler—I agree with the Governor General and Mr. Francis, that Colonel Leſlie be recalled.

Reſolved, That Colonel Leſlie be recalled from the Command of the Detachment made from the 1ſt Brigade, and that he be ordered to deliver over the Command of the ſaid Detachment to the next ſenior Officer.

Warren Haſtings,
Rich[d] Barwell,
Edw[d] Wheler.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 15th October 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler,
} Eſquires.

Mr. Barwell delivers in his Opinion as follows, on the Governor General's Propoſitions of the 7th Inſtant.

Mr. Barwell.—I will not prolong a Debate in a Degree cloſed, by commenting on the Arguments offered in Support of the Opinions of the different Members; I was prepared to have approved the Propoſitions from the Chair at the Inſtant they were dictated, ſatisfied of the Juſtneſs of the political Principle on which the Meaſure for giving effectual Aid to Bombay, and Security to our Poſſeſſions, was reſolved. Men ſee through different Mediums, or may act on Syſtem. I apprehend in either Caſe it is waſte of Words to attempt to reaſon them out of their Opinions, and while we endeavour at Conviction, we frequently do no more than offer Occaſion to perplex and confound the ſimpleſt Propoſition, and Controverſy is endleſs.

I agree with the Governor General, and think Colonel Leſlie culpable in the little Progreſs he has made.

I agree to the Recall of Colonel Leſlie, and to give the Command of the Detachment to Lieutenant Colonel Goddard.

(Signed) Rich[d] Barwell.

N° 147.

Reſolved, That the following Letter be written to Colonel Leſlie, and diſpatched by this Night's Poſt:

To Colonel Leſlie.

Sir,

We have received your Letter of the 4th September; and the Governor General has laid before us your Letter to him of the 7th of the ſame Month, encloſing Copy of the Treaty which you have

tered into, in the Name of the Company, with the Rajahs Gomaun and Comaun Sing. And we are informed that there are private Letters received, dated the 16th and 17th of the ſame Month, which mention the Detachment being then at Raje Ghur.

In the Firſt Place, we think it proper to diſavow the Treaty which you have taken upon yourſelf to conclude with thoſe Rajahs, and to declare it invalid.

We conſider your Attempt to pledge the Name of the Company to this Engagement, and your Interference in the domeſtic Diſſentions of the Rajah of Bundlecund and his Brother, as Acts committed in direct Violation of our poſitive Orders, by which you were forbidden "to involve this "Government in future Engagements under any Pretext whatſoever, or to ſuffer yourſelf to be di-"verted from the Proſecution of your March by any new Object, except for the Safety or Subſiſt-"ence of your Troops indiſpenſably requiring it."

If you have concluded any Treaty with the Rajah of Bundlecund, or with his Brother Surnaut Sing, or entered into any Engagements with either, contrary to the Tenor of thoſe Inſtructions, we hereby alſo declare ſuch Treaty and ſuch Engagements to be invalid.

We have ſeen with equal Surprize and Concern Four Months and an Half elapſe in effecting the March from Kalpy to Raje Ghur, a Diſtance of only 120 Miles; in a Period which, for any Reaſons with which we are acquainted to the contrary, appears ſufficient to have conducted the Detachment to its ultimate Deſtination.

We deemed the Service which you were appointed to execute of ſo urgent a Nature, that we directed you to commence your March at the moſt unfavourable Seaſon of the Year. You have been informed from Authority, of the Danger which threatened Bombay from a formidable French Armament, equipped in the Port Toulon for the Invaſion of that Iſland, and you were in conſequence of ſuch Advice earneſtly required to expedite your March; yet you have remained in a State of Inactivity, which is to us inexplicable on the Grounds either of Neceſſity or Expediency.

It will afford us great Satisfaction if you ſhall be able to juſtify this Conduct, which under the preſent Appearances we can as little reconcile to your Duty, and the clear Line which you had to purſue for the Succeſs of the Enterprize committed to your Charge, as to the poſitive Rules and Precautions which we had laid down in our Inſtructions for your Guidance.

But as you have engaged yourſelf in a Line of Politics, which obviouſly tend to defeat the important Object of the Expedition, we cannot, conſiſtently with our primary Duty to the Company, and the Safety of their Intereſts, ſuffer you to continue longer in a Command which you have given us ſuch ſtrong Cauſe to apprehend will be perverted from the Ends to which it was beſtowed upon you.

We therefore command you immediately on the Receipt of this Letter, to deliver over the Charge of the Detachment to Lieutenant Colonel Goddard, or to the Officer who ſhall then be next to you in Command thereof, and to repair with all convenient Expedition, and by ſuch Route as you ſhall judge moſt practicable, to the Preſidency of Fort William.

You will take the Firſt Regiment of Cavalry for your ſafe Conduct into theſe Provinces; and as ſoon as you have entered them, or arrived within the Frontier of the Dominions of the Nabob of Oude, you will adviſe us thereof, and direct the commanding Officer of that Regiment to halt until he receives Orders for his future Deſtination, either from the Board or from the Commander in Chief.

Fort William, the 15th October 1778.

We are, &c. &c.

Reſolved, That Lieutenant Colonel Goddard be immediately written to as follows:

To Lieutenant Colonel Goddard.

Sir,

Having thought it proper to recall Colonel Leſlie from the Command of the Detachment which was made from the Firſt Brigade, for the Support and Aſſiſtance of the Preſidency of Bombay, we have ordered him to deliver Charge of the ſaid Command immediately to you, and himſelf to repair to Fort William, taking with him the Firſt Regiment of Cavalry for his ſafe Conduct.

We hereby direct, that you forthwith take Care of the Command of the Forces from Colonel Leſlie, excepting the above Corps of Cavalry; and we inveſt you with the Powers and Authority formerly delegated to him for that Purpoſe.

We encloſe for your Guidance in this Command, Copies of the Inſtructions originally delivered to Colonel Leſlie, and of ſuch further Orders tranſmitted to him as ſtill remain in Force. Theſe are ſo ample and ſo clear, that we have only to enjoin you to adhere to them ſtrictly, as far as they may be conſiſtent with our preſent and future Orders, and to effect without Loſs of Time ſuch Parts of them as yet remain unaccompliſhed.

We further direct, that you immediately purſue the Line of March preſcribed for the Detachment into the Province of Berar; that you give the earlieſt Notice of your Arrival and Progreſs, in the Manner directed in your Inſtructions, to Moodajee Booſla, the Chief of that Diſtrict, who is in Amity with the Company; that you implicitly obey all ſuch Orders as you may hereafter receive from the Preſident and Council at Bombay, for proceeding to that Side of India without Delay; and even before the Receipt of ſuch Orders, you will proſecute your March towards Bombay from Berar, if the

the Raja Moodajee Boosla shall agree to join you with a sufficient Body of his Troops to enable you, not only to stand your Ground against the Maratta Army, but in case of Need to act offensively against them.

If the Raja shall refuse or decline to reinforce you with a Body of his Troops to assist the Presidency of Bombay, and you shall not have received any Orders from that Presidency subsequent to the Date hereof, to pursue your March; we leave it to your Discretion to continue encamped in the Province of Berar, or to proceed, advising us immediately, in the most expeditious Manner, of this or any other Measure which you may resolve upon, of your Progress, and of every Transaction which may be material for our Information.

We think it necessary to direct, that you recall any Detachments which may have been made from the main Body of your Forces; and that you be careful on all Occasions to keep them united.

We authorize you to appoint your own Staff Officers, only recommending it to your Attention not to burthen the Establishment with any Posts, which may be dispensed with, consistently with the Duty of the Service.

We are, &c.

Fort William,
the 15th October 1778.

APPENDIX, N° 148.

Extract of Bengal Secret Consultations, the 19th October 1778.

PRESENT;

The Honourable Warren Hastings, Governor General, President,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler,
} Esquires.

READ a Letter from Mr. Leslie, as follows;

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

It is with the deepest Concern I find myself necessitated to inform you, that Colonel Leslie was seized with a severe bilious Fever on the 27th of last Month, which has reduced his Strength so much, that the Surgeons have very little Expectation of his Recovery: The inclosed Letter and Transcripts which I now do myself the Honour to lay before you, were given to me to prepare for Dispatch the Day after the Fever seized him, and I have been waiting a favourable Intermission for the Colonel's Signature. The Opportunity to this Moment has not offered; and as it may be still longer before the Colonel may have Strength to attend to Business, I have presumed to forward these Papers to you, not only that the Information appears necessary to your Satisfaction, but that I deem it my Duty in the Office I now hold as his Secretary, to transmit them to you, and hope therefore to be indulged with your Approbation.

I am, &c.

Camp, Rage Ghur,
2d October 1778.

(Signed) Matt^w Leslie, Secr^y.

Read the Letter inclosed in the foregoing, as follows;

Honourable Sir, and Sirs.

In my Letter of the 25th, I informed you of my Situation to that Period, and that of the 30th July would acquaint you of my Situation and Prospects to that Time, which were very flattering to my speedy moving forward, but in this I was deceived. The Demands of Goman and Coman Sing for their Services in Supplies were so exorbitant, they could not be complied with. They demanded from Surnet Sing and Anrood Sing a considerable Territory, supposed wrested from them by their Father Hindooput: From me, my Return to Jeetpoor, and dispossess Gudd Sing of that Fortress for their Use, as it was formerly taken from them by Gudd Sing's Father. This threw a Difficulty on my getting Supplies, as they had all the Power to the North and East, and knowing their own Influence (and Overtures at this Time made them by Anrood Sing and Ballajee) they created a Number of Difficulties to raise their own Consequence.

The incessant Rains which fell during this Month, had swelled the Nullas so much, that they were

were not paſſable, and the Roads were ſo broken and ſloughy, it was impoſſible for Carriages to travel; nor could I perſuade the Banjarrahs to follow me (if I could have got ſufficient Grain) till the Rains ſubſided. From this Period till near the Middle of Auguſt, I laboured inceſſantly to induce Goman and Coman Sing, to join with Surnet Sing in procuring me the neceſſary Supplies, and I had the greateſt Aſſurances from them it ſhould be ſo; but to my great Mortification, when Matters came to be adjuſted, I found Anrood Sing's Offers had prevailed, and they would engage in nothing without a Compliance to the moſt exorbitant Demands.

My Indifference to treat further with them, or accept any of their Propoſals, an' my intended March to Raje Ghur, had a better Effect than any Sooth I could have given; for I had an immediate Application by their Vackeels to come to Agreement of Friendſhip with me, independant of Surnet Sing; which was perfected on my Arrival at this Place, a Copy of which I have tranſmitted to Mr. Haſtings.

The conſtant Fall of Rain for the firſt Ten Days of Auguſt rendered my moving from Chatterpore impracticable, by the Route of Gool Gunge, had there been no Force at Raje Ghur and the Cane: But as I could not move with ſo large a Corps in my Rear without the utmoſt Riſque of ſtarving my Detachment, I reſolved the very firſt Receſs of the Rains to march to Raje Ghur, in order to remove that ſtrong Force of the Bundellahs, either by croſſing the River and proceeding by the Route of Panna, or by my Motion this Way make them quit their Poſt on the Cane to cover Panna and Callinger, and leave me at Liberty to purſue my Route by Gool Gunge without Moleſtation from them. I accordingly marched from Chatterpore, on the 15th Auguſt, as my Letter of the 16th would inform you, as would my ſubſequent Letters to the 24th of that Month, of my Situation down to that Time.

The very heavy Rains that have fallen down to this Period, and the terrible Condition of the Weſtern Roads, made it morally impoſſible for me to move, and the Obſtinacy of the Bundellahs on the oppoſite Shore of the Cane, prevented my attempting the Paſſage of that River, but amply provided for the Succeſs of the Undertaking; to this End, Boats were ſet on the Stocks by Lieutenant Colonel Fortnom, and every Preparation was in Forwardneſs, when the Raja Anrood Sing ſent Meſſages to requeſt an Explanation and Propoſals of Accommodation.

I thought Terms of Amity would be more conſonant to your Deſires, and to the expediting my March than engaging in abſolute Hoſtilities, and I acquieſced to the receiving any Perſon he would ſend. Hiera Loll was accordingly deputed to me, and has at length adjuſted the Terms of my March, together with Engagements of Amity now and hereafter: Tranſcripts of thoſe Papers I do myſelf the Honour to incloſe to you, and I truſt they are ſuch as will meet with your Approbation. This Miniſter is to attend my March to the Boundaries of the Bundlecund Territory; and I ſhall commence my March for Saguer, by the Route of Gool Gunge, To-morrow.

I have been honoured with your Letters of the 31ſt Auguſt and 1ſt September. I am very much concerned that you did not deem my Correſpondence with your Board from Chatterpore ſufficiently explanatory for the Cauſe of my Halt there; I requeſt your Reference to the ſeveral Addreſſes diſpatched to you from thence, and to this Period I requeſt your Reference to the fluctuating State of the Miniſters and Chiefs at Poona, and our Intereſts in that Quarter, as communicated to me by the Reſident, and the Jealouſies I have been impreſſed with of the Diſpoſitions of the ſeveral Chiefs, through which my Route of March will be; and I do hope, on a candid Conſideration of them, that you will be ſatisfied my Halt at Chatterpore, and the ſubſequent Delay here, has been eſſentially neceſſary to the Safety of my Troops, and that I ſhall be honoured with your Approbation of my Meaſures.

The incloſed Tranſcript of Letters from the Vackeel of the Berar Chief (Benarum Pundit) will plainly exhibit to you the State of the Roads at this Period: But had I made the Attempt, and had I marched immediately from Chatterpore to Sagur, I do conceive I ſhould have inevitably hazarded the Safety of my Detachment. The Country about Sagur does not abound with Proviſions; the Chiefs Goman and Coman Sing were, it is true, neutral at the Time, but I doubt much their Inclination to have afforded me Aid; and I was very certain the Miniſters of Anrood Sing would have taken the Advantage of my Advance from Chatterpore, to croſs a Body of Men and retake that Place, which was the only Route by which my Supplies could be drawn, and they would of courſe be intercepted. The Machination of Ballagee had produced theſe Difficulties; the Bundellahs declare it, and his late Behaviour confirms the Circumſtances.

What Reception I ſhall meet with in his Diſtricts I cannot ſay; he had promiſed himſelf the Bundellahs would have been able to fruſtrate my March by Panna, and by not coming to Terms with me, that they would have co-operated with him in harraſſing my Rear, and cutting off my Supplies by the Route of Gool Gunge; the Treaty of Amity with them aboliſhes this Plan. My Supplies and Communication with the Vizier's Dominions are ſecured, and Ballajee will, I hope, of Neceſſity to his own Intereſt, be induced to fulfil the Terms of the Treaty entered into with him in the Perſon of his Brother Gunga Dur. I cannot conclude this Subject without again expreſſing my Concern, if I have not been ſo explicit as you wiſhed, and can impute it only to my Anxiety not to give your Honourable Board any tedious Details; when I was at the Time affording Mr. Haſtings at his own particular Deſire a particular Journal of Occurrences, and to whom I truſted for ſuch Explanations as the Honourable Board might expreſs a Deſire to know, in Addition to my Addreſſes.

I will be more careful in future, that I do not ſuffer your Diſpleaſure in this Regard."

Your Sentiments contained in the Letter of the 1ſt September, I have peruſed with Attention, and will ſtrictly comply with your Orders contained therein. I have had no Repetition of the Application, and I hope I ſhall not.

You may depend on my Firmneſs and ſtrict Diſcipline to ſuppreſs any Revival of the Affair, for though I was ſatisfied of the Impropriety of it, yet it was my Duty, ſituated as I am, and liable to the moſt malicious Interpretations of every Tranſaction in my Camp, to communicate to you the Circumſtances of it.

I have the Honour to be,
with the higheſt Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant.

Head Quarters, Raje Ghur,
September 28th 1778.

A True Tranſcript.
(Signed) Matt^w Leſlie, Secr^y.

This Letter, although not ſigned by Colonel Leſlie, but tranſmitted and atteſted by his Secretary, and being in the ſame Hand in which his Letters have been generally written, the Board deem authentic.

Governor General—The pointed Reference made by Colonel Leſlie to his Correſpondence with me, and the perſonal Reproach which ſeems to be implied in it, will make it neceſſary for me to lay the Whole of his Letters before the Board, which were written ſince his Arrival at Chatterpore. I ſhall requeſt, that the Members of the Board will peruſe them, and if they appear either to contain the Reaſons for his long Stay at that Place, or ſince that Time for his halting at Raje Ghur, more explicitly detailed than they have been in his Letters to the Board, or any Facts or Circumſtances materially neceſſary for the Information of the Board, I ſhall conſent either to their being recorded entire, or ſuch Extracts from them only, as ſhall be judged neceſſary: As they may be voluminous, I do not propoſe to enter them all, nor ſhould I have thought it either neceſſary or proper to have quoted any Part of Colonel Leſlie's private Letters to me, unleſs they related to ſuch Subjects as the Board had a Right to know, and ſuch as it would in that Caſe have been incumbent on me to have communicated to them. This Diſtinction I have always made between official and private Correſpondence; and the Board will recollect, that I expreſſed it very particularly on the laſt Communication which I made of Colonel Leſlie's Letter, which contained the Particulars of the Treaty with the Rajahs Gomaun and Comaun Sing.

I am ſorry to inform the Board, that I have ſeen a Letter from Captain Cockerel to Mr. Thomas Graham, dated Raje-Ghur, the 4th Inſtant, which mentions, that at Five o'Clock on that Evening Colonel Leſlie departed this Life after an Illneſs of Six Days.

Warren Haſtings,
Richd Barwell,
Edwd Wheler.

APPENDIX, N° 149.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 22d October 1778.

PRESENT,
The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler,
} Eſquires.

READ a Letter from Colonel Goddard as follows:

Gentlemen,

It is with the deepeſt Concern I have to intimate to you the Death of Colonel Leſlie, who expired this Evening at Six o'Clock, after an Illneſs of a few Days.

The Command of this Detachment having devolved on me, I ſhall inform myſelf fully of the Inſtructions you may have tranſmitted to my Predeceſſor, and immediately proceed to execute them with the moſt implicit Obſervance and Expedition.

I ſhall do myſelf the Honour of writing to you more fully in a ſhort Time, and at preſent only beg Leave to obſerve to you, that as Colonel Leſlie, on the Day his Indiſpoſition firſt attacked him, had

had iſſued an Order for the Army to prepare for proceeding on their March, I am in Hopes to be able to proſecute the Expedition without further Delay.

I have the Honour, &c.

Camp, at Raje-Ghur, October 3d, 1778. (Signed) Tho' Goddard.

Governor General—According to the Promiſe which I made at the laſt Meeting in the Secret Department, I have brought with me, and now lay before the Board, all the Letters which I have received from Colonel Leſlie ſince the Month of April laſt, excepting One dated 25th July, from which I have already extracted and communicated to the Board ſuch Parts as were anywiſe material, for their Information, and a Reference to them will be ſufficient to ſhew, that no Part of the Letter recites any Account of his public Tranſactions. Some of Colonel Leſlie's Letters are merely of a private Nature; yet I think it neceſſary for my own Juſtification to lay the Whole before the Board, requeſting that the Members will be pleaſed to peruſe them, and to point out any Parts that may contain Advices which ought to be entered on our Proceedings; but if it ſhould be thought proper to record the Letters at large, I requeſt that the private ones may be excepted.

I beg Leave alſo to remark, that I ſubmit theſe laſt only to the private and confidential Knowledge of the Board.

APPENDIX, N° 150.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 2d November 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident;
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis, } Eſquires.
Edward Wheler,

READ a Letter from Colonel Goddard, as follows:

Gentlemen,

I had the Honour to write you the 3d Inſtant, informing you of the Death of Colonel Leſlie, and of my Expectations to proceed on my March without further Delay.

Having taken a few Days to receive the neceſſary Reports, &c. of the State of the Troops, and inform myſelf fully of your Intentions relative to the preſent Service, I left Raje-Ghur on the 8th Inſtant, and have the Pleaſure to inform you, that I arrived at Choky this Morning. I ſhall proceed To-morrow to Gool Gunjee, on the Road to Sagur, through the Territories of Ballajee, and hope in a ſhort Time to reach the Nerbuddah River.

I beg to aſſure you, that I ſhall moſt particularly comply with the Inſtructions contained in your Letter of the 7th July; and I hope, by the prompt and ready Obedience I ſhall pay to all your Commands, to prove myſelf deſerving of any Confidence you may think proper to honour me with.

I requeſt further to inform you, that I have been lately favoured with a Letter from the Honourable Select Committee at Bombay, covering a Cypher to be uſed in my Correſpondence with them; it alſo contained Intelligence that Nannah Furneis and Moodaje Scinda have detached Two principal Officers with a conſiderable Force from Poona, on the Route they expect the Army will march. On this Subject permit me only to obſerve, that the preſent diſtracted State of the Maratta Empire, and the Diviſions that reign amidſt their Councils, gives ſufficient Reaſon to ſuppoſe they will not be able to ſpare a Body of Troops of Strength equal to oppoſe the March of this Detachment, ſhould the Route of Poona be judged neceſſary.

I have the Honour, &c.

Camp, at Choky, October 11th, 1778. (Signed) Tho' Goddard.

The Governor General deſires to record the following Abſtract of a Letter to him from Colonel Goddard:

Extract of a Letter from Colonel Goddard to the Governor General; dated 11th October 1778.

I have the Pleaſure to communicate to you the Progreſs the Troops continue to make, which aſſure myſelf will not meet with any future Interruption. This Morning after performing a March of Eight Coſs with the greateſt Eaſe and Alacrity, they reached a Place called Choka, Five Coſs t the Southward of Chatterpore, on the high Road to Sagur, ſo that I have the Satisfaction to think have fairly bid adieu to the Regions of Bundlecund, at leaſt for the preſent; and to the temptin Prize the Diviſions and Family Conteſts of its Poſſeſſors offer to an Invader. I have left them pro feſſing Amity towards each other, and Reſpect and Friendſhip to the Engliſh Nation, whoſe Power and Proweſs they have at leaſt learnt to dread. The whole Country now wears a Face of tranqu Peace, and the Army is plentifully ſupplied with every Neceſſary for its Support and Convenienc I ſhall reach Gool Gunjee To-morrow Morning, as I mentioned before.

APPENDIX, N° 151.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 16th November 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Philip Francis, } Eſquires,
Edward Wheler, }
Mr. Barwell indiſpoſed.

GOVERNOR General—It being no longer neceſſary to withhold the Inſtructions to the late Mr Elliott, and the ſubſequent Minutes reſpecting them, from the Conſultations, and it being neceſſary that the Conſultations be completed for the approaching Diſpatches, I propoſe that they be now ordered to be entered.

Agreed, That Mr. Elliott's Inſtructions, and the Minutes thereon, be recorded in this Place.

APPENDIX, N° 152 and 153.

Bengal Secret Department. Perſian Correſpondence, 1778.

Letter from Modajee Bhoſila to Mr. Elliott, 1ſt November 1778.

BY repeated and ſucceſſive Letters which I have lately received from the Nabob Amaud-ul-Dowlah I learn that he has deputed you to converſe and negociate with me on many ſecret and importan Views; and that you will repair with all Expedition to Naigpore, by the Route of Cuttack, and wil make me acquainted with all Matters entruſted to your Charge; that it is neceſſary that I regard yo as poſſeſſed of complete Knowledge of all Matters, of his entire Confidence, and inveſted with ful Powers; and conſidering every thing you ſhall ſay as coming immediately from himſelf, jointly wit you concert ſuch Meaſures as ſhall be for our common Advantage; and having agreed on them tranſmit Intelligence thereof to him. Rajah Ram Pundit, the Nabob Soubahder of Oriſſa, has like wiſe repreſented to me that you are arrived in the Neighbourhood of Cuttack, whither Two of you confidential Companions arrived ſome Time before, and that you will ſhortly join them there.

I hope that by this Time you have arrived there, and have begun your Journey forward: I hav accordingly ſent expreſs Orders to Ram Pundit, by ſwift Coſſids, to receive you with every Right o Hoſpitality, to furniſh you with every Neceſſary, and to provide you with every Convenience for you Journey, ſuch as Coolies, Bearers, Palanquins, &c. and to give you whatever Eſcort you may deſire and diſpatch you hither with every poſſible Expedition. I have no Doubt but the ſaid Pundit wil literally comply with my Directions, and will take every Means to give you Satisfaction, and fulfi your Pleaſure. I have ſtationed People from Naigpore to Lamjee, to Chataſegur, which is in Bim

bajee'

bajee's Country, at different Places, that they may be attentive to your Wants in the Journey, and ſend me daily Intelligence of your Progreſs: On your Arrival in this Neighbourhood, Perſons of Credit ſhall be ſent to meet you. As the Nabob Amaud-ul Dowlah has declared you his Repreſentative, and deputed you on ſo important a Buſineſs, I am entirely deſirous, in every Inſtance, of giving you the fulleſt Satisfaction.

The more expeditiouſly you can travel with Convenience to yourſelf, the more pleaſing will it be to me: You will therefore give me daily Accounts of your Progreſs. I have likewiſe written to Bimbajee Bhoſila to protect you againſt the Dangers of the Journey.

From Modajee Bhoſila: Received 12th November 1778.

I have been favoured with Three or Four Letters from you, by the Way of Benares and Cuttack, on the Subject of the intimate Friendſhip which has been contracted between us; the delivering up of Monſieur Chevalier to the Cuſtody of Mr. Elliott, by my Miniſter for Oriſſa, Rajah Ram Pundit, agreeable to your Deſire intimated to him; and intimating, with regard to the Affair of Oadeyporee Goſaien, that as you know nothing of him, I ſhould pay no Regard, nor place any Reliance on any Negociations he propoſed to form; and that I will honour Rajah Ram Pundit with my warm Favour and Regard, in Return for the Attention which he has paid to your Deputation of Mr. Elliott, to which you were induced by the warmeſt Friendſhip and Regard, that he might form a Treaty for our mutual Benefit, on ſo firm a Baſis, that the Advantages of it might be reaped by our lateſt Poſterity. Theſe Letters afforded me the greateſt Pleaſure, and contributed to ſtrengthen the Ties of Connection already formed.

Rajah Ram Pundit's Conduct, in complying with what you wrote him, and delivering up Monſieur Chevalier, is perfectly agreeable to the Directions I gave him, and highly commendable. Where ſo intimate a Connection ſubſiſts, that the Friends and Enemies of the one Party are equally thoſe of the other, the Dictates of Friendſhip are to be followed; let others judge of the Acts produced thereby as they will. Every Degree of Regard and Attention ſhall be paid to him, and he ſhall meet with the Reward of his good Conduct. By the Bleſſing of God, mine is a powerful State, where every one receives what is due to his Merit; but every one cannot be made the Confidant of the Secrets of Government. This being the Caſe, how ſhould I have ſuffered the Goſaien you allude to, to have interfered in Matters of this Nature. Be perfectly ſatisfied, that without your Advice and Approbation I neither have permitted, nor will permit, any one to have any Concern in our Affairs.

Poſtſcript.—The Capriciouſneſs of Fortune has lately produced the moſt melancholy Event: You will eaſily judge I mean that Mr. Elliott, after arriving at Cuttack, and getting Poſſeſſion of the Perſon of Mr Chevalier, and ſetting off from thence for this Quarter, and arriving in the Neighbourhood of Sumbulpore; and writing to me by the Hircarrahs whom I had ſtationed at different Routes, to provide them with every Conveniency, that he was at that Place, and ſhould ſhortly reach Naigpore; in conſequence of which I diſpatched Mahomed Ally, a truſty Perſon, at the Head of a ſtrong Guard, to meet him, provide him with every thing neceſſary, and protecting him againſt the Dangers of the Journey, conduct him in Safety hither; and that before Mahomed Ally could reach him, I ſhould receive a Letter from Mr. Farquhar, one of his Company, from Saranagur, that being ſeized with a malignant Fever, his Career had been ſtopped by the Angel of Death!

The Concern and Affliction which it gave me, that after coming ſo great a Diſtance he ſhould be arreſted by Death without attaining the Ends for which he undertook it, exceeds the Power of Language to deſcribe; and I doubt not but the News of this melancholy Event equally affected you; but as there is no Remedy againſt theſe unavoidable Misfortunes but Patience and Reſignation, you will ſubmit without Murmuring to the Will of God.

The Magnanimity and Firmneſs which are the Characteriſtics of exalted Minds teach, that no trifling Changes of Circumſtances, which are in Fact no more than Trials, ſhou'd induce the Ruler of a State to relinquiſh a Plan formed on mature Deliberation; but that he ſhould, in Spite of ſuch Interruptions, be collected in himſelf, and continue ſteadily fixed in the Purſuit of his Object: Such Conduct is truly worthy of what great Minds alone are capable of. By the Bleſſing of God, you, my Friend, are endowed with theſe exalted Sentiments.

As the Fame of our intimate Connection, the Deputation of a confidential Agent to form a Treaty with me, and the conſtant Intercourſe of Letters between us, is ſpread throughout Decan; and I have received Letters from Pundit Purdhaun and his Miniſters, and from the Nabob Nizam ul Dowlah, deſiring Information on this Head and have candidly replied, that the Ties of Connection which have ever ſubſiſted between me and the Engliſh, by Reaſon of the Bengal Tribute, and the Vicinity of our Territories, are ſo firmly bound that no Circumſtance has or ſhall looſe them; and Advices of the Tranſactions here, both public and private, have doubtleſs been tranſmitted thither from your Quarter likewiſe; in a Word, as the Standard of Friendſhip which has been erected for the Promotion of our common Advantage, and the Ruin of our Enemies, has been ſeen far and wide, and the View of it has inſpired our Friends with Strength and Confidence, and produced Terror and Diſmay amongſt our Enemies, you will take every Means to confirm our Friends, by not giving Way to an unavailing Grief for the Loſs of Mr. Elliott, but writing immediately to Mr. Farquhar to form a Treaty on the Inſtructions given to Mr. Elliott, of which he is acquainted; and having concluded his Negociations, whatever may be concluded by our joint Deliberations, to tranſmit the Particulars thereof to you,

and to take no Meaſure which may be an Hindrance to the Eſtabliſhment of a Friendſhip between us on ſo ſolid a Baſis as may deſcend to our lateſt Poſterity, or otherwiſe ſend ſome other Perſon qualified for ſo important a Truſt, on the Wings of Expedition, by the Route of Cuttack, with Directions on no Account to be dilatory in his Journey, as the Buſineſs is of the moſt delicate Nature, and the Opportunity to perform it in is very ſhort. You need not be reminded of this.

From Dewagur Pundit: Received 12th November 1778.

I have been honoured with your Four friendly Letters with Karetahs for the Maha Rajah my Maſter, which afforded me the greateſt Pleaſure, as I learn from them your ſteady Adherence to your Friendſhip for the Maha Rajah, which muſt be productive of mutual Benefit, not only at preſent, but to the lateſt Time; they alſo cauſed the greateſt Satisfaction to my Maſter, and ſtrengthened thoſe friendly Sentiments he has long entertained towards you. By the Bleſſing of God, the Baſis of your Friendſhip becomes daily more extenſive. The regarding the Friends and Enemies of either Party as common to both, and the Delivery of Mr. Chevalier to Mr. Elliott by Rajah Ram Pundit, in conſequence of your Deſire intimated to him, are Fruits of the moſt intimate Friendſhip; and Rajah Ram Pundit, for his Attention to your Pleaſure, is warmly regarded by the Maha Rajah. No one has been, nor will be ſuffered to interfere, in any Meaſure, in the Negociations and ſecret Communications between you and my Maſter, except ſome few who are the Confidants of the Secrets of Government; how then ſhould Oodapooree Goſaien, and ſuch like Perſons, have any Thing to do with them? Of this you may be perfectly ſatisfied.

After Mr. Elliott had arrived at Cuttack, and had got Mr. Chevalier into his Hands, and quitting Cuttack, advanced as far as Saranagur, we received the melancholy News of his Deceaſe, by a Letter from Mr. Farquhar; this unfortunate Event filled both the Maha Rajah and myſelf with inexpreſſible Grief: As there is no Remedy in ſuch Caſes but Patience, it is our Duty to ſubmit with Reſignation to the Decrees of the Almighty. Since the News of Mr. Elliott's Approach, and the conſtant Intercourſe of Letters between the Two States has been univerſally acknowledged by all the Chiefs of the Decan, and the Eſtabliſhment of an intimate Connection between them is known to all Ranks of People, to ſuffer Mr. Elliott's Death to cauſe a Suſpenſion in the Negociations with which he was entruſted, and to put a Stop to your mutual Deſigns, will bring Diſcredit on both States, for to form a Deſign and afterwards on a ſmall Alteration of Circumſtances to relinquiſh it, can neither be advantageous nor honourable to either State. Since you are in Wellfare, every Wiſh may ſtill be accompliſhed: You will therefore write immediately to Mr. Farquhar, who accompanied Mr. Elliott, to enter on the Negociations on the ſame Footing as you had inſtructed Mr. Elliott, and having concluded a Treaty on thoſe Grounds, to communicate the ſame to you.

The Objects to be attained by this Negociation depends on a mutual Agreement of Sentiments; you will learn further Particulars from the Maha Raja's Letters; what I have written you will regard as dictated by Zeal and Attachment.

From Beneram Pundit: Received 12th November 1778.

I have already addreſſed ſeveral ſucceſſive Arzies to you, which I hope you have received. Agreeable to your Directions, I took Leave of Colonel Leslie, and reached Naigpore on the 22d Thabaun, 14th of September, where I had the Honour to caſt myſelf at the Feet of my Maſter, and the Pleaſure of a Meeting with Dewan Dewagur Pundit.

I had a long Converſation with my Maſter and his Dewan on the Subject of your Virtues, and your earneſt Deſire to enter into the ſtricteſt Ties of Friendſhip and Intimacy with him, on which I dwelt very largely: My Maſter expreſſed the greateſt Joy, and his Heart entertains no Sentiment but of the warmeſt Regard towards you, and deſires to cement your Friendſhip, the Means of which he is conſtantly contriving; may God eſtabliſh this Connection, fraught with Happineſs to Mankind, on a Baſis equally ſtrong as the Wall of Alexander, that it may remain throughout all future Generations: Whilſt we were in Expectation of the Arrival of Mr. Elliott, the Inſtability of Fortune, which is conſtantly producing ſome Change in the Face of Affairs, brought about an Event ſo melancholy as to effect the Hearts of all Well-wiſhers in the moſt ſenſible Manner: May the Almighty preſerve your auſpicious Influence over us to the End of Time.

The Maha Raja was greatly grieved at this diſtreſsful Circumſtance, and made much Lamentation. Your Excellency will be further informed of theſe Particulars, by my Brother Biſſemba Pundit.

The Fame of the ſtrict Connection and intimate Friendſhip between you and the Maha Raja has been every where ſpread, and has convinced Pundit Purdhaun Peſhwa and the Nabob Nizam ul Mulk, that in contracting ſuch a Friendſhip, you have the moſt extenſive Views; which Apprehenſion has filled them with Diſmay; it is therefore expedient, that you labour to confirm this Belief, which is fraught with Advantages to both States. The Maha Raja regards the Friends and Enemies of your Government as his own, and repeatedly is heard to declare, that whoever oppoſes your Sircar is his Foe, and whoever is loyal to him will promote the Wellfare of it: of the Truth of this, your own Diſpoſition will furniſh you with ſufficient Proof. As the Chiefs and People of the preſent Time are full of Suſpicion, they make every Circumſtance a Plea for exciting

Commotions; thus Coſſids with Letters from you to the Maha Raja, are apprehended in the Way in the Diſtrict of Purna by the People of the Raja of that Diſtrict, who murdered them and ſent the Letters to Pundit Purdhaun Peſhwa, which has excited hoſtile Deſigns in them.

The Rains being now at an End, and the Seaſon of Action arrived, be pleaſed to return an immediate Anſwer to the Maha Raja's Letters, which fully explain all Matters, that the Opportunity which now preſents itſelf may not be loſt. I have been for ſome Time afflicted with a Fever occaſioned by the Change of Climate, but by the Bleſſing of God, and your Excellency's and my Maſter's Favours, I ſhall ſpeedily recover.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 16th November 1778.

Letter from Colonel Goddard to Mr. Haſtings.

Sir,

In conſequence of the Arrival of Balajee's Vackeel in Camp, which I informed you of in my laſt Letter, I have the Pleaſure to communicate to you my Expectation of eſtabliſhing Terms of Amity with this Maratta Chief, without having Recourſe to the Force of Arms. The Sentiments he has expreſſed are perfectly correſpondent with my preſent Inclinations for Peace; and the only Requeſt he has made is, that I will alter the intended Route of paſſing through Saajur, which from every Information appears to be my direct Road; and he will conduct me through his Country by another Route. The Motives he urges for ſoliciting this are ſuch as Reaſon and Juſtice would in general approve, and ſeems particularly directed by Policy at this Time, when I am anxious of removing every Obſtacle, however ſmall, to the grand Object I hold conſtantly in Sight, of reaching Berar. He has repreſented to me, that Saagur is the Capital of his Country, and a very flouriſhing City, which will be totally deſerted upon the Approach of the Army; and as the Route he has pointed out to me will not make a Difference of more than Six or Seven Coſs, I have conſented to march by it, as a Proof of my friendly Intentions of the Engliſh, and their Wiſhes to preſerve the Country and Inhabitants from Ruin and Violation. I have advanced Two Days upon this Road, and am within Three ſhort Days March of Maltoun, a conſiderable Place belonging to Balajee, after which I hope ſhortly to be at Gunge Beſandat, where I fall in with the Road that will lead me towards the Huſſienalad Gaut, upon the Nerbudda. It is with Pleaſure I now aſſure you of the Proſpect I have of moving briſkly forward. I have a fine open Country before me, in compariſon to the mountainous broken one I have paſſed; and as the cold Seaſon is fully ſetting in, the Number of Sick in the Detachment, which at this Change of Seaſon, as you well know, uſed to be very numerous, will decreaſe daily. By a Letter received laſt Night from Madajee, I underſtand ſome Diſpatches are arrived from Calcutta, which he has promiſed to forward immediately, and I expect to receive them To-morrow or next Day. This Circumſtance leads me to imagine, that the Board have been miſinformed reſpecting the Situation of the Detachment, and are of Opinion that it is advanced nearer the Place of its Deſtination than it really is. Allow me to expreſs the extreme Anxiety I ſhall feel till I hear from yourſelf. I do not need any Incitement to call forth my every Exertion on the Occaſion this Service may preſent me; yet I cannot but anticipate the ſuperior Satisfaction and Spirit your Letter will infuſe into me. As I am now moving faſt to the Southward, it will, I think, become neceſſary to eſtabliſh ſome other Communication than that by Benares, which will be attended with conſiderable Delay: I therefore hope you will intimate to me your Intentions on this Head; and from the Intelligence I can obtain, I beg Leave to mention it may be eaſily done by Chuta, Naugpore, and Rutterpore, to Berar.

I am, &c.

Camp, near Lemra, October 22d 1778.

(Signed) Tho' Goddard.

N° 153.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 16th November 1778.

The following Propoſitions from the Governor General, and the Draft of a Letter to the Captain General at Goa, were circulated with the above Letters.

Governor General—As it appears from the preceding Letters that Colonel Goddard was likely to conduct the Detachment very ſpeedily to the Borders of Berar, and that Moodajee Booſla was both willing, and propoſed to join his Aſſiſtance in its Operations, and as the Seaſon of the Year will not admit of longer Delays, but require ſpeedy Deciſion and Action,

The Governor General moves, That Mr. Farquhar may be directed to deliver over all the public Papers, which were in his Charge, of the late Mr. Elliott, to Colonel Goddard, and that Colonel Goddard may be directed to carry into Execution the Inſtructions given to Mr. Elliott, and to negociate and conclude a Treaty with the Rajah of Berar, in like Manner, and with the ſame Powers as if thoſe Inſtructions had been originally given to him in Charge:

That Letters be written to the Select Committees of Fort Saint George and Bombay, and to the Reſident at Poona, adviſing them of this Commiſſion, and requiring their Conformity to it, in the Terms

Terms of the Letters written on the like Occaſion, on the Appointment of Mr. Elliott to the ſame Truſt, and by the Governor General to the Rajah of Berar, to the ſame Effect.

The Governor General alſo recommends, that a Letter be written to the Captain General of Goa, conformable to the accompanying Draft.

The Governor General, ſince writing the above, having received Letters from Captain Campbell and Lieutenant Anderſon, which he herewith ſubmits to the Peruſal of the Board, mentioning the Death of Mr. Farquhar, the late Mr. Elliott's Secretary, he recommends that the Order propoſed for Mr. Farquhar be directed to Captain Campbell, in whoſe Charge it appears that Mr. Elliott's Effects remain; and in the Caſe of his Death to Mr. Anderſon.

I reſerve my Opinion on the Governor General's Propoſitions till the Meeting of the Board.

(Signed) Philip Francis.

I agree to the Governor General's Propoſitions.

(Signed) Richard Barwell.

16 Nov. Mr. Francis delivers in the following Minute on this Subject:

Colonel Goddard's Letter of the 22d October is a private one to Mr. Haſtings, therefore ſtrictly and regularly no Authority of itſelf to this Board, to which he ought to have addreſſed himſelf on every one of the Points which he has thought fit to communicate ſolely to the Governor. Suppoſing any Meaſures which the Board may take in Conſequence of the Information contained in this Letter, may hereafter fail, I much queſtion we ſhould be warranted in appealing to it againſt Colonel Goddard: For this Reaſon, and becauſe the Terms he makes uſe of evidently imply an Opinion, that the Governor General poſſeſſes an Authority independant and excluſive of the Council, I object to our receiving it as an authentic and official Communication, on which the Meaſures of Government can be ſafely founded; and in this Place I deem it incumbent on me to declare once for all, that I object to and proteſt againſt all private Correſpondence between the Governor General and commanding Officer of the Company's Troops, ſo far forth as ſuch Correſpondence may contain Orders, Inſtructions, or Intelligence, which ought to proceed from or be communicated to the Governor General and Council collectively, and not otherwiſe: The Practice can anſwer no good Purpoſe, and is liable to many Inconveniences; it is againſt Law, and in a former Inſtance has been ſolemnly condemned by the Court of Directors. Suppoſing theſe Objections to be over-ruled, as I conclude they will be, I proceed to conſider the Letters as they ſtand, with the Propoſitions founded upon them.

It appears to me, that the Reaſons aſſigned by Colonel Goddard for departing from the high Road to Sagier are very unſatisfactory; and I muſt own I am ſorry to ſee that almoſt the firſt Step he takes after the Command is intruſted to him, ſhould be ſo liable to Exception. Balajee Pundit is the Man to whoſe Artifices and Enmity almoſt all the Difficulties and Oppoſition which Colonel Leſlie met with have been conſtantly aſcribed; our Records are filled with Proofs of his perfidious and hoſtile Diſpoſition towards us: Yet the Moment Colonel Goddard enters his Country, he finds Means to perſuade him that Reaſon, Juſtice, and good Policy, ſhould oblige him to quit the direct Road to Sagier, for Fear of diſtreſſing his Capital. In my Opinion, Balajee Pundit deſerved no ſuch Lenity and Compliance from the Commander of our Army: If the Expedition itſelf is to be juſtified, I apprehend, that Reaſon, Juſtice, and good Policy, ſhould have induced Colonel Goddard to treat this Man with ſome Degree of Severity, as a Warning to others, at all Events, his following a Route pointed out to him by ſo ſuſpicious a Guide is not to be juſtified. It appears by Mr. Anderſon's Letter, "that the Whole of the Country, nominally ſubject "to the Raja Beembajee, though in Point of Extent little inferior to that of his Brother, is yet "by ruinous Management ſo entirely depopulated, that it ſcarcely yields him a Revenue ſufficient "for the Maintenance of his Forces, which do not exceed 2,000 Horſe and Foot." Our Information with reſpect to the internal State of Berar, and the Strength and Reſources of its Sovereign, is ſo imperfect, that excluſive of all other Objections, I ſhould think it very hazardous on this Account, to enter into any Alliance with him: His Brother, with an equal Extent of Country, ſeems to be little better than a Beggar; and I do not know that there is any direct Evidence before this Board to induce us to believe that Moodajee Booſla himſelf poſſeſſes much greater Strength or Reſources, or that his Country is much better governed than that of Beembajee.

Dewagur Pundit, in his Letter received on the 12th Inſtant, ſays, "that the Fame of the ſtrict "Connection and intimate Friendſhip between the Governor General and Moodajee Booſla has been "every where ſpread, and has convinced Pundit Purdhaun Peſhwa and the Nabob Nizam ul Mulck, "that in contracting ſuch a Friendſhip the Governor has the moſt extenſive Views; which Appre"henſion has filled them with Diſmay." In my Opinion, their Ideas of the Views of this Government is not ill-founded; and as it muſt naturally excite in them the utmoſt Alarm for their Safety, it cannot but ſuggeſt to them the Neceſſity of uniting in their mutual Defence, and of engaging all the other Powers of India to join with them in oppoſing ſuch Views, and to conſider the Engliſh as the common Enemy of them all. A general War in India I think muſt inevitably be the Conſequence; and this War muſt on our Part be ſupported at an immenſe Diſtance from our own Frontier, at the Commencement of a Rupture with France, and with the Apprehenſion of an Invaſion hanging over us. Whatever may be the Event of a War maintained under ſuch Circumſtances, it deſerves to be ſeriouſly conſidered whether any Degree of Succeſs can compenſate to the Company for

the

; immederate Expence with which it muſt be attended. We are precluded from making further
:quiſitions of Territory; and if we were not, I ſee nothing that Victory and Conqueſt can produce,
t immediate and certain Diſburſements, with a very uncertain Proſpect of Payment in Re-
ıſion.

The propoſed Alliance with Moodajee Booſla, whenever it ſhall be accompliſhed, will amount to a
:claration of War with the Nizam of the Decan: On what Principle ſuch a Step can be juſtified,
lo not know; much leſs how it can be reconciled with the Company's fundamental Policy of ſup-
:ting that Prince againſt the Marattas. In their Letter of 30th June 1769, to the Preſidency of
rt Saint George, "they conſider the Nizam as one of the few remaining Chiefs, who are yet ca-
pable of coping with the Marattas;" and expreſsly add, "that it is the Company's true Intereſt to
preſerve a good Underſtanding with him." I conclude, for my own Part, that as ſoon as he ſhall
ar of the Terms of our Alliance with Moodajee Booſla, he will unite his Forces with thoſe of the
ona Government, and make an Irruption into the Carnatic.

Waving all former Objections to the Meaſure which the Governor General now preſumes to re-
ne, I object to it on the Ground of the Steps which this Government itſelf has taken, ſince the in-
ded Negociation was put a Stop to on Mr. Elliott's Death. On the 7th of October, we inſtructed
e commanding Officer to obey the Orders of the Preſidency of Bombay, whom we at the ſame
ime informed, that if their Plan of the 25th July ſtill ſubſiſted, or if they ſhould have formed any
ther Plan or Deſign for the Reſtoration of Ragoba, which ſhould require the Aſſiſtance of the De-
chment, they might command it to advance. In their Letter of the 11th September, they tell us
ey ſhall now very ſpeedily come to ſome deciſive Reſolutions, and adviſe us immediately of the Re-
lt: It is to be preſumed therefore, that when they find the Detachment ſtill under their Command,
nd that they are ſo expreſsly authorized by us to employ it in the Service of Ragoba, their Deciſion
ill ſoon follow, and their Meaſures be taken accordingly. In that Caſe, and ſuppoſing the Treaty
with Moodajee Booſla to be concluded on the Principles of Mr. Elliott's Inſtructions, the Faith of
the Company may be engaged on one Side to Ragoba, on the other to Moodajee Booſla, to ſupport
each of them in their Pretenſions reſpectively to the Sovereignty of the Maratta State. The com-
manding Officer, in the mean Time, is left to chuſe between contradictory Inſtructions, and to deter-
mine for himſelf what Authority he ſhall ſubmit to, and what Orders he ſhall obey.

If, notwithſtanding theſe Conſiderations, which to me appear to deſerve the moſt ſerious Attention,
it ſhould be determined to reſume the Negociation with Moodajee Booſla, I muſt object to our com-
mitting the Conduct of it to Colonel Goddard; Firſt, Becauſe the Buſineſs itſelf is of a moſt delicate
Nature, requiring peculiar Talents and Information, which the Governor does not repreſent Colonel
Goddard to poſſeſs. On this Principle at leaſt the Choice of Mr. Elliott, to whoſe Abilities I have
been at all Times ready to do Juſtice, was par[redacted]mmended: Independant of the G[redacted]'s
perſonal Confidence in that Gentleman, he was [redacted]e an intimate Knowledge of the [redacted]olitical
"State of this Government, in relation to the [redacted]ers of the Country." It does not derogate
from Colonel Goddard's Merit to ſay that his Qu[redacted]ons are not of this Nature.

Secondly, Becauſe I preſume that Colonel Goddard's Care and Attention will be engroſſed by the
military Duties of his Station; and that our loading him with an Employment ſo foreign from the
Line of his Experience and Profeſſion, can only tend to embarraſs and diſtreſs him.

For theſe, and other Reaſons, I object to and proteſt againſt the Motion.

With reſpect to the Letter to the Governor of Goa, I am of Opinion, that the Facts from which
our Application ariſes are purely imaginary. The ſuppoſed Alliance between the Poona Government
and the French, on which ſo much Streſs has been laid for near a Twelvemonth paſt, and from which
ſo many important Inferences have been deduced, has yet produced no one viſible Effect whatſoever:
For my own Part, I do not believe that ſuch an Union exiſts; but if it does, I cannot but deem it
in the higheſt Degree improbable, that a Governor of Goa would venture to permit a French Army
to land there, without expreſs Orders from his Court. If he has ſuch Orders, our Letter to him
avails nothing: If not, he muſt do it at the Hazard of his Head. At all Events, I think, that con-
ſidering the reſpective Rank of this Government and that of Goa, the Stile of the propoſed Letter is
much too earneſt and ſuppliant. I know the Portugueſe, and can affirm with Certainty, that this is
not the Way to treat with them. If the Danger were really ſuch as the Governor General appre-
hends, another Kind of Language might produce a good Effect.

(Signed) P. Francis.

Mr. Wheler delivers in the following Opinion: I ſubſcribe generally to the Sentiments and
Opinions expreſſed in Mr. Francis's Minute, and particularly to that Part of it which proteſts againſt
all private Correſpondence between the Governor General and the commanding Officer, being received
as authentic and official Information, ſo far as ſuch Correſpondence may contain Orders, Inſtructions,
or Intelligence, which ought to proceed from, or be communicated to the Governor General and
Council collectively, and not otherwiſe.

(Signed) E. Wheler.

The Governor General's Propoſitions being agreed to by a Majority of the Board, Reſolved,
That the following Letters be written to Colonel Goddard, and to the Select Committee at
Bombay:

Sir,

The unfortunate Death of Mr. Elliott having deprived us of his Services in the Execution of Commiſſion with which he was entruſted, and Moodajee Booſla, the Rajah of Berar, by his L on the Occaſion to this Government, having expreſſed his earneſt Deſire that ſome Perſon may immediately empowered to ſettle Terms on which the Alliance with the Company, which he ſeem anxious to form, ſhould be concluded, we have thought it expedient to purſue our Intention opening a Negociation with him for that Purpoſe; and we are induced, by the Confidence we re in your Ability, Integrity, and Zeal for the Intereſt of the Company's Affairs, to charge you with Execution of it; we have therefore directed Captain William Campbell, into whoſe Hands the pa Diſpatches and Credentials of the late Mr. Elliott have fallen by the Death of Mr. Farquhar Aſſiſtant, or Lieutenant Anderſon, in caſe of Captain Campbell's Death, to deliver up thoſe Do ments to you; and we hereby direct and authorize you to carry into Execution the Inſtructio which we had given to Mr. Elliott; you will therefore negociate and conclude a Treaty of Alli with Moodajee Booſla, in Behalf of the Company, in like Manner and with the ſame Powers as thoſe Inſtructions had been originally directed and given in Charge to yourſelf.

We are, &c.

Gentlemen,

We have already made you acquainted with the unfortunate Event of Mr. Elliott's Death, and t Reaſons of our delaying to take any further Meaſures reſpecting his Appointment, until we ſho hear from Berar. The Rajah has now written us, expreſſing his ſincere Concern for the Loſs of Mr Elliott, and earneſtly deſiring that ſome other Perſon may be immediately empowered to ſettle t Terms on which the Alliance with the Company, which he ſeems ſo anxious to form, ſhould concluded; we have therefore thought it expedient to purſue our Intention of entering into ſuch Alliance, and have appointed Colonel Goddard, on whoſe Ability and Zeal we depend, to exec the Negociation committed to the late Mr. Elliott; we requeſt that you will correſpond with him any Subject which may be material for his Information therein, agreeably to our former Deſire the Occaſion of Mr. Elliott's Appointment.

It being no longer neceſſary to withhold the Inſtructions prepared for Mr. Elliott, and now direct to Colonel Goddard, from our Records, we have ordered them to be entered, and herewith enclose Copy for your Information.

We are, &c.

To Modajee Bhooſila. To be delivered by Colonel Goddard. Written 18th October.

I have already informed you of the Removal of Colonel Leſlie, and the Appointment of Colon Goddard to the Command of the Detachment of Engliſh Forces on their March to Bomba Colonel Goddard being an Officer in whoſe Abilities I have the higheſt Confidence, and for whom entertain the greateſt Eſteem, I hope that you will favour him with your Confidence and Rega He will have the Pleaſure to deliver you this Letter; and I requeſt that you will freely communica with him on the Meaſures taken for our common Intereſt. Knowing me, &c.

To Beneram Pundit · Written 27th October.

I have very fully communicated to Colonel Goddard, who has ſucceeded Colonel Leſlie in th Command of the Engliſh Detachment, my Views with reſpect to the Operations of the Detachment and to the Connection with the Maha Rajah your Maſter. On Colonel Goddard I have the moſt im plicit Confidence, and am ſure that his Conduct will be ſuch as to merit, not only mine, but the Mah Rajah's Regard. You are well acquainted with his Character; that he is a Gentleman of the mo liberal Sentiments, and conciliatory Diſpoſition, and will repreſent him in this Light to the Mah Rajah and his Dewan Dewagur Pundit, and introduce a friendly and confidential Communicatio between them.

As it was impoſſible for me by Letters ſo fully to explain myſelf to Colonel Goddard as I could have wiſhed, I have referred him to you, who, from former Converſations we have had together on theſe Subjects, are intimately acquainted with all my Views in ſending the Detachment, and in the cloſe Connection I am deſirous of forming with your Maſter, for more particular Information; this I requeſt you will give him, and will conſult with him on the Meaſures proper to be taken, exerting all your Intereſt with your Maſter and his Dewan to give them Effect. On your Wiſdom and ſteady Attachment to your Maſter, which includes in it an Attachment to the Company, his Intereſt being ſo cloſely united with theirs, I rely for the ſucceſsful Iſſue of my Deſigns, which are calculated to promote our common Advantages.

To Modajee Bhoofila: Written 23d November.

After acknowledging the Receipt of his laſt Letter, and recapitulating the Contents of it:

To this Time I choſe to wait for the ſure Knowledge of your Sentiments, though in my own Mind I was perſuaded that they were exactly conformable to my own, before I ventured to fix the ultimate Deſtination of the Army. Your Letter has ſatisfied me; and in the firm Aſſurance that a Connection ſo well cemented, an Union of Two States ſo powerful, and ſo fortunate a Concurrence of Time and Circumſtances as the preſent, muſt, with the Bleſſing of God, which ever attends Meaſures concerted with Prudence and founded on Juſtice, be productive of Succeſs I have ſent Orders to Colonel Goddard to propoſe to you the Conditions of a Treaty between your State and that of the Engliſh Company, and a Plan of Operations to be undertaken by your Forces and ours under his Command, in Conjunction, both founded on the Inſtructions delivered to my late valuable Friend Mr. Elliott, and he has been inveſted by me and the Council compoſing this Government with full Powers for theſe Purpoſes. You have now in your Hands the Means of binding the Intereſts of your Family with thoſe of the Engliſh Company by the Ties of a perpetual Alliance, and of exalting your Name above thoſe of the moſt renowned Warriors and Chiefs of Hindoſtan and Decan. Seize the Occaſion which God and Fortune, which is but the Chain of Events produced by the natural Effect of his Prudence, have placed within your Reach; and know, that Gifts borne on the Wings of Time, paſs forward, and if neglected never return. To ſay more would imply a Diſtruſt of your Wiſdom and Fortitude, of which, were I not aſſured, I would not adventure the Concerns of my Nation with yours in ſo great an Undertaking.

To Dewagur Pundit: D°.

Containing the whole Subſtance of the foregoing Letter with the following Addition:

In the Whole of my Conduct I have departed from the common Line of Policy, and have made Advances where others in my Situation would have waited for Solicitation, as the greateſt Advantages to which I can look cannot in their Nature equal thoſe to which the proſperous Iſſue of our Meaſures may conduct the State of the Maha Rajah's Government. But I know the Character to which I addreſs myſelf. I truſt to the approved Bravery and Spirit of your Chief, that he will ardently catch at the Objects preſented to his Ambition, and to your Wiſdom, of which, if Fame reports truly, no Miniſter ever poſſeſſed a larger Portion; that you will view their Importance in too clear a Light to hazard the Loſs of them by attempting to take an Advantage of the Deſire which I have expreſſed for their Accompliſhment. This Intimation is not ſo much intended for a Caution to you, as for an Explanation of my Conduct to thoſe who may be leſs able to penetrate the Grounds of it.

APPENDIX, N° 154.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 30th November 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell, Philip Francis, Edward Wheler, } Eſquires.

RECEIVED the following Letters from Mr. Lewis, Aſſiſtant to the Reſident at Poona:

My laſt Reſpects were dated 27th ultimo. Having received Information that the Durbar had received ſeveral Letters from Pondicherry, I employed a Perſon to procure me Copies of them, which he accordingly effected; but they being written in Perſian, and I having no Perſon here who can tranſlate them, I am under the Neceſſity of forwarding the Perſian Copies to you.

Hurry Punt having, by partial Payments, in ſome Shape ſatisfied the principal Officers of his late Army, the Durbar I hear have determined on ſending him again to oppoſe Hyder in the Carnatic.

I am, &c.
(Signed) W. Lewis,

Copy

APPENDIX, N° 154.

Copy of a Letter from the Chief of Pondicherry to the Peſhwa.

Your gracious Letter expreſſive of Friendſhip, together with Letters from Nanah Purnaveſe and Hurry Pundit, on the Subject of the Quarrel with the Engliſh, and of Aid and Aſſiſtance of Money, Troops, &c. honoured me by its Arrival, and afforded me inexpreſſible Pleaſure. Accordingly, agreeable to your Orders, I am prepared to exert myſelf in the Manner you point out, and to fulfil your Pleaſure.

You will be fully informed of every Particular from my Letters to Nanah Purnaveſe and Hurry Pundit.

Copy of a Letter from the Chief of Pondicherry to Nanah Purnaveſe.

Your friendly Letter on the Subject of a War with the Engliſh Nation, and Aſſiſtance of Money and Troops to be afforded by Seremunt Sahib, and the Eſtabliſhment of a Factory at Poona after the Buſineſs of the Engliſh is brought to a Concluſion, arrived, together with a Letter from Seremunt Sahib, in a happy Hour, and greatly honoured me.

Agreeably to what you write, in which you propoſe Terms advantageous to me, which I delay to reply particularly to till a fit Opportunity, I proceed to ſuch Points as are immediately neceſſary

In the Firſt Place, you write that the Engliſh are very unfaithful to their Engagements, quarrelſome, and the Fomenters of Diſturbances; and that the principal Actor in theſe Diſturbances is Moſtyn, the Vackeel of the Settlement of Bombay, who laid the Foundation of the Quarrel with the Engliſh. You ſecondly write, that they have ſet up and eſpouſed the Cauſe of Dada Ragonaut Row Jeo, and neither have left nor do leave any Act of Malice unperformed: That if I will engage warmly in the Buſineſs, you will ſhortly cauſe Twenty Lacks of Rupees to be granted me from Seremunt's Sircar; and that when I come againſt Bombay, you will ſend Twenty Lacks of Rupees, and Ten Ships filled with your Sepoys to my Aſſiſtance.

Thanks to God, I have lately, agreeable to Seremunt's Orders and your Inclination, entered upon this Buſineſs, and neglect no Means of proſecuting the War; and every Day produces the moſt furious Attacks upon the Engliſh Army who are come before Pondicherry. A ſmart Cannonade is kept up on both Sides, of which the Hircarrahs of the Sircar are Eye-witneſſes; and that we have deſtroyed Three Engliſh Grabs, and, by the Bleſſing of God, ſhall deſtroy Four Ships which they have at Anchor in deep Water. It is neceſſary that you adhere faithfully to your Treaty, and conſider me arrived at Bombay the Inſtant we have put an End to the Conteſt here.

Extract of a Letter from the Governor General and Council in Bengal to the Court of Directors, dated 30th November 1778.

Secret Department.

Par. 10. The very dilatory Proceeding of Colonel Leſlie in his March towards Berar, notwithſtanding our repeated Orders to him on that Subject, and his direct Violation of our Inſtructions, by pledging the Faith of the Company to a Treaty of perpetual Friendſhip with the Rajahs Gomaun and Comaun Sing, a Copy whereof tranſmitted by him to the Governor General was communicated to the Board, made it, as we judged, incumbent on us to remove him from his Station, and to promote Lieutenant Colonel Goddard, the next Senior Officer, to the chief Command of the Troops. This Reſolution paſſed in Conſultation the 12th October; and on the 22d we heard of Colonel Leſlie's Death, after a ſhort Illneſs of Four or Five Days. Colonel Goddard, who on that Event aſſumed the Command before the Arrival of our Appointment, moved from Raji Ghur, where the Detachment was then encamped, in Two Days Time, and to our Satisfaction has ſince made a great Progreſs in his Way to the Place of his Deſtination.

11. In the laſt Letter from Colonel Leſlie to the Board, which he was too ill to put his Name to, a pointed Reference was made to his Correſpondence with the Governor General, for a full Account of his Proceedings: The Governor General has in conſequence laid the ſame before us, and we have cauſed ſuch Parts of the Letters as have any Relation to public Matters, to be tranſcribed for your Information. A Copy of them is entered after the Conſultation noted in the Margin.

12. The Importance of the Command entruſted to Lieutenant Colonel Goddard, our Confidence in his Experience and Abilities as an Officer, and the Length of his Services to the Company, have induced us to give him the local and temporary Rank of Colonel during the Expedition on which he is employed; and Care has been taken to declare that this is not to prejudice the Rights of Two Lieutenant Colonels, his Seniors in the Service.

13. The firſt Inſtructions we gave to Colonel Goddard on his Appointment, were to proſecute his March immediately towards Bombay, if on his Arrival at Berar the Rajah ſhould agree to join him with a ſufficient Force, to enable him to do it with Security and Effect; but if the Rajah ſhould refuſe or decline his Aid on this Occaſion, we left it to the Colonel's Diſcretion to purſue his Route

or

or to ſuſpend his Operations, unleſs he ſhould receive poſitive Orders for his Guidance from the Preſidency of Bombay.

14. We gave Notice at the ſame Time of this Licence to the Preſident and Council of Bombay, authorizing them to order the Advance of the Troops at all Events, if their original Plan for the Reſtoration of Ragoba, or any other Plan, conſiſtent with the Terms on which we expreſſed our Approval of that Meaſure, ſhould ſtill ſubſiſt, or that they judged the Preſence of ſuch a Force immediately and indiſpenſably neceſſary for the Defence of Bombay againſt a French Invaſion; but in all other Caſes, to leave it to act under our Orders.

15. We did not at this Time intend to depute any other Perſon to execute the Commiſſion entruſted to the late Mr. Elliott, until we ſhould hear from the Rajah of Berar, who would, we concluded, be more earneſt to bring about an Alliance, in conſequence of the Accident which had fruſtrated our Endeavours; and might probably either depute a Vackeel immediately to us himſelf, or propoſe Terms of Alliance advantageous to the Company's Intereſts.

16. On the News of Mr. Elliott's Death, the Rajah wrote a Letter of Condolance, and preſſed us in ſtrong Terms to ſupply his Place immediately; recommending that Mr. Farquhar, whom he had taken as an Aſſiſtant, might be empowered to execute his Commiſſion, that the Connection intended to have been formed between us might not be dropped. He even related a Circumſtance, which proves, in our Opinion, that he is ſincere in his Profeſſions: A Letter written to him from this Government, on the Occaſion of Mr. Elliott's Appointment, happened to be intercepted in Boondelcund, and immediately tranſmitted to Poona; that Durbar and Nizam Ally being in this Manner apprized of its Contents, immediately wrote to demand the real Intentions of Moodajee reſpecting us, and obliged him in conſequence, as he informs us, to declare himſelf the firm Friend of the Engliſh, and that their Enemies were his Enemies. Thus he is neceſſarily obliged to place ſome Reliance on our Attachment and Support.

17. On Receipt of the above Letter, we thought it adviſable to proſecute the Plan of Mr. Elliott's Deputation; and that no Time might be loſt in carrying his Inſtructions into Effect, we ordered them to be delivered up to Colonel Goddard, whom we have charged with the Performance of that important Commiſſion.

18. This Meaſure having rendered it improper, as we conceived, to leave a Power veſted in the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay to fruſtrate the Succeſs of the Negociation, by ordering the Troops to advance before any Engagements could be finally concluded, as they had dropped the Plan for the Accompliſhment of which the Troops were originally intended, and as their Orders might in other Reſpects claſh with our Meaſures, we thought it proper to revoke the Authority conveyed to them by our Letter of the 15th October, and have reſerved to ourſelves the ſole Right of directing the future Operations of Colonel Goddard. A curſory Account of theſe Tranſactions is all we pretend to give you in a general Letter; for a more particular Detail of them, we muſt refer you to our Conſultations noted in the Margin.

19. The State of our Advices from Bombay and Poona, at the Date of our laſt Diſpatches, will be found particularly given in the accompanying Duplicate of our Letter of the 17th Auguſt. We have ſince been informed, that Moraba Furneſe, the late Miniſter, and Burhaba Proonder, a Chief warmly attached to his Intereſt, had been ſeized by the prevailing Party, of whom Nanah Furneſe is nominally the Head, and thrown into Confinement: The Government nevertheleſs remained ſtill in Confuſion, from the ambitious Views of the different Perſons compoſing it, and the hoſtile Advances made by Hyder Ally, which they were preparing to repel. Succaram Baboo had been declared ſuperannuated by Nanah Furneſe, and compelled to give up his Offices, and retire to his own Houſe, on which Guards were placed to keep a Watch on his Actions.

20. Mr. Lewis writes, under Date the 27th October, that he had ſent away his Sepoys, and was in hourly Expectation of being recalled himſelf, as the Governor of Bombay wrote to him, that the Secret Committee had determined to act againſt the Poona Durbar.

21. Mr. Lewis has obtained Copies of Letters ſaid to have been written by the Governor of Pondicherry to the Paiſhwa and his Miniſters, which we think it our Duty to tranſmit Tranſlations of, although we have no Grounds either to credit or doubt the Authenticity of them.

22. Judging the Services of the Commander in Chief more neceſſary in the Nabob's Dominions, for making a proper Diſpoſition of the Company's Forces there, in order to protect the Weſtern Frontier, than at the Preſidency, where a complete Diſpoſition has already been formed, we directed General Stibbert to repair immediately to that Quarter.

We have the Honour to be,
Honourable Sirs,
Your moſt faithful humble Servants,

Fort William,
30th November 1778.

Warren Haſtings,
Rich[d] Barwell,
P. Francis,
Edw[d] Wheler.

APPENDIX, N° 155.

From Siccaram Pundit; received 5th December 1778.

I HAVE been favoured with your Letter, intimating your having received repeated and certain Intelligence of the Arrival of a French Gentleman at Poona, the Grant of a Place to him in the Neighbourhood of Bombay, and the Formation of a Friendſhip with him. Your Surprize at ſuch Meaſures, which are inconſiſtent with the Treaty of ſtrict Friendſhip contracted between the Two States (a Friendſhip fraught with mutual Advantages) and carry the Appearance of a Diſinclination in this Government to Friendſhip. Such Acts are a Breach of the Treaty, and oppoſite to the Duties of Friendſhip and Alliance. That the Foundations of the Treaty are laid on this Baſis, that the Friends and Enemies of each State ſhould be common to the other; and that a Conduct in Oppoſition thereto could never be reconciled to the Rights of Friendſhip, and was highly improper.

My Friend! in the Terms of the Treaty, there is no Room for Deviation, nor ſhall they ever be diſregarded on our Part; and my friendly Heart aſſures me, that you on your Part will always keep this Treaty preſent in your Mind, regarding our Friends and Enemies as common. I had, before the Arrival of your Letter on the 18th of Summadee Ulawul (25th June 1777) cauſed the French Chief to be diſmiſſed from the Preſence of my Maſter, Shemund Row Pundit Purdham Peſhwa Sahib; but he afterwards continued ſome Time at Poona, to provide for the Tranſportation of his Baggage, which being effected, he quitted Poona the 6th Jammadee Aſſanee (12th of July 1777.)

You write with the Pen of Friendſhip, that our Views and Intereſts are the ſame. It is true that I regard the Preſervation of the Friendſhip of the Engliſh Company and King of England as really incumbent; but the Governor and Council of Bombay have not fulfilled one Article of the Treaty: They have to the preſent Time given an Aſylum to Seremunt Ragonaut Row, and excited Diſturbances and Commotions in the Dominions of my Maſter, Seremunt Sahib.

As Tocojee Row Holdcar, Madajee Row Sindia, and other powerful Chiefs, have conceived Aſtoniſhment and Doubts with reſpect to the Propriety of your Conduct and good Intentions, and the Governor and Council of Bombay will not ſettle the Affair of the Three Lacks of Rupees with the Sirkar, nor reſtore Chickley, &c. Places ceded by Futtah Sing Row, with the Collections made therein; and Thomas Moſtyn, the Vackeel of the Governor of Bombay, who came here to ſettle the Matters in Debate, incited by Enmity and Hatred, has openly declared that he has no Orders from the Governor of Bombay to bring the Diſputes to a Concluſion (Copy of an Extract of a Letter of his is incloſed, Lalla Sereck Ram who will preſent it for your Peruſal) and it is the uſual Conduct of the Chiefs to contract Engagements at one Time, which they will not afterwards abide by; if in conſequence I ſhould give Thomas Moſtyn his Diſmiſſion, it will excite your Diſpleaſure.

Whilſt Colonel Upton remained here, all Matters were ſettled; but from the Day of his Departure, every Matter has been kept under the Veil of Procraſtination and Suſpence.

God only knows what Accuſations Thomas Moſtyn may write to you and the Governor of Bombay; but I conceive from this, that the Governor of Bombay in his Heart wiſhes a Breach in the Settlement made and Friendſhip contracted between the Two States.

At the Time the Treaty was formed with Colonel Upton, he was told that he ſhould ſend for a Perſon of Credit on the Part of the Governor of Bombay, and execute the Treaty in his Preſence; to which he made Anſwer, "The Supreme Council of Calcutta have from the King of England "Authority over all the Settlements: The Acts of the Supreme Court are valid; no one has Power "to violate their Orders."

The Event has been, that, notwithſtanding your expreſs Orders to the Governor of Bombay, forbidding him to give Seramunt Dada Sahib an Aſylum in the Territories of the Engliſh Company, and directing him to conclude the Affair of the Country of 3 Lacks of Rupees in the Manner ſtipulated in the Treaty, and to reſtore the Country ceded by Futty Sing Kaikwar, with the Collections made therein, and to obſerve a friendly and candid Conduct towards me; yet no one Symptom of Attention to theſe Orders has appeared in his Conduct, but the very contrary of all this. Such being the Caſe, induced by Friendſhip, adopt the only Mode left, by ſending a Perſon in whom you may confide, who may in Perſon remove the Cauſes of Diſpute on both Sides, and finally ſettle every Matter, and give you entire Satisfaction. On my Part there ſhall be no Kind of Failure in or Deviation from the Duties of Friendſhip. There is no Candour to be expected from the Governor of Bombay; the Remedy is in your Hands.

Whoever may have written you that an Engagement was contracted between me and the French Chief, and a Place granted him by the Sirkar, in the Neighbourhood of Bombay, it is neceſſary that you make the ſtricteſt Enquiry into the Matter, and bring that falſe Writer, whoſe Aſſertions are abſolute Lyes without the leaſt Shadow of Truth, to his deſerved Puniſhment, to deter others by the Example, from penning ſuch Falſhoods, of which I am entirely innocent.

From Balajee Pundit, of the ſame Tenor and Date.

Paper

APPENDIX, N° 155.

Paper referred to in the above Letters, delivered by Lalla Seurik Ram.

Copy of an Extract of the Purport of a Letter, in the Hindoo Language, written by Thomas Moſtyn, from Poona, which you are to preſent on the Part of the Peſhwa, for the Peruſal of Amaud-ul-Dowla Bahadre.

I have replied to Balajee Jenardar, his Highneſs's Miniſter, that I cannot come without an Order from the Governor of Bombay: That the Orders of my Principal are neceſſary to enable me to come on Buſineſs, and that I ſhall follow his Directions.

Conſider the Meaning of the above Lines, and that if he makes ſuch Pretences for not coming from Poona to the Fort of Poorunder, what can be effected with reſpect to the Settlement of other Matters?

From Siccaram Pundit: Received 7th December 1778.

At the Time when ſome of the Company's Chiefs were engaged in Diſputes and Hoſtilities with the Chiefs of this Government, actuated by a Wiſh to promote the Good and Happineſs of Mankind in general, which ſuffered by thoſe Troubles, you interpoſed your friendly Mediation to remove the Cauſe of Complaint, and to put a Stop to them, and deputed Colonel John Upton for this Purpoſe, to the Preſence of my Maſter Scremunt Row Pundit Purdhaun Peſhwa Sahib. At the Time of the Ratification of Peace I objected to there being no Perſon of Rank and Credit preſent on the Part of the Governor of Bombay; to which the Colonel made Anſwer, That the Governor and Supreme Council of Calcutta were inveſted with Authority over all the Settlements of the Engliſh Company, and that their Acts were binding on the Chiefs of all the Engliſh Settlements. On the Faith of this Declaration I made Peace between this Government and the Company's Chiefs, and concluded a Treaty; but the Governor of Bombay has, in every Inſtance of his Conduct ſince, excited Troubles and Commotions in Violation of the Ties of Friendſhip; and notwithſtanding your expreſs Orders to expel Seramunt Dada Sahib from the Engliſh Company's Dominions, and to ſettle all Points between the Two States, in conformity to the Treaty, he has performed nothing thereof; and an Envoy from the King of France arriving here with a Letter, intereſted Perſons and Inventors of Falſhoods, conceiving this a lucky Opportunity to obtain Credit to their lying Reports, without Examination or Reflection, repreſented it to you in the Manner beſt calculated to anſwer their malicious Purpoſes. I call God to Witneſs, that out of Regard to the Friendſhip and Alliance of the Company and Engliſh Chiefs, I diſmiſſed the ſaid Envoy, without negociating or even converſing with him. I have lately heard that ſome of your People have poſſeſſed themſelves of the Fort of Calpee, which belongs to this Government. This Meaſure is widely removed from the Faith of the ſolemn Treaty executed by the Engliſh.

When the Governor of Bombay in former Times put on the Maſk of Friendſhip for the Purpoſes of Deceit, and aided the Enemies of this Government, regarding you Sir, as ſuperior to all other Chiefs, I made Peace and Friendſhip with you, and theſe are the Fruits produced by this Friendſhip.

You write, that the maintaining of Friendſhip and ſtrict Union between our reſpective States, is your Reſolve. Is it in effect for the Preſervation of Friendſhip that you trouble the Dominions of this Government? ſuch a Mode of Conduct is inconſiſtent with the Maxims and Uſages of high and illuſtrious Chiefs. It is mutually incumbent on us to preſerve inviolate the Terms of the Treaty. Should any Deviations ariſe therein, they are the Effects of the Will, and Diſpenſations of God. Farther Particulars will be communicated Sella Senrick Ram, the Government Vackeel. Let me conſtantly have the Pleaſure to hear of your Welfare.

From Balajee Pundit; of the ſame Tenor and Date as the foregoing.

From Madhorow Peiſhwa: Received 12th December 1778.

I have been favoured with your Letter the 22d Summadee Aſſanie, 17th July, intimating your Determination to maintain the Peace inviolable, and to adhere ſcrupulouſly to all the Conditions of the Treaty, and your having diſpatched an Army for the Reinforcement of the Settlements of Bombay, and deſiring poſitive Injunctions to all the Dependants of my Government, to allow the Troops a free Paſſage, with other Particulars; which I underſtand, and which afforded me great Pleaſure.

As my friendly Heart is ever deſirous of maintaining inviolate all the Conditions of the Treaty concluded between our States, and I am conſtantly attentive thereto, it is incumbent on you likewiſe to perſevere in the Path of Friendſhip. Our well-beloved Miniſters Saccaram Pundit and Ballajee Pundit have received Orders to reply to every Article of your Letters; this they will do, and you will act agreeable thereto.

APPENDIX, N° 155.

From Saccaram Pundit: Received the 12th of December 1778.

I have been favoured with your Letter under Date the 22d Summadee Aſanie (17th July) on the Subject of the Preſervation and Increaſe of the Friendſhip between the Two States; and intimating, that it is your fixed Reſolve to maintain every Article of the Treaty as long as it is adhered to by Row Pundit Purhaun; that the Troops have been ſent ſolely for the Reinforcement of the Settlements of Bombay; and that the commanding Officer has ſtrict Injunctions to obſerve ſuch a Conduct in every Reſpect as is conſiſtent with the Friendſhip ſubſiſting: That the ſeveral Letters you have lately received from this Quarter, meaning from me, contain a Declaration to maintain the Treaty and Friendſhip between us; yet, that my having hitherto evaded your Requeſt, to grant Paſſes for the March of the Troops through the Government Dominions, cauſes you great Aſtoniſhment; that if I ſtill refuſed to comply therewith, you are remedileſs, and the Blame will fall on me. The Letter containing the above and other Particulars, which I ſhall notice before I conclude, reached me on the 4th of Shabaun (28th Auguſt) and afforded me great Pleaſure.

It is univerſally allowed that there is nothing more excellent in the World than Friendſhip and Harmony, which are Bleſſings to Mankind in general. The Maintenance of every Article of the Treaty is equally incumbent on both Parties. It is not ſtipulated in any Article of the Treaty, that either Party may ſend Forces through the Dominions of the other, without conſulting him beforehand, and cauſe Trouble and Diſtreſs to the People. To what Rules of Friendſhip can be attributed the ſtationing of Garriſons in the Forts, and making Collections in the Country of the other Party: What has happened is then agreeable to the Engliſh Faith: In proof of this Aſſertion, be it obſerved, Colonel Leſlie, the commanding Officer of the Forces, has kept with him Seramunt Dada Sahib Carkoon, and in Conjunction with him collects Money from the Dominions of the Government by intimidating its Subjects; this being the Caſe, what becomes of your Aſſurance before recited, that the Treaty ſhould be ſcrupulouſly adhered to on your Part, as long as it was maintained by my Maſter Seremunt Peiſhwa Sahib, or what Degree of Credit can be given thereto?

From Time immemorial, no Forces of the maritime European Nations having marched by Land through the Dominions of the Government, but the Route of all the trading and European Nations has been by the Ocean; nor is it ſtipulated in the Treaty that Engliſh Detachments ſhall have a Paſſage through the Government Territories.

Reflect maturely on this, and then determine on whoſe Side the Blame reſts. That ſuch unlooked-for Acts ſhould proceed from you, is Matter of the higheſt Aſtoniſhment, to think that mighty and powerful Chiefs ſhould act in direct Oppoſition to the Faith of their Engagements. You are pleaſed to write, that if the Preſidency of Bombay ſhall ſtill continue to require the Troops, you can in no Caſe agree to recall them. The Matter is briefly this:

At the Time of the Concluſion of the Treaty, I made Objections reſpecting the Preſidency of Bombay; to which Colonel John Upton made Anſwer, "The King of England and the Engliſh "Company have placed Confidence in the Supreme Council of Calcutta, and inveſted it with Autho-"rity over all the other Settlements: The Acts of the Council of Calcutta are binding on the "Government of all the Company's Settlements." Having given this Aſſurance, he prepared the Form of a Treaty, ſuch as the critical Situation of the Times rendered neceſſary; and you tranſmitted me a Treaty conformable thereto, under the Seal of the Engliſh Company. It was from the Beginning the earneſt Wiſh of the Government of Bombay, that no friendly Connections ſhould be eſtabliſhed between the Two States, and they have ever ſince been ſtriving to overſet it; and notwithſtanding the Concluſion of the Treaty, they kept Dada Sahib with them: How then was it to be expected that they ſhould recall their Troops, which were diſturbing the Peace of the Government Dominions? It even appears to a Conviction, that they perſuaded Dada Sahib to the Meaſures he has purſued: How then does the Supreme Authority of the Council of Calcutta from the King of England appear, ſince the Chiefs of the different Settlements do not regard Engagements contracted by you, as binding on them, but make no Scruple to break them; and you, paying no Regard to your Acts, take your Meaſures on the Repreſentation of the Government of Bombay? This is indeed aſtoniſhing to the higheſt Degree.

It is the Dictate of ſound Policy that you withdraw your Troops to your own Territories; this will be a convincing Proof of the Sincerity of your Friendſhip, and will ſpread the Fame of your good Faith throughout the Univerſe.

From the Commencement of the Authority of the Family of the Peiſhwa, they have entered into Treaties with many of the Chiefs both of the Eaſt and Weſt, and have never before experienced ſuch a Want of Faith from any one; nor ever, to the preſent Time, deviated from their Engagements, or been wanting to the Duties of Friendſhip and Alliance. The Blame reſts with you.

From Balajee Pundit; of the ſame Tenor and Date.

APPENDIX, N° 156.

Bengal Secret Conſultations.

Letter from Beneram Pundit; received 16th December 1778.

I HAVE already tranſmitted you Two Arzies, accompanied by Letters from the Maha Rajah and Dewan Dewagur Pundit, on the Subject of the unfortunate Death of Mr. Elliott, under Charge of Coſſids; the one by the Way of Cuttack, the other by that of Benares; all which I hope you have received, and become acquainted with their Contents.

Punait Purdhaun Peiſhwa, on the News of the late Mr. Elliott's Deputation, ſent a Vackeel named Baboo Ram Bade, to the Maha Rajah, to obtain Intelligence of what was going on. The ſaid Baboo Ram, in the Preſence of Dewan Dewagur Pundit, has repeatedly, on the Part of the Peiſhwa, talked to me of the Breach of Engagements, and obſtinately refuſed to liſten to Conviction. Dewan Dewagur Pundit obſerved to him, had Mr. Elliott arrived, all Matters would have been known. It is unneceſſary to dwell on notorious Facts. The happy Influence of the Engliſh Fortune has at all Times effected the Ruin of their Enemies, and will continue to do ſo in future. May the Almighty daily augment it!

It is a freſh Proof of their good Fortune, that on the 26th of Ramgaun, through the Valour and Magnanimity of the victorious Engliſh, the Fort of Pondicherry was reduced, and the Enemies of their State, to wit, the French Sirdars, all made Priſoners. I ſincerely congratulate you on this happy Event. The News of this Victory has been conveyed hither by a Letter from Mhad Ameen Khan to Vikar ul Dow ah; who, actuated by Friendſhip, ſent the Letter to Dewan Dewagur Pundit, who ſhewed it to me. All Tongues are employed in ſounding the Engliſh Praiſes, their Power, and good Fortune; which may God ſtill increaſe!

We wait impatiently for your Reply to the former Letters from hence, deſiring that a Gentleman might be deputed in the room of the late Mr. Elliott. Biſſember Pundit will repreſent further Particulars to you. The Maha Rajah and Dewagur Pundit are greatly rejoiced at the News of this Victory. I have been ſo ill with a Fever ever ſince I arrived at Naigpore, that I was for many Days deprived of Senſe: I am now, through your auſpicious Influence, on the Recovery, although ſtill very weak: In Two or Three Days I hope to recover ſufficient Strength to attend the Durbar. Let not my Illneſs cauſe you any Uneaſineſs; for, by the Bleſſing of God, every thing will go well.

APPENDIX, N° 157.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 7th December 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler,
} Eſquires.

THE Governor General having delivered the following Minute, it was immediately circulated with Drafts of Letters to Bombay and Colonel Goddard.

Governor General—As the Failure of the Plan to which the Detachment deſtined for Bombay was originally formed, renders it no longer neceſſary that it ſhould act under the Orders of that Preſidency, and as theſe might eventually counteract and defeat the Ends of the Negociation lately given in Charge to Colonel Goddard, I move, That the Powers delegated to the Preſident and Select Committee at Bombay, in our Letter of the 15th ultimo, be revoked, and that the commanding Officer of the Detachment be directed henceforth to obey only ſuch Orders as he ſhall receive from us; and that the following Letters to the Select Committee at Bombay, and to Colonel Goddard, be written accordingly.

To the Select Committee at Bombay.

Gentlemen,

In our Letter of the 16th Inſtant we informed you, that we had thought it proper to inveſt Colonel Goddard with full Powers to conclude a Treaty with Moodajee Booſla, Raja of Bera, on the

Grounds of our Inſtructions to the late Mr. Elliott, of which we encloſed a Copy for your Information. As the Event of his Negociation is likely to cauſe a very ſpeedy and eſſential Change in the Deſign and Operations of the Detachment, and as the Plan which we have choſen to ſupply the Place of th. originally recommended by you, has rendered it neceſſary that we ſhould retain in our Hands the Means of effecting it; we hereby revoke the Power which we gave you in our Letter of the 15th ultimo, and ſhall direct the commanding Officer of the Detachment to obey only ſuch Orders as he ſhall hereafter receive from us.

Although the Circumſtances into which we have been thrown by the Failure of the Plan for which the Detachment was originally formed, have rendered it neceſſary to make this Alteration in the Controul and Directions of it, our Intention is not to withdraw the Services of the Detachment entirely from the Support of any Meaſures which you may have formed in reliance on them, if thoſe Meaſures ſhall not prove incompatible with the Inſtructions given to Colonel Goddard, and with the Engagements which he may conclude in conſequence of them. We ſhall therefore leave him ſtill ſubject to your Inſtructions under theſe Proviſions, and requeſt that you will communicate to him ſuch Points as you may judge proper to be included in the Operations concerted with the Raja of Berar.

We are, &c.

Fort William,
23d November 1778.

To Colonel Goddard, commanding the Detachment from the 1ſt Brigade.

Sir,

As we fear that your Negociation with Moodajee Booſla, or the Meaſures which you may find it neceſſary to purſue in conſequence of your Engagements with that Chief, might be interrupted by the Orders which you would receive from the Preſident and Select Committee at Bombay, were we to leave the Direction of your Operations entirely to that Government; we think it neceſſary to revoke the Order contained in our Letter to you, dated the 15th ultimo, by which you were directed to obey all ſuch Orders as you might receive from the Preſident and Council of Bombay; and to forbid you to obey any Orders but ſuch as you ſhall henceforth receive from us. But as it is our Intention that the Detachment under your Command, ſhall yet act in ſupport of any Meaſures which the Preſident and Council of Bombay may have formed in Reliance on it, as far as they ſhall be conſiſtent with your preſent Inſtructions, and the Engagements which you may have concluded in conſequence of them, we deſire that you will nevertheleſs attend to any Inſtructions which you may receive from them, provided they be not incompatible with this Rule.

We are, &c.

Fort William,
23d November 1778.

The following Minutes were returned on the above Subject:

Mr. Francis—At laſt it is avowedly determined that the Detachment ſhall not proceed to Bombay. For my own Part, I receive this Explanation of the Intentions of the Majority without Surprize, and ſhall leave them to anſwer to the Company for this, as well as all the other Changes and Inconſiſtences which have attended the Meaſure. But it is my Duty to point out to the Court of Directors, that this laſt Arrangement is not juſtified by the Motive aſſigned for it: No Event has happened ſince the 15th of October, which ſhould induce us to believe that the Plan alluded to in the Governor's Minute has failed. If it has, it muſt have failed before we gave our Inſtructions to the Commanding Officer, under that Date, to concur in the Support of ſuch a Plan; but let the Plan formed in favour of Ragoba have failed when it may, its Failure, on the Governor General's own Principles, is no Reaſon for countermanding the March of the Detachment, or revoking the Authority of the Preſidency of Bombay over it. The Caſe of an *immediate Invaſion of Bombay by the French* was ſuppoſed and inſiſted on by the Governor General, as the Ground of giving Powers to that Preſidency to direct the Motions of the Detachment, and employ it in their Defence; but the Defence of Bombay, in caſe of an Invaſion, has no Connection with a Plan in favour of Ragoba, and is now as likely as ever it was to demand the immediate Aſſiſtance of the Detachment. The Intimation contained in the propoſed Letter to Bombay, "That it is not our Intention to withdraw the "Services of the Detachment entirely from the Support of any Meaſures which they may have "formed in Reliance on them," is nugatory, and can mean nothing, ſince it is reſted on a Condition that ſuppoſes an Impoſſibility; viz. That any Meaſures formed in favour of Ragoba, can be compatible with the Plan and Object of Mr. Elliott's Inſtructions.

For this, and many other Reaſons which I could eaſily ſtate, if I thought it were to any Purpoſe, I diſſent from and proteſt againſt the Meaſure.

(Signed) P. Francis.

I likewiſe diſſent from and proteſt againſt the Meaſure.

(Signed) Edw[d] Wheler.

Mr. Barwell having approved of the Letters propoſed by the Governor General to be written to the Select Committee at Bombay, and to Colonel Goddard, they were copied fair, and diſpatched.

The following Propoſal from the Governor General was received and circulated the 4th Inſtant:

Governor Genera'—Not having yet received Advice of the Arrival of the Gentlemen who accompanied the late Mr. Elliott, at Naugpoor; leſt any Accident ſhould have befallen them, or the Papers under their Charge, I move, That a Copy of Mr. Elliott's Inſtructions be immediately tranſmitted to Colonel Goddard, with another Copy of the laſt Letters written to him.

I acquieſce.
(Signed) P. F.
(Signed) E. W.

A Letter was accordingly ſent to Colonel Goddard, with a Copy of Mr. Elliott's Inſtructions, as follows:

Sir,

Leſt ſome Accident ſhould prevent the Delivery of the original Inſtructions to you which were given to Mr. Elliott, we think it proper to tranſmit you a Copy of them, by the Way of Benares, together with a Triplicate of our laſt Letter on the Subject of them.

We are, &c.
P. Francis,
Edwd Wheler.

Fort William,
the 4th December 1778.

APPENDIX, N° 158.

Letter from the Governor General to Ragonaut Row.

I HAVE been favoured with your very agreeable Letter on the Subject, and informing me of your having diſpatched Rajah Ram Dunkar and Trimbuck Dado Jee, Perſons poſſeſſed of your Confidence, to make me fully acquainted with them.

The Reliance you place in my Friendſhip is well grounded, of which I ſhall be ever happy to give you the moſt convincing Proofs.

It is Matter of the higheſt Concern to me, that the Meaſures taken by this Government, on the Plan propoſed for your Advantage by the Preſidency of Bombay, have hitherto failed of Succeſs; and the total Ignorance in which we have ſince been kept of the State of your Affairs, has left me at a Loſs how to act: You may however reſt perfectly ſatisfied that you are in the Hands of your Friends, and that I ſhall be always ready to join in any Meaſure for your Benefit which can be executed without any Diſtreſs to my own.

Your Vackeel Rajah Ram Dunkar and Trimbuck Dado Jee are arrived, and have related to me very particularly the Circumſtances relative to you and your actual Condition. I am greatly concerned that ſuch able and faithful Advocates were ſo lately ſent, as well as that the powerful Means employed by this Government for your Support have received ſo little from your other Friends.

The Detachment of Engliſh Forces ſent for the Reinforcement of Bombay are ſtill on their March thither, where, by the Bleſſing of God, they will ſhortly arrive; and I flatter myſelf that its Arrival will be productive of the greateſt Advantages to your Affairs. I now wait impatiently for further Advices from you on the Subject of your future Views, which I requeſt you will ſpeedily favour me with.

Convinced of your warm Friendſhip to me and the Engliſh Nation, it is with the utmoſt Pleaſure I inform you, that Pondicherry, the principal Fortreſs of our Enemies the French in India, was reduced by our Troops on the 10th of October. I doubt not but this Event, which deſtroys the Power of our Enemies, who are likewiſe your's, will be productive of the higheſt Satisfaction to you, and therefore congratulate you on it. Knowing me, &c.

APPENDIX, N° 159.

Bengal Secret Perſian Correſpondence, 1778.

Copy of a Letter from Maha Rajah Modajee Bhoſila, to Colonel Goddard; dated the 23d November 1778.

I Have been made happy by the Receipt of your agreeable Letter, informing me of your Arrival at Gourdacy, that you have quitted the Territories of Balajee, &c. who, notwithſtanding the Connection you had formed with him, and the Intercourſe of Friendſhip which had been eſtabliſhed between you by Letters and Meſſages, oppoſed your March by Stratagem and Deceit; yet, that all his Attempts to hurt you proved ineffectual, and he could carry nothing away except the Camel and Effects of Ram Budder Pundit, who ſtayed behind the Baggage, and alſo received Two Wounds from a Spear; that you reſerve the revenging this to another Opportunity; that the Maratta Cavalry are collecting on all Sides of your Army, and you hear that they are alſo gathering together in the Decan; that I ſhould therefore take ſuch Meaſures as may be moſt adviſable in theſe Circumſtances; that you ſhall take your Route by Bhelſah and Bopaul to the River Nurbudder; with other Particulars, which I underſtood, and which afforded me the greateſt Pleaſure.

I before, in conſequence of Two Letters which I received from you after the Death of Colonel Leſlie, intimating your Intention to the Banks of the Nurbudder, and from thence to the Place of your Deſtination, ſent Lalla Jadoo Roy, who had before waited near Five Months there in Expectation of the Arrival of the Army, and who was then obliged by Sickneſs and the Delay of your coming, to return to Naigpore, together with Shas Sing Hazzarey, a Man of Credit, to Saoty, which Jalook is the Jaghier of the latter; by this Time they muſt be arrived there, and will provide you with every Neceſſary, and Lalla Jadoo Roy will advance Two or Three Days Journey to meet you, and inform you of every Particular relative to the Junction of the Armies of the Decan, (to wit) thoſe of Sindeah and Holcar, and the Purport of all the Letters received from the Nabob Amaud-ul Dowla ſince the Commencement of Colonel Leſlie's March to this Quarter, and the Deputation of Mr. Elliott to conclude with me a firm Treaty and Alliance, and to adviſe with me on many Points of the utmoſt Importance: Of all theſe Affairs he will give you a perfect Knowledge, as it would take up too much Time and Paper to commit them to Writing. In Brief, that the Operations of the Army in Bundlecund ſhould be determined by the late Mr. Elliott's joint Advice and Concurrence, and that Colonel Leſlie ſhould follow the Inſtructions which Mr. Elliott ſhould write him from Naigpore, he having full Powers to conduct the Negociations, and that whatever he ſhould do be approved and ratified by all, in the ſame Manner as if done by himſelf. Mr. Elliott being unfortunately ſtopped in the Way by the Angel of Death, all the intended Negociations and Schemes are ſuſpended, and muſt continue in this State until the Arrival of Letters from Calcutta, or of ſome Gentleman of Credit to ſupply the Place of the deceaſed. As the greateſt Friendſhip ſubſiſts between me and the Nabob Amaud ul-Dowla, by Reaſon of the Concerns of Bengal, and the Vicinity of our Territories, I can have no Objection to the Army croſſing the Nurbudder, and entering my Dominions, which lay immediately on this Side of it; and Lalla Jadoo Row is ſtationed there, and will to the utmoſt of his Power provide you with Grain, Proviſions, and every other Neceſſary; but actuated by the warmeſt Friendſhip, which will not allow of any Diſſimulation or Reſerve, I judge it incumbent on me freely to communicate to you whatever I have learnt from the News-papers, which I receive from every Quarter, as well as my Sentiments on every Matter which ariſes.

The late Colonel Leſlie after the Paſſage over the Jumna wrote to me, that he ſhould ſhortly arrive at the Nurbudder, and that he hoped from my Friendſhip I would not allow any Neglect or Delay to ariſe in the Proviſion of Grain, &c. Neceſſaries for his Army; and that from thence, he would proceed to the Place of his Deſtination: I wrote in Anſwer, that notwithſtanding the Road by this Quarter was a very difficult one, if he ſhould think fit to make it his Route, I would neglect no Means to ſupply him and his Army with Proviſions and Neceſſaries through my Dominions; that he would then paſs a Part of the Peiſhwa's Dominions dependant on Burhampore, where I had no kind of Authority.

As the late Colonel Leſlie marched into the Territory of Bundlecund, and the Country of Balajee Pundit, who holds it under the Peiſhwa, and waſted near Five Months in thoſe Parts to ſettle the Affairs of the Country and regulate the Government, every Moment of Delay was impolitical, and greatly prejudical to the Expedition, for he ought to have marched to the Nurbudder without the leaſt Delay, and from thence with the greateſt Expedition to the Place of his Deſtination through the Soubah of Burhampore; in which Caſe, he would have met with no Oppoſition or Moleſtation; all the Chiefs of the Decan being at their reſpective Stations employed in their own Affairs, ſo that he might have reached Bombay with the greateſt Facility, without meeting with the leaſt Interruption in his March thither. By his Delay of Five Months in the Bundle-

cund

cund Country, and the Letters of Balajee and others to the Government at Poona, that he was creating Diſturbances in thoſe Diſtricts, and meditated the Reduction of their Territories, and then to proceed in an hoſtile Manner againſt the Peiſhwa; all the Chiefs were put on their Guard, and immediately ſet about raiſing and diſciplining Forces, and are now watching an Opportunity to employ them to Advantage. The Oppoſition of Balajee, and the Armies of Obſervation which attend on the Steps of the Detachment, are in conſequence of Inſtructions from the Government, and large Armies from Sindeah and Holcar have likewiſe been drawn together at Poona; the Forces of the Nabob Nizam-ul-Dowlah, he being in ſtrict League with the Peiſhwa, and it being ſtipulated in the Treaty between the Engliſh and the Peiſhwa, concluded by the Governor of Madras, that no Aid or Aſſiſtance ſhould be given to Ragonaut Row, and that their Friends and Enemies ſhould be common to all Parties, are likewiſe engaged in the Cauſe, and are ſtationed in different Parts at the Paſſes and Gauts in the Zella of Berar, under the Command of able Officers, waiting for the Approach of the Engliſh Army; that all theſe Parties are on their Guard and in Readineſs, is entirely owing to Colonel Leſlie's Delay in the Bundlecund Country: But all this is fruitleſs, and being paſt ſhould be forgotten.

It was my Deſign on the Arrival of Mr. Elliott, who was inveſted with full Powers, to have conſulted with him, and to have formed ſuch a Plan under the Maſk of the Peiſhwa, as might have enſured to the Troops a free and unmoleſted Paſſage to Bombay. My Plan was this, that Letters ſhould be written by me and Mr. Elliott to Poona, to the following Purport: That the Engliſh are ſteady to the Treaty which they contracted with the Peiſhwa, and have not the leaſt Deſign to ſupport or aſſiſt Ragonaut Row; but that they bear Hatred to the French, the inveterate Enemies of the Engliſh Nation, and are greatly alarmed at the Reſidence of a French Vackeel at Poona; that if the Poona Government has ſent away the French Vackeel, and will faithfully adhere to its Treaty with the Engliſh, they alſo deem it incumbent on them ſtrictly to perform their Part of it, and in ſuch Caſe neither have nor will entertain any Enmity to the Peiſhwa; that this Detachment which is ſent to Bombay, is ſolely diſpatched thither from Apprehenſions of the Deſigns of the French againſt the Engliſh Settlements, as War has been declared in Europe between the Kings of England and France; and it is therefore incumbent on them to provide for the Safety of their Poſſeſſions in this Quarter.

From ſuch Letters and Promiſes from us, namely, Mr. Elliott and myſelf, I had no Doubt that the Miniſters at Poona would have given entire Credit thereto, and regarding it as impolitic to have broken their Engagements with the Engliſh without Cauſe, would have replied thereto, That if the Engliſh were ſteady to their Treaty, they had no Objection to the Paſſage of the Engliſh Army to Bombay, to keep the French in Awe. Under this Maſk the Detachment might have come hither, and proſecuted their March from hence to Bombay in Safety and Tranquillity, and my warm Friendſhip and Attachment to the Engliſh Chiefs would have been clearly manifeſted. I formerly intimated in my Letters to Calcutta, the Purport of what the Poona Miniſters wrote to me, that they neither had nor would have any Friendſhip or Connection with the French Nation, and that the French Agent came to Poona ſolely for the Purpoſes of Trade, and that out of Friendſhip to the Engliſh they had ſent him away; that I ſhould therefore write to the Nabob Amaud-ul-Dowlah to be perfectly ſatisfied with reſpect to them, they being ſteady to their Engagements. I received a Reply from Calcutta to this Letter, but to recite the Particulars would ſwell this Letter to too great a Size: Lally Jadoo Roy will therefore make you acquainted therewith, and ſhew you a Copy of the Letter. In a Word, by the Deceaſe of Mr. Elliott, all the Deſigns before recited, as well as thoſe exiſting in the Breaſts of the Nabob Amaud-ul-Dowlah and myſelf, which could not be explained but in an Interview between me and Mr. Elliott, are ſuſpended, and depend on further Advices from Calcutta, which by Reaſon of its great Diſtance from hence cannot ſpeedily be received.

The Letters received from Calcutta ſince the Death of Mr. Elliott, are in Subſtance as follows: That the Deſigns and ſecret Views entruſted to Mr. Elliott, being by his Death of Neceſſity ſuſpended, what is to be done to obviate the Inconvenience? That Beneram Pundit is well acquainted with the Affairs and Negociations with which that Gentleman was charged; that he will fully communicate to me the Conditions which he the Nabob Amaud-ul-Dowlah offers me, and ſuch as he requires from my Friendſhip; that I will therefore inform him of ſuch Points as I wiſh from him, for the Purpoſe of eſtabliſhing a ſolid Friendſhip and ſtrict Union between us, as it is not his Deſign to draw Advantages to himſelf, without granting equal ones to me, knowing that no private Friendſhip or public Alliance can take firm Root, without being founded on reciprocal and equal Benefits; that it is on ſuch Grounds he has long formed the Deſign of an Alliance with me; that the Opportunity now preſents itſelf; that the Detachment will ſhortly arrive in my Dominions, and their Operations will be guided by my Advice; that although either of our Armies are in themſelves very powerful, and the Delay in the March of the Detachment has not been cauſed by Oppoſition of an Enemy, yet that it is adviſable to ſtrengthen it with a Body of my Forces.

In the Concluſion of the Letter is this Sentence, which is the moſt material: I have now fully explained my own Views and Deſigns, and wait impatiently to be made acquainted with yours, on which to form my ultimate Reſolutions. As to form the ultimate Plan agreeable to what the Nabob Amaud-ul-Dowlah writes, which requires the Settlement of Points of the greateſt Conſequence and Matters of great Difficulty, viz. The raiſing an Army, providing Warlike Stores, large Treaſures for the Support of each other, and the Junction of a Body of my Forces, under the Command of able and experienced Officers, will be required of me on the Arrival of a Reply to my Letters and I

muſt alſo write very full Information on every Point, and propoſe the Mode of carrying our Views into Effect with Prudence and Foreſight, and the preſent is the Time to form the Plan, which is to be ſubſequently carried into Execution, with the Advice and Aſſiſtance of Mr. Anderſon, who arrived here after the Death of Mr. Elliott, and is well acquainted with the Sincerity of my Friendſhip, and has received Letters from Calcutta to remain at Naigpore, and to make himſelf acquainted with my Sentiments and Views; it will therefore require a long Time to tranſmit Letters to Calcutta, and receive Anſwers from thence, and firmly to eſtabliſh the propoſed Union; it is not to be done at once, but requires Time to regulate Matters of ſuch Importance.

The Junction of a ſmall Body of my Forces with yours can produce no good Effect, but will remove the Veil from the Buſineſs, and leave our Deſigns expoſed; it will deſtroy the Friendſhip which is eſtabliſhed between me and the Peiſhwa and Nizam-ul-Dowlah, and expoſe my Dominions to the Ravages of the Armies of the Decan in Berar, and at the Gauts; therefore wait for a Reply from Calcutta with the Opinion of the Nabob Amaud-ul-Dowlah; and induced by Friendſhip, I have made a full and unreſerved Communication to you. Mr. Anderſon has alſo written you very fully. You will be pleaſed to adviſe me of whatever Plan you may judge proper to adopt, for an unreſerved Communication between Friends is highly commendable, and is approved by God.

Poſtſcript.—On the other Side of the Nurbudder you will meet with bad Roads and Mountains difficult of Acceſs, great Rivers to paſs, and Thouſands of Bhalahs concealed in the Cavities of the Mountains; although theſe cannot have any Effect upon the Magnanimity of the Engliſh, yet you will find great Difficulty to procure Proviſions: As ſoon as you get clear of the Savages aforeſaid, you will find the Armies of Holcar and Sindia ready to oppoſe you. Their Plan will be to watch your Motions at a Diſtance, cut off your Supplies, to watch their Opportunity to attack you at a Diſadvantage, and having done all the Miſchief they can, to retreat to their former Poſts.

Although Colonel Leſlie has been diſmiſſed from the Command by Orders from Calcutta, and you appointed to conduct the Army with every poſſible Expedition to Bombay; and you will doubtleſs make every Exertion of Zeal which ſo arduous an Undertaking requires; yet every Step brings imminent Danger, and you can only arrive at the Place of your Deſtination by fighting your Way through, and being ſubject to fierce Attacks.

I am induced by Friendſhip to give you this Intelligence, for my Heart is pained at the Apprehenſion of your experiencing any Misfortune; and to return would leſſen the Terror of your Arms, and give Diſpleaſure to Mr. Haſtings.

My Advice is, that you write all theſe Particulars to Calcutta, as I have already done, and wait for Orders from thence in conſequence, and till their Arrival continue on the Banks of the Nurbudder. For the reſt, whatever you may judge moſt expedient. If you think it adviſable, write to the Peiſhwa, that your Chief has no Idea of breaking the Treaty with the Peiſhwa, and that the Detachment under your Command is ſolely intended for the Reinforcement of Bombay againſt the Deſigns of the French, the inveterate Enemies of your Sovereign: That if he has expelled the French Vackeel from his Preſence, and has no Friendſhip with them, the Engliſh on their Part are ſteady to their Engagements: That if ſuch Friendſhip really exiſts between the Peiſhwa and your Chief, he can have no Objection to the Paſſage of the Forces for the Reinforcement of Bombay. That you will not in any Manner aſſiſt Ragonaut Row. This ſhall be accompanied by Letters from me, which may poſſibly produce a favourable Anſwer, and in the mean Time you will have an Anſwer from Calcutta.

Communicate to me your Opinion in the ſame unreſerved Manner as I have done to you; this will tend to the Encreaſe of our Friendſhip.

I have ſpoken on this Subject to Baboo Row, the Peiſhwa's Vackeel; who has replied, that he can conſent to nothing without the Knowledge and Approbation of his Superiors, to whom he will write if I deſire him. I therefore think it would be adviſable that you ſend me a Letter addreſſed to the Peiſhwa, to the above Purport, which ſhall be diſpatched with Letters from me to Baboo Row.—I ſhewed you Copy of Mr. Haſtings's Letter on the Subject of Mr. James Anderſon's ſtaying here.—For further Particulars I refer you to Lalla Jadoo Roy.

APPENDIX, N° 160 and 161.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 21ſt December 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident;
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis, } Eſquires.
Edward Wheler,

THE Governor General lays before the Board a Letter addreſſed to him by Colonel Goddard, dated 16th November; and deſires in the preſent Diſpatches to England it may be added, "that "by a private Letter from Colonel Goddard, addreſſed to the Governor General, we are adviſed that "he was arrived at Biſeer, in Bopaul, at the Diſtance of Eight Coſs from Iſlamagur, and Ten from "Bopaul;" with any other Particulars of his Letter which the Board may think proper on the Peruſal of it.

Sir,

In my laſt Letter from the Kournz, I informed you of Balajee's deceitful Conduct, and the unſucceſsful Attempt he had made to carry off a Part of the Baggage, &c. of the Detachment, on the Day of my leaving his Territories, and entering a ſmall Diſtrict belonging to a Patan Chief, which is ſituated between Sagur and Bilſah Confines. I alſo expreſſed my Hope, that the Chief of the latter Country would comply with the Requeſt I made him, of an unmoleſted Paſſage through it, and ſupply me with every thing requiſite on my March, as he had ſent in a confidential Man to treat with me. Through this Man I received from his Maſter a ſolemn Engagement to conduct the Troops, and furniſh Proviſions for them on their Route; as a Pledge for the Performance of which, the Vackeel was to remain in my Camp.

I beg Leave to encloſe you a Copy of the Agreement he entered into, the Purport of which I have confined to my own preſent Purpoſe, without involving myſelf or the Engliſh Nation in any future Engagements, which might prove inconſiſtent with your political Views. I have the Pleaſure to inform you, that by this Management I have ſucceeded in the obtaining of what I propoſed. I have paſſed the Confines of his Country, and am arrived at thoſe of the Nawaub of Bholpaul, within Twenty-five Coſs of the Nurbudda. The Troops of Balajee ſtill hover in my Rear; but they encamp at too great a Diſtance, and are too vigilant, for me to attempt attacking them with any Proſpect of a Surprize: They harraſs me every Day on the March, and now and then pick up any Baggage that ſtraggles too far from Protection: They have alſo cut off ſome Supplies of Proviſion coming into Camp; but they are not capable to delay me much, or do any material Injury. This may appear ſtrange and inadmiſſible in a Country whoſe Chief has entered into Terms of Friendſhip with me, but the Excuſe made for it by the latter is the ſuperior Force of Balajee; and he again urges, as a Motive for his Conduct, the Orders he has received from the Poona Durbar, to interrupt the Paſſage of the Engliſh to the Nurbudda all in his Power. In ſhort, I can plainly perceive that their mutual Inclinations are the ſame; but that Views of preſent Convenience have induced the Bilſah Chief to adopt a Neutrality, which is equally agreeable and ſubſervient to my Wiſh of reaching the Nurbudda without Delay, and proſecuting the grand Object of this Expedition. I have within theſe few Days received a Letter from Moodajee Booſla, in Reply to mine from Raje Ghur, informing him of my Intention to proceed towards his Country with all Expedition, and aſſuring him of my Zeal and Readineſs to promote his Intereſts, and execute the Treaty which ſhall be ultimately concluded betwixt himſelf and the Engliſh Government. He mentions with much Concern the Death of Mr. Elliott, which has ſuſpended for a while the Negociation to have been carried on with you through him; and requeſts that, if I have left Bundlecund, I will move forward by eaſy Marches to the Nurbudda: In the mean Time, he hopes to receive Anſwer to a Letter he wrote you on the Occaſion. The Terms of his Letter, and that from Dewargur, as well as Beneram Pundit, are expreſſed in as friendly a Stile and Manner as I could have wiſhed. It alſo informs me he has ſent Laloo Jadou Ram, with ſome other Chiefs, to the Nurbudda, to meet me on my Arrival there, and to provide every thing neceſſary for the Care of the Detachment; but it is plain he would rather ſome Agreement had been entered into before the Arrival of the Army in his Territory, and that perhaps he is apprehenſive of meeting with Difficulties in concluding any thing with a Perſon whoſe Name has not been made known to him by you. In all theſe Particulars, I hope your Letters will by this Time have fully ſatisfied him; and that finding the Friendſhip you honour me with, and the Truſt you may chuſe to repoſe in my Attention and Endeavours to promote your mutual Views and Intereſts, he will, before my Arrival, be prepared to receive me with that Cordiality and Confidence, ſo neceſſary to the Succeſs of the propoſed Negociation with him. Moodajee has ſent me a Paper of Intelligence relative to the Poona Durbar, which I encloſe for your Peruſal. Similar Accounts have reached me from other Quarters; but it does not appear, from any Information I have obtained, that the Force intended

tended to be ſent towards this Province has actually marched; and I am led to believe that the diſtracted State of Affairs at Poona, and a Circumſtance I alſo learn, of Hyder Naic's having taken the Field with a large Army, will employ their Attention too near the Capital to admit of their detaching any conſiderable Force at this Diſtance againſt me. From my Neighbourhood to the Nurbudda, I make no Doubt of reaching it long before any Troops could arrive, even were they detached, as talked of; and this Conſideration induces me to puſh on to the River with all Expedition. The Nawaub of Bhopal has ſent in a Vackeel to me, with Aſſurances of Friendſhip, and a Supply of Proviſions, through his Country; ſo that at preſent I can foreſee no Obſtruction to my March; for although Balajee declares he will follow me to the Nurbudda, I am convinced he cannot give me any material Interruption; and I ſhall not ſuffer any Project or Plan whatever to divert my Attention at this Time from the main Buſineſs. I have every Reaſon to expect that the Bhopal Nawaub will furniſh the neceſſary Supplies of Proviſions; and although obliged to preſerve Appearances with the Marattas, whoſe Power he ſtands in Awe of, I am of Opinion will not venture to take an active Part on this Occaſion. I am hopeful of paſſing through his Country in Peace and Amity, only guarding againſt the invidious Depredations of Balajee's Troops. I ſhall not fail to inform you of what may be finally concluded on with the Nawaub, and of my Arrival at the Nurbudda; and as I have, ſince leaving Rajighur, repeatedly wrote to Moodajee, informing him of my Progreſs, I may expect to receive more particular Replies from him every Day, which I will immediately communicate to you, and the Steps I may find neceſſary to take in conſequence.

I am, &c.
(Signed) Thomas Goddard.

Camp at Beerſea, in Bhopaul,
16th November 1778;
8 Coſs from Iſlamnagur, and
10 from Bhopaul.

The Governor General likewiſe lays before the Board, the Copy of a Letter written by Moodajee Booſla to Colonel Goddard, which the Governor lately received from Mr. Anderſon at Naguepoor, and which was delivered to him by Dewargur Pundit. It is dated the 23d November, and entered in the Perſian Correſpondence of the Secret Department.

Read the Letter.

The Governor General further reports to the Board, that he learns by Letters from Mr. Anderſon, and by Letters lately received by the Berar Vackeel, that Moodajee Booſla had been dangerouſly ill, inſomuch that his Life was at one Time deſpaired of, that he was thought out of Danger when the Letters were written, but advancing ſlow in his Recovery. The following is an Extract from Mr. Anderſon's Letter of the 15th November.

" The Rajah too, I am well aſſured, will not chuſe that we ſhould leave this until he ſees us, and it is not expected, from the Situation in which he is at preſent, that he will be able to appear in Public for theſe Ten or Twelve Days. His Illneſs has been exceedingly ſevere: He was for many Days delirious, and they had, in utter Deſpair of his Life, taken him from the Cott, and ſtretched him on the Ground. It is now, however, Ten or Twelve Days ſince a favourable Criſis took Place, and they ſeem to think him entirely out of Danger, though ſtill in a very weak Condition. A large Tumour appeared on his Neck, which has come to a Suppuration; there remain, however, Two on his Body, which afflict him much. His Father Ragojee died of a ſimilar Diſorder, which has diſconcerted him much."

Paper of Intelligence ſent by Moodajee.

The News-papers from the Vackeel at Poona, as well as the Letters from the Miniſters, contain the following Particulars, which are repeated by many others; viz. That they aſſert, we neither have had or have now, any other Views or Deſigns than Friendſhip and an Adherence to Treaty with the Engliſh, nor have we any Connection with the French Vackeel; he came for the Purpoſe of Traffick; if, notwithſtanding, their Forces are come to Chatterpore, and they make Attempts within our Dominions, and form further Deſigns againſt us, it is incumbent on us to provide againſt them, and the Armies of Sindeah and Holdcar ſhall be ſent into the Soubah of Malwa: But whilſt there is no Act of Enmity and Diſunion on their Part, no Steps ſhall be taken by us.

Induced by the ſincereſt Friendſhip, I write you without Reſerve any Intelligence I receive from Poorunder. You may depend on the Truth of what my Vackeels at the different Stations write you.

N° 161.

N° 161.

Mr. Francis—The Letter from Moodajee Boosla being a public one from the Raja of Berar to the commanding Officer of the Detachment, is of Authority to the Board, and as I think contains Matter of the most important Information. As it is not followed by any Motion from the Governor General, I beg Leave to propose the following Questions to the Board: First, Whether it does not appear to the Board, from the whole Tenor of this Letter, that Moodajee Boosla is not inclined to join Colonel Goddard, or to co-operate in any Enterprize against the Poona Government? Secondly, Whether it does not appear at this Time to be the Opinion of Moodajee Boosla, that Colonel Goddard's proceeding on his March will expose the Detachment to the greatest Difficulties and Dangers? The Affirmative to those Questions is in my Judgment so clear, that I shall not attempt to maintain it by any other Argument, than a bare Citation of some Passages from the Letter, which I desire may be entered in this Place. The Court of Directors will undoubtedly give due Attention to the entire Contents of it.

Governor General—To save partial Quotations, I propose to Mr. Francis, that the whole Letter may be entered.

Agreed to.

Mr. Wheler—I am of Opinion, from the above Letter, that it does appear that Moodajee Boosla is disinclined to join Colonel Goddard, or to co-operate in any Enterprize against the Poona Government.

I am likewise of Opinion, that it does appear by the Letter before alluded to, that the Detachment will be exposed to the greatest Difficulties and Dangers by the Continuance of its March.

Mr. Barwell—I do not think any Judgment can be formed from these Letters of a Change in the political Line of Conduct meant to be observed by the Berar State; it is such as under the Circumstances of that Government relative to ours might have been expected. The Questions now proposed appear to me calculated to preclude that necessary Information on which a decided Resolution must be taken by this Board; they lead obviously to some instant Measure to commit the Government in the Orders it may send to Colonel Goddard before it has heard from that Officer: Receiving the Questions in this Light, I must put my Negative upon them; the Affirmative, which Mr. Francis is pleased to declare to be so clear to his Judgment, to mine requires the Comment of the Person to whose Conduct and Prudence the proposed Negociations with the Berar State have been committed, I mean Colonel Goddard.

Governor General—To both Questions I answer briefly, No: I will add, that whatever were the Sentiments of Moodajee at the Time in which this Letter was written, it is my Belief, that we shall find in the Event that Moodajee is both inclined to join Colonel Goddard, and to co-operate with him; and that though it is very plain from the Postscript of the Letter, that he apprehended great Dangers from the Prosecution of the Expedition by the Detachment alone and unsupported; yet it does not therefore follow, that he entertains at this Time the same Opinion, if he shall have agreed to join and to co-operate with us. The Papers which I have introduced on this Day's Proceedings were intended for Record only, conceiving it to be incumbent upon me to afford the Board every Information concerning the State and Progress of this important Expedition. I join in Opinion with Mr. Barwell, that the Questions which have been proposed are premature, if they lead to any Object; and the Cause of an unnecessary Waste of Time if they do not. On the News of Mr. Elliott's Death, I wrote to Moodajee Boosla, that I waited for his Letters in consequence of that Event, to determine the future Destination and Operations of the Detachment. This Letter was written on the 11th of October; on the 12th November the expected Letter from Moodajee arrived, and contained the most pressing Instances that the Negociation might still proceed, and that for the Prevention of Delay it might be committed to the Charge of Mr. Farquhar, who had attended Mr. Elliott as his Secretary. On the 16th of the same Month, it was resolved to impower Colonel Goddard to treat with Moodajee Boosla on the Grounds of Mr. Elliott's Instructions; and on the 23d Letters were written to Moodajee advising him of it: Therefore, from the Time of Mr. Elliott's Death until the Receipt of this last Letter, he (Moodajee) and his Durbar must have remained in a total State of Suspence and Doubt respecting the Destination and Operations of the Detachment, and of the Interest which they might eventually have in both; so circumstanced, it was not to be expected that they should precipitately commit themselves in so hazardous a Connection, and the whole Purport of the Letter, read with this Key to it, evidently means that they waited the final Determination of this Government to regulate their own; that unless the Orders from hence could enable them immediately, and without further Reference, to concert some Plan for our common Operations, they should decline to take any future Part in our Concerns but that of Mediation; and that without their Aid it might be dangerous to trust to the Strength of the Detachment alone in the Prosecution of the Remainder of its March to Bombay, neither would there be an adequate Object to warrant such a Risk. Perhaps the Sickness of Moodajee may have contributed to heighten the Apprehensions conceived by his Minister, who undoubtedly dictated the Letter. Under a State of such Uncertainty I shall suspend my Opinion until

Anſwers ſhall be received to the Letter which I have laſt quoted, expecting that all written by the Receipt of it will be from the ſame Cauſes equally diſcouraging. Theſe are ſuch might been expected; ſuch as I ſhould have written myſelf in the ſame Situation, in Subſtance I mean, Expreſſion I ſhould never hope to equal that of the Letter which has juſt been recorded.

The Queſtions reſolved in the Negative.

Warren Haſtings,
Richd Barwell,
P. Francis,
Edwd Wheler

APPENDIX, N° 162.

Letter from Governor General to Moodajee Bhooſila: Written the 29th December 1778.

I Have received from Mr. Anderſon a Copy of the Letter which you wrote laſt Month to Colonel Goddard, and have peruſed it with the greateſt Attention.

You write, that by the Death of Mr. Elliott all your Views are ſuſpended, and depend on further Advices from Calcutta; and that by Reaſon of its great Diſtance a long Time would neceſſarily elapſe before all the Points of a ſolid Treaty between us could be diſcuſſed by Letter; which Delay you intimate may be dangerous to our Views, and are apprehenſive may expoſe your Dominions to Danger. My Friend, I am not ſurprized at theſe Doubts; they were natural to your Situation, and ſuch as I myſelf ſhould have entertained under like Circumſtances. In my Firſt Letter, after the News of Mr. Elliott's Death, I informed you that I ſhould determine on nothing till I had heard further from you, and ſhould regulate the future Deſtination and Operation of the Army by the Knowledge of your Inclination; had theſe been averſe to the Proſecution of my Deſigns, I ſhould probably have ſuſpended them, and recalled the Detachment; but on the Receipt of your Letter, written immediately after you heard of Mr. Elliott's Death, in which you preſs me to perſevere in them by the moſt ſolid Agreements, namely, that no trifling Changes ſhould induce the Ruler of a State, poſſeſſed of Firmneſs and Magnanimity, to relinquiſh a Plan formed on mature Reflections; but that he ſhould in ſpite of ſuch Interruptions, which are in Fact no more than Trials, continue ſteadily fixed in the Purſuit of his Object; and add, that the Fame of your Friendſhip having inſpired our Friends with Confidence, and produced Terror and Diſmay amongſt our Enemies, it was incumbent on me to take effectual Meaſures to confirm their fortunate Beginnings, by inveſting ſome Perſon with Authority to conclude a Treaty on the Inſtructions given to Mr. Elliott; I no longer heſitated, but inſtantly obtained a formal Commiſſion from this Government in my own Name and that of the Council, to Colonel Goddard, to negociate and conclude a Treaty on Mr. Elliott's Inſtructions, and to concert with you a Plan of Operations for our mutual Benefit: This of courſe removes all Objections ariſing from Suſpicion of Delays. The Meaſure is now made your own; I have done my Part, and truſt to your Fortitude and Reſolution for the reſt. Since however Delays have happened, and Inconveniences may ariſe, from Colonel Leſlie having, in Contradiction to his Orders, loitered away a conſiderable Time in his March, I have thought proper to provide a Reinforcement of Two Battalions for the Detachment. They will march on the 4th of January, or 15th of Zehedja, without Cannon, for the Sake of Expedition, by the direct Road of Ramgur and Chittu Naigpore, to our Weſtern Frontiers, and there wait your Orders; if you direct them to proceed and join Colonel Goddard they will go, if not, they will remain there or return; for in this Service I ſhall do nothing without your Concurrence. Major Camac, a ſteady and brave Officer, well known to the Chiefs in that Quarter, will conduct them. Let Colonel Goddard be made acquainted with your Intentions; and write to Major Camac with the proper Paſſports, if you approve of his proceeding.

I have engaged thus far at your Deſire, even more than on my own confirmed Judgement; I repeat your own Words, which I have before quoted,

"It does not become great Minds to relinquiſh a Plan formed on mature Reflection, in conſe-
"quence of a trifling Change of Circumſtances; but it is their diſtinguiſhing Characteriſtic to
"perſevere ſteadily to the End."

Do not therefore diſappoint me.

Colonel Goddard's Inſtructions in Eſſentials are poſitive. I have conſulted your Intereſts even more than my own, and exact in Return the ſame Candour and Confidence to me which I have invariably obſerved towards you. The Eyes of the World are on us both; they have ſeen me ſtruggle through Difficulties to the Points at which with your Aid I have inſured the moſt glorious Succeſs;

the

the Termination of which, by the Bleſſing of God, will afford Peace and laſting Security to the Engliſh Dominions in India, and to Increaſe of Power, Honour, and immortal Reputation. For the reſt I refer you to Colonel Goddard: Confide in him as a Man that poſſeſſes my Confidence; and rely on his Bravery and Skill as an Officer of the firſt Experience and Merits, and endowed with a great Portion of all the Virtues of a Soldier, which you poſſeſs in a more eminent Degree than any of the Chiefs of the preſent Age.

To Dewagur Pundit: D°.

The ſame as the foregoing, except where the Difference of Situation renders a Change of Expreſſion neceſſary; and with this additional Paragraph, which comes in after the Quotation ending "Perſevere ſteadily to the End."

The Encouragement you have given me in your ſeveral Letters to purſue ſteadily the Plan formed for our mutual Benefit, but more particularly for that of your Maſter; and the Reputation you have gained for Wiſdom, Firmneſs, and Reſolution, have been ſtrong Motives with me to perſevere, not doubting I ſhould receive the moſt effectual Aid and Support from the Maha Rajah, for the Attainment of the beneficial Objects propoſed by the Plan.

APPENDIX, N° 163.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, December 28th 1778.

THE Governor General delivers in the following Minute:

As the unexpected and unneceſſary Delays in the Progreſs of the Bombay Detachment until the Death of Colonel Leſlie, muſt have unavoidably occaſioned a much more conſiderable Diminution of the Strength of the Corps than could have happened, had he proceeded with that Expedition which his Duty required, and which it was in his Power to have uſed for effecting the Service he was ſent upon, and as theſe Contingences will naturally increaſe with the Length of the March; it is neceſſary to make Proviſion for ſuch a Reinforcement, as ſhall not only ſupply all preſent Deficiencies, but keep up the Detachment to the effective Strength of its original Eſtabliſhment, and was judged requiſite to attain the Objects for which it was formed.

For theſe Purpoſes, I beg Leave to ſubmit the following Propoſitions to the Conſideration of the Board.

1ſt. That Two Battalions of Sepoys be allotted for this Service, and ordered to proceed immediately, without their Artillery, to the Extremity of our Weſtern Frontier, and there wait the Directions of Colonel Goddard, either for a Junction with his Detachment, for the Protection of Naugpoor, or for preſerving the Communication with theſe Provinces, as he ſhall judge moſt conducive to the Purpoſe of the Expedition.

2d. That the 13th and 14th Battalion of Sepoys be ſent upon this Service, and ordered to croſs the River on Monday next, the 4th January, and proceed directly on their March by the neareſt practicable Route.

3d. That this Detachment be immediately ſupplied with Sixty Barrels of Muſquet Ammunition, Four Barrels of Flints, and Treaſure to the Amount of Half a Lack of Sunnaut Rupees.

4th. That Major Camac be appointed to the Command of this Detachment.

I do not intend by this Selection of Major Camac, to derogate from the Merits or Capacity of other Officers of his Rank, many of whom may be equal to him in Capacity, and the general Knowledge of their Profeſſion: But his long and ſucceſsful Services in ſome of the Countries through which the March of the Detachment will lay; his perſonal Knowledge of moſt of the Chiefs in the Route; and their known Reſpect for his Character and Abilities, together with the ſtrong Attachment to him of the 14th Battalion formerly under his Command, peculiarly qualify Major Camac for the Execution of this particular Service.

(Signed) W. H.

Mr. Francis—The Governor General's Minute is founded on a Suppoſition of a Fact, which ought to be aſcertained exactly by the Return of Colonel Goddard's Detachment: There is no direct

direct Evidence before the Board that I know of, to ſhew what Loſs of Men has already been incurred, or whether there has been any; until I ſee the Returns of the Detachment, I cannot ſee the Neceſſity of reinforcing it by Two Battalions: On the Principles of the Propoſition, I am to conclude, that Colonel Goddard has already loſt a Number of Men equal to the Reinforcement; but I do not know that this is the Fact, nor do I know on what Grounds the Two Battalions, amounting to 1,632 Men are fixed upon.

Mr. Wheler—The Majority of the Board being alone reſponſible for the Safety of the Detachment now under the Command of Colonel Goddard, and having I preſume, ſufficient Reaſon to apprehend, that it is or ſoon will be reduced to a very critical State, from a Variety of Difficulties which they have already, and muſt yet encounter, I ſhall not in this Place attempt to obſtruct the Propoſition now before the Board; but beg it may not be underſtood, that by aſſenting to the Governor's Motion I depart in any Degree from thoſe Opinions or Principles which have induced me to oppoſe the March and Progreſs of this Detachment.

Mr. Francis—There being no Return before the Board, nor any Explanation given of the actual State of the Detachment, I am obliged to admit a Suppoſition, that a Loſs, equal to the propoſed Reinforcement, has been or is likely to be incurred: On this Ground, I am of Opinion, that every Argument which I have hitherto urged againſt the March of the Army is confirmed; and that the wiſeſt Thing we can do in the preſent Circumſtances is to recall it. By ſending Reinforcements we increaſe our Expence, we hazard ſo much more of our Force, and leſſen the Defence of Bengal in the ſame Proportion: How Two Battalions, ſent from hence at this Time, can be of any Service to Colonel Goddard, I do not comprehend. The Place at which we have Reaſon to ſuppoſe him at preſent, is I believe Ten Degrees Weſt of Calcutta: The Country through which the Reinforcement is to paſs is wild, ſavage, and unknown; even that Part which belongs to us can hardly be ſaid to be under our Dominion, and is beſides in a great Degree impracticable for Troops: For theſe Reaſons, I object to the Motion: I alſo object to the Command being given to a Field Officer, as I think it an unneceſſary Increaſe of Expence: The eldeſt of the Two Captains might perform the Service: I do not mean to derogate from Major Camac's Merit: On the contrary, I wiſh to detain him here, where I apprehend his Service will be moſt wanted.

Mr. Barwell—I approve intirely of the Propoſition, and I think it properly timed. Before Colonel Leſlie's Detachment advanced into the Territories of the Raja of Berar, this cautionary Meaſure could not produce thoſe Effects which muſt follow its Adoption at this Time. The Meaſure is a very judicious one, equally if regarded as the Means of keeping up the Detachment to the effective Strength of its original Eſtabliſhment, to cover its Retreat, or to puſh its Advance. It will certainly give Vigour and Influence to its Operations, and that Security to the Dominions of the Berar Chief, as to diſpel every Apprehenſion he may entertain of the Hoſtilities with which he may be threatened. I entirely concur with Mr. Francis in Opinion, that is, there is no indiſpenſable Neceſſity to influence the Propoſition; and if I was to proceed to form my Opinion ſimply on the Neceſſity of the Thing, I ſhould undoubtedly vote againſt the March of theſe Troops. The Diſtricts of Palamow and Chute Nagpore are by no Means ſavage Countries, nor is that of Bimbajee, immediately bordering upon them, through which is the direct Road to Berar. Major Camac formerly reduced theſe ſavage Countries to the Borders of the State ruled by Bimbajee, with his own Battalion of Sepoys, and kept them in Subjection; and I believe the Force lately allotted by this Government to the latter Purpoſe is limited to Five Regular Companies, and effected to this Period by Three Militia Companies. As to Increaſe of Expence, this Meaſure makes no Alteration in the Military Eſtabliſhment, nor will the Defence of Bengal in my Opinion be weakened by theſe Troops being placed in a judicious Station on the Weſtern Frontier, as it does not appear to me that the utmoſt Weſtern Station that can be fixed on, can go beyond 150 Miles from the North Weſt Point of the Midnapore Province.

The Governor General—Since the Objections which were made to the Propoſitions introduced by me on the 16th of laſt Month, among which Objections I recollect that Mr. Francis, after having on another Occaſion entered on our Proceedings as Authority, the Extract of an anonymous Letter, formally denied the Authority of a Letter addreſſed by the commanding Officer of the Bombay Detachment, to the Firſt and executive Member of this Government; and even proteſted in Subſtance, if not in Terms, againſt the Correſpondence carried on between them; in which Opinions he was ſeconded by Mr. Wheler; I have expected Oppoſition to every Meaſure propoſed, for the Safety and Succeſs of the Detachment, as a Point of Courſe and the Effects of Syſtem, and have diſcontinued the Practice of anſwering all the Arguments which have been occaſionally applied to this Subject; and indeed I have been diſcouraged from affording the Board in their collective Character, thoſe Lights which upon many Points were neceſſary for their Information; eſpecially as the Correſpondence with Colonel Goddard has been frequently interrupted, and many of his public Letters I believe loſt: I ſhall henceforth hold it unneceſſary to ſwell our Proceedings with uſeleſs Diſcuſſions, and ſhall confine myſelf to the ſimple Recital of Facts, and to ſuch Comments on them only, as ſhall be neceſſary to the Information of our Superiors. I have thought it proper to introduce this Declaration in this Place, that my Silence in Matters of mere Controverſy were not to be imputed to a wrong Cauſe. On the preſent Occaſion, it is neceſſary to mention ſimply as a Fact, that the Loſs of Men ſuſtained by the Detachment from its firſt Marching, bears no Degree of Proportion to the Reinforcement I have propoſed, and has in Effect been inconſiderable. But whether One hundred, or Sixteen hundred Men, are wanted to recruit it, it is equally neceſſary that a

one be ſent capable of protecting itſelf in the Way, independantly of the other Reaſons which have induced me to propoſe, that Two Battalions be employed on this Service.

Mr. Francis—I have never objected to the Governor General's laying any Papers he thought proper before the Board; but I do object to our receiving private Letters to him as Authority to this Government. If there be any Reaſon why the Correſpondence of the Officers commanding the Detachment ſhould not be addreſſed directly to the Board, I am unacquainted with it. The Fact alluded to by the Governor General, is not accurately ſtated. I did never propoſe an Extract of a private Letter as Authority to the Board, or to be the Ground of any Act of theirs. It appears by the Proceedings, that I repeatedly aſked if there were any Returns of the State of Colonel Leſlie's Army, or of the Caſualties, which had happened on the Firſt Day's March from Calpee. Finding there were none, I gave the Board that private Information, which was in my Poſſeſſion. I ſtill believe it was true, at leaſt in the material Part. There were at that Time many private Letters in Calcutta to the ſame Effect. On the Remainder of the Governor General's laſt Minute, I willingly ſubmit myſelf to the Judgment of the Court of Directors. Debate in this Place is uſeleſs.

Governor General—I appeal to the Minutes delivered in the Conſultation of the 22d June, and to the Conviction which every Man muſt feel in his own Breaſt, that a Paper of that Nature, which contained Information of Facts alone, ſo ſolemnly given by a Member of the Government, muſt have been intended for Authority, or ought not to have been given at all. The following Words extracted from Mr. Francis's Minute evidently mark it to have been intended for Authority. What Mr. Francis deemed worthy of his Credit, and eſpecially deſerving the Conſideration of the Board, muſt certainly have been underſtood to poſſeſs that Quality. "As I find "there are no public Letters before the Board, to inform us of the particular Circumſtances that "attended Colonel Leſlie's March on the Firſt Day from Calpee, I beg Leave to lay before "the Board an Extract of a private Letter from Camp, to which I give Credit, and which I think "deſerves our Conſideration; I underſtand there are many private Letters in Town, which give "the ſame Accounts."

Mr. Francis—I ſtated the Letter to be a private one, and deſire that Reference may be had to the Whole of that Day's Proceedings. Whatever Credit I myſelf might have given to it, I can eaſily ſhew that the Governor General did not receive it as Authority; his Words are, "I believe that the Troops "muſt have ſuffered from the Heat and Want of Water on the Road; I did in effect foretell it in a "Minute dictated at this Board; but I believe that the anonymous Extract produced by Mr. Francis, "is a groſs Exaggeration, and calculated more to conciliate the Favour of the Perſon to whom it was "probably addreſſed, than to convey a ſtrict Relation of the Truth."

Governor General—I certainly did not, nor did this affect my Argument; I ſpeak of Authority *given*, not *admitted*. I propoſe that a Letter be immediately written to Colonel Goddard, to inform him of theſe Reſolutions, and that as much as be neceſſary be publiſhed in General Orders.

Agreed to.

The following Letter is accordingly written to Colonel Goddard:

To Colonel Goddard, commanding the Detachment from 1ſt Brigade.

Sir,

Deeming it expedient that a Reinforcement of Troops ſhould be ſent to ſupply the Loſſes which you may have ſuſtained in the Detachment under your Command, by Deaths and Deſertion, and to keep up its effective Strength to the original Eſtabliſhment, we have ordered the 13th and 14th Battalions of Sepoys to march immediately, under the Command of Major Camac, to the Weſtern Frontier of the Company's Provinces without their Artillery, and directed him to halt there, and to wait your Inſtructions, either to form a Junction with your Detachment, or to preſerve the Communication with theſe Provinces, as you ſhall judge moſt conducive to the Purpoſes of the Expedition; and we deſire that you will correſpond with him, and tranſmit to him ſuch Orders and Information, from Time to Time, as the Good of the Service may require.

We are, &c.

Fort William,
28th December 1778.

Warren Haſtings,
Rich[d] Barwell,
P. Francis,
Edw[d] Wheler.

The following Inſtructions were given to Major Camac on the 14th Inſtant, in Conformity to the Reſolutions of the Board:

Sir,

Having appointed you to the chief Command of the Detachment which has been lately formed at the Preſidency, and ordered to march to the Weſtern Frontier of Bengal, we direct that you take Charge of the ſame, and proceed, agreeably to our general Orders, with the Troops which form this

Detachment. We have directed the Chief and Council at Burdwan to cauſe 150 Draft and Carriage Bullocks to be preſſed, and held in Readineſs to march with you from that Place, as the Contractor will not be able to ſupply you in proper Time; you will therefore notify your Approach to them, and fix a Place for the Delivery of the Bullocks, which they may in conſequence provide for the Service of the Detachment.

We alſo direct that you hold a conſtant Correſpondence and Communication with Colonel Goddard, or the Officer in Command of the Detachment from the 1ſt Brigade. By the laſt Advices from the Colonel, dated in December, he was at Huſſingabad, on the South Side the Nerbudda, on the Borders of Berar.

As our Intention in making the preſent Detachment is to reinforce the Troops commanded by Colonel Goddard, you will obey ſuch Orders as you may receive from him; he will inſtruct you either to join your Force to his, or to remain at ſuch Station as may be thought moſt conveniently ſituated for preſerving his Communication and Intercourſe with theſe Provinces.

You will adviſe us from Time to Time of your Proceedings, and correſpond with us until you ſhall have formed a Junction with Colonel Goddard, from which Period you will conſider yourſelf ſolely under his Orders.

We are, &c.

Fort William,
14th January 1779.

Warren Haſtings,
Rich^d. Barwell,
Edwd. Wheler.

To Beneram Pundit; written the 30th December.

I Yeſterday addreſſed Letters to the Maha Rajah and his Dewan Dewagur Pundit, expreſſive of the Concern I felt at the Doubts he appeared to entertain, by his Letter to Colonel Goddard (Copy of which I have ſeen) and ſhould have written you at the ſame Time, but was prevented for want of Leiſure. As the Maha Rajah long ſince muſt have been acquainted with the Powers given to Colonel Goddard to negociate and conclude all Points with him, all his Doubts muſt have ceaſed; and on your Prudence and approved Attachment to both States, I greatly depend to make ſuch Repreſentations to your Maſter as may induce him to join heartily in the Proſecution of a Plan calculated principally for his Benefit, and in which we have both proceeded too far to recede, which would not only bring Diſcredit on me, but would likewiſe be the Cauſe of the greateſt Injury to his Affairs, and might end in his Ruin; for he may be aſſured, that the Part he has already taken, and the Inclination he has ſhewn, will never be forgotten or forgiven, and that his retracting would be imputed to want of Reſolution, and conſequently embolden thoſe whom he has offended to revenge it whenever an Opportunity offers; whereas by a ſteady Perſeverance in the Meaſures propoſed, he will increaſe the Power and Credit of his State, and by his intimate Union with the Government, will be effectually ſecured againſt the Attempts of all his Enemies.

From the Knowledge I have of the Rajah's Penetration, Firmneſs, and Magnanimity, I have no Doubt but theſe Arguments will be ſufficient to induce him heartily to join in my Meaſures; and in you I truſt to give them the Weight they deſerve.

To obviate every poſſible Inconvenience apprehended by the Maha Rajah in the Proſecution of the March of our Joint Forces, by Reaſon of the Delay which has ariſen, I have thought proper to provide a Reinforcement of Two Battalions for the Detachment, which will begin their March under the Command of Major Camac, a ſteady and brave Officer, on the 15th of Zehidja, and take their Route through Ramgur and Chittah Naigpore to our Weſtern Frontiers, where they will wait your Orders from the Maha Rajah, and will either proceed and join Colonel Goddard, or remain there, as he ſhall direct; as I am determined to do nothing in their Service without his Concurrence.

For further Particulars I refer you to your Brother's Letters, which will accompany this. Knowing your Maſter's Intereſt and Honour inſeparably connected with ours, you will uſe your utmoſt Endeavours to give a proſperous Iſſue to the Deſign in Hand. The News of the Maha Rajah's Indiſpoſition has filled me with inexpreſſible Concern, and my Anxiety to hear of his Recovery is not to be deſcribed. May God ſpeedily reſtore to him perfect Health! This is my conſtant Wiſh and Prayer.

APPENDIX, N° 164.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 7th January 1779.

At a Council; PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis, } Eſquires.
Edward Wheler,

READ the following Letters from Lieutenant Colonel Goddard:

Gentlemen,

I had the Honour of addreſſing you the 19th Inſtant from Hierapore, and informed you of my hopes to meet with no Interruption on my March through Ballajee's Territories, upon the Confines of which I was then arrived. In conſequence of a particular Requeſt he made me to avoid Sagur, the Capital of his Country, on account of the Loſs he muſt ſuſtain by the Approach of an Army there, I gave my Conſent, and received from him the ſtrongeſt Aſſurances of Friendſhip, and every neceſſary Aſſiſtance on my Route. Determined to loſe no Time in protracted Negociations, which I knew muſt be the Caſe if I waited to ſettle any Terms with him, I ſo far confided in the Profeſſions he made, as to move forward on the Road he had pointed out; however, I was too well acquainted with his perfidious and treacherous Character to neglect guarding myſelf effectually againſt any Attempts he might be tempted to make upon the Baggage of the Army. The Event juſtified the Precaution I had uſed; for on my March Yeſterday to this Place, when I was leaving the Confines of his Country, his whole Army, to the Amount of about 5000 Horſe, appeared on my Rear, and made repeated Attacks upon the Baggage and Followers, in which however they were completely diſappointed and baffled. It is ſurely unneceſſary to make any particular Remarks upon this Conduct of Ballajee's, which equally ſerves to diſplay his Inſolence and Treachery. After obſerving the greateſt Caution and Order in marching through his Country, preſerving from Violation the Villages and Inhabitants, who did not even quit their Habitations on my Approach; and above all, after the Treaty entered into by his Brother Gungader at Calpee, which ought to have been binding on him, and the conſequent Reſtoration of that Fortreſs, as well as his own repeated Profeſſions of Friendſhip made to myſelf, the impotent Attack he made to plunder the Followers, whom he hoped to have found unguarded and defenceleſs, is an Inſtance of villainous Cowardice, which ſurely deſerves the ſevereſt chaſtiſement. As I deem it of the utmoſt Importance to croſs the Nerbudda with all poſſible Expedition, I muſt forego the Satisfaction I ſhould feel in inflicting Puniſhment on him at preſent, by marching to Sagur, as it is 20 Coſs in the Rear, and in its Conſequences might detain me a whole Month: I ſhall not therefore, unleſs attacked by his People, proceed to further Hoſtilities, againſt him. I am now arrived on the Confines of the Billah Diſtrict, a Territory belonging to Madhadjee Sindier, whoſe Aumil has ſent a Vackeel in, with Propoſals of Amity and every friendly Aſſiſtance from his Maſter; ſo that I hope to have an unmoleſted March through his Country. I beg to acquaint you, that ſome of the Bills which were drawn upon the Revenue Council at Moorſhedabad have been returned, as they ſay they have not received your Orders to diſcharge them.

I have, &c.
Tho' Goddard.

Camp near Convey, on the Banks of the Betwar River, 5th November 1778.

Gentlemen,

I have the Honour to acknowledge the Receipt of your Letter of the 15th ultimo, inveſting me with the Command and Direction of the Expedition ordered to Bombay, and requiring the Return of Colonel Leſlie to the Provinces, with the Firſt Regiment of Cavalry. The Demiſe of Colonel Leſlie at Raje Ghur, which has long ſince been communicated to you, render unneceſſary any Reply to what immediately relates to him; and, as far as my own Feelings are affected by the particular Marks of Favour you have ſhewn me, I can only aſſure you, that the grateful Senſe I muſt ever entertain of them will call forth my utmoſt Exertion in executing with Fidelity the Truſt you had repoſed in my Zeal and Attention, and proving myſelf worthy of the honourable Diſtinction which you have conferred upon me. I beg to inform you, that I have detained the Firſt Regiment of Cavalry, conceiving it would be expoſed to conſiderable Danger in paſſing through the intermediate Countries from this Place to the Provinces; as the unſerviceable Condition it is at preſent in, while it adds little to the Strength of the Detachment by continuing with me, would however render its Return impracticable, if ſent back alone, eſpecially as the Troops are now far advanced on their Route. In my laſt Letter from Kowry, I informed you of the Treachery practiſed by Ballajee, and of my Arrival

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on the Confines of the Bilſah Territory: In conſequence of an Agreement received from the C of the latter, I have paſſed alſo through his Country; and have the Pleaſure to acquaint you w my Arrival at Bhopal, about 18 Coſs from the Gaut of Huſſengabad, at which Place I hope to c the Nerbudda in a few Days. The Troops of Balajee, joined ſince by thoſe of the Bilſah Ch and by others in the Intereſt of the preſent Adminiſtration at Poona, amounting in all to ab 10,000, continue in my Rear, and endeavour to harraſs me by Attempts to cut off the ſtraggl Baggage and Supplies of Proviſions. They have not ſucceeded in their Endeavours to diſtreſs hitherto; and the Inconvenience they mean to give, has no other Effect than to make me move w greater Caution and Security.

I have, &c.
Tho' Goddard

Camp near Bhopal,
20th November 1778.

Gentlemen,

I have the Honour to acknowledge the Receipt of your Letter of the 19th October; and of the Minutes of Council tranſmitted by your Secretary, appointing me to the Rank of Brevet Colonel during the preſent Expedition; for which diſtinguiſhing Mark of your Favour I beg to offer my ſin cere Thanks, and the Aſſurances of exerting every Endeavour to prove myſelf deſerving of it. I wrote you the 20th Inſtant, informing you of my Arrival at Bhopâl, where I have been detained for ſome Days in providing a plentiful Supply of Grain for the Detachment to the Nerbudda, as the Route to that River lies through a Country full of Jungles, and almoſt totally uncultivated; beſides that the Approach of our Army, and the Fear of being plundered by the Marattas in our Rear, has induced moſt of the Inhabitants to move off to ſome Diſtance for the Security of their Effects. I have found it neceſſary, particularly circumſtanced as I was upon my Arrival here, to enter into an Agreement with the Nawab of Bhopâl, who has engaged to ſupply me with a ſufficient Quantity of Proviſions, and to furniſh Boats at Huſſungabad for the Paſſage of the Troops acroſs the Nerbud da. Theſe friendly Inclinations towards us have drawn upon him the Reſentment of Balajee and his Confederates; who have burnt and deſtroyed great Part of his Country on the Way to this Place, and ſtill threaten him with the Vengeance of the Poona Adminiſtration for thus acting in Contradiction to the Peſhwa's Orders, of preventing if poſſible our March acroſs the Nerbudda. I have therefore at his earneſt Solicitation, and on Account of the Difficulties he may hereafter be ex poſed to, from the amicable Conduct he has adopted reſpecting us, promiſed to recommend him in the ſtrongeſt Terms to the Favour and Protection of the Engliſh Adminiſtration; in doing which I have been careful not to involve your Government in any Engagements which you might have Cauſe to diſapprove of, or which might interfere with the more important Objects of your political Inten tions, but have left entirely to your own free Choice the Meaſures you may deem it proper and eligible to purſue in conſequence of my Repreſentation made to you. I beg to acquaint you that I propoſe marching from this Place To-morrow, and proſecuting my Route to the Nerbudda.

Camp near Bhopâl,
November 25th, 1778.

I have, &c. &c.
Tho' Goddard.

Gentlemen,

Since the Letter I had the Honour to addreſs you of the 25th November, I have left Bhopâl, and am arrived on the Banks of the Nerbudda, at the Gaut of Huſſungabad.

The Route to this Place has been through a mountainous and rough Country, where the Troops have exerted themſelves with the greateſt Cheerfulneſs and Alacrity, in removing the Stones and large Trees which in many Places had blocked up the Road, and rendered it impaſſable for Carriages and Artillery, without the greateſt Labour and Difficulty. It is with particular Pleaſure I can recommend to you the Attention of the Officers, and Perſeverance of the Men on this Occaſion, who performed in Four Days, under all the Difficulties I have mentioned, a March of at leaſt 46 Miles. From the Diſpoſition and Eagerneſs they have now diſplayed, I am led to form the moſt favourable Proſpect of their future Conduct, and cannot but flatter myſelf with the Hopes that it will be ſuch as to merit your Approbation. The Nawab of Bhopâl has literally and faithfully adhered to the Engagements he entered into of ſupplying the Army with Proviſions through his Country, and furniſhing Boats for croſſing the Nerbudda at Huſſungabad, which is dependant upon his Authority. He alſo prevented the Troops of Balagee from following my Route, which they repeatedly propoſed to do; and declared he would repel them by Force if they proſecuted further War within his Territories. In ſhort, he has acted with ſuch Sincerity and Regard to his Engagements made to me on this Occaſion, that I am induced to repreſent to you my entire Satisfaction with his Conduct; and the uſeful Aſſiſtance he has afforded at a Time when the being compelled to Hoſtilities muſt have detained the Detachment conſiderably, and perhaps in the End have proved a material Injury to the Service on which it was ſent: While I thus do Juſtice to his Sincerity and Friendſhip, let me alſo contraſt with it the treacherous and ill-adviſed Behaviour of Balajee, who, notwithſtanding the moderate and conciliating Meaſures I adopted towards him, and the Pains I took to preſerve his Country

from

from Violence, attempted all in his Power to impede his March. I am informed that he alledges, in Excuſe for his Conduct, the Orders of the preſent Peſhwa. This he never communicated to me himſelf by Letter, or through his Vackeel; but I have no Doubt of Inſtructions having been ſent him, as well as the other Chiefs on the North of the Nerbudda, by the Adminiſtration at Poona, to join in preventing the Engliſh from croſſing that River; and I know he threatened the Nawab of Bhopâl with the Vengeance of the Peſhwa, in caſe he would not unite his Forces to oppoſe our March. I beg Leave further to acquaint you, that the Troops have this Day began to paſs the River; and I hope in Three Days to have the Detachment compleatly croſſed. The Berar Territories commence about 7 Coſs from the Nerbudda, on the Confines of which a confidential Perſon from the Court of Naigpore is waiting the Arrival of the Troops, whoſe Preſence I expect in a few Days in my Camp.

I have, &c. &c.

Camp at Huſſungabad Gaut, on the Nerbudda, December 1, 1778.

Thos Goddard.

Gentlemen,

I had the Honour to addreſs you the 1ſt inſtant, informing you of my Arrival at the Nerbudda, which River the whole Detachment completely croſſed the following Day: The Cauſe of this Diſpatch was owing to the Diſcovery of a Ford, at a ſmall Diſtance below the Gaut, by which the Artillery, Carriages, &c. and Remainder of the Army paſſed over, Two Battalions only having croſſed the Evening of the 1ſt Inſtant. I ſhall remain encamped upon the South Side ſome Days; and this Delay, while it is neceſſary to determine the political Meaſures proper to be purſued, equally ſuits the Convenience of the Troops; for, owing to the bad Roads over which they have marched, more particularly ſince leaving Bhopal, all the Artillery and Gun Carriages are much ſhattered and in want of Repair, beſides the Healthineſs of this Spot, upon the high and open Bank of a clear plentiful Stream of Water, conveniently ſituated for a Supply of Proviſions from the Town of Huſſungabad, and from the Neighbourhood of the Berar Territories, will in all Likelihood greatly recover the remaining Sick of the Detachment, which upon the March from Rage Ghur amounted to a Thouſand Men, and at this Time are reduced to about Fourh undred. Lala Jadou Roy, the confidential Perſon ſent to meet the Army, on the Part of Moodajee, has waited on me ſince croſſing the Nerbudda, and has expreſſed himſelf in Terms the moſt friendly and favourable to the Engliſh Intereſt, which he ſays his Maſter is diſpoſed to promote to the utmoſt of his Power. As my Arrival at this Place was ſooner than had been foreſeen or expected, I ſhall halt ſome Days till the particular Diſpatches can arrive from the Berar Court, by which my future Plan of Operations ſhall be directed, which I ſhall not fail to communicate to you. I think it neceſſary to inform you, that I have not been favoured with a Letter from the Select Committee at Bombay of a later Date than the 21ſt July, which contained no particular Intelligence whatever. I have not neglected to acquaint them from Time to Time with the Progreſs of my March, and requeſted to receive their Inſtructions and Advice relative to the Route of the Detachment, as well as every Information they could give of the Motion of any Bodies of Troops in that Quarter; I am therefore in Expectation of hearing from them every Day.

Camp on the South Side the Nerbudda, 5th December 1778.

I have, &c. &c.

(Signed) Thos. Goddard.

Warren Haſtings,
Richard Barwell,
P. Francis,
Edwd Wheler.

APPENDIX, N° 165.

Letter from Moodajee Bhoſila to the Governor General: Dated the 15th of Zekaida, 5th of December 1778; *and received 2d January* 1779.

YOUR friendly Letter of the 19th of Ramzaun, (11th of October) informing me of your having received Advice of the Death of Mr. Elliott in his Way to Naigpore; your Concern at that Event, and at the unavoidable Suſpenſion of the Negociations which that Gentleman was to have conducted

ducted with me on the Part of your Government; and the Delay in the Eſtabliſhment of a ſtrict and perpetual Friendſhip between the Company's States and mine, concerning which you had exerted yourſelf ſo warmly, by reaſon that the preſent Situation of Affairs would not admit of the Delay which muſt attend the Deputation of another Perſon from thence, without injuring the Deſigns in Hand; but that in your Conviction of my favourable Diſpoſition, from the Knowledge that my Intereſts and the Company's are inſeparately connected, and in the Zeal of Beneram Pundit, whom, during the long Period he reſided with you, you found ſo deſerving of your Confidence, from his ſincere Attachment to our common Intereſts; that you communicated to him your Sentiments and Views in the moſt full and explicit Manner, you have a Reſource for effecting the important Objects of Mr. Elliott's Miſſion; that Beneram Pundit would explain to me the Conditions which you ſhould require, and to which you would yield your Acquieſcence; and that to him therefore you refer me for fuller Information; and requeſt that I will give him an attentive Hearing, as your View in the Plan propoſed, and in what you have written, is to promote our common Advantage, not for the Intereſt of one Party only, being convinced that no public Alliance or private Friendſhip can be firmly eſtabliſhed without reciprocal Advantages; that it is on theſe Principles that you have long planned an Alliance with me, the Time for the Accompliſhment of which is now come, for you conceive it to be equally for my Intereſt as for yours, our Countries bordering on each other, and our natural Enemies being the ſame; that, in a Word, you require nothing but the Junction of my Forces with yours, by which though each is ſingly very powerful, they will require a Ten-fold Proportion of Strength: That the Delay in the Progreſs of the Detachment intended for Bombay had not ariſen from the Oppoſition of an Enemy, but from other Cauſes improper to mention, but that it will now ſhortly arrive in my Territories, and its Operations be determined by my Advice; that you have given Directions to Colonel Leſlie, the commanding Officer, to co-operate with the Forces which I ſhall unite with his; that as you offer me the Forces of your Sirkar to promote my Views, you in return expect the Aſſiſtance of mine to effect your Purpoſes; with other Particulars which I fully underſtand, reached me on the 20th of Shawaul (16th November) and afforded me great Pleaſure. I alſo received Duplicate and Triplicate of this Letter; in the latter Part of it you expreſs, that as you have fully made me acquainted with your Views, it is neceſſary that I alſo communicate to you without Reſerve the Ends which I look to for my Advantage in this Union; that the good Faith of the Engliſh to every Engagement they contract, ſo long as it is obſerved by others, is univerſally known, and that it has been the invariable Rule of your Conduct to ſupport this Character in all Acts depending on you, and never to relinquiſh any Deſign of Importance formed on good and judicious Grounds, but to perſevere ſteadily to its Completion: That having thus explained to me your Sentiments and Views, you wait only to know mine, and on the Knowledge of theſe you ſhall form your ultimate Reſolutions.

It is equally a Maxim of ſincere Friendſhip, of good Government, Steadineſs, Magnanimity, and Foreſight, that a Plan formed on good and judicious Grounds, ſhould be conducted in ſuch a Manner as to end happily: You deſire to learn my Sentiments and Views, and deferring to form your ultimate Reſolutions till you heard farther from me, is the ſame Thing as if you had conſulted me primarily on your firſt Deſigns.

Since after the ſtricteſt Scrutiny and Reſearches into the Diſpoſitions and Views of the Multitude, it has been determined, on Proofs of mutual Sincerity and good Faith, that a perpetual Friendſhip and Union be eſtabliſhed, it will like the Wall of Alexander, for the Happineſs of Mankind, continue unſhaken till the End of Time.

The having cauſed a Tranſlation to be made into the Engliſh of the Hindoo Books, called the Shaſter and Poran, and of the Hiſtory of the former Kings; the ſtudying theſe Books, and keeping the Pictures of former Kings and preſent Rulers of Hind, Decan, &c. always before your Eyes, and from their lifeleſs Similitudes to diſcover which of them were or are worthy of Rule, and poſſeſſed of good Faith, from which to determine with whom to contract Engagements, and what Conduct to obſerve to them reſpectively; alſo the Endeavour to preſerve the Bleſſing of Peace, till forced to relinquiſh it; the ſupporting every one in his hereditary Right, and revenging the Breach of Faith and Engagements, but on the Submiſſion of the Offender, the Exerciſe of the Virtues of Clemency and Generoſity, by pardoning and receiving him again to Favour, and reſtoring him to his Poſſeſſions; the not ſuffering the Intoxication of Power to ſeduce you into a Breach of Faith; and the giving Support to each illuſtrious Houſe, in Proportion to its reſpective Merits, and in Matters which require a long Courſe of Years to bring to Perfection; the forming your Conduct on mature Deliberation, and the Advice of the Company and Council, are the ſure Means of exalting your Greatneſs and Proſperity to the higheſt Pitch: The Intention of all this is to recommend univerſal Peace and Friendſhip in the Manner following: The Almighty diſpoſes of Kingdoms, and places whomſoever he chuſes on the Seats of Power and Rule, but makes their Stability to depend on their peaceable, juſt, and friendly Conduct to others: It is not every one who is equal to the Taſk of Government, on the Plan deſigned by the Almighty Ruler, and of inſuring his Stability by a wiſe and juſt Conduct: Hind and Decan poſſeſs at preſent very few enlightened, but a great Multitude of weak and ignorant Men; the Engliſh Chiefs, and you in a ſuperior Degree, poſſeſs all the Virtues above recited; who coming from diſtant Iſlands by a Six Months Voyage on the great Ocean, by their Magnanimity and Fortitude, gained the Dominion of many Soubahs on that Continent: It is eaſy to acquire a Kingdom, but to become a King over Kings and Chief of Chiefs, is a very difficult Matter: The Attainment of this is only to be effected by the Means of

Friendſhip,

Friendſhip, by which the Univerſe may be ſubjected: My Conduct is formed on theſe Principles. The Preſence of Beneram Pundit at Calcutta was ſolely to effect the Eſtabliſhment of the moſt intimate Friendſhip, and by the Bleſſing of God it has taken ſuch deep Root, that through your Means it has reached the Ears of the Company and King of England; and our Connection and Correſpondence carried on under the Veil of the Vicinity of our Dominions, has been diſcovered by the Poona Miniſters and the Nabob Nizam-ul-Dowlah; yet although they form various Conjectures and Doubts, and have ſent a truſty Vackeel, and written repeated Letters to endeavour to find out the Motives of our Union, yet they remain a Myſtery, as I make the Plea of our ancient Ties, and the Junction of our Territories.

I was impatiently expecting the Arrival of Mr. Elliott, who, being endowed with an enlightened Underſtanding, and inveſted with full Powers from you to conduct the Negociations, and determine on the Meaſures to be purſued, would have eſtabliſhed the Ties of perpetual Friendſhip, and have ſettled every Matter on the firmeſt Baſis. It pleaſed God that he ſhould die on the Journey; and the Grief I felt on this unfortunate Loſs, who would have been the Means of ſettling all Points between us to our mutual Content, and by his Negociations with me, of giving Satisfaction to the Peiſhwa and the Nabob Nizam ul Dowlah, all which have been by his Death thrown back many Months, is not to be deſcribed, and could only ſerve to add to your Affliction. I have not yet recovered the Shock which this Event gave me, as you will learn from Beneram Pundit: There is no Remedy for ſuch Misfortunes; and it is in vain to ſtrive againſt the Decrees of Providence. Had Mr. Elliott arrived, ſuch Strokes of Policy would have been employed, that the Poona Miniſters would have adhered more ſcrupulouſly than before to their Engagements; and the French, who are the natural Enemies of the Engliſh, would have been their's likewiſe; and their Suſpicions and Apprehenſions, of Support being given to Ragonaut Row, which never was nor is deſigned by the Engliſh Chiefs, as I learn from Beneram, who had it from your Mouth, and which have cauſed them great Uneaſineſs, would have been entirely removed by Mr. Elliott's and my joint Security.

The Nabob Nizam-ul Dowlah, who wrote you repeatedly on this Subject, and received for Anſwer, that you had no Idea of aiding or ſupporting Ragonaut Row; that your Enmity was ſolely pointed againſt the French; and that whoever aſſiſted the French were your Enemies, would likewiſe by theſe Means have been thoroughly ſatisfied, and your Detachment would have reached Bombay without meeting with the ſmalleſt Interruption; and had the Poona Miniſters then acted a contrary Part, ſhould have withdrawn myſelf from their Friendſhip: But by the Death of Mr. Elliott all theſe Deſigns muſt have fallen to the Ground, and muſt be ſuſpended till another Opportunity, and the Knowledge of your Sentiments. It is a Proverb, that what is deliberately done, is well done. In Reply to what you write reſpecting your forming your ultimate Reſolutions, I have communicated to Beneram Pundit whatever I judge proper and eligible, and which may promote them in ſuch a Manner as may not be ſubject to any Change from the Viciſſitudes of Fortune. For theſe Points, which have fixed on after the moſt mature Deliberation, as the moſt eligible that can be adopted, I refer you to the Letters of Beneram Pundit: If notwithſtanding you have any Plan to propoſe for the reciprocal Benefit of our States, be pleaſed to communicate it to me.

Poſtſcript.—To your Letter reſpecting your ſending an Army to over-awe the French, and to reinforce the Government of Bombay; and ſetting forth, that the Poona Miniſters having broken the Treaty with the Engliſh, and in Oppoſition to the Rights of Friendſhip, received an Envoy of the French King, and granted the Port of Choul to that Nation, thereby enabling them to form an Arſenal, and collect military Stores, and of their having written to their Officers to permit the French Ships to enter their Ports; all which Inſtances of Breach of Treaty you learned from the Letters of a Perſon entruſted by the Poona Government: And that it being therefore incumbent on you to take Meaſures to counteract their Deſigns, you had determined to ſend a ſtrong Detachment for the Reinforcement of Bombay, by the Route of Berar; and that in Conſideration of our ancient Friendſhip, and the Vicinity of our Dominions, you requeſted that on its Arrival in my Neighbourhood, I would cauſe it to be inſtructed in the Route; and providing it with Proviſions and Neceſſaries, have it conducted in Safety through my Territories, and join a Body of my Forces with it, which would cement and increaſe our Friendſhip; and that you have, at the Aſſurance of Beneram, fixed on this Route for its March, in Preference to any other. In Reply to this Letter, actuated by the Dictates of the ſincereſt Friendſhip, I waited not to take the Advice of any one, but without Heſitation wrote to you, that where a ſincere Friendſhip exiſted, the Paſſage of Troops through one's Country was a Matter of no Moment: That they ſhould proceed unmoleſted through my Country. I likewiſe informed Colonel Leſlie of the Difficulties and Dangers he would meet with in the Way, from dangerous Mountains, extenſive Rivers, &c. and alſo diſpatched Lalla Jadoo Roy, with a Chief of Note, to the Banks of the Nurbudder, to ſupply the Detachment with Proviſions as long as they were in my Territory, and to treat them with all the Duties of Hoſpitality; where he waited Six Months, in Expectation of their Arrival, to no Purpoſe: They loitered away their Time in the Bundlecund Country, contrary to every Rule of Policy. At that Time all the Poona Miniſters were ſeparately employed in their own private Affairs, or in the War with Hyder Naig, inſomuch that they had no Leiſure to turn their Attention to the Concerns of other Parts, and the March to Bombay might have been effected with the greateſt Eaſe: The Time is now paſt; the Arrow is ſhot, and cannot be recalled. As I have repeatedly written to the Poona Miniſters, with whom I keep up a Correſpondence, on the Subject of their encouraging a French Envoy, and breaking their Faith with the Engliſh Chiefs; Acts highly

highly inconſiſtent with Honour and Policy; the Anſwer I have received from them I have communicated to you. The Subſtance of what they ſay in their own Juſtification is this: That the French Vackeel came for the Purpoſe of Traffick, not to negociate; yet, for the Satisfaction of the Engliſh, they gave him his Diſmiſſion: That the Account of the Grant of the Port of Choul and an Arſenal, is without Foundation; and that they have not the leaſt Indiſpoſition towards the Engliſh: That I will therefore write to Calcutta, that you may be perfectly ſatisfied reſpecting their Diſpoſition. My Letter did not produce the Effect of ſatisfying you on the Subject of the Peiſhwa, but your Doubts ſtill remained; and, actuated by Wiſdom and Prudence, you determined to depute Mr. Elliott to me; and wrote me, that on his Arrival at Naigpore, after he had had an Interview with me, and learnt my Sentiments and Views, he would, in conjunction with me, form a Plan for our mutual Honour and Benefit, and give Directions to Colonel Leſlie in conſequence, who would be guided thereby. The Event of this Gentleman's Deputation is too well known; and Colonel Leſlie likewiſe, after engaging in Hoſtilities with the Peiſhwa's Officers and the Zemindars of thoſe Parts, and collecting large Sums of Money, died alſo. Colonel Goddard ſucceeded to the Command, and purſued the ſame Line of Conduct with reſpect to the Talookdars, as his Predeceſſor; and arriving at Gorawaie and Goroſur, in the Territory of the Afghans, whither he was obliged to march with the utmoſt Caution, being ſurrounded with a Maratta Army, who conſtantly ſeized every Opportunity to attack him, wrote me from thence, that he ſhould ſhortly reach the Nurbudder, where I would be pleaſed to cauſe Grain, &c. neceſſary, to be prepared, and a Party of my Forces to be ready to join him. I wrote them in anſwer, that Lalla Jadoo Roy and Shao Balo Hazaree were waiting on this Side the Nurbudder, which is within my Territories; and that the Gaut where the Troops ſhould croſs was Two Coſs from thence, under Hoſhungabad: That Sanojee Bhoſilla forded it at that Place with his Army, in his Expedition to Malwa; and that I did not doubt it was now fordable: That he would therefore croſs his Army there, and repair to Hoſhungabad; and that Lalla Jadoo Roy would exert his utmoſt Aſſiduity in ſupporting them with Grain and other Proviſions, and treat them with every Degree of Hoſpitality: But that, as the Road forwards was very difficult and dangerous, and Thouſands of the Bad Caſt were concealed in the Holds in the Mountains; who, though not able to oppoſe him openly, yet would do it by Ambuſcades and Stratagems, and would cut off his Supplies of Proviſions; and beyond that he would enter the Soubah of Berhampore, dependant on the Peiſhwa; and near Four thouſand of Sindeah's Cavalry were waiting at the Fort of Aſſeer the Arrival of the Engliſh on the Banks of the Ganges; Ten thouſand more, under the Command of Baugrut Sindeah and Sindeah himſelf, with other Chiefs, in Readineſs at Poona, waiting to hear the Approach of the Engliſh; and moreover in Berar, in which the Nabob Nizam ul Dowlah poſſeſſes a Share with me, all the Jaghierdars, to wit, Huſhmud Jung Behadre, Sellabut Khan Behadre, and Balool Khan Behadre, the Sons of Iſhmail Khan, deceaſed, as alſo Bullund Khan Mye, Bharam Jung; and in Newmull, Zuffer ul Dowlah, Mobarez ul Mulk Bahadre, were in Readineſs with powerful Armies; and although the Engliſh poſſeſſed the greateſt Magnanimity in Battle, yet as every Step they took would be into the Mouth of Danger, and all the above-mentioned Chiefs would ſet themſelves to cut off and deſtroy his Proviſions, and take every Opportunity of attacking him where they ſaw an Advantage, and of harraſſing him Night and Day; conſtantly ſurrounding his Army with their numerous Forces, the Junction of a Body of my Forces with his would avail nothing in the Face of ſuch large Armies, but would only involve me in the greateſt Loſſes: That neither was it adviſable for him to return, which would diminiſh the Awe and Reſpect in which he was held: That I would therefore write the full Particulars, in the moſt explicit Manner, to Calcutta; and that whatever you ſhould think proper to intimate to him and me in Reply, it would be adviſable to abide by, and act accordingly; till which Time I would recommend that he continued at Hoſhangabad: That I had received Letters from Calcutta, filled with the warmeſt Aſſurances of Friendſhip and Confidence, to the following Purport, That the Detachment would come into my Neighbourhood, and be guided in its Operations by my Advice; that it is incumbent on every Chief, who enjoys the Confidence of another, to give ſuch Advice as may be moſt advantageous to the Party repoſing Truſt in him, and moſt conſiſtent with the Faith of Engagements; and with ſuch Conduct the Almighty is well pleaſed: That I had alſo written to the Poona Miniſters my Advice on the Situation of Affairs, to this Purport, That Mr. Elliott was deputed hither to negociate with me, but dying in the Journey, all the Negociations entruſted to him were ſuſpended; that had he arrived at Naigpore, I had determined, from Principles of Attachment, to have removed from the Minds of the Engliſh the Doubts and Apprehenſions which had ariſen by reaſon of the ſuppoſed Encouragement of the French Envoy at Poona, and the Agreement to ſupport that Nation, the inveterate Enemies of the Engliſh, which had given Riſe to the Quarrel between the Two States; by proving to them, under the Sanction of ſolemn Oaths, and becoming myſelf Guarantee, that thoſe Reports were groundleſs, and that the Poona Miniſters were zealous and ſteady in their Engagements with the Engliſh, and on ſeveral Accounts highly obliged to them; and I would alſo have taken from Mr. Elliott Engagements that the Engliſh had no Idea of affording Support to Ragonaut Row, but were reſolved to maintain their Treaty inviolate, and that their Apprehenſions related to the French; and that when I gave the Engliſh Satisfaction reſpecting the French, and became Guarantee, all his Doubts were removed: That if it were requiſite, a freſh Engagement ſhould be executed, and that he would be Guarantee to it: That in brief, each Party entertained a reaſonable Doubt, the Engliſh that the Poona Miniſters would join with the French, and the Poona Miniſters that the Engliſh would ſupport Ragonaut Row: That when theſe Suſpicions no longer remained, all Cauſes of Diſpleaſure muſt of courſe ceaſe; and that they could then have had no Objection

ction to the Detachment of Engliſh Forces, ſent for the Reinforcement of Bombay, and to over-awe he French, not for the Support of Ragonaut Row, repairing thither; and to oppoſe them would in uch Caſe have been highly improper, as Mr. Elliott and myſelf would have been Guarantees to the Engagement: That as theſe important Objects have failed, in conſequence of the unfortunate Loſs f Mr. Elliott, and depended on Advices from Calcutta; and that the Purport of all the Letters I ave received from thence, and of the Aſſurances of Beneram, was, that the Detachment of Engliſh orces was ſolely deſtined for the Reinforcement of Bombay, in conſequence of Apprehenſions of oſtile Deſigns on the Part of the French, without the ſmalleſt Deſign to ſupport Ragonaut Row; that : was therefore adviſable in them not to give any Interruption to the March of the Detachment, but o ſuffer it to march peaceably to Bombay; that the Event muſt at any Rate by theſe Means be put ff to a diſtant Period: That the above was the Purport of my Letters to Poona, and thoſe of Baboo low, who is not merely a Vackeel, but one of the Chiefs of Poona: That we muſt wait to ſee what nſwer they would give, by which Time Letters would likewiſe arrive from Calcutta: That it was herefore adviſable that he ſhould remain at Hoſhengabad, preſerving the ſtricteſt Watch and Vigilance, as Balajee and Byſajee were lying in wait for a favourable Opportunity; and that he ſhould be rniſhed with Proviſions from hence to the utmoſt poſſible.

I have written thus to Colonel Goddard, but have not yet received his Anſwer; and, induced by ne ſincereſt Friendſhip, I have given you this explicit Information. Inform me of your Sentiments, nd of the Meaſures which your enlightened Underſtanding po nts out to you, that Colonel Goddard ay regulate himſelf thereby.

Poſtſcript.—Baboo Row, the Peiſhwa's Vackeel, has obſerved to me in the Courſe of Converſaon, that his Maſter has not the ſlighteſt Idea of failing in his Engagements with the Engliſh, or of ontracting any Friendſhip with the French; but that the Treaty forbids the March of Engliſh orces through the Peiſhwa's Dominions, and that the Approach of the Detachment now on its larch is an Infringement of the Treaty. Mr. James Anderſon, is frequently acquainted with all the latters; nothing is concealed from him. Ramkaund, Mr. Elliott's Paſhcur, has alſo written rearding them, from which you will receive complete Information.

Poſtſcript.—Although it may be improper to repeat the ſame Thing over again, yet the Importance of the Subject may plead in my Excuſe: On either Part a Doubt ſubſiſts. The Poona Miniſters ſuſpect that the Engliſh Forces on their March to Bombay, though oſtenſibly for the Purpoſe of oppoſing the French, are in Reality intended for the Support of Ragonaut Row; and that he Engliſh at Bombay, who were not included in the Treaty with the Peiſhwa, which was concluded through the Governor of Madras with the Advice of the Chief of Calcutta, are deſirous of reaking with the Peiſhwa, and of ſupporting Ragonaut Row; and that the Detachment on its larch has been ſent at their Requiſition. They alledge, that the Chief of Calcutta writes to them hat he is firmly reſolved to adhere to the Treaty with the Peiſhwa, and that the Detachment he has ent to Bombay is ſolely to awe the French, without the leaſt Deſign to aſſiſt Ragonaut Row; and hat ſince it is forbidden in the Treaty to diſpatch Troops over Land, the March of the Troops is Breach of it: That if it is neceſſary to ſend Troops to Bombay to awe the French, they ought to e ſent by Sea.

The Engliſh on their Part ſuſpect the Poona Miniſters of joining the French, in conſequence of heir having received a Vackeel. As the Peiſhwa formerly wrote me that he had no Idea of failing n his Engagements with the Engliſh; and that he had given no Encouragement to the French 'ackeel, who came for the Purpoſes of Traffic; and that he had diſmiſſed him, and therefore reueſted that I would ſatisfy you reſpecting him; I in conſequence formerly wrote all theſe Particuirs to you. As I have a Voucher in my Hands from the Peiſhwa, that he has no Connection with ne French, and is ſteady to his Engagements with the Engliſh, I am able by this Voucher to give ou complete Satisfaction on this Head; but I have no Voucher nor Intimation from you by which may be enabled to give Satisfaction to him.

As he pleads a Prohibition in the Treaty to the March of Forces over Land, and likewiſe complains ſpecting the Money that Colonel Leſlie collected in his Territories, what Anſwer can be made ereto?

As the Times require that a Conciliation take place with the Poona Miniſters, you will conſider nd determine what Reply ſhall be given to theſe Two Points of which they complain, and by what leans they may be ſatisfied; and communicate your Reſolution to me, that I may write conformably ereto, and remove all Doubts.

From Dewagur Pundit; received 2d January 1779.

Your friendly Letter, under Date the 19th of Ramzaun (11th of October 1778) intimating your having, on the News of Mr. Elliott's Death, entruſted the Repreſentaton of the Points of Negociation committed to the Charge of that Gentleman, to Beneram Pundit; your having delayed to form your ultimate Reſolutions till you receive further Advices from hence; your having appointed Colonel Goddard to take the Command of the Army in the room of Colonel Leſlie, who is to be conſidered as fully empowered in every Point of Negociation; your Deſire that your Army may be

accompanied to Bombay by a Body of the Forces of this Government; and in Concluſion intimate that Colonel Goddard will ſhortly arrive in this Neighbourhood, and regulate his future Operations for the common Intereſt, by the Advice and Concurrence of the Maha Rajah, for which Purpoſe you have written the neceſſary Inſtructions to the Colonel, who will conduct himſelf accordingly, reached me on the 26th of Shawal, (16th November) followed by Duplicate and Triplicate, and accompanied by Three Karetahs for the Maha Rajah, my Maſter, and inſpired me with the utmoſt Pleaſure. From this Letter I become fully acquainted with your Sentiments and Views, and of your unchangeable Friendſhip to the Maha Rajah; and likewiſe underſtand what Biſſembur Pundit wrote at your Deſire to his Brother Beneram Pundit.

By the Death of Mr. Elliott, who would have been the Means of ſettling many Points of the utmoſt Importance, all Matters were thrown into Suſpence, and became dependant on further Advices from Calcutta: The Repetition of the Grief felt by the Maha Rajah and myſelf at this unfortunate Event, could ſerve no other Purpoſe than to renew your Affliction: There is no Remedy againſt the Decrees of Providence: The Objects which would have been effected by Mr. Elliott's Magnanimity are now thrown back many Months, but by the Bleſſing of God, will take Effect at a favourable Opportunity, and your Views and Deſigns be fully accompliſhed; I am employed Day and Night in Meaſures for the Augmentation and perpetual Duration of Friendſhip between your illuſtrious States: The Maha Rajah has very fully written you on the State of Affairs, the Meaſures which the Times require, and the Means for the uninterrupted Paſſage of the Forces deſtined for Bombay; and of his having written in the moſt effectual Terms to the Poona Miniſters on this Subject; and that in theſe Letters he has ſolely attended to the Dictates of that warm Friendſhip which he feels for you, diſregarding every other Conſideration; as alſo of his having unreſervedly communicated to Colonel Goddard his Sentiments and Advice on the Conduct to be purſued; from that Letter, you will have complete Information, for it contains the Dictates of the Heart, and every Sentiment of it proceeds from the trueſt Friendſhip, the cleareſt Behaviour, and foundeſt Policy, and will doubtleſs meet with your Approval, and produce a Reply to the Maha Rajah and Colonel Goddard, with ſuch Inſtructions as your Judgement ſhall point out to you as beſt adapted to the Situation of the Times: Colonel Goddard has been written to, to continue at Hoſhengabad, which is within the Dominions of this State, till ſuch Time as Advices are received from you, becauſe it is by no Means adviſable to proceed forwards into the Territory of the Peiſhwa; where no Progreſs can be made without fighting, and all the Chiefs with numerous Forces are waiting the Approach of the Engliſh Army, and taking Meaſures to ſtop their receiving Supplies of Proviſions, to ſeize on all the Paſſes and Ghauts, and difficult Roads, but no Anſwer has been yet received from Colonel Goddard: We muſt wait to ſee whether he will conſent to remain at Hoſhengabad, or determine to proceed forward, but it is certainly moſt adviſable that he ſhould continue there, which is in the Territory of this State, till he hears further from you: He will be ſupplied with Proviſions from hence to the utmoſt poſſible.

Byſajee and Balajee Pundit, Talookdars of the Peiſhwa, who conſtantly encompaſs the Army and harraſs it by daily Skirmiſhes, and have plundered ſome of the Baggage, have been written to, that ſuch Conduct is highly improper, as the Detachment is intended for the Reinforcement of Bombay, and to awe the French, not for the Support of Ragonaut Row; that the Poona Miniſters will not approve of their Conduct, and that they will ſhortly receive Letters from Poona: I have no Doubt but they will pay Attention to what has been written to them, and ſuſpend their Hoſtilities.

Whenever the Army begins its March from Hoſhengabad, the Marattas will inſtantly ſet themſelves in Oppoſition, but by remaining in this City which is in the Dominion of the Maha Rajah, they will be in a State of perfect Security: Their Artillery and the Guards which they will ſtation around them, will prevent their receiving any Injury: In the mean Time, Replies will be received from Poona, and Intelligence of their Force, and of the Deſigns of Sindeah and Holcar will be learnt; in conſequence of which, a proper Plan may be formed for the March of the Army: Set your Mind at reſt, that the Colonel will experience no Inſtance of the ſlighteſt Failure or Inattention from this Quarter, but every Thing ſhall be done, and his Honour ſhall be conſidered in the ſame Light as our own, and his Deſires paid equal Attention to as our own: Beneram Pundit has received Inſtructions to reply to the important Points repreſented by him at your Deſire: From his Letters you will have full Information.

Mr. James Anderſon, Captain Campbell, and Ramkund, Mr. Elliott's Peiſhcur, are arrived here; agreeable to your Deſire all Matters are communicated to theſe Gentlemen, and in conſequence of your Recommendation, they have been received here with every Degree of Honour and Attention: They have likewiſe, at our Deſire, written what was judged proper to Colonel Goddard.

Having made themſelves acquainted with every Matter, and of the Maha Rajah's Candour and warm Friendſhip towards you, they have written your Excellency on the Subject, to which Letters I beg Leave to refer you for full Information on theſe Points: I impatiently wait your Reply.

From

APPENDIX, N° 165.

From Beneram Pundit; received 2d January 1779.

I have been honoured with your Three gracious Letters, intimating your having received Accounts of the Death of Mr. Elliott in his Way to Naigpore; your Grief on that Event; your not appointing another Perſon in his Room; your Reſource for remedying the Delay which had ariſen in the Objects of that Gentleman's Miſſion; and your appointing me to the Truſt of repreſenting your Sentiments and Views to the Maha Rajah my Maſter, and Dewan Dewagur Pundit, and communicating to your Highneſs their Sentiments in conſequence: The Receipt of theſe Letters afforded me the greateſt Pleaſure.

I have made a full Repreſentation to my Maſter and the Dewan, of whatever I had formerly learnt from you, and of all the Particulars contained in my Brother's Letters written at your Deſire: The Maha Rajah's Reply thereto was as follows: Where a ſincere and intimate Friendſhip ſubſiſts, a free and unreſerved Communication of all Matters, is the moſt certain Means of augmenting and carrying it to the higheſt Pitch; that in a Word, by the Delay of Colonel Leſlie for a Term of Six Months in the Bundlecund Country, a Meaſure highly impolitic, the Opportunity was loſt; that the Poona Miniſters had been all engaged in their reſpective Affairs, and had no Leiſure to pay Attention to the Concerns of any other Part, by which Means the Detachment might have proceeded to Bombay with the utmoſt Facility, and without the ſmalleſt Oppoſition: That immediately on the Receipt of your Highneſs's Letter, he had ſent Lalla Jadoo Roy to wait at the Nurbudder, and on the Arrival of the Detachment within his Territories, to uſe every Means to ſupply them with Proviſions, and to afford them every Kind of Aſſiſtance: That he remained there Six Months improfitably, and that Affairs then took a different Aſpect, for the Poona Miniſters, apprehenſive of Support being given to Ragonaut Row, which never was nor never will be thought of by your Highneſs, collected together Armies, and ſtationed them in different Parts: That for the Purpoſe of removing their Suſpicions, he had written to them with Aſſurances, that the Engliſh Detachment were repairing to Bombay, with the ſole Deſign of reinforcing that Government, and awing the French, the natural Enemies of the Engliſh, and had no other Deſign in View; that they ſhould be perfectly ſatisfied on this Account, and not give Way to Suſpicions, which were unworthy of Credit.

There is great Reaſon to believe that theſe Letters will produce the deſired Effect, and that ſatisfactory Anſwers will be returned. The Maha Rajah and Dewan Dewagur Pundit have written you very voluminouſly on this Subject; the Letter of the former conſiſting of Six Sheets of Paper, from which you will have complete Information.

Colonel Goddard, after the Death of Colonel Leſlie, marched from Chattapore, and with unparalleled Bravery, exceeding all Deſcription, has, by daily Marches, in full of every poſſible Oppoſition from the Talookdars of thoſe Parts, to wit, Byſajee, Bylajee, and others, who have thrown every Obſtruction in his Way, forced his Paſſage to Bopaul: The Maha Rajah and Dewan Dewagur Pundit have written to Byſajee, and other Talookdars, to relinquiſh ſo improper and unjuſtifiable a Conduct, in which, if they perſiſt, the Event will prove fatal to them.

The Detachment will ſoon arrive on the Banks of the Nurbudder, this Side of which River is in my Maſter's Territories. Lalla Jadoo Roy and Shas Sing Hazzaree are at Hoſhengabad, on the Bank of the River, and will employ their utmoſt Endeavours to ſupply the Detachment with Proviſions, &c. and Orders have been iſſued to bring Proviſions to the Army from every Quarter. As ſoon as they arrive within the Maha Rajah's Territories they will be ſecure from all Oppoſition; but as the Route forward is very difficult, and the Hills are very ſteep and dangerous, and by the Direction of the Poona Miniſters Multitudes of Bahlas and others are ſtationed in different Parts, to oppoſe the Progreſs of the Army, it has therefore been judged adviſable, and has been recommended to Colonel Goddard, that as the moſt intimate Connection ſubſiſts between the Two States, he will for the preſent encamp on the Bank of the Nerbudda, and will be guided in his future Motions by the Situation of Affairs and the Reſult of the common Deliberations; that it will be proper maturely to reflect on the probable Event before the Commencement of any Undertaking; and that it is the Part of Wiſdom and ſound Judgment, before any further Steps are taken, to determine by what Means they are to be ſupported, that no Unſteadineſs may hereafter ariſe: Whatever Meaſures may be adopted by mutual Conſent after the Arrival of the Detachment at the Nurbudder I will communicate to you. For further Particulars I beg Leave to refer you to the Letters of Mr. James Anderſon and Biſſembur Pundit.

Poſtſcript.—Your gracious Letter, through the Channel of Colonel Goddard, informing me of your having appointed him to the Command of the Detachment, and that not being able to explain yourſelf on ſeveral Points ſo fully as you could have wiſhed, you have referred him to me for particular Information, has made me happy by its Arrival. As the River Nurbudder is only Eight Days Journey from Naigpore, as ſoon as the Colonel arrives there I will repair thither, and ſtate every Matter fully to him; and whatever ſhall be determined on with the Colonel's Advice ſhall be carried into Execution, and I will give Information thereof to you.

APPENDIX, N° 165.

From Modajee Bhoſila; received 2d January 1779.

I have had the Pleaſure to receive Four Letters from you; Two by the Way of Benares, One by the Route of Cuttack, and another from the Hands of Mr. James Anderſon. You write, that ſince Mr. Elliott is dead, Mr. Anderſon and Mr. Campbell will proceed to Naigpore; and that as Mr. Anderſon is a Gentleman of Worth, and acquainted with the Perſian and Hindoſtan Languages, he may be of Uſe in explaining Colonel Goddard's Negociations, and will write to the Colonel whatever he may in conjunction with me deem proper; that he will remain with me at Naigpore, and will with my Concurrence write you all the Occurrences of this Quarter. The aforeſaid Gentleman, together with Ramkund, Mr. Elliott's Peiſhcur, arrived here in Safety, and have frequently viſited me. Mr. Anderſon exceeds your Deſcription in Worth, and in his perfect Knowledge of Affairs; Ramkund is likewiſe well verſed in Affairs, and poſſeſſed of Penetration and ſound Judgment. I have already made, and will make them acquainted with all Correſpondence which has paſſed, or may paſs between us; and alſo with Colonel Goddard, as well as the Advices from Poona and the Nabob Nizam ul Moulk; and I have cauſed them to tranſmit you in Engliſh and Perſian the Particulars of my Letters to you and Colonel Goddard; the Affairs of this Quarter; and the Subſtance of the Advices from Poona; as well as the Account of Colonel Goddard's Arrival at Bopaul; his being encompaſſed by the Armies of Byſajee and Balajee, and of his daily Skirmiſhes with them; and that by the Bleſſing of God he will reach the Nurbudder in another Week, and having croſſed the River will come to Hoſhengabad; and agreeable to my Advice, founded on ſound Policy, and the Letters which I have deſired Mr. Anderſon to write to him, will encamp there, where he will be furniſhed by me with Proviſions, and wait for further Advices from Calcutta. You will receive fuller Information on all theſe Points from my Letters under Charge of the firſt Coſſids which arrive here, in which having written at large, it is unneceſſary to dwell longer on the Subject in this Place.

I have likewiſe written Letters to Poona to remove their Suſpicions and Apprehenſions on the Subject of Ragonaut Row, aſſuring them that this Detachment was proceeding to Bombay, for the Purpoſe of awing the French, not for the Support of Ragonaut Row, and giving them Advice touching their Conduct. We ſhall ſee what Anſwer they return; I will communicate it to you as ſoon as it arrives; in a Word, I have no other Wiſh or Deſign than the Preſervation and Encreaſe of Friendſhip with the Engliſh Chiefs, and of keeping on good Terms with the Poona Miniſters, which the Situation of the Times renders neceſſary; that by theſe Means the Detachment deſtined for Bombay may reach that Place with Facility, and experience no Hoſtilities in its Paſſage. Confiding in the Candour and Sincerity which ſubſiſts between us, you may implicitly rely on the above Aſſertions.

From Dewagur Pundit; received 2d January 1779.

I have been honoured with the Receipt of your friendly Letters, written after the Deceaſe of Mr. Elliott, informing me, that Mr. James Anderſon, a Gentleman of great Worth and Abilities, and well verſed in the Perſian and Hindoſtan Languages, will remain at Naigpore, and explain the Advices received from Colonel Goddard, and will write to the Colonel whatever he may in conjunction with us deem proper, and communicate the ſame to you; that I will therefore make him acquainted with every Matter, and regard him as a Perſon worthy of Confidence. Theſe Letters gave me great Pleaſure, and from your former and late Karetahs, and Letters repeatedly received by the Way of Cuttack and Benares, I am perfectly acquainted with your Sentiments and Deſigns, the Principal of which appears to be the Paſſage of the Detachment to Bombay, with the Advice and Concurrence of this Government, which will be attended with reciprocal Advantages to both States. I have alſo explained all Matters, from firſt to laſt, to Mr. Anderſon, and have replied fully to theſe Letters without the leaſt Reſerve, ſtating the moſt eligible Mode for the Paſſage of the Army to Bombay, and the Removal of the Peiſhwa's Suſpicions, which the preſent Situation of Affairs renders neceſſary, without ſuffering the leaſt Point to eſcape me; and to thoſe Letters I muſt refer you, having on mature Reflection formed your Judgment on the ſeveral Points contained therein, and regarding the Letters from hence as dictated by the warmeſt Attachment and Zeal, you will return an explicit Anſwer with your Sentiments and Advice, that Colonel Goddard, who is now arrived in the Country of Bopaul, under the Dominion of the Afghans, and is daily engaged in Conteſts with Byſajee and Balajee, Talookdars of the Peiſhwa, and who, by the Favour of the Almighty, will reach the Nurbudder in another Week, and in conſequence of Letters from hence will encamp at Hoſhengabad, on this Side the River, and under the Dominion of this State, and wait there for freſh Advices from Calcutta, may conduct himſelf thereby. In what I have written I have no other Intereſt than my Attachment to the Proſperity of both States, and my Deſire to comply with the Views both of the Maha Rajah and the Engliſh, and have guided myſelf by the Dictates of Prudence and Foreſight.

Mr. Anderſon and Ramkaund have written you a particular Account of what they have ſeen and heard, and from them you will have complete Information. The Company of Mr. Anderſon and Ramkaund has offered me the higheſt Pleaſure, as they are Perſons of diſtinguiſhed Worth and Underſtanding; they are both here and well, and have written to Colonel Goddard whatever was mutually judged proper to induce him to remain at Hoſhengabad: We are in Expectation of the Colonel's

Reply

Reply thereto. The Poona Miniſters have been written to to remove their Suſpicions; aſſuring them that the Engliſh Chiefs have not the ſmalleſt Deſign to ſupport Ragonaut Row, and that the Detachment on its March to Bombay has been ſent thither ſolely from Apprehenſions of the French; that they may be aſſured of this, and ſhould not obſtruct or moleſt them in their Paſſage, which will inflame the Diſputes to the greateſt Degree.

There is little Doubt but their Anſwer will be as formerly, that they have not the leaſt Deſign to break their Engagements with the Engliſh; and if ſuch Idea has been formed from the Reception of a French Vackeel, it is entirely groundleſs; and that whoever has written to that Effect to Calcutta has been actuated by Falſhood; that he came for the Purpoſe of Traffic, and that they diſmiſſed him to ſatisfy the Doubts entertained by the Engliſh; that we will therefore ſatisfy you on this Head: But for the Purpoſe of ſatisfying their Doubts by an Aſſurance that you have no Idea of ſupporting Ragonaut Row, and that the Detachment you have ſent is deſigned againſt the French, and that if the Engliſh Government of Bombay, who had no Concern in the Formation of the Treaty, ſhould on this Account wiſh to break the Peace, and require Aſſiſtance from you, no Attention ſhall be paid to them, but they ſhall be diſmiſſed from their Stations, and that a Perſon of Credit ſhall be given as Guarantee for the Performance (for without ſuch a Guarantee they will never be ſatisfied): whatever you may judge adviſable in this Caſe be pleaſed to communicate to me, that they may receive Satisfaction.

It is my Opinion that ſuch Meaſures ſhould be taken as may conciliate the Mind of the Peiſhwa, and till this Point is effected, that Colonel Goddard ſhould remain at Hoſhengabad.

I have been induced to make theſe Two Propoſitions entirely by Principles of the ſincereſt Friendſhip to the Engliſh Chiefs, and from a View into Futurity. Whatever is your Opinion, be pleaſed to make it known to me. It is the Duty of Friendſhip to labour for the Intereſt of both States: For the reſt, it remains with you.

What I have lately learnt from Baboo Row, the Peiſhwa's Vackeel, and the Letters of the Poona Miniſters, is as follows: That they are firm to the Treaty they have contracted with the Engliſh; that they gave no Encouragement to the French Vackeel; that he came to traffic, and they diſmiſſed him; that whilſt they adhered to their Engagements, the March of an Engliſh Army through their Territories and the Collection of large Sums of Money in different Places, and moleſting and injuring the Diſtricts and Perſons of their Talookdars, were evident Inſtances of a Breach of Treaty; what other Judgment could they form of it? That ſince the Treaty prohibits the March of Engliſh Forces over Land, to what Motive are they to attribute ſuch a Meaſure? That if it is neceſſary to ſend a Force to Bombay for the Reinforcement of that Settlement, and to awe the French, they ſhould ſend it by Sea, and thereby avoid a Breach of Treaty: That as they have been guilty of no Violation of their Engagements, the Preſervation of them on the Part of the Engliſh is neceſſary to good Faith: That the Detachment muſt not therefore come by Land, but be tranſported by Sea to Bombay, and the Money taken from the Talookdars and other Places, be reſtored as good Faith requires. Such are the Intimations which have been received from the Poona Miniſters, with a Requiſition that Letters to this Effect may be written from hence to Calcutta, and that Endeavours may be uſed to confirm the Treaty between them and the Engliſh Chiefs, on the Terms above-mentioned, and ſatisfactory Aſſurances given you, that they neither have, nor will enter into any Friendſhip or Connection with the French; in brief, ſuch is the Purport of their late Letters, and Baboo Row confirms the Subſtance. Whatever you deem adviſable you will therefore be pleaſed to communicate to me without Delay.

APPENDIX, N° 166.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 11th January 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler,
} Eſquires.

MR. Francis—I deſire that the Letters received on the 2d, and recorded in the Perſian Correſpondence on the 9th inſtant, from Moodajee Booſla and his Miniſters, may be read; and that a Minute, which I ſhall ſend in Circulation this Evening, on the Subject of theſe Letters, may be entered in this Place.

Agreed to.

The following Minute from Mr. Francis is therefore recorded in this Place:

Mr. Francis—I have nothing to object to the pious Precepts and excellent moral Inſtructions contained in this Letter: Whether they come ſeaſonably or not, at a Time when deep Plans of Policy and decided Acts of Vigour might have been expected from our intended Ally, inſtead of a general Diſcourſe upon the Duties of a Stateſman; or how far ſuch a Diſcourſe may with Propriety be addreſſed to the chief Member of this Government; are Queſtions very little neceſſary to be conſidered at preſent. It is of no ſort of Moment to us now, to enquire into the moral Character or religious Creed of this Maratta; though it might have been prudent in us to have been ſomewhat better acquainted with both, before we truſted him ſo far. From other Parts of his Letters, we may collect Information of a more intereſting Nature. If we really mean the Public Service; if we mean to ſave Colonel Goddard's Army, and to provide for the Security of the Company's Poſſeſſions, let us not obſtinately ſhut our Eyes to the Evidence before us. After examining the Facts without Prejudice or Paſſion, let us draw the natural and obvious Concluſions from thoſe Facts, and endeavour to act firmly and conſiſtently upon both.

For my own Part, the Declarations contained in Moodajee Booſla's Letter to Colonel Goddard, recorded on the 21ſt December, appeared to me ſufficiently explicit: A Majority of the Board however ſtill thought it neceſſary to wait for ſome farther Explanations; but now I preſume that not a Shadow of Doubt can remain with any of us concerning his real Sentiments and Reſolutions. The moſt material Points of Fact aſcertained by the preſent Letters, and by which our Meaſures muſt be immediately directed, are,

1ſt, That ſo late as the 5th of December, Moodajee Booſla does not appear to have had the leaſt Idea of the Extent or Nature of the Governor General's Views in the propoſed Alliance, though we have been informed that his Vackeel, Beneram Pundit, was perfectly poſſeſſed of the Project of that Alliance, from ſeveral Converſations which he had had with the Governor General in Calcutta, and was authorized to communicate the ſame to his Maſter.

2d, That whatever Degree of Information the Rajah might poſſeſs on this Subject, and admitting his Ignorance of the Governor's Plan to be merely affected, he appears plainly to have no Sort of Diſpoſition *to catch at the Objects preſented to his Ambition*, or to run the Riſque of a Rupture either with the Peſhwa, or with the Nizam, much leſs with both at the ſame Inſtant, for the Sake of any Offer that we can make him. On this Point his Declarations are clear and decided.

3d, That ſo far from ſhewing a Diſpoſition to join us againſt his Countrymen, he ſays expreſsly, "That the Junction of a Body of his Forces with Colonel Goddard would avail nothing in the "Face of ſuch large Armies, but would only involve himſelf in the greateſt Loſſes."

4th, That it is his, Moodajee Booſla's Opinion, founded on Reaſons, which, if he does not deceive us, are ſufficiently ſolid, that the Detachment cannot proceed towards Bombay without the greateſt Difficulty and Danger, nor return without Diſgrace.

5th, That ſo far from entering into an offenſive Alliance with us againſt the Poona Government, he inſiſts on the Neceſſity of our coming to an immediate Conciliation with them, and of our previouſly giving them Satisfaction for the March of our Army through their Country, and for the large Sums collected from their Zemindars, firſt by Colonel Leſlie, and afterwards by Colonel Goddard, who, he ſays, has purſued the ſame Line of Conduct with reſpect to the Talookdars as his Predeceſſor.

The Peruſal of theſe voluminous Letters will ſuggeſt many other intereſting Reflections to our Superiors. One Circumſtance in particular I think deſerves their Notice: Notwithſtanding the Detachment was for ſome Months under the Orders of the Preſidency of Bombay, whoſe Deſigns were very explicitly communicated to us; and although the commanding Officer was inſtructed to co-operate with them in the Plan they had formed for the Support of Ragoba; and notwithſtanding all the Meaſures taken here profeſſedly originated from the Communication which we received in January laſt, of certain Overtures propoſed to have been made by the Miniſters for reinſtating Ragoba, Moodajee Booſla now affirms, that his Vackeel had it from Mr. Haſtings's own Mouth, "That it "never was nor is deſigned by the Engliſh Chiefs to ſupport Ragoba." The good Advice contained in theſe Letters is in Effect the ſevereſt Reflection on the Levity and Precipitancy of our Councils; and probably has no other Meaning, but to ſhew the Governor General in what Reſpect Moodajee Booſla holds a Stateſman, who profeſſes *to have departed from the common Line of Policy in the Whole of his Conduct*. If we were not become the Objects of his Scorn, would our boaſted Ally take ſuch a Time to tell us, "That it is a Proverb, that whatever is deliberately done is well done; that it will "be proper maturely to reflect on the probable Event, before the Commencement of any Undertak-"ing; and that it is the Part of Wiſdom and ſound Judgment, before any further Steps are taken, "to determine by what Means they are to be ſupported, that no Unſteadineſs may hereafter ariſe?" What muſt this Maratta think of the Prudence of a Government, which ſends an Army a Thouſand Miles forward into an Enemy's Country, on the Preſumption of receiving Aſſiſtance on the Spot, without any Treaty previouſly concluded, without a ſingle Condition agreed on; without one Stipulation formed for the Operations, for the Proceeding, or for the Retreat of that Army; and even without knowing the general Sentiments, Views, or Diſpoſition of the Prince, on whoſe future Support we placed our Dependance? I do not wonder that Moodajee Booſla ſhould feel no Inclination to unite his Fortune with ſuch a Government: But let us now at leaſt profit by his Advice, as far as the Circumſtances we are reduced to will admit. In the natural Order of Things, Deliberation ſhould go before Meaſures; with us, it muſt follow them.

Colonel

Colonel Goddard's Army is now near Eleven Degrees Weſt of Calcutta: We have no other Way of tracing his Progreſs, or aſcertaining his Diſtance from us, but by obſerving, as accurately as we can, the Latitude and Longitude of his Poſition, on a general Map of India. If he attempts to proceed, it muſt be *into the Mouth of Danger:* If he retreats, it will reflect Diſhonour on our Arms: If he advances into Berar, it is againſt the Advice of the Rajah, who inſiſts on his remaining where he is, and who, I preſume, will never ſuffer an Engliſh Army to march into the Heart of his Country, eſpecially when he hears that another Detachment is preparing to enter it from the Eaſtward: This Meaſure, ſo far from giving him Encouragement to join us, muſt naturally fill him with Jealouſy and Diſtruſt. Without inſiſting on the faithleſs Character uniformly attributed to the Marattas, theſe Motives alone are ſufficient to put him on his Guard againſt us; while others equally powerful may induce him to take Advantage of the critical Situation of our Army, and to compromiſe his own Differences with the Peiſhwa and the Nizam at our Expence. At all Events, I preſume it cannot be diſputed, that the Safety of the Detachment depends greatly on the good Faith of Moodajee Booſla.

In this Situation, we have a Choice of Difficulties before us. Whatever Reſolution we adopt, will, I fear, be liable to ſuch Objections, as will admit of no better Anſwer, than that ſtill greater Objections may be urged againſt any other.

We may order Colonel Goddard, at all Events, to proceed to Bombay; or to move towards our Weſtern Frontier, through Berar; or to return as expeditiouſly as he can, by the Way he went: I am againſt the Firſt, becauſe I am convinced it cannot be attempted without the greateſt Hazard to the Detachment, or with the ſmalleſt Probability of Succeſs. I conſider it as one common and equally eſſential Intereſt of all the Powers of India, to oppoſe the March of an Engliſh Army acroſs the Continent; and by defeating the Attempt in the Firſt Inſtance, to deter us from ever forming ſuch an Enterprize again: Moodajee Booſla himſelf ſtates the Danger to us, in Terms which ſufficiently expreſs his Opinion of the Impoſſibility of ſurmounting it: With reſpect to Bombay, notwithſtanding all that has been ſaid of the deep Deſigns of the French, that Place is actually in no Danger, and if it were, this is not the Way of providing for its Defence.

I am againſt the 2d, becauſe it appears, that the Rajah himſelf is very averſe to letting Colonel Goddard come into his Country, and inſiſts on his ſtaying where he is: If the Army ſhould move into Berar without the Conſent and without ſome Stipulations previouſly determined with him, it will always be in his Power to ſacrifice them to the Poona Government, or to the Nizam, if they can make it his Intereſt to do ſo. For my own Part, I am very much inclined to think, that all his late Delays and Uncertainties are affected for no other Purpoſe than to give his Countrymen Time to complete their Preparations, and to ſurround Colonel Goddard: No Choice then is left but to order Colonel Goddard to return as he went; I do not ſay, that this Meaſure will not leſſen the Opinion which the Powers of India may hitherto have entertained of the Councils of this Government: It may alſo be thought in ſome Degree diſgraceful to our Arms; but neither is this of Weight againſt other ſuperior Conſiderations, nor do I apprehend, that if no direct Impreſſion be made upon our Army, its bare Retreat will prove any Thing, but the extreme Imprudence of thoſe Meaſures, which have left us no other Option; at the ſame Time, I think that proper Letters ſhould be written to the Peiſhwa, to inform him of this Alteration; to deſire that the Army may retire without Moleſtation; and to aſſure him, that we are ſincerely diſpoſed to come to a Conciliation with him, and to adjuſt whatever Differences may have unfortunately ariſen between his Government and ours in an amicable Manner, and agreeably to the Terms and Principles of the Treaty of Poona.

The Time which has elapſed ſince the Receipt of Moodajee Booſla's Letter, and the critical Situation of the Detachment, make it indiſpenſably neceſſary that ſome clear and deciſive Orders ſhould be immediately diſpatched to Colonel Goddard; I ſhall be ready to correct or alter my Opinion if I ſee juſt and ſolid Reaſons urged againſt it.

(Signed) P. Francis.

Governor General—I have received Mr. Francis's Minute, but do not think it neceſſary or proper to reply to it.

(Signed) W. H.

The following Minutes from Mr. Wheler and the Governor General were returned with the above Minute from Mr. Francis.

Mr. Wheler—The Obſervations contained in Mr. Francis's Minute appear to me too ſtrong and too well ſupported, not to deſerve a Reply: I have no Doubt of their attracting the particular Attention of the Court of Directors: At any Rate, the Situation of Colonel Goddard's Army makes it neceſſary, that ſome clear and deciſive Orders ſhould be ſent him without further Delay: I ſee by the Book of Perſian Correſpondence, that the Governor General has Letters from him as late as the 17th December; at that Time Moodajee Booſla does not appear to have altered the Reſolution expreſſed in his former Letters, of not engaging with us againſt the Peiſhwa: If the News we have juſt received ſhould prove true, that the Preſidency of Bombay have ſent an Army to Poona, under the Command of General Carnac, in order to reinſtate Ragoba, an Alliance with Moodajee Booſla on the Plan of Mr. Elliott's Inſtructions becomes impracticable: The Rajah of courſe will conclude, that we mean nothing but to deceive him, or at leaſt, that we have no Au-

thority over the Presidency of Bombay: But let him think as he will of the Sincerity and good Faith of this Government, he will naturally make this a Plea for not proceeding in any Negociation with Colonel Goddard.

In these Circumstances, it becomes a Question of the greatest Importance to determine, what Colonel Goddard is to do.

I presume, it is not meant that he should remain much longer on the Banks of the Nerbudda; and if he is to move, the Object of his future Operations, and the Place of his Destination ought to be clearly pointed out; this Question is every Day embarrassed with new Facts and fresh Difficulties, which no Information at present before the Board is sufficient to clear up. Waiting therefore for those Lights which I presume the Governor General is able to give us, I shall content myself at present with urging the Necessity of immediately resuming the Subject, and of coming to some Resolution on the final Orders to be given to Colonel Goddard.

Governor General—As there is no Question proposed in either of the preceding Minutes, I must decline to bear my Part in a Debate of which I see no Object.

Warren Hastings,
Rich[d] Barwell,
P. Francis,
Edw[d] Wheler.

APPENDIX, N° 167.

Extract of Bengal Secret Consultations, the 25th January 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Hastings, Governor General, President,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler,
} Esquires.

THE Governor General delivers in the following Minute.

Governor General—The Intimation given by Mr Barwell, of his Intention to return to England, in the Public Department Consultation of the 11th Instant, has already given Currency to an Opinion of an impending Change in the Administration of these Provinces; not only by the immediate Consequences which his Departure would produce in the Influence of the present Council, but by the Conclusion drawn from it, that it proceeded from some Fore-knowledge of the new Settlement of this Government, and that it was intended as an Anticipation of it: I feel myself exceedingly alarmed for the Effects of this Belief on our public Measures; and especially on one which is now at its Crisis, and may receive its ultimate Direction from such an Impulse. Calcutta is unhappily become the Resort of Agents, both public and secret, from many of the States, and even of some of the remotest of India. To these the Nakedness of our Constitution has been long exposed, and the Facility with which the most important Transactions of the Council find their Way to the public Notice, enables them to send early and constant Advices, modified according to their respective Views and Interests; or dictated, as I believe, by a concealed Influence, not only of actual Events as they occur, but of every Rumour of every Day, to their several Constituents.

By such Channels it will be soon known, both at Poona and Naigpore, that the Powers of this Government which rest with a Majority of Voices in the small Body composing it, are on the Eve of devolving to the Two Members who have considerably opposed in every Stage of its Progress, the Plan which has been publicly adopted for the Support of the Company's Interest on the Western Side of India; and who, it is universally believed, will seize the first Means which are offered to them to defeat and annul it altogether. A Member of this Government entrusted with the Guardianship of the Company's Interest, and of the Honour of the British Name in India, has not scrupled to propose, that we should make an abject Submission to the miserable Possessors of the feeble Government of Poona; acknowledge our past Faults, with a Promise of Amendment; and humbly intreat their Permission for the safe Retreat of our Army from Berar, to its own Confines. If I misconstrue Mr. Francis's Words, let them speak for themselves, as they stand in the following Extract of his Minute, dated the 11th Instant.

" No Choice is then left, but to order Colonel Goddard to return as he went. I do not say, " that this Measure will not lessen the Opinion which the Powers of India may hitherto have " entertained of the Councils of this Government: It may also be thought in some Degree dis-

" graceful

graceful to our Arms, but neither is this of Weight againſt other ſuperior Conſiderations, nor do I apprehend, that if no direct Impreſſion be made upon our Army, its bare Retreat will prove any Thing but the Imprudence of thoſe Meaſures which have left us no other Option: at the ſame Time, I think that proper Letters ſhould be written to the Peſhwa, to inform him of this Alteration, to deſire that the Army may retire without Moleſtation, and to aſſure him, that we are ſincerely diſpoſed to come to a Conciliation with him, and to adjuſt whatever Differences may have unfortunately ariſen between his Government and ours, in an amicable Manner, and agreeably to the Terms and Principles of the Treaty of Poona."

What Conduct may not be expected from ſuch Sentiments, and ſo avowed, if they are allowed the Acceſſion of Power to give them Operation, not only in the Inſtance which I have already mentioned, but in every other Meaſure of Government, however neceſſary or ſalutary, which has been propoſed by me or Mr. Barwell: This it ſhall be my Care, as it is my Duty, to obviate by every Means within the ſlender Compaſs of my Ability. I do therefore conjure Mr. Barwell, both by that Zeal which he has hitherto ſo ſteadily manifeſted for the Intereſts of our common Maſters, and even by the Ties of a Friendſhip cemented by a Participation of the ſame Labour and Sufferings for the Public Service, that he will not permit the Meaſures in which he has a common and equal Reſponſibility with myſelf, to be expoſed to the Triumph of a Party; but that he will both continue to afford the Support of his Preſence and Abilities to the preſent Government, while it yet exiſts; and that he will ſuffer me to exact from him a Declaration to that Purpoſe, not only for my own Satisfaction, but for that of every Man, who has the Company's Intereſt, or the Proſperity of this Settlement, or the Credit of his Country, at Heart; and who, I preſume to ſay, expect this Sacrifice from him. A few Months will either releaſe him from the Effects of it, or bind him by freſh Obligations, and ſuch as may engage his voluntary Submiſſion to remain; for, left as this Government has been for the laſt Four Years, to a State of Suſpence and Indeciſion, it is not poſſible for it to continue ſo beyond the Term of its legal Exiſtence, which muſt ceaſe of courſe, even without the Hand of Power to annihilate it, in the Month of October; and it is not probable that we ſhall be much longer ignorant of that which muſt of abſolute Neceſſity be ſubſtituted in its Place. If I may truſt to the Intelligence which I have received from England, ſo late as the 10th of June, private indeed, but derived from what I deem the beſt Authority, no Alteration will take Place at that Period, which will affect either Mr. Barwell or myſelf.

Mr. Barwell—I am concerned that I ſhould have given Occaſion for the Minute this Inſtant preſented; the Declaration of my Intention to depart I thought had been ſufficiently guarded to obviate any Conſequences that might effect the Influence of the exiſting Government. I do not mean by the Declaration I have already made, to decline my Aid in the Support of the Governor General's Adminiſtration, ſo long as it ſhall continue; I have hitherto yielded it with Cheerfulneſs, and do not propoſe, whatever Wiſh my Health may make me entertain of going to Europe, to decline ſharing with him in the Reſponſibility of his Meaſures ſo far as I have engaged in them, and conſequently ſupporting him under every diſcouraging Circumſtance that may ſtand in Oppoſition to my Duty; I do not think myſelf at Liberty to follow my own Wiſhes, and every private Conſideration muſt yield, ſhould the Public Service require it: The Reaſons that are aſſigned for it by the Governor General, require me abſolutely to retract the Intention I have declared; I admit the Force of them; and with Pleaſure declare my Determination to ſupport his Government, as long as the public Meaſures of it ſhall require me.

Governor General—I beg Leave to record my Thanks to Mr. Barwell for his ready and honourable Acquieſcence in my Requeſt; it adds to the many Obligations which I already owe him for his paſt Support, but cannot heighten the Senſe of Gratitude which I already entertain for him.

Mr. Francis—I ſhall leave it to the Court of Directors, who will have the Whole of my Argument before them, to determine, whether the Paſſage quoted from it by the Governor General, will fairly bear the Conſtruction he has been pleaſed to give it; paſſionate and contemptuous Terms, unaccompanied with Argument, will prove nothing againſt the Prudence of that Opinion which I ſubmitted to the Board, with an expreſs Declaration of my Readineſs to correct or alter, if juſt and ſolid Reaſons were ſuggeſted to me for doing ſo. The Governor General gives no Reaſons, nor does he propoſe any Thing; yet I preſume it is not meant that Colonel Goddard is to be left much longer without Inſtructions. It happens ſingularly that the Advice which I have preſumed to give on this Occaſion concurs with an Opinion which I ſhould have thought would have had ſome Weight with the Governor, I mean that of Moodajee Booſla; his former Letters, which I have already referred to, were ſufficiently explicit; but even in one received within theſe few Days, and written after he had ſeen and converſed with the Perſon whom Colonel Goddard had deputed to him, and after he was perfectly apprized of the intended Plan of Alliance, his Advice ſtill is to come to a Conciliation with the Peiſhwa; he ſays, "I do not myſelf think it by any Means prudent at preſent to enter on this Buſineſs; that it is improper precipitately to plunge into Undertakings of ſuch a Nature, and that "Precipitation is not at preſent by any Means adviſable." Theſe Sentiments of Moodajee Booſla I apprehend could not be influenced either by Mr. Barwell's late Declaration, or by the Opinion expreſſed in my Minute of the 11th Inſtant; they appear to have been invariably his own ever ſince he had any Knowledge of the Governor General's Views. In ſuch a Situation it avails but little to ſay, that any particular Opinion of a Member of this Government is dangerous, impolitic, or diſgraceful. Moodajee Booſla refuſes to act; can that Fact poſſibly be denied? yet the Governor General propoſes nothing. I ſee we differ very much in our Ideas of national Honour; I have no Idea of

national Honour independant of Juſtice. The Projects of Ambition are uſually ambitious; if they are nothing but the Projects of Ambition, they are in my Judgment always diſhonourable. To revert to that pacific Syſtem which the Company have uniformly preſcribed to us, to endeavour to conciliate the Friendſhip which we have unjuſtly or unwiſely departed from, and to return, if it be poſſible, to the Terms of a Treaty which we ourſelves have wantonly violated, are not Acts that will ever I think, and as I feel, bring Diſhonour on the Britiſh Name; I am ſure they are the beſt Means of preſerving our Strength and our real Influence in India, and I have no Doubt that they will meet with the higheſt Approbation from Home. As long as I am truſted with any Share in the Office of Guardian of the Britiſh Intereſts and Honour in this Country, theſe ſhall be the Principles on which I will invariably act.

For what Purpoſe Mr. Barwell made his late Declaration, or what Purpoſe it is now retracted, is to me a Queſtion of the moſt profound Indifference; I believe it to be equally immaterial to the Support of the Influence and Authority of the preſent Majority of this Board; in the Language of Moodajee Booſla, "The Arrow is ſhot, and cannot be recalled." Since the Governor General has been pleaſed to mention his private Intelligence, and the Security it gives him, I ſhall beg Leave to aſſure him that I alſo have private Intelligence, which perhaps may be no better founded than his; but on which I for my own Part place ſome Dependance; that a total Change in the ruling Power of this Government was determined when Sir Eyre Coote left England, and I have no Doubt that Sir Eyre Coote will give us ſome very ſatisfactory Information on this Point; but whether he does or not, his Preſence alone muſt in the higheſt Degree affect that very Object which Mr. Barwell's preſent Declaration profeſſes to have in View.

Governor General—The Reſpect which I bear for the Character of Sir Eyre Coote, would have prevented me from introducing his Name on the preſent Occaſion, had I thought it any way concerned in it, and reſtrains me from anſwering the Aſſurances implied in the Concluſion of Mr. Francis's Minute reſpecting him; for the reſt, I mean not to enter into a Debate with Mr. Francis, I had a different Object, yet I think it neceſſary to ſay, that I know of no Expreſſions of mine which merit the Epithets of paſſionate or contemptuous; neither did I mean, or do I now think it neceſſary to anſwer his Minute of the 11th Inſtant with Argument. I did not underſtand it to contain any ſerious Propoſitions, it may be Irony, it may be Sarcaſm, it may be Invective; but I believe that no one who reads it will underſtand it to aim at any other Object; and it was for that Reaſon I have ſaid that I thought it neither neceſſary or proper to reply to it.

Mr. Francis—I hope and believe the Governor General did not mean to apply the Terms I alluded to perſonally to me, nor did I object to them on that Preſumption.

APPENDIX, N° 168.

Bengal Private Perſian Correſpondence.

Letter from Moodajee Bhoſila: Dated 10th Zehedja, 30th December 1778, and received 22d January 1779.

COLONEL Goddard having by the greateſt Bravery and good Management arrived in Safety at Hoſhengabad, on this Side the River Nubudder, which is dependant on me; and not judging it adviſable to leave his Army at that Place, which is 120 Coſs from Nagpore, and to proceed in Perſon hither, deputed Mr. Weatherſtone, a Gentleman in his Confidence, to wait on me. This Gentleman being accordingly arrived in Safety, has in an Interview fully informed me of your Sentiments and Views; which are indeed fraught with the greateſt Friendſhip and Regard towards me, and with mutual Advantages, the ſame which you gave in Charge to Mr. Elliott when you deputed him to this Quarter. I likewiſe ſome Time ago received your obliging Letter, written after the Deceaſe of Mr. Elliott, to the following Purport; That it would not anſwer to depute another Perſon from thence in the ſame Character with Mr. Elliott, which would occaſion too great Delay to the Affairs in Hand; and that Beneram Pundit, who was fully acquainted with all your Views and the Points of Negociation entruſted to Mr. Elliott, would therefore make me acquainted therewith; and I would inform you in Reply with my Sentiments and Views, by which you ſhould be enabled to form your ultimate Reſolutions, namely, to form a Treaty between the King of England, Company, and this Government, on ſo firm a Baſis, that like the Wall of Alexander it might continue unſhaken from Generation to Generation to the lateſt Poſterity; and that our Friends and Enemies be in common, and reciprocal and equal Advantages derived to both States. Beneram Pundit accordingly fully communicated every Point to me. As your Views are of the moſt important Nature, and to carry them into Execution require great Preparations to be made, to wit, the aſſembling an Army, forming Alliances with the Decan Chiefs, preparing Military Stores, &c. mighty Treaſure, all which require Time, I deemed it adviſable to delay their Execution for ſome Time, and accordingly pointed out to you in Anſwer, the Meaſures I judged moſt fit and prudent. Beneram Pundit likewiſe

Avife wrote you very fully on the ſame Subject. Agreeably thereto all theſe Matters were ſtated to Mr. Weatherſtone, who, inſpired with the Sentiments of Bravery and Magnanimity inherent in the Engliſh Chiefs, replied, "The Opportunity now preſents itſelf; the leaſt Delay in the Buſineſs is "impolitic." To this he was anſwered; "The Decan is our Country, and we have a ſuperior Knowledge of the State of it, and are well acquainted with the proper Seaſon for ſuch an Undertaking. I do not myſelf think it by any Means prudent at preſent to enter on this Buſineſs; if, notwithſtanding, the Engliſh Chiefs are of a different Opinion, the firſt Step muſt neceſſarily be the Formation of a ſolemn Treaty." Mr. Weatherſtone, conformably to the Cuſtoms and Manners of his own Nation replied, "Colonel Goddard is inveſted with full Power to conclude this Buſineſs in the "room of Mr. Elliott." As every one prefers his own Cuſtoms and Manners, and it is neceſſary before the Commencement of an important Undertaking, that complete Confidence be eſtabliſhed, I anſwered, "The Formation of the Treaty, which is to be the Foundation of all the Meaſures propoſed, muſt of Neceſſity be in the Preſence of the Nabob (alluding to you;) that had Mr. Elliott arrived, ſtill the final Concluſion of the Treaty would have been in your Preſence, on the Knowledge of our mutual Sentiments, that ſo both Parties might have been fully ſatisfied; that I would now diſpatch Beneram Pundit to Calcutta with the Liſt of the Terms I expect, and that the Colonel ſhould likewiſe write whatever the Duties of Friendſhip required; and that after this Point was firmly concluded, and I had received a ſatisfactory Anſwer from you, we would then in concert enter on the Undertaking."

Mr. Weatherſtone having obtained complete Information on all theſe Points, and of the Sincerity of my Friendſhip, wrote an Account thereof to Colonel Goddard. As you are univerſally allowed to poſſeſs the greateſt Penetration and Foreſight, and to exceed all others in your Judgment of the Propriety and Fitneſs of every Meaſure; and as your Opinion on all Occaſions receives my Approbation and Aſſent, I am about to diſpatch to you Beneram Pundit, accompanied by Ramkund, the late Mr. Elliott's Peiſhwa, a Man of Underſtanding, and attached to your Government, whom I have made acquainted with all my Deſigns in this important Undertaking. On their Arrival they will in private make you fully acquainted therewith, and you will conſider them with the greateſt Attention; and having fixed and concluded on ſuch Points as are moſt advisable, and may be completely ſatisfactory to both Parties, will inform me thereof, that conformable thereto the moſt judicious Meaſures may be adopted.

From Modajee Bhoſilah: Received 22d January 1779.

The late Events at Poona and Bombay are theſe: Officers from Bombay have marched from thence with Three Battalions, and ſome Pieces of Cannon, into the Cokun Country, and ſent a Detachment from their Army to Bore Ghaut, which is about 20 Coſs from Poona, where they have made Entrenchments. The Poona Miniſters have now diſpatched their Army, which was in Readineſs to march, towards Hoſſungabad, to oppoſe the Progreſs of Colonel Goddard againſt the Bombay Army. By theſe Means there does not at preſent appear to be any Force to oppoſe Colonel Goddard's March to Bombay; but I have already repeatedly written to you my Opinion on this Subject, founded on the Situation of the Times; and have fully communicated to you whatever I have learnt of the State of Poona, and informed you of the Tenor of the Letters of the Miniſters of Pundit Peiſhwa, as well as what I gathered from Report; and I ſhall now perform the Duty of a Friend, by freely ſtating to you my Advice on the preſent State of Affairs, which is as follows: You have conceived Diſpleaſure and Reſentment againſt the Poona Miniſters on Account of the Arrival of a French Vackeel, and their negociating with him. They have written to me repeatedly on this Subject, that they never entertained the ſlighteſt Idea of Enmity towards the Engliſh Company, or of giving Support to the French: That a Frenchman came there for the Purpoſes of Traffic, and that even him they ſent away; and have not the ſmalleſt Deſign of breaking their Treaty with the Engliſh: That ſuch a Conduct, while ſolemn Engagements ſubſiſted, would render them deteſtable in the Sight of God and Men, and be ſo ſhameful a Renunciation of every religious Tie, as to make them the Objects of Abhorrence; that I would therefore write to Calcutta, and clear your Mind from ſuch Suſpicions. I accordingly wrote all theſe Particulars to you. I now give it you as my Advice, that a Perſon of Credit may on the Application of Pundit Purdhaun, with the Conſent of the Engliſh Chiefs, become Guarantee for both Parties, that ſo all Doubts may be completely removed, and an End put to all Hoſtilities and Contentions. Let the Terms of the Guarantee be, that the Poona Miniſters ſhall never form the Idea of giving Support to the French Nation, who are the Enemies of the Engliſh Company; and that the Engliſh Chiefs, in Violation of Treaty, ſhall take no Steps for the Support of Ragonaut Row; and that if either of the contracting Parties ſhall infringe the Engagement, the Guarantee ſhall be reſponſible for ſuch Breach.

Every Perſon who undertakes any difficult Enterprize or Conteſt, ſhould firſt conſider the End thereof, and well underſtand the Advantages or Loſſes which may reſult therefrom; and if it appears in his Judgment, after the matureſt Reflection, that the Advantages over-balance the Loſſes, he may then purſue it.

The Monarchs of former Times, and Viziers, poſſeſſed of a noble Ambition, made this an invariable Rule in the Proſecution of their Conqueſts, and never deviated in the leaſt Inſtance from it; on this Principle, that where their Object could be effected with Facility and Quiet, it was impolitic and

uſeleſs

uſeleſs to purſue it with Labour and Difficulty; knowing that none but the All-wiſe could of a Certainty foreſee the Event of any Undertaking.

Thus it appears improper precipitately to plunge into Undertakings of ſuch a Nature: I am therefore deſirous that you ſhould for the preſent pretend to be ſatisfied on the Subject of the Apprehenſions which you had conceived of the French, on account of the Support of the Poona Miniſters, and leave the Proſecution of your private Deſigns to a more favourable Opportunity: This may be productive of the moſt important Advantages; for it will be reported through the whole Country, that the Engliſh Chiefs having conceived Suſpicions of the Poona Miniſters, diſpatched an Engliſh Army on this Account ſolely, to the Decan, and not with any View of ſupporting Ragonaut Row, and that the Poona Miniſters being convinced and aſhamed of their Error, has given a Perſon of Credit as a Hoſtage, and thereby extinguiſhed the Flames of a dreadful Conteſt, and this would exalt your Reputation and Fame to the higheſt Pitch; you will therefore maturely conſider the Advantages and End of ſuch a Conduct, and to what good Purpoſes it may be turned. The Opportunity is not yet paſſed. If you approve of this Advice, give immediate Intimation thereof to me, Colonel Goddard, and the Bombay Gentlemen.

I have communicated all the above Particulars to Mr. Weatherſtone, who will write to Colonel Goddard whatever he may judge moſt fit and proper.

From Dewagur Pundit. Dated 10th Zehedja, 30th December 1778, and received 22d January 1779.

Beneram Pundit, after the Deceaſe of Mr. Elliott in his Way hither, in Conformity to your Directions intimated to him, fully repreſented all your Views and Deſigns with which he had been entruſted, tending to the Eſtabliſhment of a Treaty between the King of England, the Company, and yourſelf, on the one Part, and the Maha Rajah my Maſter on the other, on ſo firm a Baſis that like the Wall of Alexander it might continue unſhaken from Generation to Generation to the lateſt Poſterity; and the prudent and judicious Anſwer he received, "That for the Commencement "of ſo important an Affair the neceſſary Preparations, ſuch as the aſſembling an Army, the Junction "of Allies from amongſt the zealous Friends of this Sirkar, the collecting Magazines of Warlike "Stores, and the Proviſion of a large Treaſure, required a conſiderable Time to complete," has been already communicated to you. Colonel Goddard having lately croſſed the Nurbudder, and being arrived at Hoſhingabad, dependant on the Maha Rajah, not deeming it adviſable to quit his Army, and repair to Nagpore, which is at the Diſtance of 120 Coſs from that City, deputed Mr. Weatherſtone hither. On his Interview he communicated your Sentiments to the ſame Effect as Beneram Pundit had before repreſented them, and was anſwered in the ſame Manner as has been written to you. Inſpired by the Courage and Magnanimity inherent in the Engliſh Chiefs, he replied, "This is the Time, let not the Opportunity which preſents itſelf eſcape." Actuated by Penetration and Foreſight, I repreſented to him the State of the Decan, and the Neceſſity of a Treaty from Calcutta, prior to the Commencement of ſo important an Undertaking, fully explaining every Point to him, which he wrote to Colonel Goddard, who will communicate them to you.

Beneram Pundit and Ramkund the late Mr. Elliott's Peiſhwa, a Man of Underſtanding, Intelligence in Buſineſs, and a zealous Servant of your Government, are about to be diſpatched from hence with Letters to you. When they arrive, and you have learnt all my Maſter's Views, and the Terms he requires, you will make me happy by a Reply thereto.

Poſtſcript—Certain Intelligence has been lately received, that the Engliſh at Bombay have ſent ſome of their Officers through the Cokun Country to Bhoſe Gaut, which is 20 Coſs from Poona, and that they are making Preparations to croſs, and that the Peiſhwa's Army is gone againſt them: As the Poona Miniſters deny every Kind of Intrigue or Connection with the French, which they have repeatedly done by Letters to this Quarter, and the Engliſh Chiefs have no Deſign to ſupport Ragonaut Row, of which Beneram Pundit has given us repeated Aſſurances; to what End therefore, are theſe Suſpicions entertained contrary to the Treaty, and which give room to the World to talk in a very improper Stile? If, notwithſtanding, the Engliſh have any Apprehenſions leſt the Poona Miniſters ſhould hereafter ſupport the French, the Maha Rajah will, agreeably to what they have deſired of him, give you full Satisfaction reſpecting them, and in like Manner will give Satisfaction to the Poona Miniſters, and remove the Apprehenſions they have conceived, leſt the Engliſh ſhould ſupport Ragonaut according to the Aſſurances made to him by Beneram Pundit: This will exalt the Fame and Honour of the Engliſh Chiefs throughout the World, and extinguiſh the Flames of War and Diſcord, of which none but the all-wiſe God can with any Degree of Certainty foreſee; the Event and the Views which you deſign to carry into Execution in concert with the Maha Raja my Maſter, will likewiſe take effect at a proper Opportunity: Precipitation is not at preſent by any Means adviſable. For more particular Information on theſe Points, I beg Leave to refer you to the Maha Rajah's Letters, where they are fully treated with.

If you approve of this Advice, you will diſpatch Letters immediately to Bombay, forbidding them to engage in a Conteſt with the Poona Miniſters, and will likewiſe write to Colonel Goddard and me, that in conſequence thereof, we may uſe our Endeavours to remove all Suſpicions on either Side, and for the Confirmation and Duration of the Treaty: This Meaſure ſuits with the Times,

Times, will extinguiſh the Flames of Diſcord in every Quarter, and do you great Credit in the Eyes of the World.

For the reſt, whatever your enlightened Underſtanding, who are endowed with the moſt diſtinguiſhed Virtues, and are well verſed in every Part of Buſineſs, points out to you, will meet with Aſſent and Approbation.

APPENDIX, N° 169.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 1ſt February 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis, } Eſquires.
Edward Wheler,

READ the following Letter from Bombay:

Gentlemen,

We have had the Honour to receive your Letter of the 17th Auguſt, but we have not yet heard a Syllable of or from Mr. Elliott.

We were for a conſiderable Time in ſuch a State of Suſpence ariſing from the ſlow Advance of the Bengal Detachment, our Expectation of Advices from Europe, and the Fate of Pondicherry, as well as ſome Difficulties we had to overcome on the Part of Ragoba, that we could not fix upon a Period when to write to you with any Degree of Certainty, as to the Meaſures we ſhould purſue with reſpect to our Plan for eſtabliſhing him in the Regency of the Maratta Government; but we have now the Pleaſure to acquaint you, that Matters are at laſt brought to a Criſis, and our Forces have actually taken the Field to conduct Ragoba to Poona.

After the moſt ſtrict Attention to the Words and Contents of your Letter of the 17th of Auguſt, nothing more appeared to us to be meant, than that we ſhould not enter into any final Engagements with Ragoba, which might be contrary to ſuch as might be concluded with, or of a hoſtile Tendency to the Government of Berar; for if your Letter was to be underſtood as containing a Direction, that we were abſolutely not to undertake any thing till we had received Advice from Mr. Elliott of the Reſult of his Commiſſion with the Bouncello, it would have been equivalent to a Prohibition of the Expedition we had meditated, and which you had approved, by ſuſpending it to ſo diſtant a Period, as to leave us little or no Hopes of Succeſs.

We therefore thought ourſelves warranted not only by your Letter, but by the moſt urgent Plea of Neceſſity, to give our immediate and moſt ſtrenuous Aſſiſtance for placing Ragoba in the Office of Regent; and our lateſt Intelligence from Europe giving us not the ſmalleſt Apprehenſion of Danger to this Settlement in the Abſence of our Forces, preſented an Opportunity ſo favourable for the Execution of our Plan, that we could not conſiſtent with our Duty any longer forego it: But in order to guard againſt the Inconvenience from our Treaty with Ragoba claſhing with the Engagements you may form with Moodajee Bouncello, we have by the 17th Article made the neceſſary Proviſion on that Head.

It was on the 12th of October, when we took the Reſolution for immediately carrying into Execution our Plan, as explained in our Minutes of the 21ſt of July, when Mr. Draper thought proper to diſſent, being of Opinion the Juncture was not favourable to our Deſign, for which he aſſigned the following Reaſons: Firſt, Becauſe of the expreſs Conditions contained in your Letter of the 17th Auguſt: Secondly, Becauſe of the Reſtraint Moraba, Butcheba, and their Adherents ſtill appear to be under: Thirdly, Becauſe of the remote Diſtance of Colonel Leſlie's very conſiderable Reinforcement: Fourthly, Becauſe of the very great Deficiency in our European Corps, to the laſt Eſtabliſhment ordered by the Honourable Company.

This Packet being already ſwelled to a large Size for an over-land Diſpatch, we ſhall defer ſending you a Copy at Length of Mr. Draper's Diſſent, till the firſt Sea Conveyance, when it ſhall be accompanied by a Copy of our whole Minutes and Proceedings on the Occaſion.

We now tranſmit a Copy of the Treaty, and it will give us the moſt ſenſible Satisfaction if the Terms thereof are approved by you: A Copy of the Manifeſto, or circular Letter, diſperſed by the Troops on their landing on the Continent, is likewiſe encloſed.

The whole Conduct of the Expedition is entruſted to a Committee, conſiſting of Mr. Carnac, Colonel

lonel Egerton, and Mr. Moſtyn, who are directed to correſpond punctually with you, and to advise you of all material Tranſactions. A Copy of their Inſtructions is encloſed, and of thoſe given to Colonel Egerton; and alſo a Copy of the Orders we have ſent to Colonel Goddard, who by our laſt Accounts, dated the 31ſt October, was only advanced to Kimlaſſy, on the other Side of the Nerbedah.

The Force ſent on this Service conſiſts of 172 Artillery, 549 Infantry, and 2689 Sepoys, all Officers included, beſides 500 Artillery Laſcars, which we flatter ourſelves, all Circumſtances conſidered, will be able to bring this Buſineſs to a happy Concluſion. The Voice of the People, we are aſſured, is ſtrongly with Ragoba; nor do we think Moraba's Party ſo much depreſſed, but that they will be able to yield material Aſſiſtance, which with the Approach of the Bengal Detachment, whoſe Arrival we anxiouſly expect, and the Fall of Pondicherry, will we truſt effectually contribute to the eaſy Accompliſhment of our Scheme.

Our Troops took Poſſeſſion of the Fort of Bellapore without Oppoſition, and are now with Ragoba's Forces near the Foot of the Gauts, which had before been ſecured by the Grenadier Sepoys of the Army, advanced for that Purpoſe by a different Route, under the Command of Captain Stewart, they have hitherto proceeded without ſeeing the Face of an Enemy.

Mr. Lewis remained at Poona till the very laſt Moment; and left that Place when recalled by us, without the leaſt Moleſtation.

We ſhall immediately ſend a Letter to Mr. Elliott, adviſing him of the Concluſion and Object of the Treaty with Ragoba.

The ſlow Advance of the Bengal Detachment has given us much Uneaſineſs; as whatever Turn Affairs may take at Poona, we ſhall certainly require a conſiderable Augmentation to our Force, when we come to ſettle the neceſſary Arrangements for the Defence of our new Acquiſitions, and provide a reſpectable Garriſon for this Place: Their Arrival would be of unſpeakable Advantage to the Honourable Company's Affairs on this Coaſt, and place us in a Situation almoſt above Annoyance.

We expect to receive Three hundred European Recruits by the Ships of this Seaſon, including thoſe received by the Royal Henry, and thoſe on board the Gatton and Calcutta; and the Honourable Company acquaint us, they hope to be able to raiſe a further Number, in which Caſe they promiſe to ſend a Ship purpoſely with them to this Settlement.

We have not yet taken Poſſeſſion of the ſeveral Ceſſions made by the Treaty with Ragoba. We believe it was impracticable to have ſtipulated for a Territory in lieu of the Northern Purgunnahs, which would have been either equal in Value or in Convenience of Situation; for the Productions of the Guzerat Country infinitely exceed thoſe of the Conkan, and when we have got Baſſein we ſhall poſſeſs the whole Sea Coaſt from Bombay to the River Myhie, with very little Interruption, except the Portugueſe Settlement of Damaun.

The Conduct of Hyder Ally towards the French ſtill continues to ſhew a Diſpoſition very favourable to them: He has ſent Supplies of Proviſions, and even Money, we believe, to Mahié; and we have had Intimation, that he has given the French Governor there Permiſſion to hoiſt his Colours in the Place, ſhould it be attacked by the Engliſh. It is ſaid he alſo intends ſending his Fleet with Supplies of Proviſions to the French Iſlands, and that his Ships will be armed with Detachments of French Soldiers, which were ſent to him from Mahié, before the Account arrived of the Rupture with England.

We know not what Effect our Succeſs againſt Pondicherry may have on the Nabob's Conduct; but we have now a Gentleman under Orders to proceed to his Durbar, whom we propoſe detaining until we are at ſome Certainty with reſpect to the Intentions of the Gentlemen of Fort Saint George regarding Mahié, and the Part the Nabob will take if that Settlement ſhould be attacked.

Judging it highly improper that the French ſhould be permitted to continue a Factory at Surat, in the very Centre of our Poſſeſſions, from whence the moſt important Intelligence might be tranſmitted, and a dangerous Correſpondence carried on with the Country Powers, we have arreſted the Perſon of the French Conſul, and all other Frenchmen in that City, and have removed them to Bombay, except the Conſul, who remains at Surat under an Engliſh Guard, and upon his Parole not to carry on any Correſpondence whatever but under the Inſpection of the Chief.

A French Officer having in Charge a Packet from the Miniſtry for Monſieur Bellcombe, has been intercepted at Grain, a Port on the Arab Coaſt, by a Plan of the Company's Servants at Buſſora, and arrived at Bombay the 3d Inſtant. His Diſpatches are in Cypher, and not to be unravelled, though we have actually got the Cypher, which was found amongſt the Papers of the French Conſul; we find by the Prints and private Letters he brought with him, that there had been an Engagement on the 27th of July, between the Grand Fleets under Admiral Keppel and the Count D'Orvilliers, which was not at all deciſive, though it does not appear any Declaration of War had yet been made, ſo late as the 14th Auguſt; the Paper which Mr. Abraham terms ſo in the encloſed Extract being only an Order to the French Admiralty to grant Commiſſions for making Repriſals, of which we have the Honour to encloſe a Tranſcript.

The Count D'Eſtaing's Squadron arrived at Boſton the 20th of June.

This Packet will be ſent by Sea to Anjengo, from whence it may be forwarded to Madras with the utmoſt Safety, and we ſhall deſire the Gentlemen there to tranſmit it to you with all poſſible Security.

We

We requeſt you will immediately commence ſending us our annual Supply of Money; and are with much Reſpect, &c.

Bombay Caſtle,
12th December, 1778.

Signed by the Secretary, by the Governor's Order, who is unable to hold a Pen. } William Hornby.

(Signed) D. Draper.

(Signed) Edw[d]. Ravenſcroft, Sec[ry].

APPENDIX, N° 170.

READ the following Letter from Colonel Goddard, to the Governor General and Council at Fort William, dated 5th January 1779.

Gentlemen,

I ſome Time ago informed you of the Arrival of the Detachment upon the Confines of Berar, and that a confidential Perſon on the Part of the Rajah had met me after I croſſed the Nerbudda.

Finding that he was not impowered to enter upon the Subject of any particular Negociations betwixt his Maſter and the Engliſh, by confining his Converſation ſolely to the Subject of my March towards Bombay, and the Means of reconciling that Step to the Peiſhwa and Poonah Miniſters, I judged it proper alſo to be ſilent towards him reſpecting the Views of your Government; and that no Time might be loſt in communicating to Moodajee, both them and the Extent of my Commiſſion from you, I determined upon immediately ſending Lieutenant Watherſton to Naigpore, fully inſtructed in every Point relative to this Buſineſs.

From the Uncertainty in which I had Reaſon to be, concerning the Sentiments of that Court, and the Diſtance of the Rajah's Reſidence from the Frontier, being above a Hundred Coſs, I did not think it eligible myſelf to leave the Army, till I was aſſured that the Intentions of that Prince were perfectly favourable to the ſeveral Points on which I was impowered to treat with him, and I beg to aſſure you of my entire Satisfaction with the Conduct of Lieutenant Watherſton, on this Occaſion, who has, I am convinced, neglected nothing which was neceſſary to promote the Succeſs of this Negociation, and has ſtrictly conformed to the Inſtructions I gave him.

I cannot in any reſpect tax this Court with poſſeſſing Inclinations unfriendly to the Engliſh; on the contrary, I am convinced they ſee their own Intereſts in maintaining a Connection of Amity with us, which inſtead of breaking, they will endeavour to improve and ſtrengthen; but in the preſent Situation of Affairs in the Decan, they find Excuſes for Delay, by which they were determined to be influenced.

To the former Part of your Inſtructions delivered to Mr. Elliott, concerning the Terms of a defenſive Alliance, they expreſſed to Mr. Watherſton a perfect Satisfaction and Concurrence; but as theſe in their Conſequence do not require an immediate Execution, and a Spirit of peculiar Circumſpection and Caution ſeems to direct the preſent Conduct of this Government; they propoſe to defer the final Deciſion, even on this Part of the Treaty, till the ſeveral Articles relating to it ſhall be confirmed under the Signature of your Board, and the Seal of the Honourable Company, for obtaining which they mean to depute a Perſon to Calcutta immediately.

The ſame Reaſon they urge for Delay reſpecting the former, they alſo advance as one Cauſe why the latter Part of your Inſtructions, which relate to an Alliance of an offenſive Nature, cannot now be entered into by them, with any Regard to their own Intereſt and Advantage, as the Sanction they require in the firſt Place, muſt be the only Foundation on which their future Views can be raiſed, and becomes more neceſſary, in Proportion to the Importance of the Object they have in purſuit.

Another Obſtacle they ſtart to the immediate Commencement of any active Operations, is the preſent Diſputes in which the Miniſters at Poona are involved with the Engliſh, and the Part taken by the Council of Bombay in favour of Ragonaut Row.

They have themſelves addreſſed your Government on this Subject, and have ſolicited, as well as recommended, the relinquiſhing the Cauſe of the latter, and accepting Terms from the preſent Miniſterial Party; the Motive they acknowledge for acting this mediating Part, is to pave the Way for the

the Advancement of their own Schemes hereafter, in concert with the Engliſh, which they profeſs cannot be done conſiſtent with an Attention to the Intereſts of Ragonaut Row.

For theſe Reaſons Moodajee Booſla has declined entering into any Treaty, or taking any active Part whatever till further Accounts may arrive from Calcutta, by the Nature of which he will then be guided; and if it ſhall be found eligible by you to adjuſt the Difference betwixt the Bombay Council and the preſent Adminiſtration of Poona, excluding Ragonaut Row from any Share in the latter, he will in that Event cheerfully ſolicit your Aſſiſtance to accompliſh his Views; otherwiſe it is plain he will be induced to lay them aſide altogether; in the mean Time, I can ſpeak with Confidence, that his Inclinations towards the Engliſh are perfectly friendly; and I have ſtudiouſly taken Care to leave the Negociations with him in ſuch a Train, that it will be always in your Power to renew them whenever you may judge it for the Intereſt and Honour of your Government to do ſo.

Diſappointed in my Views at this Court, I have referred to the latter Part of your Inſtructions given to Mr. Elliott for his Guide, and compared them with the Purport of your Letter to me of the 23d November laſt, in which you have thought it neceſſary to revoke the Order before ſent me for obeying all ſuch Orders as I might receive from the Preſident and Council at Bombay, leſt a Compliance with them might interrupt any Meaſures I might find it neceſſary to purſue in conſequence of my Engagements with the Rajah of Berar.

You have alſo ſignified to me, that it is your Intention the Detachment under my Command ſhould act in ſupport of any Meaſures which the Council at Bombay may have formed in Reliance on it, as far as they may be conſiſtent with the Inſtructions given me, and the Engagements I may have concluded in conſequence of them.

By the Determination of this Court, any Difficulties which an Attention to the latter might have occaſioned, are entirely removed; and as I conſider it further conſiſtent with the Spirit of your Inſtructions, I have thought proper to march towards Poona immediately.

I am induced to adopt this Step in conſequence of having received Letters from the Select Committee at Bombay, informing me that the Forces from that Preſidency had actually taken the Field to effect the Reſtoration of Ragoba; that Meſſrs. Carnac, Egerton, and Moſtyn, were appointed Commiſſioners for ſettling the Poona Government; and requiring me to advance towards that Place with all Expedition, as the Preſence of my Detachment is neceſſary to the Succeſs of their Views. From other authentic Intelligence I learn that Hoſtilities are actually commenced; I am therefore led to believe, that whatever may be the Reſult of your political Reſolves, the Arrival of the Force under me in the Neighbourhood of Poona, will be for the Intereſt of the Service, either to proſecute the War, or to bring it to an honourable Concluſion; at the ſame Time that I ſhall be ready to act, in concert with Moodajee, any Plan that may be deemed neceſſary in conſequence of your Determination.

I beg Leave to encloſe for your fuller Information, Copies of the Letters I have received from the Select Committee at Bombay; and as they are ſo earneſt and preſſing for my Arrival at Poona, I propoſe marching towards that Quarter with all poſſible Expedition; it will be however abſolutely neceſſary for me to wait the Arrival of the Treaſure which Lieutenant Watherſtone is bringing from Naigpore, the Produce of the Bills tranſmitted me in your Letter of the 16th November. The Gomaſtah of Gopaul Doſs not being able to collect a Sum more than ſufficient to diſcharge the Amount of the Bill for One Lack, I applied to the Rajah for the Two remaining, who immediately advanced them, without any Deduction or Diſcount for the Period to elapſe before they would become due.

I have the Honour, &c.

(Signed) Thomas Goddard.

Camp near Huſſeinabad,
5th January 1779.

The Governor General lays before the Board the following Letters to him from Colonel Goddard:

Honourable Sir,

I have the Pleaſure to tranſmit you herewith a Letter addreſſed to the Honourable Board, informing them of the Delays I have met with in bringing to a Concluſion the Treaty they had impowered me to enter into with Moodajee Booſla, the Rajah of Berar, and the Reaſons aſſigned by that Chief for his paſſive Conduct on this Occaſion.

In order to give you a more full and complete Idea of the Negociation, I beg Leave to encloſe for your Peruſal, Copies of the Letters I have ſucceſſively received from Lieutenant Watherſton, ſince his Arrival at Naigpore; from theſe you will perceive the determined Sentiments of that Court are, to take no active Part whatever till further Accounts may arrive from you, when they declare their Readineſs to co-operate with the Force under my Command in any Plan that may be fixed on for the mutual Intereſt of both Parties. The Rajah has himſelf addreſſed a Letter to you, expreſſive of their Inclination, which I have the Pleaſure to encloſe you: He has alſo addreſſed you on the Subject of the preſent Diſputes betwixt the Bombay Council and the Miniſters of Poona, in which the Intereſt he ſeems to take in wiſhing to reconcile the Difference that has aroſe, proceeds entirely from Motives of Policy; indeed he does not ſcruple to acknowledge this to be the Caſe; and I am perſuaded nothing would in Reality be more agreeable to his Wiſh, than to ſee the Power of the Paiſhwa reduced; but he juſtly apprehends that the eſtabliſhing Ragonaut Row's Authority under the Influence of the

Engliſh

Engliſh would exclude him from all Hopes of ever obtaining the Object he has in View through their Means, as an Attention to and Obſervance of the Intereſts of both would be an impracticable Taſk to our Government, and irreconcileable to themſelves. There appears no Doubt of the friendly Diſpoſition of the Berar Court towards the Engliſh, which from political Motives they will ſtudy to cultivate and improve; for the Vicinity of Cuttack to our Poſſeſſions, and the Conveniency of its Situation to them, renders it an Object in our Eyes, of which they know we can at any Time avail ourſelves. Throughout the Whole of what has paſſed with the Naigpore Court ſince my Arrival here, this friendly Inclination ſeems fully manifeſted; and in the Train in which the Negociation is now left they have covered their Refuſal of immediately acceding to any Treaty by ſpecious Arguments, which diſcover at the ſame Time the trueſt Confidence repoſed in our Government. I have alſo made it my particular Study, nor are my Endeavours I am perſuaded unſucceſsful, that ſhould you at any Time hereafter find it for the Honour and Intereſt of the Company to proſecute an Alliance with Moodajee, upon the eligible and advantageous Plan already propoſed, it will always be in your Power to do ſo, with Advantage and Convenience to your own Affairs. The Rajah ſcruples not to declare his Wiſh to ſettle the Sittera Succeſſion; and as the only Powers on whoſe Aſſiſtance and Friendſhip he can rely to ſupport him in this Attempt, he names the Engliſh and Zuffer ul Dowla. You will perceive by the Subject of a Converſation mentioned in one of Mr. Watherſton's Letters, how cloſely connected that Chief is with the Berar Family, to whoſe Views he is made privy, and is very urgent with them to ſeize the preſent Opportunity offered by the Friendſhip of the Engliſh for their Accompliſhment.

By the encloſed Letters to you from Moodajee, you at once ſee the Plan adopted by that Prince, and the Motives that influence his Conduct on the preſent Occaſion, which appear to be ſolely dictated by Regard to political Conſiderations of Safety and Convenience. Although he is exceedingly urgent to adjuſt the preſent Diſpute with the Paiſhwa's Government, he frankly acknowledges his View in ſo doing is to pave the Way for his own future Projects; and he declares, with equal Appearance of Sincerity, that theſe are incompatible with the Meaſures now adopted in favour of Ragonaut Row. Here then we find the principal, and although others are aſſigned by themſelves, I could almoſt ſay the only Obſtacle, to the Succeſs of the Negociation I was empowered to manage with Modajee. *The Schemes of the Gentlemen at Bombay, and the active Part they have taken in Support of Ragoba, have deſtroyed all Hopes of concluding the propoſed Alliance with the Court of Naigpore*, until it may be judged expedient by you to direct the former to be relinquiſhed, in order to leave Room for the entire and free Adoption of the latter. The Sentiments contained in the Rajah's Letter to you exactly correſpond with the Opinion I have above advanced; and he further poſitively aſſures me, that when the Anſwers to his Letters ſhall arrive from you; when the Treaty which he propoſes to enter ſhall be confirmed by the Seal of the Company and the Signature of your Board; and when the Plan he has recommended reſpecting the Diſputes at Poona ſhall have taken place; he will join his Forces with thoſe of the Engliſh, and aſſert his Pretenſions to the grand Object of his Wiſh and Ambition. To the Inconſiſtency there appears in labouring ſo ſtrenuouſly for the Intereſts of a Power with whom he means ſoon to be engaged in Hoſtilities, and for whom he profeſſes to have no friendly Inclination, he anſwers, by obſerving, that it is abſolutely neceſſary for his Succeſs; and that when Matters are ripe for Execution, the Oppoſition of the Paiſhwa will be added to a Variety of other Excuſes that may be framed for a Rupture with that Court. This is a Refinement upon Policy that might almoſt lead one to ſuſpect he was not altogether ſerious and determined upon his Sittera Expedition, was it not to be accounted for by the unfortunate Interference of Ragonaut Row's Intereſt, and proved ſtill more ſo beyond Contradiction by the Contents of Zuffer ul Dowla's Letters written by his own Hand, and which Watherſton himſelf peruſed.

I have forwarded to the Honourable Governor General and Council Duplicates of the Letters I have received from the Select Committee at Bombay; in conſequence of which, as I find War actually commenced in that Quarter, I conſider it for the Company's Intereſt, and conſiſtent with the Spirit of the Inſtructions of your Government, that I ſhould immediately march with the Troops under me to aſſiſt and co-operate with thoſe of Bombay: In the mean Time I hope to be honoured with your particular Orders and Inſtructions for my future Guidance; and I beg Leave to aſſure you, that in the Eſtimation of a juſt and wiſe Policy, whatever Proportion the Plan in favour of Ragonaut Row may bear to that intended to have been proſecuted with Moodajee, I ſhall exert my Endeavours with the ſame Zeal and Ardour for the Good of the Service, in accompliſhing the former, as if the more pleaſing and eligible Taſk had been fortunately aſſigned me of effecting the latter.

The propoſed Treaty with Moodajee would, I am perſuaded, have met with no Obſtruction, had not the Meaſures taken by the Bombay Council intervened to counteract it. Should it be found political or proper to put a Stop to them, it will then be liable to no further Interruption. I have referred Moodajee in this Point entirely to your Government; he waits with Impatience for the Reſult of your Reſolutions, and is ready to take up Arms if you give the Word. In the mean Time the March of this Detachment towards Poona cannot but be attended with the moſt beneficial Conſequences; and the Rajah is convinced, that let your Determination be which Way it will, the Preſence of my Force will either be of Uſe in bringing the Miniſters to a proper Senſe of their improper Conduct, or to commence the Operations in his Favour when the favourable Juncture ſhall arrive; I propoſe therefore to march from this Place immediately, and move forward with all poſſible Expedition. I am however neceſſarily detained Three or Four Days, till the Arrival of the Treaſure coming with Lieutenant Watherſton from Naigpore. The Gomaſtah of Gopaul Doſs could only collect

collect a ſufficient Sum to pay off the Bill of One Lack made firſt payable, ſo that I was obliged to apply to the Rajah for the remaining Two, who immediately advanced them to me, taking the Bills in Depoſit, and without any Diſcount or Deduction. I think it proper to mention to you, that the Court of Naigpore has cheerfully and willingly afforded every Aſſiſtance I found it neceſſary to require of them, except that of joining me with a Body of Troops, or taking any active Part in the War, prior to which they ſay it is requiſite that a Treaty ſhould be concluded and ratified by the ſolemn Sanction of your Board; and for this Purpoſe the Delay of ſome Time is neceſſary. They have publicly demonſtrated their friendly Sentiments to the Engliſh, in a Manner obvious to the neighbouring Powers; and the Aſſurances made by the Rajah and Dewan in the ſeveral Converſations with Mr. Watherſton, and in particular when he delivered the Preſents from me in the Name of your Government, ſtrongly evince their Sincerity. Mr. Watherſton's Letter to me on this Subject goes encloſed, together with an Account of the Preſents he delivered at the Court of Naigpore.

I have, &c.

Camp at Huſſeingabad, January 15th, 1779. (Signed) Thomas Goddard.

Honourable Sir,

Incloſed I have the Honour to tranſmit you the remaining Part of Mr. Watherſton's Correſpondence from the Court of Naigpore, together with the Letters from Rajah Moodajee Booſla, which I omitted to forward in my laſt Night's Addreſs.

You will perceive by the Converſation related in Mr. Watherſton's laſt Letter, which paſſed upon taking his Leave, how deſirous the Rajah is of detaining the Force under my Command in theſe Parts, till Anſwers ſhall arrive from you relative to the Point referred by him to your Government, and till an Accommodation may have taken place with the Miniſterial Party at Poona; on this Head my Reſolution is however taken, and I have in my former Letter fully explained to you my Motives for proceeding towards Bombay, to be in Readineſs to act in Support of the Meaſures purſued by the Select Committee, either as the Company's Intereſts may require, or as it may be hereafter found conſiſtent with the Orders and Inſtructions you may judge it neceſſary to ſend me in conſequence of the unexpected Part now taken by the Gentlemen at Bombay.

I have alſo reconciled the preſent Movement of my Detachment to the Court of Naigpore, by informing them, their Buſineſs being ultimately referred to you, as well as the final Determination of the Diſputes with the Poona Miniſtry, I ſhall be ready to execute any Meaſures in concert with him, which you may judge requiſite for the mutual Intereſt of both Parties.

In Reply to what he mentioned to Lieutenant Watherſton, reſpecting Huſſeingabad and Maundalla, I have in a few Words informed him that the Intention of your Government in ſending an Army into his Country, and empowering me to conclude a Treaty with him in your Name, was to obtain an Object more important and eſſential to his Intereſts than the partial Subjection of a few ſmall Diſtricts; that in particular the friendly and hoſpitable Behaviour of the Nawab of Bhopal, to whom Huſſeingabad now belongs, upon the Arrival of the Engliſh Troops in his Country, gave him a Claim to their Favour, and that at any rate I could not act in this Buſineſs without the Sanction and Authority of the Governor General and Supreme Council being firſt obtained.

I have now made known to you every Thing material that has occurred during my Negociation with the Rajah of Berar; and muſt, together with him, leave the further Proſecution of it, as well as the partial Line you may think proper to preſcribe for my future Conduct, to your final Determination.

I have, &c. the Honour, &c.

Camp, near Huſſeingabad, January 6th, 1779. (Signed) Tho' Goddard.

The Governor General remarks, that the Letters alluded to in that from Mr. Watherſton to Colonel Goddard, of the 24th of December, are only Duplicates of thoſe which have been already received direct from the Rajah.

Governor General—I did hope to have been able to lay before the Board at this Meeting, ſome Plan for Approbation, in conſequence of the late Advices from Bombay; but I have been prevented, 1ſt, by the Neceſſity of waiting for the Advices from Colonel Goddard now received, and 2dly, by the Want of the Materials which I judged requiſite for the Knowledge of the Board, in deciding on the Treaty concluded by the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay with Ragoba, and on the Meaſures which would be neceſſary on our Part, as the Conſequences of that Treaty: The Materials to which I allude, are our late Letters to Bombay, eſpecially thoſe which contained the Inſtructions on which they had concluded and publiſhed the Treaty, as the Effect of our immediate Sanction, and their Advices to us reſpecting their Plan of the 21ſt July appears to be that now carried into Execution; I ſhall loſe no Time in preparing for the Inſpection of the Board, ſuch Propoſitions as appear to me neceſſary on the Occaſion.

Warren Haſtings,
Richard Barwell,
P. Francis,
Edw[d] Wheler.

To

APPENDIX, N° 178.

To Colonel Goddard.

Sir,

The Governor General and Council have adviſed us of their Reſolution to remove Colonel Leſlie; before they heard of his Demiſe, and of their having appointed you to the chief Command of the Detachment of Forces ordered for the Support of this Preſidency: They have alſo apprized us of the Orders they have given for your Conduct on your Arrival in the Berar Country.

We congratulate you on this Mark of Diſtinction conferred on you by the Governor General and Council; and though we hope this will meet you well advanced on your March, in conſequence of our Letters of the 13th November and 6th Inſtant, yet to prevent all Diſappointment, and that you may not be at any Loſs in your Proceedings, we judge it proper to repeat to you that our Forces have actually taken the Field in Proſecution of the Plan communicated to the Governor General and Council, for the Reſtoration of Ragoba, and that we deem it requiſite and adviſable that the Army under your Command ſhould move forwards towards Bombay.

We therefore hereby require you to advance according to our former Orders, even without a Junction of the Troops of any Power in Alliance with the Honourable Company, and we likewiſe deſire and enjoin you to conduct your March with all poſſible Expedition.

The Settlement of the Government at Poona is committed to Meſſrs. Carnac, Egerton, and Moſtyn, with whom we deſire you will correſpond; and we flatter ourſelves the Movement of our Forces will facilitate your March, in like Manner as we expect the Advance of your Detachment will leſſen the Oppoſition to our Forces.

We are,

Sir,

Your moſt obedient, &c.

(Signed) William Hornby,
D. Draper.

Bombay Caſtle,
19th December 1778.

A true Copy,
R. Dunkley, Sec^y.

To Colonel Goddard.

Sir,

I beg Leave to write you a few Lines, to acquaint you with my Arrival and Reception at the Court of Naigpore: About Three o'Clock this Afternoon, I was met about Two Miles from the Town by Bulwant Roy, the Buckſhy's Son, who was ſent by the Rajah to conduct me into it.

In the Evening I waited upon the Rajah in his Palace, where I was introduced to his Three Sons, the Dewan, and Bapow Row, the Poona Vackeel: It was full Durbar, and nothing of Buſineſs was talked of: I propoſed to the Dewan, to have a Meeting with him on Buſineſs immediately, nay, preſſed it very much; as my Inſtructions from you were poſitive to loſe no Time in commencing Negociations, and they were of too important a Nature to admit of any Delay: He has excuſed himſelf till To-morrow.

The Rajah received me very graciouſly, and mentioned in the ſtrongeſt Terms, his Friendſhip for the Engliſh, and his Senſe of the Proof given by our Government to theirs, in deputing you to his Court. He has recovered of his Sickneſs, which was a very ſevere one, and it is Ten Days ſince he received public Congratulations on that Account; he ſtill however appears weak; he talks, I am informed, little in general; and at this Time, on account of the Remains of his Indiſpoſition, leſs than uſual. All Buſineſs is managed by the Dewan, who has promiſed to be with me To-morrow, and to whom I will not fail to mention every Circumſtance relative to the Buſineſs on which I come, when you ſhall hear from me in the fulleſt, and I hope moſt ſatisfactory Manner.

I have the Honour, &c. &c. &c.

(Signed) Dal. Watherſton.

Naigpore,
19th December 1778.

A true Copy.
R. Dunkley, Sec^y.

To Colonel Goddard.

Sir,

About 3 o'Clock in the Afternoon, as my laſt Letter informed you, the Dewan came according to his Engagement, and continued near Four Hours, when the whole Subject of the Negociation propoſed, was fully canvaſſed. The Particulars of what paſſed, are as follow:

I firſt explained to him, the Powers delegated to you by the Governor and Supreme Council, to conclude an Alliance of Friendſhip, in the Name and by the Authority of the Engliſh Eaſt India Company, with the Rajah of Berar; mentioned to him the particular Wiſh of our Government, and your ſtrong Inclination to promote the Intereſts of Moodajee, together with your Readineſs to carry into immediate Execution, any Plan for that Purpoſe.

The Dewan expreſſed the favourable Intentions of his Maſter, his Deſire to enter into Terms

of Friendſhip with the Engliſh, in the warmeſt Manner, and his Happineſs, that an Opportunity now offered of doing ſo by your Arrival with full Powers from Calcutta to treat with him.

I told the Dewan, you was yourſelf exceedingly deſirous of having a Meeting with the Rajah, and as ſoon as he conſented to the Alliance, would ſet out for Naigpore to ſettle the Buſineſs with him in Perſon; that in the mean Time you had ſent me to communicate the Nature of the Negociation you meant to carry on, and to obtain his Anſwer, which would immediately determine your Operations.

I then proceeded to ſpeak particularly to the Points contained in the Inſtructions given by the Board to Mr. Elliott for concluding an offenſive Alliance with Moodajee; concluding that to be the Object which the Board were anxious to obtain, and in particular the End you had principally in view in ſending me. It is unneceſſary to repeat the Whole of the Arguments I advanced on the Occaſion; be aſſured, I neglected nothing that you had ſuggeſted to me, or that occurred to myſelf at the Time. Indeed ſo earneſtly did I preſs their Compliance with an Object from its Nature ſo manifeſtly tending to their Advantage, that it ought rather to have been propoſed and ſolicited by themſelves, that nothing but the Importance of the Meaſure in its probable future Conſequences, and the ſtrong Wiſh of Mr. Haſtings to effect it, would have juſtified my Earneſtneſs and Importunities.

It was however to no Effect; and I can aſſure you as you will plainly perceive by their Letters now writing you on the Subject, that they are determined not to take any active Part whatever with our Armies.

They have a thouſand Arguments to oppoſe to thoſe I urged in favour of the Plan for aſſuming the Dignity of Rauge of Sittara; they gave a long Detail of the paſt Tranſactions of their Hiſtory, the Connections which they have ſince formed, and the Treaties ſolemnly entered into by them in conſequence. They then dwelt a good deal upon the Regard they have ever paid to their [illegible], by an Adherence to which they have always been proſperous and flouriſhing.

They ſay they have ſworn to an Alliance of Friendſhip with the preſent Peiſhwa, Pundit Purdhaun Madhurow, which they cannot violate; and add, that their aſſerting their Pretenſions to the Sovereignty will meet with numberleſs Oppoſitions; and that though Victory muſt in the End crown our Arms over them all; it will not be without ſhedding much Blood, and at the Expence of their violating the ſacred Force of Engagements before entered into by them. This laſt Circumſtance the Dewan lays much Streſs on. It is plain from every Sentiment expreſſed by him, that the Rajah does not mean on any Account at this Time to commence a War in Support of his Claim.

I repreſented to him the favourable Opportunity that now preſented itſelf; an Army on his Frontier, ready to accompliſh his Wiſh, the diſtracted State of Affairs at Poona, which would prevent the Miniſtry from ſeriouſly oppoſing him, however hoſtilely inclined; and that the Reaſons he had in his Letter urged to Mr. Haſtings and you accounted for the Difficulties occaſioned by Mr. Elliott's Death; and the Delay of the Detachment now no longer exiſting. All this he acknowledged; but declared it contrary to every Conſideration of Prudence and Policy, for his Maſter at this Time to adopt the Scheme propoſed: He talked of deferring it for Two or Three Years; but could not give any particular Reaſon, why it would then be more eligible than at this Time. The Motives by which they ſeem to be actuated, appear to me as follow:

Knowing the friendly Intercourſe ſubſiſting betwixt the Engliſh and themſelves, and alſo plainly foreſeeing that a Rupture with the Peiſhwa is at this Time abſolutely unavoidable, they wiſh not to involve themſelves in any Hoſtilities till the Event of the War ſhall determine on whoſe Side Victory will finally declare; I doubt not but they are convinced in the Opinion, that it will be on ours, in which Caſe they are aſſured of a Friend in us; and ſhould it prove otherwiſe, beſides in the mean Time ſecuring their Country from the Effects of War, they would have the leſs to fear from the Reſentment of the Miniſterial Party hereafter.

The Dewan told me, that Zuffer-ul-Dowla, the Chief of Narnull (at preſent independant of Nizam Ally) is much inclined to unite himſelf with Moodajee; that Letters have come from him, ſoliciting the Rajah in the ſtrongeſt Terms to join with the Engliſh, and aſſert his Pretenſions to the Sovereignty of Sittara, in which Zuffer-ul-Dowla is ready to aſſiſt him with his Forces: Notwithſtanding this concurrent favourable Circumſtance, ſays the Dewan, the Attempt cannot be made at this Time; in ſhort, let what will be the Motive for retracting from the ambitious Projects the Rajah once meditated, it is now obvious that he has altered his Views altogether, or at leaſt that he has deferred them till a future Opportunity.

The Dewan did not fail to mention to me the Motion of the Bombay Troops towards Poona, which he aſſerts to be an abſolute Fact, and communicated to him by undoubted Authority: Ragonaut Row's adopted Son accompanies them with a Body of his Father's Troops; ſo that there is no Doubt of the Intentions at leaſt of that Government in favour of that Chief. This Circumſtance, (though he did not poſitively ſay ſo) what with the general Averſion in which Ragonaut Row is held; the particular Diſputes which have of late ariſen betwixt him and Moodajee, when the latter was compelled to make Terms with the preſent Peiſhwa and Nizam Ally; and above all, a Conſciouſneſs that his attaining the Rauze of Sittara in the Extent he wiſhed, under the Adminiſtration of Ragonaut Row, would be impracticable; I ſay this Circumſtance ſeems an effectual Bar to the Rajah's Concurrence with the Plan projected for his Advancement by the Supreme Government at Calcutta, beſides a firm Perſuaſion, I am certain it will be impoſſible to divert him of, that however we may profeſs to favour his Views, our principal and ultimate End is to favour thoſe of Ragonaut Row. Many

Parts

Parts of the Dewan's Converſation, and which do not at preſent occur, to communicate minutely, were of a Tendency to aſſure me beyond the Need of further Conviction, that every Effort to perſuade the Rajah into a Concurrence with the propoſed Plan would be abſolutely ineffectual.

Although there is too much Reaſon to believe the Report of our Troops at Bombay being in Motion, I have ſince my Arrival at this Court affected to ſuppoſe it might be premature, or attempted to account for it by ſome Diſpute which might have happened with the Peiſhwa and our Government here, or ſome Quarrel diſtinct from Ragonaut Row's Cauſe; poſitively perſiſting in the Intentions of the Supreme Board at Calcutta, to enter into and ſupport the Views and Pretenſions of Moodajee.

I was induced to be the more peremptory on this Head, from the Contents of the Supreme Council's Letter to the Gentlemen at Bombay, relative to Mr. Elliott's Embaſſy, in which they poſitively requeſt that Government to refrain from any Engagements of a Nature hoſtile to the actual Adminiſtration at Poona, excepting ſuch as may appear abſolutely neceſſary for the Defence of their own Poſſeſſions.

The Neceſſity thus provided againſt by no Means appearing admiſſible in Excuſe for the Meaſures this Court ſuppoſed have been taken in favour of Ragonaut Row, I have not ſcrupled altogether to doubt the Inclinations for reſtoring him, having prompted the Bombay Council to take the Field at this Time; and having aſſerted my Belief that they mean only to be in Readineſs to ſupport and co-operate with us in favour of Moodajee's Claim.

I am to have an Interview with the Rajah To-morrow, when I ſhall be able to write you more particularly.

I have the Honour, &c. &c. &c.

(Signed)

Dal. Watherſton.

Naigpore,
20th December 1778.

A true Copy,
R. Dunkley,
Sec^r.

To Colonel Goddard.

Sir,

I wrote you Yeſterday informing you of the Subject of a Conference I had with the Miniſter: As you deſired me to be very minute in relating every Circumſtance that might occur during my Stay at this Place, I ſhall punctually communicate the ſmalleſt Particular, in the Courſe of which, if I mention any Thing that does not immediately relate to the preſent Negociation, or that ſeems to contradict the Sentiments expreſſed by the Court in any former Conference, it may ſtill be of Uſe to diſcover their real Object, and give you a more clear and complete Idea of the Situation of Affairs here.

This Evening I had a private Interview with the Rajah, at which his Three Sons and the Miniſter were preſent, when the Whole of the Converſation of the preceding Evening was again talked over, and the ſame Sentiments freely and clearly declared.

The Rajah has however entered more fully into his own particular Views; he has acknowledged the Object of his Wiſh; and to prove his Sincerity in that Reſpect, the Miniſter ſhewed me Two Letters from Zuffer-ul-Dowla, the Nawab of Narnull, in which he urges the Rajah to make Uſe of the Opportunity now offered by the Arrival of the Engliſh Troops, and poſſeſs himſelf of the Sovereignty of Sittara.

The Rajah talked much of his intimate Connection and Friendſhip with this Nawab, whom he eſteemed as his own Son, and the Deſire he had of making him alſo a Friend of the Engliſh. To this I anſwered in general Terms, that the Engliſh would ever conſider his Friends as their own.

Moodajee added, that I plainly ſaw what his Views really were, but that many Things were firſt neceſſary before they could be accompliſhed: In the Firſt Place, a Treaty of Friendſhip muſt be concluded betwixt the Engliſh Company and himſelf. I told him that was your Intention, and that you was impowered to do ſo by the Governor General and Council. I then explained to him the Principles upon which it was propoſed a defenſive Alliance ſhould be made; to all which he gave a general Conſent; but added, that the Concurrence of the Council muſt be obtained from Calcutta, before his Mind could be at Eaſe, and before he would undertake the grand and important Enterprize. I then read to him the Board's Credentials, and explained the Nature of them, pointing out the full Authority with which it is cuſtomary for the Engliſh to inveſt their Miniſters when ſent to treat with any foreign Power: At the ſame Time I told him, that thoſe Articles which were intended to be of a permanent Nature, and did not require an immediate Execution, might be firſt ſettled here, and ultimately referred to the Confirmation of the Board, but that what related to the immediate Service of the Troops could not wait for this Reference; and I exhorted him in the warmeſt Terms to reflect upon the Opportunity that now preſented itſelf, and which might not perhaps ſo readily occur to his Wiſh. My Endeavours were however to no Purpoſe, and he has aſſured me, that he cannot now undertake the Buſineſs; he is writing Letters to the Governor and to you to this Effect, which however will not be ready to accompany this Diſpatch; I ſhall therefore forward them by ſome future Opportunity.

APPENDIX, N° 170.

In the Courſe of our this Day's Converſation, many Points moſt ſtrongly inſiſted on Yeſterday were either totally omitted, or but ſlightly touched upon. The Sacredneſs of public Faith was once hinted, but no Regard to the Peiſhwa's Intereſt at all expreſſed; on the contrary, the Rajah plainly avowed his own ambitious Projects; but, as I mentioned before, declared the preſent Seaſon for attempting them altogether improper and unfit. Ragonaut Row was not at all introduced into the Subject of this Day's Converſation; but after all I am led to believe that the preſent apparent Revolution in his Favour is the principal Bar to our Negociation. The various Excuſes urged To-day for Delay are prompted ſince the Conference of Yeſterday, to ſoften the Refuſal they think it political to give to the preſent Propoſals made to them; at the ſame Time they mean to keep up the friendly Intercourſe they now have with our Government, and to improve it hereafter to their own Advantage at a favourable Opportunity.

I have the Honour, &c. &c.
(Signed) Dal. Watherſtone.

Naigpore,
21ſt December 1778.

A true Copy,
R. Dunkley,
Sec^ry.

To Colonel Goddard.

Sir,

I have now the Pleaſure to tranſmit you a Letter from the Rajah to yourſelf, and Two from Mr. Haſtings, which the Rajah requeſts you will forward to Calcutta: Their Contents I have already fully explained to you in my former Letters: As they exactly correſpond with the Reſolutions expreſſed in the ſeveral Conferences I have had at this Court, I Yeſterday paid the Dewan a Viſit, when every Particular was again fully and minutely diſcuſſed.

Their firſt Wiſh ſeems now to ſet aſide our Connection with Ragonaut Row, the ſupporting whom the Dewan ſays he is convinced is highly impolitical, and will in the End be fully proved ſo. The Abhorrence in which that Chief is univerſally held is, he ſays, no Secret to you; and the Prejudices in the Decan againſt him will not eaſily if ever be removed. There may be One Cauſe why this Court is peculiarly inimical towards him, becauſe an intimate Connection formerly ſubſiſted betwixt him and Moodajee, which has ſince ſuſtained a total Change; in effecting which, Policy concurred with Inclination on the Part of the Berar Rajah to combine with the Peiſhwa and Nizam, when he ſolemnly engaged to them never to aſſiſt or join Ragonaut. The principle Cauſe, however, of their Objection to the Bombay Schemes is, I make no Doubt, the invincible Bar they foreſee they will occaſion to the Accompliſhment of their own.

This Conſideration furniſhes one of the moſt conſiderable Objections to the Negociations propoſed to have been entered into with them at this Time; and another they aſſign is the unprepared State in which they now are for effecting the grand Object of their Ambition, for which they ſay powerful Alliances, a large Treaſure, and numerous Force, are abſolutely neceſſary.

The Dewan did not ſcruple to ſay that your Detachment was unequal to ſuch an Enterprize; he ſoftened this, by adding, that wherever you marched, and whatever Foe you attacked, you would be victorious; but that it was neceſſary to guard againſt the Depredations of Enemies ſo ſudden in their Motions as the Marattas are, in many Quarters; that it would be requiſite to leave Two Battalions for the Protection of Naigpore, and Two for that of Narnull: In ſhort, he ſummed up his Judgment of the Matter by ſaying, Twenty Battalions would be requiſite, and a Thouſand Europeans, for this Work; the Thouſand Europeans he means principally for the Service of the Guns, for he has no Idea of that Duty being properly performed but by them: In this Opinion I confirmed him, but added, a few ſkilful Men would be able to manage our Artillery. What they ſeem to have in View at preſent is this, the making a Peace betwixt the Engliſh and the Peiſhwa through their Mediation, the totally diſcarding Ragonaut Row, and the taking a future Occaſion of aſſerting their Pretenſions, when a Treaty ſhould have been concluded in the Manner they propoſe to the Governor.

The Dewan, whoſe Influence directs every thing here, is a Man of great Prudence and Abilities; nor does he ſeem inclined to ſuffer his Maſter to enter upon this Buſineſs, or riſk the Safety of his own Dominions by new Projects, till he conceives every Poſſibility of Diſappointment is effectually obviated: The preſent State of Things by no Means flatters or promiſes Succeſs to the Atchievement.

The Letter they have wrote to you is perfectly plain and pointed, as are thoſe addreſſed to the Governor. The Dewan adviſes the March of your Detachment to Poona, by which Time the Governor may ſend Orders to Bombay of the Nature recommended in the Rajah's Letter, and Rene Ram alſo may have ſettled the other Buſineſs with Mr. Haſtings. He talks a good deal inconſiſtently, for he propoſed going himſelf to Poona, to act as Mediator on the Part of his Maſter, with the Miniſters there, which would be a Proof of the higheſt Friendſhip; whilſt at the ſame Time he ought to be thinking of arming, in conſequence of Mr. Haſtings's Reſolves, againſt the very Root of the Peſhwa's Power; in ſhort, I am, from Circumſtances occurring in the Courſe of Converſation, well perſuaded, that however deſirous the Rajah himſelf may be, the Dewan is himſelf more lukewarm; perhaps he thinks his own Honour concerned in the maintaining the Treaties between the Nizam and the Peiſhwa, which he himſelf principally brought about; and there is even Room to believe

believe he may have entered into Negociations of a very ſecret Nature with the Miniſtry at Poona, who are Brahmins like himſelf; nor do I imagine it can be his Wiſh to ſee the Power of the Brahmins totally annihilated, which would be the inevitable Conſequence of placing a Rajepoot of the Authority of Moodajee in the Throne of Sittara.

Laſt Night, by ſome Means or other, he ſeemed to give a Looſe to his Sentiments a good deal; he acknowledged you had Cauſe to be offended with the Reception given to Monſieur St. Lubin at Poona, by the Miniſterial Party, which he deſcribed.

He ſays he brought Letters from the French King, and told them in the Name of his Maſter, to point out in what Manner they might be ſerved, as the French were ready to do ſo. He had very valuable Preſents, among which, was one Picture of a very particular Nature, and which denoted the deep Addreſs and Cunning with which the Deſigns had been laid: It repreſented the Murder of Narrain Row, in the moſt ſtriking Point of View, and the Providence of Heaven interfering (which were indeed the Heads of the Miniſterial Party) to ſave the Wife of Narrain Row, Gungaboy, from Deſtruction, who is attempting to kill herſelf; and telling her to bring forth that Child with which ſhe was pregnant (meaning the preſent Peiſhaw) who would live to revenge his Father's Death, and perpetuate the Glories of his Race.

The Reception they gave St. Lubin, was moſt gracious and attentive; he was preſented with an Elephant, &c. in Proportion, and liberally ſupplied with every Thing, whilſt our Reſident Mr. Moſtyn was denied Acceſs to the Durbar, and received even particular Indignities.

St. Lubin ſince, or about the Time of the March of our Detachment, was diſmiſſed from Poona, and is gone to Nidjiff Khân.

Dewagur deſcribes with great Satisfaction the Conduct of St. Lubin, who, he ſays, wept a good deal at this affecting Story, as did ſome of the other old Brahmins there; but Nana Furneſe laughed at the Artifice of the Frenchman, and greatly admired the Facility with which he could ſhed real Tears.

I have the Honour, &c.
(Signed) Dal. Watherſton.

Naigpore,
24th December 1778.

To Colonel Goddard.

Sir,

I have received your Letter of the 21ſt, by which I find the News of the Bombay Troops being in Motion has alſo reached you, and before this I make no Doubt it will be fully and particularly confirmed to you. This Circumſtance and the Determination of the Berar Court to remain at preſent inactive, which I have in my former Letter ſignified to you, will of courſe make you anxious to adopt ſome Plan of immediate Operations.

By every thing that has paſſed ſince my Arrival here, I am fully perſuaded of the friendly Inclinations of Moodajee towards the Engliſh; I before mentioned Two Letters he ſhewed me from Zuffer-ul-Dowlah, the Nawab of Narnul, and informed me of the Contents; laſt Night he received another, he ſent it me to peruſe.

It begins with abuſing the Government at Poona, pointing out their Inſolence in a Gleam of Proſperity, and their oppoſite Conduct when apprehenſive of any Misfortune, which he proves by reminding the Rajah of the Threats the Miniſters had formerly made uſe of when they were victorious over the Party raiſed by Nanah Furneſe and comparing it with the Expreſſions they now employed to prevail upon Moodajee and himſelf to unite in oppoſing the Engliſh, who they ſay, in Breach of the ſolemn Treaty they had made, are marched with an Army from Bombay to ſupport Ragonaut Row; in ſhort, Zuffer-ul-Dowla tells the Rajah that the Behaviour of theſe People is ſolely dictated by their own private Views, and adviſes him to put no Confidence whatever in their Profeſſions but to join the Engliſh, who, he ſays, are able and willing to be his faithful Friends: He adds a few Words to the Letter in his own Hand Writing, which are earneſtly preſſing him to make Friends with the Engliſh, and to join their Forces, which are come into his Country: He alſo encloſes a Copy of a Letter from the Miniſters to the Nizam, informing him of the March of the Bombay Detachment, and their taking Poſt at Bhore Gaut; to oppoſe whom they have detached Scindia and Tookajee Holcar, with Orders to puniſh their Temerity; they preſs the Nizam to join them; and after talking of ſome Grants of Land which they had made over to him, for which Purpoſe they had given Orders to their Aumil, they mention their Inſtructions hereafter, ſending Scindia and Holcar to aſſiſt him in puniſhing Hyder Naig, who they ſay is now beſieging ſome Fort belonging to them.

I forgot to tell you that in Zuffer-ul Dowla's Letter he informs the Rajah that the Miniſters have wrote to him of their entering into Terms of Friendſhip with Hyder Naig: How palpably the Two Letters contradict each other in that Reſpect. As a farther Proof of the Artifices to which they are obliged to have Recourſe, they propoſe to the Nizam, as an Inducement for his joining with them, to aſſiſt him in attacking Arcot. They have alſo inſtructed their Miniſter at this Court, Bapow Row, to demand the Aſſiſtance of the Rajah; and have promiſed to ſend Scindia and Holcar with a Body of Troops to aſſiſt him in levying the Chout of Bengal. They have further propoſed to the Rajah to give him an Extent of Country in the Province of Khendeſh, that will yield a Revenue equal to that of Cuttack (as they perceive he is apprehenſive of the Engliſh taking it into their Poſſeſſion)

and

and they will themſelves receive Cuttack in Exchange, which they will maintain againſt all our Efforts.

Moodajee ſees the Situation of the Poona Durbar, and the Folly of their Councils; he is reſolved firmly to obſerve a neutral Part at preſent; and recommends to the Peiſhwa by no Means to enter upon a War with the Engliſh, which muſt be attended with certain Ruin to his Government. He avows to them his Friendſhip for us, but alſo gives them to underſtand he will not fight againſt their Forces; and if they commence Hoſtilities againſt him, he has nothing to dread from their Power, ſupported as he will be by the Arms of the Engliſh.

It appears that a better Opportunity than the preſent could not offer for our ſettling the Affairs of this Country according to our Wiſh; Moodajee and the Narnull Nawab are our Friends; Hyder Naig has for his Enemies ours; the Partizans of Ragonaut Row will greatly divide the Force of the Maratta State; and I have Reaſon to think that even Nizam Ally will obſerve a Neutrality.

I think it neceſſary to ſay ſomething about Bapow Row, the Miniſter at this Court from the Poona Durbar: He has often reſided here in that Character; and about Eight Months ago came to endeavour to prevail upon the Rajah to ſend his Son Ragogee with a Force to aſſiſt the Peiſhwa againſt Hyder Naig, which he was put off from Day to Day with Hopes of obtaining, till the March of our Detachment, and the Rumour of the Deſigns of our Government, gave a Turn to the Syſtem of their Politics; ſince that Time he has been indefatigable in counteracting our Views at this Court; he is treated with a good deal of Reſpect and Attention, and though his Aſſiduity and Influence may have proved too weak to make Moodajee wiſh to break off his Alliance with us, it has I make no Doubt aſſiſted a good deal to prevent his acting hoſtilely againſt the Peiſhwa. I was introduced to him on the Day of my public Audience, but have not met with him ſince.

This Evening I viſited the Dewan; he propoſed, when we were diſcourſing on the Subject of our Diſputes with the Peiſhwa, that this Man ſhould be ſent for; but I objected talking to him formally on any Point relating to public Buſineſs; as a private Friend of the Dewan's only, I ſhould be glad to ſee him—the Motion for ſending for him was immediately dropped.

I went Yeſterday, by the particular Requeſt of the Rajah, to ſee his Artillery; he takes much Pride and Pleaſure in it, and has made a Number of Pieces of Ordnance himſelf; they are ſome of them large, and prettily ornamented; but the Carriages, &c. are exceedingly clumſy, and ill-conſtructed: He has Four or Five Europe Guns apparently old. The Whole of his Artillery amounts to Forty; Twelve of which are very ſmall, not exceeding the Bore of One of our Muſkets. He has ſome Half Portugueze, and a few vagabond Europeans in his Service, who receive about 30 Rupees per Month.

They tell of Two Frenchmen of ſome Conſequence and Rank that came here about Five Months ago; one of them died, the other is gone to obtain Service, either with the Peiſhwa or Nizam. Extravagance is not a Fault of this Rajah; and I find, though he treated the ſurviving Frenchman with ſufficient Attention, and even made him ſome Preſents, giving him Money for his preſent Support, he would not ſatisfy his Expectations to induce him to remain in Employment at Naigpore; perhaps on Account of Mr. Elliott's expected Arrival, and the Negociations he was carrying on with the Engliſh, the Rajah was not deſirous of his Stay.

However upon the ſtricteſt Enquiry, I can ſee no Grounds to ſuſpect the Intereſts of the French Nation were any ways connected with this Viſit.

I have the Honour, &c. &c. &c.

(Signed) Dal. Watherſton.

Naigpore,
27th December 1778.

To Colonel Goddard.

Sir,

In conſequence of the Authority you gave me for ſo doing, I ſignified to this Government that I had in my Poſſeſſion ſome Preſents as Teſtimonies of Friendſhip from the Honourable Governor General and Council, which you had hoped to have the Happineſs of delivering yourſelf in Perſon when you ſaw the Rajah; but as you were diſappointed in that Hope, you had deſired me to preſent them in your Name: He received them with many Marks of Satisfaction, and ſaid a Number of Things expreſſive of his Attachment to the Engliſh, whoſe Friendſhip he affirmed he never would relinquiſh; but that the Family of Booſſa ſhould be the ſame with the Engliſh, without Diminution, to the End of Time. This Declaration he repeated, laying his Hand upon his Breaſt; adding, that he did ſo that his Three Sons, who were ſitting by him, might be Witneſſes of his Sentiments, and that it might make an Impreſſion on their Minds.

The Dewan propoſed that the Preſents intended for him might be given in Preſence of the Rajah alſo; which I accordingly did, and he received them with the ſame Proofs of Satisfaction, expreſſing himſelf particularly pleaſed with the Preſent of the Ink-ſtand, which he placed upon his Head, as a Mark of the honourable Diſtinction he thought done him by ſending it.

Many Things were ſaid upon the Subject of the Preſents, all expreſſive of the Satisfaction they gave; and I am particularly pleaſed that this Proof of Attention, ſo neceſſary in opening a Negociation with any of theſe States, whoſe eſtabliſhed Cuſtom it is to make that Ceremony an Introduction to Buſineſs, has not been omitted.

I this Evening obtained my Audience of Leave from the Rajah, at which his Sons and the Miniſter

niſter were preſent, as indeed they have always been at the ſeveral Interviews I have had ſince my Arrival. He repeated at this Converſation the Aſſurances of Friendſhip, and Deſire of Alliance with the Engliſh, which he before expreſſed to me; and aſſigned the ſame Reaſons for delaying the Concluſion of the propoſed Treaty with our Government, which I have communicated to you in my former Letters. He reſted his Hopes of every Succeſs in his own future Views upon the Reſolutions which may be taken at Calcutta, and the Anſwers which ſhall arrive in conſequence of the Letters he has addreſſed to Mr. Haſtings, and forwarded to him through you; theſe, he ſays, contain every Thing neceſſary to be attended to for the Accompliſhment of his Wiſhes, and the Subſtance of what he has empowered Benie Ram to propoſe to Mr. Haſtings in his Name, by whom alſo he has ſent Duplicates of the ſame Letters.

Benie Ram Pundit is to ſet out immediately by Way of Cuttack; but as he means to travel by daily Stages, I do not ſuppoſe he will arrive at Calcutta in leſs than Forty Days.

In addition to the Propoſals before made by this Court, relative to the Troops under your Command, the Rajah and Duan expreſſed a ſtrong Deſire that they might not move forwards towards Poona, but remain in the Neighbourhood of the Berar Territories till Orders might arrive from the Supreme Council, in Anſwer to the Rajah's Letters; and in the mean Time, as it would be neceſſary to make ſome Proviſion for the Expence that would be requiſite for their Maintenance, prior to the final Adjuſtment of the grand Object, they propoſed that you ſhould reduce to the Subjection and Authority of the Rajah, the Diſtricts of Huſſeingabad and Mundalla, over both which they advance a legal Claim of Sovereignty, and which they aſſert are unjuſtly withheld from them by the preſent Poſſeſſors: To effect this Service they propoſe ordering a ſmall Force to accompany you.

Not having received any Inſtructions from you on theſe Points, I declined giving any particular Anſwer regarding them; but as I was to ſet out for Camp immediately, I promiſed to make known to you their Propoſals, to which you would yourſelf immediately ſend an Anſwer.

As the Diſtance of this Place, and the Length of Time I muſt neceſſarily take in conducting the Treaſure to Camp, will make my Arrival ſomething tedious, I have diſpatched an Expreſs to you with the Particulars of what has paſſed, that you may be enabled to reply to the Rajah's Propoſals without Loſs of Time, in the Manner you may yourſelf judge moſt proper.

I beg Leave to intimate to you One Circumſtance relative to Bapou Row, whom in a former Letter I have mentioned as Miniſter from the Peiſhwa at this Court: This Man prior to my Arrival, and for ſome Time after, was treated with great Attention and Reſpect; but for ſome Reaſon, which I cannot certainly learn, is now a good deal neglected, and the Dewan told me he was to return to Poona in a few Days; I know he remonſtrated very freely with this Court for the Partiality and Friendſhip ſhewn by them to the Engliſh, but to no Effect; and I believe ſome Altercations aroſe betwixt the Miniſter and him on theſe Subjects, which produced the preſent Rupture.

I have the Honour to be,
Sir, &c. &c. &c.
(Signed) Dal. Watherſton.

Naigpore,
1ſt January 1778.

N.B. The Rajah has requeſted me to take in Charge for you an Elephant, a Cheeta for hunting Deer, a Hawke, and a Kooka, which I conſented to bring with me.

(Signed)
D. Watherſton.

APPENDIX, N° 171.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 4th February 1779.

PRESENT;

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
and
Edward Wheler,
} Eſquires.

RE-conſidered the Advices from Bombay, recorded in the laſt Conſultation.

The Governor General delivers in the following Minute:

APPENDIX, N° 171.

The following Obſervations have occurred to me as worthy Notice in the Conſideration of the Letter lately received from the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, and now before the Board:

On the 17th of Auguſt we received a Letter from the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, dated the 25th of July, informing us that they had concerted a new Plan for conducting Ragonaut Row to Poona. We replied on the ſame Day, and authorized them to carry their Plan into Execution, with the following expreſs Proviſions:

1ſt. That it ſhould not interfere with any Engagement formed with Moodajee Booſla by Mr. Elliott, and previouſly notified to them by him.

2d. That their lateſt Advices from Europe ſhould amount to an Aſſurance that the Force required for this Service might be ſpared without endangering the Safety of Bombay in the Event of a French Invaſion.

3d. That the Engagements which they might form either with Ragonaut Row himſelf, or with Moraba and his Aſſociates, ſhould not be contrary to thoſe concluded by Mr. Elliott, and notified to them, nor of a hoſtile Tendency to the Government of Berar.

Theſe appear to have been the laſt Inſtructions received by them from this Government when they reſolved on the Execution of the Plan, and concluded the Treaty with Ragonaut Row, of which they have adviſed us in their Letter of the 12th of December; theſe they have quoted to us as their Authority, and the ſame Authority has been proclaimed to the World by Ragonaut Row in his Manifeſto.

So far the Letter of theſe Inſtructions could warrant the Execution of their Plan, independantly of the Circumſtances under which they were dictated; the ſubſequent Change of theſe Circumſtances, the Period of Time originally fixed and notified to us for its Execution, the great Lapſe of that Time, and the known and actual State of our political Syſtem, it is certainly warranted by them, ſince no Engagement had been formed between this Government and that of Berar; nor do the Conditions of the Treaty viſibly bear a hoſtile Tendency to the Government of Berar; neither are they in any Danger of a French Invaſion.

But whether it can be juſtified under all the other Conſiderations which I have enumerated, I ſhall leave to a higher Authority to determine, ſince it is not my Intention to propoſe that we ſhould either diſclaim or annul it; I ſhall ſimply confine myſelf to a brief Recital of the Tranſactions and Events which have happened ſince the Notifications of their Deſign, and which may affect the Propriety of it, conſidered relatively to the Time and Mode of its Execution.

The Time firſt appointed for the Execution of the Plan was the Beginning of September.

On the 11th September they adviſed us, that "they had not yet taken any Meaſures in the Proſecution of the Plan, but ſhould ſpeedily come to ſome deciſive Reſolutions, and adviſe us immediately of the Reſult," referring us to Mr. Lewis for full Information of the Situation of Affairs at Poona.

The Words which I have marked with Lines drawn under them were too emphatical not to attract our particular Notice when they were read, and obviouſly impreſſed us with the Perſuaſion, that as ſo long a Time had already elapſed (for the Letter did not reach us till the 2d of November) and as we had received no other Advices from them, though promiſed to be immediately ſent us, of the deciſive Reſolutions which were ſpeedily to follow it, no Reſolutions had followed, but that the Plan had proved abortive. In this Opinion we were confirmed; I ſpeak for myſelf, at leaſt by the Information received from Mr. Lewis, that the Heads of the Party at whoſe Invitation the Preſidency of Bombay had formed the Deſign of conducting Ragonaut Row to Poona, were all either impriſoned or deprived of Office and Authority. I muſt add in this Place, that notwithſtanding the Promiſes ſo pointedly given in their Letter of the 11th September, we heard no more from them till the Receipt of their Letter of the 12th December now before us.

Our Army was at this Time far advanced; the Object originally preſented to it ſeemed to have vaniſhed, and none remained but the propoſed Alliance with Moodajee Booſla, which had been to this Time treated as little more than a Reſource, to which we looked in the Event of a Failure in the Deſign furniſhed us by the Preſidency of Bombay. It was now reſolved to adopt it wholly; and to prevent our being embarraſſed by a Revival of the former, Colonel Goddard having been empowered by our Letter of the 16th November, to negociate a Treaty with Moodajee Booſla on the Ground of Mr. Elliott's Inſtructions; he was by another Letter of the 22d of the ſame Month releaſed from the Authority of the Preſidency of Bombay, and directed to obey only the Orders of this Board, with the Allowance to exerciſe his own Diſcretion in complying with ſuch Requiſitions from them as were not inconſiſtent with the ſpecial and ſingle Commiſſion which he had now in Charge.

Theſe were Conſequences which the Preſidency of Bombay ought to have foreſeen and to have made a Proviſion for them; I will venture to ſay that they did foreſee them; they knew that our Army was on the Way, and making quick Advances, their Letter mentions it; they knew that we were in Treaty with Moodajee; they knew that we had left the Negociations open for the Accompliſhment of their Plan, while there was a Chance of its taking Effect; and as they had given us every Cauſe to conclude that it would not take Effect, they ought to have concluded in their Turn that we had indemnified ourſelves for the Diſappointment by an immediate and decided Engagement with Moodajee, the only Reſource now left us; and which in Effect we had at firſt abandoned to aſſiſt in the Proſecution of the Schemes which they had preſented to us, and to which the Orders of the

the Company had required our preferable Attention. They knew alſo that at the very Time in which they were in Treatry with Ragonaut Row, and preparing to conduct him to Poona, the Miniſters of this Government were either in immediate Treaty, or on the Point of commencing it with Moodajee Booſla; and that we had already drawn that Prince into a declared Party with our Government, by the Proſpect held out to him of the Credit and Advantages of our Alliance; under ſuch Circumſtances they will poſſibly be deemed by impartial Judges to have exceeded the Point of Duty in acting at all, and in not waiting for the Reſult of the depending Meaſures of their ſuperior Government: But as they had reſolved to act, they ſurely ought to have paid ſome Regard to the probable State of our Connection with Moodajee, and have left an Opening for his Admiſſion into their Engagements with Ragonaut Row, after our Example, and in the ſame Manner as our Inſtructions to Mr. Elliott had preſcribed the Junction of Ragonaut Row in his Negociation with Moodajee. This Precaution they wholly neglected, confining themſelves to a bare Acknowledgment of any Engagements which might have been actually concluded with Moodajee at the preciſe Date of their Treaty, without which the Treaty itſelf would have been invalid. Thus far their Conduct may have been defective; it has defeated our Meaſures and expoſed us to the Suſpicion of Duplicity; but I know not how it can be remedied.

The laſt Point which remains to be noticed is of greater Conſequence, and merits a more ſubſtantial Conſideration of it, as the Remedy is, I preſume, within our Power, and our Duty requires that we ſhould apply it. It will be remembered that our Detachment was expreſsly deſigned for the Support of the Plan communicated to us by the Preſidency of Bombay, in December 1777, and ſince executed in a different Form. Its Object was afterwards varied, becauſe we underſtood, on the Authority of that Preſidency, that their Plan was wholly laid aſide. They have now precipitately recalled it to its original Purſuit, but have neither provided the Means of indemnifying the Company for the paſt Expences of the Army, nor a Fund for its future Subſiſtence, although it was one of the Firſt Injunctions given to them, when we reſolved on furniſhing them with this Aid, "That a ſpecific "Sum ſhould be required, to reimburſe the Company for the military Charges which might be "incurred by their Interpoſition." See our Reſolutions of the January 1778. The 9th and 10th Articles of the Treaty do indeed bind Ragonaut Row to the Payment of a ſpecific Sum, viz. Two and a Half Lacks of Rupees per Month for the Charges of the Army and Stores with which he was to be aſſiſted *now*, that is from the Preſidency of Bombay only; and the Number of Men compoſing this Aid is fixed at 4000, which is within 90 of the Force actually employed on this Service. But they have not only made no Proviſion for the Charge of our Detachment; they ſeem to have ſtudied to preclude it altogether, by the following Clauſe of the 10th Article, viz. "Which the "Governor and Select Committee agree to accept without further Account, in full of every Expence "attending the Army."

I hope and believe, that however we may have differed, or may differ, on other Points, we ſhall be unanimous in the Reſolution to require that this Defect of the Treaty be ſupplied by a Demand of a ſpecific Sum for the Reimburſement of the paſt Expences incurred by the Expedition, and of a Monthly Subſidy during its Continuance.

It does not appear neceſſary for this Board to expreſs either an Approval or Diſapproval of the Treaty. It has been made under the Declaration of their Sanction, and proclaimed as poſſeſſing it. The Conditions have received the firmeſt and fulleſt Ratification that could be given to them by the contracting Parties, and cannot therefore admit of Amendment or Addition. It is happily conformable to the Orders of the Court of Directors; and if the Objects of it be ſucceſsfully proſecuted, the eſſential Purpoſes of our late Meaſures, which have a Relation to the Marattas, will be anſwered by it, though perhaps not ſo effectually, nor ſo durable a Syſtem of Policy eſtabliſhed as might have been obtained by an Alliance with Moodajee Booſla, on the Footing projected for it. The Meaſure is paſt, and cannot be recalled; our own Plan has been rendered impracticable by it, and our Detachment muſt by this Time be far advanced to ſupport it. We have therefore no Option. We muſt give it all the Aids that can be effectually beſtowed on it.

But I do not think for this Purpoſe we ſhould entirely diſarm our own Government of its Powers, and leave it to the Diſcretion of the Government of Bombay. This would be neither conſiſtent with the Leſſons of Prudence which we have learnt from dearly-bought Experience, nor with the Dignity we poſſeſs as the ſuperior State. Beſides, the near Approach of the Period which has been fixed for the Duration of the preſent Government impoſes an additional Obligation upon us to maintain inviolate thoſe Rights of which we are but the temporary Guardians. The Defects of the preſent Syſtem have been manifeſted by a Trial of Five Years; and it is to be expected that the Wiſdom of the Legiſlature will provide a more complete and effectual Controul for the new Adminiſtration of the Britiſh Affairs in India, than that which was conſtituted by the laſt Act of Parliament. With this Conſideration in Proſpect, I ſhall propoſe that Colonel Goddard ſhall ſtill retain his Independancy on the Government of Bombay; and that he be inveſted with Powers to treat with the Adminiſtration of Poona, as the Miniſter and Repreſentative of this Government, on all Points which regard the general Intereſts of the Company, or the particular Views of this Government.

Having thus laid down the Grounds of our future Conduct, I ſhall now proceed to recommend the following Propoſitions as dependant on them:

1ſt. That Colonel Goddard be directed to co-operate with the Preſidency and Select Committee of Bombay, and with the Committee appointed by them for conducting the political and military Affairs at Poona, in the Support of the Treaty concluded by that Preſidency with Ragonaut Row, and of the Operations dependant on it.

2d. That he be confirmed in the Poſſeſſion of the Powers which he at preſent holds, dependant on the Governor General and Council of Bengal, and independant of the Government of Bombay.

3d. That he be authorized to apply for ſuch Reinforcements of Troops from the Preſidency of Bombay as he ſhall judge neceſſary for completing the Strength of his Detachment, and to receive the ſame, with the Condition that they be not commanded by any Officer of a ſuperior Rank to his own, and that the Preſidency of Bombay be deſired to furniſh him with ſuch Reinforcements, on the Condition thus preſcribed.

4th. That he ſhall not interfere in any of the Negociations or other Tranſactions of the Committee appointed by the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, nor in any Points which reſpect the Treaty lately concluded with Ragonaut Row, or the ſeparate and immediate Intereſts of that Preſidency, except only in ſuch Points in which he ſhall be called upon by the Preſidency and Select Committee, or by the Committee appointed for conducting the military and political Affairs at Poona, for his Advice or Aſſiſtance.

5th. That he be appointed by the Miniſter of this Government at the Court of Poona, with full Powers to treat with Ragonaut Row, or ſuch other Perſon or Perſons as ſhall be at the Head of the Maratta State, upon ſuch Matters as ſhall be expreſsly given to him in Charge; and to accept or conclude any Engagements for the ſame on the Part of the Governor General and Council; and that a Letter of Credence be given him to that Effect.

6th. That he be inſtructed to demand from Ragonaut Row, or the Government for the Time being, Payment of the Expences already incurred in the Expedition undertaken by the Detachment under his Command, eſtimated at 2 Lacks of Rupees per Month, from the 1ſt of June 1778 to the Day of Arrival at or near Poona, and a Monthly Subſidy to the ſame Amount, for the Time in which it ſhall remain at Poona; with the Allowance of Six Months for the Return of the Detachment to Bengal from the Day of its Diſmiſſion; that it be left to his Diſcretion to obtain the moſt complete Security for theſe Payments, either by Aſſignments on the public Treaſury, or on reſpectable Shroffs, or, on the laſt Reſort, on any of the Aumils or Collectors of the Revenue, who ſhall engage to him for the ſame, but not on the Collections themſelves; and that he be expreſsly forbidden to interfere, or to have any Concern in the Collections, or to ſuffer any Perſon under his Authority to interfere, or have any Concern therein.

7th. That in caſe of the Refuſal to comply with this Demand, or of ſuch an Evaſion of it as ſhall be equivalent to a Refuſal, Colonel Goddard be directed to notify the ſame to the Committee, and to the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay; and either to return with the Detachment under his Command to the Province of Berar, or to retire to the Lands ceded to the Company, and in Poſſeſſion of the Government of Bombay, at his Diſcretion; and that the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay be peremptorily required and commanded, in ſuch Caſe, to recall their Troops from Poona, and from the Maratta Dominions.

8th. That the Inſtructions already given to Colonel Goddard do remain in full Force; and that he be directed to reſume the Negociations with the Government of Berar, and to treat with it on the Grounds of thoſe Inſtructions, whenever an Occaſion ſhall offer to proſecute them conſiſtently with the foregoing Reſolutions.

9th. That the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay be deſired to appoint an Agent or Miniſter on the Part of their Government, for the Management of its ſeparate Concerns with the Adminiſtration of Poona, and for the Accompliſhment of the Treaty lately concluded with Ragonaut Row; that his Inſtructions be limited to theſe Objects, and that they themſelves be forbidden to enter into any new Engagements without a previous Application to us, and our Sanction obtained.

Mr. Francis—I ſhall give theſe Propoſitions the moſt attentive Conſideration; but that the Board may have the whole Subject at once before them, I beg Leave to aſk, whether it be meant that the Detachment under Major Camac ſhall proceed under its preſent Orders, or be recalled? Colonel Goddard's Advance to Poona, I apprehend, alters the Ground on which that Reinforcement was ſent, and makes it now impracticable to effect a Junction between the Two Detachments.

Governor General—I think it is probable that we may find Reaſons in the ſubſequent Advices from Colonel Goddard to recall Major Camac; but I do not think that we ſhould too precipitately reſolve on this Meaſure, as we are yet unacquainted with the Reſult of the Expedition undertaken by the Preſidency of Bombay, the Event of which may render the Advance of this Reinforcement very eſſentially neceſſary. Colonel Goddard was adviſed of our Reſolution to ſend him this Reinforcement in our Letter of the 28th December, which I underſtand from the Secretary was diſpatched on the 1ſt or 2d of January. It will probably have reached him before the End of laſt Month, allowing the greateſt probable Length of Time for its Conveyance, and his Anſwer to it may be expected by the End of this Month: I think it will be adviſable to wait till that Time, unleſs from any intermediate Intelligence we ſhall have ſtrong Grounds to conclude either that the Junction will be impracticable or unneceſſary. The Detachment will ſtill remain within our own Territories, and ready for any other Service, although there is no great Likelihood that it will be required.

Warren Haſtings.
Rich[d] Barwell.
P. Francis.
Edw[d] Wheler.

Bengal

APPENDIX, N° 171.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 8th February 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler,
} Eſquires.

Re-conſidered the Minute of the Governor General, entered in the laſt Conſultation.

Mr. Wheler delivers in the following Minute:

Having on former Occaſions given my Opinion fully on the general Queſtions, which relate to our political Tranſactions with the Marattas, I hold myſelf diſpenſed from again entering into that Subject, and ſhall therefore confine my preſent Remarks to the Propoſitions contained in the Governor General's Minute, and upon which I am called by him to give my Opinion.

I ſee no Objection to the Propoſition contained in the Firſt Article; underſtanding it to have been the original Deſign of this Government, in ſending a Detachment to Bombay, to ſupport and aſſiſt the Preſident and Council of that Settlement, in their Engagements with Ragonaut Row.

To the Second and Third I object; and to every other Propoſition which has for its Object the giving to Colonel Goddard any Authority, Civil or Military, independant of the Preſident and Council of Bombay. I conſider it as contrary to every Principle of ſound Policy, that either in the Conduct of War, or Negociation between Two States, there ſhould ſubſiſt in Reality or Appearance, Two Authorities, or Two Intereſts; I know of no Intereſt that this Government or the Preſidency of Bombay can have, ſeparated from each other: And the Court of Directors order, That in our political Tranſactions and Negociations with the Powers on the other Side of India, we make Uſe of the Channel and Agency of the Preſident and Council of Bombay.

To the 4th Article I ſee no Objection: The 5th, 6th, and 7th, I conſider already in great Meaſure as anſwered; and although I am equally deſirous with the Governor General, that the Company ſhould be reimburſed for the Expence occaſioned by the March of the Detachment acroſs India, yet I cannot conſent to the Demand of it being made by Colonel Goddard, or to the Alternative propoſed for him, ſhould that Demand be refuſed. The Preſidency of Bombay have entered into a Treaty with Ragonaut Row, on the Part of the Company, by which we are bound, and are engaged in Meaſures in ſupport of that Treaty; I cannot conſent to Orders which authorize an Infraction of the Treaty, and which may claſh with, or even totally defeat the Meaſures taken in conſequence.

To the 8th Article I object, becauſe I conſider any Negociations or political Connections with the Rajah of Berar, as totally inconſiſtent with the Company's Policy and conſtant Orders; and if this was not the Caſe, the Diſinclination he has already manifeſtly ſhewn to enter into any Engagements with this Government, is a ſufficient Warning to us not to renew our Negociations in that Quarter.

To the 9th Article I muſt obſerve, that during a State of actual War, when Circumſtances may change every Day, and when the Preſidency of Bombay muſt act from them, according to the Occaſion; I cannot conſent to ſo ſtrict a Limitation, either of the Object of their Miniſter at Poona, or of their future Negociations with Ragonaut Row, becauſe at the Diſtance we are placed, an entire Change of Circumſtances may take place, and favourable Opportunities be loſt, before we can be made acquainted with the Events, much more give our Orders in conſequence.

As far therefore as the Letters and propoſed Inſtructions to Colonel Goddard may differ from the Sentiments expreſſive above, they muſt meet with my Diſapprobation, and I diſſent from them accordingly.

Mr. Francis delivers in the following Minute:

The Line of Conduct which I have invariably purſued with reſpect to the late political Meaſures of this Government and of the Preſidency of Bombay, not only exempts me from all Reſponſibility for the Conſequences of them, but from any Obligation of deciding upon the reſpective Merits of their Proceedings and ours: That Queſtion lies ſtrictly between the preſent Majority of this Board, and the Preſidency of Bombay: I ſhall enter into it no farther than I am compelled to do by the Propoſitions before us, and by the exiſting State of Facts.

In the Conſideration of every Meaſure, which I have either recommended or oppoſed, my original and conſtant Object was, to preſerve the Peace of India; to adhere faithfully to our Treaty with the Peſhwa; and not to ſuffer the Company's Arms to be engaged either on this Side of India or by the Preſidency of Bombay, in Schemes of Conqueſt and Ambition: In adhering to theſe Principles, I believe I have been guided by the Dictates of ſound Policy and right Reaſon; as I aſſuredly have been by the Company's fundamental Maxims, and by their poſitive and repeated Commands: I have it too from an Authority, which in the Scale of any Argument of mine, muſt be deemed

* Vide Sect. inf. 7th Auguſt 1776.

particularly weighty * "that in the Company's Concerns with their Neighbours and Allies, the moſt "ſcrupulous Obſervance of their public Engagements, and of the Rights of others, ought to be "their firſt and ruling Object; for every Prince and State whoſe Poſſeſſions may ſtand within the "Sight of the Company's Ambition, is naturally led to apply to their own Intereſts the Treatment "which they ſee others receive from the Company and their Dependants."

When I found my firſt and principal Object no longer attainable, my next Endeavour was, to preſerve if poſſible an Unity of Views, a Conſiſtency of Plan, and a general Co-operation of Meaſures between this Government and the ſubordinate Preſidencies. My Efforts in both Inſtances have been equally unſucceſsful: For the Truth of theſe Aſſertions, I ſhall content myſelf with referring generally to our Secret Conſultations for the laſt Twelve Months; but more particularly to that of the 17th Auguſt 1778; nothing has happened which had not been foretold: But ſince no Reflections on what is paſt will leſſen the Difficulty of our preſent Situation, I ſhall avoid all Retroſpect as much as poſſible; new Facts create new Queſtions, and *theſe* Facts, I fear, are ſuch as exclude this immediate Influence of general Principles of Policy and good Conduct, on which alone a great State can found a ſolid Syſtem of Strength, Security, and Duration. The Arguments and Events with which the Governor's preſent Propoſitions are introduced, are ſtated to be the Grounds of our future Conduct: As ſuch, I muſt examine them, and perhaps my own Safety may make it neceſſary on this Occaſion more than any other, to ſhew how far I do or do not concur in the Aſſertions or Opinions which I may be obliged to ſet my Name to.

1ſt. I agree with the Governor General, that the Plan lately carried into Execution by the Preſidency of Bombay was *certainly warranted* by our Inſtructions to them of the 17th of Auguſt 1778.

2d. I agree with the Governor General in thinking that, conſidering the particular Promiſe contained in their Letter of the 11th of September, as well as the general Line of their Duty, the Subordination in which they ſtand to this Government, and the Attention they owe to the common Intereſts of the Britiſh Empire in India, not leſs than immediately to thoſe of their own Preſidency, they were bound to have ſent us immediate Notice of the Reſult of their Reſolutions; and that their reſolving on an Enterprize of ſuch Importance on the 12th October, and not giving us Intelligence of it before the 12th of December, is not to be defended, not at leaſt by any Fact or Argument which is yet before us.

3d. But I do not admit that any Thing done or omitted by the Preſidency of Bombay after the 11th September, did or could warrant the Reſolution taken here of abandoning Ragoba, and ſubſtituting an Alliance with Moodajee Booſla, in the Place of the Object originally preſented to us by the Preſidency of Bombay: That Reſolution was taken here on the 11th of July. I conſider our Plan as *wholly adopted* the Moment Mr. Elliott's Inſtructions were reſolved on. From that Time forward it never was conſidered as *little more than a Reſource to which we looked in the Event of a Failure in the other Deſign*; it then became our main and ſole Object; and Mr. Elliott was poſitively inſtructed to conclude, even without waiting for any further Orders from the Board.

It is true that on the 17th of Auguſt we authorized the Preſidency of Bombay to carry their own Plan into Execution; but I never can allow that the Two Meaſures could be reconciled. When their manifeſt Inconſiſtency was objected to, the Anſwer to that Objection was, that "the Reſolution "of the Preſidency of Bombay to defer the Execution of a Deſign, the Succeſs of which could only "be inſured by immediate Action, was equivalent to a Reſolution to do nothing." The Governor General then regarded their Deſign in favour of Ragoba as improbable, yet thought *it incumbent on him to ſupport their Meaſures, though againſt his Belief of their taking Effect.* In the Event it appears, that they have adhered to their Plan, and *have* carried it into Execution.

4th. Whether the Preſidency of Bombay did or did not foreſee the Conſequences which might attend their engaging in this Enterprize, they have our direct and explicit Authority to plead in their Defence. They were not made acquainted with the Contents of Mr. Elliott's Inſtructions, conſequently they had no direct Information of the Nature of our Views to guide or reſtrain them in the Exerciſe of that Power which our Letter of the 17th Auguſt gave them. They never received any Letter from Mr. Elliott; nor do they appear to have heard of his Death on the 12th December; and admitting that they had not left an Opening for Moodajee Booſla's Admiſſion into their Engagements with Ragonaut Row, I know not how the Example of this Government, and the Inſtructions ſaid to have been given to Mr. Elliott, to provide for a Junction of Ragonaut Row in his Negociations with Moodajee Booſla, can be urged againſt the Preſidency of Bombay, who knew nothing of the Matter. To this Hour we do not know that they have ever ſeen Mr. Elliott's Inſtructions.

By their Letter before us, they do not appear to have known that our Army was making *quick Advances*; on the contrary, they expreſs an Uneaſineſs at the *ſlow Advances* of the Bengal Detachment.

5th. In ſpeaking of our intended Engagement with Moodajee, it is ſaid, "that in Effect we had "at firſt abandoned it to aſſiſt in the Proſecution of the Scheme which they had preſented "to us."

From the obvious Conſtruction of theſe Words I ſhould conclude that the Alliance with Moodajee Booſla was the Firſt Object of this Government, contrary to every Thing that has been profeſſed of our original Motives for undertaking the Expedition; but be this as it may, it does not appear that we ever abandoned *our* Project to aſſiſt in the Proſecution of their's. The Fact, as I underſtand it, is totally new to me.

6th. I do not entirely agree with the Governor General in thinking that *their Conduct has expoſed us*

to the Suſpicion of Duplicity; perhaps they may think themſelves entitled to reverſe the Charge, and to retort it on this Government: Neither do I admit *that*, in Fact, *it has defeated our Meaſures.* Mooſajee Booſla, in his Letter to Colonel Goddard of the 23d November, expreſſes the ſame Determination not to join the Detachment, or to co-operate in our Views againſt the Peſhwa, which he has done invariably ſince that Time in all his Letters to the Governor General; but on the 23d November he knew nothing of the Proceedings at Bombay, nor for ſeveral Weeks after; nor does he any where allude to their Engagement with Ragonaut Row, or alledge that as a Reaſon for not taking Part with us.

7th. Though clearly exempt from any Degree of Reſponſibility on Account of the Expence which this Government has voluntarily incurred by ſending the Detachment, I am nevertheleſs as deſirous as the Governor General can be of ſeeing the Company reimburſed, though not by all or any Means whatſoever; Three material Objections occur to me againſt the Demand which is propoſed to be made on Ragonaut Row; Two of theſe relate to the Demand itſelf; the Third to the *Quantum.* I deem it unjuſt, for the following Reaſons:

It is ſaid "that the Bombay Treaty has been made under the Declaration of our Sanction, and "proclaimed as poſſeſſing it; that the Conditions have received the firmeſt and fulleſt Ratification "that could be given to them by the contracting Parties, and cannot therefore admit either of "Amendment or Addition." Acquieſcing in this Opinion, I can never admit that we have any Right to make ſo material an Addition to the Treaty, as we ſhould do by inſiſting on a ſpecific Sum for the Reimburſement of the paſt Expences incurred by the Expedition, and of a Monthly Subſidy during its Continuance, conſidering that the Treaty itſelf has fixed a ſpecific Sum, which the Preſidency of Bombay agree to accept *without further Account, in full of every Expence attending the Army.* Neither do I think that we have an equitable, any more than a conventional Right, to make any ſuch Demand on Ragoba. If he be reinſtated, it is done without the Aſſiſtance of the Detachment. Colonel Goddard was not to move from Huſſeingabad before the 15th of January: Fifty Days at leaſt muſt be allowed for his March to Poona; which, ſuppoſing nothing to retard him but the Length of the Journey, fixes his Arrival at Poona to the 6th March. But the Bombay Expedition moved from thence on the 22d November; and if it did not effect its Object by the 15th January, I can only ſay from myſelf that I have very little Idea or Expectation of its Succeſs. Colonel Keating, with a much greater Force, was beaten in the Field, and compelled to retire.

Suppoſing, on the other Hand, the Expedition to have ſucceeded, and Ragoba to be reinſtated; I wiſh to know on what Pretence the Charge of our Detachment, which in the Caſe ſuppoſed will have been of no Service to him, can be exacted of him.

My Second Objection to the Demand is, that I am convinced it never can ſucceed. Ragoba has no Reſources equal to ſuch accumulated Demands; nor if he had, is it likely that any Thing but Force ſhould compel him to yield to them. To inſiſt on the Demand, or to abandon him in the Manner propoſed, I look upon to be as clear and direct a Violation of the Treaty with him, as if we ſhould determine to renounce it in Terms.

My Third Objection to the Demand is, that were it granted it would not reimburſe us the Expence of the Detachment. A conſiderable Part of this Charge muſt have commenced in March 1778; the Whole of it I believe in April; but the Demand is only to be made from the 1ſt June. Again, the Expence is eſtimated at Two Lacks of Rupees per Month, whereas the Preſidency of Bombay have obtained a Subſidy of Two Lacks and a Half a Month, though their Force amounts to little more than Half ours. The annexed Abſtract ſhews that the actual Expence of our Army amounts to very near Two Lacks Sixty thouſand Rupees a Month, excluſive of the Pay of the Nabob of Oude's Cavalry, and excluſive of the Expence of Major Camac's Detachment, which is eſtimated at 64,600 Rupees a Month. I conceive we have as much Right to exact the Whole as any Part of the Expence of the Armament, from Ragonaut Row.

8th. I ſhall now give my Opinion on the ſeveral Propoſitions in the Order in which they ſtand; premiſing only, that the Situation we are in compels me to accommodate myſelf to Events for which I am not anſwerable, and to ſubmit to Facts which I cannot alter.

Suppoſing the *Meaſure paſt, and that it cannot be recalled*, I acquieſce in the Firſt Propoſition; underſtanding, that by the Word *co operate* it is meant that Colonel Goddard ſhall follow the Inſtructions of the Select Committee of Bombay, as he was originally directed to do.

I am againſt the Second, as incompatible with the Purpoſes expreſſed in the Firſt, and becauſe I deem it in the higheſt Degree unſafe to employ Two Armies on the ſame Ground and in the ſame Service; and to place each of them under a ſeparate, an independant Authority. In military Operations, more indiſpenſably than in any other, the Power that directs them ought to be united in One Hand. Independant Powers can produce nothing but claſhing Councils, or ſeparate Purſuits. The Meaſure I believe is wholly unprecedented, and cannot be received but with the higheſt Diſguſt by the Governor and Council of Bombay. Whether Colonel Goddard, under any Inſtructions whatſoever from this Board, can refuſe to obey the Orders of General Egerton, when once he ſhall be within the Reach of ſuch Orders, is a Queſtion of the moſt ſerious and extenſive Conſequence. I am of Opinion that his Refuſal could not be maintained without a direct Violation of the Articles of War, Diſobedience of the Injunction contained in the Body of his Commiſſion, and a Subverſion of the fundamental Principles of military Diſcipline and Subordination; I therefore diſſent from the Propoſition, and moſt ſolemnly proteſt againſt it. If the Board ſhould now be of Opinion that it is not ſafe to truſt the Preſidency of Bombay with the Conduct of our Negociations at Poona, or with

any

any Authority over the Troops which we ſend to their Aſſiſtance, ſuch a Reaſon may be valid againſt permitting them to embark in Enterprizes to which we deem their Councils unequal; but it will not juſtify us in purſuing a Syſtem which naturally tends to divide and weaken our own Strength, and of courſe to defeat our Meaſures as well as theirs.

On the ſame Principles I object to the Third; and hope it will be ſeriouſly conſidered, that a Caſe may poſſibly happen in which a Junction of the Two Armies may be indiſpenſably neceſſary for the Preſervation of both; many probable Caſes may be imagined, in which without ſuch a Junction, it might be impoſſible for their Operations to ſucceed.

I agree to the Fourth.

I object to the Fifth, not knowing what ſort of Buſineſs Colonel Goddard can have to tranſact with the Court of Poona, independant of the Council of Bombay; and foreſeeing, that we ſhall weaken their Credit and Influence with the Court of Poona for no adequate Purpoſe. This Article conſtitutes an Ambaſſador, with Letters of Credence and full Powers—to do nothing. The Propoſition is open to many other Objections; but the Company's Orders in the 21ſt and Three following Paragraphs of their Letter of the 5th February 1777, are poſitive and explicit on this Subject, and leave no Room for Argument.

I have already given my Opinion fully on the Subſtance of the Sixth Article.

Seventh. I agree to the Return of the Detachment to the Frontiers of Berar, ſuppoſing that Route to be the ſhorteſt that leads to the Jumna: But I object to our requiring the Council of Bombay to break their Treaty with Ragoba, eſpecially on ſuch unwarrantable Ground, as that propoſed for doing it; I mean his Refuſal to comply with a new Condition, not only not ſtipulated in the Treaty, but expreſsly excluded by it.

I object to and proteſt againſt the Eighth: In another Place, the Governor General ſpeaks of the Uſes to be derived from *dearly-bought Experience:* We are by this Time ſufficiently acquainted with the light and unſteady Character, not to ſay Duplicity of Moodajee Booſla; and as to the general Queſtion no Words can be ſtronger than thoſe in which Mr. Haſtings has heretofore expreſſed his Opinion againſt an offenſive Alliance with the Marattas. But waving this and all former Objections to the propoſed Alliance with Berar, the Governor General himſelf ſays, that "the Bombay "Meaſure is paſt and cannot be recalled, and that our own Plan has been rendered impracticable "by it." Will our breaking a Third Treaty with the Marattas, facilitate the Concluſion of a Fourth? Let us conſider at leaſt what Character theſe Tranſactions are likely to fix upon the Britiſh Name in India.

I acquieſce in the Ninth Propoſition.

My Opinion of the propoſed Letter to Colonel Goddard is virtually included in the preceding Obſervations. I think it neceſſary however to obſerve, that although I do not condemn Colonel Goddard for reſolving to march to Poona, believing him to conſider it as an Act of Neceſſity, forced upon him by Moodajee Booſla's Conduct, and by the Circumſtances he was reduced to; ſtill I do not think that it calls for any particular Approbation and Applauſe. The Applauſe of Government ſhould never be beſtowed, but upon clear and unqueſtionable Ground, and always with Dignity and Moderation. I think it will appear that Colonel Goddard has acted without Orders: By our Reſolution of the 23d November, the Powers delegated to the Preſident and Select Committee at Bombay were revoked. He was then directed *henceforth to obey all ſuch Orders as he might receive from us.* But he has never ſince received any Orders from us, directly or indirectly authorizing him to march to Poona; or to co-operate with the Preſidency of Bombay in the Reſtoration of Ragoba: The Board, I am perſuaded, will conſider the Conſequences of giving their Applauſe without Reſerve to any Reſolution, however prudent or neceſſary, which a Commanding Officer may take without their Authority. In the Preamble to the propoſed Letter to Bombay, I object to our ſaying that, *in conſequence of their Operations, our Meaſures have been abruptly broke off*; becauſe I am convinced, for Reaſons already aſſigned, that their Proceedings have really had no Influence whatever on the Councils of Moodajee Booſla.

Eleventh. It only remains for me to ſay, that I think Major Camac's Detachment ſhould be immediately recalled.

(Signed) P. Francis.

Extract of the Obſervations on Sir John Lindſay's Letter to the Preſident and Council of Fort St. George, dated 18th April 1771.

We have frequently in our Deliberations on this Subject expreſſed our Opinion very clearly and fully againſt an offenſive Alliance with the Marattas. In this we are juſtified by the repeated Sentiments of the Court of Directors, expreſſed in their Commands for ſeveral Years paſt, againſt diſtant Operations, and engaging in Alliances with the Country Powers. Theſe Sentiments of the Court of Directors, it is true, are not expreſſed in ſuch Terms as naturally convey the Idea of abſolute and determinate Orders; nevertheleſs we ſtand in ſo unhappy a Predicament that we have no Safety but in conſidering them as ſuch; for the whole Tenor and Spirit of the Diſpatches of laſt Seaſon (as we have noticed in other Inſtances) are Proofs that Sentiments ſo expreſſed are quoted as abſolute Orders; at the ſame Time Candour obliges us to acknowledge that the Sentiments of the Court of Directors

Directors on this Subject are perfectly conformable to our own. Their Orders of the 27th June last, received per Dolphin, are very positive and express; they are as follow:

"We have only here to enjoin you to avoid, as much as in you lies, becoming Parties in any Disputes between the Powers of India, and to pay the most strict Obedience to our Orders for confining "our Views to our present Possessions, the Peace and Security of which are the utmost Scope of our "Wishes, as they will necessarily tend to advance the commercial and vital Interests of the Com-"pany."

These, if there were no other, would be very sufficient Motives to induce us to be very cautious of entering into Alliances or Engagements with the Country Powers in general; but with regard to the Marattas, the Honourable Court have very clearly in many Parts of their Commands expressed their Apprehensions of the Dangers of an Alliance with them, or of adopting any Measures which may tend to encrease their Power.

Ordered, that the Account referred to by Mr. Francis be entered after the Consultation.

Mr. Barwell—It is not necessary for me to enter into a Discussion of the Objections that have been urged against the Governor General's Propositions; whoever will take the Trouble to examine the real existing Facts, and the Reasonings upon them, to controul the Measures that are now proposed to be pursued, will be impressed with a Conviction that they are urged more upon System than Policy of State. The Argument is not supported by the Facts, these I have carefully weighed, and upon these, after the maturest Deliberation, I concurred with the Governor General in Sentiment, and with him formed and approved the Propositions on which the Sentiments of the Board are now to be delivered; my Opinion still continues the same of the Measures that should be pursued; I in consequence give my Voice in the Affirmative to the several Propositions.

Governor General—I believe I shall make no Reply, I think it unnecessary, and I have no Time. If on reading the past Minute, I should think it necessary to add to the Debate, I shall take another Occasion for it.

Resolved, that the following Letter be written to Bombay:

Gentlemen,

We have received your Letter of the 12th December, with its several Inclosures.

It was formerly a Matter of great Concern to us that you had suffered so many Opportunities to escape after the Conclusion of the Plan which you had formed in December 1777, for restoring the Power of Ragoba, without taking any effective Means to carry it into Execution. It now affords us equal Concern and Mortification that you have precipitately undertaken it, after having given us every Reason to conclude that you had abandoned it altogether, and compelled us therefore to adopt other Measures, which in consequence of your present Operations have been abruptly broken off, without intimating your Designs to us, and affording us Time to suspend the Course of our own Transactions, or to accommodate them to yours.

You appeal to the Authority contained in our Letter of the 17th August, as a Sanction for concluding the late Treaty with Ragonaut Row, and for proceeding immediately to carry it into Execution. It is true that you were warranted by that Letter to form such Engagements, and that you have literally complied with our Instructions; but no Attention appears to have been had either to the Circumstances under which they were dictated; to the Length of Time since elapsed; or to the very essential Change which has taken place in the Situation of Affairs: We shall leave it to our Superiors to determine whether you were justified under every other Consideration that occurred.

On the 11th September, about the Time fixed for the Commencement of your Operations, you informed us, "that you had not yet taken any Measures in Prosecution of the Plan, but would "speedily come to some decisive Resolutions, and advise us immediately of the Result;" you also referred us to Mr. Lewis for full Information of the Situation of Affairs at Poona. Words so emphatically expressed as those contained in the above Passage of your Letter, could not fail to raise our Expectation; and when a long Period had elapsed without further Advices from you, though we had received Intelligence from Mr. Lewis of the Seizure and Confinement of Moraba Furnese, and Bulhaba Poonder, and of the entire Depression of Ragoba's Party, these Causes served to confirm us in the Persuasion that nothing had been determined, but that your Plan had proved abortive. Our Army at this Time was far advanced towards the Maratta Country; the Object presented to it seemed to have vanished, and none remained to establish an Influence in those Parts, but to effect the proposed Alliance with Moodajee Boosla: Though till then it had been treated as little more than a Resource in the Event of a Failure of your Design, we now resolved to adopt it wholly; and to prevent our being embarrassed by a Contrariety of Orders, we thought it proper to release Colonel Goddard, whom we had previously empowered to prosecute Mr. Elliott's Commission from your entire Authority, except in Cases where your Requisitions might not be incompatible with the special and single Trust thus committed to him.

These are Consequences which we think you ought to have foreseen, and to have provided for them, since it appears that you actually did know of the quick Advances made by our Detachment after the Death of Colonel Leslie, and of the Negociations commenced with Moodajee Boosla. We also conceive that you were acquainted with the Effects of the Alliance held out to that Chief, which had

had brought upon him the Reſentment of Nizam Ally and the Marattas, and in a Manner drawn him into a declared Party with our Government. Under theſe Circumſtances we think you might have waited the Reſult of our depending Meaſures, or at leaſt have paid ſo much Regard to the Steps of our probable Connections with the Government of Berar, as to have left an Opening for its Acceſſion into your Engagements with Ragoba, after the Example we had ſet when we preſcribed the Junction of Ragonaut Row to Mr. Elliott in his Negociations with Moodajee Booſla, and requeſted you to inſtruct him on any Points which your own Situation might ſuggeſt. That Precaution however you neglected, and confined yourſelf to a bare Acknowledgment of ſuch Conditions as might have been concluded at the preciſe Date of your Treaty, without which the Treaty itſelf would have been invalid.

We ſhall here cloſe our Remarks upon this Subject; adding only, that as no Conditions were finally agreed upon with Moodajee Booſla, and the Treaty with Ragonaut Row has been concluded and proclaimed under the Declaration of our Sanction, it remains only for us to ſupport it in the moſt effectual Manner we can; we therefore approve the active and zealous Conduct of Colonel Goddard in marching immediately towards Poona, on your Requiſition; and we hope that the Cauſe has received timely Succour from the Junction of this Force, and Credit from its Approach.

It cannot however but appear extraordinary to us, that although you foreſaw the Neceſſity of Colonel Goddard's Force to ſupport your Operations, and wrote to him in the moſt preſſing Manner to march to your Aſſiſtance; and although his Detachment was originally formed for the Service of Ragonaut Row, and our Firſt Inſtructions to you, dated the 2d February 1778, expreſsly enjoined, "that a ſpecific Sum ſhould be required to reimburſe the Company for the military Charges, that "might be incurred by their Interpoſition;" yet you omitted to make any Proviſions for the Expences of the Detachment in your Engagements with that Chief. In the preſent Situation of Things we ſhall endeavour to correct this Overſight by the beſt Means that occur to us; we have therefore inveſted Colonel Goddard with full Powers to act as the Miniſter of this Government at Poona, and he is furniſhed with Inſtructions to the following Effect:

1ſt. He is ordered to co-operate with you, and the Committee appointed by you, for conducting the political and military Affairs at Poona, in the Support of the Treaty concluded with Ragonaut Row, and of the Operations dependant upon it.

2d. We have confirmed him in the Poſſeſſion of the Powers conveyed to him by our Letter of the 23d November, and which he at preſent holds dependant immediately on us, and independant of your Preſidency.

3d. We have authorized him to apply to you for ſuch Reinforcements of Troops as he ſhall judge neceſſary for compleating the Strength of his Detachment; and we requeſt that you will grant him the ſame, with this expreſs Condition, without which he is not authorized to receive them, That the Officers whom you ſhall appoint to the Command of them, may be of a junior Rank to that of Colonel Goddard.

4th. We have forbid him to interfere in any of the Negociations or other Tranſactions of the Committee appointed by you, or in any Points which reſpect the late Treaty with Ragoba, or the ſeparate and immediate Intereſts of your Preſidency, except only in thoſe Points in which you or the Committee ſhall call upon him for his Advice and Aſſiſtance.

5th. He is appointed, as we have already obſerved, the Miniſter of this Government at the Court of Poona, with full Powers to treat with Ragonaut Row, or ſuch other Perſon or Perſons as ſhall be at the Head of the Maratta State, upon all Matters which we ſhall expreſsly give to him in Charge, and to accept or conclude any Engagements for the ſame on our Part: He is furniſhed with a Letter of Credence for this Purpoſe.

6th. He is inſtructed to demand from Ragonaut Row, or the Government for the Time being, Payment of the Expences already incurred in the Expedition undertaken by the Detachment under his Command, eſtimated at Two Lacks of Rupees per Month, from the 1ſt June 1778, to the Day of his Arrival at or near Poona; and a Monthly Subſidy at the ſame Rate for the Time in which he ſhall remain at Poona, with the Allowance of Six Months for the Return of the Detachment to Bengal from the Day of its Diſmiſſion: We have left it to his Diſcretion to obtain the moſt complete Security for theſe Payments, either by Aſſignments on the public Treaſury, or on reputable Shroffs; or in the laſt Reſort, on any of the Aumils or Collectors of the Revenue, who ſhall engage to him for the ſame, but not on the Collections themſelves, in which we have peremptorily forbid him or any one under him to have any Concern or Interference.

7th. In caſe of the Refuſal of the Maratta Government to comply with theſe Demands, or of ſuch an Evaſion as ſhall be equivalent to a Refuſal, we have directed him to notify the ſame to you and to the Committee; and either to return with the Detachment under his Command to the Province of Berar, or retire to the Lands ceded to the Company, and in your Poſſeſſion at his Diſcretion. We alſo hereby peremptorily require and command you in ſuch Caſe to recall your Troops immediately from Poona and from the Maratta Dominions.

8th. We have confirmed the Inſtructions which we had originally given to Mr. Elliott, and on his Death transferred to Colonel Goddard; they will therefore remain in full Force, and he is directed to reſume the Negociations with the Government of Berar, and to treat with it upon the Grounds of thoſe Inſtructions whenever an Occaſion ſhall offer to proſecute them conſiſtently with the Plan laid down in this Letter.

We recommend that on the Return of your Committee you appoint an Agent or Miniſter on the

Part

Part of your Government, for the Management of its ſeparate Concerns with the Adminiſtration at Poona, and for the Accompliſhment of the different Articles of the Treaty which you have concluded with Ragonaut Row, with Inſtructions expreſsly limited to theſe Objects; and we think it proper to [illegible] command, that you do not enter into any new Engagements without previous Application to us for our Approbation, and that Sanction obtained.

We are, &c.

The following Letter to Colonel Goddard, containing Inſtructions for his Conduct, was prepared by Order of the Governor General, and ſent round to the other Members on Friday and Saturday.

To Colonel Thomas Goddard.

Sir,

We have received your Letters of the 4th and 6th January.

We are very much concerned that Moodajee Booſla ſhould have ſo far diſtruſted the Powers with which you were inveſted, as to ſuppoſe that any Engagements formed by the Preſident and Council of Bombay could preclude the Accompliſhment of a Treaty with him, if ſuch had been concluded; and therefore that he declined to enter into the propoſed Negociation. If a Treaty had been executed by you on the preſcribed Terms, it would have been our Duty to enforce it in Preference to any made at Bombay; and to have taken Care that no Conditions in which that Preſidency might have bound itſelf, ſhould have operated to the Prejudice of our Engagements; but in the preſent Situation of Things we approve and applaud the Prudence and active Zeal for the Intereſts of the Company, which you have ſhewn in the Reſolution ſo immediately taken on Receipt of the Requiſition from the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, to relinquiſh the Proſecution of the Commiſſion which had been ſpecially entruſted to you, and to proceed with the Detachment under your Command to ſupport the Meaſures in which the Preſidency of Bombay was actually engaged, and in which they had ſo far committed the Safety and Proſperity of their own Government, and perhaps the general Welfare of the Company, as to require every Aid that could be poſſibly given to them.

As the Treaty concluded by the Preſident and Select Committee at Bombay with Ragonaut Row was declared to be made under our Sanction and Authority, and as we actually did grant our Conſent to ſuch a Treaty on the 17th Auguſt 1778, we are determined to abide by and ſupport it, notwithſtanding the total Change which has ſince taken place in the Circumſtances under which it was propoſed to us, and the new Meaſures which we have ourſelves adopted, on the ſuppoſed Failure of thoſe planned by the Preſidency of Bombay: But as the Treaty does not provide for the Expence of your Detachment, although it was expreſsly deſigned for the Support of the Plan on which the Treaty was founded; and although our Inſtructions to the Preſident and Council of Bombay, dated the 2d February 1778, expreſsly direct, that a "ſpecific Sum ſhould be required to re-"imburſe the Company for the military Charges which might be incurred by their Interpoſition;" we think it neceſſary to rectify this Omiſſion, and to inveſt you with full Powers for that Purpoſe, alſo to furniſh you with the following Orders, to which we require your ſtricteſt Obedience.

1ſt. We direct that you co-operate with the Preſident and Council or Select Committee at Bombay, and with the Committee appointed by them for conducting the political and military Affairs at Poona, in the Support of the Treaty concluded by that Preſidency with Ragonaut Row, and of the Operations dependant on it.

2d. We do hereby confirm you in the Poſſeſſion of the Powers which you at preſent hold, dependant on this Government, and independant of the Government of Bombay.

3d. We authorize you to apply for ſuch Reinforcements of Troops from the Preſidency of Bombay as you ſhall judge neceſſary for completing the Strength of your Detachment, and to receive the ſame; with the Condition that they be not commanded by any Officer of a ſuperior or ſenior Rank to yours: And we have deſired the Preſidency of Bombay to furniſh you with ſuch Reinforcements on the Condition thus preſcribed.

4th. We forbid you to interfere in any Negociations or Tranſactions of the Committee appointed by the Select Committee of Bombay, or in any Points which reſpect the preſent Treaty with Ragonaut Row, or the ſeparate and immediate Intereſts of the Preſidency of Bombay; except only in ſuch Points in which you ſhall be called upon for your Advice or Aſſiſtance by the Preſident and Council or Select Committee appointed to conduct the military and political Affairs at Poona.

5th. We do hereby appoint you the Miniſter of this Government at the Court of Poona, with full Powers to treat with Ragonaut Row, or ſuch other Perſon or Perſons as ſhall be at the Head of the Maratta State, upon all Matters which ſhall be expreſsly given in charge to you by this Government for that Purpoſe, and to accept or conclude any Engagements for the ſame on our Part: A Letter of Credence to this Effect is incloſed.

We hereby enjoin you to demand from Ragonaut Row, or the Maratta Government for the Time being, Payment of the Expences already incurred in the Expedition of the Detachment under your Command, eſtimated at the Rate of Two Lacks of Rupees per Month, from the 1ſt June 1778, to the Day of your Arrival at or near Poona; and a Monthly Subſidy at the ſame Rate for the

Time in which it ſhall remain at Poona, with the Allowance of Six Months for its Return to Bombay, from the Day of your Diſmiſſion.

We leave it to your Diſcretion to obtain the moſt complete Security for theſe Payments, either by Aſſeſſments on the public Treaſury, or on reſpectable Shroffs; or, in the laſt Reſort, on any of the Aumils or Collectors of the Revenue, who ſhall engage to you for the ſame, but not on the Collections themſelves. And we expreſsly forbid you to interfere, or to have any Concern in the Collections yourſelf, or to ſuffer any Perſon under your Authority to interfere or have any Concern therein.

7th. In caſe of the Refuſal of the Maratta Government to comply with your Demand, or of ſuch an Evaſion on their Part as ſhall be equivalent to a Refuſal, you are to notify the ſame to the Committee at Poona, and to the Preſident and Select Committee at Bombay; and either return with the Detachment under your Command to the Province of Berar, or retire to the Lands ceded to the Company, and in Poſſeſſion of the Government of Bombay, at your Diſcretion. And in ſuch Caſe we have peremptorily required the Preſident and Select Committee at Bombay to recall their Troops from Poona, and from the Maratta Dominions.

8th. We think it proper to declare, that the Inſtructions originally given to Mr. Elliott, and transferred to you, do remain in full Force; and we direct that you reſume the Negociations with the Government of Berar, and treat with it on the Grounds of thoſe Inſtructions whenever an Occaſion ſhall offer to proſecute them, conſiſtently with the following Proviſions:

If Ragonaut Row ſhall conform to the Terms of his Engagements with the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, and ſhall yield to the juſt and equitable Demands of this Government, you muſt give, and continue to give, all the Support which ſhall be requiſite for the Confirmation of his Authority: But if he ſhall depart from the Terms of thoſe Engagements, and the Preſident and Council, the Select Committee, or the Committee appointed by them, ſhall declare to you that he has ſo departed from them; or if he ſhall refuſe to comply with the Demands which you are inſtructed to make; or if he ſhall himſelf deſire to include the Government of Berar in his Alliance with the Company, on the Footing preſcribed by your original Inſtructions; or in the Event of his Death, or of the Failure of the Plan laid for reſtoring him to the Adminiſtration of the Government at Poona; we ſay, in either of the Caſes here premiſed, we authorize you to recur to the Negociations which have been ſuſpended with the Court of Berar, and to conclude a Treaty with that Government in the Manner, and on the Terms already preſcribed by your former Inſtructions.

However we may be reſtrained by Motives of Policy from proſecuting this Meaſure under the Circumſtances which have cauſed the preſent Suſpenſion of it, we are by no Means precluded by the Terms of the Treaty with Ragonaut Row; the Pretenſions of Moodajee Booſla to the Rauze, or Sovereign Authority of the Maratta State, exiſting independantly of any Connections between the Company and Ragonaut Row, and being alſo perfectly reconcileable with them.

Although the Orders which are numbered, taken collectively as they ſtand, are of themſelves very expreſſive and clear, we have thought it neceſſary to add this Explanation of the laſt, with a View to obviate any poſſible Miſapprehenſion of the Nature and Extent of the preſent Treaty concluded with Ragonaut Row; and to recommend it to you, to keep the Object of your original Commiſſion conſtantly in Mind, that you may be prepared to carry it into Execution, in Whole or in Part, whenever you ſhall have it in your Power to do ſo, without embarraſſing this Government in diſcordant Meaſures.

Warren Haſtings.
Rich[d] Barwell.
P. Francis.
Edw[d] Wheler.

APPENDIX, N° 171.

The actual Expence of the Bombay Detachment for Three Months; viz. June, July, and August, 1778, is — — — — — C R° 7,79,328 15 7
Which upon an Average of One Month, is — — — 2,59,776 5 2

The Expence of the Detachment under the following Heads:

Artillery,			
For Three Months, is — — —	C R°	90,118 8 —	
Upon an Average of One Month, is —		— —	30,039 8 —
1st Regiment of Cavalry,			
For Three Months, is — — —	C R°	80,266 13 8	
Upon an Average of One Month, is —		— —	26,755 9 11
Six Battalions of Sepoys,			
For Three Months, is — — —	C R°	3,45,713 2 2	
Upon an Average of One Month, is —		— —	1,15,237 11 5
General Staff,			
(Under which Head the Paymaster has included Bullocks, and the Contingencies of the Gen[l] Staff)			
For Three Months, is — — —	C R°	2,63,230 7 9	
Upon an Average of One Month, is —		— —	87,743 7 11
	Curr[t] Rupees,	7,79,328 15 7	2,59,776 5 2

N.B. The Detachment of the Nabob of Owde's Kandahar Horse, is supposed to be not included in the above Regiment of Cavalry.

(Signed) Claud. Alexander,
Comm[y] General.

Estimate Expence of Major Camac's Detachment for One Month, taken from the Average of Col[l] Goddard's Detachment, and supposing the 700 Drafts, with the Supernumerary Officers, equal to a complete Battalion, is — — — — C R° 57,618
General Staff and Contingences, supposed to be per Month, — — — 7,000

Current Rupees, 64,618

(Signed) Claud. Alexander,
Comm[y] General.

APPENDIX, N° 171.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 15th February 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis, } Eſquires.
Edward Wheler,

The Governor General having delivered in the following Minute in Reply to Mr. Francis's, which is entered in the laſt Conſultation, a Copy of it was ſent Home a Number in the Shrewſbury's Packet.

Governor General—I think it proper to make the following detached Obſervation in Reply to ſuch Parts of Mr. Francis's Minute of the 8th Inſtant, as appear to me to require it, for the Purpoſe of correcting the Fact miſ-ſtated, of compleating the Senſe of partial Quotations, or of removing Objections ariſing from Principles to which I cannot ſubſcribe.

Mr. Francis.

I conſider our Plan as wholly adopted the Moment Mr. Elliott's Inſtructions were reſolved on. From that Time forward it never was conſidered as little more than a Reſource to which we looked; in the Event of a Failure in the other Deſign, it then became our main and ſole Object.

But I never can allow that the Two Meaſures can be reconciled, when their manifeſt Inconſiſtency was objected to. The Anſwer to that Objection was, "that the Reſolution of the Pre-"ſidency of Bombay to defer the Execution of a "Deſign, the Succeſs of which could only be in-"ſured

Reply.

1. To ſo pointed a Denial of my Aſſertions the beſt Argument which can be oppoſed will be a Reference to Mr. Elliott's Inſtructions, and particularly the following Clauſe:

"But if you ſhall have Reaſon to believe that "the Preſidency of Bombay have commenced "any Negociation, or entered into any Engage-"ment, either for the firm Eſtabliſhment of "Peace with the Poona Miniſtry, or for the Re-"ſtoration of Ragonaut Row, or for any other "Purpoſe, which may prove incompatible with "the Operations which we have authorized, you "will in ſuch Caſe ſuſpend your Negociations "until you ſhall have received authentic Infor-"mation, either from Mr. Moſtyn or the Preſi-"dency of Bombay, of the Nature of the En-"gagements either projected or executed by "them; and you will ſo conduct yourſelf as to "conform to their Meaſures, if you can conſiſt-"ently with the prior Attention which you will "give to our Views; or at leaſt not to engage in "any offenſive Plan which ſhall be contrary to "that of the Preſidency of Bombay." In this Caſe Mr. Elliott is not only directed to ſuſpend his own Negociations on the Information of any Engagement actually concluded by the Preſidency of Bombay, and to conform to it; but he is reſtricted from the Proſecution of his own, on the Information, and even on the Belief of any Negociation having been only commenced, and from engaging in any offenſive Plan which ſhould be contrary to the Plan of the Preſidency of Bombay.

How then can Mr. Francis ſo peremptorily affirm, that the Negociation with Moodajee Booſla was never conſidered as little more than a Reſource to which we looked in the Event of a Failure in the other Deſign, and that it then became our main and ſole Object.

2. I muſt here repeat the Obſervation which I have had too frequent Occaſion to make, of Mr. Francis's Mode of extracting, that by the Selection of diſjointed Sentences, any given Senſe may be affixed to any Words, even in the literal Queſtion of them. To the Firſt of theſe Quotations I

have

Mr. Francis.

Reply.

" ſured by immediate Action, was equivalent to " a Reſolution to do nothing."

The Governor General then regarded their Deſign in favour of Ragoba as impoſſible, yet thought it incumbent on him to ſupport their Meaſures, though againſt his Belief of their taking Effect. In the Event it appears, that they have adhered to their Plan, and have carried it into Execution.

have no Objection, but do not ſee how it applies to Mr. Francis's Argument.

The Second is highly exceptionable, as it implies and involves in it, for Want of its Context, a Complication of the groſſeſt Abſurdities, for what Purpoſe I know not; for even theſe do not aſſiſt the Propoſition which it appears to have been introduced to prove, namely, that the Meaſures of the Two Preſidencies could not be reconciled.

I ſhall beg Leave to inſert my Words at full Length, and leave it to thoſe who may be the Judges of our Conteſts, to compare the Senſe of his Quotation with the genuine Extract: " But " though I regard the projected Deſign in fa- " vour of Ragoba as improbable, I ſtill conſider " it as poſſible, and in that View only propoſed " the Anſwer expreſſed in the Queſtion; and I " have thought it incumbent upon me to ſupport " the Meaſures of that Preſidency in this In- " ſtance, though againſt my own Belief of their " taking Effect, becauſe the Court of Directors " have expreſsly enjoined the Renewal of the En- " gagements with Ragoba in the Caſe of a Rup- " ture with the preſent Government of Poona."

Although Mr. Francis has not aſſigned any Reaſon for his Aſſertion, that the Two Meaſures cannot be reconciled, yet as it is poſſible that others may adopt the ſame Concluſion, I ſhall briefly ſtate the Two Meaſures as they were propoſed, without any Comment upon them.

That formed by the Preſidency of Bombay was to reſtore Ragonaut Row to the Office of Peſhwa or Chief Miniſter of the Maratta State; ours to ſupport Moodajee Booſla in his Pretenſions to the Rauze or Sovereign Authority of the Maratta State. Theſe Offices are both univerſally acknowledged to be conſiſtent and exiſtent Parts of the Maratta State; they were therefore, and ſtill continue, reconcilable to each other.

I know not how the Example of this Government and the Inſtructions ſaid to have been given to Mr. Elliott, to provide for a Junction of Ragonaut Row, in his Negociation with Moodajee, can be urged againſt the Preſidency of Bombay, who knew nothing of the Matter to this Hour; we do not know that they have ever ſeen Mr. Elliott's Inſtructions.

3. It is true they had not then ſeen Mr. Elliott's Inſtructions, but they know ſo much of their intended Effects, as to juſtify the Obſervation made in my Minute that "they ought to " have left an Opening for the Admiſſion of " Moodajee Booſla into their Engagements with " Ragonaut Row, after our Example, and in " the ſame Manner as our Inſtructions to Mr. " Elliott had preſcribed the Inſtructions of Rago- " naut Row, in his Negociation with Moodajee " Booſla."

Our Letter to them dated the 17th Auguſt, clearly implied, that we had left ſuch an Opening in our Inſtructions to Mr. Elliott, becauſe it authorized them, under certain Conditions, to aſſiſt Ragonaut Row with a military Force, and conduct him to Poona; and it was not poſſible for them to ſuppoſe, that at the Time when we gave them ſuch an Authority, we ſhould either give or leave to Mr. Elliott ſuch Inſtructions as in their Nature would tend to annul it.

By their Letter before us, they do not appear to have known that our Army was making quick Advances; on the contrary, they expreſs an Un-

4. By their Letter before us, they acknowledge their having received Intelligence of the Arrival of the Army at Kimbaſſy: It is to this Know-

ledge

Mr. Francis.

eaſineſs at the ſlow Advances of the Bengal Detachment.

In ſpeaking of our intended Engagement with Moodajee, it is ſaid, "that in Effect, we had not "firſt abandoned it to aſſiſt in the Proſecution "of the Scheme which they had preſented to "us." From the obvious Conſtruction of theſe Words, I ſhould conclude, that the Alliance with Moodajee Booſla was the firſt Object of this Government, contrary to every Thing that has been profeſſed of our original Motives for undertaking the Expedition. But be this as it may, it does not appear that we ever abandoned our Project to aſſiſt in the Proſecution of theirs: The Fact, as I underſtand it, is totally new to me.

Moodajee Booſla in his Letter to Colonel Goddard of the 23d November, expreſſes the ſame Determination not to join the Detachment or to co operate in our Views againſt the Paiſhwa, which he has done invariably ſince that Time in all his Letters to the Governor General; but on the 23d November, he knew nothing of the Proceeding of Bombay, nor for ſeveral Weeks after, nor does he any where allude to their Engagement with Ragonaut Row, or alledge that as a Reaſon for not taking Part with us.

I can never admit that we have any Right to make ſo material an Addition to the Treaty as we ſhould do by inſiſting on a ſpecific Sum for the Reimburſement of the paſt Expences incurred by the Expedition, and of a monthly Subſidy during its Continuance; conſidering that the Treaty itſelf has fixed a ſpecific Sum, which the Preſidency of Bombay agreed to accept *without further Account, in full of every Expence attending the Army.*

Reply.

ledge I have alluded in the Expreſſion to which Mr. Francis objects, and which I think is warranted by it.

5. An Alliance between the Governments of Bengal and Berar, was firſt ſuggeſted by Shawbajee Booſla, the Predeceſſor of Moodajee Booſla, in the Year 1773, and has been the Subject of a continued Correſpondence between the Two States to the preſent Time: I believe, it was alſo intimated by me on the Acceſſion of the new Government, in a Minute which I wrote upon the Political State of their Preſidency: It has been frequently mentioned in the Courſe of our Debates on the preſent depending Meaſure.

6. I knew, which Mr. Francis indeed could not, that the Firſt Change of Moodajee Booſla's Sentiments aroſe from his Knowledge of the Deſigns which were then actually formed by the Preſidency of Bombay, to engage in ſome active Enterprize with Ragonaut Row: This was mentioned by Beneram Pundit, the Maratta Vackeel, in a Letter to his Brother, and communicated to me. I own it made little Impreſſion at that Time upon me, becauſe I had no Expectation of what has ſince paſſed at Poona, and thought that Moodajee had a more obvious and ſubſtantial Reaſon for his Heſitation in the ſuppoſed Indeciſion of this Government. All the Letters written ſince that Date by Moodajee Booſla, the Conferences held by him and his Dewan with Mr. Watherſtone, the Opinion of Mr. Watherſtone, and that of Colonel Goddard, all combine to prove, that this was the prime if not the ſole Cauſe, and I think an allowable one, of his declining to accept of the proffered Engagement with us.

7. By the Treaty, the Preſidency of Bombay are only bound to conduct Ragonaut Row to Poona, and to place him in the Government, with this expreſs Stipulation, that this done they ſhall leave him there. We have therefore a clear Right to withdraw our Force when theſe Points are accompliſhed; and the Orders iſſued to this Effect, in the Event of the Caſe ſuppoſed, can only operate after the Reſtoration of Ragonaut Row to the Poſſeſſion of Poona, and of the Government of that Capital. The Treaty with the Preſidency of Bombay doth not preclude any Demand which may be made by this Preſidency for the ſpecific Aid afforded to Ragonaut Row; and every Principle of Juſtice, and the univerſal Practice of all States in ſimilar Caſes, authorizes us to demand an Equivalent for the Aid which we have furniſhed to Ragonaut Row at his Requiſition, and applied directly to his Support; we have ordered the Demand to be made, but no other Means have been preſcribed to enforce it, except to avail ourſelves of the poſſible Advantage which the Treaty itſelf, both in the preciſe Terms and evident Intention of it, gives us.

If Mr. Francis had objected that the Means propoſed

Mr. Francis.

Reply.

propoſed might, under certain and poſſible Caſes, prove inſufficient, I ſhould have acknowledged it; but pleaded that this was a Caſe of Neceſſity, impoſed upon us by the Preſidency of Bombay, and ſuſceptible only of the imperfect Remedy which we have applied to it.

Neither do I think that we have an equitable any more than a conventional Right to make any ſuch Demand on Ragoba.

If he be reinſtated, it is done without the Aſſiſtance of the Detachment. Colonel Goddard was not to move from Huſſengabad before the 15th January; Fifty Days at leaſt muſt be allowed for his March to Poona, which, ſuppoſing nothing to retard him but the Length of the Journey, fixes his Arrival at Poona to the 6th of March.

8. I impute the Firſt Revolution in the Maratta State to the Influence of our Detachment, although it was then ſcarcely formed.

I aſcribe the Second to the Inaction of the Preſidency of Bombay, and to the ſlow Progreſs of our Detachment.

I ſhall aſcribe a Share at leaſt of the Succeſs of the Operations undertaken by the Preſidency of Bombay, if they ſhall prove ſucceſsful, to the Advance of our Army, and to the other correſponding Meaſures which have been taken by this Government to defeat the Deſigns of the Adminiſtration at Poona.

I ſhall leave the Juſtice of theſe Concluſions to every Man's own Breaſt, who knows the Force of Opinion on all great political Events; but without reſting the Equity and Reaſonableneſs of our Demand on this ſingle Ground, I ſhall add as incontrovertible Proofs that this Aid was originally projected at the Requiſition of the Preſidency of Bombay, on the Behalf of Ragoba; that repeated Requiſitions have been made for it by both; that its Deſtination has been lately called by the ſame Party from the other Objects in which it was then engaged; and laſtly, that the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, whom we muſt regard as empowered to tranſmit the Sentiments and Wiſhes of Ragonaut Row, have expreſsly aſſigned as a Reaſon for calling the Detachment to their Support.

Ragoba has no Reſources equal to ſuch accumulated Demands.

9. The Reſources of the Maratta Government, if united through the Means of our Aſſiſtance, added to thoſe which Ragonaut Row inherently poſſeſſes, are equal to theſe and infinitely greater Demands; and ſurely we have a Right to claim the firſt Application of his Treaſures to the Diſcharge of the Expence incurred on his Account, if he derives the Poſſeſſion of them immediately from us.

My Third Objection to the Demand is, that were it granted, it would not reimburſe us the Expence of the Detachment.

10. After having read it objected to the Demand, that it was too much, I did not expect an Objection immediately to follow it, that it was too little; it was not my Deſign to obſerve the Preciſion of an Account current in the groſs Sum to be demanded as the Reimburſement of a general Expence: The Sum propoſed for the Subſidy is certainly moderate, but I believe upon the whole it will prove adequate to its profeſſed Object; the Charge of the Detachment did not properly commence until we had carried into Execution the Expedient adopted in July laſt, for replacing the Number of effective Men which had been drawn from our Eſtabliſhment by this Detachment, and the Expence of their being confined to Effectives only, bears but a ſmall Proportion to the Battalions which have been ſpared for this Service; I do not include Major Camac's

Mr. Francis.

Whether Colonel Goddard, under any Inſtructions whatſoever from this Board, can refuſe to obey the Orders of General Egerton when once he ſhall be within the Reach of ſuch Orders, is a Queſtion of the moſt ſerious and extenſive Conſequence.

Reply.

Detachment in the Expence of Colonel Goddard's, nor ſuppoſed it to make a Part of the preſent Demand.

11. This is a very alarming Declaration, and may be attended with ſerious Conſequences if it ſhould reach the Preſidency of Bombay, which is not improbable from the Facility with which the moſt important, and what from their Nature ought to be the moſt ſecret Tranſactions of this Government, make their Way to the Public Notice. I know no Powers which Colonel, not General, Egerton poſſeſſes over the Officers and Soldiers of this Eſtabliſhment

It has been uſual in all Inſtances in which Detachments have been ſent from one Preſidency to another to particularize in the Inſtructions and Orders given to the Officer commanding each Detachment, how far he was to obey the Orders of the Preſidency under which he was to ſerve.

From the many Inſtances which may be brought to prove this, I ſhall juſt mention ſuch as at preſent occur to me.

When Colonel Clive was ſent from Madras in 1757 to retake Calcutta, he was empowered and directed by the Preſidency of Fort Saint George to return with his Troops, or any Part of them which he thought proper, when he ſhould judge it neceſſary.

When Colonel Peach was ſent from Bengal to the Decan in 1767, with a Diviſion of the 1ſt Brigade, this Preſidency not only reſerved to itſelf the Power of recalling the Detachment whenever they pleaſed, but ſtipulated alſo that Colonel Peach ſhould command this Force, and any other that the Preſidency of Madras ſhould judge neceſſary to add to it.

Mr. Francis may not now perhaps recollect, that when ſo ſmall a Detachment as a Lieutenant, an Enſign, and 50 Men from the 1ſt Regiment, were ordered to Bombay in 1776, under the Command of Lieutenant Taylor, it was expreſſed, that in the Event of a Campaign that Party was to be put under the Command of a Bengal Officer, Captain Allan M^c^Pherſon.

It was further agreed, that on the Arrival of this Party at Bombay they were to be put under the Orders of the Governor and Council there.—This ſurely implies that it was neceſſary for us to grant an Authority to the Officers under this Government, to obey the Orders of the Government of Bombay before they could obey them, we might of courſe have reſerved to ourſelves the Power of recalling the Detachment when we thought proper.

If after this Explanation any Doubts ſhould remain as to our Power of ſending diſcretional Orders to General Goddard, or inveſting him with an Authority over the Troops of this Preſidency, ſubject only to our future Inſtructions, although I am ſorry to take up the Time and Attention of the Board on a Point ſo extremely clear, let Mr. Francis read over the Commiſſion of an Officer in this Service; he will there ſee that every Officer on the Bengal Eſtabliſhment is directed and bound to obey our Orders, and the Orders of his

Mr. Francis.

Reply.

I object to the 5th, not knowing what Sort of Buſineſs Colonel Goddard can have to tranſact with the Court of Poona, and foreſeeing that we ſhall weaken their Credit and Influence with the Court of Poona, for no adequate Purpoſe. This Article conſtitutes an Ambaſſador with Letters of Credence, and full Powers—to do nothing.

But I object to our requiring the Council of Bombay to break the Treaty with Ragoba, eſpecially on ſuch unwarrantable Ground as that propoſed for doing it, I mean his Refuſal to comply with a new Condition, not only not ſtipulated by the Treaty, but expreſsly excluded by it.

ſuperior Officers, which inevitably implies Officers commiſſioned by or acting under our Authority only.

While the Treaty of Poona was depending in 1776, and there was a Proſpect of our commencing Hoſtilities againſt the Maratta Government, we took upon ourſelves to appoint the late General Gordon to command the Army that ſhould be ordered to act upon the Malabar Coaſt, and to appoint Lieutenant Colonel Upton Commander of the Troops that ſhould be ſent from Bengal, and Second in Command of the Forces that might be ordered to act againſt the Marattas. 9th March

In the Firſt Inſtance our Orders were thus expreſſed:

"We think it incumbent upon us to *require* "and *inſiſt* that you aſſign the *Command* of the "Army to General Gordon, &c."

The Second Inſtance was expreſſed, "We ſhall "direct Lieutenant Colonel Upton to ſend the "Two Companies of Sepoys under the Com-"mand of Captain Wroe, which he took with "him as his Eſcort to ſtrengthen your Army, and "to *command* it to you that he may be appoint-"ed Second in Command in your Army, &c."

The Words uſed by Mr. Francis in a Minute, delivered by him on this Occaſion, are ſo oppoſite to the preſent Debate, that I ſhall beg Leave to extract them: "Neither is our Recommenda-"tion of Colonel Upton, in my Opinion equi-"valent to an abſolute Order; at the ſame "Time, I expect it will be complied with; ſince, "independant of the ſuperior Authority veſted in "this Council, it would be highly unreaſonable, "that even on the Footing of a combined Army, "the Party from which the chief Support of the "common Cauſe is expected, ſhould have an Of-"ficer in that Army on whom they can directly "depend."

12. The Inſtructions expreſs in very plain Terms, *what ſort of Buſineſs Colonel Goddard is to tranſact at the Court of Poona, independant of the Preſidency of Bombay.*

The 5th Article impowers him to treat upon ſuch Matters as ſhall be expreſsly given to him in Charge; and the next expreſſes in Terms the Matter on which he is to treat, namely, to demand a ſpecific Monthly Sum for the Charge of the Detachment.

I am at a Loſs to conceive, on what Grounds Mr. Francis has crouded together ſo many ſtrong and pointed Terms, to expreſs his Senſe of the Futility of Colonel Goddard's Powers.

13. I have ſaid, that the Preſidency of Bombay "ſeem to have ſtudied to preclude it," but I do not agree with Mr Francis "that they have "expreſsly excluded it," for the Truth of which, I refer to the Article of the Treaty itſelf.

Mr. Francis.

We are by this Time ſufficiently acquainted with the light and unſteady Character, not to ſay Duplicity, of Moodajee Booſla.

Reply.

14. I know no Inſtances of Moodajee's Conduct which can juſtify theſe Charges: On the Application to him, to permit the Detachment to march through his Dominions and to ſupply it with Proviſions, he complied inſtantly and liberally; wrote to the commanding Officer to come with Security; and ſent a Man of Truſt with a Store of Proviſions to his own Borders, when it lay waiting for the Detachment Five Months: On the Propoſal made to him of an Alliance, he acquieſced without Reſerve; and when that Propoſal was in Danger of failing by the Death of Mr. Elliott, he ſtrongly recommended the immediate Transfer of the Commiſſion to another. Before the Commiſſion could take Effect, he received Intelligence of a Deſign projected, and on the Eve of being executed at Bombay, which he judged incompatible with the propoſed Engagements, or with his Views in it; he therefore declined to engage further in it, until that Obſtacle was removed, or until it could be undertaken on more ſolid and ſatisfactory Grounds, and for this Purpoſe, he had deputed an expreſs Agent to receive our ultimate Determination, and to explain the Conditions on which he will acquieſce in it: He may have carried the Principle of Caution, as I think he has, to a faulty Exceſs; but of Levity, of Unſteadineſs, of Duplicity, I wholly acquit him.

Mr. Francis has in another Place produced contraſted Paſſages of Moodajee's Letters, written under different Situations, which I have explained; but he has not offered the Evidence of a ſingle Fact, nor I preſume, can any be offered, in ſupport of the Allegations which are thus harſhly pronounced againſt Moodajee Booſla, not by Mr. Francis in his own Perſon only, but on the Behalf of the whole Board as united in the ſame Sentiments with him.

And as to the general Queſtion, no Words can be ſtronger than thoſe in which Mr. Haſtings has expreſſed his Opinions, againſt an offenſive Alliance with the Marattas.

15. With equal Reaſon the Garments which I now wear may be conſtrued to infer an Inconſiſtency with Declarations made by me with reſpect to the Weather on the 1ſt of May laſt: Different Seaſons and Circumſtances require different Solutions of the ſame general Queſtion. At the Time from which Mr. Francis has borrowed his Quotation, the Maratta Empire was in its full Vigour; its Parts entire; its Poſſeſſions extending from the Banks of the Jumna to the Walls of Seringapatam; and it was adminiſtered by a ſpirited and enterprizing Prince, who had demanded our Aid, not as the Gift of reciprocal Policy, but as the Right of aſcertained Superiority; and denounced War and Ruin on the Carnatic if we refuſed: It was then argued, that it was impolitic to contribute to the Aggrandizement of a Power already too great for our own Safety. This was the Language of the Court of Directors, and of the Preſidency of Fort Saint George, reiterated to each other: It is now propoſed to aſſume an Aſcendant over this no longer dreaded State; ſuch is the Spirit of the Orders given by the Court of Directors for the Reſtoration of Ragonaut Row; and ſuch is the Spirit

Mr. Francis.

I think it will appear that Colonel Goddard has acted without Orders. By our Resolution of the 23d November, the Powers delegated to the President and Select Committee at Bombay were revoked. He was then directed *henceforth to obey* all such Orders as *he might receive from us*; but he has never since received any Orders from us, directly or indirectly, authorizing him to march to Poona, or to co-operate with the Presidencies of Bombay for the Restoration of Ragoba.

Reply.

Spirit of the Measures which we had projected for the Elevation of Moodajee Boosla.

16. It is true that our Orders of the 23d November directed Colonel Goddard henceforth to obey all such Orders as he might receive from us, and from us only; but these did not forbid him to comply with a Requisition of the Presidency of Bombay, although delivered, as it must be, until the Revocation of our former Orders was known, in the Style of Authority, if it was consistent with the Instructions before given to Colonel Goddard; and both our Instructions of the 15th October and those of the 23d November, fully warrant the last Movement of the Detachment, the former Instructions allowing him Authority to advance, even without the Order of the Presidency of Bombay, and the latter to assist and co-operate with them, consistently with the primary Objects of his Commission.

I shall conclude this Minute by acknowledging, that the Propositions were written with the immediate and personal Assistance of Mr. Barwell, after the most deliberate and wary Consideration of them, and are at least as much his original Composition as my own, which I repeat with Pleasure, because I think they will reflect no Discredit on him; and I shall ever think it a Credit to my Labours, that they have so strong a Sanction as his Participation in them.

(Signed) W. H.

Mr. Francis in consequence sent in the following Remarks, a Copy of which were also enclosed a Number in the Packet.

Mr. Francis—I beg Leave to offer One Observation on the Governor General's Minute recorded Yesterday, and which I desire may accompany it as a Number in the Packet.

Having stated my Objections to the Command proposed to be exercised by Colonel Goddard, independent of Brigadier General Egerton, his superior Officer in the Company's Service, with whom he is nevertheless to co-operate, it is urged in Reply that, in May 1776, we directed the sole Command of the Company's Troops at Bombay, or that should be ordered to act on the Malabar Coast, to be vested in General Gordon; and that we recommended it to the Presidency of Bombay to appoint Lieutenant Colonel Upton Second in Command in their Army. Whether these Measures were advisable or not, or whether we had a Right to insist on their Compliance with our Injunctions, are not the Points at present in Debate. The Question is, whether, when I object to dividing the Command of Troops on the same Service, and to our making an inferior Officer independant of his Superior, such Objection is answered by saying, that at a former Period we insisted on the *sole* Command being vested in General Gordon, and recommended that Lieutenant Colonel Upton should be appointed to act *under him*.

On all the other Points I submit to Judgment, with this Remark only, that I do not believe it will appear to any impartial Judge, that I have ever in any Instance misrepresented the Sense of any Passage in the Governor General's Minutes, though I do not think it necessary to recite all the Words he makes use of. If the contrary be affirmed, it should be shewn by a clear Statement of the Amount of his Meaning, compared with that which I have attributed to him, in what Particular, or to what Degree the one essentially differs from the other.

Long Quotations, which nobody will attend to, seldom have any other Effect but to leave the Question perplexed and undecided.

(Signed) P. Francis.

Governor General—I do not myself make long or full Quotations, but think it incumbent on me to include in them every Thing necessary to compleat their Sense; and I complain that Mr. Francis, by a different Practice, and particularly by the Exclusion of intermediate Words and Sentences, has totally perverted my Meaning.

A Compariſon of his Extract from my Minute of the 4th Inſtant, with the compleat Paragraph inſerted in the Second Paragraph of my laſt, will verify this Obſervation.

(Signed) W. H.

Warren Haſtings,
Richd Barwell,
P. Francis.

APPENDIX, N° 172.

Extract of a Letter from the Governor General and Council in Bengal to the Court of Directors, in their Secret Department; dated the 1ſt February 1779.

WE have juſt received very important Advices from the Select Committee at Bombay, and from Colonel Goddard, which being now under our Conſideration, we ſhall defer writing on the Subject of them until we can inform you of the Reſult of our Deliberations; in the mean while we encloſe Copies for your Information.

Copy of a Letter from the Governor General and Council in Bengal to the Court of Directors, in their Secret Department; dated the 11th February 1779.

Honourable Sirs,

In our laſt Diſpatch of the 1ſt Inſtant, by the Godfrey, we tranſmitted you a Copy of the important Advices which we had juſt then received from the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, and gave you to expect that our Proceedings upon them would ſhortly follow. We have now the Honour to forward a complete Copy of them by the Shrewſbury, agreeable to our Promiſe: As they are very full, and not encumbered with any foreign Subject, we truſt that you will beſtow on them the Attention which they deſerve; and therefore we ſhall take the Liberty to refer you principally to them.

We ſhall not enlarge in this Place upon the apparent Irregularity and Precipitancy of the Meaſures lately adopted by the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, but leave you from a Peruſal of the Facts to judge and paſs your Opinion, whether they were fully juſtified in reſolving to undertake them on the different Grounds and Conſiderations that occurred at the Time.

With reſpect to the Mode of Conduct which we have reſolved to purſue on this Occaſion, we think it proper to be rather more minute. The preſent Treaty with Ragonaut Row having been formed by the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, under the expreſs Letter of our Sanction; and this Authority having been proclaimed to the World in a Manifeſto, under the Company's Seal, it remained only for us to ſupport the Engagements thus concluded, although a very principal Condition, both enjoined by us in our Letter to Bombay, dated 2d February 1778, and obviouſly ſtriking in itſelf, had been omitted; we mean, a Stipulation or Proviſion for the Expences of the Detachment ſent from hence to the Aid of Ragonaut Row; which was at that Time advancing quickly into the Maratta Country, and which has ſince actually marched towards Poona, at the expreſs Requiſition of the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay.

Thus circumſtanced, with an Object of ſo much Importance to ſecure at the Court of Poona, we thought it adviſable to purſue the moſt effectual Means of accompliſhing it that were ſuggeſted by the Occaſion; and therefore reſolved to inveſt Colonel Goddard with Powers to treat with that Court, and to furniſh him with Inſtructions, to the following Effect:

Colonel Goddard is directed to co-operate with the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, and with the Committee appointed by them for conducting the political and military Affairs at Poona in ſupport of the Treaty concluded by that Preſidency with Ragonaut Row, and of the Operations dependant on it.

He is confirmed in Poſſeſſion of the Powers conveyed to him by our Letter of the 23d November, which he at preſent holds, dependant on this Government, and independant of the Preſidency of Bombay.

He is authorized to apply for ſuch Reinforcements of Troops from the Preſidency of Bombay, as he ſhall judge neceſſary for completing the Strength of his Detachment, and to receive the ſame, with the Condition that they be not commanded by any Officer of ſuperior Rank to himſelf.

We have forbid Colonel Goddard to interfere in any of the Negociations, or other Tranſactions of the Committee appointed by the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, or in any Points which reſpect the Treaty lately concluded with Ragonaut Row, or the ſeparate and immediate Intereſts of that

that Preſidency, except only in thoſe in which he ſhall be called upon by the Preſident and Select Committee, or the Committee appointed by them, for his Advice and Aſſiſtance.

We have appointed Colonel Goddard the Miniſter of our Government at the Court of Poona, with full Powers to negociate with Ragonaut Row, or ſuch other Perſon or Perſons as ſhall be at the Head of the Maratta State, upon all Matters which ſhall be expreſsly given to him in Charge, and to accept or conclude any Engagements for the ſame on our Part.

We have inſtructed Colonel Goddard to demand from Ragonaut Row, or the Government for the Time being, Payment of the Expences actually incurred in the Expedition undertaken by the Detachment under his Command, eſtimated at Two Lacks of Rupees per Month, from the 1ſt of June 1778 to the Day of his Arrival at or near Poona, with the Allowance of Six Months for the Return of the Detachment to Bengal, from the Day of its Diſmiſſion; to obtain the moſt complete Security for theſe Payments, either by Aſſignments on the Public Treaſury, or on reputable Shroffs; or, in the laſt Reſort, on any of the Aumils or Collectors of the Revenue, who ſhall engage to him for the ſame, but not on the Collections themſelves, in which we have forbidden him, or any one under his Authority, to have any Concern or Interference.

In caſe of a Refuſal on the Part of the Maratta Government to comply with theſe Demands, or of ſuch an Evaſion of them as ſhall be equivalent to a Refuſal, Colonel Goddard is directed to notify the ſame to the Committee, and to the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, and either return with the Detachment under his Command to Berar, or retire to the Lands ceded to the Company, and in Poſſeſſion of the Government of Bombay, at his Diſcretion; and we have peremptorily required and commanded the Preſident and Select Committee in ſuch Caſe to recall their Troops from Poona, and from the Maratta Dominions.

We have thought it proper to confirm the Inſtructions originally given to Mr. Elliott, and after his Death transferred to Colonel Goddard, and to direct him to reſume his Negociations with the Government of Berar, and to treat with it on the Grounds of thoſe Inſtructions whenever an Occaſion ſhall offer to execute them conſiſtently with the foregoing Reſolutions.

For the fuller Explanation of our Intentions in this Article, and to obviate any Miſconception of the Obligation impoſed on us by the Treaty concluded by the Preſidency of Bombay with Ragonaut Row, we have diſtinctly ſpecified the ſeveral Caſes which ſhall authorize him to renew the Negociations with Moodajee Booſla. Theſe are as follow:

1ſt. If Ragonaut Row ſhall depart from the Terms of his Engagements with the Government of Bombay.

2dly. If he ſhall refuſe to comply with our Demands.

3dly. If he ſhall himſelf deſire to include the Government of Berar in his Alliance with the Company, on the Footing preſcribed by our Inſtructions to Mr. Elliott.

4thly. In the Event of Ragonaut Row's Death.

5thly. In caſe of the Failure of the Plan undertaken by the Preſidency of Bombay for reſtoring that Chief.

We have given the neceſſary Directions on theſe ſeveral Subjects to the Preſident and Select Committee at Bombay; and further recommended it to them, on the Return of their Committee, to appoint an Agent or Miniſter on the Part of their Government for the Management of its ſeparate Concerns with the Adminiſtration of Poona, and for the Accompliſhment of the different Articles of the Treaty which they have concluded with Ragonaut Row, but with Inſtructions expreſsly limited to thoſe Objects; and we have alſo thought it neceſſary to forbid them to enter into any new Engagements, without a previous Application to us, and our Sanction obtained for that Purpoſe.

We are,

Honourable Sirs,

Your moſt faithful humble Servants,

Warren Haſtings,
Rich[d] Barwell,
P. Francis,
Edw[d] Wheler.

Fort William,
11th February 1779.

APPENDIX, N° 173.

Bengal Secret Perſian Correſpondence.

Letter from Governor General to Moodajee Bhoſila: Written 9th February 1779.

I DID not think proper to return an immediate Anſwer to your Firſt Letter, becauſe it had been written on the Suppoſition that the Commiſſion which had been entruſted to Mr. Elliott had not been transferred to any other Perſon, and that the Negociations and Objects of it were left in total Suſpence;

Suſpence; and as all your Objections to the propoſed Alliance were grounded on that Preſumption, I expected that when you were informed, as you would ſoon have been after the Diſpatch of that Letter, that Mr. Elliott's Commiſſion had been transferred to Colonel Goddard, with full Powers for carrying into Execution the Plan intended by it, all your Objections would ceaſe of courſe, and that you would be as much diſpoſed to accept of the propoſed Alliance, and to join in the Meaſures projected for it, as you appeared to be in the Letter which you wrote me immediately after the News of Mr. Elliott's Deceaſe: In this Hope however I have been diſappointed; an unfortunate Concurrence of Circumſtances has cauſed a Change in your Sentiments, and defeated my Deſigns. By your laſt Letter, and by the Advices received at the ſame Time from Colonel Goddard, I underſtand that you have given him his final Anſwer, and that the Subjects of his Negociations remain ſuſpended to an indefinite Time; and that the Cauſe of your Reluctance to enter into my Views, has proceeded from the Engagements which have been lately concluded by the Government of Bombay with Ragonaut Row, and the Meaſures actually taken by them for replacing him in the Adminiſtration of Poona. I will own that the Doubts you entertained on the Receipt of this Intelligence were reaſonable; for I have no Right to expect that you ſhould place an implicit Reliance on the Faith of any Engagements implied by the Overtures made by me to you, but not ratified by any formal Inſtrument; yet I am ſorry that you entertained this Diſtruſt; and do declare, that had you accepted of the Terms offered you through Colonel Goddard, and concluded a Treaty with this Government upon them, I ſhould have held the Obligation of it ſuperior to that of any Engagements formed by the Government of Bombay, and ſhould have thought it my Duty to maintain it, and to defend the Faith of this Government pledged for the Performance of it againſt every Conſideration even of the moſt valuable Intereſts and Safety of the Engliſh Poſſeſſions intruſted to my Charge; nor in Effect was the Plan propoſed to you precluded by the Engagements of the Government of Bombay with Ragonaut Row, but as I conceive entirely reconcilable to it; this however has had the Effect of diverting your Mind from the Proſecution of our mutual Deſigns, and I am therefore without Remedy.

You will be pleaſed to remember that the original Intention of ſending an Engliſh Army from this to the Weſtern Side of India was to aſſiſt the Government of Bombay in the Accompliſhment of a Plan connected with the actual Rulers of the Maratta State, with whom they were in Alliance, and ſimilar to that which they have lately carried into Execution, as I informed you in my Firſt Letter written upon this Subject. That Plan proved abortive; but the ſame Cauſes which had induced me and the Members of this Government to give our Sanction to the Meaſures of the Government of Bombay, namely, the dangerous and forward Intrigues of the French at Poona, ſtill ſubſiſted, with other additional Motives, for proſecuting the Undertaking; and I thought this a fair Occaſion to afford you the moſt ſubſtantial Proof of the Sincerity of the Profeſſions which I had repeatedly given to you, and of cementing a laſting Friendſhip between your Houſe and the Company by the ſtrong Connection of mutual Advantages. With this View I firſt deputed Mr. Elliott with full Powers to negociate, and to conclude a Treaty between us, and to concert the Operations dependant on it. His Death ſuſpended this Deſign, which was inſtantly renewed on the Intimation given me by you of your Wiſhes concurring with mine, and Colonel Goddard was ſubſtituted the Miniſter of this Government in his Place.

To you I had unreſervedly communicated all my Views, partly and indiſtinctly by Letters, but very fully in repeated Converſations with Beneram Pundit, as it would have been very improper to have truſted Affairs of ſuch Delicacy and Importance to Letters, and to the Hazards to which theſe would have been expoſed in a long and doubtful Journey. Your Caution was ſtill greater, and was perhaps more commendable, although I may regret the Neceſſity which preſcribed it; for neither your Letters, nor the Letters of Beneram Pundit, afforded me the leaſt Clue to judge of your Sentiments or Inclinations reſpecting the particular Points of Action which were to form the Subſtance of our projected Engagements; and although from your general Profeſſions, and the Warmth and Sincerity with which theſe were manifeſtly dictated, I had every Reaſon to conclude that you approved of them, yet, without ſome Aſſiſtance, common Prudence required that I ſhould not precipitately abandon every other Reſource, and irrevocably commit the Honour and Intereſt of this Government in a doubtful Meaſure. Precautions were taken that nothing ſhould be undertaken by any of the Governments dependant on this, which might eventually interfere with thoſe actually concluded with you; and laſtly, that Colonel Goddard might be freed from all Embarraſſments which might check or impede him in his Negociations with you. The Orders by which he had been ſubjected to the Authority of the Government of Bombay were revoked, and he was inſtructed to give his whole Attention to the Treaty which he was charged to conclude with you. Due Intimation of this was at the ſame Time written to Bombay.

The Paſt is paſt, and cannot be recalled; it is therefore as unneceſſary as it would be improper, to paſs a Judgment on the Propriety of it. With reſpect to the future, my Diſpoſition and Wiſhes remain the ſame; nothing is yet loſt, although the Proſpect be removed to a greater Diſtance. I ſhall wait for the Arrival of Beneram Pundit for the Information of future Inclinations; and by this it is my Deſire to be guided in the Hopes that they may be ſpeedily accompliſhed to our mutual and entire Satisfaction.

APPENDIX, N° 174.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 2d March 1779.

PRESENT,
The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell, Philip Francis, Edward Wheler, } Eſquires.

MR. Francis having ſent in the following Minute on the 23d ultimo, it was circulated, and returned this Morning by the Governor General, with the Minute which is entered after it.

Mr. Francis—It does not belong to me to anſwer for the Inconſiſtency of the Meaſures purſued by this Board ſince December 1777, or to reconcile and account for the contradictory Declarations with which they have been occaſionally introduced or ſupported; in every Inſtance, in which I may be able to produce the Governor General's own Authority in Defence of my Opinion, I ſhall think myſelf at Liberty to make uſe of it. Mr. Francis, 23d February 1779.

The Queſtion left in Debate by his laſt Minute, recorded the Eleventh Inſtant, and in which I underſtand him to maintain the Affirmative, are as follow:

1ſt. "Whether at the Time when Mr. Elliott's Inſtructions were reſolved on, the Plan propoſed by that Commiſſion was not the *principal* Object of this Government; or whether it was conſidered by us as *little more than a Reſource to which we looked in the Event of a Failure in the other Deſign?*"

When Mr. Elliott's Appointment was reſolved on in July 1778, it appears by his Inſtructions, that the Bombay Plan, in favour of Ragoba, was abandoned by this Government. In the Inſtructions it is expreſsly inſerted, That "*the Deſign had failed*; that Ragonaut Row had now no Party left; that the Preſidency of Bombay could not now, under any Circumſtances, afford him this Aſſiſtance; and that, thus deprived of the Reſources on which we depended, in the Partizans of Ragoba, &c. we were therefore deſirous of joining our Forces and our Intereſts with thoſe of Moodajee Booſla." Even the Paſſage quoted by the Governor General proves, that the Junction with Moodajee Booſla was not conſidered by us as *little more than an eventual Reſource*, but that it was then our main and principal Object. On a Suppoſition that the Preſidency of Bombay might have actually entered into Engagements with Ragoba, the Inſtructions to Mr. Elliot ſay, "You will ſo conduct yourſelf as to conform to their Meaſures, if you can, conſiſtently with the *prior Attention which you will give to our Views*, remembering that a defenſive Alliance with Moodajee Booſla being the permanent Object of your Commiſſion, you are to ſuffer no Conſideration whatever to divert you from that Object, &c."

Finally, the Governor General in his Letter of the 9th Inſtant to Moodajee Booſla, ſays, "I do declare, that had you accepted the Terms offered you through Colonel Goddard, and concluded a Treaty with this Government upon them, I ſhould have held the Obligation of it ſuperior to that of any Engagement formed by the Government of Bombay."

2d. "Whether the Two Plans, *viz.* That formed at Bombay, for the Reſtoration of Ragoba to the Office of Peiſhwa, and that projected by us for the Advancement of Moodajee Booſla to the Sovereign Authority of the Maratta Empire, are compatible in their Nature, and may really exiſt together."

The Object conſtantly aimed at by Ragoba on one Side, and held out to Moodajee Booſla on the other, has been, the actual Sovereignty of the Maratta State. It is not to be ſuppoſed, that either of them would be ſatisfied with a bare Title, while the actual Power was left in the Hands of his Rival; nor in Fact was ſuch a Propoſition ever made to them. But if the actual Power of the Adminiſtration was their common Object, it can hardly be a Queſtion, whether Two Plans, the profeſſed Purpoſe of which is to place both of them in Poſſeſſion of ſuch Power, can be reconciled and executed together. The Governor General himſelf ſays, That the Reſolution taken at Bombay *has defeated our Meaſures, and expoſed us to the Suſpicion of Duplicity*; but the Affirmative of the Queſtion ſuppoſes the Meaſures compatible, conſequently the Execution of one ought not to defeat the Succeſs of the other. The Opinion that they are really incompatible, does not belong to me alone. In Mr. Elliott's Inſtructions the poſſible Caſe of an Engagement on the Part of Bombay, for the Reſtoration of Ragoba, is ſtated as *incompatible with the Operations which we had above authorized*, viz. in the preceeding Part of the Inſtructions. Colonel Goddard, in his Letter of the 6th of January, ſays, "That Moodajee Booſla juſtly apprehends, that the eſtabliſhing of Ragonaut Row's Authority under the Influence of the Engliſh, would exclude him from all Hopes of ever obtaining the Object he has in View through their Means, as an Attention to, and Obſervance of the Intereſts of both would be an impracticable Taſk to our Government, and irreconcilable to themſelves."

In another Part of the ſame Letter he tells us, that "Moodajee Booſla acknowledges his View "is to have the Way to his own future Projects; and that he declares, with equal Appearance of "Sincerity, that theſe are incompatible with the Meaſures now adopted by Ragonaut Row."

Mr. Watherſtone, in his Letter of the 24th of December, ſays, "The principal Cauſe, "however, of their Objection to the Bombay Schemes, is, I make no Doubt, the *invincible Bar* "they foreſee they will occaſion to the Accompliſhment of their own." The Governor General himſelf ſays, That "our own Plan has been rendered impracticable by it."

I ſubmit to Judgment, whether this Evidence be or be not concluſive?

3d "Whether the Preſidency of Bombay were bound *by our Example*, to leave an Opening "for the Admiſſion of Moodajee Booſla into their Engagements with Ragoba, *in the ſame Manner* "as our Inſtructions to Mr. Elliott had preſcribed the Junction of Ragoba in his Negociations "with Moodajee Booſla?"

The Governor General affirms, "That it was not poſſible for the Preſidency of Bombay to "ſuppoſe that at the Time when we gave them ſuch an Authority, we ſhould either give or "leave to Mr. Elliott ſuch Inſtructions, as in their Nature would tend to annul it." Yet the Declaration quoted from the Governor's laſt Letter to Moodajee Booſla, plainly ſhews that ſuch a Suppoſition, if they had formed it, would not have been unwarrantable. At all Events they ought not to have been left to their own Conjectures, on a Point of ſuch Importance. They ought to have been informed of the preciſe Object of Mr. Elliott's Commiſſion. They would then have had no Excuſe for entering into Engagements, which are now ſaid to have defeated our Meaſures, and to have expoſed us to the Suſpicion of Duplicity. It reſts with the Governor General to ſhew how it was poſſible for them to follow our Example, and to leave an Opening for Moodajee Booſla, in the ſame Manner as our Inſtructions to Mr. Elliott had preſcribed the Junction of Ragoba, with his Negociation with Moodajee Booſla, when they had never ſeen Mr. Elliott's Inſtructions, nor know any thing of the Plan of them.

4th, "Whether the Support of the Plan, preſented to us by Bombay, in December 1777, "was not our Firſt profeſt Object in undertaking the Expedition, and whether we have ever "abandoned our Plan, to aſſiſt in the Proſecution of their's?"

When the Court of Directors ſhall have read the following Quotations, I believe they will view with the ſame Surprize that I do, the Governor General's preſent Declaration, that the Alliance with Moodajee Booſla was the Firſt profeſſed Object of this Government.

Conſultation, 8th October 1778. "If there are Men in England ſo devoid of Common Senſe as to ſuppoſe it poſſible for me "to have formed a Plan, oſtenſibly profeſſed for the Support of Bombay, but really meant as a "Cover for other Deſigns, let them. Whoſoever they are, or in whatever Relation they may "ſtand to this Government, ſuch Opinions will give me no Kind of Concern."

"We were called upon by the Preſidency of Bombay to aſſiſt them in a Plan, &c. Our As- "ſiſtance was only neceſſary to ſupport it."

4th February 1779. "The Object *originally preſented* to our Army, ſeemed to have vaniſhed." "It will be re- "membered, that our Detachment was expreſsly deſigned for the Support of the Plan com- "municated to us by the Preſidency of Bombay, in December 1777."

Mr. Haſtings to Moodajee Booſla, February 1779. "You will be pleaſed to remember, that the original Intention of ſending an Engliſh Army "from this to the Weſtern Side of India was to aſſiſt the Government of Bombay, in the accom- "pliſhing of a Plan, concerted with the actual Rulers of the Maratta State."

If nevertheleſs, an immediate and decided Engagement with Moodajee had in Effect been firſt adopted, and afterwards abandoned by us, to aſſiſt in the Proſecution of the other Scheme, with what Reaſon can it be conſidered as little more *than a Reſource, to which we looked in the Event of a Failure in the Deſign* furniſhed us by the Preſidency of Bombay?

I deny that we have ever abandoned the Project of an Alliance with Moodajee Booſla, ſince it was firſt avowed. The Proof of the contrary lies on the Affirmative.

5th. "Whether the ſuppoſed Change in Moodajee Booſla's Sentiments, is to be attributed to "his Knowledge of the Deſigns lately formed at Bombay?"

A private Letter from the Marratta Vackeel to his Brother, is no Evidence to this Board, if it had ever been before us. It appears that the Governor General himſelf paid no Regard to it. But Moodajee Booſla's Letter to Colonel Goddard, of the 23d of November, muſt be received by us as public Authority. He therein ſtates a Multitude of Reaſons for not engaging in the propoſed Alliance. Is it to be ſuppoſed, that if he had been acquainted with the Reſolution then taken at Bombay, he would not have added that Argument to the reſt, or that he would have deſignedly omitted to juſtify himſelf by the only Plea to which in Truth there could be no Poſſibility of Reply?

6th. "Whether we have *ſtrictly* a Right to inſiſt on a farther Subſidy from Ragoba, in Ad- "dition to the Sum ſtipulated and limited by the Bombay Treaty?"

The Twelfth Article of the Treaty ſays, "The Engliſh Forces are to continue with Ragonaut "Row, until the Object of this Treaty is accompliſhed, which is to place him in the Regency "of Poona." But, if he refuſes to comply with the Demand of Two Lacks a Month, beyond the Subſidy limited by the Treaty, Colonel Goddard is commanded to retire with his Detachment, and the Preſidency of Bombay to recall their Troops from Poona. The Execution of theſe Orders is not to wait till the Objects of the Treaty are accompliſhed; the Demand is to be inſtantly

inſtantly made, and a Refuſal to comply with it is to be immediately followed by the Retreat of our Armies. The Concluſion from theſe Premiſes is obvious and unavoidable.

7th. " Whether we have an *equitable* Right to inſiſt on ſuch a Demand?"

We muſt wait the Event, before we can determine whether Colonel Goddard's Army will really have contributed in any Degree to the Succeſs of the Expedition from Bombay. That Preſidency may naturally tell us, that the Motion of *their* Army was the Cauſe of Colonel Goddard's Security, ſince it evidently muſt have diverted a Part at leaſt of the Force that would have oppoſed him. The Argument, otherwiſe equal in itſelf, preponderates clearly in favour of that Party, which ſtands neareſt to the common Enemy, and enters firſt into Action.

8th. " Whether Ragoba, ſuppoſing him reinſtated, derives the Poſſeſſion of his Treaſures " immediately from us?"

I know of no Reſources which Ragoba *inherently poſſeſſes*; for a conſiderable Time paſt he has been a Burthen to the Company, even for his perſonal Subſiſtence. That he will derive the future Poſſeſſion of any other Treaſures *immediately from us*, is a Propoſition which, I believe, the Preſidency of Bombay will be as unwilling to admit as Ragoba himſelf; they will claim the whole Merit of the Service, and they will engroſs the Reward of it. We need not yet, however, embarraſs ourſelves about a Diviſion of the Spoil. That Queſtion at preſent is premature.

9th. " Whether my Objection to the Amount of the Demand be unfair on my own Principles?"

There is an Air of Cavil in the Remark on my Objection to the Amount of the Demand, which perhaps might excuſe me from replying to it. Yet I ſhould be ſorry to be miſunderſtood; my Meaning is, that if all Objections to increaſing our Demands on Ragoba, on the Score of the Aſſiſtance he may derive from the March of Colonel Goddard's Army, be over-ruled, the Demand then ſhould be proportioned to our actual Expence. On any Principles that will juſtify us in demanding a Part, we have a Right to the Whole. Two Lacks a Month from June laſt, fall very ſhort of reimburſing the Company for the Charge of this Meaſure.

10th. " Whether it appears what Sort of Buſineſs Colonel Goddard is to negociate and tranſact " at the Court of Poona, as Ambaſſador from this Government?"

To make a peremptory Demand of a ſpecific Sum of Money, does not require us to veſt Colonel Goddard with the Character and full Powers of an Ambaſſador, and no other Object of Negociation appears to be intruſted to him.

11th. " Whether we have no Reaſon to charge Moodajee Booſla with Levity, Unſteadineſs, or Duplicity?"

If it be true that Moodajee Booſla conſtantly ſolicited an Alliance with this Government, and, as I find it aſſerted by the Governor General on the 16th of November laſt, that " he was " both willing and prepared to join his Aſſiſtance in the Operations of the Detachment;" I am entitled to charge him with Levity and Unſteadineſs in departing from all his former Profeſſions, as he evidently did on the 23d of November, when it was impoſſible for him to be apprized of the Reſolution taken at Bombay. With reſpect to his Duplicity, I muſt leave it to others to judge from Facts; in the mean Time, I do not deem it unwarrantable, nor is it unprecedented in the Conſultations, either here or at Madras, to queſtion the good Faith of a Maratta. How it ſtands with the Governor General's perſonal Credit, or with the Wiſdom of his Meaſures, to maintain that Moodajee Booſla's Conduct has been unexceptionable, is a Queſtion which I think deſerves his Conſideration.

12th. " Whether the direct Change of Opinion admitted by Mr. Haſtings, with reſpect to the " Policy of engaging the Company in an offenſive Alliance with the Marattas, be juſtified by a total " Change of Circumſtances, ſuppoſed to have taken place ſince his former Opinion was de- " livered?"

When fundamental Maxims of Policy are avowedly ſet aſide, the Change of Circumſtances ſhould not only be clear and uncontrovertible, but it ſhould be ſuch a one as warrants the Adoption of new and oppoſite Principles of Action. I am not ſufficiently Maſter of the Revolutions which have happened in the Maratta Empire ſince April 1771, and which in ſo ſhort a Period are ſuppoſed to have produced a total Alteration in its Circumſtances, to enter into that Part of the Queſtion. Taking the Facts as they are ſtated by the Governor, it ſeems to me an obvious Concluſion, that, if it were dangerous for us to unite with the Marattas when their Empire was entire and in its full Vigour, it muſt be uſeleſs to commit ourſelves by taking any Part in their Diviſions, when their Empire is falling to Pieces of itſelf; either Way, our engaging the Company's Arms in an offenſive War, whether in Conjunction with a Part or the Whole of the Maratta Empire, is indefenſible, ſince it is equally contrary to the Company's poſitive, moſt ſolemn, and repeated Commands.

13th. " Whether Colonel Goddard in marching to Poona, has not acted without Orders?"

It is admitted, that on the 23d of November, Colonel Goddard was directed thenceforth to obey all ſuch Orders as he might receive from us, and from us only. The Excluſion contained in theſe Terms, could only relate to the Authority heretofore delegated to the Preſidency of Bombay and now revoked; under theſe laſt Inſtructions Colonel Goddard could no longer obey the

the direct Orders of that Presidency; but it seems he was at Liberty to comply with their Requisitions. Such a Construction of positive Orders, I believe, is unprecedented. The verbal Distinction between Orders and Requisitions, seems to me to be of no Weight. Colonel Goddard has defended his Conduct on much better Grounds.

(Signed) P. Francis.

The Governor General—This is not a Time for speculative Discussion; yet I must defend myself against the Charge of Inconsistency in Measures of such Importance to the Interests of the Company and to the national Reputation, as those into which I have been forcibly drawn, not by my own Option, but by the Acts of others independant of me, since December 1777; and which are rendered yet more important to my own Character by the miserable Catastrophe which has attended the Design from which these all derive their Origin. I shall conform to Mr. Francis's Arrangement of his Arguments in my Reply to them, and hope at least to have the Merit of Brevity, if I am not justified by the Motives which have impelled me to give up so much of my Time to Debate, which might be devoted to more useful Purposes, and to write what perhaps no one will read.

1st. Mr. Elliott's Commission consisted of Two distinct and independant Points; a defensive Alliance, which was to be concluded independantly of any Measures or Engagements of the Presidency of Bombay; and an offensive one, which was not to take place, if any Engagements should have been concluded, or Measures formed, by the Presidency of Bombay, which were contradictory to it. This is clearly expressed in the following Extract of his Instructions, which I quote again to save the Trouble of a Reference. "But if you shall have Reason to believe that the Presidency of Bombay have commenced any Negociations or entered into any Engagements, either for the firm Establishment of Peace with the Poona Ministry, or for the Restoration of Ragonaut Row, or for any other Purpose, which may prove incompatible with the Operations which we have above authorized, you will in such Case suspend your Negociations until you shall have received authentic Information, either from Mr. Mostyn or the Presidency of Bombay, of the Nature of the Engagements either projected or executed by them; and you will so conduct yourself as to conform to their Measures, if you can consistently with the prior Attention which you will give to our Views, or at least not to engage in any offensive Plan which shall be contrary to that of the Presidency of Bombay." There is a clear and pointed Opposition stated of Two Designs; one proposed by Mr. Elliott's Commission, and the other by the Presidency of Bombay; and it is declared that the former shall not be attempted in the Case of the actual Prosecution of the latter; therefore it is provided, that "at the Time when Mr. Elliott's Instructions were resolved on, "the Plan proposed by the Committee was not the principal Object of this Government, but "considered by us as little more than a Resource, to which we looked in the Event of a Failure "in the other Design."

The Quotation made from my Letter to Moodajee, has no Relation to the Proposition stated by Mr. Francis himself, which expressly confines it to the Date and Duration of Mr. Elliott's Instructions. This speaks only of Engagements made by Colonel Goddard. The relative State of the Two Commissions was clearly this: In Mr. Elliott's we considered the Project formed by the Presidency of Bombay as abortive, but in the Supposition of the Possibility of its Existence we gave it the Preference, and therefore left the Detachment under the Orders of that Presidency—In Colonel Goddard's Commission, we still considered that Project as abortive, and deeming it indispensably necessary to fix the Destination of Colonel Goddard's Detachment, then advanced to the Confines of Berar, where it must either remain for the Junction of Moodajee, and for the Accomplishment of the Plan proposed to him; or abandoning that Design, proceed to the Support of that of the Presidency of Bombay; we gave the Preference to the former, and therefore released the Detachment from the Orders of that Presidency.

2d. It was never agreed nor proposed, neither did Ragonaut Row ever require, that he should be put into Possession of the Sovereignty of the Maratta State, whatever might have been the implied and secret Object of the Engagement concluded with him. He did not dare in his ejected State to violate the Constitutional Forms which the Peishwa's, his Predecessors in the Plenitude of their Power professed to hold sacred. Whether therefore he were satisfied or not with the "bare Title" of Peishwa, without the usurped Powers of it, would have been no Concern of mine, nor ought to have influenced the Measures of our Government if we could have improved its Relation to the Maratta State by other Aids, not prohibited by our Engagement with him.

The professed Object of the Alliance with Moodajee, was to put him in Possession of the Sovereignty of the Maratta State, to which he had fair and legal Pretensions, and which he might have certainly held without Prejudice to the Rights of Ragonaut Row as Peishwa; and Ragonaut Row might as consistently have exercised the Office of Peishwa under his Authority as his Predecessors in the same Office did before the Usurpation of Ballagee in 1740, which has been supported under all the Forms and avowed Rights of the Constitution.

Therefore, the Two Plans, viz. "That formed at Bombay for the Restoration of Ragoba to the "Office of Peishwa, and that projected by us for the Advancement of Moodajee Boosla to the "Sovereign Authority of the Maratta Empire, are compatible in their Nature, and may really exist "together."

My.

My Aſſertion, that " the Reſolution taken at Bombay has defeated our Meaſures and expoſed us to the Suſpicion of Duplicity," does not imply that the Two Meaſures are incompatible. The Union of Two diſtinct Caſes may be conſiſtently ſuppoſed, although the Attempt to unite them may fail, or the Means ſeparately taken to eſtabliſh one may defeat or counteract the other. Moodajee could not truſt Ragonaut Row, nor commit himſelf and his Fortunes in an Engagement with us, which might eventually be defeated by thoſe which he ſaw formed by the Preſidency of Bombay with Ragonaut Row, and with the Nature and Extent of which he was unacquainted. He therefore declined it under ſuch Circumſtance; ſo that in Effect, the Reſolution taken at Bombay has defeated our Meaſures, becauſe he did not chuſe to be a Party in it, yet it does not therefore follow that the Meaſures were in themſelves incompatible. That " our own Plan has been rendered impracticable by it," which are quoted as my Words, and I ſuppoſe are ſuch, meant no more than that it was no longer practicable for Colonel Goddard to concert a Plan of Operations with Moodajee Booſla, ſince he had been obliged to leave him, and to march to Poona, for the Purpoſe of giving his Support to the Preſidency of Bombay in Favour of a Plan to which Moodajee was adverſe; yet ſurely neither is this a Proof that the Two Meaſures were in themſelves incompatible.

3d. I preſume that the Point is ſufficiently proved by what has been already ſaid upon it in my former Minute, as I find nothing new in Mr. Francis's preſent Argument againſt it.

4th. Here again Mr. Francis has confounded Two different and unconnected Subjects, viz. The offenſive Alliance with Moodajee Booſla for the mutual and perpetual Support of our reſpective Territories, immediately bordering on each other, and an offenſive Alliance for other Purpoſes. The Deſign of the firſt had exiſted ſince the Middle of the Year 1773, and a fair Opportunity preſented itſelf of accompliſhing it, when the Preſidency of Bombay called our Attention to another Object. It would have been unreaſonable at ſuch a Time to attempt it. It was therefore abandoned to aſſiſt in the Proſecution of theirs." This is a ſufficient Comment on the multiplied Quotations which Mr. Francis has too exultingly produced for the " Surprize of the Court of Directors."

5th. Mr. Francis has affirmed, that the ſuppoſed Change in Moodajee's Sentiments could not have been influenced by the Knowledge of the Deſigns lately formed at Bombay, becauſe it is firſt avowed in his Letter to Colonel Goddard of the 23d November, when no ſuch Deſigns exiſted. It now appears that the Treaty with Ragonaut Row was executed on the 24th of November, and that on the 5th of December the Operations of the Army for the Support of it were in ſuch forwardneſs, that an advanced Party from it was in actual Poſſeſſion of the fatal Paſs of Roorgaut. A Month only be allowed, which is a very ſhort Allowance for making the neceſſary Proviſions for the Expedition, and paſſing the Army and Stores to the Continent, this Time was much more than ſufficient to have furniſhed Moodajee with a complete Knowledge of their Intentions. It appears beſides from Mr. Lewis's Letter, dated the 27th of October, that there had been formally ſtated to him by Mr. Hornby, that he had in conſequence ſent away all the Sepoys ſtationed with the Reſident, and hourly expected his own Recall. The Proof therefore of Moodajee having poſſeſſed this Knowledge, no longer reſts on a private Letter from the Maratta Vackeel to his Brother; and for its Effect on Moodajee's Sentiments, his Declarations, the corroborative Opinions of Mr. Watherſtone and Colonel Goddard, and the plain Concluſions of common Senſe, are ſufficient Evidences.

6th. The profeſſed Object of the Treaty is to place Ragonaut Row in the Government of Poona; and it is a Condition of it, that this being effected, our Forces ſhall have Liberty to leave him. This is all that is propoſed by the Orders given to Colonel Goddard, and to the Select Committee of Bombay, in the Event of Ragoba's Refuſal to repay the Charges of our Detachment. We have therefore " ſtrictly a Right to inſiſt on a further Subſidy from Ragoba, in Addition to the Sum ſtipulated and limited by the Bombay Treaty," with this ſingle Alternative.

7th. The Failure of the Undertaking renders this a Point of pure Speculation; I ſhall therefore leave it to be ſupported by the Arguments which I have already uſed in my former Minute.

8th. This too ſuppoſes a Caſe no longer exiſting nor likely to exiſt; I ſhall therefore leave it.

9th. I refer to my former Minute as a complete Reply to Mr. Francis's ſhort Argument on this Propoſition, as he has ſtated it, if either his Reaſonings or mine on ſuch a Subject merit ſo much Attention.

10th. Colonel Goddard is not ſimply impowered to make a peremptory Demand, but he is inſtructed in the ſeveral Modes in which it may be accepted, and in the Conduct which he is to obſerve in the Caſe of the Refuſal to comply with it. Theſe are Powers ſpecifically given to Colonel Goddard, and whether neceſſary or not, in Mr. Francis's Opinion to the Character of an Ambaſſador, theſe ſufficiently prove that, " it appears what ſort of Buſineſs Colonel Goddard is to negociate and tranſact at the Court of Poona, as Ambaſſador from this Government."

11th. This Quotation has been ſufficiently diſcuſſed in my Obſervations on the 5th Propoſition, and in my former Minute.

12th. "The emphatic Appeal made by Mr. Francis to the Company's poſitive, moſt ſolemn, "and repeated Commands," might deter me from replying, if I had no other Means of Defence than in ſheltering myſelf under contradictory Orders of the Court of Directors; their recent Commands to recur to the Engagement formed by Ragonaut Row, are a virtual Repeal of all former Orders given to abſtain from Hoſtilities with the Marattas, and under the Circumſtances in which theſe oppoſite Orders were dictated, both are mutually reconcilable, as I have proved in my former Minute.

13th. Colonel Goddard was freed from the Authority of the Preſidency of Bombay, but he was directed to uſe his Diſcretion in certain preſcribed Caſes. He might therefore comply with a Requiſition from Bombay, or even an Order, which preſented to him any of the Caſes preſcribed, As in Effect it did. He has not therefore acted without Orders in the Reſolution taken by him to march to Poona on ſuch Requiſition.

(Signed) Warren Haſtings.

APPENDIX, N° 175, 176, and 177.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 25th February 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis, and } Eſquires.
Edward Wheler,

RECEIVED the following Letter from Bombay.

Gentlemen,

We have had the Honour to receive your Letters, dated the 15th and 20th of October, by the Terrible; and agreeable to the Power given us in the Firſt of theſe Letters, we immediately ſent an Order to Colonel Goddard to advance to this Coaſt, even without a Junction of the Forces of any Power in Alliance with us; a Meaſure we thought indiſpenſably requiſite, having formed our Plan with a Dependance upon the Services of this Detachment, which we always underſtood was meant for the Support and Aſſiſtance of this Preſidency.

We were therefore much ſurprized and concerned upon Receipt of your Letter of the 23d November, to find the Direction of the Detachment taken out of our Hands, at a Time when we had ſuch preſſing Occaſion for its Services; and our Perplexity was much increaſed by the Miſcarriage of the Letter and Inſtructions therein referred to, whereby we were left intirely ignorant of the Object of a Negociation, which we are told is likely to cauſe a very ſpeedy and eſſential Change in the Deſign and Operations of that Detachment.

All that we could do in ſuch a Situation, was to explain to Colonel Goddard our Views in the Engagement we had formed with Ragoba, and to ſend him a Copy of the Treaty, that he might judge how far our Meaſures were compatible with his Inſtructions from you: We at the ſame Time preſſed him ſtrongly to advance to this Coaſt as ſoon as poſſible; and we truſt, that you, Gentlemen, reflecting on our Situation, will ſee the Propriety and Neceſſity of enforcing our Injunctions.

We beg Leave to encloſe a Copy of our Letter on the Subject to Colonel Goddard.

Our Army has not yet made any conſiderable Progreſs, being on the 6th Inſtant advanced but a ſmall Diſtance from the Head of the Ghauts. The Enemy cannonade and ſkirmiſh with our Troops, but avoid coming to a deciſive Action, endeavouring as much as they can to harraſs them and cut off their Supplies. In theſe deſultory Attacks, Lieutenant Colonel Cay, the Second in Command, has been mortally wounded, and Captain Stewart killed, with ſcarely any other Loſs. Colonel Egerton's infirm State of Health has obliged him to give up the Command to Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, to whom we have given Orders to proceed with the utmoſt Vigour and Activity in his Operations, in order to give Encouragment to Ragoba's Friends, who are ſlow in declaring themſelves in his Favour.

It is with Concern we adviſe you of the Death of Mr. Moſtyn, who is an inexpreſſible Loſs at this Juncture.

We have yet no Accounts of the Aſia, or the Indiamen under her Convoy.

We

We have judged it advisable to desire the Gentlemen at Madras to give us a Latitude to keep in a Part of the Forces destined for the Expedition against Myhie, after that Service is brought to an End, if we should then find ourselves disappointed of the Bengal Detachment, or the Exigence of our Affairs may require their Aid.

The Royal Henry will be dispatched in a few Days, when we shall transmit the Papers mentioned in our Letter of the 12th ultimo.

We are, &c.
(Signed) Wm Hornby.
D. Draper.

Bombay Castle,
the 13th January 1779.

Sir,

We Yesterday received your Letter dated the 22d ultimo, and had before that received that dated the 7th.

The Miscarriage of a Letter referred to in the one you enclosed from the Governor General and Council, leaves us totally in the Dark as to the Object of your Negociation with Moodajee Boosla; nor while we remain in this State of Ignorance, can we be proper Judges what Points relating to this Presidency may be necessary to be included in the Operations to be concerted with the Rajah of Berar. We have as before advised, depending upon the Services of your Detachment, and the Aid and Support of the Governor General and Council, concluded a Treaty with Ragonaut Row, and our Forces are now actually in the Field in consequence of that Engagement; therefore the Assistance of your Detachment is withheld from us, we know not how deeply the Honourable Company's Interest may be affected, as the Poona Ministers seem determined to make a vigorous Opposition. The Governor General and Council's late Orders to you, appear to have been given on a Supposition that the Plan for your Detachment, as originally formed, had failed, upon which Account they had adopted another of their own to supply the Place of hers.

Their Plan we therefore conclude must have the same Object with ours, which was to subvert a Party in the Poona Government, connected with the French in Designs hostile to the Company, to prevent the French from acquiring the predominant Influence in that Durbar, and to settle a Government at Poona friendly to the English, and which would look up to their Alliance for its Support and Stability. We shall not enlarge upon the great political Necessity of the Measures we have engaged in, of which we doubt not you must be fully sensible; and when to the Objects above recited, are added the Territorial Advantages gained by our Treaty, the Importance of the Undertaking must appear very striking.

That you may have every Light we can afford, we enclose a Copy of the Treaty with Ragonaut Row; and when our present Situation is considered, and how essentially the Company is interested in the Event of our Operations, to which we think the Aid of your Detachment, on which we always depended, is necessary to ensure Success, we doubt not but the Governor General and Council will approve of your conforming to your former Instructions alluded to in our Letter of the 9th ultimo; and as we cannot suppose it possible that our Measures can be incompatible with your present Instructions, we most earnestly press and enjoin you to march directly to Poona, without a Moment's Loss of Time, instead of Ziner, as before directed.

Colonel Egerton's bad State of Health has obliged him to resign the Command of the Army in the Field to Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, Lieutenant Colonel Cay being, it is thought, mortally wounded.

It is at any Rate highly proper, that your Detachment should be at this Place before the Monsoon, to secure Bombay in Case of an Attack by the French next Season, which our own Force is by no Means equal to oppose; and you must bear in Mind, that there is only an Interval of little more than Four Months left you to perform the March before the Rains set in. This Consideration is alone sufficient to press you to advance with Expedition, and to which we assure ourselves you will be strongly prompted by your Zeal for the Company's Interest, and the important Services you have it in your Power to render on this Coast.

We do not conceive that Hyder's Views can in any Shape interfere with the March of the Army under your Command, and we have desired the Gentlemen at Madras to make a proper Application to the Nizam, and to demand his Neutrality in the Contest.

We are, &c.
(Signed) Wm Hornby.
D. Draper.

Bombay Castle,
the 12th January 1779.

N° 176.

The Governor General lays before the Board, the following Paper of Intelligence received Yesterday, with a Letter from the President of Fort St. George. A Letter arrived at the same Time from the Nabob of Arcot, which is not yet translated, but which the Governor understands contains a Copy of the same Intelligence which appears to have been written from his

Vackeel at Poona. From other Intelligence tranſmitted to him by General Stibbert, and through other Channels, he is confirmed in the Belief that the News contained in this Paper is but too true. Alarming as this Event is, the Governor does not think it proper to propoſe any immediate Meaſures to be taken in conſequence, as the Board are yet unacquainted with the Situation of the Detachment under the Command of Colonel Goddard, from whom Advices may be hourly expected, which will inform them of the Plan of Action which he may have formed on the Knowledge of this unhappy Cataſtrophe.

Although it gives me the moſt heart-felt Pain to communicate ſuch News as I have juſt received from Poona, yet wiſhing to give my Friends the firſt Intelligence, that they may be put on their Guard, and take ſuch Meaſures as Providence may dictate, I now encloſe you a Copy of it.

I have taken every Opportunity of pointing out to my Friends ſuch Meaſures as appeared to me proper. I incloſe you a Copy of a Letter, containing my Advice in conſequence of Informations which I ſome Time ago received from Poona, addreſſed to the Governor and Council of Madras, under Date the 3d December 1778, and alſo of one I wrote them with the Intelligence received from Poona; had they purſued my Plan, the Affairs there had been well ſettled. Will you, my Friend, who are endowed with Wiſdom, even now take ſuch Meaſures as ſhall be moſt adviſable?

I did myſelf the Honour to diſpatch a Pair of Coſſids to your Highneſs on the 11th Zehedj, with the following Intelligence, that Seremunt Ragonaut had proceeded with the Engliſh Army as far as the Gaut with hoſtile Intentions; and that Uppa Bulwant Row, Bhum Row Bhanſa, and the Armies of Scinda and Holcar, were marched from hence towards the Gaut to oppoſe them, theſe I hope reached you ſafely. I again diſpatched another Pair on the 1ſt Zehedje, with this Intelligence, that Ragonaut with the Engliſh croſſed the Gaut; but thoſe Coſſids being plundered at Funderpore returned to me. I ſent another Pair of Coſſids on the 26th of the ſame Month, with Intelligence that the Engliſh were marching back towards Bombay, that is to ſay, towards the Gaut; this Pair was likewiſe plundered at Naringpore, which occaſioned a Delay in your receiving regular Advices from me. I now diſpatch another Pair; God grant that they may meet you in Safety, and make you acquainted with all the Particulars.

The late Occurrences are theſe: The Engliſh paſſed the Gaut, and employed a Month in removing of Difficulties, receiving Supplies from behind; they entrenched themſelves within Paliſadoes.

Ragonaut Row came at firſt to the Gaut, from whence he went to Drangaut, and having reduced Two Forts in the Way, returned to the Gaut, from whence he marched forwards with the Engliſh Army, conſiſting of Eight Battalions of Sepoys, 700 European Soldiers, 40 Pieces of Artillery, a Colonel and other Officers, Cheſts of Ammunition, and Specie to the Amount of 40 Lacks of Rupees, and his own Force conſiſting of 600 Horſe and Two Battalions of Sepoys. On the Side of the Marattas, Succarum Pundit and Nannah Purnaveſe in concert, employed Two Months in preparing their Armies, they employed both Money and Grants of Jaghires to ſatisfy Hujjarant Packa and the other Chiefs; and although he ſhewed himſelf attached, yet the Miniſters for greater Security, entered into ſtill ſtricter Ties to conciliate him the more to them, and Holcar having been diſpleaſed by the Impriſonment of his Dewan Naroo Gunnaſe, the ſaid Dewan was reſtored, and Scinda alſo employed Means to induce him to eſpouſe the Cauſe. After this the Miniſters aſſembled all their Chiefs, both great and ſmall, and told them to conſult together, and that whatever Meaſures they jointly agreed on ſhould be carried into Execution: They all with one Accord made Anſwer——*Had Ragonaut Row come with Marattas only we would not have made War with him, for he was our Chief; but ſince he wiſhes to come in with an Engliſh Army, who are Foreigners and very powerful, with whoſe Diſpoſition we are well acquainted, from their Conduct in Bengal, and to Sujah-ul-Dowla and ſeveral other Chiefs, which is notorious, how can we admit of it? except we ſhould chuſe to ſubmit to the Engliſh Yoke, and put on Hats and Coats; rather than ſo, it is better to die in Battle!*——Theſe Sentiments, which were general, they all ratified by Oaths. Afterwards Bam Row Bhanſa, Raja Pundit appa Uppa Bulwant Row, Sindea, and Holcar, with an Army of 40,000 Cavalry and 15,000 Infantry marched to Felgong.

The moſt earneſt Wiſh of the Bombay Chiefs was to aſſiſt Ragonaut Row; and the News of the Reduction of Pondicherry, the Arrival of the Calcutta Army at the Nurbudder, and Mooſajee Booſla's Friendſhip, inſpired them with too great Preſumption; in the mean Time Mr. T. Moſtyn and Jetoo Peetul went from Poona, and perſuaded them, that they had only to ſhew themſelves at the Gaut to be immediately joined, not only by thoſe who were already connected with them, but alſo by many other of the Maratta Chiefs; that Holcar would come over to them the Moment they arrived at the Gaut, and would be followed by Hujjerant, and all the others; that by reaſon of a general Defection, there was no Life in the Party; that the Opportunity then preſented itſelf. Hearing this, the Engliſh and Ragonaut Row repaired to the Gaut, and after waiting a whole Month not one of the Maratta Chiefs joined them, but they were informed from hence by Sadaſhew Ramchund and Madho Goherna, that if they would advance more forward there would be a general Defection to them, but this was without the ſmalleſt Foundation. When Mr. Moyſton learnt the Particulars of the Meaſures taken by the Marattas he perceived that the Buſineſs was at an End, and being likewiſe indiſpoſed, he took Leave of the Commander in Chief, and returned to Bombay, where I learn he is ſince dead.

The

The Engliſh quitted the Gaut and marched forwards, and the Maratta Chiefs ſet about Hoſtilities after their uſual Manner, and commanded the Engliſh at a Diſtance, with the large Cannon under the Charge of Bum Row. The Engliſh marched Two Coſs a Day, and halted every ſecond Day, and thus in Two Days March arrived at Chicklee, which is Four Coſs from the Gaut: As there were many Nullahs and difficult Paſſes in the Route, the Maratta Army could not encompaſs them, but the Conteſt was always on one Side. Notwithſtanding this, the Marattas, wherever they ſaw an advantageous Spot for the Purpoſe, diſcharged their Cannon at them. Near Chicklee Colonel Stewart, the Commander in Chief, was killed by a Diſcharge of a Grape Shot, and was ſucceeded in the Command by his Nephew, who was on the Spot. Mr. Carnac, the Second in Council at Bombay, was preſent, intending, when Ragonaut Row ſhould be eſtabliſhed at Poona, to contract Engagements with each of the Chiefs, and to oblige them to ſubmit themſelves to Ragonaut Row; and for this Purpoſe he carried the Company's Seal with him.

On the 21ſt of Zehedjee (10th of January) the Engliſh Army arrived at Jeelgong, Seven Coſs from the Gaut. Siccaram Pundit, &c. were at Jeelgong, and having learnt the firſt Day that the Engliſh had reached Roregong, Two Coſs from them, they had ſent their Baggage, &c. towards Cumbandaree, and retreated themſelves Two Coſs; the Engliſh ſuppoſed they had fled, and the Marattas wiſhed to draw them into an open Plain. The Day when the Engliſh arrived at Jeelgong an Engagement was fought, in which the Marattas had near 200 Cavalry killed, and the Engliſh loſt 25 European Soldiers, including One or Two Officers, and 100 Sepoys. On the Second Day the Engliſh, from the Heights of Jeelgong, perceived that they were ſurrounded on all Sides by the Maratta Forces; they halted there Two Days, hoping to be joined by ſome of the Maratta Chiefs, but not a ſingle Man came over to them; and the Intelligence they had been accuſtomed to receive from the other Army was ſtopped; ſhould they wait for the Calcutta and Booſla's Army, they were on the Banks of the Nurbudder, and it would require a long Time to receive any News from them; in this Situation they ſaid to Jetoo Peetul, "You have brought Ruin on us, who engaged thus far on the Strength of your Promiſes." It was the general Opinion of the Officers that they ought to return to Piangaut, it being impoſſible for them to ſtand againſt the Maratta Army. Ragonaut Row learning this, ſent to Sindeah and deſired to be received by him in any Manner that it could be contrived, and that even if the Maratta would make a ſmart Attack upon the Engliſh, he would go over to them with his 600 Horſe and Two Battalions: It is probable the Engliſh got Intelligence of this Proceedure. On the 23d Zehedjee (12th January) at Midnight, the Engliſh leaving their Tents, &c. Neceſſaries, with One Battalion of Sepoys and 200 European Soldiers, with Seven Pieces of Cannon, at Jeelgong, ſet off ſecretly with Ragonaut Row, hoping by this Means to deceive the Marattas, who might ſuppoſe the whole Army in their Camp; and that they might by this Stratagem eſcape; they accordingly took the Route of Worgong. Siccaram immediately drew up his Army with the moſt conſummate Skill, and with Nanna Purnaveeſe, Sindeah, and Holcar marched to attack the Engliſh, who they imagined were marching towards Poona, but found they had taken the Route of the Gaut. As ſoon as they ſaw this they flew to the Attack of the Party which had been left, and plundered the Tents and Money, and every thing they found there: The Two Battalions and the Europeans fought very bravely, but Siccaram led his own Army to the Attack, and Multitudes flocked in from all Quarters, in the Hope of ſharing in the Plunder; and the Whole were deſtroyed. As the Engliſh and Ragonaut Row had not advanced far, they ſoon overtook and ſurrounded them in a Place where there were many Nullahs, ſteep Rocks, and Hollows, and taking Poſſeſſion of all the Paſſes, attacked them with Muſketry from Midnight till the Evening of the next Day; the Engagement was kept up with ſmall Arms, and the Engliſh were not ſuffered to advance a Step; the Engliſh Artillery were rendered uſeleſs by the Nullas and Heights, ſo that they ſtopped their Fire; but the Maratta Cannon, which were of a much larger Size, kept up a continual Fire upon them from a Diſtance; the Engliſh had therefore no Reſource. That Day the Engliſh loſt 150 European Soldiers, 600 Sepoys, and ſeveral Officers, and the Marattas loſt Two or Three Officers, namely Gaoda, Suttoola, &c. and 200 Horſes and 500 Sepoys. At Night the Marattas ſtopped their Fire, and ſet ſtrong Guards at all the Poſts, after which Siccaram Pundit, &c. went and ſupped at Teelgong. On the 24th Zehedje (13th January) at Midnight, all the Chiefs went to attack the Intrenchments, and begun a Cannonade; Siccaram was on Foot, and having taken Care to ſecure the Nulla, ſent on a Party of ſkilful Muſketeers to attack the Engliſh: Nanna, Scindia, and Holcar, were as uſual very attentive to their reſpective Poſts; the Engliſh Artillery did no Good, and the Firing was therefore ſtopped: On that Day the Marattas loſt 75 Men, and the Engliſh 50 Europeans and 400 Sepoys. In the Afternoon a Kidmutgar of Ragonaut Row and a Kidmutgar of the Colonels brought a Letter addreſſed to Serement Row Pundit Purdhaun, deſiring to ſend a Perſon of Credit to treat on ſeveral Points. All the Miniſters having peruſed the Letter, ordered Victuals to be given to the Kidmutgars, gave them a Preſent, and ſent them back with this Anſwer, That they might ſend whomſoever they pleaſed, that a Truce ſhould be obſerved. The Miniſters having then ſtrengthened the Guards at the different Poſts, returned to their Tents, and continued there till Mid-day of the 25th Zehedja (14th January); after Dinner they went to the Intrenchments, and Sindea fired Two or Three Times on the Engliſh, but they did not anſwer it either by Cannon or Muſketry. At this Time Mr. Farmer, a Friend of your Highneſs's, with whom he ſome Time ago, came out, on which Sindea ceaſed firing, and called him to him: Mr. Farmer came out and ſpoke thus to the Miniſters, We are Merchants,

and have ſhed no Blood in your Families; Ragonaut Row took Refuge with us, and ſolicited our Aid, and we, ſuppoſing him the Chief of the Government, accompanied him; Fortune does not favour him; we are remedileſs; do you receive and ſettle Matters with him; the Engagements which were contracted between us are ſtill in Force; whatever has ſince paſſed forgive; in future we muſt conform to the Engagements which ſubſiſt.—The Miniſters anſwered, Ragonaut Row is one of us; where is the Neceſſity for your Interference in our Negociations? The Fort of Shaſtee which you took Poſſeſſion of, with the Wealth in it, as well as all the Money you have collected from the Country you ſhall give back; you ſhall likewiſe relinquiſh Rambooſeer, &c. as well as the Mahals of the Rackwar Goujeraut, and the Diviſion of Broach which belonged to the Sirkar, you ſhall alſo reſtore the 12 Lacks of Rupees which the Colonel took on account of the Treaty: How would you be ever able to defray the Charges of the Army, and the Price of the Horſes which have been killed? but it is neceſſary that you pay the Amount of the latter. In future you ſhall conform to the Engagements concluded under Ballajee Row Pundit Purdhan, and raiſe no Diſturbance.

Mr. Farmer having received this Anſwer, returned to his own Army. During theſe Negociations 10,000 Maratta Cavalry arrived at Piangaut, which being joined to 5,000 which had been ſent there before, deſtroyed all the Guards which the Engliſh had poſted at different Stations as far as the Gaut, and burnt their Paliſades, and plundered the whole Country from Piangaut to Punveil; this I heard from the Mouth of Nanna Purnaveeſe, but cannot certainly tell if it is true or falſe. At Noon of the 26th Zehedja (15th January) Mr. Farmer came to Sindea, and ſaid, I give you a ſealed Carte Blanche, write your own Terms; I agree. Sindea accordingly ſent word to the Miniſters, I ſhall put down whatever you ſhall direct me, but it is improper to ſpill more Blood, which would leave Reſentment in their Breaſts: Whatever Points are neceſſary, make them agree to: When Ragonaut Row comes hither, every Matter is ſettled; they muſt reſtore Shaſtee, the Goujerat Country, the Subjects of the Sircar, the Guicawar's Country of Four Pannahs which they took at the ſame Time with Shaſtee, the Bengal Army which is approaching ſhall likewiſe return, and give no Trouble in the Sircar's Territories; and all Matters ſhall remain on the Footing they were under Seremunt Ballajee Row and Madho Row; they ſhall reſtore the Jewels pledged by Ragonaut Row, and make no Demand for the Amount, and ſhall give all the Bonds and Deeds entered into by Ragonaut Row; nor ſhall they claim any thing on the Account of the Expences they have been at for Ragonaut Row. Theſe are the Terms dictated by Sindea, which he ſent to Siccaram, who held a Conſultation on them, with Nanna Purnaveſe and Madho Row, and ſettled them. I am endeavouring to procure a Copy of it, and if I ſucceed will ſend it to your Highneſs. It was further ſtipulated, that till a Treaty was received under the Seal of the Company, and the Signature of the General, the Council and Select Committee, and Garriſons eſtabliſhed in Shaſtee, and the other Mahals, the Nephew of Colonel Stewart and Mr. Farmer ſhould remain in their Hands. The Engliſh were remedileſs; they had been Three Days without Victuals, and both the Soldiers and Sepoys had thrown their Arms and Accoutrements on the Ground.

On the 27th Zehedja (16th January) the Treaty under the Seal of the Company which Mr. Carnac had with him, and the Signature of Four Officers of the Army, Carnac, Egerton, Farmer, and Mr. Holmes, was prepared and delivered to Sindeah, who immediately ſent them Proviſions, on the 28th Zehedja (17th January) the Engliſh marched from thence, and Ragonaut Row remained there; the Sirkar's Guards are kept there. This not being a fortunate Day, Ragonaut Row did not come to the Camp, but will come at Noon To-morrow, which is a lucky Hour. The Engliſh repreſented that the Garriſons in the Maratta Forts would moleſt them in their Return, and therefore requeſt an Eſcort, and Rahdarry Duſtuck; a Duſtuck and an Eſcort of 2000 Horſe were accordingly ordered them, and they ſet out. Whatever may hereafter occur I ſhall repreſent to your Highneſs.

N° 2.

Copy of a News-paper from the Durbar of the Nabob Nizam ul Dowla Bahadre: Dated the 8th Mohurrem (4th February) 27th January; received at Madras the 16th of Mohurrem, 1779.

A Pair of Hircarrahs arrived on the Night of the 16th of Mohurrem, who report that Ragonaut Row, who might be ſaid to be impriſoned in the Hands of the Engliſh, being driven to Extremity, ſent a Meſſage through Sindeah and Holcar, to be allowed to go to that Party and make his Peace; and that accordingly on the Day of the Engagement between the Maratta and Engliſh Armies, ſeeing the Superiority on the Side of the Marattas, he quitted his Party with 5 or 6000 Horſe which he had with him, and joined Sindeah; the Marattas regarding this Event as an important Victory, received the Force brought them by Ragonaut Row.

In a Word, Ragonaut Row with his Force joined with the Maratta Army, and the Engliſh having ſuffered a terrible Defeat, took Shelter in the Heights above the Gaut; Sindeah and Holcar are the Managers of the Negociations for Ragonaut Row, and mean to exclude the Engliſh from all the Interference therein, and under the Sanction of Oaths to accommodate Matters between Ragonaut Row and the Poona Miniſters. This Account is confirmed by the Poona Vackeel here.

N° 3.

N° 3.

py of a Paper of Intelligence from the Durbar of the Nabob Nizam ul Dowla: Dated the 8th of Mohurrem (27th January) received the 16th of the ſame Month (4th February).

His Highneſs Yeſterday received Intelligence from Jewajee Vackeel, of the Seizure of Ragonaut Row; and peruſed the Arzie containing this Account, in private, and early this Morning ſent for Samſaum ul Dowla, Vikhar ul Dowla, Sabut Jung, and Jewagee, who attended him in the Dewan Kana, where he held a private Conſultation with them; Jewagee the Vackeel preſented Letters from Poona written by Kiſhen Row Mulhar to his Maſter, containing the following Particulars; That the Engliſh Chiefs at Bombay having determined on an Expedition for the Support of Ragonaut Row, took him with them, and employed ſome Time in ſettling the Cokun, and leaving him on the other Side the Gaut, Three or Four ſmart Engagements were fought on the Heights of the Gaut, and then continued their March to the Village of Teelgong on the Poona Side of the Gaut, when the Maratta Army took Poſſeſſion of all the Paſſes, and cutting off all their Supplies reduced them to the utmoſt Straits, and made frequent Attacks on them, killing Hundreds of them, and wounding great Numbers ſo as to deſtroy near Half of their Force, and thoſe who were ſurrounded found it difficult to ſave their Lives: A Detachment of the Maratta Army was ſent from thence to ſeize on Ragonaut Row, whom they brought back with them. Another Letter mentions, that when the Europeans were ſurrounded, and all their Proviſions at an End, they aſked their Lives, and the Marattas demanding that Ragonaut Row ſhould be delivered up to them, they ſent for him and delivered him up to Sindeah, and thoſe that remained had their Lives ſpared.—Theſe are the Two different Accounts of the Matter.

When his Highneſs had peruſed the Letters and heard the Account from the Vackeel, he ſaid to him, It is well, the Right has prevailed in that your Enemies have of their own Accord delivered themſelves into your Hands, but the Naig has reduced the Fort of Cheetuldurk to great Extremity, if you now take Meaſures to raiſe the Siege it will be well, otherwiſe you will loſe it in a Month or two.

From the Poſſeſſion of the ſingle Fort of Cotee the Naig made himſelf ſo powerful, ſhould he be ſuffered to reduce the Fort of Cheetulburk it will be attended with the worſt Conſequences. Jewajee replied, By the Favour of God, in a ſhort Time we ſhall ſo completely deſolate the Countries of Sena and Myſore, and Balagaut and Pian Gaut on the other Side of the Carnatic, and the Province of Bengal and City of Calcutta, as not to leave a ſingle Cherrauk burning.

The Quarrel between the Engliſh and French is not yet accommodated in Europe. A mighty Engagement has been fought, in which loſt 8000 Men, and their Army which had nearly reached Arrampore, is on its Return to Calcutta.

The greateſt Part of the Day was taken up in ſuch Converſations, when the Nabob diſmiſſed the Durbar.

N° 4.

Copy of a Letter from his Highneſs, addreſſed to Mr. Thomas Rumbold, Governor of Madras: Written the 3d December 1778.

The Friendſhip which I have borne the Company and Engliſh Nation has not been equalled by any other of the Powers in Hindoſtan, and by the Bleſſing of God it has been invariable and augmenting daily, and the Proſperity or Adverſity of either is conſidered as that of the other.

This is impreſſed on the Minds of all the different Nations and Powers in this Continent, and in Conſequence many of the Princes of Hindoſtan are deſirous, through my Mediation, of obtaining the Friendſhip of the Company and Engliſh Nation; and whenever I have ſeen an Opportunity of promoting our Intereſts, I have inſtantly communicated the Plan to my Friends. Accordingly, the Peace with the Nabob Nizam ul Dowla was concluded with my Advice and Aſſiſtance; and through me the Nabob Sellabut Jung agreed to put the Fort of Guntore into the Hands of my Friends, on Condition of Support from them, and by the Aſſiſtance of the Engliſh drive out the French. For a Term of Five Years a civil War ſubſiſted amongſt the Marattas, and many deſperate Battles were fought between Ragonaut Row and Siccaram Pundit and Nana Purnaveſe, the Miniſters of Sewal Madha Row the Son of Narrain Row Pundit Purdhaun. At length Ragonaut Row took Refuge with my Friends, and the Peace concluded between the ſaid Miniſters and my Friends at Poona through the Medium of Colonel Upton's Embaſſy, it is well known did not continue, on which Subject it is unneceſſary to enlarge; my whole Wiſhes have been lately turned to the Promotion of the Credit and Advantage of my Friends by adjuſting of this Buſineſs. As it has already taken up a long Time, and it appears evident that if it is not heartily proſecuted, it may ſtill be ſpun out to a very diſtant Period, and the News of War having broke out in Europe with our Enemies being ſpread abroad, many of the Chiefs of Hindoſtan who look with a jealous Eye on the Succeſs and Power of the Engliſh, wiſh to keep up a conſtant War in this Country, with a View, ſhould our Enemies ſend a Force into this Country, to join them with their whole Powers; it is therefore adviſable that my Friends employ their warm Endeavours, without Delay, in Conjunction with the

Poona

Poona Miniſters, that is to ſay, Siccaram Pundit, &c. to eſtabliſh Ragonaut Row in the Chiefſhip of the Marattas, preſerving the Rights of Sovereignty to the Son of Naran[illegible] Pundit Punhan, which will redound to the Company's Honour; and that they ſhould endeavour to effect this by Policy without employing Force. As I have received a private Hint on this Subject from Siccaram Pundit, wiſhing, through me, to form a ſtrict Friendſhip with my Friends, I have thought it worthy of my Friendſhip to give you Information thereof; and I have no Doubt that the Gentlemen of Bengal and here, and the Governor and Council of Bombay, who are all united in the View of promoting the Intereſt of the Company's Affairs, and the Tranquillity of the Country, in which I heartily join with them, will judge it proper to repoſe ſo much Confidence in me, as to conduct this Matter through me. I can with their Knowledge, and in Conjunction with them, give the moſt happy Iſſue to this Buſineſs, and thus leave my Friends at Liberty to employ their whole Attention againſt any Enemy who may ariſe; and ſhould it be neceſſary, they may have the Aſſiſtance of the whole Maratta Force under Ragonaut Row; and it will be abſolutely neceſſary to the other Powers of Hindoſtan, to keep on friendly Terms with them; and ſhould they have conceived any Deſigns of a contrary Nature, they will relinquiſh them. My Ardour in this Buſineſs is excited ſolely by Motives of Friendſhip, and a View to the Intereſt of the Company and Engliſh Nation, and the Security of the Country; any Plan which my Friends may adopt, by which the Security and Rights of the Carnatic are preſerved, is equally for their Benefit.

I requeſt that you and the Council will do me the Favour to keep this Matter ſecret, as till it takes Effect it ought not to become public.

N° 5.

Copy of a Letter from his Highneſs, addreſſed to Governor Rumbold, dated the 14th February 1779.

As you are conſtantly deſirous that I ſhould communicate to you any Intelligence which I may receive from any of the Powers in Hind and Decan, I am induced thereby to encloſe you a Tranſlation of a Paper of Intelligence which I have juſt received from Poona, and Copy of a Newſpaper from Hyderabad. Although I cannot communicate ſuch News without feeling the moſt ſenſible Affliction, yet I have thought it proper to inform my Friends of it, that they may be upon their Guard. I formerly received a Hint from a Perſon at Poona, reſpecting the Adjuſtment of this Buſineſs, which I inſtantly communicated to my Friends, in a Letter bearing Date the 3d December 1778. Had my Friends at that Time left the Management of the Buſineſs to me, I hoped to have concluded it to the Honour of the Company and Engliſh Nation, whoſe unalterable Friend I am.

N° 177.

Mr. Francis—As we know not what bad Effects the News of this Event may produce in the Upper Country, or what Influence it may have upon the Minds and Diſpoſition of Nudjiff Cawn, of the Seiks, of the King, and any other Country Powers that border on the Nabob of Oude's Dominions, or on our own Provinces, I think that immediate Orders ſhould be ſent to General Stibbert to put him on his Guard, and to hold the Troops ſtationed in Rohilcund and in Oude in Readineſs to march; that he ſhould order all abſent Officers to repair immediately to their Poſts (the ſame to be iſſued in General Orders here) and take ſuch other Meaſures as he ſhall think neceſſary for covering that Frontier againſt an Invaſion. The Seiks have already made Irruption in different Parts of the Nabob's Territories; and Mr. Middleton, in his Letter of the 16th December laſt, acquaints us, that the Maratta Army has joined Nudjiff Cawn's Camp, and that they have entered into a Treaty of Alliance offenſive and defenſive with him; I think it very probable that they may avail themſelves of this Opportunity to endeavour to diſtreſs us; at all Events, we ought to conſider it a poſſible Caſe, and be prepared againſt it.

Mr. Wheler—I think it highly proper that this, and every other neceſſary Precaution ſhould be taken without Delay. I aſſent to the Motion.

Mr. Barwell—From the general Tenor of the Propoſition, I expected it to contain ſome extraordinary cautionary Meaſure; but I do not find upon Examination of it, that any particular Security is propoſed, than ſuch as the exiſting Orders of the Government provide for. The Propoſition points out the Nabob Nudjiff Cawn, as a particular Object of our Jealouſy, and Mr. Middleton's Letter is quoted in Support of this Suggeſtion. Mr. Middleton's Letter, I conceive, intimates the direct contrary; for he ſays, "though I am aſſured of ſuch Things, I think Matters are nearly as diſtant from any permanent Adjuſtment as ever." To found any Orders we may think it neceſſary to iſſue in the preſent Criſis of Affairs, on Suppoſition or Surmiſe of Diſaffection in the neighbouring Princes, can neither be juſtified by the Conjuncture, nor is conſiſtent with Policy.

It is a Treatment that muſt diſguſt them, and any Movements of our Army upon ſuch Reaſons muſt alarm their Government, and compel them to arm in their own Defence. By Mr. Middleton's Letter, it clearly appears that the Maratta Leaders were negociating with the Nabob Nudjiff Cawn on their own Account. The Invaſion of the Seiks which is alluded to, appears evidently to have been the Operations of a predatory Band, as little authorized by any Government as thoſe of the different Bodies of Faqueers this Government has ſeen at various Times committing little Pillages in the very Heart of Bengal, and which, from the Extent and Conſtitution of the Hindoſtan Governments, every one of its Governments is ſubjected to. I think with Mr. Francis, and the Governor General's Minute warrants the Sentiment, that we ought to appear ſenſible of what is due both to the Honour of our own Government, and what is wanting to vindicate the Dignity of it.

The Governor General appears to wiſh, that whatever Meaſures are determined, they ſhould not be partial, but include the whole political Scene. In this he is certainly right; but as I can ſee no Objection to decided cautionary Meaſures, I think in Prudence the Armies on the Weſtern Frontiers ſhould be immediately drawn out in the Field, and held in Readineſs to march on the Firſt Orders from this Government; and that to preclude the Effect of falſe Alarms, it ſhould be publicly and poſitively declared that theſe extraordinary Camps are not formed to act againſt any of the Powers in the Neighbourhood, but are aſſembled for an Emergency that may call them into the Field, to give Weight to the different Negociations or Diſputes in which we are, or may be engaged with the Marattas, and to protect our Alliances.

The Governor General—I confeſs I wiſh the Motion had not been made, becauſe I think it both unneceſſary and unreaſonable; and that a general Plan of Action or of Defence ſhould be conſtituted, which we are not yet warranted, by any Materials before us, to form. We are yet in the Dark with reſpect to every Circumſtance which ought to influence our future Meaſures, nor have yet an Object, except a general Defence againſt poſſible, but unknown Dangers. I hope yet Colonel Goddard's next Advices will afford us all the Lights that we can want with reſpect to the preſent Motion; it is almoſt in Terms the ſame with the Inſtructions delivered to General Stibbert on the 2d September; theſe were expreſsly given to him for the Purpoſe of guarding againſt the probable Effects which might be produced by a ſuppoſed Event exactly ſimilar to that which has actually befallen us; namely, the Diverſion of our Arms by a powerful foreign Enemy. Theſe Inſtructions are ſhort, I therefore deſire that they may be copied in this Place, as they will ſhew better than any Argument, in how little need General Stibbert ſtands of preſent Inſtruction. Nevertheleſs, as it has been propoſed, and as I wiſh upon this Occaſion eſpecially to accommodate my own Sentiments, ſo far as I may do it conſiſtent with the indiſpenſable Line of my public Duty, with thoſe of every Member of this Board, I ſhall acquieſce both in the Motion made by Mr. Francis, and in the additional Propoſitions contained in Mr. Barwell's Minute.

I cannot quit this Subject, though I ſhall moſt reluctantly bear a Part in any Thing which has the Point of Controverſy, without a ſhort Obſervation on the Suggeſtion of Nudjiff Cawn's Connexion with the Maratta Government. It certainly will be underſtood by thoſe who have read Mr. Francis's Minute, unaccompanied by other Documents, that Nudjiff Cawn had entered into a Treaty of Alliance offenſive and defenſive with the Maratta Nation. The Fact is, that the Treaty of Alliance to which Mr. Middleton's Letter of the 10th December alludes, meant no more than the Conditions on which Two independant and predatory Chiefs of that Nation were treating to engage in the Service of Nudjiff Cawn. This plainly appears by a former Letter of Mr. Middleton, dated the 1ſt December, when theſe Two Chiefs compoſed their Differences, which was effected by a pecuniary Compromiſe; the Maratta Leaders opened Negotiations on their own Account with Nudjiff Cawn, the declared Object of which was to obtain an eligible Eſtabliſhment in his Service, &c. I deſire to be underſtood, I mean not to hold with Nudjiff Cawn as the Friend of this Government. I conſider all the Powers around us as our Friends or Enemies merely as their Intereſt impel them; and I approve the Principle of Mr. Francis's Recommendation, though I differ in the Application of it.

Mr. Francis—The Orders I propoſed are purely cautionary and defenſive; they are ſuch as every Government gives on ſimilar Occaſions, and in no way tend to preclude or obſtruct our future adoption of any others. Why they ſhould give Offence to Nudjiff Cawn; why he ſhould be acquainted with our Reaſons for giving them; why he ſhould be diſguſted with thoſe Reaſons, if he knew them; or why we ſhould pay the ſmalleſt Regard to the ſuppoſed Effect which Meaſures neceſſary for our own Security, and not tending to the Offence of any other Powers, may produce in his Mind, form a Queſtion too confuſed and perplexed for my Underſtanding to decide. I confeſs it appears wholly unaccountable to me, that Objections of this Nature, which clearly ſuppoſe my Propoſition unneceſſary, ſhould be followed by an Amendment that carries it much farther than I do. I do not agree to the Amendment, becauſe I am ignorant whether the preſent Diſpoſition of the Two Brigades can with Safety be ſo far altered, as it would be by aſſembling them in Two Camps, and becauſe we do not yet know enough of Colonel Goddard's ſituation to determine what particular Meaſures may be neceſſary to favour his Retreat. The immediate calling in of the Detachment of the Two Brigades, is a Meaſure that ought to be decided on here, without General Stibbert's Opinion, and without our being thoroughly apprized of

the Conſequences it may be likely to produce with reſpect to the general Defence of the Weſt Frontier. With reſpect to the Connections formed between Nudjiff Cawn and ſome of the Maratta Chiefs, I think it not unlikely that they might have remained dormant, or at leaſt that they would have produced no Effect, in which the Intereſt of this Government would have been concerned, but the Diſaſter we have ſuffered at Poona makes a material Alteration in every Queſtion that relates to the future Conduct of the Country Powers; it may revive a dormant Treaty, or it may give Birth to new Alliances againſt us. Even when General Stibbert was ſent to take the Command in the Field, the Caſe of an Invaſion of the Nabob's Country was expreſsly ſuppoſed and ſtated; if it was a probable Event at that Time, how much more ſo is it now? As I really do not wiſh to enter into Debate at this Time, much leſs into any thing that may have the Air of Altercation, I ſhall only offer one Obſervation on a Paſſage in the Governor General's Minute; that is, that I do not remember at what Time an Event exactly ſimilar to that which has befallen us, was ever ſuppoſed poſſible by the Governor General, or by Mr. Barwell. The Impoſſibility of any vigorous Reſiſtance on the Part of the Marattas, and the Certainty of Succeſs in every Attempt on our Side, have conſtantly been held out as Propoſitions not to be diſputed.

Governor General—We are led into a boundleſs Field of Argument, which the Occaſion neither requires nor warrants; the Event to which I alluded was a Diverſion made by a French Invaſion, at that Time expected, and, as I recollect, the profeſſed Motive of our Orders given, as above quoted, to General Stibbert. I hope it is unneceſſary to make a further Reply to Mr Francis's Minute.

Reſolved in the Terms of Mr. Francis's Motion, with the Amendment propoſed by Mr Barwell.

The following Letter is accordingly written to General Stibbert:

Sir,

We have received Intelligence which we deem authentic, that the Detachment from Bombay under the Command of Colonel Egerton, has been defeated, and compelled to capitulate, by the Marattas: Not knowing the Effect that the News of this Event may produce, or what Influence it may have upon the Minds and Diſpoſitions of the Country Powers bordering on the weſtern Frontier, or on our own Provinces, we deem it neceſſary that you immediately form Two Camps of the Armies under your Command, and that you hold them in Readineſs to march on the ſhorteſt Notice: And to preclude the Effect of falſe Alarms, the Governor General will adviſe the Vizier that theſe extraordinary Camps are not formed to act againſt any of the Powers in the Neighbourhood of his Dominions; and we deſire that you will publicly and poſitively declare the ſame to the Vackeels of any of the Country Powers that may be in your Camp.

We alſo deſire that you will immediately iſſue Orders for all abſent Officers to repair forthwith to their Stations.

We are, &c.
Warren Haſtings,
Rich[d] Barwell,
P. Francis.

APPENDIX, N° 178.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, 1ſt March 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler,
} Eſquires.

READ again the Paper of Intelligence received from the Nabob of Arcot, and recorded on the Conſultation of the 25th ultimo, containing an Account of the Surrender of the Bombay Army.

Read alſo the Letter from the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, dated 15th January, and recorded in the laſt Day's Proceedings.

APPENDIX, N° 179 and 180.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 1ſt March 1779.

READ the following Letters from Colonel Goddard, under Date the 17th, 20th, 24th, and 26th January.

Gentlemen,

I had the Honour to write you the 5th Inſtant, informing you of my Intention to move forwards towards Poona, as ſoon as the Supply of Treaſure expected from Naigpore might reach Camp. I accordingly left Hoſſeingabad Yeſterday, and am this Day encamped at Suiny, a Place ſituated between the Countries of the Bhopal Nawab and the Rajah of Berar, both of whom are in Receipt of its Revenue. This is Two Days March diſtant from Hurdah, a pretty conſiderable Town, belonging to the Paiſhwa, and which is laid down in Mr. Smith's Survey upon the Road to Burrampore.

By the laſt Advices from the Bombay Army, they have taken Poſt on the Top of Bhore Gaut, where they are waiting for Supplies of Stores, and upon their Arrival I underſtand they intend advancing towards Poona, which is at the Diſtance of Fifty Miles. The Forces of the Miniſters are collected betwixt them and the City, but I do not find that any of the Chiefs in that Party have yet declared themſelves in favour of Ragonaut Row; nor according to the beſt Intelligence that I can obtain, is there at preſent any Proſpect of their doing ſo. It is impoſſible to ſay what Effect the vigorous Motion and Approach of this Detachment may have upon their Minds; but I have already explained to you the Reaſons which have influenced me to move forward, and I flatter myſelf my Conduct in this Reſpect will meet with your Approbation. In the vacant Time, I ſhall impatiently look for particular Anſwers from your Board, to the Accounts I have tranſmitted, of the Situation of Affairs here, and by the Inſtructions they contain I ſhall be implicitly guided.

I think it neceſſary to repeat my certain Belief of the friendly Sentiments of the Berar Chief towards our Government, which his Conduct has evinced in every Reſpect, except that of taking an active Part with our Arms; he promiſes to give every Aſſiſtance in his Power for furniſhing Proviſions as we advance, and for that Purpoſe a principal Perſon belonging to him is to remain upon the Confines of this Country, and collect and forward the Supplies of Grain.

In Obedience to your Commands, I have directed the Accounts of the Detachment to be made out, in order that they may be tranſmitted for your Inſpection; theſe being compleated to the 1ſt of October, I have ſent by the Way of Naigpore, as they were too large a Packet to truſt by the public Dauks. I expect in a very ſhort Time to have them made out to the 1ſt of December, when I ſhall forward them by the ſame Route, conceiving it, though more tedious, to be the ſecureſt Mode of Conveyance.

I beg Leave alſo to mention to you, that the Three Lacks, for which you tranſmitted me Bills of Exchange on Naigpore, notwithſtanding the Expedient I was obliged to adopt, of drawing upon your Honourable Board, have only been ſufficient to clear off the Troops to the End of November. A Gomaſtah belonging to Gopaul Doſs, of the Name of Neigecor Doſs, has arrived in Camp, where he propoſes to reſide, and promiſes to ſupply me with Caſh, through the Means of the different Houſes eſtabliſhed by his Maſter in the principal Cities of the Decan. It is impoſſible for me at preſent to aſcertain the exact Rate of Remittance proper to ſettle with him, as it will always be varying with Circumſtances: I ſhall however be guided by the Precedent you have given me; and am hopeful my Conduct in this Particular will meet with your Approbation. As I have not however the ſmalleſt Confidence in this Mode of Supply, on Account of the Proſpect there is of my Progreſs being hoſtile, from the Oppoſition of the Peiſhwa's Forces, I beg to acquaint you, that I ſhall continue to grant Remittances on the Provinces for Money paid into the Treaſury here, in the ſame Manner as heretofore, till a certain Supply can be provided through the Means of the Gomaſtah.

This I conſider as abſolutely neceſſary, to guard as much as poſſible againſt any immediate Exigency of the Service; and I muſt further entreat you to continue to afford me your Aſſiſtance, which I conſider as the only certain Reſource to which I can look for a Supply of Caſh at this Period.

I have the Honor, &c. &c.
(Signed Tho' Goddard.

Gentlemen,

It is with particular Concern I have to communicate to you the Death of Lieutenant Colonel Fort[illegible]m, this Morning; a long and tedious Illneſs had reduced him to the weakeſt and moſt helpleſs Condition, and that Event had become almoſt certain for theſe laſt Ten Days.

I beg

I beg to acquaint you with my Expectation to arrive at Burhanpore in Five Days, it being but little more than 25 Cofs from my preſent Encampment. I ſhall do myſelf the Honour of addreſſing you again from that Place, and ſhall fully communicate every material Occurrence, as well as any Intelligence I may be able to obtain of the Operations at Bhore Ghaut, from which Place I have received no Accounts ſince I laſt wrote you.

I have the Honour, &c.

Camp, at Chumpore,
24th January 1779.

Tho' Goddard

Gentlemen,

I have the Pleaſure to encloſe for your Peruſal, Copy of a Letter received this Day from the Gentlemen appointed by the Select Committee of Bombay, to conduct Ragoba to Poona, and ſettle the Affairs of that Government. I was in Hopes of being able as ſoon as Letters might arrive from that Quarter, to communicate to you ſomething of Importance relative to the Bombay Forces, and the Progreſs they had made in Proſecution of their Enterprize; but you will perceive by the Contents of this Letter, that ſo far from entering into any particular Detail of their Situation, or the Plan they mean to purſue, they nearly leave it a Matter of Doubt, whether they have not found it neceſſary to lay it aſide altogether. The Change which they obſerve has taken Place within the laſt Two Days in their Affairs, and which they ſay has rendered the Directions formerly ſent to me for my March to Ziner, in the Neighbourhood of Poona, now unneceſſary, would almoſt lead one to believe that they had themſelves removed every Obſtacle to Success, did not the Apprehenſions they afterwards expreſs, of the Difficulties to which I might be expoſed in marching to Surat or Broach, prove the Forces of the Miniſterial Party to be, in their Eſtimation, ſtill very ſtrong and powerful.

I cannot help remarking upon the Difference of Stile throughout this Letter of Meſſrs. Carnac and Egerton, to what had been before uſed by the Select Committee, who were always moſt urgent for my proceeding to Ziner with all Expedition, as you would perceive by the Copies of their Letters, tranſmitted you the 5th Inſtant.

Upon the whole, I am of Opinion that a Proſpect of being able to effect the Revolution in favour of Ragoba themſelves, is their Motive for expreſſing ſo little Anxiety about the Arrival of the Detachment. With reſpect to the Bodies of Horſe who are to infeſt and interrupt my March to Surat or Broach, they are ſo little explicit in the Deſcription of them, that I am left altogether in the dark as to their Number, or the Names of the Chiefs to whom they may belong.

I am ſorry that it is not in my Power to give you a more clear Account of the State of the Company's Affairs near Poona than the above, which muſt appear founded upon Conjecture rather than a Knowledge of real Facts, for it is plain the encloſed Letter gives no poſitive Information whatever; and the Teſtimony of uncertain Report, which ſays, that many of the Chiefs have gone over to Ragoba's Party, does not ſeem to deſerve any Credit; beſides that it is contradicted by the Sentiments expreſſed by Meſſrs. Carnac and Egerton, in their Advices to me.

I am now within Four Days March of Burhanpore, and on or before my Arrival at that Place, I make no Doubt of receiving Letters from the Select Committee at Bombay, which will, I ſhould ſuppoſe, fully explain their preſent Views and Situation. I ſhall then be enabled to determine preciſely my own future Operations, which I will not fail to communicate to you inſtantly.

In my Letter of the 5th Inſtant, I declared to you my Motive for advancing from the Confines of Berar towards Poona was in Obedience to what I conceived to be the Spirit of your Orders, and as eſſential to the Intereſts of the Engliſh Company. Let me again aſſure you, that my future Conduct ſhall be directed ſolely by an Attention to theſe Objects.

I have already informed you of my neceſſitous Situation reſpecting Treaſure for the Subſiſtence of the Troops; the diſtant Hope I entertained of receiving a Supply at Burhanpore, is now totally vaniſhed, as I learn all the principal Merchants have deſerted that Place, not ſo much from the Fear of being treated with Violence by the Engliſh Army, as on Account of Orders ſent them by Scindia, to whom the City belongs, prohibiting them from furniſhing any Supplies of Money to us.

This Conſideration, and the Impoſſibility there appears of obviating the Diſtreſs, which the low State of the Treaſury threatens, by any Reſource to be found in this Quarter, will in all Probability compel me to haſten my March towards Surat; but on this Point I cannot at preſent determine, as it muſt depend ſo much upon Circumſtances, and theſe I cannot perfectly know till my Arrival at Burhanpore, when you ſhall hear from me again in the fulleſt and moſt particular Manner.

I have the Honour to be, &c.

Camp, near Piplaud,
26th July 1779.

(Signed) Tho' Goddard.

N° 180.

The Governor General—I move, That an immediate Remittance by Bill of Six Lacks of Rupees be ſent to Colonel Goddard; I have had an indirect Offer made to me this Morning of Bills nearly to that Amount, from the joint Agents of Three capital Shroffs, on the Terms on which the former Bills were granted: I have not ſeen the Agents myſelf, but if the Board approve the Motion, I will direct them to make their Application to the Secretary, the regular Channel of ſuch Negociations.

Mr. Wheler—I agree to the Neceſſity of this Supply; but am of Opinion, that the Shroffs ſhould either lay before this Board, or at leaſt before the Governor General, the Means by which they conſider themſelves able to fulfil their Engagements with us; to me it appears very uncertain whether they will be able to do it.

Mr. Francis—I acquieſce in the Neceſſity of ſupplying Colonel Goddard, but I can form no Idea of the Means by which the Remittance is to be effected. If the Shroffs undertake to remit Money to Colonel Goddard, without knowing where he is; and if it be conſidered, that it is at this Moment a Matter of Doubt to ourſelves, whether he be actually at Surat or in the Territory of Scindia, or in Berar; I think it will appear that we have no Sort of Security for their being able to fulfil their Engagements; at the ſame Time the Sum with which they are to be truſted, forms a very conſiderable Object. I therefore agree with Mr. Wheler, in thinking that the Shroffs ought to be called upon, to inform us what Meaſures they intended to purſue; and that we ſhould furniſh them with whatever Lights we can concerning Colonel Goddard's probable Situation.

Mr. Barwell—I agree to make the propoſed Remittance in the Terms of the Governor's Motion.

Governor General—I am afraid that the Conſent given to the Remittance with ſo many uncuſtomary Reſervations, may have the Effect of a Refuſal, as it is impoſſible for the Shroffs to produce the Evidence required of them, neither do I imagine that they would injure their Credit by the Attempt to produce it. The Concern which I feel for the Safety and Succeſs of Colonel Goddard's Detachment, induced me to make the Enquiries, which have produced the Offers communicated by me to the Board; I am no better acquainted with the Means which the Shroffs poſſeſs of diſcharging the Bills, than any other Member of the Board, nor better acquainted with their Perſons or Characters, One only excepted. I was deſired to conceal their Names from the Public, becauſe I was told it might expoſe them to hazardous Conſequences. I therefore give them with the ſame Caution to the Board, they are Moolchund Doobee, Caſhmeery Mull, and Munnoo Loll; if the Secretary can obtain either better Terms, or equal, from more creditable Perſons, I ſhall agree to them, or ſhall be as ready to acquieſce in any ſurer Means of Supply that ſhall be recommended by either Mr. Wheler or Mr. Francis. It may be neceſſary to add One Obſervation on the cautionary Terms which have been required, that before the Bills can be delivered we muſt receive decided Advices from Colonel Goddard reſpecting the Direction of his March, after the Receipt of the News of the Defeat of the Bombay Army, and theſe will of courſe determine the Choice of the Place appointed for Payment of the Bills. That Bills ſhould be ſent, or other adequate Means of pecuniary Supply provided, I ſuppoſe to be a Concluſion in which we are all agreed. I ſhall further add, that the Names of ſome capital Cities were mentioned to me where the Payment ſhould be made, if I recollect, they were Nagpore, Burkunpore, Arungabad, and Surat; but this is immaterial: The Names, I ſuppoſe, will be inſerted in the Bills, unleſs they ſhall agree to pay them in Colonel Goddard's Camp, wherever it may be.

Mr. Wheler—I have no Connection either with the Shroffs or Merchants of India, nor would I, if I had, venture to recommend any One or more to this Board upon the preſent important Occaſion, who had not previouſly convinced me, that he was in the Habit and Courſe of Correſpondence with others, who had the certain Means of paying Bills ſuddenly drawn upon them to the Amount of Six Lacks of Rupees. A Precaution of this Sort cannot be the Means of divulging Secrets; 'tis made Uſe of in all Parts of the World by private Individuals, and becomes more neceſſary, when the Intereſt of the Public is ſo materially connected with it.

Reſolved, That a Remittance of Six Lacks of Rupees be made to Colonel Goddard's Detachment, and that the Secretary do obtain Bills on the moſt advantageous Terms.

The Governor General—In our preſent State of Uncertainty, reſpecting the State of the Army of the Preſidency of Bombay, and the Deſigns which the Marattas may form, or other Powers encouraged by the ſuppoſed Decline of our Influence in conſequence of its Defeat, I ſhould deem it very unwiſe and precipitate to propoſe any general or decided Plan of Operations; but I think it incumbent on us, to uſe the moſt early Means for guarding our Poſſeſſions and Connections in thoſe Parts, which lie the moſt expoſed to Attack. The Preſident and Select Committee of Fort Saint George have ſuggeſted to us One Scene of Defence, which will be a proper Subject

of Conſideration, when we are furniſhed with more recent Advices, both from them and from Colonel Goddard. With reſpect to the Countries, the Defence of which more immediately depends on our Government, we are in no Danger of an Invaſion except in the Dauab, and the more Eaſtern Parts of the Vizier's Dominions. I have always held it the beſt Policy to meet the Attempts of our Enemies when we have juſt and reaſonable Grounds to expect them. On this Principle, I think it proper now to ſubmit to the Conſideration of the Board the Expediency of ordering General Stibbert to cauſe the Firſt Brigade to croſs the Jumna, and to encamp in the moſt convenient Station in the Neighbourhood of Allahabad, and of the high Road leading from thence to Berar, and to the Southern Parts of Hindoſtan. This, if the Board ſhall agree to it, will be ſufficient for an immediate Order. I propoſe this Meaſure as the moſt likely to prevent any Deſign being formed againſt us, and the moſt ready for repelling any which may be made.

Mr. Francis—I will not venture at this late Hour to give an immediate Opinion on a Propoſition of ſuch Magnitude and Importance, particularly under the Firſt Impreſſions which it has made upon my Mind, and which I fear I ſhould not be able to command; I therefore move that it ſhall lie for Conſideration, and that the Board be ſummoned to meet To-morrow at 11 o'Clock, or at a later Day, to reſolve upon it.

The Governor General—There is no preſſing Buſineſs in the Revenue Department. I have no Objection to meet again in this at the uſual Hour To-morrow Morning; in the mean Time, as Mr. Francis has expreſſed his Objections to the Queſtion propoſed by me to the Board in Terms ſo very pointed, I yield to his Deſire of availing himſelf of further Time to conſider the Queſtion; I hope he will alſo allow me the ſame Opportunity of conſidering his Objections, poſſibly they may have the ſame Weight with me as they have with him, if they are delivered with Temper, and not abruptly intruded on the Inſtant at which our Determinations are to be formed. The Queſtion which I have propoſed is a Subject for Conſideration, not a decided Opinion offered for the Confirmation of the Board.

Mr. Francis—I have never preſſed the Governor General, nor any Member of the Board, to give a haſty Opinion on any Propoſition of mine; and certainly ſhould not attempt it on an Occaſion which requires more than common Deliberation.

The Governor General—I do not wiſh to preſs the Subject; I have only requeſted the ſame Meaſure to be dealt to me that I deal to others. Upon this particular Occaſion I wiſh, if poſſible, that our Reſolutions, on the Event of which the Fate of India may poſſibly depend, may be formed with that cool Deliberation which they demand; and therefore that I may know the Grounds of the Objections which may be made to the Meaſure now propoſed, that I may come fully inſtructed and prepared either to ſupport, to correct, or to join in the rejecting it; I ſhould not at any other Time or Occaſion be ſo urgent as I may now appear, but I perſuade myſelf, that whoever reads Mr. Francis's ſhort Minute immediately following my Propoſal, will hold me juſtified in my Apprehenſions reſpecting the Spirit with which it is likely to be debated.

Agreed, That the Governor General's Propoſition lie for Conſideration, and that the Board be ſummoned to meet in this Department To-morrow Morning.

Warren Haſtings,
Richard Barwell,
P. Francis.

APPENDIX, N° 181.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, 2d March 1779.

THE Governor General delivers in the following Minute:

The Governor General—My Deſign is to propoſe the moſt effectual Meaſures of Defence, and of Defence only.

I think that the moſt certain Means of preventing an Attack, will be to ſhew ourſelves not only ready to repel but to meet it. The Prevalence of Opinion is ever a ſtrong Spring of Action, and in this Part of the World it is perhaps the ſtrongeſt. The unexampled Check which the Engliſh Arms have ſuſtained on the other Side of India will not fail to create and circulate the Belief that our Power is declining; and every State which has any Thing to hope by taking the Advantage of our ſuppoſed Weakneſs, or to fear from the Reſentment of our capital Enemy, will be ready to riſe in Arms againſt us, unleſs by ſome vigorous Exertion and confident Diſplay of our Strength, we ſhew ourſelves ſuperior to the partial Misfortune which has befallen us.

The

The Neighbourhood of Illahabad I prefer for the Station of the Brigade, becauſe of the Conveniency which it affords of depoſiting the Stores of the Brigade as they may be occaſionally wanted: It will give Vigour and Weight to the Operations of Colonel Goddard, if he ſhall return to Berar and proſecute his original Inſtructions; and in the Suppoſition of his Retreat to our own Provinces it will be a ready Support to him.

In the Event of any Deſign which may be formed againſt the immediate Dependencies of this Government, it may be regarded as certain, that the Countries bordering on the Jumna will be the firſt affected by it: Theſe therefore require our firſt and earlieſt Attention.

To carry into Execution the Queſtion which I have propoſed in its full Extent, will employ ſome Time; Circumſtances may occur in the Interim which may require a Variation of the firſt Intention. The firſt Movements neceſſary for the Brigade may be the ſame, whether it be ultimately reſolved to croſs the Jumma, or to wait within it: And as we may hope to be ſpeedily aided by the Preſence of Sir Eyre Coote, I ſhall be better pleaſed to wait his Arrival, than to propoſe any decided Operations, for which there is not any very urgent Call.

For theſe Reaſons, I beg Leave to change the Terms of my firſt Propoſition, and recommend, that in addition to the Orders already given to General Stibbert, he be directed to march the Brigade towards the Banks of the Jumna, and to chuſe ſuch a Situation for encamping as he ſhall judge moſt convenient for defending the Duab againſt an Invaſion; and at the ſame Time to examine which Part of that River will admit of his croſſing the Brigade, if it ſhall hereafter be found neceſſary, with the greateſt Facility.

(Signed) Warren Haſtings.

Reſolved, in the Terms of the Governor General's Minute.

The following Letter is accordingly written to General Stibbert:

Sir,

In addition to the Inſtructions which we tranſmitted to you on the 25th ultimo, we think it neceſſary to direct, that you order the Firſt Brigade to march towards the Banks of the Jumna, where you will chuſe ſuch a Situation for encamping it as you may deem the moſt convenient for defending the Duab againſt an Invaſion; and at the ſame Time you will aſcertain which Part of that River will admit of your croſſing the Brigade with the greateſt Facility, if it ſhall hereafter be found neceſſary.

Fort William, the 2d March, 1779.

We are, &c. &c.

Meſſrs. Francis and Wheler having ſent in the following Minute, in reply to the Governor General's Motion of Yeſterday, it is now recorded.

Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler—Having attentively conſidered the Propoſition made Yeſterday by the Governor General, we muſt refuſe our Aſſent to it for the following Reaſons, which we think it ſufficient to ſelect out of many that occur to us.

1ſt. Becauſe the Meaſure itſelf ſtands in manifeſt Contradiction to the Company's fundamental Maxims, and would be a freſh Inſtance of direct Diſobedience to their poſitive Commands on this Subject.

2dly. Becauſe the ill Succeſs which has attended the Movement of Colonel Goddard's Detachment, on a Plan of the ſame Nature; and the alarming Situation to which, we have Reaſon to think, he is now reduced; would leave us without a Juſtification or Excuſe, if we hazarded another Portion of the Force eſtabliſhed for the Defence of our own Poſſeſſions, in a ſimilar Attempt.

3dly. Becauſe no particular Object or affirmative Reaſons being aſſigned, in Support of a Meaſure apparently ſo hazardous, we have no ſpecific Grounds given us to warrant our Aſſent to it.

4thly, Becauſe, whereas it is ſaid generally by the Governor, "That he has always held it the "beſt Policy to meet the Attempts of our Enemies when we have juſt and reaſonable Grounds "to expect them," we are warranted in oppoſing the Principle he now profeſſes, by another drawn from the ſame Authority, and, as we think, much better founded: On the 9th of July laſt, when our military Strength was yet unimpaired, and the Reputation of our Arms had ſuffered no Diminution, the Governor General delivered it as his Opinion, "That great as the Power is "which the Britiſh Nation has acquired in India, compared with that of its Rival, its general "Line of Action is and muſt be purely defenſive."

5thly. Becauſe admitting that we had juſt and reaſonable Grounds to conclude, that Deſigns are formed againſt us by the Marattas, (which however we deem to be a Suppoſition purely gratuitous) ſtill no Argument is produced, to prove that this particular Meaſure is wiſely calculated to prevent an Invaſion, or to ſhew by what Steps or Operations it is likely to produce that Effect.

6thly. Becauſe this Meaſure appears to be a leading Step to the Execution of ſome more extenſive Plan yet unavowed. It is ſaid that *many conſequent Operations may be hereafter neceſſary*; but

but of what Nature thoſe Operations are meant to be; how far they are to be carried; or to what Objects they may be directed, is entirely kept out of Sight. As long as this Reſerve is continued, we cannot think it ſafe or prudent, particularly after the fatal Experience we have had of the diſtreſſing Conſequences of a ſimilar Reſolution, to commit ourſelves in any one Step belonging to a Series of Meaſures, of which we do not know the real Purpoſe or Extent.

7thly. Becauſe, when it is declared *that we are in a State of Uncertainty reſpecting the Fate of the Army of the Preſidency of Bombay*; and when, from theſe ſuppoſed Premiſes, it is concluded, that *it would be very unwiſe and precipitate, to propoſe any general or decided Plan of Operations*, we are equally at a Loſs to reconcile that Concluſion with the Motion now before us, (and which appears to us to be the moſt decided Step that could be taken) and unable to judge for what Reaſon it is ſaid, that the Fate of the Bombay Army is uncertain. The Governor General has repeatedly expreſſed his Conviction, that there could be no Doubt of the Truth of the Intelligence from Poona; and this Intelligence aſſures us, that the Bombay Army was totally defeated, and had ſurrendered at Diſcretion.

8thly. Becauſe we are convinced, that if the Object of this Propoſition be to relieve or aſſiſt Colonel Goddard, or to favour his Retreat, it is morally impoſſible that it can operate in any Degree to that Effect. To ſee the Force of this Objection, it may be neceſſary to conſult the Maps, and to calculate the Time which muſt intervene between the Criſis of any Danger to which Colonel Goddard may be expoſed, and that at which this pretended Relief can reach him. At the Beginning of February his Poſition muſt have been at Brampore, that is near Twelve Degrees of Longitude Weſt of Calcutta; if from thence he has made his Way to Surat, or retreated into Berar, our Aſſiſtance would be unneceſſary, nor in the former Caſe could he poſſibly receive it; if not, the Fate of his Army muſt be underſtood to remain undecided, in the Heart of an Enemy's Country, from the 1ſt of February not only to this Time, but to that at which our Orders for the Movement of another Brigade can be carried into Execution, and the Impreſſion of that Meaſure felt at ſuch a Diſtance as Brampore.

9thly. Becauſe admitting that ſuch a Step might at any other Time be adviſable or neceſſary, we deem it to be uſeleſs if not dangerous at this particular Seaſon, conſidering that the Brigade cannot croſs the Jumna in leſs than Six Weeks, ſuppoſing the Orders to be diſpatched To-morrow; and that in Six Weeks more the violent Heats of April and May will be ſucceeded by the Rains. But if the Rains ſet in with any Degree of Violence, the Brigade will neither be able to act, nor can they continue in Camp without great Diſtreſs: At the ſame Time the River will be ſo much ſwelled, and its Rapidity ſo much increaſed, that it may be very difficult, if not impracticable, to re-croſs it in any Emergency.

10thly. Becauſe all our Intelligence agrees in aſſuring us, that among the Engagements by which General Carnac and Colonel Egerton have purchaſed their Safety; and for the Performance of which thoſe Gentlemen, with the Remainder of their Army, muſt be conſidered as Hoſtages; it is ſtipulated that Colonel Goddard's Detachment ſhall return to Bengal. But if inſtead of our ratifying this Stipulation the Marattas ſhould find their Country threatened with another Invaſion, what have we to expect, but that they will treat their Priſoners with all the Severity which the Laws of War and of Nations entitle them to exerciſe againſt the Hoſtages of a baſe and faithleſs Nation, neither to be bound by Treaties, nor reconciled by the unexampled Lenity and Moderation with which they appear to have acted towards an Enemy invading their Country, without the Shadow of a Provocation; and for the avowed Purpoſe of overturning their Government?

11thly. Finally, becauſe by croſſing the Jumna, we relinquiſh the great and natural Defence which all our Poſſeſſions derive from the Intervention of the River, and expoſe a Third Detachment to the ſame Diſaſter which has already befallen the Bombay Army, and which we have too much Reaſon to fear may have befallen Colonel Goddard: By ſuch unconnected partial Efforts the whole Force of the Britiſh Empire in India may be gradually waſted; and our Army, which, if united under a wiſe and ſteady Direction, we believe to be equal to every Purpoſe of Defence, ſucceſſively beaten, and ruined in Detail.

For theſe Reaſons, as well as for ſome others, which we do not think fit to declare, we object to the Propoſition, and moſt ſolemnly proteſt againſt it.

(Signed) P. Francis,
Edw[d] Wheler.

The Governor General—It would lead to endleſs Debate, and occaſion a Waſte of Time, which I ſhould deem inexcuſable in myſelf, were I to reply to every Part of this Minute; and every Part equally merits a Reply. My Opinions are ſo applied, that in the obvious Senſe of them, as they ſtand in the Conſtruction, I cannot avow them, and Facts aſſerted for which I believe there is no Voucher. It is ſufficient that I have changed the Terms of the Queſtion which I propoſed, and accommodated it to the general Senſe of the Board; every Reaſoning therefore which can be now introduced upon it, is obſolete and unneceſſary.

APPENDIX, N° 182.

Bengal Secret Conſultations 2d March, 1779.

MR. Francis delivers in the following Minute.

Mr. Francis—I had no Doubt that the Peruſal of the Letters read Yeſterday at the Board, would have been followed by ſome Propoſition from the Governor General, for Orders or conditional Inſtructions to Colonel Goddard. His Silence on the important Queſtion which thoſe Letters immediately bring before us, leaves it open to me, without Irregularity, to offer my own Opinion upon it. In Juſtice to myſelf however, I muſt previouſly ſubmit one general Conſideration to the Judgment of my Superiors.

If it were poſſible to anſwer every Objection to the Principle on which military Expeditions of this Nature are founded, and to reconcile their real or pretended Object to the Dictates of Honour, Juſtice, and ſound Policy, another Difficulty inſeparably belonging to the Execution of ſuch Enterprizes, ought for ever to deter a wiſe Government from engaging in them; it is that Armies carried to ſo great a Diſtance from our own Territory, are in Effect removed from under our Command; and that we are deprived even of a timely Knowledge of their Operations. To ſhew the Truth of this Obſervation, it need only be applied to our actual Situation: Colonel Goddard is at ſo great a Diſtance from us, that his Letters never can enable us to judge truly of the Circumſtances he may be in at the Time we receive them; much leſs will it permit us to ſend him Aſſiſtance if he wants it; or even ſuch Orders or Inſtructions as we can in any Degree be aſſured will properly apply to the Poſition in which ſuch Orders may find him. Our Councils then muſt be directed in a great Degree by Chance or Conjecture, and the Motions of our Army governed ſolely by the Diſcretion of the commanding Officer, or by the Neceſſities he may be reduced to: Such Diſcretion too he muſt exerciſe not only in the Choice of Means, or in the Detail of military Operations, but in determining the general Line of his Conduct, and even the Choice of his Objects. Colonel Goddard's Movement towards Poona; his March to Surat, if he purſues it; or his Retreat into Berar, if Circumſtances ſhould leave him without any other Reſource; are all of them Steps unauthorized by our Orders, and whichever of them is adopted muſt be executed without our Knowledge.

If theſe Reflections be well founded, it follows, that whatever Orders we ſend to Colonel Goddard muſt be conditional, and that a Latitude muſt be allowed him to accommodate the Execution of them to his actual Situation: Orders given with this Reſerve may, in ſome Caſes, be abſolutely neceſſary for his Guidance, and cannot in any Caſe be productive of bad Effects: At all Events, he ought not to be left any longer unacquainted with the general Intentions of the Board.

I move therefore, That if at the Time when Colonel Goddard ſhall receive the preſent Orders, he ſhall not have arrived at Surat, Broach, or Bombay; or if he ſhall have been obliged to halt at Brampoor, or at any other Station in the Maratta Dominions; he do immediately retire to Berar, and demand a Paſſage from the Rajah through his Country towards the Coaſt of Orixa; or if he ſhall have been already obliged to retire into Berar, that he continue his March towards the Coaſt of Orixa and the Chicacole Circar.

I adopt the Meaſure as recommended by the Preſidency of Fort Saint George, as well for the Reaſons aſſigned in their Letter of the 7th ultimo, as becauſe I deem it the beſt that can be purſued in our preſent Circumſtances. I am alſo influenced in my Choice of it by the Sentiments of Sir Eyre Coote, with whoſe Approbation I conclude it was propoſed, if not immediately recommended by himſelf.

If the Motion be carried, the Preſidency of Fort Saint George muſt be adviſed of it, and the Governor General requeſted to write ſuitable Letters to Moodajee Booſla, to claim the Effects of the Friendſhip he has profeſſed for us, and to give our Army all the Relief and Aſſiſtance in his Power.

(Signed) P. Francis.

Ordered, That this Minute lie for Conſideration till Thurſday next.

Warren Haſtings,
Rich[d] Barwell,
P. Francis.

APPENDIX, N° 182.

Bengal Secret Conſultations the 4th March 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident;
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler,
} Eſquires.

The Governor General delivers in the following Minute:

Governor General—There cannot, in my Opinion, be a greater Inſtance of Weakneſs and Levity, in Perſons entruſted with the Conduct of great Affairs, than to enter into precipitate Reſolutions, involving the moſt important Conſequences on the Firſt Rumour of diſaſtrous Events. By adopting deciſive Meaſures without any certain Knowledge of the Facts on which they are founded, a partial Misfortune may be converted into general Ruin.

I contend that we have not yet received ſuch authentic Information as can warrant our taking an active Part with Safety. We are ignorant of the ultimate State of the Bombay Detachment; of the exact Manner in which their Enterprize terminated; of the Operations which Colonel Goddard will have purſued in conſequence; or of the real Situation of the Government of Fort Saint George: I therefore have delayed offering any Propoſitions to the Board on the ſuppoſed State of Affairs on the other Side of India, and I muſt ſtill ſuſpend my Opinion on the Meaſures moſt proper to be purſued until ſuch Informations arrive—theſe may be hourly expected.

If Mr. Francis's Poſition were true, that diſtant Military Expeditions were in themſelves irreconcilable to the Dictates of Honour, Juſtice, and ſound Policy, Great Britain ought not to be in Poſſeſſion of theſe Provinces, nor of any other remote Territory obtained by Conqueſt.

A diſcretionary Power to Officers commanding diſtant Military Enterprizes, is both cuſtomary and unavoidable: Government may direct the Object, and preſcribe the general Means of attaining it, but the dependant Operations muſt be left to thoſe with whom the executive Part is entruſted; and Mr. Francis's Objection, that "Armies ſo far removed from our own Territories "are in Effect removed from our Command, &c." is anſwered by the glorious Succeſſes which attended the Britiſh Arms in the moſt diſtant Enterprizes during the Courſe of laſt War, where the Commanders were much further removed from the Controul or Aſſiſtance of Government, than Colonel Goddard is from ours.

Had the Politics of Great Britain been confined within ſuch narrow Limits, as Mr. Francis would preſcribe to thoſe of this Government, her Power and Opulence muſt have been unknown beyond the Seas which ſurround her.

I cannot conceive why Mr. Francis perſiſts in aſſerting, that Colonel Goddard is unauthorized by our Orders to proceed either to Surat, Poona, or Broach, or to retreat to Berar, as Circumſtances may render either prudent or neceſſary; ſince my Minutes of the 25th February and 2d March clearly prove, that we have given him ſuch Authority.

Having anſwered the Preface to Mr. Francis's Minute, I now proceed to give my Opinion on the Queſtion.

However urgent the Neceſſity may be for the Aid which the Select Committee of Fort Saint George require from us, it does not therefore follow that ſuch Aid muſt neceſſarily be afforded by Colonel Goddard's Detachment; admitting the Neceſſity as ſtated by the Gentlemen at Madras, we are the Judges of the Means by which we can beſt relieve it; and this reduces Mr. Francis to the ſingle Reaſon aſſigned by him in Support of the Requiſition, viz. that it appears conformable to the Sentiments of Sir Eyre Coote, and was probably recommended by him: Such an Argument may very well ſuit the Purpoſe of eſtabliſhing an Influence by Party, but ought never to be urged as a Motive of public Conduct.

The Opinion of Sir Eyre Coote would have as great Weight with me as with Mr. Francis, where full Information of Circumſtances might enable him to decide; this cannot be the Caſe in the preſent Inſtance: With reſpect to our Situation, and from the Knowledge which I have of his Character, I will venture to affirm, that he will not expect that the Intereſts of Government ſhould be hazarded for a perſonal Compliment.

I have Two ſtrong Objections to the Queſtion:

1ſt. It is probable, from the Advices juſt received from Colonel Goddard, that he has reſumed his Negociations with Moodajee Booſla; and his abrupt Recall at ſuch a Juncture might not only deprive us of the Advantages that we may expect from that Alliance, but might juſtly excite the Reſentment of Moodajee and provoke him to oppoſe the March of Colonel Goddard through his County, and thus both Deſigns would be rendered abortive.

2d. The propoſed Route of the Detachment would lie through a conſiderable Part of the Dominions of Nizam Ally Cawn. It is not to be expected from the known and avowed Diſpoſition of that Prince, that he would conſent to their Paſſage, nor is this a Time to furniſh him with a Pretext for open Hoſtilities againſt us.

I might object to the Queſtion upon Mr. Francis's own Principles; as during the whole Line of the Route which Colonel Goddard muſt unavoidably purſue from Berar to Rajahmundry (the only Place to which he can direct his March to the Northern Circars) his Communications would be more difficult and precarious, and his Diſtance greater from Calcutta than Hoſſengabad, his late Station on the Banks of the Nerbudda.

(Signed) W. H.

The Queſtion is put on Mr. Francis's Motion of the 2d Inſtant, viz. "If at the Time when "Colonel Goddard ſhall receive the preſent Orders, he ſhall not have arrived at Surat, Broach, "or Bombay; or if he ſhall have been obliged to halt at Brampour or at any other Station in "the Maratta Dominions; he do immediately retire to Berar, and demand a Paſſage from the "Rajah through his Country towards the Coaſt of Orixa; or if he ſhall have been already obliged "to retire into Berar, that he continue his March towards the Coaſt of Orixa and the Chicacole "Circar."

Mr. Wheler—I agree to the Motion.

Mr. Francis—The immediate Object of the Motion is, if poſſible, to withdraw Colonel Goddard from a Situation of the greateſt Danger; the future Deſtination of his Army, if he were once in Berar, would always be ſubject to the Orders of the Board: Without making any further Reflections at preſent on the Governor General's Minute, I adhere to the Motion.

Mr. Barwell—The Reaſons with which the Governor General has oppoſed the Direction of Colonel Goddard's March towards the Northern Circars appear to me unanſwerable, and I concur with him in Opinion, that any Meaſures at this Inſtant that may deprive us of the Alliance of the Berar State, or create a Miſunderſtanding between that Government and ours, is to be avoided. In objecting to Mr. Francis's Motion, I ſhall not enter into the Propriety of affording an Aid to the Preſidency of Fort Saint George; but I do not think it poſſible that Aid can be given by the Detachment under Colonel Goddard, unleſs a Treaty takes place between the Two Governments of Bengal and Berar.

The Governor General—Had the Queſtion been propoſed in Terms ſimilar to the Explanation given of it in Mr. Francis's laſt Minute, I ſhould have given a very different Opinion upon it; wiſhing equally with Mr. Francis for the Return of the Detachment to Berar, and equally dreading to hear of its proceeding to the other Coaſt; but I ſhould have oppoſed the Propoſition of ſending any expreſs Orders to Colonel Goddard for this Purpoſe, ſimply on the Principle that ſuch Orders could not reach him till their intended Effect were paſſed.

The Queſtion is reſolved in the Negative.

Mr. Francis—It reſted with the Governor General to have adopted ſo much of the laſt Motion as concurred with his Wiſhes and Opinion; and I ſhould have been well content to have ſeen even the Firſt Part of my Object accompliſhed; I mean the Retreat of the Detachment from a Situation of Danger into the Country of a Friend: Having this Object ſtill much at Heart, I will not relinquiſh it, becauſe I cannot obtain all I propoſed; I therefore beg Leave to move, in the Terms of the Firſt Part of the laſt Motion, viz. "That if at the Time when Colonel Goddard ſhall receive the "preſent Orders, he ſhall not have arrived at Surat, Broach, or Bombay; or if he ſhall have "been obliged to halt at Burrampore, or at any other Station in the Maratta Dominions; he do "immediately retire to Berar." I am inclined to think with the Governor General, that any Orders we ſend now may be too late; but, ſince the contrary is not impoſſible, we ought not to leave Colonel Goddard without Orders, which perhaps may be neceſſary to him, and which we are not abſolutely certain will be uſeleſs.

The Governor General—I beg Leave to ſtop the Courſe of the Queſtion, by an Obſervation which I think may poſſibly induce Mr. Francis to withdraw it: The Object of it is already paſſed. Our Orders to Colonel Goddard of the 5th, and recorded in Conſultation the 8th February, preciſely enjoin what is now required: I will repeat ſo much of them as appertain to the preſent Subject: "Or in the Event of his Death, or if the Failure of the Plan laid for reſtoring him to "the Adminiſtration of the Government at Poona, we ſay, in either of the Caſes here premiſed, "we authorize you to recur to the Negociations which have been ſuſpended with the Court of "Berar, and to conclude a Treaty with that Government, in the Manner and on the Terms already "preſcribed by our former Inſtructions." The Plan for reſtoring Ragonaut Row to the Adminiſtration of the Government at Poona has failed; Colonel Goddard therefore, from the Inſtant he receives certain Advice of this Concluſion, was under expreſs Orders to return to his Negociations with Moodajee Boonſla, which neceſſarily and unavoidably implied his Return to Berar; and from the Reluctance with which he quitted the Objects of that Commiſſion at the Call of the Preſidency of Bombay, we may ſafely conclude, that in this Inſtance his Inclinations, equally with his Duty, would prompt him to return: But if the contrary ſhall have happened; if for Reaſons which lay beyond the Reach of our preſent Conjecture, he ſhall have reſolved to proſecute his March, either to Bombay, Surat, or Broach, what will be the Effect of the Order which it is now propoſed to ſend? The Diſtance from Burampore to either of thoſe Places would ſcarcely require a Month to accompliſh it, but a full Month has already elapſed ſince the Date of the laſt Letter, in which he informs us of his Reſolution to make an immediate Choice of his future Line, and another Month at leaſt muſt paſs before he could receive any Orders now ſent him, they would be therefore ineffectual for the Prevention of ſuch a Deſtination of his Force; but other Conſequences might attend

attend it, ſince, as it is expreſſed, it would require his implicit Obedience to it, though he ha reached either of thoſe Places, and though his Return would ſubject him to the Repetition of al the Dangers which have been ſtated as inſurmountable in his Attempt to attain them; again I repeat, why ſhould we form precipitate and decided Reſolutions without a Clue to guide us, whe the Delay of a Day may furniſh us with all the Knowledge in this Point, at leaſt that may be neceſ ſary to guide us in the Choice of them?

Mr. Francis—The Board I am perſuaded are in Poſſeſſion of every Argument that I coul urge in ſupport of the Motion. If Colonel Goddard ſhall have reached any of the Settlement of the Malabar Coaſt, it is expreſsly provided, that the preſent Orders ſhall not operate: If they are preciſely the ſame with any which we have already given him (which however I do not admit) the Repetition of them can do no Miſchief; whereas in many Caſes, they may relieve Colone Goddard from any Doubt about our Intentions.

As for the reſt, I ſhall only obſerve, that I did never underſtand that Colonel Goddard quitte the Objects of his Commiſſion to Moodajee Booſla at the Call of the Preſidency of Bombay: I am ſure I can prove from his Letters, that he took this Reſolution upon the Refuſal of Moodaje Booſla to concur in the propoſed Plan of Alliance; even in one of the Letters before us, he ſpeak of the Neceſſity he conceived there was of advancing towards Bombay, in conſequence of the Delays that have ariſen in the Accompliſhment of the Negociation with Moodajee Booſla. I deſire that the Queſtion may be put.

The Governor General—Colonel Goddard's Reaſons for the Reſolution taken by him to march to Poona, to which this Extract is little more than an Alluſion, are contained in his Letter of the 5th January, in which that Reſolution is firſt notified to us; theſe are his Words: "Diſappointed "in my Views at this Court, I have referred to the latter Part of your Inſtructions given to Mr. "Elliott for his Guide, and compared them with the Purport of your Letter to me of the 22d "November laſt, in which you have thought it neceſſary to revoke the Order before ſent me for "obeying all ſuch Orders as I might receive from the Preſident and Council at Bombay, leſt a "Compliance with them might interrupt any Meaſures I might find it neceſſary to purſue in con- "ſequence of my Engagements with the Rajah of Berar.

"You have alſo ſignified to me that it is your Intention the Detachment under my Command "ſhould act in ſupport of any Meaſures which the Council at Bombay may have formed in "Reliance on it, as far as they may be conſiſtent with the Inſtructions given us, and the Engage- "ments I may have concluded in conſequence of them.

"By the Determination of this Court any Difficulties which an Attention to the latter might "have occaſioned, are entirely removed and as I conſider it further conſiſtent with the Spirit of "your Inſtructions, I have thought proper to march towards Poona immediately.

"I am induced to adopt this Step in conſequence of having received Letters from the Select "Committee at Bombay, informing me that the Forces from that Preſidency had actually taken "the Field to effect the Reſtoration of Ragoba; that Meſſrs. Carnac, Egerton, and Moſtyn, "were appointed Commiſſioners for ſettling the Poona Government, and requiring me to ad- "vance towards that Place with all Expedition, as the Preſence of my Detachment is neceſſary "to the Succeſs of their Views. From other authentic Intelligence I learn, that Hoſtilities are "actually commenced; I am therefore led to believe, that whatever may be the Reſult of your "political Reſolves, the Arrival of the Force under me in the Neighbourhood of Poona will "be for the Intereſt of the Service, either to proſecute the War, or to bring it to an honourable "Concluſion, at the ſame Time that I ſhall be ready to act, in concert with Moodajee, any Plan "that may be deemed neceſſary in conſequence of your Determination." Here he expreſsly declares, that his intended March to Poona was occaſioned ſolely by the Requiſition of the Select Committee at Bombay; and the Refuſal of Moodajee Booſla is mentioned only as his Juſtification in relinquiſhing the immediate Object of his Commiſſion to comply with that Requiſition. His private Letters to me are all tinctured with the ſtrongeſt Marks of Diſcontent and Mortification at being thus defeated in his Negociation by the Preſidency of Bombay, to whoſe Acts he imputes the Failure of it by the ſudden Diſinclination ſhewn by Moodajee to accept of the proffered Terms of it. This however he had not abſolutely relinquiſhed, but had left it on ſuch a Footing that the Obſtacle of Ragoba being removed he might reſume it; and Moodajee on his Part equally deſirous, in Appearance at leaſt, that it might take Effect, has ſent back his confidential Vackeel with Powers to conclude a Treaty immediately with this Government and did requeſt Colonel Goddard to wait with the Army within his Territories until the final Reſolves of this Government could be received concerning it. As for the reſt, having ſhewn that in my Senſe of it, the Queſtion was unneceſſary, and that it might be attended with Danger, it is unneceſſary to repeat that I cannot agree to it.

Mr. Francis—I do not doubt that Colonel Goddard was immediately determined to move towards Poona, by the Letters he received from Bombay, but it appears plainly, that he did not take that Reſolution until after he had received Moodajee Booſla's Refuſal to co-operate with him on the Terms of the propoſed Treaty. Diſappointed in his Views at the Court of Berar, he then, and not till then, referred to his Inſtructions. This Doubt however, if there be any, may eaſily be reſolved: Is it a Queſtion with any Members of this Board, whether, if Colonel Goddard had not been diſappointed in his Views at the Court of Berar, and if he had actually concluded the intended Alliance with Moodajee Booſla, he would in that Caſe have paid any Regard to the Requiſition

Requiſition from Bombay to aſſiſt in the Reſtoration of Ragoba; or could he have done it, conſiſtently with the Treaty he had concluded?

The Governor General—I beg Leave to diſcontinue the Debate.

Mr. Wheler—Whether Colonel Goddard has or has not already received Orders from this Board under preſcribed Circumſtances, to return with his Army into the Province of Berar, is not the preſent Queſtion: If he has received ſuch Orders, the Propriety of Mr. Francis's Queſtion is fully eſtabliſhed, for ſurely there can be no Harm in repeating them; if he has not, the Neceſſity of Mr. Francis's Queſtion is evinced, upon Ground equally tenable; in either Caſe, there does not in my Opinion exiſt the Shadow of an Argument againſt the preſent Queſtion. I therefore moſt heartily concur in it.

Mr. Barwell—I agree in Opinion entirely with the Governor General; and excluſive of the Reaſons he has aſſigned for his Negative, I ſhould have an Objection to the Queſtion, as propoſing a Meaſure which it only in Fact repeats: The Meaſure has already been propoſed and carried in the Affirmative, in the Inſtructions to Colonel Goddard on the 2d of laſt Month, againſt the Opinions of both Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler, though by a new Form it now appears as an original Propoſition, proceeding from the diſſenting Members to the Firſt Queſtion, included in the Inſtructions above referred to.

Mr. Francis's Second Motion reſolved in the Negative.

Bengal Secret Conſultations the 8th March 1779.

At a Council; PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,

Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler,
} Eſquires.

The Proceedings of the 4th Inſtant, read and approved.

Mr. Francis—I deſire that the Governor General's Minute, entered at the Beginning of the Conſultation of the 4th Inſtant, be read.

Read accordingly.

Mr. Francis records the following Minute in Reply to it.

While a Queſtion of ſo much Importance to the public Service was depending, I would not allow myſelf to engage in a Debate, which was not likely to influence the Deciſion of the Board, and could only delay it. But ſince I am convinced, that the late political Meaſures of this Government, and of the Preſidency of Bombay, will ere long be the Subject of a Parliamentary Inquiry; and that every Part of our Proceedings, which has occaſioned or led to the late Diſaſter, will be ſubmitted to the Judgment of the Public; it highly concerns my Reputation, if not my Safety, that my Conduct through the Whole of the Tranſaction ſhould be fairly repreſented, and in no Inſtance miſunderſtood; for this Purpoſe only I preſume to trouble the Board with Obſervations on the preceding Minute.

1ſt. I agree with the Governor General, in his Idea of the Levity and Weakneſs of entering into precipitate Reſolutions on the Firſt Rumour of diſaſtrous Events. On this Principle, there could be no Atonement for the Motion introduced on Monday laſt, to ſend another Brigade acroſs the Jumna, but the early Retraction which followed it. Our Superiors will judge whether the Doctrine can with the leaſt Colour of Truth be applied to any Acts of mine. The Evidence of our Conſultations will ſhew, that I have at all Times, and in all Circumſtances, equally preſſed for the Recall of Colonel Goddard's Detachment; and that I have more than Once been reproached for an unavailing Perſeverance in this Endeavour. In perſiſting to urge the Neceſſity of the Meaſure, I am moved, not ſo much by the Misfortune which has already befallen us at Poona, as by an Apprehenſion of thoſe which are likely to follow it.

2d. Admitting that we were uninformed of the preciſe State of Affairs on the other Side of India, it would be no Argument againſt conditional Orders, expreſſing clearly the ſeveral Caſes in which they are and are not to operate; the ſame Degree of Ignorance muſt at all Times attend our Debates concerning Objects at ſo great a Diſtance. Two Months at leaſt muſt elapſe, before our Reſolution on any given State of Facts on the other Side of India can reach the Perſons who are to be guided by it; and in the Interval a total Change of Circumſtances may have happened. Is it meant, that no Orders ſhall be given, becauſe the Nature of the Caſe will not permit us to make them poſitive and abſolute? or how can we be aſſured, that any further Information we may receive of Colonel Goddard's Situation a Month ago, will enable us to give him Inſtructions perfectly adapted to that in which he may find himſelf a Month hence?

3d. I am ſuppoſed to aſſert that diſtant military Expeditions are in themſelves irreconcilable to the Dictates of Honour, Juſtice, and ſound Policy; and that Officers intruſted with the Conduct of ſuch Enterprizes ought not to be allowed a diſcretionary Power to judge of the Means of carrying them into Execution. When Propoſitions ſo palpably abſurd are imputed to me, the

cleareſt Proof ſhould accompany the Imputation. The Meaning of my Argument could not have been ſo totally miſtaken, if the Terms in which it is expreſſed had been recited. The Object before me was a military Expedition through an immenſe Tract of Countries hardly known to us, and avowedly deſtined to conquer Nations, from which we have received no Injury. From this Fact my Inference was deduced, that if it were poſſible to anſwer every Objection to the *Principle* of Expeditions *of that Nature*; and *to reconcile their real or pretended Object* to the Dictates of Honour, Juſtice, and ſound Policy, another Difficulty inſeparable from the Execution of ſuch Meaſures, would remain in Force, viz. That the Diſtance of an Army ſo circumſtanced, obliged us to truſt the commanding Officer with an abſolute Diſcretion, not only in the Detail of military Operations, but in the Choice of his Objects. In ſupport of this Propoſition it need only be obſerved, that a Month ago it depended ſolely on Colonel Goddard's Determination, certainly not on any Orders of ours, whether he ſhould proceed to Poona, to Broach, or to Surat, or whether he ſhould return to Berar.

4th. The Limits I would preſcribe to the Britiſh Empire in India, are wide enough to anſwer every wiſe and profitable Purpoſe. The Force of our Arms ſhould now be employed in ſecuring what we have gained. All our Acquiſitions may be loſt while we are endeavouring to extend them. But if Maxims of an oppoſite Tendency are recommended, as the Foundation of a wiſer Policy, ſuch Maxims cannot be ſupported by the Example of Great Britain. The diſtant Dependencies of the Britiſh Empire took their Origin from the Spirit of Commerce and Coloniza-tion, not from Conqueſt; and, though it be true that our Fleets have acted with Honour in the moſt diſtant Quarters of the Globe, the Succeſs of Naval Enterprizes proves nothing in Favour of Expeditions by Land, into the Heart of Countries hoſtile or unknown to us. Later Events have demonſtrated the inſuperable Difficulty of ſuch Attempts.

5th. My Aſſertion, that if Colonel Goddard has proceeded to Surat, Poona, or Broach, or retreated to Berar, he has acted without Orders, is not anſwered by ſaying, that we ſent him Orders on the 8th February; ſince they probably have not reached him at this Moment: Suppoſing theſe Orders clear and to the Purpoſe; and though it ſhould happpen that they coincide with the Reſolution he may have taken, ſtill he acts without Orders, if he acts before he receives them.

6th. I do not affirm, that the Aid to be given to Fort Saint George muſt *neceſſarily* be afforded by Colonel Goddard's Detachment, or that *we* are not Judges of the Means by which we are to relieve that Preſidency. Yet theſe Propoſitions are ſtated as mine, and left, as they ought to be, without a Reply; I ſhould indeed deſerve no Anſwer, if, when I recommended a Meaſure to the Choice and Judgment of the Board, I could forget myſelf ſo far as to aſſert or intimate that the Board were not the Judges of it.

7th. When *I adopt the Reaſons aſſigned by the Preſidency of Fort St. George*, thoſe Reaſons become mine; and when I adviſe a Meaſure, expreſsly becauſe *I deem it the beſt that can be purſued in our preſent Circumſtances*, it is clear, that I am not reduced to the ſingle Argument of *its appearing conformable to the Sentiments of Sir Eyre Coote*. But as on this Point I really do not underſtand the Governor General's Reaſoning, I muſt leave it unanſwered.

I will not look into the Heart of any Man for the ſecret Motives of his Conduct: Thoſe which the Governor General is pleaſed to impute to me, are ſufficiently anſwered by a Denial. That Sir Eyre Coote has formed his Opinion without ſufficient Knowledge of our Circumſtances, I for my own Part do not believe; but I perfectly agree with the Governor General, in thinking "that "he will not expect that the Intereſts of Government ſhould not be hazarded for a perſonal "Compliment."

8th. I ſee no Probability for my own Part, that Colonel Goddard has reſumed his Negociations with Moodajee Booſla; nothing at leaſt appears in his Letters of the 27th of January and 2d of February to incline us to think ſo. But let Colonel Goddard's Diſpoſition be what it may, there ſeems no Likelihood that Moodajee Booſla, who refuſed to unite with us when our Force was entire, and the Reputation of our Arms had ſuffered no Diſcredit, ſhould be forward to engage at this Seaſon, againſt a Government flushed with Victory and ſtrengthened by Succeſs:

9th. I underſtand the Dominions of the Rajah of Berar to reach from the Nerbudda to the Coaſt of Orixa; it would not be neceſſary therefore for the Detachment to march through any Part of the Nizam's Dominions. But *if this be not a Time to furniſh that Prince with a Pretence to open Hoſtilities againſt us*, with what Conſiſtency can it be propoſed to revert to the intended Alliance with Moodajee Booſla, one of the main Objects of which is to attack the Nizam, and to conquer a Part of his Dominions?

10th. In the laſt Paragraph of the Governor's Minute, I underſtand it to be aſſerted, that ſuppoſing Colonel Goddard to move from Brampore through Berar to the Coaſt of Orixa, his Communication with us would be more difficult and precarious, and his Diſtance from Calcutta greater than if he were not to purſue that Route. If this be not the Meaning of the Propoſition, I have nothing to do with it; if it be, I muſt deny it, as a Matter of Fact, that any March Eaſtward from his preſent Poſition will place him at a greater Diſtance from Calcutta, or make our Communication with him more difficult and precarious.

Warren Haſtings,
Rich[d] Barwell,
P. Francis.

APPENDIX,

APPENDIX, N° 183.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 4th March 1779.

At a Council; PRESENT,
The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis, } Eſquires.
Edward Wheler,

READ the following Letters from Colonel Goddard:

To the Honourable Warren Haſtings, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Supreme Council.

Gentlemen,

I have had the Honour of your Letter of the 28th ultimo, informing me of the Two Battalions you have thought proper to ſend under Major Camac, to reinforce my Detachment, and the Orders he has received to act conformably to ſuch Inſtructions as I may find it neceſſary to give him. As the Route of Major Camac in order to join me, after leaving Ramghur and Churta Naigpore, muſt lay through the Territories of the Berar Rajah, I have wrote a Letter to that Prince, informing him of this Force having been detached by you, to be employed under me, for the mutual Intereſts of both Parties; and from the Rajah's favourable and friendly Diſpoſition towards the Engliſh, I do not doubt his cheerful Concurrence to their Paſſage through his Dominions, and every neceſſary and proper Aſſiſtance on their March.

I have already related to you every Tranſaction attending the Negociation I was empowered by your Government to enter into with Moodajee Booſla, and the Neceſſity I conceived there was, in conſequence of the Delays that have ariſen in the Accompliſhment of that Buſineſs, of advancing towards the Bombay Settlement; and as I am of Opinion in the preſent uncertain State of Affairs, that ſhould I find it neceſſary to proceed beyond Burhanpore, the effecting a Junction of the Force under Major Camac with my Detachment might be attended with extreme Hazard and Danger; I have directed him not to advance beyond the Weſtern Boundaries of the Berar Territories, or enter the Dominions ſubject to the Peiſhwa or Nizam Ally, till he ſhall receive further Inſtructions from me. I beg to encloſe you Copy of a Letter received from the Select Committee at Bombay, accompanying a Copy of the Treaty concluded on by them with Ragonaut Row, in the Name of the Engliſh Company. The Earneſtneſs with which they repeat their Anxiety and Solicitude for the Arrival of the Troops under me, as a Meaſure neceſſary to the Company's Affairs, does not ſeem to correſpond altogether with the Sentiments expreſſed by the Commiſſioners, in their Letter, of which I had Yeſterday the Honour of tranſmitting you a Copy; nor indeed does the Purport of the one in any Reſpect throw a Light upon the irreconcileable Doubts a Peruſal of the other had occaſioned. You will however perceive that this Letter from Bombay bears Date the 12th Inſtant, and was wrote the ſucceeding Day to that from the Army of the 11th; of courſe the Circumſtance alluded to in the latter could not then have been communicated to the Select Committee: I remain therefore in hourly Expectation of full and ſatisfactory Accounts from that Quarter, which I ſhall no doubt receive before my Arrival at Burrampore. I beg to acquaint you that I ſhall moſt certainly reach that City the 31ſt, the Narrowneſs and Difficulties of the Road having occaſioned the Delay of a Day longer than I expected.

I have the Honour, &c.
(Signed) Tho' Goddard.

Camp at Suvill,
27th January 1779.

To the Honourable Warren Haſtings, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Supreme Council.

Gentlemen,

I had the Honour to addreſs you the 26th and 27th ultimo, encloſing Letters for Meſſrs. Carnac, Egerton, and from the Select Committee at Bombay; ſince which I have marched to Burhampore, the Capital of Khandeiſh, and am encamped oppoſite the City, upon the Banks of the Taplee River. I reached this Place on the 30th, One Day ſooner than I expected, having found it neceſſary to make a forced March through ſome broken Ground and narrow Defiles, in order to get Ground for Encampment.

Since my Arrival I have been in conſtant Hope of receiving ſome Advices from Poona, to remove the Uncertainty I was under, from the Style of thoſe before arrived; but except the encloſed, no Letter or authentic Intelligence whatever has reached me; and you will perceive, that I can derive no certain Information from a Peruſal of its Contents.

I am ſorry that the Letter alluded to of the 16th has miſcarried, becauſe the Gentlemen with the Army might perhaps in it have condeſcended upon a Detail of Particulars, which would have

diſcovered

diſcovered to me the real Situation of their Affairs: At preſent, when I compare the Two Letters they have written me, with the flying Report that prevails at this Place, although I am left in the Dark as to the Manner in which Matters have been ſettled, it is however manifeſt that ſome Change has taken place in them; and there is great Reaſon to apprehend it has been brought about by Circumſtances unfavourable to our Arms.

The Firſt Letter, by the cautious Advice it gives againſt the Bodies of Horſe I may meet with, to interrupt and moleſt my March towards Surat or Broach, proves that if any Terms have been made, they are ſuch as were dictated by Neceſſity, and a Regard to their own particular Safety, without Reference to the Object for which the Enterprize was Firſt undertaken; except perhaps, agreeing to relinquiſh the Purſuit of it; and without providing in any Shape for the probable Progreſs of the Detachment, I am confirmed in the Belief that the Gentlemen of Bombay have laid aſide a Proſecution of their Plan in favour of Ragonaut Row, from the Name of the Place at which the laſt Letter is dated, as I underſtand it is a few Coſs on the Bombay Side of Bhore Ghaut.

The Coſſids who brought this, inform me, that Ragonaut Row has remained behind at Jelligong with the miniſterial Forces; that the Chiefs, after a long and obſtinate Conflict, in which Numbers were killed on both Sides, many of them ſubmitted themſelves to him, and promiſed to put him in Poſſeſſion of the Regency at Poona, if he would diſmiſs the Engliſh Troops; other Accounts again ſay, that Ragoba was taken Priſoner by Sindiah and Holkar: In ſhort, ſo various are the Reports that prevail, and ſo little are any of them to be depended on, from the partial Channels through which I am forced to receive them, that I can fix upon no certain Opinion, except that our Troops are actually upon their Return to Bombay; and that Ragoba's Buſineſs is either accompliſhed, or it is become unneceſſary to proſecute it further.

I have halted at this Place Two Days, and am collecting a ſufficient Quantity of Proviſions, that I may be ready to adopt ſuch Meaſures as ſhall be judged moſt expedient upon aſcertaining the exact Situation of Affairs at Poona, which I expect muſt arrive every Hour; for although the Gentlemen with the Army have, for Reaſons which I cannot account for, thought proper to conceal from me a Knowledge of Circumſtances ſo neceſſary for the Intereſt of the Company, and the Safety of the Detachment to be known, I do not doubt but the Select Committee will explain the whole Tranſaction clearly and fully to me. In the Hope of receiving this ſatisfactory Account, I think it prudent to defer coming to an immediate Determination; when it arrives, I will addreſs you fully.

Camp, oppoſite Burrampore,
the 2d February 1779.

I have the Honour, &c.
(Signed) Tho' Goddard.

To Colonel Goddard.

Sir,

We addreſſed you on the 16th a Letter containing Orders, which upon Recollection we do not think ourſelves authorized to give you: You are therefore to pay no Regard whatever thereto.

We are, &c.
(Signed) John Carnac.
C. W. Egerton.

Campoly,
19th January 1779.

A true Copy.
(Signed) Rich[d] Dunkley, Sec.

Ordered that theſe Letters lie for Conſideration.

Warren Haſtings.
Rich[d] Barwell.
P. Francis.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, dated the 11th March 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler,
} Eſquires.

Read the following Letter from Colonel Goddard:

To the Honourable Warren Haſtings, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Supreme Council.

Gentlemen,

I had the Honour of writing to you the 2d Inſtant, encloſing Copy of a Letter received from Meſſrs. Carnac and Egerton, ſince which I have looked with anxious Expectations for Accounts from that Quarter, to clear up the Uncertainty I had Reaſon to be under concerning the Event of

Affairs

Affairs at Poona; but it is with a good deal of Concern I muſt ſtill repeat to you my Surprize at their continual Silence and Reſerve; having received no other Intelligence from them or the Select Committee at Bombay, except the unſatisfactory Information contained in the Letters I have had the Honour to tranſmit for your Peruſal.

Situated as I now am in the Centre of the Maratta Dominions, and the Seaſon faſt approaching in which it would be extremely hazardous to keep the Field in an Enemy's Country, I have thought it neceſſary to come to an immediate Determination, and have reſolved to march towards Surat with all Expedition. The Reaſons which have induced me to take this Step, I beg to ſubmit to your Conſideration; and I am hopeful they will appear to you founded upon a Regard to the Intereſts of the Honourable Company, and to the Nature of the Inſtructions which you have been pleaſed to give me for my Guidance and Direction.

Although the Firſt Letter received from the Gentlemen with the Army could not poſſibly make me acquainted with any Particulars that had paſſed, it however gave me Reaſon to believe, as I before hinted to you, that the Troops of the Miniſterial Party were powerful in their Eſtimation: The laſt Letter, of the 19th ultimo, by being dated from Campoly on the Bombay Side of Bore Ghaut, amounted to a Proof that the Bombay Forces were returning to their own Settlements; and the different Intelligence I have been able to obtain here, together with the Reports made me by my own Hircarrahs from that Quarter, all ſeem to confirm the Belief, that a Settlement has been made with the Chiefs of the adverſe Party, by no Means favourable to our Arms; this Opinion is further corroborated by a Letter I have juſt received from Moodajee Booſla, informing me, that a Battle had been fought betwixt the Bombay Forces and thoſe of the Miniſters, in which the latter were victorious; and that having ſurrounded the Engliſh, the latter ſent a Deputation to the Marattas, propoſing to deliver up Ragonaut Row into their Hands, and promiſing to adhere to the Terms of the Treaty before made with Nanah Furneſe by Colonel Upton.

What I have been enumerating are all the Grounds on which I can form any certain Conjectures of the Situation of Affairs at Poona; and as I think the Intelligence ſent by Moodajee deſerving of particular Credit, I doubt not you will concur with me in Opinion, that the Government of Bombay muſt have ſuſtained a conſiderable Check; and that the Preſence of the Force under me may be abſolutely neceſſary to prevent any bad Conſequences that might happen to the Company's Intereſt on that Side of India in conſequence of it, ſhould this Event be followed by an Attack from the French, which you will perceive by the Select Committee's Letter, may be the Caſe next Seaſon, and on that Account preſs my ſpeedy March, from the Inſufficiency of their own Force to oppoſe it, I cannot but anticipate a probable Suggeſtion, that my Arrival may not only be the Means of reſtoring the Affairs of the Settlement of Bombay, but of ſaving it from utter Ruin.

I propoſe marching from this Place To-morrow Morning on the Road to Surat; and as I ſhall uſe all poſſible Expedition, I make no Doubt of being able to reach it in a Month, notwithſtanding the Oppoſition I may expect to meet with on the Road. I am ſorry however Meſſrs. Carnac and Egerton were not more explicit in their Firſt Letters to me, as I might by this Time have been conſiderably advanced on the Road.

With reſpect to the Negociation propoſed to be carried on with the Rajah of Berar, nothing can be effected in that Buſineſs, till the Arrival of Anſwers from your Government to the Letters ſent by him through me; and even admitting the Certainty of their acceding to the Alliance, the Diſpoſal of the Detachment in the mean Time becomes a Conſideration of Importance and Difficulty to determine: Should I wait Anſwers at this City to Letters I might write to Moodajee on the Subject, adviſing with him upon a Place to halt at till the expected Diſpatches might arrive from Calcutta, a Period of One Month would in all Probability elapſe; and ſhould he after all prove averſe to my remaining in any Part of his Territories, the hot Seaſon would be ſo far advanced, and the Rains be ſo near at Hand, that even my March to Surat, allowing for many other Circumſtances which might happen, would be rendered very inconvenient, and perhaps impracticable. I am induced to believe he would object to my continuing within his Dominions, becauſe with the Account he has written me of the Tranſactions at Poona, he has propoſed my returning to Calcutta by ſuch Road as I ſhall find moſt convenient and eligible, without making any Reference in favour of his Views in concert with your Government.

In this Uncertainty reſpecting the Intentions of Moodajee; the unfavourable Aſpect of Affairs at Bombay; the Probability of an Attack from the French upon that Settlement next Seaſon; and the preſſing Terms uſed by the Select Committee for my ſpeedy Arrival, to guard againſt the evil Conſequences of ſuch an Event; I beg to repeat to you that I conſider it for the Intereſt of the Honourable Company, and entirely conſiſtent with the Spirit of your Inſtructions, that I ſhould purſue my Route towards Bombay by the neareſt and moſt practicable Road, which is by the Way of Surat.

I have wrote to Major Camac in conſequence of Moodajee's Propoſal, for this Detachment to return to Calcutta; and the Interruption the Negociation with the Court of Naigpore has met with, not to advance beyond the Weſtern Boundaries of the Company's Provinces; but to be guided with reſpect to his remaining there, or returning to Bengal, by the Inſtructions he either has or may receive from you.

I have the Honour, &c.

(Signed) Tho' Goddard.

Camp, oppoſite Burhampore,
5th February 1779.

Poſtſcript.—Since writing the above, a Letter from the Select Committee is juſt arrived, Copy of which I beg to tranſmit for your Peruſal: You will perceive it contains no certain Intelligence of what has happened, except confirming my Belief of the Return of the Bombay Forces, and further proving the Expediency of my March towards that Settlement. As ſoon as the particular Information they promiſe to give me arrives, I ſhall do myſelf the Pleaſure of communicating it to you.

(Signed) T. G.

To Colonel Goddard.

Sir,

We have juſt received your Letter, dated the 3d Inſtant; and concluding this will meet you on your March, we direct that you proceed ſtraight to Surat, inſtead of to Poona or Ziner, as before directed.

Our Army we learn is now on the Return to Bombay; but we are not at preſent able to give you any preciſe Information as to the Reaſons for that Meaſure, or the probable Conſequences of it: We will however write you fully the Moment we are able to do it with Certainty.

We are, &c.

Bombay Caſtle,
22d January 1779.

(Signed) Wm Hornby,
D. Draper.

A true Copy.
(Signed) R. Dunkley,
Secretary.

Warren Haſtings,
Richd Barwell,
P. Francis.

APPENDIX, N° 184.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, dated the 15th March 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell, }
Philip Francis, } Eſquires.
Edward Wheler, }

MR. Francis delivers in the following Minute:

Mr. Francis—Having received no Advices from the Preſidency of Bombay of the Circumſtance or Conſequence of the Defeat of their Army near Poona, nor any direct Information whatſoever of the actual State of the Company's Affairs on the other Side of India; we are left to judge of both from Appearances, and to form our Meaſures on ſuch Facts as are known to us, and on ſuch probable Conjectures as the Lights we are poſſeſſed of may ſuggeſt. It appears to me, as well from the profound Silence which the Preſidency of Bombay have obſerved to us, as from their Letter of the 22d of January to Colonel Goddard, that ſuppoſing he ſhould reach Bombay, they have it in their Contemplation to break their laſt Engagement with the Poona Government, and to renew the War at all Events. They now have nothing to loſe, not even Honour; and we know not to what fatal Extremities Deſpair may impel them. Uniform Experience intitles us to form any Conjectures whatſoever, however unfavourable to them, with reſpect to their future Conduct: The ſame Experience, I think, obliges us to ſuppoſe the Neceſſity of our guarding againſt the moſt injudicious and dangerous Meaſures, that it is poſſible for them to purſue.

In this Situation the Firſt Thing in my Opinion to be done, is to prevent the Preſidency of Bombay, from acting at all; I mean without our ſpecific Orders and Inſtructions: I therefore move, That a Letter be immediately written to the Preſidency of Bombay, to expreſs our Concern and Surprize at the profound Silence they have obſerved to us, on the late Operations and Defeat of their Army; and to prohibit them, in the moſt preciſe and poſitive Terms, and as they will anſwer the contrary at their Peril, from commencing or renewing Hoſtilities againſt the Marattas, or any other Indian Princes or Powers, *except in their own immediate Defence*, without our Conſent and Approbation firſt had and obtained.

The

The Governor General—It has perhaps eſcaped Mr. Francis, that his preſent Motion has been anticipated by Orders exactly to the ſame Amount already paſſed, and ſent in the following Clauſe of the 9th Article of our Inſtructions of the 4th of laſt Month; "And they themſelves (that is, "the Preſident and Select Committee) be forbidden to enter into any new Engagements with-"out a previous Application to us, and our Sanction obtained." If it be true that their Deſign in favour of Ragobah hath failed; that they have entered into a new Treaty of Peace with the Maratta Government; and that they had actually abandoned Ragonaut Row, or ſurrendered his Perſon to their common Enemy, for which Facts we have ſo many concurrent Authorities as to leave us with ſcarce the Poſſibility of a Doubt of their Reality; they can neither commence nor renew Hoſtilities againſt the Marattas, or againſt any other Indian Prince or Power, except in their own immediate Defence, without a poſitive Breach of thoſe Orders. The whole Tenor of our Letter ſtrongly expreſſes the Reluctance with which we agreed to ſupport them in the Proſecution of the Meaſure which they had undertaken; ſo that it is impoſſible they can have miſtaken the Force of this Order, or overlooked it: And if, in Defiance of it, and with the moſt ſcandalous Breach of their own ſacred Engagement ſo recently contracted, they ſhall have commenced a new War with the Marattas, they will have brought themſelves preciſely into that Situation deſcribed by the Act of Parliament, by which they will become liable to be ſuſpended from the Company's Service, by the controlling Power of this Government. Our Letter of the 4th February, containing the Order above mentioned, may by this Time have been received; and I ſhall deem them accountable for every Act done in Contradiction to it. But the Order now propoſed to be ſent cannot reach them before the Month of May, at which Time it will be impoſſible for them to begin any military Operations, if they ſhould be ſo diſpoſed; and inſtead of preventing further Miſchief may ſerve them as a Plea to juſtify any Acts of Hoſtility, which they may have previouſly committed, in Breach of our former Orders. It appears therefore to me both unneceſſary and improper to ſend them any new Orders to the ſame Effect: Let us wait a few Days longer; we yet know no more of the Event of this Expedition than we did on the 25th of laſt Month, when we received the firſt News of it: It is ſcarcely poſſible that we ſhould remain many Days longer in this State of Ignorance and Suſpence; and therefore I wiſh ſtill to wait for Materials, before we venture to iſſue Orders the Effect of which we cannot foreſee, and which have no apparent Object, in the Situation of thoſe for whoſe Guidance they are deſigned.

Mr. Francis—We were not informed of the Diſaſter at Poona, when we wrote to Bombay, on the 4th of laſt Month; neither does the Inſtructions quoted from our Letter of that Date, appear to me to amount, in any Degree, to the Meaning of my Propoſition; this I think will be evident, from a bare Inſpection of the Terms of the Two Orders. They may commence or renew Hoſtilities on their former Plan, without entering into any new Engagements. If nevertheleſs the Two Orders were preciſely the ſame, I think that the important Event which we have heard of in the Interval, and of the Effects of which on the Minds of the Gentlemen of Bombay we cannot be abſolutely certain, would authorize and oblige us to repeat them. In the preſent critical Circumſtances, it is our Duty even to *them*, not to leave them the Shadow of a Pretence for acting in Oppoſition to our Intentions. Our not ſending the Orders I now propoſe will no more enforce the Obligation they were under to obey former Orders, than our ſending them will leſſen it. Whatever they may have done in the Interval muſt be condemned or juſtified by the Terms of the Orders, of which they were actually in Poſſeſſion.

Mr. Wheler—I agree to Mr. Francis's Motion.

Mr. Barwell—To agree to Mr. Francis's Motion would imply an Opinion, that it had been rendered neceſſary, by a Deficiency in the Orders already given: That there is no ſuch Deficiency is evinced by the Quotation made by the Governor General from the Orders of the 4th of laſt Month; yet to deny my Aſſent to it, I am ſenſible may expoſe me to the Charge of Inattention to the Conduct of the Bombay Preſidency, which too much warrants the Suggeſtion thrown out by Mr. Francis. Under the Orders exiſting, the preſent Motion is premature, and anticipates that full Information on which alone the Board can maturely reſolve; and which Motion, probably, inſtead of appearing irregular, might have been a general Vote of the Council, reſulting from the Facts before them. I am againſt the Motion.

Mr. Francis's Motion reſolved in the Negative.

Warren Haſtings,
Rich[d] Barwell,
P. Francis.

APPENDIX, N° 185, 186, and 187.

Bengal Secret Conſultations the 18th March 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler,
} Eſquires.

RECEIVED the following Letter from the Select Committee of Bombay.

Gentlemen,

The preceding is a Duplicate of our Addreſs, dated the 13th ultimo.

We ſhall very ſhortly diſpatch a Veſſel expreſs to Bengal, with a full Account of the unſucceſsful Iſſue of the late Expedition; this being tranſmitted over Land, to convey to you as quick as poſſible this diſagreeable Intelligence. When our Army had advanced to Tellagong, within Eighteen Miles from Poona, and it was found, contrary to Expectation, that none of the Maratta Chiefs ventured to join the Standard of Ragoba, it was judged expedient by Meſſrs. Carnac and Egerton, that the Army ſhould fall back to the Head of the Gauts, to ſecure their Supplies of Proviſions, which they could not procure as they advanced, the Country being entirely laid waſte by the numerous Bodies of Horſe that oppoſed them: The Army was accordingly put in Motion the 11th at Night, and on their Retreat were very vigorouſly attacked by the Maratta Horſe, who carried off ſome of the Baggage and Proviſion; but after a long and warm Action, were compelled to retire. This Engagement having occaſioned the Army to halt, Ragoba took that Opportunity to open a Negociation with Moodajee Sindia; and the commanding Officers having given it as their Opinion, that the Army would not ſtand another Attack, and refuſed the Charge of conducting it to Bombay, the Committee found themſelves obliged to treat with the Maratta Chiefs for an unmoleſted Paſſage. They at Firſt only demanded, that we ſhould give up the Cauſe and Perſon of Ragoba, which was accommodated without Difficulty, as Ragoba had already declared his Intention of putting himſelf under the Protection of Moodajee Sindia; they then roſe in their Demands, and inſiſted that we ſhould ſurrender all the Acquiſitions made ſince the Time of Madarow, and that Colonel Goddard's Detachment ſhould be ordered back to the Bengal Provinces. This the Committee declared in Writing, in the moſt plain and poſitive Manner, that they had no Authority whatever to agree to; and that, if they did make ſuch an Agreement, the Miniſters would be deceived; however, as they perſiſted in their Demands, the Committee after that Declaration, having no Alternative, did ſubſcribe a Paper, containing the above Conditions, and our Troops accordingly returned to Bombay. As we cannot admit that an Agreement made in ſuch Circumſtances, and after ſuch a previous Declaration, is of any Validity, we ſhall endeavour to treat with the Marattas upon another Footing; and we have directed Colonel Goddard to march to Surat, inſtead of to Poona, as before ordered. We requeſt, Gentlemen, that you will ſuſpend all Judgment and Determination reſpecting this unfortunate Affair, till the Whole is fully laid before you, which ſhall be done as ſoon as poſſible; and in the mean Time we remain, with Reſpect,

Gentlemen, &c. &c.
Wm Hornby,
Jn° Carnac,
D. Draper.

Bombay Caſtle,
3d February, 1779.

N° 186.

Mr. Francis—As it appears to me, by the preceding Letter from Bombay, that the Opinion I had formed of their Intentions is well founded, viz. That they have it in Contemplation to renew Hoſtilities with the Marattas, and that it is for this Purpoſe they have ordered Colonel Goddard to proceed to Surat; I beg Leave to renew the Motion which I made on Monday laſt in the ſame Terms, viz. "That a Letter be immediately written to the Preſidency of Bombay, to expreſs our Concern and Surprize at the profound Silence they have obſerved to us, on the late Operations and Defeat of their Army; and to prohibit them in the moſt preciſe and poſitive Terms, and as they will anſwer the contrary at their Peril, from commencing or renewing Hoſtilities againſt the Marattas, or any other Indian Princes or Powers, *except in their own immediate Defence*, without our Conſent and Approbation Firſt had and obtained."

Mr.

Mr. Wheler.—I agreed to the Propriety of Mr. Francis's Motion on Monday laſt; and I am, in Conſequence of the Letter now before the Board, fully convinced of the abſolute Neceſſity we are under of reſtraining that Preſidency from any further Act of Hoſtility againſt the Maratta States.

The Governor General.—As I am not aware of the Extent of the Queſtion, I muſt beg Leave to interrupt the Courſe of the Votes given *upon it*, by a few previous and neceſſary Obſervations. I have carefully read over that Part of the Letter from Bombay, to which the Queſtion has an immediate Relation, but do not find any Thing in it which can warrant Mr. Francis's Concluſion, "that they have it in Contemplation to renew Hoſtilities with the Marattas, and that it "is for this Purpoſe they have ordered Colonel Goddard to proceed to Surat." I infer the Reverſe from their Words; and, that their Meaning may not be loſt by a diſtant Reference to them, I will here quote them: "As we cannot admit, that an Agreement made in ſuch Cir-"cumſtances, and after ſuch a previous Declaration, is of any Validity, we ſhall endeavour to "treat with the Marattas upon another Footing; and we have directed Colonel Goddard to march "to Surat inſtead of Poona, as before ordered." They had before mentioned, that a Treaty had been extorted from their Military Committee, conſiſting of three Articles, viz. 1ſt. That they ſhould give up the Cauſe and Perſon of Ragoba; 2dly. That they ſhould ſurrender the Acquiſitions made ſince the Time of Madahrow; and 3dly. That Colonel Goddard's Detachment ſhould be ordered back to the Bengal Provinces. The Paſſage which I have before quoted, is a Diſavowal of the Treaty, and a Declaration that they will not abide by it; that is to ſay, that they will not ſurrender Salſette, Broach, and all their other Poſſeſſions, excepting Bombay and Surat, to the Marattas, but treat with them for their Poſſeſſions. It is impoſſible that their Declaration can have any other Meaning; becauſe, of the Three Articles, the Firſt has had it's full Effect; the Third has been already broken; and the Second of courſe is the only one which remains undecided. I think it poſſible that their Refuſal to ratify it may have provoked the Maratta Government, flushed with its recent Succeſs, to renew Hoſtilities on them; but it is plain, from the Terms of their Letter, that it is their Intention to avoid the Renewal of Hoſtilities againſt the Marattas, unleſs they ſhould be compelled to it, in the Defence of their Poſſeſſions. I muſt beg Leave to aſk, Whether it is the Intention of the Queſtion now before the Board, that the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay ſhall be directed to give up thoſe Poſſeſſions? I ſhould apprehend not; becauſe we are not yet furniſhed with the Authority, which the Military Committee poſſeſſed, to conclude Treaties; and becauſe we are not in Poſſeſſion of the Treaty itſelf, nor of the written Declaration, ſaid to have been given by the Committee, diſclaiming their own Authority to make it; and of courſe we are incompetent to judge how far the Treaty, under the Circumſtances in which it was made, was binding on the Preſidency of Bombay: I omit the Conſideration of its Obligation on ours, it being foreign from the preſent Subject. The Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay would obviouſly apply the propoſed Order, if ſent to them in Anſwer to their Letter, to that Part of the Letter only to which it had a Relation; and as they have no where expreſſed a Deſign of renewing offenſive Hoſtilities, they would of courſe underſtand it as a Prohibition to withhold the Performance of that Part of the Treaty, on the Performance of which the Confirmation of the Peace between them and the Marattas apparently reſted.

Mr. Francis.—I have ſtated my Opinion of the Intentions of the Preſidency of Bombay; as I collect it from the Terms of the Letter before us, perhaps it may be erroneous. The preſent Motion is to prohibit them from again invading the Marattas, or renewing Hoſtilities againſt them, except in their own immediate Defence; it goes no farther.

Mr. Barwell.—There is no new Matter before the Board. The ſhort Reply made by Mr. Francis to the foregoing Obſervations, is not to the Point thoſe Obſervations are propoſed to guard againſt. I muſt ſuſpend my Opinion on the Orders neceſſary to be reſolved by their Government, until we ſhall be fully informed. If the Preſidency of Bombay, upon good and ſufficient Ground, ſhall refuſe to ratify that Part of the Act of the Army Committee, which gives up the Poſſeſſions of the Company, I ſhall not think myſelf authorized to lay it as an Injunction upon them to part with thoſe Poſſeſſions. The preſent Repetition of the Queſtion appears to me totally unneceſſary; every cautionary Meaſure has been taken by this Government, and I do not apprehend any others can be added to them, until we receive further Advices.

Governor General.—As Mr. Francis, by declining to anſwer the Queſtion put to him, has left me Conſtruction, which I ſuppoſed, in the Words of the Motion, and as that Conſtruction is, in my Opinion, clearly warranted by them, this alone is ſufficient Reaſon for me to object to it. I have *other* Objections; theſe I partly have ſtated in the Opinion which I before gave on the laſt Council Day upon the ſame Motion. The Letter received from Bombay has indeed opened new Lights upon the State of their Affairs, but theſe are yet too imperfect to enable us to form a true Judgment of them; beſides, as I have already obſerved, it is ſcarce poſſible any Orders which we can give will prove effectual. Their Line muſt be decided, and its Effects irrevocably paſſed, before our Orders can poſſibly reach them.

Mr. Francis.—It appears to me that my laſt Minute contained a direct Anſwer to the Governor General's Queſtion; at leaſt I meant it ſo. A Prohibition againſt invading or renewing Hoſtilities againſt a People who never injured us, and who, when they had our Army in their Power, acted with ſuch Moderation as to permit that Army to return unmoleſted, is evidently ſo juſt,

and ſo reaſonable, that I cannot conceive it ſhould require any Argument to defend it. Such Prohibition, however, certainly does not include an Order to the Preſidency of Bombay to give up any Poſſeſſions, neither does it direct the Reverſe. On that Point I deſire to be underſtood to give no Opinion whatſoever pro or con. It would be premature at this Time, when we have neither a Copy of the Engagement before us, nor even of the Commiſſion under which Meſſrs. Carnac and Egerton acted.

Governor General.—Not to give an Opinion, is to leave the Queſtion to its natural Conſtruction. The Preſidency of Bombay have told us, that they will not give up their Poſſeſſions; which in other Terms is, that they will renew Hoſtilities, if the Marattas inſiſt on this Article to the Treaty. In Anſwer to their Declaration, it is propoſed to forbid them to renew Hoſtilities, which in this Conſtruction is equivalent to an Order for them to give up their Poſſeſſions; for, as I have ſaid before, there is not a Word in their Letter to which the Suppoſition of the Renewal of Hoſtilities can poſſibly apply, but their Diſavowal of the Treaty, and implied Reſolution not to abide by it.

Mr. Francis's Motion reſolved in the Negative.

N° 187.

Governor General.—As a conſiderable Time has elapſed ſince the Board were adviſed of the Reſolution taken by Colonel Goddard to march to Surat, and no Reply has been yet written to him upon that Subject, I propoſe the following.

To Colonel Thomas Goddard.

Sir,

We have received your Letter, dated 5th of February, and approve the Reſolution which you have taken to direct your March to Surat; which, under the Circumſtances deſcribed by you, and eſpecially with the ſtrong Requiſition of the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, we think was a Meaſure indiſpenſably neceſſary.

We have waited thus long in the daily Expectation of authentic Intelligence from Bombay, to guide us in forming the Inſtructions which it might be neceſſary to give you, in the great Change which has taken Place in the general Line of our Political Syſtem. We have at length received a Letter from the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, dated 3d February, which contains the firſt authentic Account of the unhappy Concluſion of the Expedition undertaken by that Preſidency for the Support of Ragonaut Row. We ſend you an Extract of ſuch Parts of their Letter as we think may be uſeful for your Information.

It is impoſſible for us to conjecture, with any Degree of Confidence, what Events may have followed the Defeat of our Arms; but from the Reſolution expreſſed by the Select Committee to diſavow the Authority by which the late Treaty was concluded, and to refuſe their Compliance with the Terms of it, we think it probable at leaſt, that they may be engaged in further Hoſtilities with the Maratta State, but of what Kind we may yet remain for ſome Time in Ignorance; nor can we form any reaſonable Concluſion of the Situation in which you may be on the Receipt of this Letter. We can therefore give you no new Inſtructions, but leave you to act on thoſe which you already poſſeſs; of which the following is rather an Explanation than any Addition to them.

As the Motive and Object of your March to that Side of India were to afford the Protection of the Forces under your Command to the Preſidency of Bombay, your whole Attention in all your Operations muſt be confined to that Object, ſo long as the Situation of their Affairs ſhall require it, until we can furniſh you with more explicit Orders; and we truſt to your Diſcretion, that in the Performance of this Service you will conduct yourſelf with the Caution which the particular State of our Affairs on that Side of India demands; and that you do not involve either yourſelf or this Government in the Reſponſibility of the Acts of that Preſidency, remembering that you ſtill act under the ſole Authority of this Government, independant of theirs, and that of courſe you are to exerciſe your own Judgment, both in the Acceptance and Execution of any Service which they ſhall require you to perform.

We are, &c.

Fort William,
18th March 1779.

Mr. Francis.—I do not think that the March to Surat was a Meaſure indiſpenſably neceſſary. Colonel Goddard might, I think, have retreated to Berar. I acquieſce in the Remainder of the Letter, without relinquiſhing any Opinions which I have heretofore delivered.

Mr. Wheler.—I accede to the Letter propoſed to be ſent to Colonel Goddard, with the Reſervation pointed out by Mr. Francis.

Mr. Barwell.—I agree to the Letter.

APPENDIX, N° 188.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 22d March 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident;
Richard Barwell, Philip Francis, Edward Wheler, } Eſquires.

READ the following Letter from Colonel Goddard.

To the Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, &c. Supreme Council.

Gentlemen;

I had the Honour to addreſs you the 5th Inſtant, informing you of my Intention to proceed immediately towards Surat, and fully explaining my Motives for ſo doing, which I flatter myſelf were ſuch as you would approve of. I rejoice much at the Reſolution I then took, as it appears a Meaſure abſolutely neceſſary, not only to the Proſperity of the Settlement of Bombay, but to its immediate Safety. The Accounts which you muſt long ere this have received from that Government, of the Event of their military Tranſactions at Poona, will have confirmed the Truth of the above Opinion, and alſo render unneceſſary any particular Explanation I could give of the State of their Affairs; beſides that except the Letters already ſent you, and that which accompanies this Diſpatch, every other Information I could obtain has been of a private and indirect Nature, and neither authentic nor particular enough to deſerve being communicated to you.

The encloſed Letter from Meſſrs. Carnac and Egerton was delivered me by a Vackeel belonging to the Peiſhwa Madherow Narrain, with another at the ſame Time from his Maſter, correſponding with the Directions contained in the former, of returning towards the Bengal Provinces. I at the ſame Time received a Letter from Mr. Farmer, forwarding that of the Commiſſioners, and acquainting me, that himſelf and Lieutenant Charles Stewart were left in the Maratta Camp, as Hoſtages for the due Performance of the Capitulation made with the Durbar of Poona, for the unmoleſted Return of our Army to Bombay.

I am releaſed from every Obligation this Letter of Meſſrs. Carnac and Egerton might lay me under, by theirs of the 19th ultimo (Copy of which has been already tranſmitted you) deſiring me to pay no Attention whatever to the Directions before ſent me of the 16th; and I am alſo on this Account convinced, that the perſonal Safety of the Gentlemen left as Hoſtages will not be affected by my March. This Conſideration, added to the cogent Reaſons furniſhed by an Attention to the ruined State of the Bombay Settlement, which would of itſelf render the Step at all Riſques abſolutely neceſſary to the Company's Intereſts, has determined me to proſecute my Intention of proceeding to Surat with all Expedition.

In conſequence of this Reſolution, I have wrote to the Poona Dubar, that in Obedience to the Orders of your Government, I marched with a Part of your Forces to protect the Engliſh Settlement of Bombay againſt any Invaſion of its Enemies the French; that your Intentions, and the Inſtructions given me for my Guidance, were perfectly friendly to the Maratta State, as the Whole of my Conduct hitherto muſt have convinced them; and that I ſhould continue to preſerve the ſame Regard to the Friendſhip ſubſiſting betwixt your Government and the Poona Adminiſtration inviolably, protecting the Subjects of the Peiſhwa from all Violence, and avoiding any Act of Hoſtility whatever, unleſs compelled to it by their Oppoſition. I farther added, that I had now advanced to the Neighbourhood of Bombay, according to your Orders; that in Obedience to them it was neceſſary I ſhould reach that Settlement; after which I ſhould be guided by the Directions you might think proper to give me.

I beg to acquaint you with my having reached the Gul Nuddy in Four Days March, which is diſtant from Burhampore near 40 Coſs. I ſhall halt To-morrow upon the Banks of it, to refreſh the Troops and Cattle, and ſhall proceed the next Day, with the ſame Expedition, towards Surat, which Place I hope to reach by the End of this Month, as it is very little more than 100 Coſs from my preſent Encampment.

The late Loſſes ſuſtained at Bombay, and the Check given to their Arms, muſt inevitably for ſome Time put a Stop to any military Operations depending upon a Plan formed by their Government; the Meaſures to be purſued will therefore reſt ſolely upon the Reſolutions you may find it neceſſary, for the Intereſts of the Company, to make, in conſequence of the unfortunate Event that has happened; and I ſhall wait with Anxiety for a Knowledge of them, to direct my future Conduct; at the ſame Time I beg to be honoured with your full and particular Inſtruc-

tions

tions relative to the Situation and Connection of this Detachment with the Government of Bombay, in order to prevent every poſſible Obſtruction to the Public Service; from a Regard to which and the Honour and Intereſt of your Adminiſtration, it ſhall be my fixed and conſtant Object never to depart.

Camp near Choprah,
upon the Gul Nuddy,
9th February 1779.

I have the Honour, &c.
(Signed) Tho' Goddard.

To Colonel Thomas Goddard, commanding the Forces from Bengal.

Sir,

Having this Day ſettled an Agreement with the Durbar, wherein it is ſtipulated, that the Army under your Command ſhall be immediately directed to march back to the Bengal Provinces, you will pleaſe, on the Receipt of this, immediately to march back in the moſt convenient and expeditious Manner you may think fit, and on your March no Moleſtation is to be offered to any Perſon, the Durbar ſending with their Hircarrahs proper Perſons to direct the different Aumildars to ſupply you with whatever may be requiſite.

We are, &c.

Camp at Worgas, near Telligoa,
the 16th January 1779.

(Signed) John Carnac,
C. W. Egerton,
Warren Haſtings,
Rich[d] Barwell,
P. Francis.

A true Copy.
R. Dunkley,
Secretary.

APPENDIX, N° 189.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 23d March 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell, } Eſquires.
Philip Francis, }
Edward Wheler, indiſpoſed.

MR. Wheler having ſent in the following Minute juſt as the Council broke up Yeſterday, it was circulated to the different Members of the Board.

Wheler's Minute.

Mr. Wheler.—The Situation to which I ſee the Company's Affairs reduced, in every Part of India, fills me, I confeſs, with the deepeſt Anxiety and Concern. On the Malabar Coaſt, I ſee a War undertaken, and likely to be continued, againſt the Marattas, without the Pretence of a Provocation of any Kind, and from the Succeſs of which the Company cannot, in my Opinion, derive any poſſible Advantage, none, I am certain, that can ever compenſate for the immediate Expence and Diſtreſs which muſt attend it; for I am convinced that new Acquiſitions can anſwer no End, but to entail upon us and perpetuate new Eſtabliſhments; I need not point out the Conſequences of a Second Defeat.

To ſupport a War at ſuch a Diſtance, and on ſuch diſadvantageous Terms, or even to maintain the Military Eſtabliſhment now exiſting on that Side of India, is enough to exhauſt all the Reſources of Bengal; from which the Company will in vain expect Returns of Wealth to England.

On the other Coaſt, I ſee the Preſidency of Fort Saint George already engaged, and likely to be more deeply involved, in Military Operations, on which not only the Defence of the Carnatic, but even of their own Preſidency, may depend, without a Friend in Reſerve, or any Mode of obtaining Supplies of Money, on which they can ſecurely rely. Hyder Ally threatens them on one Side, the Nizam on the other; and what Reaſon have we to ſuppoſe, that the Attempts made by theſe Powers will not be followed or accompanied by an Invaſion of the Marattas? On theſe Circumſtances, the Preſidency of Fort Saint George apply to the Treaſury of Bengal, as to their only Refuge.

In our own Government I ſee an expenſive and uſeleſs Military Expedition ſtill on Foot, towards our Weſtern Frontier, without an Object of any Kind. A Marine maintained at the enormous Expence of Fourteen Lacks a Year, which never has done, nor, as far as I can judge, ever will do the ſmalleſt Service. In the mean Time, we are to provide againſt Troubles in the Vizier's Country, where Two Camps are ordered to be formed for that Purpoſe.

We

We know not what particular Deſigns may be formed by Nudjiff Cawn the King, or the Seiks, or what may be the Views of the former in inviting Timur Shaw into Hindoſtan; but we know, in general, that the Diſpoſition of thoſe Powers is not favourable to us, and that, as the Power of the Engliſh, and the Uſe we make of it, is to them an Object of conſtant Jealouſy and Diſtruſt, ſo it is not unlikely that they may promiſe themſelves extraordinary Advantages from the Invaſion and Plunder of theſe Provinces. The Opinion of our Superiority in Arms has received a Check, to which we never ſhould have expoſed it. In this Situation, I ſee no Steps towards Peace, no Meaſures any where taken to recover or ſecure the Friendſhip of any of the Indian Powers; but Demands made upon Bengal from all Quarters, for Supplies of Men and Money, as if all India was united againſt us, and our Reſources alone were equal to every Demand.

I ſtate the general Poſition of our Affairs without Exaggeration, and exactly as they ſtrike me, in Hopes that the Board will conſider in the ſame Light that I do, the Neceſſity of adopting pacific Meaſures, at leaſt in ſome of the Quarters in which we are threatened with Hoſtility.

The Letter now before us from Fort Saint George cannot, I think, be read without ſuggeſting ſimilar Reflections to every Member of the Board. With reſpect to the Point on which Mr. Francis has delivered his Opinion, though it does not come in the Form of a Motion, I deem it equally incumbent on me to ſay, that, as Things are actually circumſtanced, we cannot in Safety or Prudence refuſe them a Supply of Money; if we do, they will either borrow at a heavy Intereſt, or draw upon the Company; each of which may be productive of very bad Conſequences. At the ſame Time, the ſtricteſt Oeconomy ſhould be recommended to them; and this Recommendation cannot be more effectually enforced, than by an Aſſurance that we ſee no Probability of being able to continue ſuch Supplies in future, and that they muſt exert their own Efforts, and regulate their Expences accordingly.

APPENDIX, N° 190.

Extract of a Letter from the Governor General and Council in Bengal to the Court of Directors, in their Secret Department, dated the 29th March, 1779.

IN a Letter from the Select Committee at Bombay of the 13th January, we were informed that their Army under Colonel Egerton had made but a ſlow Progreſs towards Poona, as none of the Maratta Chiefs had joined Ragoba; and that, in order to give Encouragement to his Friends, who were ſlow in declaring themſelves in his Favour, they had directed the Commanding Officer to proceed with the utmoſt Vigour. This Letter alſo adviſed us of the Death of Mr. Moſtyn; that Lieutenant Colonel Cay and Captain Stewart were killed in a Skirmiſh with the Marattas; and that Colonel Egerton's bad State of Health had compelled him to give up the Command of the Army to Colonel Cockburn.

Soon after the Receipt of the above Letter from Bombay, the Governor General laid before us a Paper of Intelligence of the moſt alarming Nature, ſent by the Nabob of Arcot, and acquainted us that the like Intelligence had been communicated to him through other Channels. It informed us of the total Defeat of the Bombay Army by the Maratta Forces on the 11th January. The Particulars of this Diſaſter were ſo circumſtantially related, and its Authenticity ſo ſtrongly marked, that they did not leave a Doubt in our Minds concerning the Truth of it.

In order therefore to guard againſt any bad Conſequences which this unfortunate Event might have on the Minds of the Country Powers, we immediately directed Brigadier General Stibbert to form Two Camps of the firſt and temporary Brigades, and to hold them in Readineſs to march at the ſhorteſt Notice. To preclude the Effect of falſe Alarms, the Vizier has been adviſed, that theſe extraordinary Camps are not formed to act againſt any of the Powers in the Neighbourhood of his Dominions. General Stibbert has alſo been deſired to declare the ſame publicly to any of the Vackeels of the Country Powers that may be in his Camps.

At a ſubſequent Meeting we iſſued Inſtructions to General Stibbert, to order the Firſt Brigade to march towards the Banks of the Jumma, and there fix on ſuch a Situation for encamping it as ſhould appear the moſt convenient for defending the Douab.

A Letter from the Select Committee at Bombay confirms in Part the Intelligence tranſmitted by the Nabob of Arcot. It ſtates that Meſſrs. Carnac and Egerton had thought it adviſable to retire with the Army to the Gauts; that this being agreed on, the Troops were accordingly put in Motion on the 11th January; that they were immediately attacked by the Marattas, whom they repulſed; but that the Officer commanding having declared that they were not in a Condition to ſuſtain another Attack, and having refuſed to undertake the Charge of conducting the Army back to Bombay, they were

obliged to treat for an unmoleſted Paſſage, which was granted on their delivering up the Perſon of Ragoba to the Miniſters. That this Stipulation being agreed to, the Marattas roſe in their Demands, and inſiſted that all our Acquiſitions ſince the Time of Mada Row ſhould be reſtored to the Maratta Government, and that Colonel Goddard's Detachment ſhould be ordered back to the Bengal Provinces. That with reſpect to this latter Requiſition, Meſſrs. Carnac and Egerton had informed them, that they had no Authority whatever to aſſent to it, and that if they did comply with it, the Miniſters would be deceived. Notwithſtanding ſuch a Declaration, they perſiſted in their Demands; which were at laſt agreed to. Hoſtages for the due Performance of the Engagements on both Sides were exchanged, and we learn that the Troops are returned to Bombay. The Select Committee have deſired us to ſuſpend our Judgment on this fatal Event until a compleat Account thereof can be tranſmitted to us. For your further Information, we muſt beg Leave to refer you to our various Minutes on this Subject, and the different Motions in conſequence of the Intelligence received; they will appear in the Conſultations noted in the Margin.

We beg Leave to refer to the Letters from Colonel Goddard, recorded in the Conſultations noted in the Margin, for a particular Account of the Progreſs of his Detachment, and of the Steps taken by him in conſequence of the Intelligence he had received reſpecting the Diſaſter which befel the Bombay Army. In his Letters of the 5th and 9th February he acquaints us of his final Reſolutions, in conſequence of the urgent Deſire of the Select Committee at Bombay, to march forward to Surat; the Reaſons which induced him to this Meaſure are fully ſtated in his Letters, and deſerve your Notice.

Not knowing what Events might have followed the Defeat of our Arms, and unable to form any reaſonable Concluſion of the Situation in which Colonel Goddard might be on the Receipt of a Letter from us, we refrained from giving him any new Inſtructions, and left him to act on thoſe which he already poſſeſſed. We approved however of the Reſolution he had taken; and, as the Motive and Object of his March to the other Side of India were to afford the Protection of the Troops under his Command to the Preſidency of Bombay, we directed him to confine his whole Attention in all his Operations to that Object, ſo long as the Situation of Affairs might require it, and not to involve either himſelf or this Government in the Reſponſibility of the Acts of that Preſidency.

APPENDIX, N° 191.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 5th April 1779.

THE Governor General lays before the Board the following Minute:

Governor General's Minute.

The Aſſembly of the Board being now rendered compleat by the Acceſſion of Sir Eyre Coote, and the Seaſon of the Year too far advanced to admit of our waiting longer for more authentic or more circumſtantial Intelligence of the State of our Affairs on the other Side of India, to deliberate on the Meaſures neceſſary to retrieve the Diſgrace which the Britiſh Arms have ſuſtained by the late Miſcarriage of the Expedition undertaken from Bombay, and to prevent the Conſequences which may be ſtill expected from it; I ſhall now call the Attention of the Board to this intereſting Subject.

We already poſſeſs a ſufficient Knowledge of the capital Points on which our future Reſolutions ought to turn; theſe I ſhall briefly ſtate:

An Army ſent into the Field for the Purpoſe of effecting a Revolution in the Maratta State has failed in the Attempt, and been compelled to purchaſe its Safety by ignominious Conceſſions, made without Authority on the Part of thoſe who ſubſcribed them, and with a Knowledge of the want of that Authority in thoſe who exacted them. Of theſe Conceſſions we only know the following; viz.

1ſt. That Ragonaut Row, in whoſe Cauſe the Enterprize was formed, ſhould be delivered up to our common Enemy.

2d. That all our Poſſeſſions immediately dependant on Bombay, excepting Surat, were to be ſurrendered to the Maratta Government.

3d. That the Detachment under the Command of Colonel Goddard ſhould return to Bengal.

The Firſt of theſe Conditions was performed upon the Spot.

The Second remains unaccompliſhed, and the Select Committee of Bombay have declared to us both their Diſavowal of the Engagement and their Determination not to yield to it.

The Third Condition has been already broken, by the March of Colonel Goddard to Surat.

The laſt Letters from Bombay inform us that their Army was ſafely returned thither.

By

By private but certain Intelligence I can inform the Board, that Colonel Goddard, with the Forces under his Command, reached their Deſtination at Surat, either on or about the 26th of February.

Of the Conſequences of theſe Events the following Conjectures may be rationally formed:

1ſt. I think it probable, for many Reaſons, that the Maratta Miniſters will be content with the Advantages which they have gained in the Poſſeſſion of the Perſon of Ragonaut Row, and will not be very ſtrenuous in inſiſting upon the Performance of the Engagements made with them by Meſſrs. Carnac and Egerton. The Select Committee have informed us that they ſhould treat with them upon theſe Points, and will probably have concluded a Peace, on the Agreement of the Marattas to relinquiſh their Pretenſions, or that they have been referred to us for our Deciſion on them.

2d. If however, contrary to this Expectation, the Maratta Government ſhall have inſiſted upon the Performance of the Conditions of the Treaty ſigned by Meſſrs. Carnac and Egerton, it is probable that the Select Committee of Bombay will have refuſed their Compliance; that Colonel Goddard will have been called upon to aſſiſt with his Force in their Defence; and that the War has been continued to this Day, ſince there is no apparent Object on our Part which could lead to a Termination of it.

Or, 3dly. The Marattas may have inſiſted upon the Performance of the Engagements, and on the Refuſal of the Select Committee of Bombay have taken no inſtant Meaſure to enforce the Performance of them; that knowing the Invalidity of theſe Engagements, and expecting that they would not be ratified, they had exacted them only to ſerve as a ſpecious Subject for preſent Negociation, and a Pretext for a Renewal of the War when they ſhould be in a Condition to proſecute it with a ſurer Effect; and that with this Intent they may have invited the French to unite with them in availing themſelves of the Advantages preſented to both by our late Defeat, and the Decline of our Influence, and to bring an Armament from Mauritius for that Purpoſe. We are certain that the French have a Force at that Iſland ſufficient and more than ſufficient for a Deſign of that Nature; and if ſuch an Occaſion has been preſented to them, it cannot be ſuppoſed that they would ſlight it, or not uſe every Exertion to ſeize and improve it. It is the only Employment left for their Troops, and the only Chance left them of regaining their Influence in India.

A Veſſel ſent with Diſpatches from Mahé or Damaun might, if it ſailed in January, arrive at Mauritius by the Middle of March. The whole Southerly Monſoon would be then before them; and if they had Veſſels ready to tranſport the Number of Troops neceſſary for the Purpoſe of giving the firſt Movement to the Plan, theſe might be expected to arrive at the deſtined Scene of Action by the Month of September next at fartheſt.

4thly. The Diviſions of the Maratta State has been ſuperficially covered, but by no Means healed, by the Neceſſity which lately united the different Parties of that State in one common Cauſe. The Loſs of the Perſon of Ragoba has indeed deprived us of the Influence which that before gave us on the Fears and Paſſions of the preſent Rulers; but his Preſence is as likely to be the Cauſe of new Contentions and new Jealouſies amongſt themſelves. Madajee Scindia, who is ſaid to have the actual Charge of his Perſon, who has always ſupported a ſeparate Intereſt from that of the Government which he defends, and who is regarded as the capital Inſtrument by which the preſent Adminiſtration holds its Power and Authority, may apply the Sanction of Ragoba's Name, and his Pretenſions, to the Confirmation of his own Independancy, and with ſuch an Advantage his Ambition may be excited even to the Purſuit of more extended Views. But I ſee no preſent Chance of our being able to recover the Poſſeſſion of Ragoba: On the contrary, he ſeems loſt to us for ever; nor am I certain that, all Things conſidered, we have much Cauſe to regret it; but in the Wound which the Britiſh Credit may have received in the Manner of his Separation from us.

5thly. The Conduct obſerved by Moodajee Booſla, ſince his Knowledge of the late Event, manifeſtly ſhews the Impreſſion which it hath generally made on the Minds of the People of Indoſtan. Inattentive to the peculiar Circumſtances which have occaſioned the Defeat of the Bombay Army, or ignorant of them, he conſiders it as a natural and unavoidable Conſequence, and a Proof that any Force which we could oppoſe to the Marattas muſt prove unequal to their Superiority of Numbers, and the rapid Movements of their Cavalry.

The Apprehenſion of drawing upon himſelf the Reſentment of a Power ſo formidable, was the undoubted Motive of the Advice ſo repeatedly and ſtrongly urged by him to Colonel Goddard, to return to Bengal; and influenced by the ſame Impreſſion he has apparently given up all Thoughts of the deſigned Alliance, which he was at one Time ſo deſirous of concluding with us; nor, great and extended as my Hopes were of the Advantages of ſuch a Connection, ſhall I think it adviſable to propoſe the Renewal of any Overtures towards it. Whenever a proſperous State of our Affairs, added to the Apprehenſions of Danger impending on the Government of Berar, ſhall induce it to ſolicit from us the Support which we have hitherto ineffectually offered to the preſent Ruler of it, I ſhall deem it adviſable, under every Situation of our Affairs, to grant it, provided it ſhall not be contrary to any other Engagements ſubſiſting. For the preſent, I regard this State as neutral, but ſecretly diſpoſed to us, and wiſh only to keep it ſo.

I ſhall not carry on my Conjectures to other Points of leſs Importance. Theſe are ſufficient for our preſent Purpoſe.

The

The greateſt Loſs which we have ſuffered by the late Diſaſter is in the Diſcredit which it has reflected on our Military Reputation, and therefore the greateſt Care ought to be taken, in all our Meaſures which have a relation to this Subject, that they do not appear to betray a Conſciouſneſs of Weakneſs, or a Diſtruſt in our own Powers, but rather that we feel ourſelves poſſeſſed of the Ability, and animated with the Reſolution, to ſupport our Intereſts and Poſſeſſions againſt all Opponents.

If Peace can be obtained on ſuch Terms as may be conſiſtent with this ruling Principle, I ſuppoſe that it will be the Object of our unanimous Wiſhes; but if Peace cannot be ſo obtained, I hope we ſhall equally agree in the Determination to exert every Power which this Government poſſeſſes, either within itſelf or by its Influence over the other Preſidencies, to efface, by a vigorous and ſucceſsful War, the Loſs which our Credit and Influence have recently ſuffered. At all Events, while we ſeek for Peace we ought at leaſt to be prepared for War, as the ſureſt Means, whether immediate or remote, to obtain it.

Upon theſe Principles I beg Leave to offer the following Propoſitions to the Conſideration of the Board:

1ſt. That we inveſt Colonel Goddard with full Powers, as the Miniſter of this Government, to treat with the Peſhwa and Miniſters of the Maratta State for the Renewal or Confirmation of the Treaty of Poorunder, provided they will recede from the Pretenſions which they have acquired by their late Engagements with Meſſrs. Carnac and Egerton, and that they will engage never to admit any French Forces into their Dominions, nor allow them to form any Eſtabliſhments on the Maratta Coaſt; and that theſe Conditions be made the Alternative of Peace or War. Accompanying is a Draft of his Inſtructions, N° 1.

2dly. That the Firſt Brigade, which has already been ordered to march to a Station convenient for croſſing the River Jumma, be completely ſupplied with Ordnance, Ammunition, and Stores, fit for any Service on which that Body or a Force equal to it may be deſtined.

I make this Diſtinction, becauſe it will officially reſt with the Commander in Chief to recommend both the Strength of this Corps and the Parts of which it ſhould be compoſed; expreſſing my own Hope that it may not be found neceſſary at any Time to employ either our European Infantry or Artillery, but for the ſole Defence of our own Provinces and the preſcribed Limits of the Dominions of the Nabob of Oude.

3dly. That Major Camac be ordered to return to Korumber, or to any other Station as convenient, near, and within our own Borders, and to remain there until further Orders; and that he be ſupplied with Ammunition, Guns, and Stores for complete Battalions.

4thly. That the Commander in Chief be requeſted to iſſue the neceſſary Orders for carrying the Reſolutions of the Board into Execution on the Two foregoing Propoſitions.

5thly. That a Letter be written to the Peſhwa and his Miniſters, with the ſame Subſtance with Colonel Goddard's Inſtructions, according to the accompanying Draft, N° 2.

6thly. That a Letter be written to Moodajee Booſla, according to the annexed Draft, N° 3.

7thly. That a Letter be written to the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, adviſing them of Colonel Goddard's Inſtructions, and requiring them to conform to them; and in the mean Time to be prepared either for repelling any hoſtile Attempts of the Marattas, or for any other Service which may hereafter be judged neceſſary, but to undertake nothing offenſively without explicit and poſitive Orders from us.

8thly. That a Letter be written to the Preſidency of Fort Saint George, to inform them of this Deſign, and, in the Event of their Succeſs againſt Mahé, to order all the Troops which are now employed in that Expedition to remain there, or otherwiſe at Tellicherry, and to be prepared to move on the Receipt of any Orders for their Junction with our Forces on that Side of India.

Theſe Diſpoſitions are propoſed as the neceſſary Preparatives to any Plan which we may be hereafter compelled to concert, with the Aid of the other Preſidencies, in the Event of a War with the Marattas alone, or joined with the French, or of an Attempt ſingly made by the French on the Preſidency of Bombay.

The ſubſequent Arrangements I leave to the Commander in Chief, to whoſe Province they officially belong.

Read the following Letters from Major Camac.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have the Honour to inform you of my Arrival here on the 20th ultimo, which is Fifteen Cos diſtant from Burwah; but from its apparent healthy Situation, the Goodneſs of its Water, and Eaſineſs of getting Proviſion, is much preferable to it. Ever ſince my Arrival, I have been very impatient for Inſtructions for my further Progreſs, but have neither heard from the Council nor from Colonel Goddard on that Head.

I have wrote to the Colonel ſeveral Times, informing him of all the Particulars relative to my Detachment, and requeſting his Directions alſo how I am to act in reſpect to the Countries which I am to paſs through.

I have diſpatched ſeveral Hircarrahs to Bimbajee, telling him of our friendly Intentions, and requeſting him to ſend a Perſon to meet me, in order to obviate my March, and to give Aſſurances to the Inhabitants that they have not ing to apprehend from us.

Since

Since my Arrival I have heard from Report, that the Treaty with Moodajee has not been concluded, which I am doubtful may alter the Plan of my March. When I ſet out, it was expected that he would forward my Progreſs, and with this View it was not thought neceſſary to furniſh me with more Ammunition than was ſufficient for that Occaſion; I have now only Forty Rounds per Man, and Ten Rounds in the Pouches, with One hundred and Sixteen Round and Grape for each of the Guns; which Stock is not more than we ought to be provided with for a ſingle Action, conſidering how much Ammunition the native Troops uſually conſume. If therefore we ſhould be obliged to act ſeparately, or the Countries we have to paſs ſhould be hoſtile to us, as they are ſtrong and difficult, and ſome Oppoſition and Skirmiſhing may be expected, we ought in that Caſe to be provided with much more. I have thought proper to mention this to you, as the Nature of the Service may now be ſo much changed, from the Failure of the Negociation with Moodajee.

In order that at all Events I may be able to act without any unneceſſary Delay, I have ventured to ſend an Indent to Patna, which will compleat us to One hundred and Fifty Rounds a Man, and Two hundred for each of the Guns, which I think is the leaſt we ought to have with us, in caſe any Oppoſition is to be expected.

Two hundred of the Drafts have no Arms; thoſe from Berrampore were ſent away without any, and were moreover ſtript of their Coats, though they were Property, having already paid for them; and though the Council had ordered new ones to be made up in their ſtead.

Our March was delayed much by the Badneſs of the Carriage Bullocks, as we got only Seventy from Burdwan, which were preferable to thoſe brought from Calcutta; all the good ones belonging to the former Place being either ſent out of the Way or hid; with this, and the Deſertion of the Drivers, the Magazine was ſtrewed in the Roads, and could never have been got on, was it not for the Activity of Captain Mayaffre, and Sixty Sepoys placed with him, who were obliged to act the Part of Drivers. The Guns went very well, and even out-marched the Sepoys all the Way; but the Diſtreſs of Individuals was very great; Servants of all Sorts extorted large Sums from their Maſters, and took the firſt Opportunity of leaving them; the Gentlemen were forced to advance Two or Three Months Pay to their Coolies and Bearers, at the extravagant Rate of Eight Rupees a Man, who threw down their Baggage, and left them after the firſt Three or Four Days; it is a Pity that theſe could not be brought to Puniſhment, and this Matter regulated for the Benefit of future Detachments under the ſame Circumſtances.

At the Range of Hills which parts Patchete from Naigpore, there were Two Gauts, one of Junck, and the other called Jymarah, through the Tamar and Boondo of Diſtricts; theſe I paſſed in Two Diviſions; and, as Troops had never marched through them before, I wrote to Lieutenant Rankins, who was ſurveying in the Neighbourhood, to go with one Diviſion, whilſt Lieutenant Cameron accompanied the other. I embraced this Opportunity, which might not again offer (becauſe of the Turbulency in theſe Hills) to have thoſe Paſſes traced, which may be eſſential for Military Service, and for the Benefit of future Detachments.

I thought it neceſſary to halt at Jelda Three Days, to get Proviſions, and to get in the Gaut Wallahs, who had made ſome Shew of Reſiſtance; I was induced to this, that I might not be inſulted without puniſhing them, in caſe they had the Temerity to fire on us, as we had not Time to throw away. On this Occaſion Borun Sing, who behaved ſo ill to Mr. Daniel, was very inſolent, but did not proceed further. For the Coming-in of theſe Gaut Wallahs, I am much obliged to Purſanah Sing, the Rajah of Ramgur, who came to me to Julda, and accompanied me through them.

Mr. Hewitt alſo was very obliging, and extremely aſſiduous in providing every Thing we ſtood in need of; we had much Occaſion for his Aſſiſtance, for we might as well have come through a Deſart as Burdwan; the Inhabitants had all left their Villages (as we were informed) by Order of a Man called Byjonate, who was ſent on before by the Ranny's People for this Purpoſe.

We have not had Twenty Men deſerted ſince our March, and thoſe were all from the Drafts; the Sepoys are all in very good Spirits, and will go wherever we want them; however, it is to be apprehended that many of the Followers will run away, though every Means has been uſed to encourage them.

At this Place we joined Captain Crawford's Corps, which he has already brought into very good Order and Diſcipline; he has ſupplied me with a vaſt Addition to my Buzar, and I expect much from his Aſſiſtance.

I am in eager Expectation to hear from Bimbajee, and of the political State of Matters to the Weſtward; when any Thing material occurs, I ſhall not fail immediately to adviſe you of it.

Camp at Corambah,
in Chuttah Nagpore,
11th March 1779.

I have, &c.
(Signed) Jacob Camac.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We have had for ſeveral Days Reports of the Defeat of the Bombay Army, and we have had it ſince confirmed by very authentic Letters by way of Patna and Banaras. In this Poſture of Affairs I was entirely without Inſtructions for my further Progreſs, until Yeſterday that a Coſſid arrived from Colonel Goddard, with a Letter for me, dated at Aſſeragur 28th of January, Two Days from Boorhampore. In this he directs me to proceed, in caſe Moodajee Booſla ſhould give his Con-

currence and Conſent to my paſſing through his Country, and gives me Inſtructions for my Route to Poona. He acquaints me he has wrote to the Berar Prince on this Subject, who will forward this Letter to me with one from himſelf, intimating his Approbation of the Meaſure: That I am to obviate or over-rule any Objections he may make for detaining me, unleſs urged in the moſt pointed Terms; and that in caſe of his Refuſal, I am to remain at the Extremity of the Company's Provinces, till I receive further Orders either from your Board or from himſelf.

Moodajee, after keeping the Hircarrahs waiting for Five Days, permitted them to come away without any Letters for me; ſo that, without his Approbation or Diſapprobation, I am now left to my own Judgment. Indeed, circumſtanced as we are, I ſhould be apt to deem his Silence a Diſapproval. Bimbajee too has not wrote me in Anſwer to my Letters: He holds the adjoining Parts of Moodajee's Dominions, and though he is in a Manner independant, may be cautious of taking ſuch a Meaſure without his Brother's Conſent.

Undoubted News is now come, dated the 5th of February, from Boorhaunpoor, that the Colonel, hearing of our Diſaſter near Poona, was to march that Night for Surat; ſo that if he purſues his Intention, it will be in vain my thinking to join him. Had he kept his Ground at Boorhaunpoor, or had determined on returning by Burrar, I ſhould have thought it indiſpenſable for me to march immediately to ſupport him.

In this Situation, I think it neceſſary to purſue a middle Courſe, until I ſhall receive further Lights: Colonel Goddard may be obliged to give up his Scheme of going to Surat; he may be obliged to return through Nagpoor: Madajee may be induced through Fear, or to pay Court to the prevailing Side, to behave unfriendly to him. I propoſe therefore advancing ſlowly into Ruttempoor, profeſſing the greateſt Friendſhip for Moodajee and his Brother, until I hear further from them; which will be the Means of keeping Moodajee at leaſt at Home, ſecure the Colonel on that Side, and further his Retreat, if neceſſary, through Burar into our Provinces; or puſh on to join him, if offenſive Meaſures ſhould be determined on. In the mean Time, whilſt I am moving ſlowly on, Captain Crawford, whom I ſhall direct to remain for ſome Time at Burwa, to forward Proviſion and keep open the Communication, will eſcort to me the Supply of Ammunition, which I have indented for to Patna, and will then return to Burwa, or to his Station at Chetrah.

Leſt you ſhould think it extraordinary that a Detachment ſo lately come out ſhould want Ammunition, I took the Liberty of mentioning it in my laſt. The Circumſtances under which it was ſuppoſed I was to proceed then, made very little requiſite, and no more than a ſufficient Quantity for that Purpoſe was provided. Things being now ſo much changed ſince that Time, I thought it expedient that I ſhould be completed for any Contingency; and, to prevent unneceſſary Delay, indented to Patna for a ſufficient Quantity. I am only apprehenſive that enough of Muſquet Ammunition or Powder is not to be got there, and beg that you will direct whatever has been indented for may on Requiſition be ſupplied from Burar or Chuna. I beg alſo you will write to Patna to ſupply me with Money, which we ſhall be ſoon in much Want of.

Encloſed is the Proceeding of a General Court Martial held in this Camp on the 25th February, and which has been diſſolved.

Camp at Korumba,
Chuta Nagpore,
14th March 1779.

I have, &c.
(Signed) Jacob Camac.

Reſolved that the following Letter be written to Major Camac:

Sir,

We have received your Letter of the 14th ultimo. We deſire that you return to Korumba, where you will encamp the Detachment under your Command, and there wait our further Orders.

We are, &c.

Warren Haſtings,
Rich. Barwell,
P. Francis.

To Siccaram Pundit and Balajee Pundit.

I have received your Letter, containing various Complaints of the Conduct of the Governor and Council of Bombay, and other Particulars, which I fully underſtand.

This Letter not having been as uſual accompanied by one from the Peſhwa, I think it neceſſary to inform you of it, leſt, ſhould one have been written and miſcarried in the Way, there might appear an Impropriety in my not returning an Anſwer to it.

I have heard by various Channels ſome Particulars of the late Events on that Side of India, and have received ſome little and imperfect Intelligence relative thereto from the Gentlemen at Bombay; but, till my Knowledge of thoſe Matters is more complete and authentic, I muſt ſuſpend my Judgment reſpecting the Rectitude of the Conduct of the Members of that Government.

hear, with the greateſt Surprize, that the Chiefs of the Army from Bombay have made a Conven-tion with you without the Authority of this Government, which you well know was indiſpenſably neceſſary for an Act of that Nature, and that the Conditions of it are very injurious to the Rights of the Company and the Honour of the Engliſh Name. I have not yet received a Copy of it; but, whatever it may be, it is incumbent on me to take the earlieſt Occaſion to diſavow it, and declare it null.

This Declaration ought to be unneceſſary to you, to whom the like Information was given in Form on the Deputation of Colonel Upton.

The paſt cannot be recalled; but for the future it is my firm Wiſh, that, as I laboured before, however ineffectually, to conciliate the Differences which had ariſen between you and the Govern-ment of Bombay, and which prevented the Execution of the Treaty made through Colonel Upton, Peace may be yet reſtored, and all paſt Grievances buried in Oblivion. For this Purpoſe, I and the Counſellors of this Government have authorized Colonel Goddard to negociate and conclude with you, in the Name and Behalf of the Company, a new Treaty, confirming that made by Colonel Upton, on theſe Conditions, viz. That you relinquiſh all Claims derived from the unauthorized Act of our Army, and which could not even have received the Sanction of the Preſidency of Bombay; and that you alſo engage never to grant the French, who are the Ene-mies of our Nation, any Settlement or Reſidency in the Ports of the Peſhwa, nor to admit the Forces of the French into any Part of his Dominions, nor to form any Alliance nor any Con-nection with them, either for Traffic or otherwiſe.

On theſe Conditions, we offer you the Friendſhip of the Company and the Engliſh Nation for ever. If you reject them, we are remedileſs, and blameleſs of the Conſequences, whatever they may be, as Peace or War depend upon your Determination.

For further Particulars I muſt refer you to Colonel Goddard, to whom I have granted full Powers for the Purpoſes above deſcribed, and deſire that you will regard him accordingly, as the Re-preſentative of this Government, and his Acts, done under this Authority, as the Acts of the Com-pany and of the Engliſh Nation.

To the Peſhwa in Subſtance the ſame as the foregoing.

Draft of a Letter to Moodajee Booſlah.

I have received your Letters. They are long, and dictated with the ſame Wiſdom and Friend-ip with which all your former Letters have been written; but as the great Object of them all is ow entirely at an End, it is unneceſſary to recapitulate the Subſtance of them. Beneram Pundit arrived, and has delivered to me the Paper which you entruſted to his Charge: At his Deſire, in bedience to your poſitive Injunctions, and the other Oath which I underſtand he ſwore to per-rm them, the Paper was delivered and opened in the Preſence of Rameaunt Moonſhy, and read me by him. Having fully underſtood the Contents, I have returned the Paper to Beneram undit, at his particular Requeſt, that it might be ſent in its original State to you; this alſo being, I underſtand, a Part of his Inſtructions. Reſpecting the different Points contained therein, they e ſuch as will not admit either of Negociation or Comment; I conceive them to have been in-nded as an implicit but deciſive Anſwer upon a Subject in its own Nature ſo delicate, and ren-ered more ſo by the paſt Interchange of our Sentiments upon it, and our known mutual Wiſhes, at you apparently choſe this indirect Method of declining to engage any further in it, rather an to relinquiſh it by an abrupt Declaration, which might have been conſtrued unſuitable to the riendſhip and Cordiality which have hitherto ſubſiſted ſince ſo long a Period, and which I hope ill ever ſubſiſt between us, and between your Family and the Company and Engliſh Nation; herwiſe it was certainly unneceſſary to have ſent a Perſon honoured with ſo high a Degree of our Confidence as Beneram Pundit poſſeſſes, upon ſo long and perilous a Journey, merely to ive me the Information which might have been expreſſed by a Letter containing no more than a ngle Line. What is paſt, is paſt—Of the Deſign which I had formed, I ſhall totally relinquiſh l future Thoughts; but of your paſt Kindneſs I ſhall retain a laſting Remembrance.

When I firſt wrote to you that an Engliſh Army had been appointed to proceed to the other de of India, and deſired you to aſſiſt it in its Progreſs, you immediately returned an Anſwer preſſing your chearful Compliance; and, not contented with bare Profeſſions, which are oftener e Maſk of Deceit than the Indication of Sincerity, you wrote at the ſame Time to the Com-ander of our Forces, inviting him to paſs through your Country; you ſent a Perſon of Rank d Truſt to wait on the Borders of your Dominions with a Store of Proviſions for their Sub-ſtence; you cauſed them to be entertained, in the long Stay they made in your Country, with all oſpitality, and have continued the ſame Conduct to them ſince their Departure. Theſe are not mplimentary or equivocal, but real and ſubſtantial Acts of Friendſhip; as ſuch, it is eſpecially this Time incumbent on me to expreſs the Senſe that I entertain of them, as it is my Wiſh, and all be my Care, to make every ſuitable Return to them, whenever any future Occaſion of your ffairs ſhall demand it.

I have ordered Major Camac to remain within the Borders of Bengal, and not to proceed any rther; but have not yet determined whether he ſhall return to Calcutta, or join any other Part our Army; this muſt depend on future Contingencies.

Poſtſcript.

Poſtſcript.—Since I wrote the above, I have received a Letter from Major Camac, informing me that Orders had been ſent him by Colonel Goddard to proceed forward and join him, provided it ſhould be agreeable to you, without whoſe Inſtructions he was to take no Step: That for this Purpoſe the Colonel had written to you, requeſting that you would either ſend a Paſſport to Major Camac, or intimate to him your Diſapproval of his Proceedings; in which latter Caſe he would lay aſide the Deſign—That the Coſſed ſent to you by the Colonel having been detained Five Days at Naigpoie, and then bringing with him no Letter or Inſtructions from you, he had conceived it a tacit Conſent to his March, and that for private Reaſons you might not chooſe to truſt it to Writing; and that he was therefore marching on ſlowly.

As this Meaſure is by no Means agreeable to me, I have written to Major Carmac to return within our Borders.

Agreed to the Propoſitions contained in the Governor General's Minute; and

Reſolved, That the following Letters be written to the Select Committee of Bombay and Fort Saint George, and to Colonel Goddard; and that the Governor General be requeſted to write, in the propoſed Terms, to the Peſhwa and Moodajee Booſla.

Gentlemen,

We have received your Letter of the 21ſt February.

We wiſh that you had not apprehended the Perſon of Gazidy Cawn, as it has the Appearance of at leaſt an Act of Violence to him, which no Pretext can juſtify, and which may furniſh Occaſion for Jealouſies, that at this Time you ſhould be particularly careful to avoid. We muſt therefore earneſtly recommend to you, inſtantly to grant him his Liberty, peremptorily inſiſting that he do immediately quit the Engliſh Territories; and, if you have an Opportunity, we further recommend that you forward him on his Way to Mecca.

We have deemed it neceſſary to inveſt Colonel Goddard with full Powers, as the public Miniſter of this Government, to treat with the Peſhwa, and the Miniſter of the Maratta State, for the Renewal or Confirmation of the Treaty of Proondur, provided they will recede from the Pretenſions which they have acquired by the late Engagements of Meſſrs. Carnac and Egerton, and will agree not to admit any French Force into their Dominions, nor allow that Nation to form any Eſtabliſhment on the Maratta Coaſt; impowering him to conclude a Treaty of Peace with them on theſe Conditions; Acceptance or Refuſal of which muſt determine the Alternative of Peace or War.

Our Firſt Object in this Negociation is to obtain a Peace on honourable Terms: In the mean Time, we recommend to you to be prepared, either for repelling any hoſtile Attempts of the Marattas, or for any other Service which we may hereafter judge neceſſary; and we do formally forbid you to undertake any offenſive Meaſure without explicit and poſitive Orders from us.

We are, &c.

Gentlemen,

We have received your Letter of the " and, in Conſequence of your urgent Deſire to be furniſhed with a Supply of Treaſure from hence, we have reſolved to ſend you Fifteen Lacks of Current Rupees in Gold; Ten Lacks of this Sum we ſhall diſpatch immediately by the Stafford, and the remaining Five Lacks will be forwarded by the firſt ſafe Conveyance in Auguſt: We ſhall take an early Opportunity of replying to the other Parts of your Letter.

We have deemed it expedient to inveſt Colonel Goddard with full Powers, as the public Miniſter of this Government, to treat with the Paiſhwa and Miniſters of the Maratta State, for the Renewal or Confirmation of the Treaty of Proondur, provided they will recede from the Pretenſions which they have acquired by their late Engagements with Meſſrs. Carnac and Egerton, and that they will engage not to admit any French Forces into their Dominions, nor allow that Nation to form any Eſtabliſhments on the Maratta Coaſt; and that the Acceptance or Refuſal of theſe Conditions muſt determine the Alternative of Peace or War.

Having thus informed you of our Deſigns, we deſire, in the Event of Succeſs in the Enterprize now carrying on by your Government againſt Mahie, that you will order all the Troops which are now employed on the Expedition to remain there, or otherwiſe at Tellicherry, and to be prepared to move on the Receipt of any Orders for their Junction with our other Forces on the Weſtern Side of India, in the Event of its becoming neceſſary.

To Colonel Goddard.

Sir,

Having under Conſideration the late Advices from Bombay, we have deemed it neceſſary to inveſt you with full Powers, as the public Miniſter, and the Miniſters of the Maratta State, for the Renewal or Confirmation of the Treaty of Proondur; provided they will recede from the Pretenſions which they have acquired by the late Engagements of Meſſrs. Carnac and Egerton, and will agree not to admit any French Forces into their Dominions, nor allow that Nation to form any Eſtabliſhments on the Maratta Coaſt; and we empower you to conclude a final Treaty of Peace with them on theſe Conditions; the Acceptance or Refuſal of which muſt determine the Alternative of Peace or War.

The Points in which we are willing to allow you a Diſcretion to relax are theſe:

1ſt. To yield up the Balance which may yet remain due to the Company, of the Sum of Twelve Lacks of Rupees, which the Maratta Government were bound, by the 6th Article of the Treaty of Proonder, to pay as an Indemnification for the Expences of the War undertaken in Support of Ragonaut Row, and for which Aſſignments were taken on Jambooſeer, and muſt of courſe be relinquiſhed with this Conceſſion. The Second Point is the Amount of the Lands in the Neighbourhood of Broach, ſtipulated by the Fifth Article of the Treaty of Proonder to be ceded to the Company, yielding a complete Rent of Three Lacks of Rupees. The Words which the Tranſlation render "complete Revenue," are in the Original, *Jumma Cahmil*; which have been interpreted by the Miniſters, the Jumma or Rent at which the Lands are rated in the public Account of the Revenues; and the Lands which were offered by them amounted to Three Lacks, according to their eſtimated Amount, although their real Produce has been ſtated to us by the Preſidency of Bombay to amount to no more than Rupees 209,200.

We think this not a Point worth conteſting, at the Hazard of an Object ſo important as Peace, if it ſhould prove an Impediment to it, and we therefore empower you to accept of the Lands tendered as above.

The Nature of our Connection with Ragonaut Row being very materially changed by the Surrender of his Perſon to the Marattas, we cannot inſiſt on the literal Confirmation of thoſe Articles in the Treaty of Proonder which were ſtipulated in his Favour, nor, ignorant of his preſent Condition, can we preſcribe any expreſs Terms which ſhould be required on his Behalf; but generally recommend to you to obtain ſuch Proviſions for him as you ſhall judge the moſt ſuited to his preſent Circumſtances, for his perſonal Safety and Subſiſtence, making the former an indiſpenſable Engagement.

Upon the Whole, Sir, our Object is Peace; if it can be obtained on ſecure and honourable Terms. By concluding a Peace on ſuch Terms, you will render a moſt acceptable Service to the Company, and merit our higheſt Approbation.

We incloſe you a Letter of Credence inveſting you with this Power, and a Copy of the Treaty of Proonder for your more particular Information.

We are, &c.

To Colonel Thomas Goddard, commanding the Detachment from the 1ſt Brigade.

We the Governor General and Supreme Council of Bengal, in virtue of the Authority and Powers veſted in us by the Legiſlature of Great Britain, and by the Honourable Eaſt India Company, to direct and controul the Political Affairs of all the Company's Settlements in India, relying on your Fidelity, Prudence, and Integrity, do depute, authorize, and empower you, in our Names, and on Behalf of the Honourable the United Eaſt India Company, to negociate and conclude a Treaty of Peace and Friendſhip between the Chiefs and Rulers of the Maratta State and the Engliſh Eaſt India Company, on ſuch Terms and Conditions as ſhall be for the mutual Honour, Benefit, and Satisfaction of both Parties, and remove all the Cauſe of Enmity now ſubſiſting between that State and the Government of Bombay; and we hereby give you full Powers to this Effect, declaring that we will ratify and confirm whatever ſhall be ſo concluded by you in our Names and in our Behalf, according to the Inſtructions with which you have been furniſhed for that Purpoſe.

Given in Fort William, under our Hands, and the Great Seal of the United Company, this Fifth Day of April in the Year One thouſand Seven hundred and Seventy-nine.

Warren Haſtings,
Richard Barwell,
P. Francis.

From Madajee Bhoſilah: Received 20th February 1779.

Your agreeable Letter bearing Date the 3d Zehedja, 23d November 1778, conceived in Terms calculated to carry our Friendſhip to the higheſt Pitch, recapitulating the Contents of my former Letters, and adding, that my Views and Sentiments perfectly coinciding with your's, gives a Certainty of Succeſs to our common Deſigns; that you have therefore appointed Colonel Goddard in the room of the late Mr. Elliott, and given him Directions to act in concert with my Forces; that I will not therefore let ſlip the Opportunity which now preſents itſelf of exalting my Name above thoſe of the moſt illuſtrious Chiefs; that I muſt not neglect the preſent Moment, as an Opportunity once loſt is hardly ever recovered; and adding, that a Word to the wiſe is ſufficient: This Letter reached me on the 20th of Zehedja, 9th February, by the Route of Cuttack,

followed by a Duplicate, and afforded me the higheſt Degree of Pleaſure, conveying with it the Proofs of the utmoſt Sincerity and Warmth of Friendſhip, and convincing me of the Wiſdom of your Plans, your Magnanimity, Penetration, and Foreſight, which are the firmeſt Support of Government, and give a certain Aſſurance of Succeſs in the moſt arduous Undertakings.

I likewiſe underſtand what you write reſpecting the favourable Opportunity which preſents itſelf; the Caſe is this:—Men of Underſtanding, who are experienced in Affairs and ſkilled in all the Duties of Government, before they engage in any Undertaking, make it their Buſineſs maturely to conſider the probable Event, and take their Meaſures accordingly, omitting no Means which the moſt conſummate Prudence can dictate to enſure Succeſs: All your Letters abound with theſe Sentiments; and where both Parties enter upon an Undertaking upon mature Judgment and Foreſight, and from a Knowledge of the probable Event, ſuch Undertaking will be crowned with Succeſs; the Sentiments of each will meet the Approbation of the other, and their Views will coincide in every Inſtance, and every Plan be purſued which may promote the common Intereſt, every Deſign freely communicated, and no Reſerve obſerved.

When Colonel Goddard had croſſed the Nudbuddar, and was arrived at Hoſhingabud, which is dependant on me, he deputed Mr. Watherſtone to me, and agreeable to your Inſtructions informed me of his Arrival, that he had received Inſtructions from Calcutta to concert a Plan of Operations with me, and requeſted to be informed of my Sentiments, and that it was expedient I ſhould not let the preſent Opportunity ſlip;—in Reply thereto, actuated by Sentiments of the ſincereſt Friendſhip, knowing that you had placed the moſt implicit Confidence in me, I ſaid, "This is a Buſineſs of the greateſt Difficulty and Delicacy: I am perfectly acquainted with "the State of all the Powers in the Country, and with the Affairs of the Decan, which is my "Country; that an Army was called together at Poona of 70,000 Horſe, and that immediately "on Intelligence of the Connection formed between us they would be increaſed to 100,000, "and that, actuated by a Love of their Country, their Families, and a Regard to their Fame, "the Chiefs would diſregard their Lives, and make aſtoniſhing Exertions to oppoſe any Attempt "that ſhould be made againſt them; that therefore to meet them in Arms would require at the "leaſt an Army of 50,000 Men from hence, in Addition to the Engliſh Force, and large Ma"gazines of Proviſions and Stores; that the aſſembling ſuch an Army and Military Stores "would require an immenſe Treaſure, and moreover a long Space of Time would be required "to conciliate the Minds of the different Chiefs, and to draw over the moſt conſiderable to our "Party; that being now arrived at Hoſhingabad, and calling on me to join him, it was impoſ"ſible for me to comply; that if this had been intimated to me in former Letters, I ſhould have "been on my Guard, and employed the 10 or 12 Months which have elapſed in the Negocia"tion, in raiſing Forces and collecting Military Stores; but that all the Letters I had received "from Calcutta were to this Effect—That the Detachment was ſent to Bombay for an Appre"henſion of the Deſigns of the French, and deſiring that on its Arrival on my Territories I "would take Care to ſupply it with Proviſions and all other Neceſſaries, and ſend a ſmall Party "to accompany it to the Borders of my Country: Now that I learn this important Deſign, how "can I at ſo ſhort a Notice carry it into Effect? Every Step that is taken ſhould be taken with "Firmneſs, and on mature Reflection; that therefore I thought it adviſable to ſend Beneram Pun"dit and Ramkund to Calcutta, and to charge them with my Inſtructions reſpecting the final "Concluſion of this Matter; that after their Arrival there, and ſettling the Points of Negocia"tion, and the Receipt of Letters from Calcutta addreſſed to me and him, a Plan of Operations "ſhould be ſettled; till that Time, if he choſe it, I would have him remain at Hoſhingabad, "and take with him a Part of my Forces, &c. and reduce the Fort of Mundilla, which had re"volted from me, and that whatever Money he collected ſhould be divided into equal Proportions "between us; that if he did not agree to this Propoſal, either let him proceed to Bombay, as "there was now no Danger from the Maratta Forces, who were all gone to oppoſe the Engliſh "at Boregaut in the Cokun Country; that the Engliſh, from Bombay with their Army, were "arrived at the ſaid Gaut, and were followed by Ragganaut Row; that he ſhould go thither: In a "Word, that he ſhould remain wherever he thought proper, but that wherever he ſhould fix he "ſhould wait for further Advices from Calcutta."

Mr. Watherſtone having maturely conſidered and underſtood all theſe Particulars, returned ſatisfied to the Army.

I diſpatched Copies to you by the Route of Benaras, with Letters containing the Particulars of this Negociation, which I hope you have before this Time received; Colonel Goddard likewiſe has doubtleſs written you on the ſame Subject. I have not yet heard from Colonel Goddard's Army, nor do I know if he will remain at Hoſhingabad, go towards the Fort Mondilla, or proceed to Bombay; we ſhall ſee what he writes. You will give the neceſſary Directions to Colonel Goddard.

Beneram Pundit and Ramkund have left this, charged with Letters of Commiſſions to you, and will proceed by the Route of Cuttack; they have Orders to uſe every poſſible Expedition, and on their Arrival will repreſent to you whatever I have given them in Charge, and will make ſome important Propoſitions to you; by the Spirit of Wiſdom you will diſcover, that the Foundation of them is like the Wall of Alexander, and built on the ſincereſt Foundation, and will pay due Attention thereto; and, Beneram Pundit having fulfilled the Purport of his

Miſſion, you will ſend him back without Delay, that agreeable thereto I may plan the Execution of the moſt important Affairs. I impatiently wait your Reply.

From Dewagur Pundit: Received the 26th February 1779.

Your friendly Letter, containing ſeveral *friendly* Intimations and Hints reſpecting your ſecret Views and Deſigns; the Appointment of Colonel Goddard, on the Part of the Council, to concert and adjuſt all Matters, with the Advice and Concurrence of this Government; and briefly touching on Knowledge of the Seaſon of Action, and not to let the fortunate Opportunity which preſents itſelf ſlip, with other Particulars of the moſt important Nature, arrived in a happy Hour; and by its Contents, which I perfectly underſtood, afforded me the greateſt Pleaſure: And Mr. Watherſtone likewiſe, who came here on the Part of Colonel Goddard, made the like Repreſentations, and was anſwered in the Manner which the Situation of the Times, and the Knowledge of the State of Affairs in Decan in general, and at Poona in particular, rendered it expedient. It was therefore judged proper to depute Beneram Pundit, accompanied by Ramkund, a Follower of the late Mr. Elliott, to Calcutta, and to concert the Operations agreeable to the Anſwers which ſhould be received from thence. This Determination was communicated to Mr. Watherſtone, who then departed for the Army encamped at Hoſhingabad, on this Side the Nubader. Time will ſhew, whether, conformably thereto, the Army halts at Hoſhingabad, or Gurra Mundillah, or proceeds towards Bombay; whichever Meaſure is adopted, I will communicate to you. What you write of your Hopes of the fortunate Iſſue of your Deſigns, with the Concurrence and Aſſiſtance of this Government, founded on your Knowledge of the Magnanimity and Fortitude of my Maſter, and my Wiſdom and Abilities in Government, I perfectly underſtand.

By the Bleſſing of God, the excellent Plans you form are always built on the moſt ſolid and judicious Grounds; and your Magnanimity and extenſive Views are without Parallel in Indoſtan and Decan. And from the Commencement of this Undertaking I have conſtantly written and declared to the Engliſh Chiefs, the Meaſures which my confined Abilities and Judgment pointed out to me as moſt likely to bring it to a fortunate Iſſue: Accordingly, with the Approbation of Watherſtone, a Letter in the fulleſt and cleareſt Terms was diſpatched to you; and Beneram Pundit, and Ramkund, a Follower of Mr. Elliott, were diſpatched by the Way of Cuttack, charged with Letters, and ſeveral Points of Negociation, for the final Settlement of the Groundwork of the important Deſigns in Hand; I doubt not but he will ſhortly arrive, and fully repreſent to you the Particulars with which he is charged; and, having attained the Ends of his Miſſion, that you will, without Delay, give him his Diſmiſſion, by which Means it is poſſible the common Deſigns may be brought to a ſatisfactory Iſſue. Your Reply is impatiently expected; and that this Matter be ſettled on ſuch firm and ſolid Grounds, that the Advantages thereof may be felt by the lateſt Poſterity, and the Warmth and Sincerity of my Friendſhip and Attachment proved to a Demonſtration.

For further Particulars I beg Leave to refer you to the Maha Rajah's Letter, which is full and explicit.

From Beneram Pundit: Received the 5th March 1779.

I did myſelf the Honour to addreſs ſeveral Arzies to you before I left Naigpore, informing you of Mr. Watherſtone's coming thither, and after various Conferences returning to the Army, which I hope you have received.

I took Leave of my Maſter on the 24th Zehedja, 13th January, and began my Journey, accompanied by Salla Ramkund, the late Mr. Elliott's Moonſhey, and arrived at Cuttack on the 7th Juſter, 24th February. Salla Ramkund is gone to perform religious Ceremonies at Jaggarnaut, and I am detained here a little by ſome Buſineſs with Rajah Ram, but ſhall ſhortly renew my Journey, and ſoon have the Pleaſure of preſenting myſelf before you, and explaining all the Particulars of my Commiſſion fully to you.

On the Day of my Arrival here I received Letters from the Maya Rajah and his Dewan, to your Addreſs, which I now do myſelf the Pleaſure to encloſe to you: I hope they will ſhortly reach you, and make you acquainted with their Contents. My Brother Biſſenber Pundit will communicate to you the News from Poona. At Saranagan I met with Yatakee, the Servant whom you ſent to erect a Monument for the late Mr. Elliott; I went 2 Coſs out of my Way to viſit the Tomb of the bleſſed Deceaſed, and likewiſe waited on the Chief of the Rajah Biſhenaut Sing, and preſſed him warmly to afford his Aſſiſtance, and to ſupply Neceſſaries for the Completion of the Monument; but, as Stone-cutters and other Artificers cannot be had in that Diſtrict, and muſt be brought from Simbulpore, I went thither, and made it my Requeſt to the Dewan Akber, that he would furniſh Yattakee, on his Application, with Artificers, and every thing he ſhould require for the Completion of the Monument. He obliged me by his Promiſe of a cheerful Compliance, and ſent a Man to the Spot. I have no Doubt but the Buſineſs will now go on briſkly, and will be ſhortly completed.

From

APPENDIX, N° 191.

From Modajee Bhoſilah: Received 5th March 1779.

I ſome Time ago, after the Arrival of Colonel Goddard at Hoſhingabad, and Mr. Watherſtone's coming hither, the former of whom had been appointed from Calcutta to act with my Advice and Concurrence in the Deſigns projected, wrote you very fully, in repeated Letters, whatever Prudence, Foreſight, and a perfect Knowledge of the real State of Affairs, and the Force of the Armies in the Decan, which is my own Country, pointed out to me, and likewiſe communicated to you whatever I learnt on theſe Subjects; I likewiſe diſpatched Beneram Pundit and Ramkund, with Letters full of Advice and important Plans for the future, by the Way of Cuttack, who I doubt not will after ſome Time arrive at Calcutta, and, having explained to you all the Particulars with which they are charged, will form ſuch ſolid Engagements as may be the Foundation of a firm Treaty, which ſhall deſcend to the lateſt Poſterity; and that Beneram Pundit, having procured all the Neceſſaries for the carrying it into Execution, may be immediately diſpatched to this Quarter.

I ſent Word to Colonel Goddard by Mr. Watherſtone, to write to the Bombay Gentlemen, who had brought Ragganaut Row with a moderate Army into the Neighbourhood of Poona, and commenced Hoſtilities with the Forces of Pundit Pundhaum, who were prepared to receive them, to ſuſpend their Operations, and that he himſelf ſhould halt ſome Time in Mundilla and Guna Diſtricts, by which Time Beneram Pundit would return from Calcutta with deciſive and ſatisfactory Anſwers, by which he ought to regulate his Motions; and that this Advice was founded on the State of the Times: In Reply, he wrote me that he had written what was proper to Bombay, to put a Stop to Hoſtilities, and that Letters from Calcutta having been ſent to the ſame Effect, he had no Doubt that they would lay aſide their hoſtile Deſigns, and would act with a Samorcand Policy; that he could not halt in the Diſtrict of Guna Mundilla without Orders from Calcutta; that he was marching to the Weſtward to Binhampore, where he would wait in Expectation of the Reſult of the Negociations at Calcutta, and the Return of Beneram Pundit: In a Word, he proſecuted this Deſign in Preference to all others, and marched from Hoſhingabad, and I have not ſince heard from him how far he has advanced.

Certain Intelligence has lately been received here from Poona, that ſeveral Engagements have been fought between the Bombay Army and the Forces of Pundit Pundhaun, and that in the End the Engliſh inconſiderately and raſhly quitted the Gauts with Ragganaut Row, and deſcended into the Plain, when the Marratta Army of 50,000 Horſe, judging it a favourable Opportunity, began an Engagement with them by a Cannonade from their large Artillery, which will throw a Ball One or even Two Coſs Diſtance, and kept themſelves ſecure behind their Guns; the Engagement was very hot, and in the End the Maratta Army ſurrounded the ſmall Body oppoſed to them, and took Poſſeſſion of 3 P^s of Artillery, their Tents, Baggage, and Artillery Bullocks, and killed great Numbers. As all Communication was cut off from the Engliſh Army, they were reduced to the Neceſſity of ſending an Agent to treat with the Poona Miniſters; Time will ſhew what Terms are agreed on, and what will be the Reſult of this Buſineſs; to the Time when the Advices came away, the Engliſh continued ſurrounded. Whatever I may hear further, induced by the ſincereſt Friendſhip, I ſhall write. Doubtleſs you have received the ſame Advice from other Quarters. I am in all Events ſteady in Friendſhip.

I received Two Parcels of Engliſh Papers from Colonel Goddard, one containing Accounts, the other, Letters for the General at Madras: I have diſpatched them both: you will receive the Accounts, and the Letters will be ſent from Cuttack to Madras.

Poſtſcript. Since I wrote the above, certain Intelligence is arrived from Poona, that the Engliſh being ſtraightly beſieged by the Maratta Army, they delivered up Ragganaut Row to the Poona Miniſters, and have entered into Engagements to conform to the Treaty of Ballajee Row.

From Modajee Bhoſila: Received 6th March 1779.

Your agreeable Letter, containing the joyful News of the Succeſs of the Engliſh Arms in the Reduction of Pondicherry, the Seat of the French Power in India, on the 27th Ramzaun, 18th October 1778, and congratulating me thereon, afforded me inexpreſſible Pleaſure; before the Receipt of your Letter, I had received Intelligence of this happy Event by the Decan Newſpaper, and communicated it to Mr. James Anderſon, and directed Beneram Pundit to write to you, from whoſe Letters I flatter myſelf you received this pleaſing Account. I moſt ſincerely congratulate your illuſtrious Monarch, the Company, and yourſelf, on this Event; may the Almighty render it joyful to you, and let it be followed by Bleſſings innumerable!

From Dewagar Pundit: Received the 5th March 1779.

Your agreeable Letter, containing an Account of the Succeſs of the Engliſh Arms in the Reduction of Pondicherry, the Seat of the French Power in India, arrived by the Route of Cuttack, and

and afforded me inexpreſſible Pleaſure. The Maha Rajah likewiſe received the greateſt Joy from the News of your important Succeſs againſt your Enemies the French. I ſincerely congratulate you and all the Chiefs of your Nation thereon.

I have already written to you in repeated Letters, whatever the Situation of Affairs pointed out as adviſable; and Beneram Pundit and Ramkund have been diſpatched to you by the Way of Cuttack, charged with Letters from the Maha Rajah, and will on their Arrival explain to you all the Particulars of their Commiſſion. I entertain the greateſt Hopes, that, actuated by Wiſdom and ſolid Judgment, and the Dictates of ſound Policy, the Propoſitions to be made to you will meet with your Approbation and Aſſent; and that you will ſhortly diſmiſs Beneram Pundit with the Accompliſhment of the Objects of his Miſſion.

From the Maha Rajah's Letters you will have full Information of whatever, prompted by the State of Affairs, was written to Colonel Goddard, or communicated perſonally to Mr. Watherſtone, as well as the Advices received from Poona, of Hoſtilities between the Engliſh of Bombay and the Maratta Army; the Diſtreſſes of the Engliſh Forces, their ſmall Army having been ſurrounded by the numerous Troops of the Marattas, and in the End their having been reduced to the Neceſſity of ſending a Perſon to treat of Peace and an Accommodation with the Miniſters.

I am firmly reſolved, in all Events, ſteadily to purſue the Dictates of the ſtricteſt Friendſhip towards you, who are ſtrictly united in Friendſhip with the Maha Rajah my Maſter. I wait impatiently the Return of Beneram Pundit, with the Accompliſhment of the Objects of his Miſſion.

Poſtſcript.—The ſame as that to the Rajah's Letters.

From Dewagar Pundit: Received the 5th March 1779.

When Advices, to the Effect mentioned in my former Letter, arrived from Poona, I inſtantly diſpatched Letters, by ſwift Coſſids, to Colonel Goddard with the Intelligence; and ſet forth that his proceeding any further towards Benhampore was highly unadviſable; that it was expedient, that in Compliance with the Advice which had been given him from hence, he ſhould halt ſome Time in the Diſtrict of Guna Mundilla, and relinquiſh for the preſent his Deſign of advancing; for the Maratta Forces would certainly oppoſe him in the Neighbourhood of Benhampore. You will therefore be pleaſed to write what you judge proper, to induce him not to advance, but to concert his Meaſures with us.

As the Hurry and Precipitation of the Engliſh at Bombay, and their Imprudence, Temerity, and Diſregard to your Directions ſent them from Calcutta, forbidding them to commence Hoſtilities (which Colonel Goddard has aſſured me, by Letter, you did ſend them) have brought Affairs to this paſs, you will not be too precipitate and haſty in the Proſecution of your former Deſigns; ſhould they be delayed Months, till a fortunate Opportunity preſents itſelf, it is a Matter of no Moment; but it is neceſſary that the Fabrick be built on the moſt ſolid Baſis, that it may not be ſubject to any Shock. The Form of this Fabrick, the Baſis on which it is built, and the Purpoſe for which it was intended, ſhould be kept the moſt profound Secret till the Time of Action, and not truſted to a ſingle Perſon, except ſuch as are entirely in your Confidence, and heartily attached to you; for even Walls have Ears.

All the Particulars have been confided to Bala Ramkund, who poſſeſſes Wiſdom, Prudence, and complete Knowledge of Buſineſs, and is firmly attached to your Government, and verſed in all the Views and Deſigns of this. He, in Concert with Beneram Pundit, will in private fully communicate them to you.—The Plan which has been formed, has been entirely built on a complete Knowledge of the Affairs of the Decan: Being convinced of this, you will without Delay intimate your Aſſent to me, that it may be carried into Execution without Hurry or Precipitation. Let a conſtant Correſpondence be kept up between us: I am at all Times, and on all Occaſions, ſincerely attached to you; and whatever I write you will give implicit Belief to, and, regarding it as directed by the warmeſt Friendſhip, you will act agreeably thereto. Although it may appear preſumptuous in me to write in this Manner to Chiefs who poſſeſs ſuch Magnanimity and extenſive Views, yet the ſincere and hearty Friendſhip I bear takes from me the Power of reſtraining my Pen, and guides it as the Heart dictates; what I write flows ſpontaneouſly from the Heart.

POSTSCRIPT.

As within theſe Ten Months near 50 Letters have been received from you, prompted by the warmeſt Friendſhip, and with a View to Futurity, I have, without Reſerve, communicated to you continually every Particular reſpecting the State of the Decan, in which I am completely verſed; had not theſe been my Motives, what elſe could have induced me have writ to you ſo fully and clearly on all theſe Matters?

APPENDIX, N° 191.

Copy of a Letter from Madajee Bhoſila to Beneram Pundit: Received by him at Cuttack.

You are fully acquainted with all my Affairs, and Sentiments, and Schemes; not the leaſt Circumſtance is hidden from you: Proceed with the utmoſt Diſpatch to the Place of your Deſtination, and apply diligently to the Settlement of the Buſineſs in Hand. Although I wrote repeatedly to Colonel Goddard, to halt ſome Time in the Diſtrict of Gana Mundilla, he has paid no Regard thereto, but is marched towards Benhampore. I have juſt received certain Intelligence from Poona, that a great Battle has been fought with the Engliſh of Bombay, who had paſſed the Gaut, and that the Engliſh were worſted, and are ſurrounded by the Maratta Army, and have ſent a Perſon to treat of a Peace and Accommodation with the Poona Miniſters, and that Ragonaut Row is encompaſſed with the Engliſh; we ſhall ſee what will be the Reſult. In the Beginning of this Buſineſs, what I ſaid from the Dictates of Penetration and Foreſight, and a competent Knowledge of the Armies of the Decan, was diſregarded as of no Conſideration; it is now come to paſs as I predicted; Time will ſhew what Plan Colonel Goddard will adopt and communicate to me. I have diſpatched Letters on the Subject of theſe Events to Calcutta, do you repair thither with all Expedition, as the moſt material Point of all my Deſires and Plans is the raiſing Sepoys, which at the leaſt muſt amount to 50,000 choice Men, under the Command of Country Officers; and moreover firm Allies and Chiefs of Note are requiſite to join the Party, all which depend on large Sums of Money; you will take effectual Methods to accompliſh this material Object. For the reſt, nothing, however trifling, is concealed from you; you perfectly underſtand them, and will accompliſh them all; write me an Anſwer without Delay. You will ſettle the Plan on ſo ſolid a Baſis, that it may not be ſubject to any Change or Shock, and that our mutual Pains may not be throwed away unprofitably. As I have received a great Number of Letters from the Nabob Amaud-ul-Dowla, and have written him as many, as you know, and as you likewiſe brought a Meſſage from him to me, it was for theſe Reaſons that I have conſtantly written him whatever came to my Knowledge reſpecting the Affairs of the Decan, and to this I have been prompted by the moſt ſincere Friendſhip alone, having had no other View in ſo doing. Exert all your Endeavours for the Succeſs of this, as is the Duty of a good Servant.

From Maha Rajah Modajee Bhoſilah: Received the 18th March 1779.

I have been made happy by the Receipt of your agreeable Letters, under Date the 10th, 14th, and 19th of Zehaida, and 9th and 11th Zehedja, and perfectly underſtand all their Contents. I am greatly indebted to your Friendſhip for the Enquiries you made regarding my Health, which you heard had much ſuffered. I thank God, who has been pleaſed perfectly to reſtore it to me. The repeated Account you give me of the pleaſing Event of the Capture of Pondicherry, on which I have before congratulated you, affords me the higheſt Pleaſure: May the Almighty give you Joy of it! With reſpect to your Letter expreſſing your Deſire for the eſtabliſhing of a Dauk, by the Route of Midnapore and Morebinge, by Reaſon of the Directneſs of the Road; the Coſſids who go that Way repreſent it as filled with Difficulties and Dangers. The Route of Cuttack, although longer, is therefore to be preferred. In the other Letter you expreſs yourſelf very fully on your ſecret Views and Deſigns; the Recapitulation of all the Particulars would take up too much Time; but they are in Subſtance, that I will not ſuffer the preſent favourable Opportunity to eſcape, but will concert all the Operations with Colonel Goddard, and carry them into Execution; and that by ſuch Conduct our common Intereſt will be effectually promoted. All this I perfectly comprehend, as I am completely Maſter of the State of Affairs in Decan, which is my own Country, and no Particular thereof is hidden from me; I therefore explained myſelf very fully to Mr. Wetherſtone, and alſo wrote my Sentiments to Colonel Goddard. I alſo diſpatched Beneram Pundit and Lalla Ramkund with Letters to you, and hope that they are by this Time arrived, and have explained to you all the Points of their Commiſſion. Your perfect Knowledge in the Art of Government, and in the Management of Negociations, will, I doubt not, lead you to approve of the Points which will be propoſed to you.

Since the Engliſh at Bombay, by their ill-judged and raſh Meaſures, and by the Precipitation with which they attempted to carry them into Execution, have received a ſevere Check from the Maratta Army, and been obliged to deliver up Ragganaut Row to the Poona Miniſters, and to relinquiſh Shaſtie, &c.; to give Two Hoſtages, and to return to Bombay under an Eſcort from the Maratta Army, and to conclude a Treaty, ſtipulating that Colonel Goddard ſhould return; and, as an Army conſiſting of near 100,000 Horſe is aſſembled at Poona, in high Spirits and Confidence, ſhould Colonel Goddard march on, he will undoubtedly meet with the ſevereſt Oppoſition: I have therefore written repeatedly to him to return, but have yet received no Anſwer, and am filled with Uneaſineſs as to the Event, ſhould he continue at Buhampore; the Times abſolutely require that he ſhould return. Should you have received theſe Advices at Calcutta, you doubtleſs have or will give him Inſtructions to return: You will likewiſe direct Major Camac, whom you have diſpatched to this Quarter, to ſtop; for in important Undertakings, and Matters of Difficulty and Danger, Magnanimity and Fortitude alone are not ſufficient; other Points, ſuch as the aſſembling numerous Forces, collecting warlike Stores,

Stores, and a large Treaſure, are equally requiſite, to enable the Parties to proſecute them with Succeſs, in ſpite of all Oppoſitions, otherwiſe Diſgrace will be the inevitable Conſequences. The preſent Situation of the Engliſh at Bombay may ſerve as an Example. On the Arrival therefore of Beneram Pundit and Ramkaunt, having learnt the Buſineſs of their Deputation, and the real State of Affairs at Bombay, you will form a ſolid Plan for the projected Operations, which you will communicate in Writing to me, or ſend both the Deputies back to me, that I may warmly engage in the Purſuit thereof.—Further Particulars you will learn from my Miniſter Dewagur Pundit's Letter, written with my Concurrence.

Your Application to me for Aid and Aſſiſtance is a Proof of the ſincere and warm Friendſhip you bear me; but every Step which I take in this Buſineſs muſt be on mature Deliberation, Reflection, and on ſolid Grounds, that ſo there may be no Cauſe for drawing back.

From Dewagur Pundit: Received 18th March 1779.

Your agreeable Letters, accompanied by Karetahs for the Maha Rajah my Maſter, the Contents of which are very voluminous, and to every Point of which I ſhall reply in the Sequel, arrived in a happy Hour, and afforded me the higheſt Pleaſure; I perfectly underſtand every Thing you write. The News of the Capture of Pondicherry, by the Magnanimity of the Engliſh Forces, gave me great Joy: God give you Joy of it!

Your kind Enquiry after the Health of the Maha Rajah, who you had heard was greatly indiſpoſed, is a Proof of your warm Friendſhip; although he was very ſeverely attacked, yet the Almighty has been graciouſly pleaſed to reſtore him to perfect Health, and he has in a great Meaſure recovered his former Strength.

As it has ever been the Characteriſtic of the Bhoſila Family to keep their Friendſhip inviolable, and pay the moſt ſcrupulous Regard to their Word and Engagement, and as it is my Practice to communicate to every illuſtrious Chief who will place Confidence in my Judgment and Advice, the Advantages and Diſadvantages attendant on any Object in View, I therefore communicated to Mr. Watherſtone, and wrote to Colonel Goddard, whatever my poor Judgment pointed out to me as eligible.

Beneram Pundit and Ramkaunt have been likewiſe diſpatched to you with Karetahs and Letters, and will fully communicate with you on all the Points entruſted to them; I have no Doubt that actuated by your Knowledge of the Art of Government, by your Penetration, and Foreſight into the probable Events of any Meaſure, you will approve and aſſent to all the Propoſitions they will make you. As I am warmly intereſted in the Buſineſs in Hand, I ſhall obſerve upon all the Correſpondence, and from firſt to laſt, and offer my Opinion as a ſincere Friend on the Meaſures which Policy points out for the future.

Your firſt Letters treated of the Diſputes in Europe between the Courts of Great Britain and France, and of the Commencement of War, and of the Poona Miniſters having received a French Envoy, notwithſtanding the Treaty ſubſiſting between the Engliſh and Pundit Purdham, their granting him the Port of Chowl, and furniſhing him with an Arſenal; your having in conſequence diſpatched a formidable Detachment under the Command of Colonel Leſlie for the Security of Bombay, and intimating your Deſire, that, in caſe they ſhould paſs this Way, they ſhould be aſſiſted with Proviſions and other Neceſſaries, and a Body of Forces ſent to conduct them through theſe Territories. As the Ties of Connection with Bengal, by Reaſon of its Vicinity, had been long formed, and Beneram Pundit was ſtationed with you ſolely for the Purpoſe of cultivating and improving thoſe friendly Ties, you were anſwered, *That* no Objection would be made to your Detachment marching through theſe Territories, and that they ſhould be aſſiſted to the utmoſt poſſible, and accompanied to the Borders by a Perſon of Credit.

Intelligence was given to the Poona Miniſters, and they were informed, that, whilſt they were in a Treaty of Friendſhip with the Engliſh, their receiving a French Vackeel, and intriguing and forming Connections with that Nation, in Breach of their Engagements with the Engliſh, was highly improper and unjuſtifiable. The Anſwer from Poona was, That they had not given any Encouragement to a French Vackeel; that the Perſon who came there, came ſolely for the Purpoſes of Traffic; and that even him they ſent away, for the Satisfaction of the Engliſh, and were ſteady at all Times to their Treaty with them; that we would write Aſſurances of this to Calcutta.

Letters were accordingly written from hence to Calcutta to that Effect, as well as to Colonel Goddard and Colonel Leſlie, and the ſame was communicated to Mr. Watherſtone and Mr. James Anderſon. In Anſwer thereto Mr. Watherſtone replied: "We have not the ſmalleſt "Idea of giving Support to Ragonaut Row, nor any Intention of acting hoſtilely againſt Pundit "Peiſhwa or the Poona Miniſters; but we are going from an Apprehenſion of evil Deſigns, "formed by the French againſt Bombay, and the other Poſſeſſions of the Engliſh. If the Poona "Miniſters give Aſſiſtance to the French, we ſhall certainly commence Hoſtilities againſt them." In Reply to this, we ſet before him the State of Decan, which being our Country, we were perfectly acquainted with, and told him that to advance would be highly impolitic, as they would undoubtedly be oppoſed by the Maratta Armies in the Way; that they had better halt ſome Time in the Diſtrict of Mundillah, &c. in Expectation of Inſtructions from Calcutta. In the mean Time, before Colonel Goddard reached Hoſhingabad, ſeveral Letters were received from you,

you, intimating that having ſeveral private Matters to communicate, which it would be improper to commit to Writing, you had therefore deputed Mr. Elliott, a Gentleman of ſuperior Underſtanding, and entirely in your Confidence, to repair hither, who would fully explain the Motives of his Deputation, and would concert all Meaſures, and ſettle all Points in Conjunction with us; and that, having eſtabliſhed a perpetual Friendſhip between the Two States, he would write you Word thereof. Two or Three Months paſſed in Expectation of Mr. Elliott's Arrival, and in the Interim ſeveral Letters, all tending to the ſame Point, that Mr. Elliott would ſhortly arrive, and fully explain your Views and Sentiments, were received from you. As that Gentleman died in the Journey, and the News of his Deputation reached Poona and Hydrabad, and threw both thoſe States into the greateſt Apprehenſions, we received Letters from both, deſiring to know for what Purpoſe Mr. Elliott was coming hither; but, as we were totally unacquainted with your Deſigns, what could we write, or what Plan could we fall upon?

The Poona Miniſters, and the Nabob Nizam ul Dowla, becoming daily more apprehenſive of our Deſigns, Letters were accordingly written to you after the Deceaſe of Mr. Elliott, that the Standard of our Friendſhip and Union having been ſeen throughout Hindoſtan and Decan, and been the Cauſe of inſpiring our Friends with Confidence, and our Enemies with Diſmay, that we ought therefore to make our Advantage of it; or in other Words, that you ſhould depute another Perſon in the Room of the Deceaſed, to conclude the Negociations, that, being informed of your Views, we might purſue a Plan for their Accompliſhment, and remove the Doubts entertained by the Powers of Decan.

In what was written from hence "that no trifling Change of Circumſtances, which are in Fact "no more than Trials, ſhould induce the Ruler of a State to relinquiſh his Deſigns; and that Firm-"neſs and Steadineſs in the Purſuit of his Object, and a ſteady Adherence thereto, was truly praiſe-"worthy, and the diſtinguiſhing Characteriſtic of great and exalted Minds," the Meaning was this—that it was not conſiſtent with the Statements of magnanimous and illuſtrious Chiefs to ſet aſide the Treaty ſubſiſting between Pundit Purdham and the Engliſh for a trifling Change of Circumſtances, namely, that a French Agent came to the Poona Miniſters; when they would not receive him, but ſent him away. You will not underſtand it to have meant any thing elſe. Since by Mr. Elliott's Deceaſe in the Way we were deprived of all Knowledge of your Views and Deſigns, how could you write that ours totally coincided with yours, notwithſtanding we were totally unacquainted with them? As you repeat in all your Letters that you place entire Confidence in my Judgment and Penetration, you will therefore pay the greateſt Attention to any Plan which ſhall iſſue from me, conſidering it as formed on the moſt ſolid, not on a weak Foundation, or liable to be ſhaken by every Blaſt.

In all your Letters to this Time, you write that Colonel Goddard, when he arrived in theſe Territories, would conduct himſelf by my Advice. After the Arrival of Mr. Watherſtone at Naigpore, I told him, actuated by my Knowledge of the real State of Affairs in the Decan, the Multitude of the Maratta Forces, the Dangers of engaging in Hoſtilities with them, and the Difficulty of overcoming them; the Impropriety of acting precipitately in Affairs of ſo important and extenſive a Nature, the Neceſſity of a numerous Army, the Alliance of the principal Powers of the Country, and a large Treaſure, for the Accompliſhment of the Deſigns; all which Points muſt be provided for, and the Operations clearly laid down, and every Step taken therein be on ſolid Grounds. That from all theſe Conſiderations it would be proper to depute Beneram Pundit, who was charged from thence to explain the Objects of Mr. Elliott's Deputation to Calcutta, and that in the mean Time the Detachment ought not to advance further, but to halt in the Mundillah Diſtrict, and ſend Orders to the Engliſh at Bombay to put a Stop to their Hoſtilities, which were very impolitic. Beneram Pundit and Ramkaunt were accordingly ſent by the Route of Cuttack, and having been now gone more than a Month, I flatter myſelf they will ſoon arrive, and explain to you every Matter entruſted to them; and that you, actuated by Friendſhip, ſound Judgment, and the Knowledge of the Art of Government, will approve of their Propoſals and comply with them.

Colonel Goddard would not conſent to halt in the Mundillah Diſtrict, but wrote for Anſwer, that he could not think of it without Inſtructions from Calcutta, and muſt go on; and he is now arrived at Burhampore.

In the mean Time, repeated Advices have been received from Poona, that the Engliſh of Bombay having paſſed Boregaut came into the Plain, where they engaged with the Maratta Army; that being ſurrounded by the Multitude of the Enemy, conſiſting of 80,000, their Supplies cut off, and they ſubjected to a ſevere and conſtant Cannonade, they were obliged to treat of Peace, and to deliver up Ragonaut Row, with his Family and Dependants, to the Poona Miniſters; to leave Two creditable Hoſtages with the Army for the Relinquiſhment of Shaltie, &c; and to enter into a new Treaty, by which they engage for their peaceable Behaviour in future, and for the Return of the Engliſh Detachment on its Way from Hoſhingabad; which Treaty having been ratified, they returned to Bombay. On the Receipt of theſe Advices repeated Letters were written from hence to Colonel Goddard, requeſting him not to advance, as the Maratta Army, conſiſting of near 100,000 Horſe, and being now freed from their Apprehenſions of the Bombayers and Ragonaut Row, would immediately follow him and ſurround him; that it was therefore expedient he ſhould return, and on no Account think of proceeding; but no Anſwer has been yet received from the Colonel, and we are left in the greateſt Uneaſineſs of what may be the Event. In the

Interim, Karetahs and Letters have been received from you by the Route of Cuttack, Midnapore, and Morebunge, of Beneras, and alſo through the Channel of Colonel Goddard; Two Letters of Congratulation on the Capture of Pondicherry; Two on the Subject of eſtabliſhing a Dauk through Midnapore and Moregunge, provided it ſhould be found ſafe and expeditious; Two, containing Information of your having diſpatched Major Camac with Two Battalions of Sepoys by the Way of Kamgur and Chutteah Naigpore, and intimating, that on his Arrival on the Borders he would take Advice from hence with reſpect to his proceeding to join Colonel Goddard; Three very voluminous Letters with your ſecret Views, and of their coinciding with ours; and ſetting forth, that from our late Letters, and the Advices you received at the ſame Time from Colonel Goddard, you perceive that Delays have ariſen in the Execution of your Views; that you place the greateſt Dependance on our hearty Support, and implicitly rely on the Fortitude and Magnanimity of the Maha Rajah, and on my Wiſdom and Penetration; that from Sentiments of the warmeſt Friendſhip you are engaged ſo far in the Buſineſs, and now require our Aid and Support for the Completion of it; that it is therefore incumbent on us not to delay it to a future Opportunity, but engage warmly in ſuch Meaſures as will raiſe the Engliſh * Name in Hindoſtan.

It is neceſſary to look back and attentively conſider the Circumſtances you allude to: That ſince, in the Term of a full Year that this Correſpondence has ſubſiſted, nothing has been hinted at in your Letters but the Enmity of the French, and in the mean Time Mr. Elliott was deputed hither, perſonally to explain your Sentiments, which on his Deceaſe were entruſted to Beneram Pundit, on the Subſtance of whoſe Letters, and the Anſwers from this Quarter, you were to form your ultimate Plan of Operations; and that till that Time Colonel Goddard was to conduct himſelf by your Advice: And Anſwers were immediately written in the fulleſt and moſt explicit Terms, in the Preſence of Mr. Watherſtone, from which I hope you have a clear Inſight into every Particular; and ſoon after Beneram Pundit and Lalla Ramkaunt were diſpatched with Letters to you. And as moreover we have never failed in the Performance of the leaſt Duty of Friendſhip, have given our Advice on the Meaſures propoſed, pointed out the Advantages and Diſadvantages to be expected, and propoſed Plans for the preſent and future, which our Knowledge of the Cuſtoms and of the Affairs of Decan, and the Multitude of the Maratta Forces on Foot, enabled us to do, pointed out the Means of effecting the Object in View, the Neceſſity of taking every Step with Firmneſs and Solidity; notwithſtanding all this, and that the Engliſh at Bombay have by their Raſhneſs and Precipitation, and ill-formed Meaſures, reduced themſelves to their preſent Situation; and the Maratta Army amounts to near 100,000 Horſe ready for Action, and the Nabob Nizam ul Dowla Bahadre is ſtaunchly attached to their Party; yet you write confidently that we ſhould, at ſuch a Time, engage warmly in the Purſuit of your Deſigns, and act therein in concert with Colonel Goddard. Whilſt we are not provided with Warlike Stores, with ſufficient Forces or Treaſure to meet the other Party, how can we engage in this dangerous Undertaking, upon the Strength of mere perſonal Bravery alone? Or how can Colonel Goddard adviſe us to ſuch a Meaſure? The Event would be attended with Diſgrace, in like Manner as the Expedition of the Bombayers has been. On the Arrival of Beneram Pundit and Lalla Ramkaunt, all theſe Matters will be made clear to you, and we ſhall receive from you ſatisfactory Anſwers: You will alſo write to Colonel Goddard to return, and will give Major Camac Directions to ſtop, as this is not a Seaſon for this ſmall Body to give Proof of their Bravery by advancing. On the Arrival of Beneram Pundit and Lalla Ramkaunt, after you are acquainted with the Points of their Commiſſion, and have learnt the State of the Engliſh at Bombay, you will form a ſolid Plan on the moſt judicious Grounds, for the Completion of the important Objects in View, and inform us thereof by Letters, or ſend both the Deputies back.

You will regard this long and explicit Letter as dictated ſolely by Candour and the warmeſt Friendſhip, and a perfect Knowledge of the Affairs of Decan.

From the firſt Arrival of Colonel Goddard, my Sentiments have been inviolably the ſame, and with theſe, and the Products of Reflection and Penetration, have all my Letters been filled; this was the Subſtance of all my Letters to you before the late Occurrences happened at Bombay, and I ſhall continue without Reſerve to give you my Sentiments and Advice.

Poſtſcript.

Since I wrote the above, Letters have been received from Colonel Goddard at Burhampore, that he has received Advices reſpecting the Engliſh at Bombay, but that it is neceſſary he ſhould go to adjuſt the Affairs of Bombay; that he can on Account conſent to return. As we have not been wanting

* If this is meant as a Quotation, it is a very imperfect if not a falſe one. The Words of the Letter to which I ſuppoſe it alludes, are theſe: "The Eyes of the World are on us both; they have ſeen me ſtruggle through Difficulties to the "Point, at which by your Aid I have enſured the moſt glorious Succeſs, the Termination of which, by the Bleſſing of "God, will afford Peace and laſting Security to the Engliſh Dominions in India; and to you Encreaſe of Power, Ho"nour, and immortal Reputation."

It may not be unneceſſary to remark, that I have compared the Perſian Tranſlation of the above Words with the Engliſh, and find it to be as literal as the different Idioms of the Languages will allow. I have alſo read it to the Governor General, who is of the ſame Opinion.

(Signed) J. H. D'Oyley, Perſian Tranſlator.

in the Duties of Friendſhip, or in giving him good Advice, if he will not take it we have no Remedy.

From Siccaram Pundit; received 28th March 1779.

In former Times Seremunt Ragonaut Row, inſtigated by certain villainous Perſons, was guilty of Acts condemned by all Religions and Laws, the Particulars of which Acts you are too well acquainted with to make it neceſſary for me to repeat them. By the Support of the Governor of Bombay he raiſed Commotions in the Neighbourhood of Surat: As ſoon as you heard of theſe improper Acts, and the unjuſtifiable Deſigns of Dada Sahib, you deputed Colonel Upton and Captain M°Pherſon to Seremunt Peiſhwa Purdhaun, to bring about an Accommodation, which was neceſſary for the Happineſs of the People, and a Treaty was concluded under the Seals of the Engliſh Company and Seremunt Peiſhwa Sahib; and as it is univerſally allowed that Friendſhip is preferable to any thing in the World, particularly with the Engliſh Nation, who are famous throughout the Univerſe for their good Faith and ſteady Diſpoſition; and as it was believed by all the Powers of the Country, that a ſincere Friendſhip and Union had been formed between the Engliſh Company and Seremunt Peiſhwa Sahib, in ſuch a Manner that it ſhould be of perpetual Duration in ſpite of all the Attempts of our mutual Enemies to deſtroy it; and as on the 14th Rujjub Letters to this Effect were received from you, that as long as the Peiſhwa continued to fill the Muſnud there ſhould be no Failure in the Engagements contracted, and that an Engliſh Detachment had been diſpatched over Land for the Reinforcement of Bombay; although you muſt have known, that from the moſt diſtant Period to the preſent Time no Engliſh Forces had ever paſſed that Way overland, and that they would be oppoſed in the Dominions of the Sircar. But to paſs over this: Your other Officer of this Detachment, in the Firſt Inſtance, on his croſſing the Summum took Poſſeſſion of the Fort of Culpee, in the Sircar's Dominions, at the Inſtigation of Ragonaut Row's Vackeels, whom he carried with him, and afterwards proceeded forwards in the Deſign to injure the Sircar's Territories. In Purſuit of this Plan he attacked the Bundlecund Chiefs, between whom and the Family of the Peiſhwa the moſt intimate Friendſhip has ſubſiſted for a Term of 50 Years, and you engaged that our Friends and Enemies ſhould be common, and plundered theirs and the Sircar's Country. Neceſſity obliged the Officers of the Sircars, for the Security and Protection of the Territories entruſted to them, to follow and obſerve the Motions of the Detachment. The Particulars of this you muſt have heard from other Quarters; but what is moſt ſurprizing is, that the Governor and Council of Bombay, in concert with Ragonaut, have raiſed Diſturbances, and ſuddenly ſent their Forces to the Ghauts, which are only 20 Coſs from Poona, and another Detachment of Europeans are raiſing Commotions in Cokun. I implicitly relied on your Sincerity and good Faith, which is in the Mouths of all Ranks of People, otherwiſe I ſhould have diſpatched an Army to Hindoſtan, and ſettled Matters.

The Governor of Bombay, who was from of old the Diſturber of Peace and Friendſhip, notwithſtanding your poſitive Injunctions to ſettle all Points between us, and not to afford an Aſylum to Ragonaut Row in any Part of the Company's Territories, paid no Attention thereto. I alſo wrote him repeatedly to fulfil the Articles reſpecting the Sircar, and to receive thoſe which had Relation to the Company. To this likewiſe he turned a deaf Ear, and in Oppoſition thereto wrote you Fictions mixed with ſome Truth. He made Uſe of the Opportunity of the Arrival of a French Vackeel here to confirm his Repreſentations; but God knows what he wrote to you on the Subject. I on the firſt Hint from you gave him his Diſmiſſion, without having any Conference with him. Keep Juſtice in View, and be yourſelf the Judge, who was the Cauſe of the Troubles which have ariſen. We are now about to attack the Forces which are arrived at the Ghauts. The Detachment ſent by Land to this Quarter, is in the Neighbourhood of Bopaul. I encloſe to Lalla Sewuk Ram, who will deliver it to you, a Perſian Copy of a Letter, under the Seals of Ragonaut, and the Honourable General of Bombay, addreſſed to the Sirdars of this Government, and other Powers. You are endued with Wiſdom, which has induced me to write theſe Particulars. Conſider maturely on whoſe Side the Blame lies. There is no Remedy againſt the Decrees of Providence, and God is the Diſpoſer of States and Wealth. I have never deviated from the Duties of Friendſhip and Union.

Tranſlation of a Paper delivered by Beneram Pundit, on the Part of Maha Raja Moodajee Bhoſilah.

Delivered for Tranſlation the 28th March 1779.

The Almighty Creator of the Heavens and the Earth, the Enlightener of the Sun and Moon, who ſpread out the Carpet of the Earth, and placed on it Animals, Vegetables, and Mountains compoſed of the Four Elements; who formed the human Race, and the whole Univerſe, and gave Beauty to the Seven Climates of the Globe, ornamenting them with Monarchs and illuſtrious Characters, the Feeder both of the Great and Small, agreeably to their different Stations, is Witneſs of the following Propoſals, which from firſt to laſt are compounded of Religion, good Faith, Sincerity, Candour, and the Knowledge and Fear of God, and under the Sanction of his mighty Name, this mutual Treaty, on the Conditions following, ſhall remain unſhaken from Generation to Generation, to the End of Time.

1ſt.

1ſt. The Raje of Sittara, the ſtrong Forts, Places, and Dependencies thereon, were reduced to Subjection, or created by the Power of Maha Rajah Savajee Bhooſila; and it is the indiſpenſable Duty of all the Subjects or Servants of the ſaid Raje, on all Occaſions to preſerve the Rights of the aforeſaid Rajah, by Submiſſion and Obedience to the Government of his Deſcendants, whether by the Male or Female Line; it is therefore incumbent on me to place on the Muſnud of the Rajah, the neareſt lineal Deſcendant of that Family, and to uſe all my Endeavours for the Support of his Government and Power; and from the very Firſt to the preſent Period this Conduct has been invariably purſued by my Family to the illuſtrious Line on the Muſnud, which is in Fact the ſame Family, and no Step has been taken, inconſiſtent with the Duties of Obedience and Religion. Whenever there remains no lineal Deſcendant of the ſaid bleſſed Rajah, by the Favour of God, my Family is worthy of the illuſtrious Rank of the Muſnud of this Raje; the hereditary Right is in no other. On this Point your Aid and Aſſiſtance is more particularly neceſſary.

2dly. At the Time when we in concert regulate the Affairs of the Sittara Rajah, every Chief or Miniſter, who unjuſtly makes Oppoſition thereto, and calls in another; as for Inſtance the Nabob to his Party, regarding both of them inimical, and receiving them, whatever Places or Territories dependant on ſuch Chief (the Nabob) ſhall come into our Poſſeſſion, after ſeparating the Soubah of Berar, which belongs to me, and relinquiſhing of the Remainder, ſuch Places and Territories as belong to our Ally in this War; what is then left ſhall be divided in equal Proportions between us, and our Ally ſatisfied in the Manner abovementioned.

3dly. If any Enemy ariſes againſt you, and on your written Application, Aſſiſtance is afforded you from hence; or if any one looks with an hoſtile Eye on me, and at my Application I receive Aſſiſtance from you; in caſe of the Arrival of Forces to the Aſſiſtance of either, it is fit that the Perſon making the Application ſhould defray the Expence of the Expedition. In the Sequel I have fixed on a Mode for the Regulation of this, which is, That when Forces go from hence to your Aid, their Pay be ſettled conformably to the Treaty of the Nabob Mohabut Jung Bahadre, viz. To every Horſeman One Rupee per Diem, and to particular ones Five Rupees; to Semuldars and Sirdars according to their reſpective Rank and Station, from 20 to 100 Rupees, and even more, ſhould their Rank demand it. And when your Troops come to my Aſſiſtance, they ſhall receive, One Battalion per Month, when in Cantonments or fixed at any Place, 10,000 R°; when in Motion 13,000; beſides this, an Allowance to the Officer ſuitable to his Rank; and whatever Profits may ariſe from the Operations of our joint Forces, excluſive of the Soubas or Dependencies of either Party, after debiting the Party receiving Aid, for the Expence of the Force afforded him, ſhall be divided in equal Proportions between us; and whoever joins himſelf to us in theſe Deſigns, from amongſt the Sirdars of Note, with a good Body of Forces, we are both bound to ſatisfy him in Proportion to the Aſſiſtance he has brought us.

4thly. Let the Ties of Friendſhip and Union, from Generation to Generation, be firmly knit and eſtabliſhed between us, and our Friends and Enemies common to each. Should it happen that one who is my Friend ſhould be an Enemy to you, I will interfere and make him your Friend. In caſe the Enemies of either will not hearken to Propoſals of Accommodation, we will form a Plan in Concert, and by ſome Means or other bring them over to our Views; firſt trying the Mode of Advice and gentle Perſuaſion, and if that fails, by Force and Chaſtiſement; but in a Word, the moderate Way ought firſt to be tried. In like Manner, ſhould any one who is a Friend to you be in Enmity to me, you ſhall make him my Friend.

5thly. Should any one interrupt the Settlement of the Raje, and the Nabob affords him no Kind of Aid or Support, in this Caſe, after having made ourſelves fully acquainted with the Merits of the Caſe, we will in concert determine, whether it will be adviſable to keep on friendly or inimical Terms with the ſaid Nabob.

6thly. The Soubah of Ouſſa, commonly called Cuttack, has been from ancient Time a Dependency of mine, and the Borders of the ſaid Soubah join your Territory; whenever at any Time Diſputes ſhall ariſe between the Borderers of our Territories on any trifling Matter, in this Caſe it is incumbent on both Parties to make ſtrict Inveſtigation thereunto, and whoever may be found culpable, ſhould be puniſhed by the Party to whom they belong. This will tend greatly to the Promotion of Friendſhip and Harmony between us.

7th. From the Soubah of Bengal the Sum of Twelve Lacks of Rupees for the Sircar, and Two Lacks of Rupees for Durbar Charges, altogether Fourteen Lacks of Rupees; and Preſents of various Kinds, were annually remitted, from the Time of the Nabob Mohabut Jung to the Time of the Nabob Meer Mahomed Jaffier Khan's Government, and were regularly diſcharged to this Government: Coſſim Ally Cawn, in the Time of his Soubadarry, fulfilled the Engagement for One or Two Years, after which he broke through this eſtabliſhed Cuſtom, and God, who rules by Juſtice, brought on him the Fruits of it, and the Country of Bengal devolved to the Engliſh; on this Account a Vackeel from hence has conſtantly reſided with you, and from the Knowledge I have of your religious Principles, good Faith, Uprightneſs, Integrity, Knowledge of the Deity, and Piety, under the Auſpices of which your Ships of the greateſt Burden, like the Moſques of the Upright, ſail over the light Waves, and give you immenſe Wealth, and which is even become a Proverb throughout the World, I am perfectly ſatisfied that you will ſettle this Matter: It is therefore incumbent on you to adjuſt this Matter; and knowing the Right, that you fulfil it, although weighed in the Scales of theſe great Deſigns, which are to give us Territories and Wealth in Decan and Hindoſtan, the Tribute of Bengal is an Object unworthy of being mentioned; but as it was acquired by my Anceſtors, and is my Inheritance, and

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it is neceſſary to preſerve this before all, and then to apply to other Plans; your Conſent and Approbation to this is therefore neceſſary.

8thly. Let a lineal Deſcendant of Maha Rajah Chuttebutty Sewajee Bhoſila continue on the Muſnud of the Sittara Rajah; but till the Power and Authority of the Raje is eſtabliſhed nothing is done: Let us therefore unite, not in Appearance only, but in Reality, and together with other Allies, who are warmly attached to us, purſue every Meaſure to eſtabliſh the Rajah firmly in the Raje; and inflicting exemplary Puniſhment on every one who ſhall oppoſe or obſtruct this Eſtabliſhment, let us uſe our Endeavours to put the Affairs of the Raje in a proſperous and flouriſhing Situation. In this Caſe, our giving Stability to the Raje and Rajah will redound greatly to your Honour, and will on my Part be complying with the Duties of a Subject, in like Manner as I have ever done, by an Attention to the Family on the Raje; and as long as any Deſcendants of Maha Rajah Chatterbutty is on the Muſnud of Sittara, my Religion points out to me Obedience; and with ſuch Conduct God is well pleaſed. As by theſe Acts the Raje will owe great Obligations to the Engliſh, in return for theſe Kindneſſes, I will procure Grants to them of Ports on the Sea Coaſt, ſuch as Buſſie, Salſette, and their Dependencies; and moreover One or Two Forts fit for the complete Settlement of the Affairs of the Raje, and the Eſtabliſhment of the Rajah upon Sittara. One Half of the Wealth of the Opponents of theſe Meaſures, and of the Income of their Territories, which ſhall come into our Hands, ſhall be appropriated to defray the Expence of the Engliſh Forces which come to ſupport the Meaſures; and whoever will become our Ally in this Expedition ſhall be completely rewarded by both Parties, and the perpetual Treaty which ſhall be concluded between you and the Rajah on the moſt ſolid Baſis ſhall be engraved by me on a Tablet of Braſs, and ſhall be returned by you under the Signatures of the auguſt King, the Directors of the Company, and the Council; let it be ratified likewiſe by ſolemn Oaths, that no Deviation may ever ariſe therein. And if the Engliſh are engaged in War, the Forces of Maha Rajah Chatterbutty ſhall be ſent to their Aid, and nothing demanded for the Expences; and if Hoſtilities break out againſt the Raje, Engliſh Forces ſhall be ſent on Application for its Support, and nothing required for their Expences: As the Armies of the Raje have from ancient Time made Expeditions to Hindoſtan, and the Villaet Afghans quit their own Border, which is at Keybur and enter Hindoſtan, where they have Once or Twice made dreadful Attacks on the Armies of Decan, and defeated them; the Aſſiſtance of the Engliſh is peculiarly required to chaſtize them, and the Rajahs of Hindoſtan; and whatever Advantages are derived from the Expedition, either in Wealth or Territory, Half of it ſhall be given to the Engliſh: I will cauſe a Treaty to this Effect under the Seal of Maha Rajah Chatterbutty to be delivered to you, on condition that the Rajah's Authority is eſtabliſhed.

APPENDIX, N° 192.

Bengal Secret Perſian Correſpondence.

To Moodajee Bhoſila: Written the 6th April 1779.

I HAVE received your Letters: They are long, and dictated with the ſame Friendſhip and Wiſdom with which all your former Letters have been written; but as the great Object of them all is now entirely at an End, it is unneceſſary to recapitulate the Subſtance of them. Beneram Pundit is arrived, and has delivered to me the Paper which you entruſted to his Charge; at his Deſire, in Obedience to your poſitive Injunctions, and the Oath which I underſtand he ſwore to perform them, the Paper was delivered, and opened in the Preſence of Ramkaunt Moonſhy, and read to me by him. Having fully underſtood the Contents, I have returned the Paper to Beneram Pundit at his particular Requeſt, that it might be ſent back in its original State to you; this alſo being as I underſtand a Part of his Inſtructions. Reſpecting the different Points contained therein, they are ſuch as will not admit either of Negociation or Comment: I conceive them to have been intended as an indirect but deciſive Anſwer upon a Subject in its own Nature ſo delicate, and rendered more ſo by the paſt interchange of our Sentiments upon it and our known mutual Wiſhes, that you apparently chuſe this indirect Method of declining to engage any further in it, rather than to relinquiſh it by an abrupt Declaration, which might have been conſtrued unſuitable to the Friendſhip and Cordiality which have hitherto ſubſiſted ſince ſo long a Period, and which I hope will ever ſubſiſt between your Family and the Company and Engliſh Nation; otherwiſe it was certainly unneceſſary to have ſent a Perſon, honoured with ſo high a Degree of your Confidence as Beneram Pundit poſſeſſes, upon ſo long and perilous a Journey, merely to give me the Information which might have been expreſſed by a Letter containing no more than a ſingle Line. What is paſt is paſt; of the Deſign I had formed, I ſhall totally relinquiſh all future Thoughts, but of your paſt Kindneſs I ſhall retain a laſting Remembrance.

When I firſt wrote you that an Engliſh Army had been appointed to proceed to the other Side of India, and deſired you to aſſiſt it in its Progreſs, you immediately returned an Anſwer, expreſſing your cheerful Compliance, and not contented with bare Profeſſions, which are oftener the Maſk of Deceit than the Indication of Sincerity, you wrote at the ſame Time to the Commander of our Forces, inviting him to paſs through your Country, you ſent a Perſon of Rank and Truſt to wait on the Borders of your Dominions with a Store of Proviſions for their Subſiſtence, you cauſed them to be entertained in the long Stay they made in your Country with all the Dues of Hoſpitality, and have continued the ſame Conduct to them ſince his Departure. Theſe are not complimentary or equivocal, but real and ſubſtantial Acts of Friendſhip: As ſuch it is, eſpecially at this Time, incumbent on me to expreſs the Senſe that I entertain of them, as it is my Wiſh, and ſhall be my Care, to make every ſuitable Return to them, whenever any future Occaſion of your Affairs ſhall demand it.

I have ordered Major Camac to remain within the Borders of Bengal, and not to proceed any further, but have not yet determined whether he ſhall return to Calcutta, or join any other Part of our Army; this muſt depend upon future Contingencies.

Poſtſcript.

Since I wrote the above I have received a Letter from Major Camac, informing me that Orders had been ſent him by Colonel Goddard to proceed forwards and join him, provided it ſhould be agreeable to you, without whoſe Inſtructions he was to take no Step; that for this Purpoſe the Colonel had written to you, requeſting that you would either ſend a Paſſport to Major Camac, or intimate to him your Diſapproval of his Proceeding, in which latter Caſe he would lay aſide the Deſign; that the Coſſids ſent to you by the Colonel having been detained Five Days at Naigpore, and then bringing him no Letter or Inſtructions from you, he had conceived it a tacit Conſent to his March; and that for private Reaſons you might not chuſe to truſt it to Writing, and that he was therefore marching on ſlowly. As this Meaſure is by no means agreeable to me, I have written to Major Camac to return within our Borders.

To Siccaram Pundit and Balajee Pundit: Written 6th April 1779.

I have received your Letter, containing various Complaints of the Governor and Council of Bombay, and other Particulars, which I fully underſtand.

This Letter not having been as uſual accompanied by one from the Peiſhwa, I think it neceſſary to inform you of it, leſt, ſhould one have been written, and miſcarried in the Way, there might appear an Impropriety in my not returning an Anſwer to it.

I have heard by various Channels ſome Particulars of the late Events on that Side of India, and have received ſome little and imperfect Intelligence relative thereto from the Gentlemen of Bombay; but till my Knowledge of thoſe Matters is more complete and authentic, I muſt ſuſpend my Judgment reſpecting the Rectitude of the Conduct of the Members of that Government. I hear, with the greateſt Surprize, that the Chiefs of the Army from Bombay have made a Convention with you without the Authority of this Government, which you well know was indiſpenſably neceſſary for an Act of that Nature, and that the Conditions of it are very injurious to the Rights of the Company and the Honour of the Engliſh Name: I have not yet received a Copy of it; but whatever it may be, it is incumbent on me to take the earlieſt Occaſion to diſavow it, and to declare it null.

This Declaration ought to be unneceſſary to you, to whom the like Information was given in form on the Deputation of Colonel Upton.

The Paſt cannot be recalled; but for the Future it is my firm Wiſh, that as I laboured before, however ineffectually, to conciliate the Differences which had ariſen between you and the Government of Bombay, and which prevented the Execution of the Treaty made through Colonel Upton, Peace may be yet reſtored, and all paſt Grievances buried in Oblivion. For this Purpoſe I and the Counſellors of this Government have authorized Colonel Goddard to negociate and conclude with you, in the Name and on Behalf of the Company, a new Treaty, confirming that made by Colonel Upton, on theſe Conditions; viz. That you relinquiſh all Claims derived from the unauthorized Act of our Army, and which could not even have received the Sanction of the Preſidency of Bombay; and that you alſo engage never to grant the French, who are the Enemies of our Nation, any Settlement or Reſidence in the Ports of the Peiſhwa, nor to admit the Forces of the French into any Part of his Dominions, nor to form any Alliance, nor hold any Connection with them, either for Traffic or otherwiſe.

On theſe Conditions we offer you the Friendſhip of the Company and of the Engliſh Nation for ever. If you reject them we are remedileſs, and blameleſs of the Conſequences, whatever may be, as Peace or War depend on your Determination.

For further Particulars I muſt refer you to Colonel Goddard, to whom I have granted full Powers for the Purpoſes above mentioned, and deſire that you will regard him accordingly as the Miniſter and Repreſentative of this Government, and his Acts done under this Authority as the Acts of this Government, of the Company, and of the Engliſh Nation.

APPENDIX, N° 192.

To the Peiſhwa: Written the 6th April 1779.

In Subſtance the ſame as the foregoing.

To Madho Row Sindeah: Written 28th April 1779.

I have been favoured with your Letter on the Subject ſaid to have been formed by the Bombay Government, with other Particulars, which I perfectly underſtand.

I have heard by various Channels ſome Particulars of the Events you allude to, but having yet received no authentic Accounts of the Motives by which the Governor and Council of Bombay have been actuated in the Meaſures they have adopted, I muſt ſuſpend my Judgment of their Conduct, in which this Government had neither Share nor Knowledge.

The Aſtoniſhment I was in, to learn that the Chiefs of the Bombay Army had made a Convention with the Maratta Government, of a Nature ſo highly injurious to the Rights of the Company and diſhonourable to the Engliſh Name, could only be increaſed by the Information, that a Chief ſo renowned for Wiſdom, and who has invariably ſhewn a Deſire of Friendſhip with the Company, ſhould join in accepting a Treaty from Perſons entirely unempowered to perform an Act of that Nature, and in dictating ſuch Terms as it is the higheſt Diſgrace to any Perſons aſſuming the Engliſh Name to have conſented to: Neither thoſe Perſons, nor the Government they are immediately under, had any Authority to form Treaties with the Powers of India and Hindoſtan. This Information was given in Form to the Maratta State on the Deputation of Colonel Upton; had it been otherwiſe, and the Government of Bombay had been in Poſſeſſion of ſuch Powers, where would have been the Neceſſity or Propriety of deputing Colonel Upton to ſet aſide the Treaty which that Government had formed with Ragonaut Row, and to conclude a new one on the Part of this Government, which alone of all the Company's Settlements in India has the Power of performing ſuch Acts? In this Caſe the Treaty concluded by them muſt have been preſerved; but in the preſent Inſtance it does not appear that the Gentlemen who ſigned the Papers preſented to you at Tellegong had even the Authority of the Government of Bombay for ſuch an Act; ſo that it was in every Reſpect an idle and ineffectual Engagement: It is therefore incumbent on me to take the earlieſt Opportunity of declaring to you, that the Treaty you allude to is in itſelf abſolutely null and void. It is probable that you were not fully acquainted with the Powers of the Engliſh Government in Caſes of this Nature; but thoſe on whoſe Behalf you appeared are without a Shadow or Plea for Complaint, ſince in accepting the Convention of the Chiefs of the Army they muſt have oppoſed their own certain Conviction of its Invalidity.

The Paſt cannot be recalled, but for the Future, it is my firm Wiſh, that as I laboured before, however ineffectually, to conciliate the Differences which had ariſen between your Government and that of Bombay, and which prevented the Execution of the Treaty made through Colonel Upton, Peace may yet be reſtored, and all paſt Grievances buried in Oblivion.

For this Purpoſe, I and the Counſellors of this Government have authorized Colonel Goddard to negociate and conclude with the Managers of the Maratta State in the Name and on Behalf of the Company, a new Treaty confirming that made by Colonel Upton, on theſe Conditions, viz. that they relinquiſh all Claims derived from the unauthorized Act of our Army; an Act ſo diſhonourable that I may not conſider any one as a Friend who ſhall adviſe the Execution of it; and that they alſo engage never to grant the French, the Enemies of my Nation, any Settlement or Reſidence in any of the Ports of the Peiſhwa, nor to admit the Forces of the French into any Part of his Dominions, nor to form any Alliance, nor hold any Connection with them either for Traffic or otherwiſe.

On theſe Conditions we offer the Friendſhip of the Company and Engliſh Nation for ever; ſhould they be rejected, we are remedileſs and blameleſs of the Conſequences whatever they may be.

It is well known it is my Wiſh, as it is conſonant to the Orders of my Superiors, to live in Peace with all the Powers of India, whilſt they will permit me ſo to do, and I am more particularly anxious to continue on good Terms with you, with whoſe Worth I am ſo well acquainted. To this, and the conſtant Inclination you have ſhewn to maintain a Friendſhip with the Engliſh, I truſt that you would exert your Influence in promoting Peace on the reaſonable Terms now offered; and will effect the Concluſion of ſuch a Treaty with Colonel Goddard as I have propoſed above, and thereby enſure the Reſtoration of Friendſhip and Harmony between the Peiſhwa and Company, and your own good Name.

To Siccaram Pundit: Written 7th May 1779.

I wrote you ſome Time ago in conſequence of the Reports which I had heard of the Events on that Side of India, and expreſſed my Sentiments on them as fully as the imperfect Intelligence I had received would admit of, declaring to you that the Treaty ſaid to have been concluded between you and the Chiefs of the Bombay Army, of which I had likewiſe heard, was null and void; ſince that Time I have received your ſubſequent Letter, encloſing me a Copy of the Engagement in queſtion, and the Aſtoniſhment I was in to learn from the Peruſal of it, that the Chiefs of the Bombay Army had made a Convention with you, ſo highly injurious to the Rights of the Company, and diſhonourable to the Engliſh

Engliſh Name, could only be encreaſed to find that you had accepted a Treaty from Perſons entirely unempowered to form an Act of that Nature, and had dictated ſuch Terms, as it is the higheſt Diſgrace to any Perſons aſſuming the Engliſh Name to have conſented to; as you could not be ignorant that neither thoſe Perſons, nor the Government they are immediately under, had any Authority to form Treaties with the Powers of India, ſince this Information was given to you in form on the Deputation of Colonel Upton. Had it been otherwiſe, and the Government of Bombay had been in Poſſeſſion of ſuch Powers, where would have been the Neceſſity or Propriety of deputing Colonel Upton to ſet aſide the Treaty which that Government had formed with Ragonaut Row, and to conclude a new one on the Part of this Government, which alone, of all the Company's Settlements in India, has the Power of performing ſuch Acts? In this Caſe, the Treaty concluded by them muſt have been preſerved; but in the preſent Inſtance, it does not appear that the Gentlemen, who ſigned the Papers preſented to you at Tellegong, had even the Authority of the Government of Bombay for ſuch an Act; ſo that it was in every Reſpect an idle and ineffectual Engagement, and I here repeat my Diſavowal of it, it being of itſelf null and void.

Nor can you have any Reaſon to complain, ſince in accepting it, you muſt have acted againſt your own Conviction of the Invalidity of ſuch an Act.

It is well known that it is my Wiſh to live in Peace with all the Powers of India, whilſt they will permit me to do ſo. I have already informed you of the Terms on which you may ſecure the perpetual Friendſhip of the Company and Engliſh Nation; ſhould you reject them, we are remedileſs and blameleſs of the Conſequences, whatever they may be; but I make no Doubt, when you reflect on the Reaſonableneſs of the Terms offered, you will cheerfully comply, and conclude with Colonel Goddard ſuch a Treaty as I have propoſed, by which Friendſhip and Harmony may be reſtored and perpetuated between the Peiſhwa and Company, and your good Name eſtabliſhed.

To Moodajee Bhoſila: Written the 13th May 1779.

Accompanying I have the Pleaſure to ſend you a Duplicate of my laſt Letter, the Original of which I hope you have long ago received. As the rainy Seaſon is approaching, I have directed Major Camac to return into the interior Parts of the Provinces.

You muſt doubtleſs have heard the full Particulars of the late Events, which have happened on that Side of India, and of the unfortunate Concluſion of the precipitated and ill conducted Expedition, ſet on Foot by the Preſidency of Bombay, of the improper Convention made by the Chiefs, who accompanied the Bombay Army, and of the Arrival of Colonel Goddard at Surat. On theſe Circumſtances I think it needleſs to enlarge or comment, any further than to inform you that this Government do not conceive themſelves bound to abide by Engagements contracted by Perſons who, not having even the Sanction of the Government of Bombay for ſuch Act, it can be regarded in no other Light than a private Act of Individuals, and have therefore diſavowed and declared it abſolutely null. So far is ſuch an Act from being binding on us, that even the Government of Bombay have not Authority without our Concurrence, to engage in any ſuch Meaſure, the ſole Authority in all political Matters being veſted by the King and Parliament of England in the Governor and Council of Bengal.

This was made the Foundation of Colonel Upton's Deputation, and public Notice given thereof to the Miniſters, who can therefore have no Right to complain of our Diſavowal of a Treaty, which they accepted againſt their own Conviction of the Inſufficiency and Invalidity of it; nor can ſuch Diſavowal reflect any Diſcredit on our good Faith, ſince no State can be ſuppoſed to be bound by the unauthorized Engagement of Individuals of it. As I wiſh for Peace, as long as it can be preſerved with Honour, I have offered to the Miniſters to renew the Treaty concluded through Colonel Upton, upon Condition that they formally relinquiſh all Claims founded upon the aforeſaid Convention, and engage never to hold any Connection with our Enemies the French. If they agree to the reaſonable Terms, it is well, Peace and Harmony will be re-eſtabliſhed, if they reject them they only will be to blame for the Conſequences, for which I am now fully prepared.

As from the intimate Friendſhip which has long ſubſiſted between us; and as Reſerve does not become the Boſom of a Friend, and as the Intereſts of our reſpective Dominions are the ſame, I have communicated all theſe Particulars for your Information.

Beneram Pundit has read to me the Subſtance of a Letter which he has written to you, in conſequence of ſome Converſations which have paſſed between us; and what he has ſaid reſpecting my Sentiments, entirely coincides with them. As he has been much indiſpoſed for ſome Time paſt, and wiſhes to change the Air for that of Benares; and as there are no Affairs at preſent depending between us, that can make his Stay neceſſary, I have given him my Permiſſion to go thither.

To the Nabob Nizam ul Dowla: Written the 3d June 1779.

I ſome Months ago wrote you very fully on the Subject of the Intrigues of the French with the Poona Miniſters; the Diſpatch of a Detachment of Engliſh Forces for the Reinforcement of Bombay; and my Determination to overlook the bad Conduct of the Miniſters, and to preſerve Friendpiſh

ſhip with them, provided they relinquiſhed all Connection with our Enemies the French. "You are doubtleſs acquainted with the late Events on that Side of India, and the unfortunate Concluſion of the precipitate and ill-conducted Expedition ſet on Foot by the Government of Bombay, in which this Government had neither Share nor Knowledge, with the improper Convention made by the Chiefs who accompanied the Bombay Army, and with the Arrival of Colonel Goddard at Surat. On theſe Circumſtances I think it needleſs to enlarge or comment, any further than to inform you, that this Government do not think themſelves bound to abide by Engagements contracted by Perſons not having even the Sanction of the Government of Bombay for ſuch an Act; it can be regarded in no other Light than a private Engagement of Individuals; and have therefore diſavowed it, and declared it abſolutely null. So far is ſuch as an Act from being binding on us, that even the Government of Bombay have not Authority, without our Concurrence, to engage in any ſuch Meaſure; the ſole Authority in all political Matters being veſted by the King and Parliament of England, in the Governor and Council of Bengal.

This was made the Foundation of Colonel Upton's Deputation, and public Notice given thereof to the Miniſters; who can therefore have no Right to complain of our Diſavowal of a Treaty which they accepted againſt their own Conviction, of the Inſufficiency and Invalidity of it; nor can ſuch Diſavowal reflect any Diſcredit on our good Faith, ſince no State can be ſuppoſed to be bound by the unauthorized Engagements of Individuals of it. As I wiſh for Peace as long as it can be preſerved with Honour, I have offered to the Miniſters to renew the Treaty concluded through Colonel Upton, upon Condition that they formally relinquiſh all Claims founded upon the aforeſaid Convention, and engage never to hold any Connection with our Enemies the French. If they agree to the reaſonable Terms, it is well; Peace and Harmony may be re-eſtabliſhed; if they reject them, they only will be to blame for the Conſequences, for which I am now fully prepared.

I have explained myſelf thus fully to you, becauſe I wiſh to preſerve inviolable the Friendſhip and Engagements which have ſo long ſubſiſted between you and the Company; and I am fully convinced that you, actuated by the ſame Motive, will take every Means for the Continuance and Encreaſe of it.

APPENDIX, N° 193 and 194.

Bengal Secret Conſultations; the 3d May 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell, and Philip Francis, } Eſquires.
Mr. Wheler at Beercool for the Benefit of his Health.
Sir Eyre Coote forming Military Arrangements.

READ the following Letters from Colonel Goddard:

Gentlemen,

It is with particular Satisfaction I can inform you of the Arrival of your Forces under my Command at Surat Yeſterday Morning. I before acquainted you, in a Letter from Berhampore, with my Intention of purſuing the Route to that City, and my Reaſons for ſo doing; which I explained afterwards more fully in my Addreſs of the 9th Inſtant. Theſe Letters having been tranſmitted in Triplicate, will, I hope, have reached you ſafe; and the Conduct I have purſued on the Occaſion, be ſuch as to merit your Approbation.

Not doubting but the Poona Durbar, as it was their Intereſt ſo to do, would endeavour to moleſt and interrupt my March, I thought it adviſable to proceed with all the Celerity in my Power; and it is owing to the Expedition I have uſed, that the Troops reached this Place without Oppoſition; for the Day of my Arrival, I received a Letter from Mr. Farmer, in the Camp of Mahadjee Scindia, encloſing another from the Select Committee, which informed me of the Miniſters having detached about 20,000 of their beſt and moſt choſen Horſe to ſurprize me: I therefore conceive they have been diſappointed in their Views of attacking me in the Heart of their own Country; and will now, in all Probability, to prevent an Appearance of Hoſtilities on their Part, return without ſhewing themſelves in my Neighbourhood, as no Intelligence of their Motions has yet reached from any other Quarter.

I am happy in the Opportunity now afforded me, of recommending to your Notice the good Behaviour

haviour of the Troops in general, who have performed the March from the Nurbuddah to this Place, with a Cheerfulneſs and Alacrity that gives the moſt favourable Preſage of their future Services; in particular from Burhampore, which is a Diſtance of near 300 Miles, we have arrived at Surat in Twenty Days, including Three halting ones. I muſt obſerve to you, that I experienced, in the moſt eminent Degree, the good Effect of thoſe Principles of Moderation which had before directed me, in the Aſſiſtance I received from the Inhabitants on the Road, who continued in Poſſeſſion of their Villages, and voluntarily ſupplied me with Proviſions and Grain. This Readineſs on their Part, was of particular Uſe at this Time; becauſe, although I had before my leaving Burhampore, collected a ſufficient Quantity to ſupply the Troops on the Road, the Rapidity of my March was ſuch, that many of the Carts upon which I was obliged to tranſport it, were unable to accompany me; ſo that but for this continued Supply I received daily, my Progreſs would have been a good deal retarded, from the Neceſſity there would have been of adapting my Motions to the Length of Road they could travel.

I cannot acquaint you with the preſent Views of the Bombay Government, having received no Advices from them, ſince their being informed of my near Approach to Surat; but as I have from Time to Time communicated to them my Progreſs, I hope to hear from them every Day, when I ſhall immediately make known to you their Inſtructions. At the ſame Time, I am flattered with the Expectation of receiving your full Inſtructions relative to my Situation in Command of your Forces acting under this Preſidency.

I am ſorry to acquaint you with the Death of Captain William Campbell of the Fourth Battalion of Sepoys, who joined the Detachment by the Way of Naigpore, reduced at that Time by a Diſorder he caught on the Journey from Calcutta; but which did not deſtroy him till within a Day's March of this Place.

I beg to inform you, that the Troops are encamped upon a convenient and healthy Spot of Ground, Two Miles above the City, upon the Bank of the River Taptee.

I have the Honour to be, &c.

Camp near Surat,
26th February 1779.

(Signed) Tho' Goddard.

Gentlemen,

I had the Honour to addreſs you the 20th ultimo, informing you of my Arrival at Surat the preceding Day, ſince which nothing material has occurred worthy of communicating.

I have received a Letter from the Select Committee at Bombay, expreſſing their Deſire to ſee me with the earlieſt Convenience; on which Account I purpoſe ſetting out immediately, leaving the Troops encamped in the Neighbourhood of this City, in order that no Time may be loſt in laying before you the State of Affairs at this Settlement, and coming to a Reſolution upon the Meaſures moſt proper to be hereafter purſued. I find it rather troubleſome to ſettle the Rate of Exchange with the Merchants of this City, who ſeem inclined to take Advantage of the preſſing Want they think I am in of a Supply of Money; but as my Situation is by no Means ſo neceſſitous or without Reſource as it was, I ſhall not come to any Terms with them that are not very moderate and proper, which I am in Expectation of being ſoon able to effect.

When the Troops were in the Neighbourhood of Burhampore, I received a Sum of Money of Nuggeen Doſs, the Gomaſtah of Gopaul Doſs, in my Camp, at the Rate of 99 Naigpore Rupees for each 100 Siccas payable in Calcutta. The Amount for which I have drawn the Bill is 60,000, the Exchange is 2¼ per Cent. dearer than what the Bills you tranſmitted me on Naigpore were received at; and the Man urges in Excuſe for this Increaſe, the Difficulty he had in procuring even this ſmall Supply at Burhampore, where his Maſter has no eſtabliſhed Houſe, and the advanced Price he was obliged to pay the Merchants for what he could collect at that Place.

I have the Honour, &c.

Camp near Surat,
the 2d March 1779.

(Signed) Tho' Goddard.

Gentlemen,

I did myſelf the Honour of addreſſing you from Surat the 2d Inſtant, acquainting you with my Intention of ſetting out immediately for Bombay: Owing to the Veſſel's not being in Readineſs ſo ſoon as was ſuppoſed, and the unexpected Length of the Paſſage, I did not arrive at this Place till the 15th. Having made the Select Committee a Report of the State of the Forces under my Command, ordered from your Preſidency for the Aſſiſtance of this Settlement, I received a Letter from them informing me of the Miſcarriage of a Letter from you, encloſing a Copy of your Inſtructions to Mr. Elliott, which they therefore requeſted I would furniſh them with, and alſo give them ſuch Information reſpecting my Embaſſy at the Court of Berar, as might tend to diſcover to them the Nature of the intended Connection with Moodajee Booſla.

Conceiving it for the Intereſt of the Company's Affairs that they ſhould have as thorough a Knowledge as poſſible of this Buſineſs, in order to prevent their adopting Meaſures which might counteract the Views of your Government, I wrote them a Letter in Reply, of which the encloſed is a Copy. I cannot at preſent acquaint you with the political Syſtem the Gentlemen at Bombay mean to embrace, or the Plan of Operations intended for the Forces under my Command; as far as it may reſt with

with me you may be assured of my acting consistent with the Instructions given me for my Guidance, and to promote the obvious Advantage and Improvement of the Company's Settlements in the Western Quarter of India. It is with particular Satisfaction I can declare to you the Confidence I place in the Courage and Attachment of the Troops under me, who are prepared and willing to carry into Execution whatever may be resolved upon. I purpose setting out to join the Army at Surat very soon, when I will without Loss of Time communicate to you the Plan adopted for the immediate Disposal of the Troops, and during the approaching rainy Season.

The Select Committee have transmitted you a particular Account of the late Expedition to Poona, which is referred to your Consideration and Decision, together with the several Transactions that have occurred since and consequent to that unfortunate Affair. It is therefore unnecessary for me to say any thing further upon this Business, which they will themselves no Doubt take Pains to explain fully to you. You will find from their Relation of Circumstances that the Situation of this Government respecting the Marattas is as follows: The Authority by which the disgraceful Convention was concluded at Pilligong, has been declared illegal and inadmissible, and of course it remains uncomplied with in all its Parts. The Vackeel from Mahadjee Scindia has been given to understand so, and has returned with this Answer to his Master: If the Marattas attempt to obtain a Performance of the Articles by Force, the Committee may think themselves justified in commencing Hostilities; as I am however of Opinion, notwithstanding a Report which now prevails of their having attacked a small Fort belonging to us called Bancoote or Fort Victoria, that the Government of Poona will be satisfied with the Advantage they have gained, and not wish to provoke upon themselves a War, the Consequence of which might be fatal to their Party; I do not apprehend a Rupture on their Side, unless actually joined by an Armament of the French. The Operations in this Quarter will therefore depend upon the Decision you may give, and the Measures you may find it necessary to adopt for the Regulation of Affairs here; and I beg to assure you of my entire Devotion to your Desire, and my Resolution to promote the Views of your Government, for the Honour and Interest of the Company in their fullest Extent, as far as lies within my Power. I before took the Liberty of soliciting your particular Instructions relative to my Connection with the Administration of Bombay, on which Subject I hope to hear from you every Day, as well as regarding the Negociations with Moodajee Boosla, which continue in the same State I formerly described to you.

I beg to acquaint you with my having drawn on you in favour of Perwarry Doss, Banker in Surat, for Six Lacks of Bengal Sicca Rupees. The Rate of Exchange, which was the most favourable I could get, although I wrote to Mr. Boddam Chief at Surat on the Subject some Time before my Arrival was fixed at 95 Surat Rupees for each 100 Siccas.

A young Gentleman named William Charles Alston, a very near Relation to Lieutenant Alston of the Bengal Establishment, has solicited my Leave to join the Detachment as a Volunteer, which I have permitted him to do; but without any Allowances, till I can be honoured with your Commands respecting him. As he appears to be a young Man of Spirit, and promises to make a good Officer, I beg to recommend him to your favourable Attention.

Bombay,
March 21st 1779.

I have the Honour, &c.
(Signed) Tho° Goddard.

Gentlemen,

I am favoured with your Letter of the 17th Instant, requesting a Copy of the Instructions given by the Bengal Government on the Subject of an Alliance with the Rajah of Berar, and any other Information respecting an Embassy at his Court, which may tend to discover to you the Nature of the intended Connection with him.

Mr. Ravenscroft, Secretary to your Committee, having acquainted me, that since the Writing of your Letter a Copy of these Instructions is come to Hand; I do not suppose it is necessary for me to send you one: Should you however require it, I will order one to be immediately prepared, and transmitted to you.

As the Perusal of these Instructions will fully explain to you the Object of the Governor General and Supreme Council in the proposed Negociation with Moodajee, it would be superfluous in me to enter into any particular Discussion of their Plan, which is so clearly and pointedly laid down by themselves; what therefore remains for me to do is to relate to you, as far as may be necessary to influence the political Transactions of this Government with the Maratta State, the Progress made in the Treaty; the Situation in which it was left upon my March from the Nurbuddah; and how it may be considered to stand at this Time.

In some of my Letters formerly addressed to your Committee, and in particular in those of the 3d and 10th January I observed, that the Measures previously adopted by your Government in favour of Ragonaut Row, had been the Means of preventing Moodajee from acceding to the Terms wished for by the Gentlemen of the Administration at Bengal, which he otherwise shewed himself in every respect disposed to embrace. This Sentiment appeared through his whole Conduct, while the Army remained in the Neighbourhood of his Country; and indeed he frankly owned the Interests of Ragonath Row and his own interfered too much with each other to admit of their being supported by the English at the same Time. In the Letters which I transmitted from him to the Governor General, he recommends in the strongest Terms the relinquishing Ragoba, and making Peace with the Poona Durbar; but the Part he so warmly takes in favour of the latter, he professes to arise solely with a Regard to his own Views in concert with us: He at the Time of writing this Letter, and indeed

indeed repeatedly ſince, has declared to me that he only waited for Anſwers from Calcutta, containing a Compliance with his Propoſals, to renew and conclude the Negociations upon the Terms of Alliance mentioned in the Inſtructions: Theſe Anſwers ought to arrive by the End of this Month, when the Sincerity of Moodajee's Declarations will be at once put to the Teſt; for any Objections he could now ſtart, would prove his Diſinclination to the propoſed Buſineſs, and the little Dependance that is to be placed in him. The grand Obſtacle of Ragonath Row is effectually removed, and indeed every leading Circumſtance has happened favourable to the ambitious Views of the Berar Prince. The Bengal Army is arrived at Surat ready to take the Field in his Cauſe, whenever the Terms of Alliance can be adjuſted; and though he tried by every Means to prevail upon me not to advance to this Side of India, I uſed every Argument the Situation of your Affairs, conſiſtent with the declared Object of the Bengal Government, could ſuggeſt, to prove to him the Neceſſity of ſuch a Meaſure, and reconcile it to his own future Schemes and Expectations.

In a Letter from the Honourable Governor General and Supreme Council of the 23d November, Copy of which I had the Honour before to encloſe for your Peruſal, they begin by abſolutely forbidding me to obey any Orders but what I might immediately receive from themſelves; but in order to guard as much as poſſible againſt every Accident, they afterwards direct me to comply with whatever Inſtructions I might receive from you (ſhould you have adopted any Meaſures depending upon the Support of my Detachment) provided they were not incompatible with the Inſtructions I had received from them, or the Negociations entered into with the Rajah of Berar.

At the Time your Letters reached me, with Intelligence of the Treaty made with Ragoba, and of your Army having actually taken the Field in conſequence of it, preſſing at the ſame Time my expeditious March, the Negociation with Moodajee had been put a Stop to, for the Reaſons I have above aſſigned; I therefore found it conſiſtent with the Orders of the Supreme Board, and conſidered it every Way for the Intereſts of the Honourable Company, to leave the Buſineſs with Moodajee in the Train I have above deſcribed, waiting for Replies from the Preſidency of Bengal to the Reference and Repreſentation made them by the Court of Naigpore, and to proceed with all Expedition towards this Settlement, either to aſſiſt in bringing the Deſigns you had undertaken to a ſucceſsful Iſſue, or to act in concert with you, in the Proſecution of any Meaſures that might be neceſſary to the Advantage of the Company's Affairs, and conſiſtent with the Spirit of the Intentions of the Bengal Government, in detaching their Forces acroſs the Peninſula of India. I was unfortunately diſappointed in my Hopes of effecting the former, but I am full of Confidence that my Expectations reſpecting the latter will be anſwered in their ampleſt and moſt deſirable Extent.

Beſides the Letters tranſmitted through me from the Court of Berar, others to the ſame Purport were ſent to Bengal, under Charge of a confidential Perſon belonging to the Rajah, who before reſided there in Character of his Ambaſſador; another Perſon of conſiderable Truſt accompanied, and ſtill remains in my Camp on the Part of Moodajee, and through him I have from Time to Time received Letters from his Maſter. When the News of what happened at Tillagaon firſt reached him, he communicated to me ſuch Particulars as had come to his Knowledge, and earneſtly preſſed me not to advance. Of his own Buſineſs he only obſerved, that he was waiting with Anxiety for the Diſpatches from Calcutta. I have not heard from him ſince the Letter I wrote him from Burhampore, informing him of my Determination to proceed towards Bombay, and that in the mean Time Leiſure would be given for the Arrival of the Anſwers from the Bengal Government.

I have endeavoured as much as lies in my Power to give you in the above Account an Idea of the State of the Berar Negociation; ſhould I have omitted any Thing which may occur to you to aſk; or ſhould there be any public Papers relative to this Tranſaction, the Peruſal of which would tend to explain it more fully to you, I am ready to give every further Information you may judge neceſſary.

I have the Honour to be, &c.
(Signed) Tho' Goddard.

Bombay,
19th March 1779.

Gentlemen,

I had the Honour to addreſs you in a Letter dated the 21ſt ultimo, acquainting you with my Arrival at Bombay, and incloſing Copy of my Letter to the Select Committee, on the Subject of the Negociations at the Court of Berar; ſince that Time the Gentlemen of the Committee here have received a Letter from your Supreme Board, and I alſo have been made happy with your Favour of the 5th February, accompanying Credentials, appointing me your Miniſter at the Court of Poona; this new Mark of your Regard and Confidence fills me with Sentiments of Gratitude, to which I am at a Loſs to give Expreſſion, and will be beſt ſhewn by the Zeal and Fidelity with which I ſhall exert myſelf in the Execution of ſo important a Truſt. I cannot however omit mentioning the ſuperior Satisfaction it gives me to find that my Conduct in proceeding to this Side of India has merited your Approbation; and I am full of Hope that the Letters I afterwards wrote you, explaining more particularly my Motives for advancing on account of the Situation of Affairs here, will have made you of Opinion that ſuch a Meaſure was not only proper, but appeared abſolutely neceſſary to the Security and Preſervation of this Settlement.

The Receipt of your Letter to the Select Committee, and of that to myſelf, the Contents of which I communicated to them, has at length fixed their Reſolves, and they have come to the Determination

mination of ſuſpending all Operations, till the Arrival of Diſpatches from your Supreme Board, in conſequence of the Repreſentation tranſmitted you of the State of Affairs by Mr. Horſley, or till you may have wrote, ſubſequent to your Knowledge of the Diſcomfiture at and Retreat from Tillagong.

I have received no Advices from Moodajee of a later Date than that mentioned in my Letter to the Select Committee, and am therefore in Expectation of hearing from him every Day, when I will immediately communicate to you the Sentiments he may expreſs, and the Propoſals he may make for the Promotion of the Plan already ſo particularly explained to him by me. Since leaving the Nurbuddah I have continued to write him in the moſt encouraging Terms, and at this Time I have addreſſed him, forwarding Letters from the Bombay Goverment, expreſſive of the Zeal and Readineſs with which they will aſſiſt and co-operate in the Execution of any Meaſures that may be determined upon conſiſtent with the Views of the Supreme Council of Bengal, with whoſe Intentions in favour of the Rajah they have been made acquainted, as well as with the full Powers delegated to me by you, to conclude the Terms of an Alliance with him in your Name.

As I conceive the Situation of Affairs in the Maratta Empire to be widely different from what you had Reaſon to expect it would be when your Letter was wrote, I have judged it proper to defer making known to the Court of Poona the Powers you have veſted in me, or formally demanding their Conſent to the Requiſitions you have enjoined me to make, upon the Suppoſition as I conceive of Ragoba's Succeſs, till I can be honoured with your further and particular Inſtructions on this Head; and this Delay I am induced to uſe the more readily, as it can be productive of no real Inconvenience, the Period intervening betwixt the Arrival of an Anſwer from you, and the Seaſon for Action, leaving ſufficient Space to follow and perfect any Meaſures you may chuſe to direct ſhould be purſued.

As the further Conſideration of political Matters, and of courſe, the Military Operations of the Army, are ſuſpended till your Reſolves can be communicated to us, I propoſe, during the Receſs from public Buſineſs, to ſet out to join the Troops at Surat, and put them in complete Readineſs for the Service in which I hope they may ſoon be employed. I beg to aſſure you, that I ſhall implicitly attend to the Spirit of the Inſtructions contained in your Letter of the 5th February.

And have the Honour to be, &c.

(Signed) Tho' Goddard.

Bombay,
April 4th 1779.

N° 194.

The Governor General informs the Board, that Mr. George Horſley, deputed from the Government of Bombay, is arrived.

Read the following Letter from Bombay:

Gentlemen,

We have been ſo much taken up with a Diſpatch to the Honourable Company, in conſequence of the unfortunate Iſſue of the Expedition of Ragoba, that we have not been able to ſend away before this the Veſſel for Bengal, with the promiſed Accounts for your Information; but as the Seaſon is now become ſo much more favourable for a quick Paſſage, we flatter ourſelves there will be but a ſmall Loſs of Time by her Detention.

That your Information may be as complete as poſſible, and every Material may be before you, to enable you to form your Judgment, we have thought it the beſt Method to ſend you at full Length, Copies of our late Addreſs to the Honourable the Secret Committee, and of every Paper therein referred to, which relates to the late Tranſactions, or our preſent political Situation.

We have been ſo particular in our Diſpatch to the Secret Committee, in the Relation of every Circumſtance that can tend to your Information, that any thing further we can now ſay, would only be a uſeleſs Repetition; we ſhall therefore ſubmit the Whole to your Determination, with a firm Reliance of meeting with a candid and impartial Judgment, and confine ourſelves in this Addreſs to what has offered ſince the Date of our Advices to the Honourable the Secret Committee; premiſing only, that excluſive of any general Opinion or Directions you may pleaſe to give, in conſequennce of the Papers which will be now before you, we requeſt your particular Deciſion on the Conduct of Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, and the Charge given in againſt them by the Preſident, in his Minute of the 29th January.

A Liſt of the Papers now tranſmitted is encloſed, in which they are enumerated in proper Order.

Since our Diſpatch to England, the Preſident laid before us a Plan of the Meaſures which appeared to him proper to be purſued in our preſent Situation. A Copy of this Paper is alſo tranſmitted under N° 3; and ſubjoined thereto is a Copy of our Proceedings and Determination, on the Day it was taken under Conſideration.

We

We have, as you will thereby obſerve, ſubmitted the Propriety of the propoſed Meaſures to you, and determined to ſuſpend the Execution thereof till we receive your Sentiments, which we hope you will tranſmit with all poſſible Expedition: And as, in whatever political Syſtem you may think proper to adopt for this Preſidency, you may poſſibly require Information on certain Points or Details of local Knowledge, which, as we cannot foreſee, we cannot now ſupply, we have, in order to prevent any Loſs of Time in Correſpondence, judged it expedient to ſend round to Bengal a Gentleman well informed in the State of the Company's Affairs, and the preſent political Circumſtances of the Preſidency; and having made Choice of Mr. George Horſley for this Commiſſion, he now waits on you with theſe Diſpatches.

We requeſt you will permit Mr. Horſley to be informed of the Meaſures you may think proper to adopt reſpecting this Preſidency, and allow him to repreſent to you any Particulars which his local Knowledge may ſuggeſt, or may appear to him material to be attended to in your Deliberations

The Marattas have diſcontinued the Attack of Fort Victoria, but we have not yet received an Anſwer to the Remonſtrances made to the Poona Durbar on that Occaſion, nor to the Letter written to Mhadjee Scindia, in conſequence of the 11th Reſolution ſubjoined to the Preſident's Review of Maratta Affairs. We however propoſe to continue temporizing with him, and to endeavour to preſerve the Diſtinction between him and Nanah Furneſe.

We moſt heartily join with our Preſident in the Encomiums beſtowed on Colonel Goddard, in his Minute of the 30th ultimo, for his judicious and deciſive Conduct in quitting the Negociation with Moodajee Bouncello, and his ready Determination of coming to our Aid, as well as the Activity and Military Skill with which he performed the March. We are happy to find by your Letter of February, without further Date, that his Conduct has alſo met with your Applauſe, and we beg to be permitted to remember him, and ſolicit from you ſome diſtinguiſhed Mark of your and our Senſe of his Services.

We have deſired the Colonel to be preſent at all our Political Proceedings; and at our Meeting the 31ſt ultimo, when we had aſſembled to conſider on the Preſident's Motion of the 30th, he laid before us your Inſtructions to him of the 5th of February, and your Commiſſion as Miniſter Plenipotentiary to the Court of Poona. We now, as already mentioned, ſend a Copy of our Proceedings on that Day, to which we beg Leave to refer.

On the 17th ultimo we received your Letter of the 16th November, encloſing a Copy of the Inſtructions to the late Mr. Elliott, and on the 29th we received your Letter of the 8th February.

It would now be quite unavailing to expreſs our Regret that we had not more timely Information of the Extent of Mr. Elliott's Commiſſion, but this is a Circumſtance which we hope will have its due Weight, when a Judgment is formed of our Conduct in undertaking the late Expedition at the Time we did.

As the whole of our Conduct will now be before you, we conſider it unneceſſary to make any Reply to your laſt-mentioned Letter; but we were exceedingly concerned to find ourſelves taxed at the ſame Time with Negligence, in letting favourable Opportunities eſcape, and Precipitation in embarking in the late Expedition when Circumſtances were not favourable. With reſpect to the latter Charge, we muſt truſt to the Statements now tranſmitted for our Juſtification; and the former being quite general, deprives us of the Advantage of making a circumſtantial Defence; therefore we can only ſay in general, that we acted to the beſt of our Judgment, according to the Situation of Affairs and the Powers given us, and that our deferring the Expedition Two Months longer than intended, was unavoidable, on Account of the unuſual Severity and Duration of the Rains, which rendered the low Country between this and the Gauts impaſſable for Troops and Artillery earlier than the Time our Forces were ſent into the Field.

We have now the Honour to tranſmit Second Copies of the Diſpatch from the Honourable the Secret Committee, received the 8th of February by Colonel Capper.

We have directed Mr. Horſley to touch at Tellicherry, to bring you the lateſt Intelligence of the State of the Operations againſt Mahé.

We have the Honour, &c.

(Signed) Wm Hornby,
&c. Select Committee.

Bombay Caſtle,
the 4th April 1779.

APPENDIX, N° 195.

Depart. Friday.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 4th May 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richd Barwell, and Philip Francis, } Eſquires.
Mr. Wheeler at Beercool, for the Benefit of his Health.
Sir Eyre Coote abſent, forming Military Arrangements.

THE Board continue to read the Papers ſent from Bombay, with the Letter from that Preſidency, under Date the 4th April. N°ˢ 5 and 6.

Adjourned until To-morrow Morning.

Depar[t]. Saturday.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 5th May 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell, and Philip Francis, } Eſquires.
Mr. Wheler at Beercool, for the Benefit of his Health.
Sir Eyre Coote abſent, forming Military Arrangements.

The Board continue reading the Papers received from the Preſidency of Bombay, with their Letter of the 4th ultimo; viz. N°ˢ 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15.

Adjourned until To-morrow Morning.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 6th May 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell, and Philip Francis, } Eſquires.
Mr. Wheeler at Beercool, for the Benefit of his Health.
Sir Eyre Coote abſent, forming Military Arrangements.

The Board continue to read the Papers tranſmitted from the Preſident and Council at Bombay, in their Letter of the 4th April; viz. N°ˢ 16 and 17.

Warren Haſtings,

P. Francis.

APPENDIX, N° 196.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, 24th May 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell, } Eſquires.
Philip Francis, }
Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote, K. B.
Mr. Wheler at Beercool, for the Benefit of his Health.

THE Governor General delivers in the following Minute:

The Governor General judging from ſome Intimations which have been caſually made at the Board, in Converſation upon the Diſpatches lately received from the Select Committee of Bombay, that our Sentiments, without a previous and liberal Communication of them, might differ not ſo much in the Judgment which we might ſeverally paſs on the Occurrences themſelves, or in the Conduct of the Perſons by whoſe Agency they were produced, as in the Choice of the Subjects which ſhould form the Subſtance of our Reply to their Letter; I have thought it proper, and hope I ſhall perform by it an acceptable Service to the Board, to enumerate and diſtinguiſh the ſeveral Points which are preſented to our Notice in the voluminous Papers compoſing theſe Diſpatches, and which may appear to require either the Inſtructions or Animadverſions of the Board upon them.

As my Deſign in this Undertaking is to ſhorten the Labours of the Board, and to obviate a Difference of Opinion on an Occaſion which ſeems to me to demand the united and moſt reſpectable Application of the Power of this Government, I hope that it will be received with Candour, or at leaſt that it may eſcape Controverſy: If either in the State of Facts, in Deductions from them, or in the Opinion which I may deliver of the Conduct to be obſerved by this Government in relation to them, I may not obtain the Concurrence of every other Member of the Board; I repeat, that I do not mean to offer Propoſitions for their Determination, but Subjects for their Selection.

To theſe I ſhall proceed, and arrange them in their Order of Time.

1ſt. The Plan formed by the Select Committee of Bombay on the 21ſt of July 1778, in Concert with Moraba Furneeſe Buchela Proonder and Tuckajee Holcar, for the Reſtoration of Ragonaut Row to the chief Adminiſtration of the Maratta State.
2d. The Second Plan, formed on the 12th October 1778, and Engagements concluded with Ragonaut Row, done for his Reſtoration.
3d. The Inſtitution of the Poona Committee.
4th. The Conduct of the Poona Committee.
5th. The Conduct of Mr. Carnac.
6th. The Conduct of Colonel Egerton.
7th. The Conduct of Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn.
8th. The ſpecific Charge preferred againſt Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, and the Reference of the ſame to the Governor General and Council.
9th. The March of the Army from Panwell to Candola.
10th. The Deſcent of the Army from Candola.
11th. The Retreat from Tillygaung.
12th. The Surrender of Ragonaut Row.
13th. The ſecret Stipulation with Mhadajee Scindia.
14th. The Reſolution of the Select Committee to diſavow both.
15th. The Suſpenſion of Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn.
16th. The Promotion of Lieutenant Colonel Hartley, and the other Promotions and Superceſſions. General Rules for Promotion publiſhed in the general Orders of the and Remonſtrances of the ſuperſeded Officers.
17th. Plan of Negociations propoſed by Mr. Hornby on the and agreed to by the Select Committee.
18th. Plan of Operations propoſed by Mr. Hornby on the March.
19th. Recommendation of Colonel Goddard.
20th. It will be a Queſtion, Whether any, and what, Supplies of Money ſhall be ſent to the Preſidency of Bombay, and to Colonel Goddard?
21ſt. And laſtly, what Inſtructions ſhall be ſent to both for their future Conduct, whether dependent or independent of the foregoing Subjects.

If in this Catalogue I have omitted any Matter of conſequence offered to our Deliberation in the Papers now before us, the Recollection of the other Members of the Board will ſupply the Deficiency; theſe will at leaſt be ſufficient to ſhew how extenſive, various, and complicated a Duty is impoſed on us by theſe Diſpatches, if we muſt of Neceſſity enter on the Conſideration of all the Tranſactions and Events which are related in them; if we muſt paſs Judgment on every Inſtance of perſonal Conduct, either directly or indirectly brought by them to our Notice; and if we are to preſcribe Rules for their Conduct on every diſtinct Subject, under every Variation of Circumſtances which may eventually attend it.

If the Board ſhall judge it incumbent on them to enter into ſo laborious a Diſcuſſion, I ſhall ſubmit, though reluctantly, to bear my Part of it; reluctantly, becauſe it will occupy more of our Time than we can ſpare from the more ſubſtantial Objects; and becauſe I foreſee that it will lead to Altercation amongſt ourſelves; it being impoſſible that we, who have but begun to agree in Opinion on our public Meaſures, ſhould all become of one Mind on Twenty-two diſtinct and intereſting Propoſitions, and becauſe it would be unavailing and inconcluſive.

To cenſure or to commend is all that we can do, except in one ſingle Inſtance; for our Cenſures cannot impreſs Reſtraint, nor our Commendations avert the Effects of paſt Misfortunes, or preclude the Judgment which awaits the Inſtruments of them from higher Authority. Our effectual Authority is limited to political Engagements and military Operations, undertaken without our previous Licence. The Treaty or Convention, or whatever Name it may bear, which was concluded at Worgaun, certainly falls within this Deſcription, and it is in our Power if we pleaſe to puniſh the Authors of it by a temporary Suſpenſion; but is it neceſſary? An Act ſo fatal to the Intereſts of the Company, and ſo diſgraceful to the Reputation of the Britiſh Nation, cannot fail to excite the moſt rigid Scrutiny into the Conduct of every one concerned in it, and the Cauſes which produced it, by thoſe who have the Power both to judge and to puniſh, which perhaps in this Caſe we have not in Effect.

The Charge preferred by Mr. Hornby againſt Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, and referred expreſsly to us for our Judgment upon it, is but a ſmall Portion of a long Series of great apparent Miſconduct, every Part of which has an equal Claim, and many greater, to our Conſideration of them. There was no need of this Reference to us, nor are we competent to receive it: The Charge might have been tried by a Court Martial; and if the Preſident and Select Committee had deemed it neceſſary, for any Cauſe not ſo properly cognizable by a Court Martial, or capable of Proof before it, or for any other Reaſon, to remove Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, from their military Command, or from the Service, they might have removed them, and ought to have done it in ſuch a Caſe, without any Form of Trial, by the Powers veſted in them by the Company. It does not conſiſt with the Dignity of this Government, to aſſume a Juriſdiction which it cannot legally exerciſe, nor effectually without the Conſent of thoſe who, poſſeſſing ample Powers themſelves, have deſired to conſign them to us, whether becauſe they doubted the Equity of their own Conduct, or dreaded the Reſponſibility annexed to it; and therefore ſought to lighten the Weight of it by ſharing it with us; for I cannot conjecture any other probable Motive for ſo extraordinary an Appeal.

If in the above Reflections I have expreſſed the Sentiments of the other Members of this Board, nothing remains for our Conſideration but the Queſtion of what ſhall be done, and the Review of the paſt Events ſo far only as they relate to it.

We have already diſavowed the Convention of Worgaun: Would to God that we could as eaſily efface the Infamy which our national Character has ſuſtained by the Confeſſion inſerted in it, as we can juſtify, on the ſtricteſt Principles of Honour, Juſtice, and public Faith, our Refuſal to ratify the ſubſtantial Parts of it!

The ſeparate Agreement made with Madajee Scindia ſtands on very different Ground: It was not a Conceſſion extorted by the Maratta Government againſt its Conviction of legal Sufficiency in thoſe who yielded it, but it was the Price at which they purchaſed the Safety of the Army; and was ſo abſolutely their own ſpontaneous Act, that it appears that the Miniſters of Madajee Scindia were even corrupted to influence his Acceptance of it. It is true that they had no Authority to make ſuch a Compromiſe, and we may therefore refuſe to ratify it, in ſtrict Conformity to the Letter of our own Law; but I doubt whether this will avail us in the Opinion of the World, or we can reconcile it to the Obligations of Juſtice and Honour, which were thus pledged for the Retribution of the moſt ſignal (though humiliating) Act of Kindneſs that a Nation could have received from the Bounty of an Individual; unleſs we can be allowed the Rule of Aſiatic Policy, in doing to all Men what we know they would under ſimilar Circumſtances do unto us.

I am compelled therefore in Conſcience and in Duty to declare, That unleſs Madajee Scindia ſhall have forfeited his Right by any ſubſequent Act, he is intitled to the Performance of his Engagement, and we ought to ratify it.

Except this be made an Addition to the Inſtructions already given to Colonel Goddard (and I muſt own that I do not think that it will contribute to their Succeſs, but the contrary) I know of no other Point of immediate Negociation or Action that can be preſcribed either to him or to the Select Committee of Bombay, until that Commiſſion ſhall have been concluded either by a definitive Treaty of Peace, or by a decided War.

This is not a proper Time to determine on the Meaſures which may be neceſſary in the Caſe firſt ſuppoſed.

If

If the Maratta Rulers ſhall finally reject our Offers of Peace, we muſt endeavour to make the moſt of a State of War; and for that Purpoſe I cannot recommend a better Plan of Operations, than that which is contained in Mr. Hornby's Minute of the 30th March: It appears eaſily practicable by the Force which we poſſeſs; it will yield us if ſucceſsful the Poſſeſſion of the very Lands which were the Objects of our late Engagements, and diſtreſs them in the Means of ſupporting the War, by the Loſs of ſo conſiderable a Portion of their Revenue, at the ſame Time that it will increaſe our own.

Whether theſe, or whatever others, may be the Grounds of our preſent Reſolutions, I hope the Board will ſee with me the Propriety of conveying them in ſuch a Form and Temper as may give Encouragement and Confidence to the Preſidency of Bombay, inſtead of adding to their Depreſſion. They are the immediate Guardians of the Company's Property on that Side of India; and it is by their Agency we muſt defend and ſupport the general Rights of the Company, and the Honour of the Britiſh Nation, unhappily involved as they appear to be in the Conſequences of their paſt Miſcarriages. In an Emergency ſo critical and important, we have (as I conceive) but this Alternative; Either to transfer the Power (if we can do it) into fitter Hands, or to render it as complete and as efficacious as it can be made in theirs. To mark our want of Confidence in them by any public Act, would weaken their's in us; to load them with harſh and unoperating Reproaches, would indiſpoſe them to our Authority; at the ſame Time that it would abſolve them from its Effect; and to bind their Deliberations by abſolute and undiſcretional Orders, might eventually diſable them from availing themſelves of any fortuitous Advantages which the Confuſion of the Maratta Government is more likely to offer them than any Plan which we could preſcribe to them, or which they could form on the Letter of our Inſtructions. In a Word, ſuch a Conduct, by inflaming the Paſſions of Men whom we are not to regard as exempt from the common Infirmities of Humanity, would prove the ſureſt Means of converting the Powers which were ſtill left in their Hands into the Inſtruments of Oppoſition, and even of the Defeat of the very Meaſures which require their Agency, and cannot be accompliſhed without it: Let us rather excite them to exert themſelves for the Retrieval of their paſt Misfortunes, and arm them with Means adequate to that End; reſtricting their Powers where the Object is determinate, and permitting a more liberal Extenſion of them, in Caſes which are too variable and uncertain for poſitive Injunctions. Their Admiſſion of Colonel Goddard to a deliberative Seat at their Board, and the Requeſt which they have made to us to allow of his being appointed to the chief Command, if it ſhould be vacant, of their military Eſtabliſhment, which would give him an effective Voice in their Select Committee, preſent to us an Occaſion of their adopting the Principle which I have recommended, with the moſt ample Caution for the ſafe Application of it. I hope and perſuade myſelf that we have all the ſame Opinion of Colonel Goddard's Merits: I for my own Part have a Pleaſure, and will add a Pride, in declaring, that though I have often traced back his Conduct in my Reflections to the Period on which he firſt obtained the Command of the Expedition, I have not been able to detect one Error committed by him, or Advantage neglected, either in his military Conduct, or in the Line of his political Negociations. His Command has been alike diſtinguiſhed by the Spirit of Enterprize and Activity, Qualities which he was univerſally acknowledged to poſſeſs, by Prudence and Circumſpection, by a conciliatory Temper, a friendly Demeanour to the Inhabitants of the various Countries through which he had to paſs, and a ſtrict Attention to the good Order of the Troops under his Command, by a happy and ready Deciſion in the Choice of Expedients, and an implicit Obedience to the Orders under which he acted, of which the Proceedings of the Select Committee afford not the leaſt remarkable Inſtances: By acquieſcing in the Preſidency of Bombay, and by blending the Powers already veſted in him with thoſe of the Select Committee, we ſhall add Vigour to their Reſolutions, and a Security againſt their Effects, at leaſt ſo far as our Confidence in him may be juſtly placed.

The following Draft of an Anſwer to the Preſidency of Bombay has been formed on the Principles recorded in this Minute; and are ſubmitted in the Form of a finiſhed Letter rather for the Means of Diſpatch, than in the Preſumption of its proving exactly conformable to the Opinion of the Board, on every Subject which it contains, or which it may be judged adviſable to comprize in it. I have not yet drawn up any Letter to Colonel Goddard, as that will depend on what is written to Bombay.

To the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay.

We have received your Letter of the 4th of April, with its Encloſures, by the Hands of Mr. Horſley.

We do not think it neceſſary to enter on the Review of your Proceedings, but ſhall confine our preſent Inquiries to the Choice of ſuch Means as may beſt conduce to retrieve their unhappy Conſequences; leaving the paſt to the Scrutiny of higher and more effectual Authority.

We muſt deſire to decline the Reference which you have made to us, of the Charge preferred by your Preſident againſt Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, as a Point on which we have no Juriſdiction, and which is cognizable only by your Authority, either with the Powers immediately veſted in your Body by the Court of Directors, or through the regular Trial of a Court Martial.

Having already given full Powers to Colonel Goddard to negociate and conclude a Treaty of Peace with the Maratta Government, and having no Cauſe to alter the Terms which we have preſcribed in

our

our Inſtructions for that Purpoſe; we have only to repeat, that we look to the Iſſue of that Commiſſion as our primary Object, and the Termination of all our political Views on your Side of India, if it ſhall prove ſucceſsful.

But if the Miniſters ſhall reject the Propoſals which we have ordered to be made to them, and ſhall reduce us to the Neceſſity of defending the Rights and Intereſts of the Company, by an open War, we cannot preſcribe a better Plan of Operations than that which is laid down by your Preſident in his Minute of the 30th March, which in ſuch Caſe we authorize you to carry liberally into Execution; and even to qualify it by ſuch Variations as ſhall not ſubvert the general Deſign of it, which we underſtand to be the Reduction of ſuch Countries as lie along the Sea Coaſt, forming a Line of Territory with our preſent Poſſeſſions on the Continent, and defenſible againſt the Incurſions of Cavalry: And we further authorize and empower you, with the Reſervation hereaftermentioned, to enter into any Treaty or other Engagement, with the Chief of the Guicawar Family or others, for the above Purpoſe, and on the Grounds deſcribed on the aforeſaid Plan; obſerving the following Cautions, to which we require your ſtricteſt Attention: That your Engagements ſhall be offenſive only for the Objects of your immediate Operations, and in all other Reſpects purely defenſive: That your Engagements with the Guicawar Family ſhall be with the Head of it, and with him excluſively: That you ſhall not aſſume a Mediation between the Brothers, or take any Part whatever in their domeſtic Diſputes, further than to ſupport the Party in Alliance with the Company, and his Poſſeſſions againſt foreign Invaſion; and that you do not commit the Dignity of the Company, or pledge the national Faith in formal Treaties with Perſons of a Rank or Power unſuitable to ſuch a Diſtinction.

We are ſenſible of the Attention which you have ſhewn to our Views with the Government of Berar, in joining the Overtures lately made to Moodajee Booſla by Colonel Goddard, and in your Reſolution to avoid whatever might again interfere with this Negociation. We confeſs we at this Time entertain little Hope of his concurring with our Deſigns: He will wait for Proofs of our Superiority before he will hazard the Conſequences of a decided Connection with us; and every Offer made to him, while he is under the Influence of ſuch a Policy, will but ſerve to increaſe his Reſerve, as he will naturally conſtrue it to proceed from the Conſciouſneſs of our Inability to ſupport ourſelves without a foreign Aſſiſtance; and this is an additional Motive for our preferring a Scheme of military Operations practicable by our own Force, and unincumbered with the Weight of a timid Ally. If, notwithſtanding, Moodajee Booſla ſhall have anſwered the Letters which have been written to him by a Declaration of a Willingneſs to accept the proffered Alliance, we ſhall leave it to be concluded under the Inſtructions already given in charge to Colonel Goddard; if on the contrary, as we expect, he ſhall directly refuſe, or heſitate, or make new References to us, we have in ſuch Caſe directed Colonel Goddard to break off the Negociation; nor to reſume it, but on Advances made to him by the Government of Berar, nor then, unleſs it ſhall be ſtrictly compatible with the State of our other Connections then ſubſiſting, and with your Participation, in the Manner which we ſhall preſcribe hereafter.

Although we think ourſelves ſtrictly juſtifiable, in refuſing to ratify even the ſmalleſt Tittle of the Treaty or Convention of Worgaun, yet, from a fair Review of your Proceedings, we are compelled to regard the ſeparate Agreement made with Madajee Scindia in a very different Light: It was not a Conceſſion extorted by the Maratta Government againſt its Conviction of legal Sufficiency in thoſe who yielded it, but it was the Price at which they purchaſed the Safety of the Army; and was ſo abſolutely their own ſpontaneous Act, that it appears, that the Miniſters of Madajee Scindia were even corrupted to influence his Acceptance of it. It is true, they had no Authority to make ſuch a Compromiſe, and we may therefore refuſe to ratify it, in ſtrict Conformity to the Letter of our own Law; but we doubt whether this will avail us in the Opinion of the World, or we can reconcile it to the Obligations of Juſtice and Honour, which were thus pledged for the Retribution of the moſt ſignal (though humiliating) Act of Kindneſs that a Nation could have received from the Bounty of an Individual. We muſt therefore declare, that unleſs Madajee Scindia ſhall have forfeited his Right by any ſubſequent Act, he is intitled to the Performance of this Engagement, and we ought to ratify it.

We hope he may be prevailed upon to depart from the Letter of this Stipulation, and to accept of what he may deem an Equivalent for it; and we authorize you to treat with him for ſuch a Compromiſe, declaring on our Behalf, that we diſavow the Authority of Mr. Carnac and Colonel Egerton, to execute the Engagement with him, which was executed by them; but that in Conſideration of the ſignal Service afforded us by his Mediation and Influence at the Time in which it was made (and make, as we underſtand) the pledged Condition of that Service, we deem it in this Conſtruction equal to a formal Obligation, and therefore empower you to treat with him for the Accompliſhment of it, in ſuch a Manner as ſhall prove ſatisfactory to him, and more conſiſtent with our national Credit than the literal Performance of it; but if he ſhall inſiſt on the literal Performance of it, and he ſhall not have forfeited his Right to it by the Renewal of Hoſtilities againſt us, or by any Breach of Government, if any ſuch exiſts between us, we ſee no Alternative; it muſt be fulfilled.

Although the Conduct of Madajee Scindia may not ſeem to confirm your Opinion of his Diſpoſition towards us, or rather of the political Neceſſity which ſeems to incline him to enſure our future Alliance, yet we think the Arguments which you have aſſigned for this Belief ſo well grounded, and it agrees ſo well with the Knowledge which we ourſelves poſſeſs of his State Views and Talents,

leſs that we entirely adopt it, nor do we find it difficult to reconcile the Demands made on us under his Influence by the Miniſters, and immediately by him, for the Performance of the Conditions of the Convention of Worgawn with that Diſpoſition, or with the obvious Syſtem of Policy which his preſent Intereſt demands.

We ſuppoſe it probable that he will avoid any direct Engagement with us, till the Urgency of his Affairs ſhall require it, or until he can gain the Advantage of the Negociation, by waiting for the firſt Advances to be made on your Part. If from the Opportunities which you have of a nearer and more intimate Knowledge of his perſonal Character and Neceſſities, you ſhall judge this Concluſion to be well grounded, it will be adviſable to treat him with the ſame temporiſing and indeterminate Conduct, and purſuing the Plan of Military Operations which we have recommended, to wait for the Offer of his Alliance rather than ſolicit it. Propoſing this as a general Caution, we authorize you to enter into ſuch Engagements with him as ſhall not be contrary to any before concluded, and which you ſhall judge moſt adviſable; making your future Security, Peace, and an adequate Revenue, your chief and indiſpenſable Objects, and the Grounds of your Engagements with him.

To ſum up what we have written; our firſt Deſire is to obtain Peace on the Terms propoſed by our Inſtructions to Colonel Goddard of the 15th April, and it is only in the Event of the Failure of this Deſign that we have formed the ſubſequent Inſtructions, or will allow of their Operation.

In theſe the Plan of Military Operations recommended by your Preſident, is to have the firſt Place with its dependant Engagements with the Guicawars; the next in Order is the Negociation with Moodajee Booſla; and the laſt, the propoſed Engagement with Madajee Scindia.

The Execution of the projected Treaty of Peace with the Poona Miniſtry we leave to the ſole Charge of Colonel Goddard, according to the Inſtructions which we have already given him.

The Negociation and Treaty of Alliance with Moodajee Booſla we alſo leave to the ſole Management of Colonel Goddard, on the Authority of his Inſtructions of the 16th November, until the Period of their Suſpenſion, by the Refuſal or ſuch Heſitation of Moodajee Booſla as he ſhall deem ſufficient to warrant his declaring the Negociation ſuſpended. But in the future Renewal of this Negociation, and in all other Negociations, Treaties, and Plans of Military Operations, it is our Wiſh ſo to blend the Powers of your Government with our own in the Direction of them, and in every formal or occaſional Inſtrument which they may require for their Ratification, as to preſerve the Credit and diſtinct Reſponſibility of both, and to make both the Pledges for the faithful Obſervance of them; for this Purpoſe we need not recommend that Colonel Goddard be conſulted, when his Preſence, or the Nature of the Subjects will admit of it, on all Meaſures which have a Relation to our preſent Inſtructions, as you have already been pleaſed to allow him a deliberative Voice in your Council, and we are happy to find that you are ſo well ſatisfied with his Conduct and his ready Diſpoſition to aſſiſt in the Execution of your Deſigns, as to leave us little Occaſion to lay down a clearer Line for the Employment of the Forces under his Command, than that which we have already deſcribed.

We have directed Colonel Goddard to execute whatever Service you ſhall think it proper to require, which ſhall not be contrary to our Inſtructions, or to any exiſting Engagements; a Caution which we hope will be unneceſſary, but with which we do not conſider ourſelves at Liberty to diſpenſe while the principal Reſponſibility reſts with us; and we muſt require, that for the formal Repreſentation of this Government in any Treaties or other Engagements which you ſhall form in virtue of theſe Inſtructions, Colonel Goddard do affix his Signature thereto, without which we ſhall not allow them to be complete or valid.

We very readily and cheerfully acquieſce in the Deſire which you expreſs to inveſt Colonel Goddard with the chief Command of your Military Eſtabliſhment whenever that Office ſhall be vacant, reſerving to ourſelves the Right of recalling him to our Service in the Event of any Appointment from Home by which he may be ſuperſeded in the Command, and your Intentions in conferring it upon him be thereby defeated. As he will by ſuch a Determination become a regular Member of your Government, according to the Inſtitutions of the Company, and have an effective Voice in your Councils, we do not conſider it neceſſary that he ſhould, in that Capacity, be inveſted with a greater Authority than any other Member of your Select Committee; and we do therefore in ſuch Caſe revoke the Powers which we have given him to that Effect, with this ſingle Reſervation, viz.

That although he will be bound by the Reſolutions of the Majority of the Body of which he is Member, yet we require, that in order to preſerve a formal Diſtinction of the Powers of this Government in the Inſtruments which appertain to his Miniſterial Agency, he do affix his ſeparate and formal Signature to it as the Repreſentative of this Government.

Sir Eyre Coote delivers in the following Minute:

Sir Eyre Coote—The Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay having referred to us the Deciſion upon the Conduct of the Field Deputies and Commanding Officers of their Expedition to Poona, to place Ragonaut Row in the Regency of the Maratta State during the Minority of Madarow Narrain Peſhwa, and to remove Nanna Furneſe, upon Account of his apparently hoſtile Diſpoſitions againſt us,

us in favour of the French, I ſhall, in as few Words as poſſible, give my Sentiments upon the Conduct of theſe Gentlemen, in as far as the Papers ſubmitted to us can lead me to the Truth.

The Reſolution of the 21ſt of July was ſuſpended for various Cauſes until the 12th October, when it was brought before the Select Committee by a Member, who was afterwards appointed Preſident of the Committee of Field Deputies, urging its very material Neceſſity to the very Exiſtence of the Company upon that Coaſt, adding "That the Government of Bengal had given them full "Latitude to act, and had provided them with the neceſſary Reſources to do it with Vigour and "Effect." In this the Governor concurred, and the Meaſure was enacted by them, forming a Majority of the Select Committee; Mr. Draper diſſenting. The Execution thus fell to the chief, not to ſay ſole Management of the Propoſer. It is to theſe Two Gentlemen therefore that we muſt look for the Degree of its Succeſs, if it ſhall appear that their Powers were ſufficient to bring it to the intended Iſſue; ſhould theſe prove ample, the whole Weight of all the Conſequences of a Failure muſt fall upon them. Theſe Conſequences were, the immediate Loſs of the Benefits expected by a Completion of the Expedition, the Expence of the Men and Money in the Attempt, the Diſcredit of giving up our Ally, the Loſs of that Ally, the Shame of an unwarrantable Retreat, the Blemiſh thrown upon our national Honour and military Reputation; not to mention the favourable Juncture this Misfortune may afford to the French, who certainly have a very conſiderable Power at the Iſlands ready to make an Attempt upon our Poſſeſſions, which they otherwiſe would not think of doing with any Propriety, in the Situation that their Affairs are now reduced to in India. Theſe Conſequences are therefore of the moſt ſerious Nature. If theſe Gentlemen had Powers to prevent them, let Facts, taken from their own Defence, ſhew how far their Conduct was ſuitable to thoſe Powers, and their Powers to the Object.

The Governor, by whoſe Vote the Meaſure was adopted, remained himſelf the Majority of the Select Committee at Bombay; the Committee for appealing to for Deciſion, for granting or revoking Powers, in ſhort, for the grand Regulation of the Whole. The propoſing Member appointed Preſident of the Committee of Field Deputies, and poſſeſſing a double Voice, became Arbitor of the Meaſures that came within the Authority delegated to the Field Deputies. Theſe Two Gentlemen who enacted the Meaſure, thus retained in their own Hands the compleat and ſole Direction of the Whole in every Point, grand or minute. The Preſident of the Select Committee at Home, the Preſident of the Field Deputies Abroad; ſhould the one want more Powers, or meet with any Difficulties whatever, he had but to appeal, and have; ſhould the other perceive any Thing ſhort of his Wiſhes, he had but to ſay, and it could be done.

It was impoſſible to be more powerful, but at the ſame Time impoſſible to undertake more Reſponſibility. They began by a clear, at leaſt a dangerous Purchaſe of the Share of this Power, veſted in the Field Deputies. The Meaſure for appointing Field Deputies, (for every other Name to that Committee muſt be a fictitious one) was in the moſt immediate Oppoſition to the Company's poſitive and repeated Orders: To elude which, the flimſey Pretence of a falſe Name was adopted. They were to all Intents and Purpoſes a Committee of Field Deputies; an Office not only forbidden by thoſe under whoſe immediate Orders the Select Committee were employed to act, but an Office immediately exploded and reprobated by all Governments as the moſt fruſtrating Clog that can be thrown upon any military Operation, a Reſtraint under which no Man that has any Jealouſy for his own military Reputation, or any Regard for the Intereſts of his Employers, ſhould or could act under; and of all Commiſſions that ever were iſſued, there never could be framed a more deſpotic one to thoſe it was granted, and more injurious and humiliating to a Commanding Officer than the One in queſtion. The Words are, "*to conduct* and *concert* all Operations, political and military, and Obedience required from all Officers and Servants." This was ſo glaring, that even Colonel Egerton, who made no Objections to the Eſtabliſhment of Field Deputies, could not avoid oppoſing it, and proteſting againſt its being iſſued in General Orders, as it would in fact annihilate his Command; further, he complained of this to the Preſident at Bombay, who ſaw it ſo ſtrongly, that he wrote to the Field Preſident as follows: "Recommending to him upon whoſe "Conduct ſo much depended, to wave publiſhing it in General Orders, as the Promulgation of "ſuch a Commiſſion in the Army might bear the Appearance of ſetting up an Authority in the "very Camp to ſuperſede that of the Commanding Officer; and alſo agreed in moſt of the Ob-"jections that the Colonel made againſt the Inſtructions as well as the Commiſſion, wherein he "had ſtated, that the Rights given by the Company to their Commanding Officers are infringed." The Governor added, that theſe Points muſt have eſcaped himſelf and the "Field Preſident when "paſſing the Orders at the Select Committee." In the Anſwer that the Governor returns to the Colonel by the ſame Diſpatch, he evades replying to his Complaints, of which Circumſtance he acquainted the Field Preſident.

Here their Conduct ſtands in a ſtriking Point of View; whether conſidered in its monſtrous Partiality to One of Two Colleagues in a Committee; whether in not contributing to that Harmony which they confeſs needful, and had enacted in a ſeparate Article of the Commiſſion, for the Diſpatch of the Buſineſs they were ſent upon; whether in trampling upon the Rights annexed by their Superiors to particular Stations; or finally, whether in aiding to correct an Error laid before them, and acknowledged by themſelves as an Act of Injuſtice, ariſen from Omiſſion or Ignorance, cauſing, as they are pleaſed to ſtate, Diſſentions in the Committee, to the Detriment and Delay of a public Tranſaction of the moſt weighty Nature. Thus confeſſing themſelves the Authors of Faults that they do not afterwards heſitate to charge others with, having the Power to correct it, ſeeing the Riſe

and Progreſs of the Error, and its bad Effect, yet evading to amend it. Nor ſimply this, for in a further Letter to the Field Preſident, he expreſſes his great Satisfaction at his concurring in the Propriety of ſupporting theſe acknowledged faulty Orders.

The Governor again writes to Colonel Egerton, "that if any Difference ſhould ariſe between him "and the Field Deputies, regarding his Military Rights, which he is ſure can be but trifling, the "Opinion of the Field Deputies muſt preponderate." *Sure they can be but trifling*, after having confeſſed that the Commiſſion annihilate his Command, and the *Opinions of the Field Deputies*, conſiſting in fact of the Preſident alone, to preponderate in a Deciſion upon their own Powers.

That ſame Diſpatch he confirmed to the Field Preſident his caſting Vote, and eluded filling up the Vacancy cauſed by Mr. Moſtyn's Illneſs, "relying ſingly upon him;" who concurs in ſupporting the full Powers of the Commiſſion and Inſtructions againſt every Attack or Objection that may be made againſt them.

Under theſe inordinate Powers, nothing being left to the Commanding Officer, except the Mode of pitching Tents and forming the Quarter Guards, ſhall the Committee of the Field Deputies be exonerated of the Blame of the Delays in performing a March of 24 Miles in 25 Days? They who had the concerting and conducting of all Military Operations, might have concerted and conducted a more rapid March, without ever having borne Military Commiſſions: They might have diſcovered that 19,000 Bullocks to 2,600 Men was ſomewhat diſproportionate, poſſibly little tending to accelerate the Progreſs of ſo ſmall a Force; which indeed could ſcarce be deemed an Eſcort to ſuch an Equipage. They charge Colonel Egerton, and ſtate, that an Attack upon the Enemy's Guns might have been of ſingular Uſe; yet, as appears by the Diary, never ordered or recommended it; nor even, as they did upon other Occaſions when they wiſhed to ſave Appearances, induce the Governor to write a Letter recommending what they wanted the Commanding Officer to do.

Again, they complain of Apprehenſions of Want of Proviſions; but it does not appear they ever took active Steps to procure any, until they propoſed the unfortunate Retreat; nor could it be, as Mr. Draper juſtly obſerves, want of Incentive that deferred their Activity, for they had been Witneſſes to the Loſs ſuſtained by the Delays at the Preſidency of Three friendly Chiefs, who during that Time were taken from their Party; and having declared that the Gain of Fifteen Days would have brought the Army without Oppoſition to Poona, yet had they not had Power ſufficient to regulate and controul the Army; the Select Committee at Bombay might and ought, upon perceiving the unmilitary Delays in the Progreſs of the Troops, to have recalled or changed thoſe who appeared blameable. But now we approach to the Effect of theſe extraordinary Field Deputy Powers, and the Uſe they were put to.

A Deputation of the Members of Adminiſtration come forth from their Seats in Government, with a declared Purpoſe of benefiting and gaining Credit and Territory to their Employers, veſted with the higheſt, even unwarrantable, Powers to ſupport theſe Purpoſes; at the Head of a Britiſh Army, well appointed, having a Prince by the Hand to ſeat him in the Regency of the Empire, arrived within Fifteen Miles, One Day's March from the Capital he was to govern, where it was to be ſuppoſed were many Friends, who were only until their Arrival reſtrained from ſtanding forth, nay ſome of whom, to the Amount of 4,000 Horſe, had already come over to join their own Army in uncommonly elevated Spirits, as teſtified by all its Officers, having Eighteen Days Proviſion in Hand; the Enemy a depreſſed though numerous Rabble, the chief Leader among whom they knew was only keeping up the Maſk of Enmity, for his Shot were ordered to be all thrown ſhort, the Council of the Foe having the Day before ſent Submiſſion to Bombay, offering to pay the Charges of the War, and gratify the protected Ally.

In this Situation, how did they exert the Powers delegated to them for the Object in View?

A Retreat was ordered without conſulting the Commanding Officer of the Army, Colonel Cockburn; who upon receiving the Order, together with Captain Hartly, repreſented how dangerous it would be to attempt a Retreat with Troops who had never been accuſtomed to it. And failing in that, Mr. Holmes, a Civilian, joined Meſſrs. Cockburn and Hartley, and propoſed treating with the Marattas where they then were, as better Terms might be expected before the Enemy knew any thing of our Intention to retreat: But this met with the ſame Fate as a Propoſal made the Day before; Ragonaut Row who ſolicited them to defer Submiſſion for One Day, as he was treating with his Friends among the oppoſed Army, and might yet ſave all; but he was anſwered, that not an Hour could be granted him.

After all this, Mr. Cockburn's Opinion being then aſked by the Field Preſident, he anſwered, That he had not a Doubt of carrying the Army to Poona, if ordered; but the Reſolution for the Retreat was not to be altered; fatal Infatuation! The next Day after the Firſt Stage of the Retreat had been effected from Tellagoun to Worgaum, in Deſpite of a fruitleſs Attempt of them to prevent it, a Carte Blanche was ſent to the Enemy, and they proceeded to give up, not only what was entruſted to their Management in the preſent Expedition, but they added all the Acquiſitions made by the Bombay Preſidency during the Reign of the preſent Peſhwa, nay, they extend their Conceſſions to this Preſidency, by ordering our Troops to return; again they enter into a private Treaty, of their own *free Will and Accord*, with one of the Enemy, making further Surrenders in Conſideration of Benefits ſaid to be received at his Hands in the good and favourable Terms of the General Treaty. In the General Treaty we acknowledge ourſelves to be the Infringers of former Treaties, although we ſet out in our Manifeſto with declaring that we acted upon their Infringements, and in the private Treaty we acknowledge ourſelves defeated, although no ſuch Defeat exiſted. In

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Addition to this Reward for ſuppoſed Services, they ſubmit to another humiliating Act that ſtain the Firſt: They, acting under a Commiſſion in the King's Name, bribe the Chubdars, the menial Servants of the Enemy, with a Thouſand Rupees, and others among them with 41,000 Rupees, to purchaſe what they thought their own Safety; and finally, give Two Gentlemen as Hoſtages, for what they declare was out of their Power to perform. The Loſs of Life or cruel Sufferings theſe Hoſtages may be reduced to, they muſt be anſwerable for.

Is there any Thing that we can do adequate to ſuch a Caſe? The Eyes of the Nation are upon us; our Feelings for our Country's Honour will be the Meaſure of our own: Our Power extends to a Removal from their Stations; Removal from Station, ſetting Loſs of Character out of the queſtion, amounts only to a Ceſſation of Salary; and ſhall a mere Ceſſation of Salary be a Requital for the Facts here ſtated, if they ſhould prove true? No, let the Acquittal or Puniſhment ſuch an Inveſtigation may bring on, become a national Object. I propoſe, that a public Trial be recommended Home; our Martial Law muſt decide upon the Merits or Demerits of the Two Commanders of the Army, or ſuch other Officers whoſe Conduct upon this Expedition may require elucidating. But nothing leſs than our national Tribunals can acquit or puniſh the Civil Gentlemen engaged in it, who, by the exceſſive Powers they took, preſerved the whole Reſponſibility to themſelves.

I wiſhed to have ended here, but ſome further Circumſtances remain unnoticed, not equally touching our Country's Welfare, but Tranſactions among themſelves cloſing the above Scene. When the Field Deputies returned to Bombay, the Field Preſident commenced his ſeparate Juſtification, by throwing the whole Blame of what had happened upon the bad Conduct of the Officers under them; by the Delays they had cauſed in the Progreſs of the Troops, by the improper Diviſion of the Army at the Retreat, and by the Opinions given by them after the Retreat; referring at the ſame Time to their Minutes of that Juncture, to prove his own Innocence.

To theſe Points I ſhall give but a few Words:

1ſt. The bad Conduct in Delays; it was in favour of the Field Deputies, as well as in the Select Committee at Bombay, to have corrected; therefore, if they were aware of the bad Effects of ſuch Delays, having the Incentives they profeſſed for Promptitude, they remain the more culpable for not altering it.

2d. Whatever the Diviſion of the Army may have been on the 12th, it is clear that the Firſt Stage of the Retreat ordered, was effected, notwithſtanding the very early Attack of the Enemy; nor was the Loſs great, conſidering the Number of the Foe, the Length of the Action, and the immediate Quantity of Baggage to be covered upon very unfavourable and broken Ground.

3d. The Opinions of the Officers upon the State that the fatal Retreat had reduced the Army to, from high Spirits to Dejection, if true, were juſtifiable; if falſe, the Field Deputies, being upon the Spot for better Information, ſhould not have been guided by them; the Army was under the Command of the Field Deputies.

4th. As for the Defence the Minute of that Day affords, it appears to me to have quite a contrary Tendency. It is aſſerted by Colonel Egerton to be an Afterwork; and the Language of the Firſt Part is ſo different from the other Productions of that Period, that it might with ſome afford a preſumptive Proof of the Truth of that Aſſertion, which in fact is not fully removed by the Evidence called to contradict it: However, letting this drop, for it is too trifling after what has preceded, I will only ſay, that if they really thought, as they pretend, that by continuing the Retreat they might have regained Safety inſtead of Submiſſion, they make themſelves doubly criminal for acting againſt their better Knowledge, whilſt under no Influence but their own Will.

Mr. Moſtyn's Death, and Ragoba's Duplicity, have alſo been mentioned as Cauſes for our Failure.

Could Mr. Moſtyn's Death give Cauſe for a Retreat, declared to have been ordered upon a Report of a Commiſſary of Proviſions? or could Ragoba's Duplicity make Eighteen Days Proviſion appear inſufficient to perform One Day's March to Poona? No, ſay they, but this Duplicity (the bad Effects of which we muſt ſuppoſe were only diſcovered the Day of the Retreat) cauſed him to ſtate more Friends than he had, and prevented his managing thoſe he poſſeſſed to the beſt Advantage. Admitting it to be true that he had miſmanaged his Friends, it ſhould, when we were ſo far advanced, have produced an oppoſite Effect to that of ordering a Retreat; it ought to have ſtimulated us to redoubled Vigour; had we marched into, and poſſeſſed ourſelves of the Capital, which the Commanding Officer declares might have been done, there cannot be a Doubt that the Chiefs who had engaged themſelves to Mr. Moſtyn, and many more, would have joined Ragoba's Party. All their Excuſes are equally frivolous, for the Governor himſelf is obliged to condemn and lament the Retreat.

Had Ragoba's Friends been really ſo ill managed by him, as it is thrown out, the Miniſterial Party forming the whole Strength of the Maratta Empire, would not have been ſo alarmed at the Appearance of 2600 Men, as to be induced to make the ſubmiſſive Offers above-mentioned to the Governor. They muſt have feared a Junction, and that of a very large Diviſion of their Party. Our Backwardneſs may have made our Friends ſuſpend Action, but could not overſet or alter the Principles or intereſted Views that firſt induced them to an Alliance with Ragoba. The Committee of Field Deputies when at Bombay, probably to ſupport their own Conduct after what had paſſed, joined the Governor in a Meaſure (Captain Hartley's Promotion on the 1ſt February 1779) which might at any Time prove fatal to military Service, but more particularly at that Juncture, as it could not fail giving univerſal Diſcontent. It was a Meaſure that muſt make every Man who feels

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as a Soldier ſympathize with thoſe unhappy Men of real military Merit, who have the Misfortune of ſerving under ſuch Regulations.

I muſt look upon Colonel Goddard's Arrival at Bombay as a moſt fortunate Circumſtance at this Juncture; his diſtinguiſhed Merits as an Officer I need paſs no Encomiums upon, as his Actions ſufficiently declare them, and I think it abſolutely neceſſary in the preſent diſtreſſed Situation that the Military upon the Bombay Eſtabliſhment are reduced to, that he ſhould have the Rank given him of Brigadier General, in order to enable him to carry on the Service with more Weight and Dignity. It is not in the Power of the Governor General and Council, or the Preſidency of Bombay, to appoint him Commander in Chief of the Forces there, or to give him an effective Voice in the Select Committee, as Colonel Egerton cannot be looked upon in any other Light than Commander in Chief (though prevented from acting as ſuch) until the Sentence of a Court Martial, or the Court of Directors, decide upon the Charges laid againſt him.

Under theſe Circumſtances, I have only to recommend that the Government of Bombay ſhall give Colonel Goddard a deliberate Voice in their Committee; and conſult him upon all military and political Points. And that we continue to him thoſe Powers which he already poſſeſſes from this Government, and further inveſt him with ſuch others as we may find neceſſary for carrying on our Views.

We are further called upon to give a Deciſion on the Meaſures which the Governor and Select Committee of Bombay now think neceſſary to be purſued.

The Reſolution of the 21ſt July is at an End; Ragonaut Row being no longer in our Power.

Scindia holds off, and declines engaging with us, which is the more to be lamented, as his Enmity, which muſt now be deeply rooted in his Mind, is owing to the deceitful and unworthy Treatment he has received from us. The Services he has rendered us, and his ſtrong Attachment to the Engliſh Intereſt, make it a national Conſideration to ſatisfy him by an Equivalent to the Benefit he might have expected from the Poſſeſſion of Broach, which cannot be ceded to him upon the Claim of a Grant that the Field Deputies were not impowered to make.

Moodajee Booſla's Claim is held forth as proper, on account of "deſtroying the Bramin Uſurpation," and reſtoring the original Ram Raja Government, which can only tend to unite, increaſe, and ſtrengthen the Maratta State. This very Conſideration, however it may weigh with the Bombay Council, would prevent me, if no better can be urged, from ever concurring in it.

Our real Intereſts are to keep theirs divided, always preventing over Growth of Power in any of their Parties; thus endeavouring to hold the Scale in our own Hands, we remain ourſelves in a great Degree the Umpire. This is the freeſt Road to the Support of our Dignity and Profit, as well as the ſureſt Means of retaining undiſturbed what we now poſſeſs.

I therefore think, that at preſent we ſhould not ſeek to renew a War, but negociate with the various Maratta Intereſts an honourable Peace, conformably to the Directions already given Colonel Goddard upon that Head. But if by refuſing this they force us to continue Hoſtilities, I muſt in this Caſe ſuppoſe a Junction of all their Parties, and of courſe an Union of all their Forces; and I do not think with Colonel Goddard, that his Detachment, conſidering the State it is now in, together with the Bombay Troops, are equal to enſure Succeſs in a Conteſt with the united Maratta Powers; and I need not aſk any Man who is verſed in the Politics of this Country, what would be the Conſequences of a Defeat. I do not doubt he muſt concur in my Opinion, that it would endanger the Whole of the Company's Poſſeſſions.

Colonel Goddard has loſt near a Thouſand of his original diſciplined Men, and thoſe he has recruited are raw, unformed, and in no Shape to be depended on. He has reported to the Select Committee at Bombay, "that One Half of his Sepoys have refuſed to receive their Pay for the "Month of January, unleſs that for the Month of February is at the ſame Time diſcharged; and "he ſeems to think, that this has proceeded from a Diſpoſition among the Men to return Home, if "they could furniſh themſelves with Money enough to bear their Charges to their own Country: "However he was of Opinion, that he ſhould be able to put a Stop to this Spirit on his Return "to Camp." "But we (ſay the Select Committee) have every Reaſon to fear the Increaſe of "it."

Whatever Sway Colonel Goddard may have over his Troops, there is no foreſeeing how far ſuch a Diſaffection may carry them, not having a Body of Europeans with them to infuſe a Spirit of Emulation, or to keep them in a proper Degree of Subjection.

Our utmoſt Vigour ſhould therefore be exerted to ſupport our military Reputation in this Country, and by one united Effort, put a glorious and ſpeedy End to the War: For however uncertain the Succeſs of War may be, we ought to leave it as little to the Reſult of Chance as poſſible, conſidering the greateſt Stake we have to riſque; for which Reaſon we ſhould alſo form Alliances with the Country Powers, eſpecially with Hyder Ally, whoſe more particular Intereſt it is to join us in any hoſtile Attempts againſt the Maratta State; and if a War ſhould be indiſpenſably continued, I would leave it to the commanding Officer, who is reſponſible to us for his Conduct, to adopt Mr. Hornby's Plan, or not, as he may think moſt adviſable for promoting the Diſtreſs of the Enemy. In ſo far I may agree in it, though not, as Mr. Hornby expreſſes it, for the Sake of Revenue; and as to the other ſimilar Propoſals of ſeeking War for Plunder, the Honour of the Nation and Company, inſeparable from my own, will never permit me to ſubſcribe to.

They call upon us for Thirty Lacks between this and October, to ſave their Poſſeſſions. While we have Money or Credit here, I never will let any of the Company's Poſſeſſions ſuffer for the Want of it; but the very Motive that will induce me to ſend it, will prompt me to prevent its falling into Hands that Experience has proved will make ſo ill an Uſe of it: Therefore I will not conſent to any Sum being ſent, until I ſee it accompanied by a proper Perſon, who ſhall be anſwerable to this Government that it be applied to the Purpoſe for which it may be granted.

As Commander in Chief of the Army, a Reference upon ſo military a Subject ſeemed to call for my particular Diſcretion: This, added to the great Variety of Matter it afforded, and its weighty Conſequences, will, I hope, be ſufficient Apology for the Length of this Minute.

(Signed) Eyre Coote.

Mr. Francis—I ought to apprize the Board, that in the following Minute I have not offered any Opinion on the Meaſures which may be proper for us to adopt hereafter, for effecting a ſolid Peace on the Malabar Coaſt, becauſe I looked upon that Part of the general Subject as already provided for, at leaſt diſpoſed of for the preſent, by the Powers and Inſtructions which we have given to Colonel Goddard. My Reflections reply only to the Facts already paſt, and which I underſtand to be referred generally to us for our Judgment upon them.

Mr. Francis delivers in the following Minute.

Mr. Francis—It is needleſs at this Time to enter into a Conſideration of the Juſtice of our Quarrel with the Maratta Government, or of the Extent and Quality of the Powers under which the Preſidency of Bombay have acted, in violating the Treaty of Poona. Thoſe Queſtions have been ſufficiently diſcuſſed in the Governor General's Minutes and mine, before Sir Eyre Coote's Arrival.

The following Obſervations are confined to the Policy of the Meaſure within itſelf, and on its own Principles, and to the Propriety of the Means made uſe of to carry it into Execution.

1ſt, It appears by the Bombay Conſultations of the 10th December 1777, and by their Letter to us of the 20th January 1778, that they were unanimouſly determined not to engage in any active Enterprize in favour of Ragoba, unleſs they were ſolicited thereto by Saccaram, Moraba, Buthaherba and Tookoojee Holcar, by a joint Application under their own Siccas and Hand Writing, and that this was a Condition *ſine qua non*.

Yet on the 21ſt of July following they reſolved to march to Poona with Ragoba, without having received any Application from the Perſons above-mentioned, or entered into any ſpecific Engagements whatſoever with any of the Maratta Chiefs. After the Expedition had failed, Mr. Hornby ſays, "It was evident, that there was not one Chief in the Empire who would draw a Sword for Ragoba."

It follows therefore, that in undertaking to act without having previouſly ſettled Terms of Co-operation with ſome of the Maratta Chiefs, they departed from their own fundamental Principles, and, as far as Succeſs depended on ſuch Co-operation, had no Right to expect it.

2d. It further appears, by their Proceedings of the 12th of October 1778, that when they took their Reſolution in July, they reckoned upon the Hopes of Aſſiſtance from Moraba, Butcheba, and Tucoojee Holdcar, with 30,000 Horſe; yet in October they determined to carry their Plan into Execution, when every Expectation of ſuch Aſſiſtance muſt have failed them, conſidering that the Two Firſt of the above Chiefs were under Reſtraint, and the latter greatly ſuſpected.

3d. In July they appear to have relied on the Aſſiſtance of Colonel Leſlie's Detachment, and to have conſidered the ſecuring a Junction with him as eſſential to the Succeſs of their Plan; for which Purpoſe they then ſent him Orders to march to Ziner; yet, on the 12th of October, while our Detachment was ſtill in Bundelcund (the ſame Station which it occupied in July) that is at ſo great a Diſtance that a Junction could not poſſibly have been effected before February following, they determined to carry their Plan forthwith into Execution.

4th. With thoſe Facts before me, I have a Right to conclude, that the Select Committee, in attempting to march to Poona, have acted in Oppoſition to their own profeſſed Principles. I mean, that whereas at Firſt, and up to the 12th of October, they appear to have thought certain Conditions neceſſary, as well to juſtify their engaging in the Meaſure in queſtion, as to inſure the Succeſs of it, they at laſt plunged themſelves into the Execution of that Plan when every one of theſe Conditions had failed them.

5th. Their Ignorance of the real State of the Poona Durbar, and of the reſpective Power and Influence of the Perſons who compoſed it, is a remarkable Circumſtance, and ſhould ſerve as a future Caution to the Company and to this Government, againſt truſting implicitly to any Intelligence we may receive from that Quarter. While the Plan was in Agitation, it ſuited their Purpoſe to repreſent Nana as the moſt powerful, and, to us, the moſt formidable of all the Maratta Chiefs; that he was devoted to the French, and had engaged to put them into Poſſeſſion of Choul. Whatever his Inclinations might be, of which we have no better Evidence than of the reſt, it is clear that they were miſtaken in their Opinion of his Power. Mr. Hornby, in his Minute of the 19th of February, ſays, "The Lead that Scindia has taken in the Adminiſtration, and the Con-

" tion, to which he has reduced Nana, to be no more than a Creature of his, were never tho-
" roughly known till the Facts diſcovered themſelves on this Occaſion; yet they are to be traced
" in Mr. Moſtyn's and Mr. Lewis's Advices ever ſince the Reſolution effected by Madjee Scindia's
" Means in June laſt, when Nana fled to him." On which Mr. Draper obſerves, " That he can-
" not enough lament that we have ſo lately become acquainted with Scindia's being the
" principal Perſon in Power notwithſtanding the Reſidence of Meſſrs. Moſtyn and Lewis at
" Poona."

In the Execution of the Meaſure, the Board I think will ſee ſuch Errors at the Outſet, as might have been alone ſufficient to defeat it.

1ſt. The Appointment of Field Deputies, under the Title of a Committee for concerting and conducting all Military Operations. The Succeſs of Military Enterprizes depends upon a Unity of Command, without which there can be neither Deciſion or Diſpatch. Debate and Execution cannot move together; conſtant Experience has ſhewn the bad Effects of Field Deputations. The Company, in a former Inſtance, ſeverely condemned the Appointment of ſome Gentlemen at Madras on a ſimilar Service, and no one Argument is ſuggeſted to ſhew that ſuch an Appointment was neceſſary on the preſent Occaſion. If the Select Committee deemed their commanding Officer unequal to the Conduct of an Expedition of Threeſcore Miles, they ought not to have employed him. To place a Civil Authority over the immediate Execution of Military Operations might create many Miſchiefs, and could correct none.

Mr. Hornby himſelf ſeems to have entertained the ſame Opinion of the Meaſure that I do. The Commiſſion given to the Committee requires the Obedience of all the Company's Servants, Civil and Military; yet Mr. Hornby, in his Letter of the 23d of December to Mr. Carnac, ſays, that " in his Opinion there can be no Neceſſity for publiſhing it, and that the Promulgation of
" ſuch a Commiſſion might bear the Appearance of ſetting up an Authority in the very Camp
" to ſuperſede that of the commanding Officer, and give Ideas among the Troops, as well as to
" Colonel Egerton, very different from thoſe of the Select Committee. He confeſſes that the
" Words *to concert and conduct all Military Operations*, are too comprehenſive; that they *eſcaped* him at
" the Time the Commiſſion paſſed, and he thinks muſt have eſcaped Mr. Carnac alſo."

Conſidering that the Body of the Commiſſion itſelf does not exceed a few Lines, it ſeems extraordinary that the eſſential Part of it ſhould paſs unobſerved by thoſe who drew it up. But, whether it eſcaped thoſe Gentlemen or not, Colonel Egerton has ſufficiently cleared himſelf from any Concern in the Meaſure; before he left Bombay he proteſted againſt being accompanied by Field Deputies; the Commiſſion was framed after his Departure, and he proteſted againſt its being publiſhed in the Army as ſoon as he ſaw it.

2d. The immoderate Quantity of Baggage and Train of Cattle which attended the Army, and which is ſaid to have amounted to Nineteen thouſand, ſeems to have been unneceſſary for ſo ſhort a March, and wholly inconſiſtent with the Plan of an Expedition which could only have ſucceeded by Rapidity and Surprize.

3d. The allowing Ragoba to move with a ſeparate Camp, inſtead of keeping him conſtantly under the Eyes of the Commander in Chief, ſeems to me a capital Miſtake. In conſequence of it, the Motions of our Army were made to depend on thoſe of Ragoba, who kept aloof when he thought fit, and was left at Liberty to negociate with the Enemy for himſelf, and in caſe of a Misfortune, to betray us to them.

For theſe Defects in the executive Part of the Plan, I deem the Preſident and Select Committee entirely anſwerable.

In reviewing the Conduct of the Expedition,

1ſt. It appears to me, that on the Face of the Accounts tranſmitted to us, the only queſtionable Part of Colonel Egerton's Conduct, while he continued in the Command, is the ſlow March of the Army from Panwell to the other Side of the Gauts, by which much Time ſeems to have been loſt; yet this makes no Part of the Preſident's Charge againſt Colonel Egerton; and if it had, the Trial of it ſhould have been immediately by a Court Martial at Bombay; nothing but an Examination of Evidence on the Spot could determine whether the Delay was unavoidable or not. It is ſtrictly a Queſtion of military Service, and ſubject to military Juriſdiction.

2d. Colonel Egerton reſigned the Command on the 6th of January. From that Time he was no longer anſwerable, as commanding Officer, for any thing done in the Committee; the caſting Voice reſted all Power in Mr. Carnac. On the 1ſt of January Mr. Carnac ſpeaks of him " as to-
" tally overpowered by Fatigue, and utterly unable to move about." On the 5th of January Mr. Hornby, in a Letter to Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, ſays, " from the Accounts I receive of
" Colonel Egerton's Health, I find I muſt look even at preſent to *you*, to your Zeal for the Succeſs of
" your Enterprize, and to your Activity, neceſſary to inſure that Succeſs for the Accompliſhment
" of all our Hopes in our preſent Undertaking."

3d. On the 11th January, Mr. Carnac ordered the Army to fall back, when Colonel Cockburn declared he had no Doubt of carrying the Army to Poona. At that Time Mr. Carnac's Power was not queſtioned.

4th. On the 14th January Colonel Cockburn's Opinion was required by Mr. Carnac, who diſſented from it, yet gave no poſitive Order for the Retreat. With reſpect to Mr. Carnac's Powers,

it is to be obſerved, that when they were firſt queſtioned by Colonel Egerton, on Occaſion of Mr. Moſtyn's Illneſs, a Deciſion in Support of them was given by the Select Committee at Bombay. Mr. Hornby, in his Letter to Mr. Carnac of the 27th of December, ſays, "the Deciſion already "ſent concerning your caſting Vote, can leave no further Doubt on that Subject. I think it much "more for the Advantage of the Service to rely ſingly on you."

Mr. Carnac himſelf tells Tookajee, that he had the Company's Seal and full Powers. He gave full Powers to Mr. Holmes to ſettle Terms with Madajee Scindia; and he executed the Convention as an Act of the Committee; in which, whether Colonel Egerton concurred or not, Mr. Carnac's Voice alone was deciſive.

With all theſe Circumſtances in View, it remains to be determined, whether Mr. Carnac is warranted in affirming, that his Authority did not extend "to the giving an Order to the Army to "march at all Events." Be that as it may, it is certain he gave no Orders for the Retreat after the Engagement.

5th. There could be no Diſobedience of an Order which never was given. But if Mr. Carnac had even deemed his Authority competent to the Caſe, he could not have directed the Order to Colonel Egerton, who had reſigned the Command Eight Days before, and whoſe continued Sickneſs made it impoſſible for him to reſume it.

6th. It appears that Colonel Cockburn and Colonel Dagon were called upon for their Opinion reſpecting the Practicability of a Retreat; and that they agreed in their Opinion: Yet, that of Colonel Cockburn's is publiſhed alone, and Colonel Dagon's ſuppreſſed at Bombay, and withheld from the Governor General and Council. The Myſtery of this Proceeding can only be cleared up by a public Trial on the Spot, when Colonel Dagon's Evidence may be called for.

7th. The Deputation of Meſſrs. Farmer and Holmes to the Marattas, and the Convention, are Acts of the Committee; the Neceſſity of which it is poſſible, and I think only poſſible, might be ſupported by the actual Poſition and Circumſtances of the Army, if we had the Means of examining *viva voce* Evidence to that Point. But it is impoſſible to reconcile thoſe Acts to the Opinion of thoſe who thought a Retreat practicable; and that it ought to be attempted.

8th. On the Return of the Army to Bombay, the Preſident exhibits a ſpecific Charge jointly againſt Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, "for having refuſed to take Charge of "conducting the Army back to Bombay." Theſe Terms expreſs a direct Diſobedience of Orders. Were ſuch Orders given, to whom were they given? and by whom were they diſobeyed? Theſe are Queſtions of Fact which can only be decided by a Court Martial. To decide them in any other Manner would, in my Opinion, be equally irregular and unjuſt.

The Charge once exhibited, ought to have been followed by an immediate Arreſt and Trial. Inſtead of purſuing that obvious and regular Courſe, the Preſident holds out a Menace to the Parties, that if they will not decline all military Duty, and ſubmit their Cauſe to the Determination of the Governor General and Council, he will move to ſuſpend them the Service; that is, unleſs Two Officers of the higheſt Rank in that Service, formally accuſed by himſelf of the higheſt military Offence, conſent to wave the Right to a public Trial, he will puniſh them without one. Many painful Reflections occur on this Proceeding: We ſee a Charge preferred, and a Trial refuſed; we ſee Puniſhment ready to follow Accuſation, without the intermediate Steps which Juſtice always takes on Enquiry and Proof: In ſhort, we ſee the regular Trial evaded, and the Cauſe referred to a Tribunal which has no Juriſdiction over it; and which, if it were otherwiſe competent, could not try for want of the Examination of *viva voce* Evidence.

From ſuch Appearances, what Concluſion can ariſe in the Minds of indifferent Men, but that Things have been done which would not bear the Public Eye, and that a Trial is refuſed in order to conceal them; that a Hope was entertained at Bombay of obtaining a Deciſion here, which might be guided by other Principles than thoſe of Juſtice; and that the ſole Object of the Reference to this Government, was to ſave one Party by a Sacrifice of the other?

Whether Meſſrs. Egerton and Cockburn are guilty, or not, or in what Degree they are guilty, remains to be enquired; if under any Influence of Menace and Authority, they really and *bona fide* evaded their Claim to a Court Martial, they were very ill adviſed. Some Allowances, however, ſhould be made for the Situation of Men ſo placed under the Weight of Power, and ſo treated as they were. At all Events they diſavowed or retracted their Aſſent to the Reference long before it was made, and Time enough to revert to and claim their original Right, a public Trial: No Conditions, tending to deprive them of it, ſhould ever have been propoſed, much leſs ſhould ſuch Conditions have been extorted from them by Menaces.

(Signed) P. Francis.

Mr. Francis—I now beg Leave to ſubmit ſome Propoſitions purely to the Conſideration of the Board, which I came prepared with, and which are conformable to the Sentiments expreſſed in the latter Part of my Minute. I mean, if the Board ſhould approve of them, they ſhould make Part of our Letter to Bombay.

1ſt. That we highly diſapprove of the Reference made to us, to decide on the Conduct of Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, over whom we have no Juriſdiction and that if we were

were otherwiſe competent to try the Charge, the want of *viva voce* Evidence to be examined upon Oath, concerning many Facts neceſſary to eſtabliſh the Truth of it, would be an immediate Bar to our Proceeding.

2d. That the former Charge exhibited by the Preſidency againſt Meſſrs Egerton and Cockburn, "for having refuſed to take Charge of conducting the Army back to Bombay," ought to have been followed by an immediate Arreſt and Trial. It is a Queſtion of Fact, which could only be determined on the Spot.

3d. That to prefer a Charge, and to refuſe a Trial, is in our Judgment a Proceeding wholly inconſiſtent with Juſtice, and liable to many dangerous Conſequences. A Precedent of this Nature, if once permitted to paſs without Condemnation, tends in the firſt Inſtance to leave the Character and Safety of Individuals at the Mercy of Men in Power, and ultimately to weaken the Hands of Government itſelf, by deſtroying that Confidence which Individuals have been taught to repoſe in the Juſtice and good Faith of Government, and which alone can engage them to act with Spirit and Vigour in the public Service.

4th. That the Menace held out by the Preſident to the Officers, againſt whom he himſelf had delivered a formal Charge of Diſobedience of Orders, viz. "That if they would not decline all "military Duty, and ſubmit their Cauſe to our Determination, he would move to ſuſpend them "the Service," is in our Opinion a high and arbitrary Proceeding, and calls for the moſt public and ſolemn Condemnation from this Board; that the Claim of Meſſrs. Egerton and Cockburn to be tried by a Court Martial, was a Claim of Right, and accrued to them the Moment a ſpecific Charge was exhibited againſt them; that any Attempts to induce Men under a public Charge to wave their Right to a public Trial, is equally inconſiſtent with the Juſtice and Dignity of Government; but that the Intention of paſſing by all Trial whatſoever, and of proceeding inſtantly from Accuſation to Puniſhment, ſo plainly expreſſed in the Menace held out by the Preſident, is in our Opinion highly criminal, and that as ſuch, we ſhall think it our Duty to repreſent it to our Superiors.

5th. That, admitting that Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, whether ſurprized by the Menaces of the Preſident, or induced by any other Motive whatſoever, had at firſt ſubmitted to the Conditions impoſed on them, yet having diſavowed or retracted ſuch ſuppoſed Aſſent long before the Reference to this Board was actually made, the Advantage taken thereof was unjuſt in itſelf, and not to be reconciled to the fair and open Purpoſes of public Juſtice; that they were in full Time to revert to their original Right, and that their Claim to it ought not to have been denied.

6th. That we are much concerned that ſo much Time ſhould have been loſt by a uſeleſs and dilatory Reference to us, of a Queſtion which ought to have been tried upon the Spot, where all the Parties and Witneſſes were preſent, and while the Recollection of every Particular was freſh in their Minds; that however the Right of Meſſrs. Egerton and Cockburn to a Court Martial is not weakened by this Delay; and for this Reaſon, as well as becauſe we think that many Circumſtances relative to the late Tranſactions at Bombay, and neceſſary for the Company's Information, can only be brought to Light by a public Trial, we are of Opinion that a Court Martial ſhould be immediately ordered for the Trial of Meſſrs. Egerton and Cockburn, on the formal Charge preferred againſt them by the Preſident.

Warren Haſtings,
P. Francis.

APPENDIX, N° 197.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 31ſt May 1779.

THE Governor General begs Leave to call the Attention of the Board to the following Paper, which is a Tranſlation of one of the Incloſures of a Letter received, within theſe few Days, from Nana Furneeſe, and appears to have been delivered in the Form, and for the Purpoſe, of Credentials, on the Part of the Military Committee, or of Mr. Carnac, repreſenting it on the Occaſion of the Overture made for a Treaty of Peace when the Army lay at Wargaum. As no Mention is made of this Letter in their Diary, nor of any other of the Correſpondence which paſſed between them and the Miniſters at the Time in which the Negociation paſſed, nor of the Powers or Orders given either to Mr. Farmer or Mr. Holmes, the Board will probably deem it incumbent upon them to require Copies of ſuch Inſtruments, and for that Purpoſe to demand them from Mr. Horſley; or in the Caſe of his not having it in his Power to ſupply them, that they be required from the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, as eſſential to complete the Proceedings of the Military Committee.

APPENDIX, N° 197.

Copy of a Letter from John Carnac, Eſquire, Commander of the Engliſh Army, ſent to the Preſence, after which Peace was eſtabliſhed, bearing Date the 24th of Zehidja 1192 Hegira, and ſealed with the Company's Seal.

Having given me full and complete Powers from Bombay, they have ſent me here: I have therefore many Things to treat with you privately about; if you ſend me a Letter, I will diſpatch a Gentleman to your Preſence, who will repreſent every Matter to you, by which you will become acquainted therewith. What ſhall I write more, but to deſire that you will preſerve Friendſhip and Favour?

Agreed, To the Governor General's Propoſition, and ordered accordingly.

Mr. Barwell—The long Detail of Facts which has been tranſmitted by the Preſidency of Bombay, and which was ſo neceſſary for our Information, contains much Matter foreign to the proper Objects of our Diſcuſſion; for I regard not any Points referred to us as proper for Diſcuſſion, to which our Orders cannot reach; the Knowledge of them may indeed be eſſential for forming a juſt Judgment of the State of their Government, and in this Light, and in this alone, ſhall I conſider all that is ſubmitted to us, touching the Demerits of Individuals; theſe appertain excluſively to the Adminiſtration of the Governor and Council of Bombay, who certainly ought, whatever may be our Opinion, to act upon their own Powers: I ſhall therefore decline giving my Sentiments on any Matter that belongs properly to their interior Government, and confine myſelf ſimply to the important Subjects of Peace and War, which fall under our Cognizance.

1ſt. I think we ſhould wait for the Effect of Colonel Goddard's Negociations for Peace.

2d. Should theſe Negociations fail, the next Conſideration is, in what Manner to gain the greateſt poſſible Advantages to the Company from a State of War?

3d. We ſhould adopt Mr. Hornby's Plan of Military Operations, and on the Reluctancy of Moodajee Booſla, treat with Madajee Scindia, and direct Colonel Goddard to carry ſuch Plan into Execution?

4th. Whether we ſhall give Colonel Goddard a Brevet of Brigadier General, a Rank that will enable him to command the Forces, even in caſe the Suſpenſion of Colonels Egerton and Cockburn, ſhould be remitted?

5th. Whether having diſclaimed the Convention of Worgaun, we ſhall now gratuitouſly beſtow on Madajee Scindia, Broach, or an Equivalent for Broach, as expreſſive of our Senſe of his Friendſhip for the Services he rendered our Army in that Convention?

To the Second Quere, I am of Opinion, Colonel Goddard ſhould act under his preſent Inſtructions, and a Latitude be given him to decline further Negociation with Mhadoojee Bouncello.

To the Third Quere, I am of Opinion we ſhould adopt Mr. Hornby's Plan, and engage the Guicawar to take Part in a State of War; and that Colonel Goddard ſhould be directed to give ſuch Plan Effect.

To the Fourth Quere, I am of Opinion Colonel Goddard ſhould be honoured with the Brevet of Brigadier General, as propoſed by the Commander in Chief.

To the Fifth Quere, I am of Opinion, we ought to expreſs our Senſe of Madajee Scindia's Services, and gain him, if poſſible, to our Party.

Warren Haſtings.
P. Francis.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 7th June 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell, Philip Francis, Edward Wheler, } Eſquires.
Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote, K. B.

To Wm Bruere, Eſquire, Aſſiſtant Secretary, &c.

Sir,

On the Diary of the Poona Committee under the 13th January, you will find that a Committee was then held to deliberate relative to Overtures to be made for the peaceable Return of the Army; and Two Letters are noted as having been ſent, and one received, on the ſame Day (as I conclude) on this Subject, but no Copies are entered; if any were preſerved, Mr. Farmer carried them away with him. On the 14th January Mr. Farmer was ſent to the Maratta Durbar, and the Meſſage with which he was charged appears on the Diary under that Date. An Account of his Negociation is contained in the Letters that paſſed between him and the Committee; and I know of no Letters,

or

or Writing of any Sort, that have paſſed between the Committee and the Maratta Durbar, from the Time Mr. Farmer was ſent until the Concluſion of the Convention. Mr. Holmes was deputed on the 15th to Madajee Scindia. The Reſolution to ſend him, and the Powers given him, are comprized in a Minute of that Day. I have always underſtood, that Mr. Farmer and Mr. Holmes acted under theſe Minutes as their Inſtructions and Authority; nor have I Copies of either in any other Form.

With regard to the Paper you have communicated to me, as Copy of a Letter from J. Carnac, Eſquire, &c. I can only ſay, that as I am entirely unacquainted with the Degree of Importance or Authenticity allowed it by the Board, it is impoſſible for me to judge of the Neceſſity or Propriety of troubling them with any Remarks on it.

I am extremely unwilling to intrude unneceſſarily on the Board, yet I hope they will pardon me, if, on a Subject ſo important as their preſent Proceedings are, to the Preſidency of Bombay, I take the Liberty to repreſent through you, that, when the Select Committee requeſted, that *I might be allowed to repreſent to the Honourable the Governor General and Council, ſuch Particulars as may appear to me material to be attended to in their Deliberations*, they did not expect I ſhould be refuſed all Information till the Reſolutions of the Board were taken, and all Deliberation at an End. I believe too a different Procedure was obſerved on a former Occaſion. I do not ground any Claims on this, though I own it gave me Hopes, that with Talents far inferior to thoſe of the Gentleman who laſt waited on this Government from Bombay, I ſhould however have found my Advantages from the Candour of the Governor General and Council not leſs than his. I dare ſay the ſame is meant to be ſhewn me.

Calcutta,
the 7th June 1779.

I am, &c.
(Signed) G. Horſley.

Ordered, That the above Letter lie for Conſideration.

The Governor General delivers in the following Minute:

Governor General—As Objections have been made to our entruſting the Select Committee at Bombay with any diſcretional Powers, and as it is my earneſt Wiſh, that on a Subject of ſuch Importance as the preſent State of Affairs at that Preſidency, our Reſolutions may be unanimous, I hope to qualify and accommodate the different Opinions which may have been formed on this Point, by an Expedient to be ſubſtituted in the Place of the laſt Clauſe of the Draft which I have offered to the Conſideration of the Board.

It is only in the Caſe of War and Negociation that we have Authority to confer diſcretional Powers on the other Preſidencies. To deprive that of Bombay of all Share in the Conduct of Meaſures which we cannot execute without their Aſſiſtance, might check their Zeal, and thereby expoſe us to the Riſque of additional Miſcarriage and Diſgrace.

On the other Hand it is aſſerted, that the Uſe which they have already made of the Powers which they have been allowed to exerciſe, hath deſtroyed their Claim to a Continuation of them, and would render us inexcuſable if with ſuch a Warning we admitted it.

The following appears to me the only Expedient for avoiding both Extremes, and reconciling thoſe oppoſite Conſiderations; viz. "That all Negociations which have no Relation to the Objects "of Colonel Goddard's Inſtructions of the 16th November and 5th April, be conducted and executed "by the Select Committee, but that no Treaty concluded by virtue of this Authority ſhall be "final, until it has been ratified by this Government."

This Limitation, while it precludes the evil Conſequences incident to a full Latitude of Conduct, will ſtill preſerve to the Select Committee that Reſpect and Confidence from the Native Governments of India, which are indiſpenſable to the Exerciſe of the regular and conſtitutional Powers veſted in them by the Company.

I cannot preſcribe a better Line for the Direction of their Military Operations, than that which I have already recommended.

A negative Controul, limited to the Points in which they are already bound, either by our expreſs Orders, or by the Obligations of public Faith, is all that can be allowed to our Officer, while he acts only in Aid of their Meaſures; nor can they complain of it as a ſevere or unreaſonable Reſtriction, ſince it is in effect no more than a Security for their ſtricter Performance of what they ought to do without it.

Much depends upon our preſent Reſolutions; much more upon their general Tendency than on the Rectitude or Wiſdom of the ſpecific Points contained in them. In Effect, whatever Opinion we may entertain of the Integrity, Knowledge, or Ability of the Men who have the actual Charge of the Government of Bombay, it is on them that we muſt primarily depend for the Retrieval of the Loſſes which the Intereſts of the Company, and the National Honour, have ſuffered from the miſerable Iſſue of the late ill-fated Enterprize. While we debate, even while the Materials which are to ſerve as the Grounds of our Deliberations are on their Paſſage to us, the Scene may be entirely ſhifted, and preſent a new Face of Affairs to the View of thoſe to whom we preſcribe in dark Conjectures Orders which they may be unable to execute, and which if too ſtrict may prevent them from availing themſelves of the Advantages which Fortune may offer to them; or they may involve them in additional Difficulties inſtead of extricating them from the paſt.

Their preſent State is ſuch, that without a vigilant Attention to Circumſtances and Events as they ariſe, and a prompt Application of them to their own Occaſions, it will not be poſſible for them to raiſe themſelves above a Degree of languid and burthenſome Security. I will not add what, in my Opinion, they are capable of effecting by great Exertions, and a reaſonable Latitude allowed them to act in, becauſe it would be impoſſible to convey that Conviction to the Minds of others which I feel impreſſed on my own, without hazarding Conjectures on all the Variety of Combinations into which the State of Affairs preſented to us may be reſolved, and diſplaying an oſtentatious Scheme of Policy, which could yield no Advantage, and which it would therefore be imprudent to avow.

But whatever may be within their Power, aided with the Means which we have afforded them, or may yet ſupply, it is certain that we of ourſelves can do nothing; and if, either from an unſeaſonable Reſentment or Diſtruſt, we wholly diſable them from acting, or, which would in the Event prove the ſame, allow them only to act and to think under an humiliating Contract, no good Conſequences can reſult from ſuch a Policy; the worſt may attend it, and we alone ſhall ſtand accountable for them.

I will not examine whether the Select Committee of Bombay have or have not the Power of beſtowing the Chief Command of their Military Eſtabliſhment on Colonel Goddard in the Caſe of a Vacancy, or of the Continuance of the Suſpenſion of Colonel Egerton: They are the moſt competent Judges of the Powers of their own Conſtitution. I readily wave the Propoſal of allowing the Admiſſion of Colonel Goddard on their Eſtabliſhment in Favour of that made by the Commander in Chief, to grant him a Brevet Commiſſion of Brigadier General on our own, to which I give my hearty Aſſent, in the Perſuaſion that it would be attended with the ſame good Effect.

With the Propoſal which is the Object of this Minute, I ſubmit the following Alterations in the Draft which I have recommended of the Letter to the Select Committee of Bombay; viz. 6th Paragraph, the concluding Sentence, "nor to reſume it, but on Advances made to him by the "Government of Berar; nor then unleſs it ſhall be ſtrictly compatible with the State of our other "Connections then ſubſiſting, and with your Participation in the Manner which we ſhall preſcribe "hereafter," to be omitted.

14th Paragraph. After the Word "ſuſpended," let the following be added: "The future Re-"newal of this Negociation we reſerve to be determined by our expreſs Orders, but without re-"voking the Credentials and Inſtructions already granted to Colonel Goddard reſpecting it. In all "other Negociations, Treaties, &c."

15th Paragraph. The Concluſion of this Paragraph beginning with the Words, "and we muſt "require," to be omitted, and the following ſubſtituted in its ſtead:

"And for the ſame Reaſon we require, that all Treaties which ſhall be concluded by you in vir-"tue of theſe Inſtructions, be referred to this Government for its final Sanction and formal Ratifi-"cation of them; and that a Clauſe be inſerted in every Treaty ſo concluded to that Effect."

16th Paragraph to be wholly omitted.

Mr. Francis delivers in the following Minute, and begs Leave to obſerve, that it refers to the Proceedings of the 24th ultimo, and not to the Governor General's Minute above recorded.

Mr. Francis—It is not poſſible that any Member of this Board can be more weary of Controverſy than I am, or more deſirous to avoid it. When the Board agreed to revert to the Treaty of Poona, we in effect endeavoured to reinſtate ourſelves in a Poſition from which we never ſhould have departed. Without looking back to the Steps by which that Ground was loſt, I willingly joined in the Attempt to recover it. I have no Doubt that Peace may be obtained on the Terms of Colonel Goddard's preſent Inſtructions, provided he enters heartily into our Views; provided this Government itſelf be in earneſt in the Purſuit of its profeſſed Object; and provided we do not ſuffer ourſelves to be entangled in the deſperate Schemes of the Perſons who now conſtitute the Government of Bombay, or thwarted by their Oppoſition. I deem the Re-eſtabliſhment of Peace on the Malabar Coaſt to be eſſential, not merely to the Proſperity of the India Company, but to their Exiſtence; the Sum total of the Britiſh Intereſt in India is involved in this Queſtion. Let a War upon the Coaſt be conducted how it may, the Difference between Conqueſt and Defeat, in my Judgment, is little more than the Delay or Acceleration of the Ruin of all our Reſources; nor is it clear to my Apprehenſion, which of theſe Two Events will ſooneſt produce the Effect I expect equally from both.

Taking the Truth of their own Repreſentations for granted, it is not eaſy to deſcribe a Situation more completely deſtitute of all the Means of ſupporting a War, than that of the Preſidency of Bombay. The annexed Account ſhews, that during the laſt Five Years they have received little leſs than a Hundred and Sixteen Lacks of Current Rupees, directly out of the Revenues of Bengal, yet their bonded Debt accumulates daily, and now amounts to Thirty-eight Lacks.

By the Month of October Mr. Hornby ſays their Finances will be utterly exhauſted. In the Interval they will want a Supply of Thirty Lacks. Of this Sum the Preſident propoſes to borrow Twenty, but doubts the Poſſibility of raiſing ſo large a Sum; and if it could be borrowed, he ſays they have no Funds to pay even Intereſt.

Colonel Goddard, in his laſt Letter of the 25th of April, tells us, "that it is impoſſible in that "Country, and he fears in its Neighbourhood, to find Men fit to recruit the Vacancies which have "happened in his Battalions ſince leaving the Jumna." But Mr. Hornby himſelf tells us, and we have every Reaſon to believe it is true, that the Bengal Sepoys will not ſtay at ſo great a Diſtance from their native Country. He ſays, that "if they were to have no Cauſe of Diſſatisfaction on ac-

"count

" count of their Pay, there is Reaſon to fear their Numbers will every Day diminiſh by their going " off to their own Country." Even before the late Rupture with the Marattas, and long before the Diſaſter which attended it, the Preſidency of Bombay told us, in their Letter of the 7th December 1777, that " ſince their late Acquiſitions it was become very neceſſary, and they had accord- " ingly recommended it to the Company, to augment the European Corps; that notwithſtanding " they gave every Encouragement, it was very difficult to raiſe good Sepoys on that Coaſt, and " that it would require ſo much Time to raiſe and diſcipline a further Number of Sepoys, ſo as in the " leaſt Degree to be conſidered as effective Troops, that it would be much better in every Reſpect to " ſend them a Reinforcement of diſciplined Sepoys, if Europeans could not be ſpared."

We ſhould do well to conſider how long we can maintain a War on ſuch a Footing before we engage in it. I will not ſuppoſe the Caſe of new Miſcarriages. Let it be admitted, that Succeſs and Conqueſt are as certain as the moſt ſanguine Expectation can imagine: It does not follow, that the Objects propoſed to be obtained by them are ſuch as we ought to aim at in our preſent Circumſtances, or that Victory will pay its own Expences. By extending our territorial Poſſeſſions, we create irreconcileable Enmity in the Minds of thoſe Powers whom we immediately rob of their Property. We fill every other Indian State with Jealouſy and Alarm; and the Territory we acquire comes waſted and depopulated into our Hands. To defend a new Line of Frontier, new military Eſtabliſhments muſt be formed; and thoſe Eſtabliſhments muſt not only be paid for out of the Revenues of Bengal, but the very Men who compoſe them, raiſed and recruited here to ſupply a Service, which we know they will take the firſt Opportunity of deſerting.

Such, in my Conception, is the Situation in which a ſucceſsful War againſt the Marattas alone will place us. But if our Succeſs, or the apparent Proſpect of it, ſhould compel them to call in the French to their Aſſiſtance; if, rather than relinquiſh their Country to us, they ſhould reſolve to make it the Seat of War, let us conſider in what Manner the Conteſt is then to be maintained, and to what Iſſue it may lead us. Nothing leſs than the extreme and inſtant Neceſſity of Self-preſervation can ever reduce the Marattas to ſo deſperate a Reſolution, as that of inviting a European Army into their Country; if once they are introduced, it may be a difficult Taſk to remove them: The Events of War in that Caſe may not be ſo clearly at our Command as they are thought to be at preſent; and let it be remembered, that on thoſe Events, if they are forwarded by our Acts, we ſhall wantonly ſtake the Fate of our Empire.

The Queſtion does not end here. In the preſent State of Things, much more than the immediate Intereſts of India may depend on the Care and Œconomy with which we conduct the Company's Affairs. A regular Return of Wealth from the Revenues of theſe Provinces is undoubtedly expected at Home. The Nation now perhaps looks to Bengal, as to its laſt and greateſt external Reſource: But, if this Demand upon us from Home were not ſo preſſing, and ſo likely to increaſe, as I think it is, it is Time for us to conſider, whether there be in Great Britain a fundamental Force equal to the Tenure of unbounded Acquiſitions at this Diſtance from the Seat of Empire; or whether we are not arrived at a Point, at which common Prudence dictates to us to fix, once for all, the Limits of our Dominion: If my Judgment were to prevail, it ſhould be our Object to contract them.

Theſe general Conſiderations belong properly to the Opinion which I mean to give on the principal Queſtions before us, and will be found applicable to the Subject.

To avoid a uſeleſs Debate at the Board, I think the firſt Queſtion ſhould be put generally, and decided by a Majority of Votes, viz. " Whether we ſhall or ſhall not enter into a Diſcuſſion and Cenſure " of the late Tranſactions at Bombay?" If it be determined in the Affirmative, the Commander in Chief's Minute and mine, will furniſh what I deem ſufficient Materials for that Part of our Letter. To theſe, however, the other Members of the Board may propoſe ſuch Additions or Alterations as they think proper.

The Second Queſtion, I ſhould think, to be decided in the ſame Manner is, " Whether we ſhould " declare our Opinion to the Preſidency of Bombay, that Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant Colonel " Cockburn ſhould be tried by a Court Martial, for the Reaſons aſſigned in the Paragraphs which " I ſubmitted to the Board on Monday laſt?"

The remaining Queſtions brought before us by the Governor General's Minute, require more Care and Deliberation than need be given to the Condemnation of any thing that is paſt.

I think we ought, in the firſt Place, to decide generally, Whether we ſhall or ſhall not ſend any new Inſtructions to Colonel Goddard, before we hear the Reſult of thoſe we have already ſent: My Opinion is, that we ſhould wait for Advices from him, in Reply to our Letters of the 5th of April.

With reſpect to the propoſed Inſtructions, I am againſt our engaging in, or giving our Sanction to the Plan of Military Operations propoſed by Mr. Hornby.

Firſt, for the Reaſon aſſigned by the Commander in Chief, in which I entirely concur, and which I beg Leave to recite in his own Words, viz. " As to the various Plans propoſed of ſeeking War " for Plunder, the Honour of the Nation and the Company, inſeparable from my own, will never " permit me to ſubſcribe to them." Secondly, becauſe if I thought that a War on this or any other Plan, might at a future Day be unavoidable, ſtill I would not, at the preſent Point of Time, hold out to the Preſidency of Bombay, the moſt diſtant Idea of Encouragement and eventual Support in the Proſecution of ſuch Meaſures, being thoroughly convinced from my Knowledge and Experience of the Temper that predominates there, that it would furniſh them with Means, of which

I fear they might avail themſelves, to embarraſs Colonel Goddard's Negociations with the Poona Durbar, and to prevent a Peace. By plunging the Company into a War, it is poſſible that a Hope may be entertained of recovering perſonal Credit; that inſtant Difficulties may withdraw the Company's Attention from Things already done; and that, in the Courſe of Events, new Queſtions may ariſe in which the Conſideration of former Miſcarriages, and former Miſconduct, may be loſt. But theſe are Motives of Action which have no Relation to the Public Service; and which neither can nor ought to have any Influence over our Deliberations.

Thirdly, Becauſe the Motive aſſigned for not cenſuring the late Tranſactions with the Severity they deſerve, viz. "That it would be improper to add to the Depreſſion of Men by whoſe Agency "we muſt defend and ſupport the Rights of the Company and the Honour of the Britiſh Nation," amounts to a Declaration or Admiſſion, that the ſame Agency which has already produced ſo much Diſhonour and Diſtreſs, muſt ſtill be truſted and employed in the Direction and Conduct of the propoſed Operations; but to this I can never aſſent. I ſee Wiſdom, nor Firmneſs, nor Union in their Councils, and I have no Reaſon to believe that their Diſpoſition is pacific.

Fourthly, Becauſe I ſee no Ground for Apprehenſion that the Marattas will renew Hoſtilities with us, even for the Recovery of the Territory ceded to them by the Convention, provided we are content to ſtand upon the defenſive. They have no general Principle of Union among themſelves but that of Self-defence. Neither Party however can now act againſt the other with Effect before October; in that Interval a Peace may be obtained, if we on our Part are heartily inclined to it: At all Events we loſe nothing by waiting for the Reſult of Colonel Goddard's Negociations. If, in Addition to his preſent Inſtructions, it be thought adviſable to impower him to gain the Friendſhip of Madajee Scindia, by an equitable Compromiſe in lieu of the private Engagements already ſettled with him, I ſhall readily agree to it, becauſe I think that, with prudent Management, it may be the Means of forwarding a general Peace, without which I would not make any Conceſſion.

I have heretofore ſtated my Reaſons at large for objecting to the Alliance propoſed to be accompliſhed with Moodajee Booſla by the Deputation of Mr. Elliot, and Colonel Goddard's ſubſequent Appointment to the ſame Commiſſion: The Plan having failed I ſhould be ſorry to ſee it reſumed. I dread the Idea of invading our Government, which is now too great to act on any but ſimple Principles, in a Labyrinth of Aſiatic Politics. Let us be contented with what we have; let us keep the Peace; let us leave our Neighbours to ſettle their Differences among themſelves without our Interpoſition; and I am thoroughly ſatisfied that no Indian Power will ever moleſt us.

To theſe general Reaſons I cannot add a ſtronger Argument than that which the Commander in Chief's Minute has furniſhed me. He obſerves that "Moodajee Booſla is propoſed, becauſe his Ele-"vation will reſtore the old Maratta Government, and thereby ſtrengthen, aggrandize, and unite "the Maratta Empire, which very Reaſon ſeeming ſo ſtrong with the Council of Bombay, if no "better can be given, will prevent his ever concurring in it." Even the Governor General's Opinion comes ſtrongly in Support of Sir Eyre Coote's Sentiments and mine on this Subject. He thinks that "Moodajee Booſla will wait for Proofs of our Superiority before he will hazard the "Conſequences of a decided Connection with us." When that Superiority is obtained, we ſhall ſtand in no need of the Connection; and if our Scheme of Military Operations be not practicable by our own Force, I agree entirely with the Governor in thinking, that we ſhall gain nothing by incumbering ourſelves with the Weight of a timid Ally.

Before we determine whether we ſhall ſend any farther Supply of Money to Bombay at this Time, and to what Amount, I deſire that the Accountant General may lay before us an Account of the Sums already remitted to that Preſidency for their excluſive Service ſince April 1778, diſtinguiſhing the annual from the extra Supply. Alſo a State of the Sums remitted to Colonel Goddard, or drawn for by him ſince he ſucceeded to the Command of the Detachment. From theſe Accounts we may be able to judge how far we are bound to comply with any new Demands from Bombay; how long Colonel Goddard's preſent Funds will laſt, and at what Time it may be neceſſary to make him farther Remittances for the Pay of his Army. At preſent I will not conſent to ſend a Rupee to Bombay for the Purpoſe of carrying on War, and making Conqueſts, nor will I conſent to it at any Time, but under the Condition inſiſted on by the Commander in Chief, that Means are taken to prevent the Money falling into Hands which Experience has proved will make ſo ill Uſe of it. A conſiderable Part of the Money which we ſent them laſt Year to defray their neceſſary Expences has been given to Ragoba and Scindia, nearly to the Amount of £. 50,000. The Truth is, they have dreamt too long of inexhauſtible Wealth from Bengal, under the Influence of this Dream they have embarked in Schemes of the moſt dangerous Nature, and waſted the Company's Property with unexampled Profuſion: It is high Time that they ſhould be awakened from it.

Ragoba.
De Officers.
Ragoba.
Scindia's Officers.

(Signed) P. F.

APPENDIX, N° 197.

An Abſtract Account of the Yearly Balance of Supplies made to the Preſidency of Bombay, from the 30th April 1774, to the 1ſt May 1779; after deducting ſuch Sums as have been during that Period brought to the Credit of the ſaid Preſidency on Account of Cotton, &c. and including the Amount of Salt Petre, &c. from the Commercial Department up to the 1ſt May 1778, viz.

From 30th April 1774, to the 1ſt May 1775	—	C. R^{s}	19,13,341	14	6
30th April 1775, to the 1ſt May 1776	—	—	37,74,615	5	6
30th April 1776, to the 1ſt May 1777	—	—	19,50,726	3	7
30th April 1777, to the 1ſt May 1778	—	—	19,36,764	3	6
30th April 1778, to the 1ſt May 1779	—	—	20,01,233	0	0
Current Rupees			1,15,76,680	11	1

Errors excepted.

31ſt May 1779. (Signed) James Miller,
Acct^{s} Account^{t} Genl.

Governor General—I am equally deſirous with Mr. Francis to avoid Controverſy. This Sentiment I not only profeſs, but I will evince it by refuſing to bear a Part in it. This muſt ſerve for my Excuſe, if any Excuſe is neceſſary, for declining a Reply to Mr. Francis's Minute; at the ſame Time that I muſt declare my Diſagreement not only with its general Tenor but with many Parts of it, which appear to me not ſo neceſſarily to ariſe out of the Subjects immediately before the Board as to be the Continuation of former Debates.

The Sentiments which have been expreſſed, by the ſeveral Members of this Board, have led us into a wide Field of Debate, from which it is officially incumbent upon me to endeavour to withdraw our Attention to ſuch preciſe Points as may bring this Buſineſs to a Concluſion.

In my Firſt Minute, I communicated all the Points of Conſideration which were brought before us by the Diſpatches lately received from Bombay; leaving it to the Choice of the Board which of theſe we ſhould reject, and which we ſhould ſelect for the Subjects of our Inſtructions to the Preſidency of Bombay and Colonel Goddard; and I concluded with the Propoſal of a Draft of a Letter to be written to the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, to which I have ſince made ſome very material Alterations.

I now beg Leave to call the Attention of the Board to the Motion which is thus regularly brought before them, and to requeſt that they will be pleaſed to decide upon it. The Letter involves many diſtinct Queſtions, which may be determined by an Approbation, a Diſapprobation, or an Amendment of each Paragraph, taken as a ſeparate Queſtion. Perhaps it may be deemed more expedient to the Diſpatch of Buſineſs to propoſe diſtinct Queſtions, and from the Senſe of the Board collected upon theſe, to form the Letter to Bombay, and ſuch other Inſtructions as may depend upon them. I ſubmit to this Mode, if the other Members of the Board ſhall prefer it.

Reſolved, That the amended Draft of the Letter, propoſed by the Governor General to be written to the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, be entered in this Place; that a Copy thereof be delivered to each Member of the Board; and that their Opinions be collected upon every Paragraph in the Manner recommended in the preceding Minute.

To the Preſident and Select Committee at Bombay.

Gentlemen,

1. We have received your Letter of the 4th of April, with its Encloſures, by the Hands of Mr. Horſely.

2. We do not think it neceſſary to enter on the Review of your Proceedings, but ſhall confine our preſent Enquiries to the Choice of ſuch Means as may beſt conduce to retrieve their unhappy Conſequences, leaving the paſt to the Scrutiny of a higher and more effectual Authority.

3. We muſt deſire to decline the Reference which you have made to us, of the Charge preferred by your Preſident againſt Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, as a Point on which we have no Juriſdiction, and which is cognizable only by your Authority, either with the Powers immediately veſted in your Body by the Court of Directors, or through the regular Trial of a Court Martial.

4. Having already given full Powers to Colonel Goddard to negociate and conclude a Treaty of Peace with the Maratta Government, and having no Cauſe to alter the Terms which we have preſcribed in our Inſtructions for that Purpoſe, we have only to repeat, that we look to the Iſſue of that Commiſſion as our primary Object, and the Termination of all our political Views on your Side of India, if it ſhall prove ſucceſsful.

5. But if the Miniſters ſhall reject the Propoſals which we have ordered to be made to them, and ſhall reduce us to the Neceſſity of defending the Rights and Intereſts of the Company by an open War,

War, we cannot preſcribe a better Plan of Operations than that which is laid down by your Preſident in his Minute of the 30th of March, which in ſuch Caſe we authorize you to carry literally into Execution, and even to qualify it by ſuch Variations as ſhall not ſubvert the general Deſign of it, which we underſtand to be the Reduction of ſuch Countries as lie along the Sea Coaſt, forming a Line of Territory with our preſent Poſſeſſions on the Continent, and defenſible againſt the Incurſions of Cavalry. And we further authorize and impower you, with the Reſervation hereafter mentioned, to enter into any Treaty, or other Engagements, with the Chief of the Guicawar Family, or others, for the above Purpoſes, and on the Grounds deſcribed in the aforeſaid Plan, obſerving the following Cautions, to which we require your ſtricteſt Attention: That your Engagements ſhall be offenſive only for the Objects of your immediate Operations, and in all other Reſpects purely defenſive: That your Engagements with the Guicawar Family ſhall be only with the Head of it, and with him excluſively: That you ſhall not aſſume a Mediation between the Brothers, or take any Part whatever in their domeſtic Diſputes, farther than to ſupport the Party in Alliance with the Company, and his Poſſeſſions againſt foreign Invaſion; and that you do not commit the Dignity of the Company, or pledge the national Faith, in formal Treaties with Perſons of a Rank or Power unſuitable to ſuch a Diſtinction.

6. We are ſenſible of the Attention which you have ſhewn to our Views with the Government of Berar, in joining the Overtures lately made to Moodajee Booſla by Colonel Goddard, and in your Reſolution to avoid whatever may again interfere with this Negociation. We confeſs we at this Time entertain little Hope of his concurring with our Deſigns; he will wait for Proofs of our Superiority before he will hazard the Conſequences of a decided Connection with us; and every Offer made to him, while he is under the Influence of ſuch a Policy, will but ſerve to increaſe his Reſerve, as he will naturally conſtrue it to proceed from the Conſciouſneſs of our Inability to ſupport ourſelves without a foreign Aſſiſtance; and this is an additional Motive for our preferring a Scheme of military Operations, practicable by our own Force, and unincumbered with the Weight of a timid Ally: If notwithſtanding, Moodajee Booſla ſhall have anſwered the Letters which have been written to him, by a Declaration of a Willingneſs to accept of the proffered Alliance, we ſhall leave it to be concluded under the Inſtructions already given in Charge to Colonel Goddard; if on the contrary, as we expect, he ſhall directly refuſe, or heſitate, or make new References to us, we have in ſuch Caſe directed Colonel Goddard to break off the Negociation.

7. Although we think ourſelves ſtrictly juſtifiable in refuſing to ratify even the ſmalleſt Tittle of the Treaty or Convention of Worgaum, yet from a fair Review of your Proceedings, we are compelled to regard the ſeparate Agreement made with Mahdajee Scindia in a very different Light: It was not a Conceſſion extorted by the Maratta Government againſt its Conviction of legal Sufficiency in thoſe who yielded it, but it was the Price at which they purchaſed the Safety of the Army; and was ſo abſolutely their own ſpontaneous Act, that it appears that the Miniſters of Mahdajee Scindia were even corrupted to influence his Acceptance of it. It is true, that they had no Authority to make ſuch a Compromiſe, and we may therefore refuſe to ratify it, in ſtrict Conformity to the Letter of our own Law; but we doubt whether this will avail us in the Opinion of the World, or we can reconcile it to the Obligations of Juſtice and Honour, which were thus pledged for the Retribution of the moſt ſignal (though humiliating) Act of Kindneſs that a Nation could have received from the Bounty of an Individual. We muſt therefore declare, that unleſs Mahdajee Scindia ſhall have forfeited his Right by any ſubſequent Act, he is entitled to the Performance of this Engagement, and we ought to ratify it.

8. We hope he may be prevailed upon to depart from the Letter of this Stipulation, and to accept of what he may deem an Equivalent for it; and we authorize you to treat with him for ſuch a Compromiſe, declaring, on our Behalf, that we diſavow the Authority of Mr. Carnac and Colonel Egerton to execute the Engagement with him, which was executed by them; but that in Conſideration of the ſignal Service afforded us by his Mediation and Influence, at the Time in which it was made, and made (as we underſtood) the pledged Condition of that Service; we deem it in this Conſtruction equal to a formal Obligation, and therefore impowered you to treat with him for the Accompliſhment of it, in ſuch a Manner as ſhall prove ſatisfactory to him, and more conſiſtent with our national Credit than the literal Performance of it; but if he ſhall inſiſt on the literal Performance of it, and he ſhall not have forfeited his Right to it by the Renewal of Hoſtilities againſt us, or by any Breach of Engagement, if any ſuch exiſts between us, we ſee no Alternative; it muſt be fulfilled.

9. Although the Conduct of Mahdajee Scindia may not ſeem to confirm your Opinion of his Diſpoſition towards us, or rather of the political Neceſſity which ſeems to incline him to enſure our future Alliance, yet we think the Arguments which you have aſſigned for this Belief, ſo well grounded, and it agrees ſo well with the Knowledge which we ourſelves poſſeſs of his State Views and Talents, that we entirely adopt it; nor do we find it difficult to reconcile the Demands made on us, under his Influence, by the Miniſters, and immediately by him, for the Performance of the Conditions of the Convention of Worgaum, with that Diſpoſition, or with the obvious Syſtem of Policy which his preſent Intereſt demands.

10. We ſuppoſe it probable, that he will avoid any direct Engagement with us till the Urgency of his Affairs ſhall require it, or until he can gain the Advantage of the Negociation, by waiting for the firſt Advances to be made on your Part. If from the Opportunities which you have of a nearer and more intimate Knowledge of his perſonal Character and Neceſſities, you ſhall judge this Concluſion

clusion to be well grounded, it will be adviſable to treat him with the ſame temporizing and indeterminate Conduct, and purſuing the Plan of Military Operations which we have recommended; to wait for the Offer of his Alliance rather than ſolicit it. Propoſing this as a general Caution, we authorize you to enter into ſuch Engagements with him as ſhall not be contrary to any before concluded, and which you ſhall judge moſt adviſable; making your future Security, Peace, and an adequate Revenue, your chief and indiſpenſable Objects, and the Grounds of your Engagement with him.

11. To ſum up what we have written; Our firſt Deſire is to obtain Peace, on the Terms propoſed by our Inſtructions to Colonel Goddard, of the 5th of April, and it is only in the Event of the Failure of this Deſign, that we have formed the ſubſequent Inſtructions, or will allow of their Operation.

12. In theſe, the Plan of Military Operations recommended by your Preſident, is to have the Firſt Place, with its dependant Engagements with the Guicawars; the next in Order is the Negociation with Moodajee Booſla, and the laſt, the propoſed Engagement with Mahdajee Scindia.

13. The Execution of the projected Treaty of Peace with the Poona Miniſtry we leave to the ſole Charge of Colonel Goddard, according to the Inſtructions which we have already given him.

14. The Negociation and Treaty of Alliance with Moodajee Booſla we alſo leave to the ſole Management of Colonel Goddard, on the Authority of his Inſtructions of the 16th of November, until the Period of their Suſpenſion, by the Refuſal, or ſuch Heſitation of Moodajee Booſla as he ſhall deem ſufficient to warrant his declaring the Negociation ſuſpended. The future Renewal of this Negociation we reſerve to be determined by our expreſs Orders, but without revoking the Credentials and Inſtructions already granted to Colonel Goddard reſpecting it; in all other Negociations, Treaties, and Plans, of Military Operations, it is our Wiſh ſo to blend the Powers of your Government with our own in the Direction of them, and in every formal or occaſional Inſtrument which they may require for their Ratification, as to preſerve the Credit and diſtinct Reſponſibility of both, and to make both the Pledges for the faithful Obſervance of them. For this Purpoſe we need not recommend that Colonel Goddard be conſulted, when his Preſence or the Nature of the Subjects will admit of it, on all Meaſures which have a Relation to our preſent Inſtructions, as you have already been pleaſed to allow him a deliberative Voice in your Councils; and we are happy to find that you are ſo well ſatisfied with his Conduct, and his ready Diſpoſition to aſſiſt in the Execution of your Deſigns, as to leave us little Occaſion to lay down a clearer Line for the Employment of the Forces under his Command, than that which we have already deſcribed.

15. We have directed Colonel Goddard to execute whatever Service you ſhall think it proper to require, which ſhall not be contrary to our Inſtructions, or to any exiſting Engagements; a Caution which we hope will be unneceſſary, but with which we do not conſider ourſelves at Liberty to diſpenſe, while the principal Reſponſibility reſts with us: And for the ſame Reaſon we require, that all Treaties which ſhall be concluded by you in virtue of theſe Inſtructions be referred to this Government for its final Sanction and formal Ratification of them, and that a Clauſe be inſerted in every Treaty ſo concluded to that Effect.

Warren Haſtings,

P. Francis,
Edw[d] Wheler.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 10th June 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edw[d] Wheler,
} Eſquires.
Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote, K. B.

Sir Eyre Coote delivers in the following Opinion on the Governor General's amended Draft of the Letter propoſed to be written to the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, recorded in Conſultation the 7th Inſtant.

Sir Eyre Coote.

Paragraph 1ſt. Agreed.

2d. Agreed.

3d. Agreed; provided the following Addition be made:

" To which we recommend their being immediately brought, not upon the limited Charge given " in by the Preſident, which ſolely points to one Part of their Conduct, but upon a general Charge " for Miſconduct upon an Expedition that has failed."

The Words "either with the Powers immediately veſted in your Body by the Court of Di-"rectors, or—" I object to, knowing but of Two Powers over the Military veſted by Government in India, Suſpenſion and a Court Martial.

Paragraph 4th. Agreed.

5th. To this I object.

As a Military Man, I would not venture my Character in giving full Applauſe, or implicitly adopting Mr. Hornby's Plan of Operations, knowing ſo little of the Nature of that Service, when at this Diſtance.

If by refuſing Peace they force us to continue Hoſtilities, I muſt in this Caſe ſuppoſe a Junction of all their Parties, and of courſe a Union of all their Forces. And I do not think with Colonel Goddard, that his Detachment, conſidering the State it is now in, together with the Bombay Troops, are equal to enſure Succeſs in a Conteſt with the united Maratta Power. Our utmoſt Vigour ſhould therefore be exerted to ſupport our military Reputation in this Country, and by one united Effort put a glorious and ſpeedy End to the War; for however uncertain the Succeſs of War may be, we ought to leave it as little as poſſible to the Reſult of Chance, conſidering the great Stake we have to riſque. For which Reaſon we ſhould alſo form Alliances with the Country Powers, eſpecially with Hyder Ally, whoſe more particular Intereſt it is to join us in any hoſtile Attempts againſt the Maratta State: And if a War ſhould be indiſpenſably continued, I would leave it to the Commanding Officer, who is reſponſible to us for his Conduct, to adopt any Part, or the Whole of Mr. Hornby's Plan, or not at all, as he may think moſt adviſable for promoting the Diſtreſs of the Enemy.

It is impoſſible to preſcribe (as is here propoſed) any military Operations at this Diſtance, the Scene ſhifts while we debate upon it; what we now preſcribe may be utterly impracticable when this Letter arrives: It muſt therefore be left to the Commanding Officer upon the Spot, who is beſt qualified to avail himſelf of the Situations that Fortune may preſent to him. I therefore object to "preſcribe this Plan to be carried literally into Execution."

Paragraph 6th. I have no Objection to, as it is only a Remark upon a former Meaſure.

Paragraph 7th. I can never agree to give up what the Grantors had no Power to beſtow. Bengal may next be given away by the next unfortunate Bombay Detachment, as properly as Broach in this. The Queſtion is not the Motive upon which it was ceded, but the Power: If the Want of Power is an Objection upon the Terms of the general Treaty, it muſt equally apply in the other. The Motive can only operate to induce us to grant ſome Equivalent in the one which there is no Opening for in the other; and in ſo far to the 8th Paragraph I agree.

But in both theſe laſt Paragraphs, I object to the conferring the Management of one Part of the Treaty with the Marattas upon Colonel Goddard, and the other to the Select Committee at Bombay. They have finiſhed their Part already, as we have too fatally experienced; what remains to be done belongs to this Government, of which Colonel Goddard is the Repreſentative Plenipotentiary at Poona. If it is thought neceſſary, let his Powers be entirely revoked; but permitting others to infringe upon them, can never be good Policy, or promote Diſpatch.

Paragraph 9th. This I agree to, provided the Negociation be conducted by the ſame Agent who is to treat with the Maratta State.

10th. "*Purſuing the Plan of Military Operations which we have recommended*," ſeems to me but a fruſtrating Concomitant with "*waiting for the Offer of his Alliance.*" I doubt whether this would lead him to treat with us.

Paragraph 11th. Moſt fully agreed in.

12th. To this I object, as I cannot admit Mr. Hornby's Plan to take place of that of the Commanding Officer; and ſecondly, an Alliance with Madajee Scindia ſhould take place of that with Moodajee Booſla, becauſe the latter ſeems to be given up. *We have* but little Hopes, and *he waits* "*till we prove our Superiority decidedly.*"

13th. I fully agree in.

14th. After acknowledging the Conduct of that ſame Government to have been of ſuch a Nature, as to leave it to a higher Authority to puniſh, it would be utterly inconſiſtent to blend the Reſponſibility of the Acts of the Two Preſidencies. To this I can never aſſent, as in the miſerable Situation to which they have reduced themſelves, I look upon the Reſponſibility of future Meaſures to lay ſolely with us, which the 15th Paragraph confirms.

Governor General—As the General has objected to the indefinite Term "Powers," in the Third Paragraph, I beg Leave to ſubmit to his Approval the inſerting of the Words "of Suſpenſion" following it; as this Correction will limit the Senſe of the Board to the ſpecific Powers poſſeſſed by them.

The General approves of the Correction.

Mr. Wheler—There are many Points in the Governor General's amended Propoſitions which I would aſſent to, and ſome of the Alterations made to thoſe Propoſitions by the Commander in Chief coincide likewiſe with my own Ideas; but taking the Paragraphs ſeparately, they ſtill remain blended with a Variety of Propoſals which I can never aſſent to. I ſhall quote only one Inſtance: The Commander in Chief's Amendment of the 3d Article ſtill leaves it in the Power of the Governor and Council of Bombay, either to ſuſpend Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, or to try them by a Court Martial. Was I to alter this Paragraph, I ſhould urge the Neceſſity of a Court Martial, as the only Means of clearing up the Suſpicions that at preſent hang

over

over them. For theſe Reaſons, and becauſe I have been favoured with the Sight of the Draft of a Letter prepared by Mr. Francis, which coincides more fully with my own Sentiments and the Principles on which I have acted, I muſt object to every Paragraph of the Letter now before the Board, except the Fourth and Thirteenth.

Mr. Francis delivers in the following Minute.

Mr. Francis—Having compared the Governor's amended Draft of the Letter to Bombay with the Minutes in which my Opinion on the different Points before us is recorded, I find it unneceſſary to follow the Paragraphs in the Order propoſed by the Reſolution, ſince there are but Two in which I can entirely concur; I mean the Fourth and Thirteenth: Nor do I ſee how it is poſſible to give a partial Aſſent or Diſſent to the Remainder. I therefore object to the Whole of the propoſed Letter, except the Fourth and Thirteenth Paragraphs.

But that the Time and Attention of the Board may not be any longer waſted in Debates, which I think have no fixed Point of View, and lead to no Deciſion, and that I may not appear to condemn the Plan offered by the Governor, without ſtating what I would prefer in its Place, I beg Leave to propoſe another Draft of a Letter to Bombay, drawn up on thoſe Principles on which I think the Commander in Chief's Sentiments and mine are agreed, and preſerving the Two Paragraphs of the Governor's Draft in which I concur.

The Board will obſerve, that I recede wholly from the Idea of entering into a particular Diſcuſſion or Cenſure of the paſt Conduct of the Gentlemen of Bombay. In doing this, I mean to relieve the Board from a heavy Taſk, not eſſential to the public Service, and to preclude a Debate which if we were once to enter into, I fear would never end. So far forth I alſo meet the Opinion of the Governor General and Mr. Barwell.

Propoſed Draft of a Letter to the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay.

1. We have received your Letter of the 4th April, with its Incloſures, by the Hands of Mr. Horſely.

2. After peruſing theſe Papers with the ſtricteſt and moſt deliberate Attention, we have determined not to enter into a particular Diſcuſſion or Cenſure of the Meaſures which have involved you in your preſent Diſtreſſes. You muſt anſwer to a higher and more effectual Authority than our's for the Difficulties to which you have reduced the Government entruſted to your Care, and for the unexampled Diſhonour you have brought upon the Company's Arms. We leave your Conduct in the Courſe of theſe Tranſactions to be examined at Home, as we doubt not it will be, with the utmoſt Severity. If on our Side it had been poſſible for us to ſelect any Part of your Proceedings, either in the Plan or Execution of your Meaſures, on which we could have beſtowed our Approbation, we ſhould readily have done it.

3. Having already given full Powers to Colonel Goddard to negociate and conclude a Treaty of Peace with the Maratta Government, and having no Cauſe to alter the Terms which we have preſcribed in our Inſtructions for that Purpoſe, we have only to repeat, that we look to the Iſſue of that Commiſſion as our primary Object, and the Termination of all our political Views on your Side of India, if it ſhall prove ſucceſsful.

4. The Execution of the projected Treaty of Peace with the Poona Miniſtry we leave to the ſole Charge of Colonel Goddard, according to the Inſtructions which we have already given him.

5. Until we ſhall be adviſed by Colonel Goddard of the Reſult of his Negociations in conſequence of his preſent Orders, we do not think it adviſable to bind ourſelves, even by a conditional Determination, to proſecute the War on the Plan propoſed by Mr. Hornby, or on any other. Suppoſing that our Views and Wiſhes, which are all directed to an honourable Peace, ſhould be defeated, it is not from a partial Effort on your Side of India alone, that we can form any reaſonable Expectation of a deciſive Succeſs againſt the united Power of the Marattas; for in the caſe of War we muſt ſuppoſe their Strength to be united againſt us. We will not therefore precipitate a Reſolution in the Conſequences of which all India may be involved. We ſhall wait for Advices from Colonel Goddard, and be determined by the Lights and Information with which he may furniſh us.

6. Having thus diſmiſſed the Conſideration of what is paſt, and deferred our Deciſion on future Meaſures, we come now to the only Point in your Diſpatches on which we cannot decline giving you a preciſe and formal Opinion.

We diſapprove and cannot admit of the Reference &c. &c. (in the Terms of Mr. Francis's Propoſitions *mutatis mutandis*, with the following Addition at the Concluſion) "or on ſuch other "Charges as the Preſident and Select Committee may think fit to prefer againſt them for their "Conduct in the Courſe of the Expedition."

With regard to the Form and Extent of the Charge againſt Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, I have no Objection to the Terms recommended by the Commander in Chief.

Mr. Barwell—The Reſolution of the 7th Inſtant precludes the Conſideration of the Propoſitions made by Mr. Francis until the Subject of that Reſolution is diſmiſſed. I ſhall therefore, agreeably to the Reſolution, proceed directly to give my Opinion upon each Paragraph of the Let-

ter propoſed by the Governor General to be written to the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay.

I approve of the Firſt and Second Paragraphs.

I approve of the Third, and adopt the General's Amendment and propoſed Addition.

I approve of the Fourth Paragraph in the Words of it.

I approve of the Points in general propoſed to be effected by the Inſtructions contained in the Fifth Paragraph, concurring with the Commander in Chief in his Propoſition expreſſed as follows: "And if a War ſhould be indiſpenſably continued, I would leave it to the commanding Officer, "who is reſponſible to us for his Conduct, to adopt any Part or the Whole of Mr. Hornby's "Plan, or not at all, as he may think moſt adviſable for promoting the Diſtreſs of the Enemy." And I agree with the Commander in Chief, for the Reaſons he has aſſigned, that we ought not to preſcribe this Plan to be carried literally into Execution, but to leave a Latitude of Action to Colonel Goddard to avail himſelf of the Situations which Fortune may preſent to him.

I acquieſce in the Sixth Paragraph.

The Seventh Paragraph appearing liable to the Conſtruction of allowing Force to one Part of the Convention of Worgaum and denying it to another, is objectionable. I ſhould not have propoſed an Amendment, but as it has ſtruck a Member of the Council in this Light, and as I conceive it to be meant, as it has already been declared by this Government, to diſclaim entirely and completely the Acts of the Military Committee at Worgaum, I would recommend that it be ſo done in expreſs Terms.

With reſpect to the 8th Paragraph, I concur with the Commander in Chief, that to render the Negociation entruſted to Colonel Goddard complete, it will be proper to include in the Commiſſion he holds from this Government every Point that ſhall become an Object of Negociation between this Government and the Maratta State, touching the unauthorized Acts of the Bombay Committee at Worgaum; and I therefore propoſe with the Commander in Chief, that Colonel Goddard be inſtructed to expreſs the Senſe in which this Government is pleaſed to regard the Services of Madajee Scindia at Worgaum, by offering him ſuch a Gratification as may be afforded him by the Bombay Government, or for Means which he may poſſeſs from the Operations of War, in caſe Peace is not concluded upon the Inſtructions he is already furniſhed with. Theſe Orders to Colonel Goddard will properly come in the Place of the Inſtructions of the Eighth Paragraph to the Bombay Preſidency, as neceſſary Information.

I agree to the Ninth Paragraph.

I acquieſce in the Propoſition of making Colonel Goddard the Channel of any Negociation with Madajee Scindia in the preſent Conjuncture of Affairs. I would recommend that the Tenth Paragraph be wholly omitted as uneſſential.

I agree to the Eleventh, and I agree to the Twelfth and Thirteenth Paragraphs.

I likewiſe agree entirely to the Fourteenth.

I agree entirely to the Fifteenth.

Governor General—Whatever Reſolutions may be paſſed upon the various Matters which the Diſpatches received ſome Time ſince from Bombay have brought before the Notice of the Board, I moſt earneſtly recommend and entreat that they will inſtantly decide upon one, on the proper Application of which the Proſperity of the Company certainly does, and their very Exiſtence may depend. The Inſtructions ſent to Colonel Goddard preſcribe certain clear and ſimple Conditions as the Alternative of Peace or War: There is no Latitude for a long Negociation; Colonel Goddard is to offer Peace to the Maratta Government, on its Agreement to revert to the State in which we relatively ſtood by the Treaty of Proonder; to renounce its Claims for the Convention of Worgaum, and to exclude the French for ever from its Dominions. If they accept of theſe Terms, there is Peace; if they refuſe (and they muſt either accept or refuſe) War.

Let us ſuppoſe either of theſe Events to have taken place, and to conſider in what State they will place us. If Peace is concluded, the Object of our Negociation is obtained, and we have nothing left to look for but the quiet Arrangement of our Affairs in their former Channel, to which they will revert of courſe without our Interference, and the Return of Colonel Goddard's Detachment, or ſuch a Proviſion made for its Services as may ſuit a State of Peace, and the neceſſary Defence of the Company's Intereſts againſt any probable or expected Attempts of the French. Theſe are Points which do not preſs for immediate Deciſion or Deliberation, becauſe our Reſolutions upon them, whatever they were, could not be carried into Effect before many Months were elapſed.

But the Caſe is widely different if War be the Reſult of our Offers to the Maratta State: In ſuch a Caſe, our Safety may depend on inſtant Action, and their's on Delay: Our Troops may act immediately, their's muſt wait for their accuſtomed Seaſon, which never commences till the Expiration of the Duſerra, or the End of September; and an Advantage may be ſucceſsfully, and if I may be allowed to truſt to my own Judgment, I will ſay, eaſily taken of the preceding Interval, to occupy ſuch Poſts, or to ſeize ſuch Parts of their Territory as may bring great Diſtreſs upon them before they are in a Capacity to reſiſt; and give us Strength and the Means of proſecuting the War, when both Parties ſhall be engaged in it, proportionate to their Loſs of both.

I have certain Intelligence, or ſuch as I deem certain, that Madajee Scindia is no longer in the Neighbourhood of the Capital, where it was ſuppoſed he would be compelled to remain for the Support of his Influence, but was ſome Time ſince arrived with his Colleague Tuccojee Holcar, and Ragonaut Row, at Berhampore, on his Way to the Eaſtern Frontier of the Maratta Dominions.

Dominions; and it is the current and general Report, that it is his Intention to invade the Dominions of our Ally, the Nabob of Owde, after the Expiration of the Rains. Whether this Report be derived from any Ground of Authority, or held out for Intimidation, or it be only the Part of a Plan depending on a Series of Contingencies, or arife from mere Conjecture; it is a Concluſion which we ought to credit, ſo far at leaſt, as to be upon our Guard againſt it, and even to prevent it.

For theſe Reaſons, I am wholly againſt the Draft propoſed by Mr. Francis, becauſe in the Event of a decided War, it will bind our own Hands while thoſe of our Enemies are free; and it will leave the Preſidency of Bombay encumbered, and oppreſſed with the Weight of that very Force on which we depend for its Preſervation.

I will never ſuffer the Object to be loſt, for which the Detachment now commanded by Colonel Goddard was firſt appointed. It was not to aſſiſt the Deſigns of the Preſidency of Bombay in their Execution, but to ſupport them in the Conſequences of it. Though the Detachment was for a while diverted from its Deſtination, on the Suppoſition that the Deſigns of that Preſidency had either wholly failed, or was relinquiſhed, yet it has ſince reverted to it, and is now preciſely in the Situation in which it was originally meant to place it. I will not ſay what might have been the Fate of Bombay, had not Colonel Goddard moſt ſeaſonably arrived for its Relief.

The Queſtion is now, Whether it ſhall anſwer the Purpoſes of its Deſtination? or whether, after ſo ſucceſsful a Termination of an Enterprize pronounced impracticable, it ſhall be wholly precluded from anſwering the Ends of its Appointment, and be converted to the Means of completing the Ruin of the Company's Intereſts, which it was provided, and is ready to retrieve? If Peace has attended the Negociation intruſted to Colonel Goddard, theſe Ends are attained, at leaſt in as great a Degree as we are warranted to proſecute them: If the contrary, let it be employed to promote them. It will be but an ill Excuſe for our Forbearance, that we waited for regular and official Information, if in the Interval in which our Troops might enable them to avert the Dangers attendant on an actual State of War, or to begin it with Advantage, any fatal Miſcarriage ſhould befal them, and through the Want of Authority to act. Hitherto the Inſtructions given to Colonel Goddard, and the Letter which accompanied theſe to the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, preclude the Dangers of which I have expreſſed Apprehenſion, ſince thoſe Inſtructions and Advices clearly preſcribe the Circumſtances which are to place them in a decided State of Peace or War; and authorize them of courſe to act conformably to either State. The Arguments which I have uſed do not therefore ariſe from any Neceſſity of giving them new Inſtructions, or ſupplying the Defect of thoſe which we have already given them: What I have ſaid applies ſolely to the Propoſal made by a Member of the Board, "to wait for Advices from Colonel Goddard, and to be determined by the "Lights and Informations with which he may furniſh us," even in the ſuppoſed Refuſal of the Maratta Miniſtry to accept of our Offers of Peace; or in other Words, "to refrain from committing "Hoſtilities, while we are threatened with them and War is actually denounced againſt us."

The other Propoſitions contained in Mr. Francis's Draft, do not appear to me to be regularly before the Board, and the Day is too far advanced to enter on new Subjects of Debate.

I now proceed to the Queſtions which are before the Board.

To the Firſt and Second Paragraphs of the propoſed Draft, I agree; and to the Third I agree, with the Amendment and Addition propoſed by the Commander in Chief.

To the Fourth I agree.

To the Fifth Paragraph I agree, with the Amendment propoſed by the Commander in Chief.

To the Sixth I agree.

On the Seventh and Eighth, I can never depart from the Opinions which I have expreſſed in theſe Paragraphs; but I ſhall not oppoſe the Sentiments of the other Members which tend to the ſame Concluſion as my own, though differing in their Principles.

I abide by the Ninth Paragraph as it ſtands; and

I agree to the Tenth and Eleventh.

The Twelfth is of no Conſequence, and may be omitted.

To the remaining Paragraphs I agree.

Sir Eyre Coote delivers in the following Minute.

Sir Eyre Coote—Under the fulleſt Conviction of the juſt Praiſe given to Colonel Goddard, I beg Leave to propoſe, and hope it will meet with the Concurrence of this Board, that we join with the Government at Bombay in recommending him to the Court of Directors, for the Appointment of Commander in Chief at that Preſidency upon the firſt Vacancy.

And in the intermediate Time, "I think it abſolutely neceſſary, in the preſent diſtreſſed Situa-"tion that the Military upon the Bombay Eſtabliſhment are reduced to, that he ſhould have the "Rank given him of Brigadier General, in order to enable him to carry on the Public Service "with more Weight and Dignity;" and therefore propoſe that a Brevet Commiſſion of Brigadier General *for that Service* be now granted him.

(Signed) Eyre Coote.

Mr. Francis delivers in the following Minute:

Mr. Francis—I have Objection to our recommending Colonel Goddard's Conduct to the Attention of the Court of Directors; but I would leave it to them to determine what Reward he may deſerve. In particular, I would not point out the Succeſſion to the Command at Bombay; becauſe I think it would look like pre-judging the Event of Colonel Egerton's Trial, ſuppoſing he ſhould be brought to a Trial in conſequence of our recommending it, of which I have ſome Doubt.

The Board have already given Colonel Goddard the Rank of Colonel on the other Side of India; and I do not think that the Occaſion calls for our inveſting him at preſent with a higher Rank: Supposing he ſhould return to Bengal, the Rank of Brigadier General, if he once holds it, will not permit him to act again in that which belongs to him on this Eſtabliſhment; and I cannot conſent to ſuperſede Officers ſuperior to him, merely becauſe they have not had the good Fortune to be employed as he has been.

Excluſive of theſe Conſiderations, I doubt whether we have a Right to beſtow the Rank in queſtion. There is no Inſtance within my Knowledge of ſuch a Rank given in India. The Court of Directors, as I have always underſtood, have reſerved to themſelves the Power of appointing General Officers in their Service.

(Signed) P. Francis.

I agree, and ſubſcribe to the above Opinion.

(Signed) E. Wheler.

Governor General—I heartily concur in both the Propoſitions.

Mr. Barwell—I approve of both the Propoſitions.

Reſolved, That a Brevet Commiſſion of Brigadier General be granted to Colonel Goddard for the Service on which he is now employed; which Commiſſion ſhall ceaſe on his Return, or on the Return of the Troops under his Command, to either of the Provinces dependant on this Government or the Government of Owde.

Ordered, That the Secretary prepare a Letter to the Preſident and Select Committee at Bombay, conformably to the foregoing Minutes.

Warren Haſtings,
Edw[d] Wheler.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 14th June 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell, Philip Francis, Edward Wheler, } Eſquires,
Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote, K. B.

The Secretary begs Leave to lay before the Board the Draft of a Letter to the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, drawn up from the Minutes of the 10th Inſtant.

Queſtion put.

Is the Letter approved?

Sir Eyre Coote—I approve it.

Mr. Wheler—I do not approve of the Letter.

Mr. Francis—I do not approve of it.

Mr. Barwell—Any particular Approbation of this Letter on my Part is totally unneceſſary. I am bound by the Senſe of the Majority to approve it. I think the Queſtion irregular, becauſe it brings in a new Mode on Points already determined, to a Second Deciſion. I muſt therefore take the Queſtion to be, Whether the Letter conforms to the Reſolutions of laſt Council Day? I think it does.

Governor General—I approve.

Reſolved, That the above Draft of the Letter to the Preſident and Select Committee at Bombay be immediately copied fair, and tranſmitted to that Preſidency.

APPENDIX, N° 198, 199, 200, 201.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, 14th June 1779.

MR. Francis delivers in the following Minute:

I diſſent from and proteſt againſt the preceding Letter, for the following Reaſons, in Addition to thoſe on which I oppoſed the Meaſures now adopted at the Time they were debated;

1ſt. Becauſe I deem it unbecoming the Dignity of the Governor General and Council, and a moſt unmerited Demonſtration of Tenderneſs and Partiality to the Majority of the Select Committee of Bombay, with ſuch Evidence of their Miſconduct as we have before us, to paſs by the Whole of their late Proceedings without the ſmalleſt Expreſſion of Diſapprobation or Concern; as if nothing were in queſtion, but ſome common and trifling Occurrence, by which neither the Intereſts of the Company, nor the Credit of our Arms had been eſſentially wounded. When the ſeparate Opinions of the Members of this Board ſhall appear before our Superiors, I doubt not they will think it an extraordinary Circumſtance, that no Part of the Spirit which breathes through thoſe Opinions ſhould be preſerved in the collective Act of the Council:

2d. Becauſe, conſidering the Claim of Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, to be tried by a Court Martial, as a Claim of Right, I think we ſhould not have confined our Interpoſition on this Point to a cold and languid Recommendation of ſuch Trial; but ſhould have inſiſted upon its being granted in Terms that could admit of no Evaſion; much leſs ſhould we have weakened even that Recommendation, by referring to an Alternative, of which the Select Committee may now avail themſelves, under Colour of our Authority. This, I conceive, is no Time to remind them, that they have other Powers veſted in them; that they are at Liberty to wave all Trial, if they think proper, and to puniſh the Parties by an immediate and direct Act of Power:

3d. Becauſe, admitting it to be true, that Meſſrs. Egerton and Cockburn conſented at firſt to relinquiſh their Claim to a public Trial, and that they had no Right to retract ſuch Conſent once given; ſtill I think we ſhould not have paſſed over in Silence the unwarrantable Acts and Declarations of the Preſident, by which it was extorted from them. They who think leaſt favourably of the Conduct of theſe Gentlemen, ſhould conſider how far the Precedent may be extended, and what Security it leaves to the Military Service in general againſt the arbitrary Acts of a Party, occaſionally prevailing in the Council:

4. Becauſe the ſeveral Plans of Alliance or Co-operation, propoſed to be executed with the Guicawars, or with Madajee Scindia, or with Moodajee Booſla, muſt be offered and negociated after we ourſelves are actually committed by a Declaration of War, and engaged in the Proſecution of it. In ſuch Circumſtances I conceive we ſhall treat with all or any of the abovementioned Chiefs for their Aſſiſtance, under great Diſadvantage. When once they ſee us engaged in a War, which at all Events we muſt carry on, they will either ſtand aloof until they ſee the Succeſs of our Operations, or ſell us their Aſſiſtance on Terms which we ſhould not yield in any other Situation:

5th. Becauſe no Conſideration whatſoever is given to the Caſe of the Two Gentlemen, who remain as Hoſtages in the Hands of the Marattas, and whoſe Lives may be hazarded by an abrupt Declaration of War:

6th. Becauſe, excluſive of all other Reaſons already urged againſt our precipitating the Company into a War with the Marattas, if that Extremity can be avoided by any honourable Means, I deem it inconſiſtent with the Principle of Colonel Goddard's Inſtructions of the 5th of April (in which the Re-eſtabliſhment of Peace is profeſſed to be our Object) to ſend him Orders, which leave no Room for Accommodation, and which ought to have accompanied the Inſtruction, if the Board had originally been determined not to wait for the Reſult of his Negociations, nor even for an Anſwer to our Letter. I deem it uſeleſs, even in View to a Proſecution of the War, ſince in all Probability the Advices we expect from Colonel Goddard may arrive in Fifteen or Twenty Days; and though a Rupture in that Interval may be forwarded, and all Means of Reconciliation precluded, in conſequence of the preſent Orders, our Troops cannot take the Field before September. No poſſible Advantage can therefore be gained by this Precipitation, unleſs it be thought an Advantage to denounce War before we are able to act, to give the Enemy the earlieſt Notice of our Intention to invade their Country as ſoon as the Seaſon will permit:

Laſtly, I am unable to reconcile it with the Opinion of every Member of the Board, except the Governor General. Of Mr. Wheler's Sentiments and mine, I preſume no Doubt can be formed. Mr. Barwell ſays, he thinks we ſhould wait for the Effect of Colonel Goddard's Negociations for Peace; but if we now decide the main Queſtion, of Peace or War, the Information which Mr. Barwell thinks we ought to wait for, can be of no Uſe to us.

The Commander in Chief, in whoſe Sentiments I have entirely concurred, declares it to be his Opinion, that we ſhould not ſeek to renew a War, but negociate with the various Maratta Intereſts

an honourable Peace: That Colonel Goddard's Detachment, conſidering the State it is now in, together with the Bombay Troops, are not equal to enſure Succeſs in a Conteſt with the united Maratta Power; yet it is with this Force alone that, under the preſent Orders, we are to commence a War which will aſſuredly unite the whole Power of the Marattas againſt us. No Meaſures previous to a Declaration of War are taken to divide them; no Alliance formed; no general Plan of Operations propoſed: In ſhort, every thing that belongs to Deliberation, and which ought to prepare and lead to a Deciſion, is left to follow it. But if in the Outſet of the Conteſt, and before any Meaſures can be taken to ſupport or co-operate with Colonel Goddard, the Army under his Command ſhould be defeated, and if the Conſequences of a Defeat ſhould endanger the Whole of the Company's Poſſeſſions, as the Commander in Chief very juſtly thinks they would, on what Principle ſhould we juſtify a Reſolution capable of producing ſuch Conſequences, from which, at the preſent Point of Time, no immediate Advantage can be derived, and to be carried into Execution by a Force which the Commander in Chief thinks is not equal to Succeſs? The Terms on which we are to engage in this War are very unequal, when the utmoſt we expect from a Victory is ſome Acceſſion of Territory on the Malabar Coaſt, and when a Defeat may endanger the Whole of the Company's Poſſeſſions.

Mr. Barwell—Mr. Francis has very accurately quoted my Words, which are, "I think we "ſhould wait the Effect of Colonel Goddard's Negociation for Peace," putting upon them the following Conſtruction: "That if we now decide the main Queſtion, of Peace or War, the Infor- "mation which Mr. Barwell thinks we ought to wait for, can be of no Uſe." I beg Leave to refer to the Whole of the Sentiments I have expreſſed in the Minute referred to; theſe are ſufficiently explanatory of the Senſe of my Words, by which I propoſed to have conveyed no other Meaning, than that Colonel Goddard's Negociations for Peace muſt have produced their Effect, and if that Effect was Peace, it precluded the Operation of any Orders we might judge neceſſary on the Suppoſition of a War. But the Conſideration of Meaſures in the Caſe of our being in an actual State of War, I did not intend (as is apparent from my Minute) to ſuſpend, for Information to be received from Colonel Goddard.

Bengal Secret Conſultations the 28th June 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Eſquire, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell, Philip Francis, Edward Wheler, } Eſquires.
Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote indiſpoſed.

Read and approved the Proceedings of the 21ſt Inſtant.

The Secretary lays before the Board the following Minute, which he has received from Sir Eyre Coote.

Sir Eyre Coote—Although I regret that I have been already induced to write more Minutes ſince my Arrival here than I did in all my former Tranſactions in India, yet I find myſelf ſo particularly pointed at in the laſt Paragraph of Mr. Francis's Proteſt of the 14th Inſtant, that I cannot now avoid ſaying ſomething, in Reply to the Aſſertions it contains.

Colonel Goddard is no where, in the Letter to Bombay or to himſelf, limited to act (in caſe he ſhould be driven to the Neceſſity of continuing the War) ſolely with the Body of Troops that accompanied him from Bengal, but left moſt fully to ſuch Plans, whether Alliances or otherwiſe, as his Judgment may direct moſt to diſtreſs the Enemy: And for this Purpoſe the fulleſt plenipotentiary Powers are granted him; ſuch Powers as will enſure Peace, if Peace is to be granted upon any but diſhonourable Terms, and upon thoſe, I hope we never ſhall accept of it.

Upon the Whole, ſo far from admitting that the Reply to Bombay is contrary to the Spirit of my Minute of the 24th May, I think it moſt compleatly concurring with every Point in it: And I muſt ſay, that if any one Letter gave me more Pleaſure to ſign than another, it was the one in queſtion, as, in my Opinion, none could be better adapted to anſwer the public Service.

However, as I do not intend now or hereafter to devote my Time to controverſial Writing, I ſhall leave my Conduct to the Deciſion of my Employers, to whom alone, with my Country, I am anſwerable.

Ghyretty, June the 27th 1779. (Signed) Eyre Coote.

Mr. Francis—This is the only Minute of Sir Eyre Coote's which appears to be occaſioned by, or to have Relation to, any thing ſaid by me. The only Obſervation I ſhall venture to make upon it, and which I hope will not lead to any further Debate, is, that although Brigadier General Goddard is not reſtricted to act ſolely with the Force under his Command, it appears from our Letter itſelf, that we

we place but little Dependence on any Acceſſion of Strength which he may derive from Alliances with the Country Powers. With reſpect to Moodajee Booſla, we expreſsly ſay, "that we prefer a "Scheme of Military Operations practicable by our own Force, unincumbered with the Weight of "a timid Ally." But our whole Force, I mean that with which Brigadier General Goddard is to act, is avowedly not ſufficient to enſure Succeſs.

N° 199.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 31ſt May 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell, } Eſquires.
Philip Francis, }
Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote, K. B.
Mr. Wheler at Beercool for the Benefit of his Health.

Received the following Letter from Mr. Horſley.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

The Diſpatches I brought you from Bombay are very circumſtantial; yet the Facts they refer to are ſo numerous, and the Proceedings upon them ſo extenſive, that I cannot help fearing ſome Particulars may be liable to be miſconceived. I take the Liberty therefore of requeſting your Permiſſion to have Acceſs to your Records, as far as they relate to the Buſineſs I am charged with; and I hope you will allow me to repreſent to you any thing they may ſuggeſt as requiſite for your fuller Information regarding the Affairs of the Preſidency of Bombay.

The Object which ſeems of the firſt Importance to the Select Committee, is to eſtabliſh ſuch a Degree of Confidence between your Government and them, as may render the Powers of both moſt efficacious for the general Advantage. They aſſure themſelves that they ſhall find you equally diſpoſed to promote a Spirit of Harmony, and to aboliſh all Appearances of an Oppoſition of Intereſts, which it will ever be their Study to avoid, and which they are convinced can never really exiſt. While I am employed in cultivating ſuch Sentiments, and in removing any Miſapprehenſions that might prevent or interrupt the good Underſtanding between the Two Boards, I know I am engaged in the Manner moſt agreeable to the Gentlemen whoſe Commands I am charged with, and it will be in Proportion to my Succeſs in theſe Endeavours, that the Termination of my Commiſſion will be eſteemed either fortunate for the Service, or honourable to myſelf.

I remain, &c. &c.
(Signed) G. Horſley.

Calcutta,
31ſt May 1779.

The Board do not think proper to allow Mr. Horſley an unreſerved Acceſs to all their Secret Proceedings relative to the Preſidency of Bombay; but ſhall avail themſelves of the Reference made to them by the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, to apply to him for Information on any Points, of which their actual Knowledge may be defective.

Ordered, That the Secretary do furniſh Mr. Horſley with Copies of all Letters to the Select Committee of Bombay, and of all the Reſolutions of the Board, which have an immediate Relation to that Preſidency in its Secret Department; and that he inform Mr. Horſley the Board will be very glad to receive from him any new Lights upon the late Tranſactions on the preſent State of that Preſidency, which his Knowledge of them may ſuggeſt, or which ſhall appear to him neceſſary; and to aſſure him, that that Weight will be given to his Repreſentations which is due to them.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 14th June 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell, }
Philip Francis, } Eſquires.
Edwd Wheler, }
Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote, K. B.

Read the following Letter from Mr. Horſley:

The Honourable the Governor General and Council.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

I did hope to have been permitted to attend you at your laſt Meeting, to aſſure you, that the Members of the Select Committee of Bombay are unanimous in wiſhing to have the Line of Conduct

reſolved on for them by your Board, laid down as clearly as poſſible; and that whatever it may be, whether for Peace, or War, or Negociation, on which either may depend, they are determined to give every Aſſiſtance in their Power for the Accompliſhment of your Views.

I wiſhed to remind you, that the Powers of the Governor General and Council had never been diſputed at Bombay; which while it ſhews the Senſe of our Government as to the Neceſſity of an Union between the Two Boards for the ſucceſsful Management of the Company's Affairs at our Preſidency, I hope will not render you leſs attentive to the ſame Object; but on the contrary induce you to concert Meaſures for forming ſuch an Union of Powers and Intereſts, as the moſt effectual Means of promoting the Schemes of Policy you may think proper to adopt.

Could I ſuppoſe you leſs convinced of the Advantage of ſuch a Conduct than the Gentlemen at Bombay, I ſhould intreat you to conſider, whether you might not defeat your own Intentions by rejecting the Union the Select Committee wiſh for and deſire, on no other Terms but of the greateſt Deference to the Lead you are entitled to take in marking the Points to which the joint Endeavours of the Two Boards are to be directed, and the Principles on which they are to be purſued.

The Sentiments of every Member of the Select Committee, which I can take upon me to anſwer for in the moſt unreſerved Terms, are theſe:

That your Board has an unqueſtionable Right to give them Directions with regard to Peace, War, and Negociation:

That however the Opinions of the Select Committee may at any Time differ from thoſe of the Governor General and Council, yet they can only promote the Welfare of their Settlement by conforming to yours:

That it is in this Way only they can hope to make the moſt of Peace, or carry on War to Advantage:

That therefore it is for their Intereſt to co-operate with you on all Occaſions, whether for Peace or in War.

I hope, Gentlemen, I may without Offence ſay, that while they acknowledge your Right to direct the Principles on which the political Concerns of the Preſidency of Bombay ſhall be conducted, they are not ignorant what their own Rights are as to the actual and excluſive Power of their Government.

Circumſtances are now ſo entirely changed, that it is to be hoped you will not ſuffer the Memory of former Diſagreements to be any Impediments to the Confidence you may be diſpoſed to place in the Government of Bombay. On the firſt Opening of the Council General's Commiſſion, the Meaſures already taken at Bombay in Maratta Affairs, fell under your ſevereſt Cenſure, both as to the Principles and Execution. The Juſtification which the Governor and Council might have derived from Succeſs, even if they had no other, they were debarred from by the Reſolutions of this Board: In this Caſe what remained for them but to defend themſelves and their Meaſures as far at leaſt as Argument would ſupport them? The Caſe is now very different; inſtead of having taken on their own Authority any Meaſures which they muſt now defend, they have referred every Thing to you: They have poſtponed the Exertions which in their Opinion their actual Situation authorized, which were the moſt neceſſary to their own Affairs, and the moſt efficacious, as they thought, for ſupporting the Syſtem of Politics they underſtood you had adopted. This they have done for no other Purpoſe, but that it might not be ſaid, that they had prevented this Board from making its own Choice, but that they might receive Directions from you grounded on the fulleſt Knowledge of the preſent State of Affairs; and preſerve from all Riſk, that Union and Confidence which they conſider as ſuperior to all other Advantages.

Uninformed as I am, I may perhaps trouble you on Subjects on which my Repreſentations are the moſt unneceſſary; and I would wiſh very much that this might be one of them: Yet the general Good of the Service, as well as the particular Intereſts and Rights of the Government of Bombay, appears much involved in the Reſolutions you may take with regard to the Powers you may think proper to continue to Colonel Goddard, or confer a new one on him; and in the Conſiſtency of them with the Powers reſerved to the Government of Bombay by Act of Parliament, and ſpecially entruſted to the Select Committee by the Court of Directors, that I ſhould think myſelf wanting in my Duty, if I did not intreat to be heard whenever theſe Points may come under your Conſideration, and before your Reſolutions on them are taken.

I remain, &c. &c.

(Signed) G. Horſley.

Calcutta,
June 14th 1779.

N° 200.

Mr. Horſley being directed to attend, that the Draft of the Letter to Bombay may be communicated to him, is admitted and allowed to peruſe the Letter.

Mr. Horſley—I wiſh to take the Letter propoſed to be ſent to Bombay Home with me: The great Length of it, and the Variety of the Subjects on which it treats, renders me cautious of offering

ing any thing ſuddenly for the Conſideration of the Board; and the more ſo, as there are ſeveral Parts of it which I fear will appear to me more detrimental to the Service the longer I conſider them.

Agreed, That Mr. Horſley be permitted to carry the Draft of the Letter to the Select Committee at Bombay Home with him.

The following Letter to Brigadier General Goddard having been circulated and approved, it was written in Cypher and diſpatched.

To Brigadier General Goddard.

Sir,

The Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay have tranſmitted to us by the Hands of Mr. Horſley, a full and clear Detail of their late Proceedings, with their Opinions on the preſent State of Affairs in that Part of India, and the Propoſitions of their Preſident for retrieving the unhappy Conſequences of the Defeat of that Enterprize.

After the moſt attentive Conſideration of theſe important Subjects, we have formed ſeveral Reſolutions on the Meaſures to be purſued for re-eſtabliſhing the Intereſt and Credit of the Company. The moſt eſſential of thoſe Meaſures we have determined to entruſt to your Conduct: Theſe we ſhall herein deſcribe to you, and give you ſuch clear Information of our Views as will enable you to carry them into effectual Execution.

We ſhall alſo communicate to you ſuch Parts of our Inſtructions to the Select Committee, as will require your acting in concert with them, either deliberately or executively, or as have any Relation to the Objects more immediately committed to your ſeparate Charge.

We have already given you full Powers to negociate and conclude a Treaty of Peace with the Maratta Government; and having no Cauſe to alter the Terms which we have preſcribed in our Inſtructions for that Purpoſe, we have only to repeat, that we look to the Iſſue of that Commiſſion as our primary Object, and the Termination of all our Political Views on that Side of India, if it ſhall prove ſucceſsful.

But if the Miniſters ſhall reject the Propoſals which we have inſtructed you to make to them, and ſhall reduce us to the Neceſſity of defending the Rights and Intereſts of the Company by an open War, we leave you a Latitude of Action, under the Inſtructions of the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, to avail yourſelf of the Situation which Fortune may preſent to you: And if a War ſhould be indiſpenſably continued, we alſo authorize you to adopt any Part or the Whole of Mr. Hornby's Plan, laid down in his Minute of the 30th of March; or not at all, as you may think moſt adviſable for promoting the Diſtreſs of the Enemy.

Should this Plan be carried into Execution we have laid the Select Committee under the following Reſtrictions:

1ſt. That their Engagements ſhall be offenſive only for the Objects of your immediate Operations, and in all other Reſpects purely defenſive.

2d. That their Engagements with the Guicawar Family ſhall be made with the Head of it, and with him excluſively.

3d. That they ſhall not aſſume a Mediation between the Brothers Futty Sing and Govind Row, or take any Part whatever in their domeſtic Diſputes, further than to ſupport the Party in Alliance with the Company, and his Poſſeſſions againſt foreign Invaſion.

4th. That they do not commit the Dignity of the Company, or pledge the National Faith in formal Treaties with Perſons of a Rank or Power unſuitable to ſuch a Diſtinction.

We leave the proferred Alliance with Moodajee Booſla to be concluded under the Inſtructions already given to you of the 16th of November; but we hereby direct, that if in his Anſwers to the Letters which were written to him by you and Mr. Hornby, or in any other Letters which you may have received from him at the Time of the Arrival of theſe Inſtructions, he ſhall have either refuſed or heſitated to accept the Propoſals which have been made to him, or ſhall have made new References to us, you do in ſuch Caſe declare the Negociation at an End, and that you do on no Account reſume it without our expreſs Orders.

We likewiſe hereby authorize you to treat with Madajee Scindia, both on the Subject of the ſeparate and ſecret Agreement made with him by the Military Committee at Worgaum; and alſo in the Event of a War, if you find him diſpoſed to our Alliance to enter into ſuch Engagements with him as you may judge to be for the Advantage of the Company, and not incompatible with any Treaty before concluded.

We think ourſelves ſtrictly juſtifiable in refuſing to ratify even the ſmalleſt Tittle of the Treaty or Convention of Worgaum. Although we abſolutely diſclaim the Acts of the Committee, and deny their Validity, and will not admit of any Pretenſions founded on thoſe Acts, yet they cannot cancel any Rights which have their Baſis in eſſential and intrinſic Benefits reaped by our Nation: This Right we muſt acknowledge to be poſſeſſed by Madajee Scindia; and we therefore declare, that unleſs he ſhall have forfeited it by any ſubſequent Act, he is entitled to a full Compenſation for any Diſappointment which he may ſuffer by our Denial of the Acts of the Committee.

You

You will therefore expreſs to Madajee Scindia the Senſe in which this Government is pleaſed to regard his Service at Worgaum, by offering ſuch a Gratification as may be afforded him by the Government of Bombay, or from Means which you may poſſeſs from the Operations of War, in caſe Peace is not concluded upon the Inſtructions you are already furniſhed.

Although the Conduct of Madajee Scindia may not ſeem to confirm the Opinion which the Select Committee of Bombay entertain of his Diſpoſition towards us, or rather of the political Neceſſity which ſeems to incline him to inſure our future Alliance; yet we think the Arguments they have aſſigned for this Belief ſo well grounded, and it agrees ſo well with the Knowledge which we ourſelves poſſeſs of his State Views and Talents, that we entirely adopt it, nor do we find it difficult to reconcile the Demands made on us under his Influence by the Miniſters, and immediately by him for the Performance of the Conditions of the Convention of Worgaum with that Diſpoſition, or with the obvious Syſtem of Policy which his preſent Intereſt demands.

We ſuppoſe it probable that he will avoid any direct Engagements with us until the Urgency of his Affairs ſhall require it, or until he can gain the Advantage of the Negociation, by waiting for the firſt Advances to be made on our Part. If from the Opportunities you may have of a nearer and more intimate Knowledge of his perſonal Character and Neceſſities you ſhall judge this Concluſion to be well grounded, we direct you to treat him with the ſame temporizing and indeterminate Conduct rather than ſolicit it. Propoſing this as a general Caution, you will make the future Security of our Poſſeſſions, Peace, and an adequate Revenue, your chief and indiſpenſable Objects and the Grounds of our Engagements with him.

To ſum up what we have written; our firſt Deſire is to obtain Peace on the Terms propoſed to you of the 5th of April; and it is only in the Event of the Failure of this Deſign, that we have formed the ſubſequent Inſtructions, or will allow of their Operation. This Negociation we have committed to your ſole Charge.

The ſeparate Negociation with Madajee Scindia bears ſuch a Connection with the foregoing, that we have thought it neceſſary to leave this alſo to your ſole Charge.

We alſo truſt entirely to your Management the Negociation of the Treaty of Alliance with Moodajee Booſla, on the Authority of your Inſtructions of the 16th of November, until the Period of its Suſpenſion by the Refuſal or ſuch a Heſitation of Moodajee Booſla as you ſhall deem ſufficient to warrant your declaring the Negociation ſuſpended. The future Renewal of this Negociation we reſerve to be determined by our expreſs Orders, but without revoking the Credentials and Inſtructions granted you reſpecting it.

All other Negociations, Treaties, and Plans of Military Operations not herein expreſly committed to your ſole Management, we leave to be formed and concluded under the regular Powers of the Government of Bombay; and we hereby direct you to execute whatever Military Service the Select Committee may think proper to require of you, and which you ſhall judge practicable; provided it ſhall not be contrary to our Inſtructions or to any exiſting Engagements.

Notwithſtanding the excluſive Powers we have granted you for the Purpoſe of negociating and concluding the Treaties before ſpecified, we direct you in all poſſible Caſes to avail yourſelf of ſuch Advice and Information as the Select Committee can afford you before you determine on the Execution of any Treaty ſeparately committed to your Charge.

We obſerve, with the higheſt Satisfaction, the Approbation which the Select Committee of Bombay expreſs at your Conduct, and the ready Diſpoſition which you have ſhewn to aſſiſt in the Execution of their Deſigns. It is with Pleaſure that we have reſolved to join with them, in recommending you to the Court of Directors for the Appointment of Commander in Chief at that Preſidency, whenever there may be a Vacancy; and, in the intermediate Time, we think it highly expedient, that you ſhould hold the Rank of Brigadier General, in order to enable you to carry on the Public Service with more Weight and Dignity, for which Purpoſe we have granted you a Brevet Commiſſion of Brigadier General, for the Service on which you are now employed.

(Signed) W. H.

Suppoſing this Letter to be conformable to that already reſolved on to the Select Committee at Bombay, I acquieſce.

(Signed) P. F.

I acquieſce under the ſame Suppoſition.

(Signed) E. W.

We have directed the Preſident and Select Committee at Bombay, to furniſh you with a Copy of the Cypher in which this Letter is written, and which we requeſt you will take particular Care of

Warren Haſtings.
P. Francis.
Edwd Wheler.

APPENDIX, N° 198, 199, 200, 201.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 21ſt June 1779.

At a Council; PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell, }
Philip Francis, } Eſquires.
Edward Wheler, }
Sir Eyre Coote indiſpoſed.

Read the following Letter from Mr. Horſley:

The Honourable the Governor General and Council.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

Had I been permitted to wait on you, and to make my Repreſentations to you on the Subjects on which I had deſired to be heard, previous to your taking your Reſolutions, I was prepared to point out to you the great and inſurmountable Objections which I thought lay againſt Colonel Goddard's ſeparate, independant, and plenipotentiary Powers, as marked in ſuch of your Letters to Bombay as I had then ſeen; but I could not be at all prepared for the great Extenſion meant to be given to thoſe Powers. Now, upon the firſt Communication of the Draft of your propoſed Letter to the Governor and Select Committee of Bombay, for what Purpoſe it is communicated, I muſt acknowledge, I am far from certain; though I ſhould flatter myſelf that I ſhould not be laid under the Neceſſity, either of deſerting the Rights and Intereſts of the Government, by which I am entruſted, or of hazarding my Opinion and Arguments againſt ſuch Authority as yours, if the Service could receive no Benefit. From the hard Choice I am to make, I will therefore take the Liberty of ſtating ſomewhat at large, though haſtily, the general Objections I conceive to be againſt the Powers you wiſh to confer on Colonel Goddard, as well as the particular Parts of the propoſed Letter to Bombay, which ſeem to me likely to prove detrimental to the Public Service; I ſhall flatter myſelf to meet with your Indulgence in uſing that Freedom which a Queſtion of Right requires.

However unwillingly I may enter on this Queſtion, yet I perceive it may have its Uſe. Upon the Information of a Perſon ſo inconſiderable, that no Contrariety of Opinion can produce Diſpute, or the moſt remote Appearances of Oppoſition, you will be able to judge of the Differences you may give Riſe to, by the Orders you are now about to ſend to Bombay. What I have to offer will be allowed its own Weight and Importance at leaſt; and in that Caſe, I may perhaps have the Satisfaction to think, that I have contributed to move the Grounds of Animoſities and Contention, which might have had the moſt ruinous Conſequences to the Service.

Permit me, on the other Hand, to hope that your Board will make ſome Allowance for the Diſadvantage the Government of Bombay are under, on a Subject of ſo great Moment to them. The ſame Arguments from them would certainly carry a Force which I cannot pretend to give them; they would probably be able to offer more and better, and ſtate them more forcibly: At preſent however the Taſk can only be performed by me, and it is my Duty to execute it to the beſt of my Ability.

I muſt however previouſly beg, Gentlemen, that you will be pleaſed to recollect, that in claiming for the Government of Bombay the Rights they hold under Act of Parliament, as well as by the ſpecial Orders of the Court of Directors, and their plain and evident Intentions, I do not take upon me to ſay, what Lengths the Government of Bombay may think proper to go in Support of them: I know their Moderation ſo well, that I am ſure the Public Welfare will be their firſt and principal Care, however they may think their legal Rights invaded, or with whatever Diſreſpect they may conceive themſelves treated.

The general Objections I take the Liberty of offering to your Conſideration on the Subject of the Powers you propoſe for Colonel Goddard, ſeparate from the Government of Bombay, independant of it, and plenipotentiary on the ſpecial Concerns of that Preſidency, are, that they are illegal; that they are inconſiſtent with other eſtabliſhed and acknowledged legal Powers; that they are inexpedient, and tend to produce the moſt dangerous Confuſion in the Company's Affairs.

The legal Power of this Government over the other Preſidencies, I preſume is all comprized in One ſhort Clauſe in the regulating Act, and is defined to be that of ſuperintending and controlling in the Caſes of War, Peace, and Negociation, by granting or withholding their Conſent and Approbation of the Meaſures of the other Governments. They have no direct Agency at Bombay, the executive Powers of the Government there being lodged, as before the Act paſſed, in the Governor and Council. The very Words, "Superintendance and Controul," in themſelves imply an intermediate Power, and in this Caſe the Superintendance and Controul is ſaid to be *ſo far, and in ſo much* as is above expreſſed, that is, *no farther, and no more.* The Means by which the Governor General and Council may enforce their legal Orders, even in caſe of Diſobedience, are marked with the greateſt Preciſion; they may ſuſpend the Governor and Council from their Offices: It is not ſaid

they may appoint Agents of their own to carry their Orders into Execution. Five Perſons nominated in the Act are intruſted with theſe Powers of Superintendance and Controul, which are limited not only by the expreſs Words of the Act, but by the abſolute Neceſſity impoſed by the Diſtance at which they muſt be exerciſed. Can it be ſuppoſed that while other leſſer Powers are ſo exactly defined, the greateſt of all, that of transferring the Power of the whole Council General to one Man, and exerciſing it on the Spot by Delegation, can belong to this Board, without the ſmalleſt Mention made of it in the Act of Parliament? The Governor General and Council I believe would demur to yield the Civil or Military Government of Bengal, Bahar or Orixa, to any Perſon who could produce no other Authority than the Orders of the Court of Directors for it. Yet it is eaſy to prove that the General Authority of the Court of Directors would better ſupport a Claim of this Sort, than the limited Authority of the Governor General and Council juſtify an Extenſion of it like that now propoſed.

The Court of Directors are bound to furniſh His Majeſty's Miniſters with all Information concerning the State of their Revenues, and all Civil and Military Affairs of their Governments: The Governor General and Council are directed and required to pay Obedience to all ſuch Orders as they may receive from the Court of Directors: And the Governor and Council of Bombay are directed and required to pay Obedience to the Orders that they may receive from the Governor General and Council on certain particular Subjects, and to a certain defined Extent and Degree. I do not find that His Majeſty's Miniſters, the Court of Directors, the Governor General and Council, or the Governor and Council of Bombay, can of their own Authority appoint Subſtitutes or Deputies to exerciſe their great Truſts. The only Thing ſimilar to ſuch a Power in the whole Act, is the Right the Court of Directors poſſeſs to authorize the inferior Preſidency to act in Peace, War, and Negociation, without waiting for the Conſent and Approbation of the Governor General and Council; and this Privilege given to the Court of Directors, who are ſpecially confined in the Exerciſe of it to confer this extraordinary Authority only on the legal Agents of the Company at the inferior Preſidencies, affords one of the plaineſt and ſtrongeſt Arguments of Induction that can be, that the Governor General and Council cannot take from the Governors and Councils of thoſe Preſidencies their Agency in their ſeveral Governments.

In ſhort, the expreſs Words of the Act give the Governor General and Council a Negative in the political Concerns of the other Preſidencies, and as expreſsly ſay they ſhall claim *no more*; and the evident Intention is, that while Bengal is conſidered as the moſt valuable of the Britiſh Poſſeſſions in India, and has a Preference given it ſuitable to its ſuperior Importance; no one Government is to be left to the Mercy of another, the Members of which have perhaps no Intereſt in its Welfare or Biaſſes contrary to it.

Give me Leave, Gentlemen, in this Place to remark again to you, that the Governor and Council of Bombay, ſo far from ſtanding on their ſtrict legal Rights, where they have conceived it for the Good of the Service to yield a greater Authority to your Board than the Act obliged them to do, have ſince the firſt Eſtabliſhment of the Council General, conſtantly allowed you to take the Lead in their Affairs, and have followed your Directions with regard to War, Peace, and all Points of Policy, for which I know only Two Reaſons that can be given; they might eaſily hope to gain your Confidence, by making this Sacrifice to that Jealouſy on your Part with which the preſent Intercourſe between the Two Boards firſt began: Or from a Principal of Moderation (which is not entitled to the leſs Praiſe on account of the little Shew ſo humble a Virtue makes in the World) they determined to yield every Thing of their own, rather than riſk any Intereſt of the Public.

I muſt crave your Patience, Gentlemen, while this very painful Subject leads me to point at the Inconſiſtency of the Powers you propoſe to confer on Colonel Goddard, with other eſtabliſhed and acknowledged legal Powers.

Such are the Powers granted by the Court of Directors to the Select Committee, who are evidently thereby ſet above the Controul of any Delegate from hence. The Select Committee do not ſay they are ſet above the Superintendance and Controul of your Board; they have acknowledged your Powers, and referred to them; yet I would wiſh it to be remembered, that they are ſo far ſuperior to the Superintendance and Controul of Colonel Goddard, or any other Delegate from hence, that were they diſpoſed to ſtart Queſtions of Right and Power, perhaps the ſpecial Orders of the Court of Directors (a Caſe provided for by the Act) might bear an Interpretation of ſtill greater Latitude. I hope I ſhall not be miſunderſtood; I only wiſh to juſtify myſelf, and the Government for which I act, by ſhewing from Example the Difference between their Claims and thoſe which Men of unruly Tempers might aſſert.

By the ſpecial Appointment of the Court of Directors, the Select Committee is impowered *to tranſact all political, military, and naval Affairs, and likewiſe all ſuch as may require Secrecy. Every Perſon in the Service of the Company, or enjoying their Protection civil or military, are enjoined implicitly to obey all Orders of the Select Committee, under Pain of Suſpenſion from the Service, or of forfeiting the Company's Licence and Protection: And if the Select Committee ſhall think fit to ſuſpend any Perſon or Perſons from the Service, ſuch Perſon or Perſons ſhall not be reſtored otherwiſe than by the ſaid Committee, except by Order of the Court of Directors.* By the ſeparate, independent, and plenipotentiary Powers granted by you to Colonel Goddard, he is to tranſact the moſt important of the political, military, naval, and ſecret Affairs of the Preſidency of Bombay: He is inveſted with the independant Command of an Army within the Limits of that Government; and yet at the ſame Time, by the Orders of the Court

Court of Directors, he is enjoined to obey implicitly all Orders of the Select Committee, under Pain of Suſpenſion from the Service, and of becoming incapable of being reſtored but by the Select Committee, or by the Order of the Court of Directors.

Theſe Orders, authorized as the King's Miniſters are to require all Information concerning the Government of this Country, we can be certain were communicated to them. Could it have eſcaped them and the Court of Directors, and the many able Men whoſe Hands they muſt have paſſed through, if the Eſtabliſhment of a Select Committee had been ſubject to Inconſiſtencies like theſe? could it be foreſeen and ſuffered, that the Commander in Chief of all His Majeſty's Forces in India, as well as the Company's, might by the unlucky Concurrence of the contrary Authorities of the Governor General and Council and the Select Committee, be rendered ſubject to the Controul of any Servant, civil or military, whom you might appoint your Delegate? For the abſolute Inconſiſtency of theſe Two Appointments, the Select Committee and your Bombay Plenipotentiary, appears with double Force from the Terms of Sir Eyre Coote's Appointment to the chief Command of all the Company's Forces in India; according to which, *whenever he is preſent at any of the Company's Settlements where there is a Select Committee, he muſt have a Seat as Second at any ſuch Select Committee, and a Vote on all Queſtions and Occaſions whatever.* In conſequence of this Order, I believe Sir Eyre Coote lately ſat at Madras in the Select Committee there; and I refer to yourſelves, Gentlemen, whether you could then have conceived it poſſible, that he or the Board, in the Powers of which his were at that Time involved, could have been made ſubordinate to any Perſon acting under deputed Powers from hence? The Reſpect due to his diſtinguiſhed Rank and Character, the Memory of his former great Services, and his Seat in the Council General, muſt no Doubt add conſiderable Weight to the Sentiments he might expreſs in the Select Committee; yet the actual conſtitutional Rights of the Committee remain the ſame, whether he is a Member or no; and while he is of the Number, he is himſelf bound by the Reſolutions of the Majority. Now in this Reſpect therefore the Powers conferred on Colonel Goddard are greater than even Sir Eyre Coote's could be, if he were on the Spot himſelf; for as he muſt be of the Select Committee, he could poſſeſs no Powers ſeparate, independant, and plenipotentiary, within the Limits of their Government.

If Sir Eyre Coote were now at Bombay, Colonel Goddard's military Command would indeed be loſt in the Commander in Chief's; yet he would ſtill controul his General in the Cabinet, if the Powers he exerciſes are legal. But I correct myſelf. I believe there is no Perſon in any Branch of the Service, much leſs Colonel Goddard, ſo ſhameleſs as to act under ſuch Powers; no one who would not carry all the Wax and Parchment from which he derived his Authority, and lay them at the Feet of the great Man, to whoſe Name and Services they were a Reproach. But will a great Government, through Choice, adopt Meaſures which are only to be corrected by the Senſe every Individual muſt have of their Inconſiſtency?

I have run through theſe Two Parts of my Subject; I have choſen rather to enumerate Heads of Argument, than to extend my Letter to a Volume: By giving myſelf full Scope, I wiſh to relieve myſelf as ſoon as poſſible from a Taſk, where I find my Judgment ſo much in Oppoſition to the Reſpect I owe you; for in ſpite of all my Deference for your Opinions, I muſt conclude, that as far as the Act of Parliament, and the Orders of the Court of Directors, are legal Obligations on your Board, in the ſame Degree are the Powers propoſed to be granted to Colonel Goddard illegal. That the Senſe of His Majeſty's Miniſters and the Court of Directors, as far as they can be judged of from the Orders to which they have given their Sanction, are on my Side; becauſe thoſe Orders are evidently contradictory and inconſiſtent upon other Principles: That granting the Powers propoſed to be given to Colonel Goddard legal (which would ſeem to me the moſt prodigal Conceſſion that was ever made in Argument;) yet the Indecency and Impropriety (pardon me the Expreſſions, Gentlemen) of this delegated Authority, are ſo ſtriking with reſpect to the Perſon who is unqueſtionably in the Second Degree at leaſt of public Truſt and Authority here, and in general through him to your whole Board, as well as to another public Body, which however inferior will ſtill I hope be thought entitled to ſome Marks of Reſpect or Attention, that ſome further Modification of theſe extraordinary Powers, which I am yet unacquainted with, muſt be intended.

I did flatter myſelf, that in a Time like the preſent, I ſhould not have ſeen ſo great an Indiſpoſition as I have, from all Union of Powers and Intereſts with us on the Part of this Government. On the Part of the Select Committee, I muſt declare, I do not know a ſingle Inſtance, in which they have had any Opportunity of expreſſing their Inclination of joining themſelves to you, on your own Terms, and for your own Purpoſes, wherein they have been wanting. I think you cannot produce one yourſelves. However, Bombay muſt ſubmit: Confidence and Harmony cannot be brought about by the Efforts of One Party only. You will have all good Wiſhes from our Side of India, for the proſperous Courſe of Affairs, according to your own Syſtem, for the Sake of the Public, and we ſhall hope theſe at leaſt will give you no Offence. The Sentiments of the Select Committee ſeem indeed to differ from yours (I am ſorry to ſay it) as far as *Things* moſt oppoſite, as Union and Diſſenſion. The Queſtion concerning the Powers of this Government over that of Bombay, may be decided here in a Quarter of an Hour; but if the Matter really comes into Diſpute, the Debate muſt be managed acroſs the Continent of India, and in the mean Time the Service muſt ſuffer. I ſhould have hoped you would have thought this a Hazard, which it was worth ſome Conſideration to avoid. You confide, and I can aſſure you very juſtly, that the Select Committee will make it an Object of their's: Perhaps they may even make no Oppoſition to the Powers aſſumed by your Board; yet can it be expected that they will unite thoſe they ſtill poſſeſs, cordially

or

or confidentially with a Body that treats them with every Mark of Diſtruſt? The ſlighteſt Appearance of a Separation of Intereſts between this Government and us, will probably have the worſt Conſequences. The intriguing and ſubtle Character of the Marattas is well known. No People are more quick-ſighted in remarking Diviſions; on the Uſe to be made of which all their own Politics turn. They muſt perceive the moſt evident Marks of it between you and the Government of Bombay; they will poſſibly preſume on it; and nothing is more likely therefore than this very Circumſtance, to force you into a War you ſay you wiſh to avoid. The Marattas have not forgot how they made Peace on their own Terms before, when they were ready to have purchaſed it with any Conceſſion we could have deſired. They account for this themſelves I believe on Principles very different from thoſe of Moderation, on which I preſume the Governor General and Council acted.

The Attention paid you by the Government of Bombay, in the moſt eſſential Points, intitle them to expect ſome Marks of it from you, with regard to their conſtitutional Rights. They certainly hoped, that the Confidence repoſed by you in Colonel Goddard, and that ſhewn him at Bombay, which while they thought due to his Merit, they flattered themſelves would have been received here as it was meant, as the Expreſſion on their Part of their Readineſs to give their Confidence to any Perſon on whom the Governor General and Council had beſtowed their's: They hoped, I ſay, that this mutual Confidence in the ſame Perſon, which they thought perfectly well placed, would ſerve as a Bond of Union between the Two Boards. They expected that Colonel Goddard's deliberative Seat in the Select Committee would enable them to inform themſelves conſtantly of the general Sentiments and Principles of this Government, from a Perſon they believed well acquainted with them, more particularly and fully than they had ever yet been able; and to theſe they wiſh at all Times to pay all Manner of Deference. But if a Conduct of this Sort procures them no adequate Return from thoſe with whom they have expreſſed the moſt unreſerved Inclination to unite; if this Government refuſes all Manner of Connection with them but that of unlimited Rule; if this Superiority is to be exerciſed with ſo little Moderation, that it is to be granted away at all Times, and to all Perſons, I cannot tell what Courſe is left for the Governor and Council, that is both ſafe and honourable for themſelves, and uſeful to the Service. They muſt either renounce and deſert their Truſt, or they muſt engage in an Oppoſition, which muſt have the moſt dangerous Conſequences. The Governor General and Council I hope will do them the Juſtice to acknowledge, that they forced them to this difficult Alternative.

I muſt next preſume, Gentlemen, to take Notice of the particular Parts of the propoſed Letter to Bombay, which ſeem to me likely to prove detrimental to the public Service: I ſhould wiſh to leave, as much as poſſible, what I have ſaid above to be applied generally to thoſe Parts of the Letter which refer to Colonel Goddard's Powers; yet I foreſee I cannot enter on Particulars without returning to the ſame Argument. And in the firſt Place give me Leave to repeat the Requeſt I made you in my laſt Letter, that you would pleaſe to make the Directions you ſend to the Select Committee on this and all other Points as clear and expreſs as poſſible; in which Reſpect I own there appears ſome Deficiency to my Underſtanding: And I fear extremely, that whenever Affairs go amiſs, the Select Committee may fall under your Cenſure for counteracting your Deſigns, or miſapprehending your Intentions, when they may perhaps be altogether ignorant that you had ever communicated either Deſign or Intention.

You are pleaſed to ſay, Gentlemen, (Par. 5.) that in caſe of War *you leave a Latitude of Action to Colonel Goddard under the Inſtruction of the Select Committee:* I think the Select Committee will be very much at a Loſs, obſerving how you have diſpoſed of their whole Department in favour of Colonel Goddard, to know what Subjects they are on which you chuſe that they ſhould give Colonel Goddard Inſtructions; eſpecially when in the ſame Paragraph they are informed, that *you have left the Latitude of Action, not to them, but to Colonel Goddard. That he is to avail himſelf of the Situation which Fortune may preſent: That it muſt reſt with him who is reſponſible to you for his Conduct to adopt any Part or the Whole of Mr. Hornby's Plan laid down in his Minute of the 30th March, or not at all, as he may think moſt adviſable.*

The Governor and Select Committe will wiſh likewiſe to be informed, whether in that emphatical Parentheſis which informs them, *that Colonel Goddard is reſponſible to you for his Conduct*, your Meaning is, that he is not reſponſible to them. The Select Committee may perhaps think it proper to direct Colonel Goddard to publiſh in his Army the Orders of the Honourable the Court of Directors, which enjoin all the Servants of the Company, Civil and Military, to obey the Select Committee within the Limits of the Government of Bombay, and veſt immediately in them a Power of Suſpenſion, as you may have very juſtly obſerved in your Letter. Leſt they ſhould do this, I muſt take the Liberty to ſay, that I think it would be but common Juſtice to Colonel Goddard, to inſtruct him what Degree of Obedience it is your Pleaſure he ſhould pay to the Orders of the Court of Directors if you expect him to diſobey them. If he receives a Counterpart of your Letter to the Select Committee of Bombay, that Expreſſion implying, that *he is to be under the Inſtructions of the Select Committee*, I ſhould ſuppoſe muſt be a very embarraſſing one to him.

In the laſt Paragraph but one of your propoſed Letter, you inform the Select Committee that *you have directed Colonel Goddard to execute whatever Service they ſhall think it proper to require, which he ſhall think practicable, and which ſhall not be contrary to your Inſtructions to any exiſting Engagement.* Permit me to obſerve to you, on this Mark of Attention to the Select Committee, that while your whole Inſtructions are directed to one ſingle Point; that is to ſay, to compel them to yield up their whole Authority into the Hands of Colonel Goddard; while they are removed from all Charge

and

and Care of Engagements either actually exiſting or likely to take place; and even refuſed all Right of judging of the Propriety of executing either in Whole, or in Part, or at all, a Plan of Operations propoſed by their Preſident, they cannot ſuppoſe you really mean, that they ſhall be Judges of the Propriety of any Service whatever.

I have ſaid that your Inſtructions to the Select Committee are directed to one ſingle Point, viz. to compel them to yield up their whole Authority into the Hands of Colonel Goddard. I think this is the Light in which they muſt appear to any Perſon who takes a general View of Colonel Goddard's Charge.

He commands an Army independantly of the Government of Bombay within their Government; of courſe he pays, augments, and diminiſhes Cantons, removes, or remains with his Army, at his own Choice and Pleaſure.

The Execution and Negociation of the projected Treaty of Peace with the Poona Miniſtry is given to his ſole Charge; that is to ſay, a Treaty, every Article of which relates peculiarly or principally to the Preſidency of Bombay.

The ſeparate Negociation with Madjee Scindia is left alſo to his Charge, though the Point on which this Negociation turns, is on a Claim of his to a Poſſeſſion of the Preſidency of Bombay, acquired at a Time when that Government was entirely independant of this, and of which, therefore, the Governor General and Council can have no more Pretenſion to diſpoſe, than of the Caſtle and Iſland of Bombay.

If in the Event of War Madjee Scindia ſhall be diſpoſed to take Part with us (I preſume both Preſidencies are included in that Word) *Colonel Goddard is authorized to form our Engagements with him.*

The Negociation and Treaty of Alliance with Madajee Booſla is left to the ſole Management of Colonel Goddard. In this Negociation and Treaty too the Government of Bombay is eventually intereſted in its moſt eſſential Concerns.

If the Poona Miniſters ſhall reject the Propoſals which are to be made to them, a Latitude of Action is left to Colonel Goddard. He is to avail himſelf of the Situation Fortune may preſent. It reſts with him to adopt any Part, or the Whole of Mr. Hornby's Plan of Operations, or reject it altogether; and in fine, it is implied, that he is reſponſible only to your Board.

In all other Negociations, Treaties, and Plans of Military Operations, you profeſs your Wiſh ſo to blend the Powers of your Government with that of Bombay in the Direction of them, and in every formal and occaſional Inſtrument which they may require for their Ratification, as to preſerve the Credit and diſtinct Reſponſibility of both, and to make both the Pledges for the faithful Obſervance of them.

The Members of the Government of Bombay will know how to judge for themſelves from the Example before them, in what Manner the Powers of the Two Governments are meant to be blended. I will not venture any Obſervation on a Paſſage in which (far as I am removed from Truſts that awake Ambition) I feel all the Bitterneſs of the Irony.

It is a Matter of the utmoſt Concern to me, to be obliged to offer any Objection againſt a Reſolution of your's, which ſeems intended to diſtinguiſh Colonel Goddard, for whoſe Character I have the higheſt Reſpect, and whoſe Merits I know to be no where more ſenſibly felt, nor his Honour more heartily wiſhed, than at Bombay. But I muſt acknowledge that I am utterly ignorant of the Right by which you have thought proper to diſpoſe of the Rank of Brigadier General ſpecially confined to our Settlement; and I am the more alarmed at it, becauſe I do not ſee that the Acquieſcence of the Governor and Council can be ſufficient to procure Submiſſion to it, even if they ſhould be diſpoſed to yield Pre-eminence to you, in an Inſtance wherein their Authority is fully equal to your own, whatever your Superiority may be in other Caſes. The Military Commiſſions granted by the Governor and Council of Bombay, and by the Governor and Council of Madras, are unqueſtionably of the ſame Validity as your's, and the Rank they give equally eſtabliſhed in the King's Company's Troops. That they or the Officers of thoſe Preſidencies therefore can ſubmit to this Innovation, I own I think impoſſible. Had you been pleaſed to grant your Brevet to Colonel Goddard, without limiting it to our Eſtabliſhment, I am certain the Diſtinction conferred on him would have been received with univerſal Approbation at Bombay; but as the Promotion appears at preſent, it will be underſtood only as a Precedent for rendering all Rank in our Military Service precarious. The like Partiality will be expected to be extended in favour of every Officer of your Eſtabliſhment, if this Innovation is ſubmitted to; and this Interpretation will be the more natural, as the independant Command you have given to Colonel Goddard over your own Troops, and his preſent Rank, ſuperior to that of every Officer on our Eſtabliſhment except Colonel Egerton, will make your Meaſure appear quite unneceſſary, except it be to anſwer ſome concealed Purpoſe. In caſe of the Arrival of any Officer at Bombay of a Rank that might entitle him to command Colonel Goddard, but for the local Rank you confer on him, I do apprehend he would not give up his Pretenſions out of Reſpect to Colonel Goddard's Brevet. The Governor and Council of Bombay will aſk, and I think the Queſtion will deſerve an Anſwer, Whether you would admit the ſame Right in them to give to one of their Officers acting on Detachment here a local Rank which he did not hold in our Eſtabliſhment; and if you would not, they would be glad to know on what you ground the Diſtinction in your own Favour? Of all the Steps that could be taken, this appears to me that which is likely to be productive of the greateſt Confuſion, Animoſity, and a Train of Conſequences that will not admit

of being tempered by the Moderation of the Government of Bombay, which, in other Cafes, may perhaps be expected to afford the ſame Remedy.

The Governor and Select Committee had joined in a very earneſt Recommendation to you of Colonel Goddard, for ſome Diſtinction expreſſive of your and their Senſe of his Services; I confeſs I ſhould have thought it a very ſtriking Inſtance of your Determination to unite with them in nothing, that a Recommendation, which ſeemed perfectly agreeable to your own Sentiments, ſhould not ſeem to you even to deſerve the common Civility of an Anſwer, had I not been equally ſenſible that, while every Diſtinction you are pleaſed to confer on Colonel Goddard is a Spoil ſeized from the Government of Bombay, and from the Servants of that Preſidency, it would have been extremely difficult to have made them any Compliment on the Occaſion, which would have looked ſerious.

Had you been pleaſed, Gentlemen, from the firſt to have made the Government of Bombay the Inſtrument in your Plans of War, Peace, and Policy, as far as they were connected with our Preſidency I believe you would have had no Cauſe to repent it: And had you tried the Force of Recommendation, when there was Reaſon to doubt of your Authority to give Orders, I am ſure you would not have found it leſs effectual. Even in the more immediate Concerns of the Bengal Government, which it might be neceſſary to manage within the Limits of the Bombay Preſidency, or where Bombay Agents were eſtabliſhed the Members of the Government, they would not have conceived you could have thought it an overſtrained Mark of Attention to their Rank, Truſt, and the Conſequence neceſſary to be preſerved to them in their political Connections with their Neighbours, to commit the Company's Intereſts to them in Preference to inferior Agents: But however this might be, they could hardly have expected to ſee the Management of their own moſt immediate Concerns wreſted from them; ſtill, I believe, they might have acquieſced with a Sort of Cheerfulneſs, had this been done only by yourſelves, or in Circumſtances of Place and Connexion, which naturally threw their Buſineſs into the Hands of your Agents. But when they ſee your itinerant Commiſſions moving up and down and acroſs the Continent, for no other Purpoſe than to make or break Treaties for them, or manage their Affairs, which without Preſumption they may ſuppoſe their Situation, their Experience, and their Truſt, make them at leaſt as fit to manage themſelves, their Right of the Queſtion, I cannot ſay how far you may expect them to carry their Moderation; but I think you cannot need be told what their Feelings, and thoſe of every Man connected with them, are.

I know not what Succeſs my Repreſentations would have had; but if you had been pleaſed to have ſuffered me to be informed of the Objects of your Deliberation before your Reſolutions were formed, I ſhould think it would have been no Diſadvantage to have been acquainted how far the Hopes and Expectations of the Members of the Bombay Government went, with regard to the Meaſures you would adopt, in order to blind the Powers of the Two Governments.

I ſhould have repreſented to you, as I have now done, the Neceſſity which I conceived there was for Colonel Goddard and his Army being allowed dependant on the Government of Bombay.

With regard to the propoſed Treaty with the Maratta Miniſters, and the eventual Alliance with Madajee Scindia, I ſhould have ſtated my Reaſons for thinking theſe would, with moſt Propriety, be committed to the Select Committee, or at leaſt that their Right to judge of the Articles ſpecially relating to their Settlement ſhould be reſpected. I am ſenſible that the Event of both is important to each of the Preſidencies, and therefore that the Select Committee had no abſolute Right to inſiſt on the Management of them being left ſolely to their Board; and I could have informed you, that in caſe you determined not to allow the Government of Bombay to act for you, they were ſo well convinced of the Detriment that would probably follow to the public Service, by employing ſeparate Agents, and repoſed ſo entire a Confidence in Colonel Goddard, that I had every Reaſon to believe they would deſire him to charge himſelf with their Intereſts as well as yours. Perhaps I might not have made you ſo ſenſible as I wiſhed of the Difference between your ſeizing and the Select Committee yielding, but I ſhould have endeavoured it.

The Management of the Treaty with Madajee Scindia, for an Equivalent in lieu of the Gratification promiſed him at Worgaum, I confeſs, I ſhould have thought an inalienable Right of our Government, as it is a Subject of our own peculiar Concern. I ſhould have wiſhed too that it might not be taken out of the Hands of thoſe with whom it at preſent reſts, as Madajee Scindia's diſcerning that his Claim received Countenance from this Government, and is treated as a Matter of ſo much Importance by you, will probably make him more untractable, and leſs inclined to accept of moderate Terms. I ſhould have urged that there ſeemed no Reaſon to doubt of the Intentions of the Government of Bombay to act agreeably to the Sentiments of your Board, ſince in fact Mr. Hornby had himſelf firſt prepared the Meaſure of treating with Scindia for an Equivalent, and expreſſed in very ſtrong Terms his Senſe of the Difference which ought to be made between the Derbar and him. With regard to the Ceſſions promiſed to each, give me Leave, Gentlemen, now to ſuggeſt to you, that in my Opinion ſome Caution ought to be given againſt yielding any Thing to Scindia, till it is certain whether we are to have Peace or War, and what Part he reſolves to take. I ſhould wiſh therefore very much that this Matter were left open for your future Determination, if you reſolve ſtill to withhold your Confidence from the Select Committee; becauſe, highly as I know Colonel Goddard to be thought of, and however well inclined I left the Members of our Government to him, yet on the Footing you have put Things betwixt them, I think it is impoſſible they can be on good Terms; and in Times of Ill-humour and Diſſenſion, I obſerve that Secrets

are generally ill kept among the diſcordant Parties. In this Caſe it is of great Importance that Madjee Scindia ſhould not know what you have reſolved on. I ſubmit to you theſe Reaſons for thinking this Treaty, if left in the Hands of the Government of Bombay, would be managed to better Advantage, and be more likely eſpecially to anſwer the End of procuring the Releaſe of our Hoſtages. The Gentlemen at Bombay would beſt judge with regard to the Advantage of treating there or at Madjee Scindia's Durbar, and if at the latter, would probably render it ſubſervient to the Purpoſe above-mentioned, by employing Mr. Farmer in it, who I believe you, Gentlemen, will think well qualified for ſuch a Truſt. With regard to the Negociation and Treaty of Alliance with Moodajee Bouncello, I might have acquainted you that I was perſuaded the Select Committee would be well ſatisfied to ſee them left in the Hands of Colonel Goddard. The Difference between theſe and the other Subjects of Negociation is very great. The Government of Bombay had never any Intercourſe with the Court of Berar. The Plan of an Alliance with Moodajee Bouncello, was entirely your own; Colonel Goddard was deputed to him long before he arrived within the Limits of our Government, and the Intercourſe that has already paſſed between them is a good Reaſon for continuing the Negociation in the ſame Channel. I ſhould indeed have thought that the Reſpect with which public Bodies commonly treat the Rights of each other, would have rendered it adviſable to give ſome Sort of Explanation of this Kind to the Select Committee, and to have recommended it to them to have commiſſioned or inſtructed Colonel Goddard with regard to the particular Intereſt of their Government, according to the Principles you might determine on for them.

As to the Plan of Operations propoſed by Mr. Hornby, or any other that might be formed in caſe of War, I ſhould certainly have ſuppoſed they would have been left ſubject to the Judgment and Diſcretion of the Select Committee, whom I think you had ſeen as deſirous of receiving Colonel Goddard's Sentiments on all Occaſions, and of regulating themſelves accordingly, as you could poſſibly deſire. I ſhould have made no Doubt either of his general Reſponſibility to our Government.

I ſhould have repreſented to you the Probability of the Command in Chief of the Forces at our Preſidency being vacated, either by the Sentence of a Court Martial or by a Vote of Suſpenſion, and that the Select Committee would probably think the Office too important in the preſent Times and Circumſtances to remain vacant, or be filled by mere Chance; I ſhould have wiſhed very much that Colonel Goddard were left free to accept of this Appointment from the Governor and Council of Bombay, which he cannot now do, according to the ſeparate and independent Powers you propoſe giving him, as they would be incompatible with his Seat and Voice in the Select Committee, which he would have of courſe, on being inveſted with the chief Command of the Bombay Troops.

Your Letter to Bombay ſeems framed on very different Principles; it is a flat Refuſal of all Union of Powers and Intereſts with the Government of Bombay: It places inſurmountable Bars between the Select Committee and Colonel Goddard, and renders him and his Army rather Objects of Apprehenſion and Jealouſy than of Hope and Confidence; it ſeems to provide that the Diſſenſions ſhall ſpread as wide as poſſible. Every Officer muſt, perhaps every private Soldier and Sepoy may, become ſenſible of the perſonal Injury afforded to him in the Inſtance of Colonel Goddard's Brevet. That ill Conſequences muſt follow is no very hazardous Prediction; but that they are to be expected at a Time when our Situation and Strength is ſuch, as to give the faireſt Proſpects of honourable Peace or ſucceſsful War, is a Circumſtance of which I cannot but feel the Aggravation; and the only Conſolation I ſee, if theſe are your ultimate Reſolutions, is, that when it becomes a Subject of Enquiry how ſo great an Undertaking as the March acroſs the Continent of India, though performed with Succeſs, came to fail in all the good Effects that might have been expected from it, the Cauſe will be as evident as the Fact: That this Enterprize, by the Orders now propoſed to be given, was diverted from its public Purpoſes, or directed to them but as ſecondary Objects: That to diſplay and flatter that Supremacy which this Government is pleaſed to aſſume, was made the firſt; and that purſued at the Expence of Diviſions, by which the joint Force of the Preſidencies was ruined, which were foreſeen, and might have been eaſily avoided.

I flatter myſelf you will pardon the Trouble I give you. The Freedom I have uſed I hope will not give Offence, ſince my only Inducement to it is the Opinion, that it may be uſeful to the Service, either now or hereafter, that you ſhould be acquainted with Sentiments which are not thoſe of the Members of the Bombay Government only, but I believe I may venture to ſay are adopted generally on our Side of India; and unleſs you received them from ſome Individual ſheltered under the Humbleneſs of his Station, I thought it probable you might ſtill remain uninformed of them, ſince it would hardly ſuit with the Decorum and Gravity of a public Body to enter into ſo minute a Diſcuſſion, particularly if they could not entertain ſome Hopes of being attended to, which ſoon after the Receipt of the Letter propoſed to be written to Bombay, I ſhould think very vain ones.

I beg you to believe, that if any Expreſſions have eſcaped me that you may judge at all wanting in the Reſpect I owe you, they have been entirely owing to Accident, and the Haſte in which I have been obliged to write this long Letter, for fear your's to Bombay ſhould be ſent before mine was finiſhed. Permit me to your Acceptance of the ſame Apology for all other Errors and Inaccuracies.

Calcutta,
18th June 1779.

I have the Honour, &c.
(Signed) G. Horſley.

The

The Secretary lays before the Board a Letter from Mr. Horſley, addreſſed to himſelf as follows:

To William Bruere, Eſquire.

Sir,

I muſt requeſt you to return me my Letter to the Honourable the Governor General and Council, dated the 18th Inſtant, or that you will pleaſe to be at the Trouble of making the following Corrections in it before it is publicly read, which is all I want it for:

Towards the Concluſion of the laſt Paragraph but Two you will obſerve theſe Words: "That this mighty Enterprize was directed to no fuller Purpoſe but as a ſecondary Object." Inſtead of which I deſire to ſubſtitute the following: "That this Enterprize, by the Orders now propoſed to be given, was diverted from its public Purpoſes, or directed to them but as ſecondary Objects."

Calcutta,
June 21ſt 1779.

I am, Sir, &c.
(Signed) G. Horſley.

Agreed, That the Secretary be directed to make the propoſed Alterations in the Letter from Mr. Horſley.

N° 201.

GOVERNOR GENERAL—Although the Letter to the Select Committee of Bombay is not entirely conformable to the Line which I recommended, yet as the Sentiments which it contains come the neareſt to my own, I acquieſced in them preferably to the other Opinions which were delivered upon the Occaſion on which it was written; but I as little approve the Arguments which Mr. Horſley has oppoſed to it, as I do the Manner in which they were conveyed. Mr. Horſley has aſſumed one Fact for the Ground of his Objections to our late Reſolutions contained in the Draft of the Letter to the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay; namely, that the Inſtructions intended to be given to Colonel Goddard, relate to the Affairs of that Preſidency, and to Points of Duty eſſentially and excluſively appertaining to the Select Committee at Bombay, which by this Conſtruction is ſubjected to the Controul and Authority of Colonel Goddard.

This Conſtruction is neither warranted by the Subjects of our Letter, nor conformable to our Intentions. The Letter propoſed to be written to the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, comprizes Two general Subjects which belong eſſentially and excluſively to us. The Firſt relates to the Negociations for the Renewal of the Treaty of Peace already concluded between us and the Maratta State, in which the Preſidency of Bombay has only dependent Concern, and for the Formation of a Treaty with a Power with which that Preſidency hath not, nor ever had any Connection; and the Second to the Operations of Colonel Goddard's Detachment, which, though deſigned for the Protection and Benefit of the Preſidency of Bombay, muſt yet in their Effects involve the general Intereſt of the Company to whatever Purpoſes they may be applied. This Force is our own, and therefore the Right of directing its Services reſts unqueſtionably with us, and we alone are anſwerable for the Uſes which are made of it. This ſingle Remark appears to me to be a ſufficient Reply to all the Arguments contained in the long and elaborate Letter from Mr. Horſley; and if it is conformable to the Senſe of the other Members of the Board, it may be expreſſed as their general Obſervation upon it, with the following Reſolution which I recommend: That the Secretary be deſired to inform Mr. Horſley, that they did not require his Animadverſions upon their Meaſures, although they ſhould have been pleaſed to have received from him any Lights which he could have afforded them, and for which they were referred to him by the Preſident and Select Committee upon the Subject of Affairs of Bombay; that they have therefore thought it proper to repeal the Reſolution which they paſſed on the 31ſt May, to furniſh Mr. Horſley with Copies of all Letters to the Select Committee of Bombay, and of all the Reſolutions of the Board relative to that Preſidency in its Secret Departments; and that he has their Permiſſion to return to Bombay whenever he has fulfilled the Terms or Objects of his Miſſion.

Agreed to the Governor General's Propoſitions; and ordered, That the Secretary do notify the ſame to Mr. Horſley.

APPENDIX, N° 202.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 21ſt June 1779.

READ the following Letter from Brigadier General Goddard:

To the Honourable Warren Haſtings, Eſquire, Governor General, and Supreme Council.

Gentlemen,

I had the Honour to tranſmit you an Addreſs the 14th Inſtant, which went by Sea under Charge of Mr. Raitt, and will I hope have arrived ſafe before this can reach you. I am ſolicitous about your receiving that Diſpatch, becauſe accompanying it I have forwarded all the Returns and Paymaſter's Accounts of Diſburſements to the End of March, with other Papers for your Inſpection.

I have nothing material to communicate to you of the Situation of Affairs here, as they remain nearly in the ſame State as when I wrote you from Bombay. If the Chiefs at Poona have renewed their Demands upon, or made any late Propoſals to the Bombay Government, it is unknown to me, and for myſelf I have had no Correſpondence with them ſince my Arrival. According to the Reſolutions I informed you I had thought it proper to adopt, I ſhall wait your Inſtructions before I enter upon any Meaſures whatever. I am in the mean Time endeavouring to obtain the beſt Intelligence of what is tranſacting around me, and conſulting the Means moſt proper to be uſed in Proſecution of the Plan you may determine upon, whenever I can receive your Orders.

By confirmed Advices from Poona, the Diſſentions ſubſiſting among the Leaders open a Field for ſucceſsful Intrigue, excluſive of any Uſe that might be made of ſupporting Ragoba's Pretenſions, the aſſiſting which would, it is probable from paſt Experience, be the Means of uniting Parties rather than arming them againſt each other; and indeed, in his preſent Situation, might be altogether impolitic, although the Confinement of Sicceram, who was always ſuſpected of Partiality to the Intereſts of Ragoba, might give Reaſon to believe that Nannah Furneſe had removed every Object of Suſpicion, and ſtrengthened his Power beyond the Dread of any future Oppoſition. This Appearance of Security is in Reality moſt deceitful, for his whole Dependance is placed upon the Support of Scindia; and this Chief, beſides his known Reputation for Cunning and Duplicity, has exhibited a recent and manifeſt Proof of the Arts by which he means to maintain his own Influence in the Government, in the Part he took and ſtill takes regarding Ragonaut Row, whom he preſerved from Nannah's Reſentment, after the unfortunate Iſſue of the Expedition from Bombay had left him expoſed to the Malice of his Enemies, and whom he at this Time retains in his own Hands, to hold out in terrorem, ſhould he find the Party to which he is at preſent engaged aſſume an Independance dangerous to his own ambitious Views. Ragonaut Row was ſent from Poona, under the Charge of ſome of Scindia's Troops, and by the laſt Intelligence was within a few Miles of Burhampore, in the Neighbourhood of which it is ſaid he is to reſide during the Rains. It is difficult to reconcile the Conduct of Scindia on this Occaſion, upon any other Grounds than what I have above ſuppoſed; his Profeſſions to Ragoba have been moſt fair and flattering, and he has even gone ſo far as to give him Hopes of befriending his Cauſe. This however, it is plain, he means nothing leſs than doing, and while he even ſuffers them to exiſt, his only Motive is politically to check the dangerous Preſumption for an Adminiſtration at preſent ſubject to his Controul, but when Circumſtances might ſo far favour at a future Period as to ſet his Power at Defiance.

With theſe Principles of Diſunion ſubſiſting among the Marattas, a more promiſing Occaſion than the preſent cannot offer itſelf for interfering in their Affairs; and though a Plan of Conqueſt ſo extenſive as the ſettling their Government, or diſpoſing of the chief Authority in it, might not, after the Opportunity lately loſt, be conſidered as political, or conſiſtent with the Company's Intereſt; I am aſſured that the Appearance of Hoſtilities on our Side will obtain a Compliance from them of any Demands you may think it neceſſary to make, either of Territory or Money, to reimburſe the Expences of your Armies upon the Claim eſtabliſhed by the Treaty of the Bombay Government with Ragonaut Row, or upon any other you may chooſe to found on their former Breach of Faith, and the hoſtile Conduct of their Subjects on my March.

I have hazarded theſe few Remarks on the Suppoſition only of a Failure in your intended Negociations with the Rajah of Berar, whom I ſtill hope, notwithſtanding the doubtful Part his Fears of the Miniſters after their Victory at Julliagong may have led him apparently to take, an Attention to his own Intereſt, and the Dread of your juſt Reſentments, will fix firm in the Meaſures he once I am perſuaded propoſed to adopt. I the leſs regret my want of Power at this Time to be fully explicit regarding Moodajee's preſent Sentiments, becauſe they muſt long ere this be clearly

diſcovered to you; and ſince the Return of his Vackeel, who went away inſtructed in every Point neceſſary to be communicated to his Maſter, I have received only One ſhort Letter from the Rajah, wherein he repeats his anxious Expectation of Diſpatches from your Government by which his Conduct will be directed. His Silence towards me may perhaps be accounted for from the Diſtance that now ſeparates us, and Motives of Fear leſt his Letter ſhould be intercepted and fall into the Hands of the Miniſterial Party through whoſe Country they muſt paſs.

It is neceſſary that I now ſay ſomething of the Province of Guzerat, whoſe favourable Situation, no leſs than Fertility and Extent, points it out as a moſt valuable and tempting Acquiſition to the Company on this Side of India. It is unneceſſary to trouble you with an Account of its Revenues and Riches, as theſe muſt be well known to you: What I mean to explain, is the Eaſe with which a Conqueſt might be now made of it; and the obvious Advantages will ſtrike you themſelves.

Futty Sing Guicawar, who at preſent poſſeſſes the greateſt Part of the Province, and ſhares it with the Marattas, although ſupported by their Power, has yet but a very weak and declining Authority, added to the Claim of Seniority by which an elder Brother, ſtill living, diminiſhes the Force of his uſurped Title. Another Brother, Govind Row, who holds Ahmedabad and its Dependencies, has always been at Variance with him, and is at this Time by no Means well inclined to his Intereſts: This has been ſecretly intimated to me ſince my Arrival. I am alſo well aware of the Uſe that might be made of the Nawab of Cambait: Many of the Principal Men of the Province have beſides communicated their Diſcontents and Readineſs to join the Forces of the Engliſh againſt Futty Sing. To theſe Advances my Replies, although tending to remove every Belief of Hoſtilities being intended againſt Guzerat, were calculated to give Encouragement in the Event of our Troops marching into it.

From the Circumſtances juſt mentioned, and other Obſervations I have been able to make, I am perſuaded that the Appearance of Arms, without any actual Exertion of their Force, would be ſufficient to bring this Province into the Subjection of the Company; but ſhould it be found otherwiſe, it is ſo ſituated for the Convenience of Supplies and Communication by Water, that it might with Eaſe be wreſted from the preſent Poſſeſſor, and maintained againſt him, though the whole Force of the Maratta Empire was joined to his Support.

I beg to acquaint you, that I have received no Letter from your Board of a later Date than the 5th of February, which leads me to apprehend they may have been intercepted on the Road.

Camp near Surat,
20th July 1779.

I have the Honour, &c. &c.
(Signed) Tho[s] Goddard.

Ordered, That the above Letter lie for Conſideration.

Warren Haſtings,
P. Francis,
Edw[d] Wheler.

APPENDIX, N° 203 and 204.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 2d Auguſt 1779.

READ a Letter from Brigadier General Goddard as follows:

Gentlemen,

I have within theſe few Days been honoured with the Receipt of your Letters of the 18th March and of the 5th of April: A Triplicate of the former, and Duplicate of the latter, has only yet come to hand; I am therefore apprehenſive the Originals may have met with ſome Accident on the Road, which has been the Cauſe of your Reſolutions not reaching me before. This Delay cannot however be productive of any Inconvenience, as you will have found by the Letters addreſſed you from Bombay; and particularly by the Contents of one wrote ſo recently as the 22d ultimo, that I had determined not to take any Steps whatever, till I had received your final Inſtructions upon a Knowledge of the Situation of Affairs on this Side of India, ſubſequent to the unfortunate Failure of the Bombay Enterprize.

As I am now fully informed of the Objects you wiſh to accompliſh, I ſhall neglect no Means conſiſtent with Propriety and the Honour of the Engliſh Name, and conformable to the Spirit of your Orders, which can be conducive to reſtore that Peace and good Underſtanding betwixt the Marattas and

and the Government of Bombay you ſo much deſire, and eſtabliſh the Alliance of that Nation with the Honourable Company on a permanent Foundation.

Having had no Correſpondence with the Poona Government ſince my Arrival, I am the leſs able to form any certain Conjecture of the Conduct they will follow, when your friendly Inclinations are communicated to them; but if a Concluſion may be drawn from the general Tenor of their Behaviour ſince the Superiority they lately acquired, there appears ſome Reaſon to ſuppoſe they will gladly embrace the Opportunity now offered them of ſecuring the Advantages Fortune has given them, by entering into an Alliance with the Engliſh.

The principal Obſtacle that now ſtrikes me, will be the Diſpoſal of Ragoba. It is not to be ſuppoſed they will conſent to reſtore him into our Hands; and I do not at preſent conceive any other Means by which his perſonal Safety can be provided for. However, of this I ſhall be hereafter better enabled to judge; and I ſhall literally conform to your Orders in making that an indiſpenſable Engagement.

My preſent Diſtance from Poona, and Ignorance of the real Diſpoſition of the Maratta Court, rendering it improper for me to leave the Army till that Point is aſcertained, I have, as the only leading Step as I can now take, wrote a Letter in the Name of the young Peiſhwa; Copy of which I beg to incloſe for your Peruſal. I have at the ſame Time addreſſed Nanah Furneeſe, the acting Miniſter, and at preſent poſſeſſed of all the Nominal Authority in the Maratta State.

I beg to aſſure you, I ſhall neglect no Means of obtaining from the Poona Court deciſive Information regarding their real Diſpoſition, which I will make a Point of doing in Time to communicate it to you, and receive your final Inſtructions upon a Knowledge of their Sentiments, before the Seaſon of military Operations arrives.

Should their Reply be favourable to the pacific Plan you have laid down, the clear Time already preſcribed in your Letter of the 5th April, has made me fully Maſter of the Views of your Government, which I ſhall conſtantly have in Mind. And in the mean Time I have wrote to the Gentlemen at Bombay, to explain to me the Situation in which the Proondur Treaty now ſtands; and how far the ſeveral Articles contained in it have been complied with.

It is at preſent unneceſſary to ſay more, than in a few Words to aſſure you of the grateful Senſe I have of the Confidence you have repoſed in me, which I ſhall endeavour to evince the Truth of by the unremitting Ardour with which I ſhall proſecute the Object you have directed my Attention to.

Suffer me only to add, that ſhould Obſtinacy or Preſumption on one Part, render my Efforts ineffectual, every Circumſtance in the Situation of Affairs concurs to promiſe an Iſſue no leſs favourable to the Intereſts of the Company by a Recourſe to Arms, than the Mode you have adopted of Negociation.

I ſhall not fail to communicate to you from Time to Time the ſmalleſt Occurrence of any Conſequence.

Camp near Surat,
2d June 1779.

I have the Honour to be, &c.
(Signed) Tho. Goddard.

N° 204.

Tranſlation of a Letter from Colonel Goddard to Pundit Purdhan Madharow Narain Paiſhwa; dated the 12th Day of Jemmad-ul-owel, or 29th June 1779.

After the uſual Addreſs and Compliments, it proceeds as follows:

At this Time Letters have arrived from the Governor General and Supreme Council of Bengal, in which they write, that Friendſhip and good Underſtanding has long ſubſiſted betwixt them and the Rulers of the Maratta State; according to which, a Part of their Armies under my Command have marched in Peace through your Dominions; and Differences having now ariſen betwixt your Government, and the Gentlemen of the Council at Bombay, they have appointed me to remove all Cauſe of Difference, and reſtore the Harmony formerly ſubſiſting betwixt you; for which Purpoſe they have made me their Miniſter, with full Powers to conclude a Treaty of Alliance on their Parts betwixt the Honourable Eaſt India Company and the Maratta Government, which ſhall be for the mutual Intereſt and Honour of both Parties, and endure like the Wall of Alexander to the lateſt Generation. I ſend you incloſed a Copy of the Writing by which they have delegated theſe Powers to me for your Peruſal and Satisfaction.

From the friendly Inclinations expreſſed by my Government, and my own Wiſhes to promote a good Underſtanding betwixt you, I am alſo well aſſured that you, agreeable to the Dictates of Wiſdom, and a Regard to the Happineſs of Mankind, will concur in the ſame amicable Sentiments, ſince it is a Circumſtance famed throughout the whole World, that the Engliſh, as they are ſincere and open in their Intentions, always continue firm, and perſevere in their Enmities and Friendſhips.

That

That no Time may be loſt in laying the Foundation of the Terms of the Treaty which is to unite the Engliſh and the Maratta Nation, I hope you will immediately ſend to me a confidential Perſon to whom I may communicate Particulars.

A true Tranſlation.
(Signed) Dal[ris] Watherſton,
Perſian Tranſlator.

A Letter was wrote at the ſame Time to Nannah Furneſe as Miniſter, and to the ſame Effect, but in more general Terms, referring him to the Peſhwa's Letter for Particulars.
(Signed) D. W.

APPENDIX, N° 205.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 8th July 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell, Philip Francis, Edward Wheler, } Eſquires,
Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote, K. B.

RECEIVED the following Letter from Brigadier General Goddard.

Gentlemen,

I had the Honour to addreſs you the 2d Inſtant, acquainting you with the Steps I had taken in Obedience to your Orders of the 5th April, for negociating with the Poona Government, which I hope will have reached you ſafe, and my Conduct been honoured with your Approbation.

The Intention of this is to communicate to you as early as poſſible an Event, extraordinary as unexpected, of which I have juſt received Intelligence.

Ragonaut Row, whoſe Surrender into the Hands of the miniſterial Party, ſeemed to have eſtabliſhed them ſecurely in their Government, and completed their Succeſs over the Forces of Bombay, has found Means to eſcape from their Power, and is arrived within a few Miles of Broach; from the Neighbourhood of which Place he has wrote me, that, confiding in the Friendſhip of the Engliſh, and truſting to me for Protection, he had ſeized an Opportunity of ſurpriſing the Party belonging to Madjee Scindia, who were conducting him to the Northward of the Nerbudda, and that their Leader, Hurry Bawajee, died a few Days after of the Wounds he received in the Conteſt.

Upon receiving the firſt News of Ragoba's Eſcape, I was alarmed at the Conſequences it might be productive of, to the Negociation now on Foot with the Maratta Leaders, and apprehenſive leſt the ſhewing him any Countenance at this Time, might be conſtrued into an Act of Hoſtility, inconſiſtent with the Sentiments I had ſo recently expreſſed to them in your Name. But when I came to reflect more fully on the Matter, I was convinced that it not only correſponded with the Spirit of the Inſtructions received from you, touching the Proviſion for his perſonal Safety, but that it might be reconciled to the Poona Durbar upon every Principle of Juſtice and Humanity; and that, in the preſent Situation of Affairs, it would be of the moſt important political Advantage to get Poſſeſſion of the Perſon of Ragoba, as any Conceſſion made hereafter on our Side regarding him, would be an Inſtance of Moderation, for which we might exact a ſuitable Return, and beſides the Apprehenſion of his being ſupported by us in his Claims on their Government, would make the Miniſters the more eager to come to an Accommodation upon Terms which it would then be left to us to dictate.

I have therefore conſented to Ragoba's Solicitation, and aſſured him he ſhall find an Aſylum in my Camp, and perſonal Security from all his Enemies, and that I ſhall immediately write to you, and acquaint you of his fortunate Eſcape, and receive your further Orders how to act. I have not thought it neceſſary to be more particular with him till we meet; I have only cautioned him to reſtrain his People from committing any Violence upon the Subjects of the Maratta State, under the Sanction of the Engliſh Name, as I ſhall not at preſent ſupport him in it.

I have not yet received an Anſwer to this Meſſage, but I think no Time ſhould be loſt in communicating to you a Circumſtance of ſo much Importance.

I therefore now write you in this general Manner, and ſhall defer Particulars either till I ſee Ragoba, or till he ſhould have determined to come in to me, or throw himſelf again on the Government

vernment of Bombay; for although he has ſignified to me his Wiſh for the former, there is no aſcertaining with Certainty which Step he may take.

You may depend upon hearing from me ſpeedily.

(Signed) Thomas Goddard.

6th June 1778.

Reſolved, That the following Letter be written to Brigadier General Goddard.

Sir,

We have received your Letter of the 6th ultimo, both Original and Duplicate; but that dated the 2d, to which you refer, has not yet come to Hand.

We entirely approve of the Offer which you have made to Ragonaut Row, and direct that you continue to afford him the Protection of your Camp, ſo long as he ſhall continue to demand it, provided he ſhall not forfeit his Right to it by any Act of Infidelity, or attempt to defeat the Effect of your Negociations, to which you will give your entire Attention without Regard to any other Conſideration. For the reſt, we leave you to act under our Inſtructions of the 5th April, in which we ſee no Cauſe to make any Alterations on account of this Event.

Fort William, 8th July 1779.

We are, &c.

APPENDIX, N° 206.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 8th July 1779.

READ the following Letters from the Select Committee of Bombay.

Gentlemen,

We have had the Honour to receive in Triplicate your Letter of the 5th April, and Colonel Goddard having alſo announced to us your Appointment of him as Miniſter from your Government, to treat with the Peiſhwa and Miniſters of the Maratta State; we ſhall, according to his Deſire, give him every Information in our Power, that may be of Service to him in his Negociation, and pay ſtrict Attention to your Orders reſpecting the Commiſſion of Hoſtilities.

Our Diſpatch of the 4th April will have acquainted you of our having given Permiſſion to Ghazudy Cawn to proceed to Surat, in order to take Paſſage for Mecca; but we underſtand, that owing to ſome Difference between him and Chillaby, the Owner of the Ship bound to that Port, he did not proſecute his Pilgrimage, but ſtill remains at Surat. We beg Leave to obſerve, that his Removal to Bombay was perfectly ſatisfactory to him; and that upon his expreſſing a Deſire to return to Surat, he was immediately accommodated with one of the Honourable Company's Veſſels.

We learn by Country Intelligence, that Ragoba has made his Eſcape from Madjee Scindia, in the Neighbourhood of Berhampore.

We are, &c. &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 7th June 1779.

(Signed) Wm Hornby. Jn° Carnac. D. Draper.

P. S. Incloſed is a Duplicate of our Addreſs of the 4th of April.

Gentlemen,

Incloſed is a Duplicate of our Addreſs of the 7th Inſtant; the Original of which was forwarded by the Swallow Sloop, built for the Service of your Preſidency.

The Intelligence of Ragoba having effected his Eſcape from Madjee Scindia, has been ſince confirmed by a Letter from the Chief of Surat, with this further Circumſtance, that he was directing his Courſe to that City; and a ſubſequent Letter from Colonel Goddard informs us of his ſafe Arrival within the Honourable Company's Protection. As this Event may be productive of very important Conſequences, we loſe not a Moment in appriſing you thereof; and for this Purpoſe we now diſpatch the Jappy Snow Expreſs to Bengal; and, at the ſame Time, to forward a Packet for your Honourable Board, received from Colonel Goddard.

We incloſe Copies of the Letters, above noticed, from the Chief of Surat, and Colonel Goddard. That no Step of ours might tend to fruſtrate the Negociation you have been pleaſed to commit to

Colonel Goddard, we immediately upon Receipt of the former Letter, ſent Directions to Mr. Boddam to deſire Ragoba to ſeek an Aſylum in ſome other Place, as we could not conſent to receive him under Protection, even till your Pleaſure was known; but we at the ſame Time intimated, that if Colonel Goddard ſhould think proper to receive him, it was a Point that muſt be determined by his own Judgment, and he muſt be reſponſible for the Conſequences.

A Copy of our Letter to the Chief of Surat, on this Subject, is alſo tranſmitted.

The Circumſtances of Ragoba's Eſcape are very unaccountable, and have much the Appearance of Connivance on the Part of Madjee Scindia. It is ſaid he is accompanied with 4 or 5000 Men, and that he has brought all his Guns with him, to the Number of Twenty.

We beg Leave to notice to you, that One or Two of your laſt Letters, on political Matters, have been addreſſed to the Preſident and Council, inſtead of the Committee.

If you ſhould make us any further Remittances by Bills on Surat, much Time will be ſaved at this Seaſon of the Year, by ſending the Bills under Cover directly to the Chief and Council.

As ſeveral of our ſmall Veſſels are now abſent on different Services, we have directed Mr. Horſely immediately to return the Tappy.

We are

Bombay Caſtle,
12th June 1779.

Wm Hornby,
Jn° Carnac.
D. Draper.

Letter from Colonel Thomas Goddard, to the Select Committee of Bombay.

Gentlemen,

The Eſcape of Ragonaut Row from the Power of the Miniſters, and his ſafe Arrival within the Protection of the Honourable Company, being a Matter of the utmoſt Importance to the Negociation with the Maratta State, entruſted to me by the Governor General and Supreme Council of Bengal, I think it neceſſary to communicate this Event to them as early as poſſible; and as the Communication by Land is moſt precarious, and at the ſame Time very tedious, I am induced to ſolicit your Aſſiſtance to forward the incloſed Diſpatch immediately to Bengal by Water, which will, I am hopeful, by this Means reach them in leſs than a Month from the preſent Date, the Paſſage being at this Seaſon of the Year, I underſtand, very quick and expeditious.

I have, &c. &c.
(Signed) Tho' Goddard.

Camp at Surat,
6th June, 1779.
Rec^d 11th following.

A true Copy.
Edwd Ravenſcroft.

Letter from Rawſon Hart Boddam, Eſquire, Chief at Surat, to the Honourable the Preſident at Bombay, with the Select Committee's Reply thereto.

Honourable Sir,

I diſpatch this Pattamar expreſs to acquaint you, that this Noon I received a Letter from Mr. Bouchier, who is now on a Viſit to Broach, adviſing me as follows:

" Ragonaut Row and his Family, with Imrut Row and an Army of about Five thouſand Horſe " and Foot paſſed by Cabbeer Waik oppoſite to the great Tree at Souelterrah about One o'Clock " this Day; he was going on towards Surat, and ſent over his Hircarrahs to know where Mr. Gam- " bier was, and has wrote to him. I alſo underſtand a Letter was alſo diſpatched to you expreſs from " Bawa Pier Ghaut this Morning. It ſeems he has cut off Scindia's Decan, who was eſcorting him " to a Fort in the Malva Country; and Ragonaut Row got Intelligence he was to be made a Pri- " ſoner, which was the Cauſe of this Affair happening. It was about 15 Days ago this hap- " pened."

I have not as yet ſeen any thing of the Letter that Mr. Bouchier mentions to be ſent me from Bowa Pier Ghaut; but the Colonel has had Letters from Ragonaut Row laſt Night much to the ſame Purport; and Ragonaut Row is expected at this Place as To-night or To-morrow. I ſuppoſe he will throw himſelf under the Protection of the Colonel. If he ſhould come to me, I ſhall get the Nabob to give him the Gardens at Mahomed a Baug, and muſt requeſt you will ſend me ſuch Inſtructions relative to him, as you and the Committee may think neceſſary on ſo extraordinary an Occaſion.

I am, &c. &c.
(Signed) Rawſon Hart Boddam.

Surat,
5th June, 1779.
Received 9th following.

APPENDIX, N° 206, 207 and 208.

To Rawſon Hart Boddam.

Sir,

The Preſident has laid before us your Letter of the 5th Inſtant to him.

We can foreſee numberleſs Difficulties and Inconveniences ſhould Ragoba be again taken under our Protection, even till we could receive the Orders of the Governor General and Council on the Subject; and that it might be an inſuperable Obſtacle to any Accommodation being effected with the Poona Government by Colonel Goddard: We therefore direct that you do deſire Ragoba to ſeek an Aſylum in ſome other Place, as we cannot, circumſtanced as we now are, conſent to receive him. But it is neceſſary to apprize you that ſhould Colonel Goddard, to whom the Negociation is committed, think proper to receive him, it is a Point which muſt be determined by his Judgment, and he muſt be reſponſible for the Conſequences.

The Pattamars are ordered to uſe all poſſible Expedition in the Delivery of this Letter.

Bombay Caſtle,
10th June 1779.

We are, &c. &c.
Will. Hornby.
John Carnac.
Daniel Draper.

True Copies.
Edward Ravenſcroft.

Reſolved, That the following Letter be written to the Select Committee of Bombay:

Gentlemen,

We have received your Letters of the 7th and 12th ultimo by the Tappy.

Brigadier General Goddard has adviſed us, that in conſequence of an Application from Ragoba, he has aſſured him of receiving Protection in his Camp; which we entirely approve, and have directed General Goddard to continue to afford it to him ſo long as he ſhall demand it, provided he ſhall forfeit his Right to it by any Act of Infidelity, or attempt to defeat the Effect of his Negociations, to which he will give his entire Attention without Regard to any other Conſideration. For the reſt, we have left him to act under our Inſtructions of the 5th April, in which we ſee no Cauſe to make any Alterations on account of this Event.

We are, &c. &c.

Fort William,
8th July 1779.

Warren Haſtings.
P. Francis.
Edw[d] Wheler.

APPENDIX, N° 207 and 208.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 2d Auguſt 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell, Philip Francis, Edward Wheler, } Eſquires,
Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote, K. B.

READ the following Letter from Brigadier General Goddard:

Gentlemen,

I had the Honour to inform you in a Letter of the 6th Inſtant, of the Eſcape of Ragonaut Row from the People who were placed over him by Scindia, and his Arrival in the Neighbourhood of my Camp. He has ſince repeatedly ſolicited Permiſſion to come and receive my Protection, which I have granted him; and this Morning he paid me a Viſit with his adopted Son, Amrut Row, a young Man of about 17 Years old, and Badjerow, a Child of 4 Years, born to himſelf ſince the Adoption of the former.

I have already in general Terms ſuggeſted to you the Advantages which it appears to me may be derived from this unexpected Event, and that you may be at no Loſs reſpecting the probable Conſequences

Conſequences it may have at this Time, on account of the Line of Conduct I have laid down, I beg Leave to aſſure you that I ſhall proſecute the Negociations for Peace with the ſame Ardour and Aſſiduity as before it happened; and that from the Nature of the Circumſtance itſelf, as well as the Alarm it has given at Poona, I have Reaſon to believe the Maratta Miniſters will not only be more diſpoſed by it to adopt pacific Meaſures, but will alſo be glad to accept of ſuch Terms as you ſhall dictate to them.

In your Letter of the 5th April, you have directed that the Proviſion for Ragoba's perſonal Safety alone be made an indiſpenſable Engagement, and this you did when himſelf and Family were in the Power of his Enemies, whoſe Intereſt and Object it would have been to remove him. Now that the Scene is totally changed, that Affairs on this Side of India are reverted to the ſame Situation in which they were before, in the inglorious Convention made at Tilliagony, which the Government of Bombay have themſelves diſavowed in the firſt Inſtance, and which you alſo have directed me in your Inſtructions to propoſe to the Miniſters, as a leading Article that is to determine the Alternative of Peace or War; their relinquiſhing any Claim to it appears an Argument founded on Reaſon and ſound Policy; that we ſhould avail ourſelves of the favourable Opportunity that now preſents itſelf, from the Poſſeſſion of Ragoba's Perſon and Family, but above all from the Preſence of your Forces under my Command; and the invincible Acceſſion of Strength it gives to the Arms of the Engliſh in the Country, to conclude a Treaty with the Maratta Nation upon Terms the moſt honourable and beneficial to the Company, and which from the ſuperior Advantages acquired by it may enſure to them a permanent and undiſturbed Poſſeſſion of their Territories on this Side of India.

I do not doubt, but when the Intelligence of Ragoba's Eſcape ſhall have reached you, you will have immediately diſpatched freſh Inſtructions for my further Guidance. Theſe may arrive long before the Seaſon for military Operations begins; and in the mean Time, admitting the Miniſters are open to Negociation, I ſhall adhere literally to the Propoſals you have already entruſted me to make, uſing only the Latitude you have given me reſpecting Ragoba, to demand ſuch Conditions in his Favour as the Nature of his preſent Situation will admit of, and by theſe Means I ſhall be able to protract the Negociation, without materially interrupting it, until I can receive your final Pleaſure.

The advantageous Points, which the Poſſeſſion of Ragoba's Perſon puts it in our Power to inſiſt upon, in Addition to thoſe you have preſcribed, appear to me,

1ſt. The Payment of the Debt due from him to the Company.

2dly, The Reimburſement of the Expences of the Bengal Army; and,

Laſtly, The Ceſſion in Perpetuity of Baſſein, Choule, or thoſe Places which were agreed to be delivered up by him, in the late Treaty he made with the Bombay Government.

In return for theſe Conceſſions on their Part, Ragoba might relinquiſh all Pretenſions to the Peiſhwaſhip, or to the Direction of Affairs in the Maratta State, and ſit down contented with a Proviſion from the Sircar, adequate and proportioned to his Rank and Birth, but poſſeſſing no public Poſt or Employment under Government. The Viciſſitudes of Fortune Ragoba has felt, and the critical Situation from which he has lately eſcaped, would eaſily reconcile theſe Conditions to his Acceptance: Beſides that, if conſiſtent with the Objects of your political Views, he muſt of Neceſſity acquieſce; he has made no particular Overtures to me ſince his Arrival, but has thrown himſelf entirely upon your Government, to which I have referred him for every thing, venturing at preſent to aſſure him only in your Name, of perſonal Safety and Protection.

It becomes neceſſary now, that I ſhould endeavour to explain to you the Circumſtances by which an Event ſo extraordinary as Ragoba's Eſcape was effected; and as I derive my Knowledge of it principally from himſelf, and People affected to his Intereſts, it may be in ſome Meaſure ſuſpected of Partiality; at any rate, the Conduct of Scindia on this Occaſion ſeems almoſt inexplicable.

To him the Surrender of Ragoba's Perſon had been made by the Committee; and he, from Reaſons of Policy, which I have accounted for in a former Letter, took upon himſelf the Management of all Buſineſs with Ragoba afterwards. I cannot help being of Opinion, that the Brahmin has proved too artful a Politician for the Soldier, however contrary it is to the Characteriſtic of the latter to be overcome by the Weapons of Deceit, which he is famed for practiſing ſo well.

Scindia had preſerved every Appearance of ceremonious Reſpect, even ſo much as to leave him the Troops who had accompanied him from Bombay, and all his Artillery except Two Field Pieces, which he requeſted from him. With this Force of his own, conſiſting of about 1500 Horſe and Foot, with above Twenty Pieces of Ordnance, Ragoba marched from Poona towards the Northern Jaghiers, where Scindia had agreed to pay him an Allowance of 12 Lacks of Rupees yearly, attended only by about 4000 Horſe belonging to the latter Chief. Many Cauſes of Diſcontent aroſe upon their Route to the Nerbudda, owing to the improper Behaviour of Hurry Bowajee, who commanded Scindia's People, and was entruſted with the conducting Ragoba; for on the Requiſition made by the latter for his ſtipulated Allowance, he put off the Payment under various Pretences, and failed in aſſiſting him with Proviſions, Forage, &c. for his Troops. Ragoba alſo received Advice, that Scindia had ſeized upon and put to Death Two of his principal Jemidars, and had detained in Confinement many of his Mute-ſuddies and People, contrary to a Promiſe he had made, that they ſhould be ſent after him. To theſe Seeds of Reſentment on the Part of Ragoba, he learnt that Scindia's Chief, ſuſpicious of ſome Deſigns, had wrote to his Maſter for a Reinforcement;

ment; and he further adds, that credible Information had been given him of the Intention of Scindia to confine his Perſon in ſome Fortreſs in the Northern Diſtricts. The Plan therefore of his Eſcape was, I am well convinced, pre-concerted, though he pretends to ſay that Accident effected it; for that on their Arrival at the Ghaut of Burwa upon the Nerbudda, as his Artillery was conducting to the River in order to croſs, the Road led near Hurry Bowajee's Tent, and the latter alarmed and ſuſpecting ſome Treachery, ordered his People to fire, which they did; afterwards the Action commenced, in which he came off victorious, and the Troops of Bowajee fled, who was himſelf wounded, in endeavouring to make his Eſcape more than a Mile from where the Tumult firſt aroſe, and died a few Days after of the Wounds he there received. I have been as particular as I could be in the Detail of this Circumſtance, becauſe I make no Doubt it will be repreſented by the Miniſterial Party in the blackeſt Colours they can invent, to colour, perhaps, their own Cruelties hereafter.

The Conduct of Madajee Scindia ſtill remains a Myſtery, and the little Precaution he ſeems to have taken on this Occaſion to ſecure the Perſon of Ragoba, is a Subject of great Aſtoniſhment.

By Accounts from Poona ſince the News of this Tranſaction reached them, the Chiefs are greatly incenſed with him, and have declared they muſt conſider him as reſponſible for the Loſs of Ragoba; ſo that it is probable at any rate this Event will tend to encreaſe their mutual Jealouſies and Diſſentions, and lead to the more ſucceſsful Accompliſhment of your Views regarding the Maratta Government.

I beg to encloſe for your Peruſal a Letter I have wrote to the Peiſhwa and Miniſters on the Subject of Ragoba's Eſcape.

Camp near Surat,
12th June, 1779.

I have, &c.
(Signed) Tho°. Goddard.

N° 208.

Tranſlation of a Letter from Colonel Goddard to the Peiſhwa Madhurow Narain, dated the 28th of Jemmad-ul-awil, or the 12th of June 1779.

After the uſual Addreſs, and recapitulating the Contents of the former Letter, it proceeds thus: At this Time Ragonaut Row has come to me, and from him I learn that a Sirdar from your Government had been ſent to accompany him with a Force, and that on the Road they fought together on account of ſome Miſunderſtanding, ariſing from the improper Conduct of your Sardar, who died of the Wounds he received, and the People with him fled; after which Ragonaut Row ſet out towards Surat, and has encamped in the Neighbourhood of my Camp, where I have detained him, ſince he is a principal Sardar of your Nation; and now that I am negociating with you, we can adjuſt whatever is proper and eligible reſpecting him. I am therefore anxious for the Arrival of a confidential Perſon from you, that our mutual Buſineſs may be ſoon finally ſettled.

A Letter to this Effect was at the ſame Time written to Nanah Furneeſe.

Dal. Watherſton,
Perſian Tranſlator.

APPENDIX, N° 209.

Copy of a Letter from the Chief at Broach to the Select Committee of Bombay.

I Diſpatch this Expreſs to adviſe you of Ragonath Row's Arrival with a large Party of Men at Occlaſier the Night before laſt. He has with him his Wife and Son, and his adopted Son Amurath Row, and by the beſt Accounts I can get, 1800 or 2000 Horſe, and 1000 Muſquet Sepoys. I have had a Conference with him, and the Account he gave me of his Eſcape, was, that at a Place called Chollee Mahaſu, about 200 Coſs to the Eaſtward, he being then under an Eſcort of 2000 of Scindia's, and an equal Number of Holcar's People; and finding by a Letter that luckily fell into his Hands, that they were carrying him to a Fort at Janſee, he had found Means to bring over to his Side Holcar's People, and with their Aſſiſtance had attacked and routed Scindia's, and

wounded the commanding Officer Govind Hurry, who was ſince dead, and from thence had made the beſt of his Way with the Forces who had eſpouſed his Party to this Country. He ſaid that as he had once more the good Fortune to eſcape from his Enemies, and get to his Friends the Engliſh, he hoped they would retrieve his Affairs; and doubted it not, as he had received many preſſing Invitations from Colonel Goddard to come to him. What Ragoba's real Intentions are I have not yet been able to diſcover, but on the whole, think he has a great Deſire to go to Colonel Goddard, from whom he ſeems to expect much Service; but at the ſame Time I believe, that if he thought his Buſineſs could be effectually done by your Honour, &c. without his throwing himſelf into the Hands of Colonel Goddard, he would prefer much the putting the Management of his Affairs under your Directions. I do not hear that any of the Baralhyes are in Purſuit of him, nor does he ſeem under any Apprehenſions of them at preſent. I have offered him good Accommodation at a large Garden near the River and cloſe under our Wall, for himſelf and a ſuitable Number of his People; but he chuſes, for the preſent at leaſt, to remain with his Cannon at Occlaſier. I ſhall be glad to receive as ſoon as poſſible any Inſtructions you may think neceſſary to be given me for my Conduct as to Ragoba, and have the

Broach,
6th June 1779.

Honour to remain, &c.
(Signed) Robert Gambier.

Copy of another Letter from the Chief at Broach to the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

Incloſed is a Triplicate of my Letters to you, which I wrote to adviſe the Arrival of Ragoba at Occlaſier, and this intended merely to acquaint, that having received Anſwers much to his Satisfaction from Colonel Goddard, he is, notwithſtanding all my Arguments to make him remain here till I received your Orders, gone to join the Colonel at Surat. Ragoba told me that he had certain Advices of the Boralhyer having detached a large Force to endeavour to take him, and that made him much more earneſt to join the Bengal Army, which he thinks all in all ſufficient to protect him and deſtroy his Enemies. I beg Leave to aſſure your Honour, &c. that whatever I thought could conduce to the Good of my Employers on this Occaſion I have both ſaid and done in reſpect to Dada Saheb; and I ſincerely hope his Eſcape from the Baralhyes, and coming again into the Company's Hands, will be productive of material Benefit to them.

Broach,
9th June 1779.

I have the Honour to be, &c.
(Signed) Robert Gambier.

Reply the ſame as that to the Chief of Surat.

True Copies,
(Signed) Edw[d] Ravenſcroft, Secr[y].

Copy of a Letter from Colonel Goddard, to the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

Since my Letter of the 6th Inſtant, informing you of the Eſcape of Ragoba from the Power of the Miniſters, and his ſafe Arrival within the Company's Authority, I underſtand that he has viſited and been received by Mr. Gambier at Broach.

As this Event cannot but be intimately connected with the Conduct of the Negociation committed to me by the Government of Bengal; I am concerned at the Circumſtance of Ragoba's having been acknowledged by any Perſon holding ſo public and diſtinguiſhed a Station under you, becauſe it may preclude me from purſuing any particular Line I might think conſiſtent with the Inſtructions of my Government, and it may beſides be diametrically oppoſite to the Spirit of them, and be the Means of rendering my Endeavours to execute their Commands in the important Charge with which they have intruſted me, abortive and ineffectual.

I need not obſerve to you, Gentlemen, the Propriety there would have been if the Application made by Ragoba, in the firſt Inſtance, had been immediately and altogether referred to me, becauſe I am ſenſible you will concur in the Opinion, that excluſive of the political Reaſons I have given above it has a Mark of Reſpect due to the Supreme Government of India, that any Overture from a Member or Subject of the Maratta Empire ſhould have been previouſly received by their Miniſter.

As I am, however, perſuaded that Mr. Gambier muſt have acted on this Occaſion without any particular Inſtructions from your Committee, and as it is probable he may not have been informed of the Nature and Extent of my Appointment from Bengal at the Court of Poona, I am led to requeſt you will be pleaſed to ſignify it to him, and to the Gentlemen compoſing your Council both at Surat and Broach, in order that nothing may hereafter happen from an Inattention to that

Circumſtance which might impede and counteract the Intereſts of the public Service, or to be conidered as diſreſpectful to the Character I bear of the Repreſentative of the Supreme Council of ndia with the Maratta States.

I beg to remind you of the Subject of a Letter I wrote you the 24th ultimo, to which I have not et been favoured with an Anſwer.

I have the Honour to be, &c.
(Signed) Tho' Goddard.

Camp at Surat,
9th June 1779.

A true Copy.
(Signed) Edw[d] Ravenſcroft, Sec[ry].

Extract of a Letter from the Chief and Council at Surat to the Select Committee, dated 14th June 1779.

And Yeſterday Afternoon the Chief received a Letter from Colonel Goddard, Copy of which ; incloſed. In Reply thereto, the Chief acquainted Colonel Goddard, that agreeable to his Reueſt, the Nabob's Houſe at Mahomed Baug was ready for Ragoba's Reception whenever he choſe) occupy it; but that as great Inconveniences might ariſe from Ragoba's bringing with him into 'own any great Number of Followers, he deſired the Number might be limited to Three or Four undred.

The Chief has acquainted us that Ragoba had himſelf applied to him for Permiſſion to reſide at ıe Houſe at Mahomed Baug, and that in conſequence the Nabob had, at the Chief's Deſire, preared it for his Reception.

Copy of a Letter from Colonel Goddard to the Chief at Surat.

Ragonath Row having made his Eſcape from the Hands of the miniſterial Party, by ſurprizing nd defeating a Party of Moodajee Scindia's People, who had been placed over him, has ſolicited ıe Protection of my Camp, which I have granted him in the Name of the Bengal Government, ll they ſhall be pleaſed to ſignify their Pleaſure reſpecting him; I have therefore to requeſt our Aſſiſtance in accommodating him and his Family with the Houſe of Mahomed Baug, beonging to the Nabob of Surat, in which Place he has expreſſed a Deſire to reſide during the rainy eaſon, and as this has now commenced, and Ragoba is beſides in a very indifferent State of Iealth, which renders his remaining in Tents not only uncomfortable but at preſent dangerous, am anxious, and hope the Gardens may be ready for his immediate Reception.

I am, &c.
(Signed) Tho[s] Goddard.

Camp, 13th June 1779.

True Copies.
(Signed) Edw[d] Ravenſcroft, Sec[ry].

Copy of a Letter from the Chief of Surat to the Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

I was honoured with your Commands of the 10th Inſtant, laſt Night; the Pattamars give the Reaſons for their not making greater Diſpatch, was owing to the Badneſs of the Roads from the Rain.

You will have been fully acquainted by the general Advices of the 14th Inſtant, of the tep Ragonath Row had taken in ſoliciting the Protection of the Bengal Camp, and that the ſame ad been afforded him by Colonel Goddard. He now reſides at the Gardens of Mahomed Baug, n Conſequence of an Application both from the Colonel and Ragonath Row, to procure the ſame or his Family's Accommodation during the Monſoon, and in conſequence came into Town for hat Purpoſe the 15th Inſtant. He is now entirely under Colonel Goddard's Protection, with whom very Tranſaction will paſs and all Reſponſibility reſt. I ſhall in no Reſpect interfere, but ſolely ict in any good Offices from the Application that may be made by Colonel Goddard.

I am, &c.
(Signed) R. W. Boddam.

Surat, 18th June 1779.

A true Copy.
(Signed) Edw[d] Ravenſcroft, Sec[ry].

APPENDIX, N° 210.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 2d Auguſt 1779.

Letter from General Goddard—18th June 1779.

Gentlemen,

I Had the Honour to write you the 12th Inſtant, acquainting you with the Eſcape of Ragoba, and his Reception in my Camp. He has at this Time ſolicited me to forward an Addreſs to your Government from himſelf; which I have done myſelf the Pleaſure of tranſmitting to the Honourable the Governor General.

In a long Conference I have had with Ragoba ſince my laſt, he has explained many Circumſtances relative to his Situation preceding the late Event, that diſcover more particularly the Views of the ſeveral Parties in the Maratta State than the Intelligence I before obtained from other Channels leſs informed in theſe Points; though at the ſame Time they tend to confirm in general the Opinion I have already given in a former Letter, of the Sentiments of the principal Leaders. He affirms, that the Proſpect of a foreign Invaſion is the only Bond which unites Nana Furneſe and Madajee Scindia; and if that was once removed, the latter would ſoon proſecute his ambitious Projects of making himſelf ſole and abſolute Maſter of the Maratta State, otherwiſe they will be found to act in concert with each other. With reſpect to the Sentiments of Tookajee Holcar, he is aſſured of their being amicable towards himſelf, and attributes the Whole of the late Conduct of that Chief, to his Fears of Madajee Scindia and the Miniſters, remarking, that Tookajee's Character is noted for Exceſs of Timidity and Irreſolution.

He aſſigns as the Reaſon for his chuſing to deliver himſelf into the Hands of Madajee Scindia, the implacable Enmity he knew was borne him by Nana Furneſe, and the Neceſſity there was of his being at that Time ſacrificed for the Safety of the Engliſh Army. This Meaſure was, he ſays, reſolved on with the Concurrence of the Committee, the Morning preceding that Night when the fatal Retreat was attempted; and as Madajee Scindia had attempted to ſend in a Perſon next Day, to treat upon the Terms of a Peace, he is convinced, if that ruinous Step had not been taken in the Interim, they might have obtained Conditions far more honourable and advantageous, than thoſe they were at laſt compelled to accept. It appears indeed moſt probable from the Circumſtance of the Troops having met with no Repulſe at that Time, and the Joy the Miniſters would receive at being delivered from an Enemy whom they could not but conſider as formidable, that the Concluſion of Ragoba is juſtly founded.

From the ambitious Deſigns of Madajee Scindia, Ragoba knew that he ſhould find in him a Protector from the Reſentment of the Miniſters; and here his Policy was not deceived, for that Chief took upon himſelf the Management and Conduct of his Buſineſs, and an Agreement was made between them in Writing, that Ragoba ſhould receive an Allowance of 12½ Lacks of Rupees per Annum, and ſhould be put in Poſſeſſion of Janſee, with a Tract of Country in its Neighbourhood, and the Diſtrict of Bundlecund, from whence he was to draw that Amount, excluſive of every Expence attending the Collections and Government of the Country. On Pretence of this, Scindia was conducting Ragoba acroſs the Nerbudda, when he found Means to make his Eſcape in the Manner I have deſcribed in my former Letters; and for the Reaſons I have alſo hinted at, that Madajee Scindia had broken through many Parts of his Agreement, by putting to Death ſome and confining others of his principal Officers and Adherents; and that added to his own Knowledge of the Treachery and Ambition of this Chief, Ragoba was credibly informed, he intended to act a perfidious Part, and ſecure his Perſon in the Fort of Janſee. Indeed it is not to be doubted, but this was his Intention, and however a general View of this Tranſaction might give room to ſuſpect that the Eſcape of Ragoba was connived at by him, the poſitive Declarations of the former, and a minute Attention to the Circumſtance that attended it, removes every Idea of that having been the Caſe.

I come now to that Part of the Converſation with Ragoba, which more relates to his own particular Intereſts, and the future Hopes he ſtill derives from the Support and Friendſhip of the Engliſh; before I enter upon which, it may not be improper to aſſure you, that although I wiſhed him to declare his Sentiments without Diſguiſe or Reſerve, I gave him no Encouragement beyond his own perſonal Security, and that of his Family; or that might make him believe he would be aided in his Pretenſions upon the Sovereignty of the Maratta States, or receive any further Aſſiſtance from your Governments, than what a ſincere Wiſh to reſtore Peace and Tranquillity to the Affairs of the Decan, founded upon Principles of Juſtice and Equity, might dictate. He began by extolling the Truth and Bravery of the Engliſh Nation, which had raiſed them to be the Sovereigns of Hindoſtan; and particularly magnified the Arms and Councils of Bengal, which had been crowned with uninterrupted Victory. Confiding in theſe, he had come once more to throw himſelf upon their Protection, and would ſubmit to whatever Fortune they might think proper to allot him; as it was from their Favour and Aſſiſtance alone, that he could derive any Hope of future Succeſs. He acknowledged, that

that when the Bombay Troops took the Field, he had aſſured that Government, that his Standard would have been joined by numerous Partizans, which proved not to be the Caſe; but in this Matter he was himſelf deceived. At the ſame Time he added, that he is of Opinion, if the Army, inſtead of retreating, had puſhed forward with Vigour, many who were inclined to his Cauſe, would have been encouraged to come over to him. Another Reaſon he aſſigned for the Backwardneſs of thoſe who ſecretly favoured him was, the Tenor of the Treaty made with the Bombay Government, eſtabliſhing his Authority in the State, by which it was made merely of a temporary and nominal Nature, while the Marks of real Sovereignty, the Title of Peiſhwa, and the Privilege of having the Sicca ſtruck in his Name, was conferred upon another. His undeterminate and unſettled Syſtem, while it held the Minds of Men ſuſpended betwixt their Hopes on one Side, and their Fears on the other, muſt, he ſaid, naturally deter them from declaring themſelves, however ſtrong their Inclinations, till ſome deciſive Blow was ſtruck to turn the Balance of the former.

He talked much, but in general Terms, as I did not think it proper to queſtion him particularly on that Head, of the ample Conceſſions he was ready to make in Favour of the Engliſh, if they befriended his Cauſe; and from the Nature of the Circumſtance itſelf, there is not a Doubt, in the Event of ſuch a Meaſure being adopted, but the Advantages would be all our own. He added a Circumſtance reſpecting the Nabob Nizam Ally Cawn, that in his late Route towards the Nerbuddah, a ſecret Emiſſary came to him from that Prince, preſſing him to make his Eſcape from Aurungabad by any Means in his Power, and he would protect him againſt the Maratta Miniſters. The Cauſe of this Conduct in Nizam Ally Cawn is, ſome late Offence he has received from that Party, who in the former War with Ragonaut Row ceded to him a Tract of Country, upon Condition of his aiding them in it, and ſince getting Ragoba's Perſon into their Hands, though they have not actually taken any hoſtile Steps for its Recovery, yet they have made known their Intention of reſuming it the firſt Opportunity. The Policy therefore of Nizam Ally Cawn muſt be, to find them Employment, which may divert their Attention from that Object, and leave him the undiſturbed Poſſeſſion of the Country before ceded to him, by alarming their Fears of being attacked from a foreign Quarter; and on this Preſumption, and the Reſentment he may be ſuppoſed to feel for the Injury intended him, Ragoba ventures to declare, that Nizam Ally Cawn will not join the miniſterial Party, but be ready to act againſt them.

With reſpect to Hyder Ally, he has been at conſtant Variance with the preſent Poona Adminiſtration for ſome Years, and has frequently aſſiſted Ragoba with Sums of Money, for the Support of himſelf and Family.

I have been thus minute in laying before you the Particulars of Ragoba's Converſation, that you may be clearly and completely informed of his Sentiments, with the Foundation on which he builds his future Proſpects, and while you derive from their Deſcription a more ample Knowledge of the weak and diſtracted State of the Maratta Government, adopt ſuch further Meaſures as your Wiſdom ſhall dictate as beſt ſuited to improve any Advantage that may be derived from the late Reſolution.

Camp, near Surat,
18th June 1779.

I have the Honour, &c.
(Signed) Tho' Goddard.

P. S. Since writing the above, I have received Intelligence from a Perſon at Poona, whoſe Authority I can depend upon, that the Conſternation there, on account of the Eſcape of Ragonaut Row, is exceſſive, and is augmented by ſome late conſiderable Encroachments Hyder Ally has made upon the Southern Boundaries of their Dominions, ſo much ſo, that they are preparing to arm againſt the Approach of ſo dangerous an Enemy.

This is alſo confirmed by Intelligence from Bombay, which I think it neceſſary to communicate to you, that the Peiſhwa and Madjee Scindia have wrote Letters to that Preſidency, adviſing them of their Intentions to march and puniſh Hyder; and expreſſing a Wiſh for ſettling their mutual Diſputes, and that the Perſon intruſted with that Diſpatch may be ſent forward to your Government. I mention this, becauſe it ſhews in how altered a Style they ſpeak, from the Language uſed by them after their late Victory, and proves the juſt Grounds of the preſent Apprehenſions that fill their Minds. I may now expect to hear from the Miniſters myſelf every Day, and to have an Opportunity of writing you in the moſt full and ſatisfactory Manner: In the mean Time, as the Circumſtance of Ragoba's Eſcape may induce you to make ſome Additions to the Inſtructions already given, I ſhall protract the Concluſion of any Thing deciſive in the Negociation with the Durbar, until I can hear from you; and I am of Opinion it will require ſmall Effort on my Part to effect this, as Cauſes of Delay will I apprehend ſpontaneouſly and neceſſarily ariſe of themſelves.

T. G.

Letter from Ragonaut Row; received the 28th July 1779.

When I quitted Bombay with an Engliſh Force, and the Engliſh retreated from Tellegong and I went to Tocojee Holcar, and Madajee Sindea at that Time, I executed whatever Engagements thoſe Chiefs choſe to impoſe on me, and they on their Part entered into Engagements

with me. They gave me a Country of 12 Lacks and a Half of Rupees exclusive of the Talook of Jhansee with the Selcundee and Charges of the Forts and Mahals, and engaged to give me a further Country to the Amount of 10 or 15 Lacks of Rupees. Madajee Sindeah gave me a Body of his own Forces, under the Command of a Chief named Hurry Bâwâjee, through whose Haughtiness and Disinclination towards me many Articles on that Part of Sindeah were not fulfilled by him. For Example, Two of my People, one named Raceſe Mahomed, a Jemautdar of Gardees, the other Curruck Sing, a Jemautdar of Peons, whom he took from me on an Engagement, that he ſhould not touch their Lives, but keep them cloſe Priſoners; theſe he put to Death, and others of my People, whoſe Liberty was ſtipulated for in the Treaty, he nevertheleſs kept in Confinement. Thus they were guilty of ſeveral Breaches of Engagements. It was my Wiſh to have repaired to your Preſence, but as this would have been a Violation of Treaty, I was obliged to decline it.

When the Engagements were violated by them, in Confidence of your ſteady Friendſhip and Regard, I chaſtiſed the Troops of Sindeah, and by forced Marches reached Surat, and waited on Colonel Goddard who is here on your Part. The Reſtoration of my Affairs now reſts with you, and I have no Doubt but you will call my faithleſs Servants who have ruined my Affairs and thrown the whole Country into Confuſion to a ſtrict Account, and will re-eſtabliſh them on a firm Footing: For this Purpoſe it is expedient that you iſſue Orders to Colonel Goddard for my Reſtoration.

APPENDIX, N° 211.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 2d Auguſt 1779.

THE following Minute from Sir Eyre Coote having been circulated, the Minutes which are entered after it were delivered by the Members of the Board.

Sir Eyre Coote—Having lately received ſome Advices mentioning Preparations at the French Iſlands for a Deſcent upon ſome of our Poſſeſſions in India, particularly Bombay, to which I the more readily give ſome Credit, knowing that that Preſidency and the Circars are the leaſt ſecured; I am induced to propoſe that the Governments of Fort Saint George and Bombay be recommended to reinforce the Army under General Goddard with the following Proportion of Troops, which, from the laſt Returns, I think they may with Propriety comply with: viz.

From Madras.

1	Battalion of Europeans,
3	Ditto Sepoys,
50	Artillery.

From Bombay.

300	Europeans,
2	Battalions of Seapoys,
100	Artillery.

As the Works of Pondicherry are now deſtroyed, the Quota from Madras may the more eaſily be ſpared. The Troops they have at Mahé 1100 Sepoys, One Company of Grenadiers, and 50 Artillery, may immediately embark to join General Goddard; the reſt may be completed from the Southern Stations, and will certainly be with him before any Operations of the Enemy can be commenced.

The Forces of Madras and of this Eſtabliſhment are, in my Opinion, fully ſufficient to protect our Poſſeſſions on this Side of India; moreover, we are in daily Expectation of a great Addition to our Strength from Europe. I therefore alſo recommend that Drafts be ſent from hence to complete the original Number of General Goddard's Detachment.

The Advantages we may expect to derive from this propoſed Reinforcement will be the Security of Bombay againſt any Attack of the French, by having ſo ſtrong an Army in the Field, the expediting of the much deſired Peace with the Marattas (if this is not already accompliſhed) and the rendering our Force on the Malabar Coaſt of ſuch Reſpect as to check any Deſigns which either the Marattas or Hyder Ally (the only Country Power from whom we have any Thing to dread on that Side of the Continent) may be inclined to form of taking Part with our national Enemies.

On the Whole, I ſubmit this Plan as the Means which in my Judgment will inſure the Peace and Safety of all our Poſſeſſions; for while we have ſo reſpectable a Force in that Quarter where we

we may expect the firſt Efforts of the French, we may be certain that it will confine their Attention to it, and prevent them from diſturbing our more valuable Territories in the other Part of India.

(Signed) Eyre Coote.

Mr. Francis—I move that the Commander in Chief may be requeſted to inform the Board of the Particulars of the Intelligence he has received from the French Iſlands, and the Authority on which it is founded. The Board have yet no Materials before them to judge of the Propriety of the Meaſure recommended.

(Signed) Philip Francis.

Mr. Barwell—The cautionary Meaſures propoſed by Sir Eyre Coote, appear to me ſo well calculated for the Security of the Company's Poſſeſſions, that I am induced to give them my immediate and hearty Concurrence.

(Signed) Richard Barwell.

Governor General—I agree moſt heartily to the Propoſal made by the Commander in Chief.

(Signed) Warren Haſtings.

Mr. Wheler—Seen, and will endeavour to prepare my Opinion againſt the next Meeting of the Board.

(Signed) Edward Wheler.

Sir Eyre Coote delivers in the following Minute:

I muſt own I feel myſelf not a little injured by Mr. Francis's Requiſition; and will venture to ſay, that a ſimilar Inſtance cannot be found upon the Company's Records, and that it is unknown in any Service for a Commander in Chief, or any General Officer, to be called upon to ſupport his Opinion and Aſſertion, by giving up the Authors of his ſecret Intelligence upon which theſe may be founded. I therefore peremptorily refuſe it; and if the Opinion I have given on the 27th ſhould not guide the Board in the Mode of Defence propoſed for Bombay, I hope I ſhall ſtand exonerated ſhould any fatal Conſequence happen to that Place.

(Signed) Eyre Coote.

Mr. Francis—Nothing can be perſonally of leſs Moment to me, than whether my Propoſition be carried or not. As a Member of the Government, I think it my Duty to oppoſe the eſtabliſhing a Precedent, which I deem inconſiſtent with the Forms and Spirit of our Inſtitution. Every Member of this Board has an equal Right to be informed of the Facts or Grounds on which a Reſolution is taken. No ſeparate excluſive Truſt is veſted in any one of us, nor is any one of us at Liberty to delegate the Truſt veſted in him to any one of the other Members: But if, as in the preſent Inſtance, I am not to know what the Intelligence is on which the Board reſolves to act, nor by what Authority ſuch Intelligence is ſupported, I certainly am no Judge of the Neceſſity or Propriety of the Meaſures ſaid to be founded upon ſuch Intelligence, and am ſo far forth deprived of the Exerciſe of the Truſt repoſed in me by Parliament. I did not mean however that the Commander in Chief ſhould give up his Authors, if it was neceſſary to conceal them.

For theſe Reaſons, which I hope will not be thought to imply Diſreſpect to any Member of the Board, I adhere to the Motion.

Mr. Wheler—I muſt join Mr. Francis in expreſſing my Wiſhes, that Sir Eyre Coote would be pleaſed to communicate to the Board the Intelligence he has received, of Preparations making at the French Iſlands, and upon which he founds his preſent Motion to reinforce General Goddard; becauſe I think, that before the Board paſs their Determination on a Subject which may affect the Safety of the Britiſh Poſſeſſions in India, they ought to have every Information before them it is capable of.

I entirely agree with Sir Eyre Coote, that it is poſſible the French may be induced to make ſome Attempts on our Poſſeſſions in India with their Forces from the Iſlands; and if they have a conſiderable Body of Men there more than ſufficient for the Purpoſes of Defence, I hardly ſee any other Uſe to which it can be applied.

I agree likewiſe with Sir Eyre Coote, that Bombay is likely to be the Object of their Attack; becauſe, if they acquire that Place, they will at one and the ſame Time have a Port for their Fleet, Docks, and Allies in their Neighbourhood, whom we have every Reaſon to ſuppoſe are, by repeated Provocations, made our Enemies. But I confeſs it does not occur to me, how the ſending a Reinforcement to General Goddard at Surat, and weakening Bombay itſelf, by detaching the greateſt Part of the Garriſon, can contribute to the Safety of that Place.

To illuſtrate this further, I need only take a View of the Situation of Bombay, that of General Goddard's Army in reſpect to it, and the Mode of Attack to which Bombay is open. It is certain, that this Atttempt can only be made by Sea, and equally ſo, that the French ſhould for this Purpoſe have either a ſuperior Fleet to ours, or expect to find the Garriſon of Bombay ſo weak,

that it muſt fall before our Fleet could relieve it from any other Part of India. And if they do reſolve on this Attack, it is hardly within the Bounds of Probability that we can receive any Intelligence of it, or the Governor of Bombay, before the Fleet and Army are within Sight, conſequently the Place will be inveſted by Sea and Land before any Succours can be thrown into it. How the Garriſon of the Iſland of Bombay is to be relieved by Troops under General Goddard after this Event, I do not underſtand; more eſpecially as I am informed that it would be attended with great Difficulty, and much Time, to march the Troops from Surat to the neareſt Part of the Continent oppoſite to the Iſland of Bombay.

I conclude therefore, that the Troops at Surat can be of no Service in caſe of an Attack on Bombay; and that we ought therefore, ſo far from ſending Troops to the former Place, to bring down if poſſible the Troops that are there into the Neighbourhood of Bombay, for which I am told the Iſland of Salſette is very convenient. Nor do I conceive that, even if it ſhould hereafter be expedient to act againſt the Marattas, the Situation of our Troops will be at all altered for the worſe, but rather amended.

On the Second Queſtion, of ſending Troops from the Coaſt.

When I conſider the great Extent of Country they have to cover and defend; the ſmall Number of Europeans they have for that Purpoſe; the low State of their Finances; the Neighbourhood of powerful Enemies in Hyder Ally and the Nizam; and the Probability of the French Force being employed, either againſt the Circars, or to act in Concert with the former, I am equally againſt weakening or detaching the Force of that Preſidency.

On the Third Queſtion, of ſending Drafts from hence, to complete the original Number of General Goddard's Detachment, I ſee many, and what appear to me, inſurmountable Difficulties.

Such Reinforcement muſt conſiſt of Native Troops, Sepoys, who if prevailed on to embark, the Seaſon of the Year renders the Voyage next to impracticable.

By Land the Difficulties are equally great; the Army under General Goddard was near a Year in performing its March, though he met with no Oppoſition; I do not conceive that a Detachment of Drafts will be more likely to march with Safety acroſs India, than General Goddard's Detachment, but rather that they will be expoſed to greater Difficulties; in the mean Time the Expence is great and enormous, and the Money muſt be drawn directly from, and ſpent out of, Bengal.

I am equally at a Loſs to judge how the Army, propoſed to be tranſported from the Coaſt of Malabar, is afterwards to be maintained there, or by what Means Remittances can be effected to ſupport ſuch an Army, and the Expences of a War on the Malabar Coaſt; but I am confident that theſe Remittances would, if practicable, prove the Ruin of the Company's valuable Poſſeſſions on this Side of India.

I am therefore equally againſt this, as the other Propoſitions, and give it as my Opinion, that the true and only Line of Policy to be obſerved in the preſent State of Affairs in India, is, to concentre our Troops on the Malabar Coaſt to the Neighbourhood of Bombay, which I deem the ſureſt Means of preſerving that Place againſt the Attacks of the French, and that we ſhould puſh whatever Advantages we actually poſſeſs, to their proper Objects of obtaining a laſting Peace on that Side of India.

General Coote—I entirely agree with Mr. Wheler, with regard to the Situation our Army ſhould be placed in for the Security of Bombay. When I propoſed reinforcing General Goddard, for the Defence of that valuable Settlement againſt the French, I could not have the ſmalleſt Idea, that our Army was to remain where it now is; and the very Mode of reinforcing it with Part of the Bombay Troops, is a ſufficient Proof that it was not my Plan in any Reſpect. The Preſervation of Bombay is the firſt Object. The beſt Method of defending it, I will venture to ſay (and appeal to the Opinion of the firſt Officers in Europe) is by an Army in the Field, ſo ſtationed, as to be able to give the Garriſon immediate Succour, either by throwing freſh Troops into it from Time to Time, or engaging the beſieging Enemy.

The Situation that Bombay is now in, from the beſt Intelligence I have received (and I may ſay I have Intelligence that I can depend upon) is ſuch as renders it, in my Opinion, abſolutely neceſſary that ſomething ſhould be done for the Preſervation of it; public as well as private Reports from Europe mention a French Armament being deſtined, and actually ſailed, for the East Indies. By the laſt Accounts from the Cape, a 74 Gun Ship put in there, with a greater Number of Sick on Board than could be ſuppoſed to have ariſen from her Complement of Men, and the Report was, that they were all the Sick of a Squadron to which ſhe belonged. A 74 Gun Ship ſailed into the Mauritius when our Cartel Ship was lying off the Harbour. This Ship, before the Man of War arrived, was under Orders to go to the Iſland of Bourbon, there to remain till they diſmiſſed her; but immediately after the Arrival of the 74 Gun Ship, a Party of French was ſent on board, in order to aſſiſt in weighing her Anchor more expeditiouſly, and ſhe receiving Orders from a 36 Gun Frigate (lying cloſe by her, and which had been placed there as a Guard upon her) to ſail due North, till ſuch Time as the Frigate fired a Gun; ſhe ſailed 20 Leagues in that Direction, and, in the Middle of the Night, the Ship fired a Gun, and then ſhe ſhaped her Courſe for Madras, ſo that it is very natural to ſuppoſe, as leaſt the Seafaring Gentlemen whom I have converſed with on the Subject, think that ſhe was ordered to ſhape that Courſe, to prevent her falling in with any French Ships that might be bound for the Iſland. When I was at the Cape they moſt undoubtedly had 5 or 6000 regular Troops at the Iſlands; and I am well informed, that they have been ſince reinforced, but with what Numbers I do not know; I am likewiſe informed, that the Duc de Lauzun's Legion

Legion is on board the Fleet, which I ſuppoſe is come to Mauritius; Part of them perhaps may be left behind at Senegal, for it is a Part of the ſame Fleet, if not the Whole, which took Senegal. As to the Protection of Bombay, it can receive none but what we give it. It cannot come from Sir Edward Hughes, nor the Forces under his Convoy; they were not arrived at the Cape when the laſt Accounts came away, though expected there. The Troops he brings out are raw Troops, and will require ſome Time for Refreſhment at the Cape; the leaſt that can be allowed is Six Weeks; they muſt go the outward Paſſage, and make Ceylon, after which they cannot get to Bombay, ſuppoſing them determined to make the Trial, till after Chriſtmas; therefore that Settlement, in caſe of an Attack from the French, muſt either defend itſelf, or ſubmit to the Enemy. It is my Buſineſs, as the Commander in Chief in India, to propoſe ſuch Meaſures for the Defence of the Company's Settlements, and to recommend the Diſpoſal of their Strength in ſuch Manner as will moſt effectually contribute to that End. When I have done this, I have done my Duty. It is with the Boards, wherever I may have the Honour of ſitting, to determine the Propriety of my Propoſitions.

Mr. Francis—The Queſtion is much altered by the Explanations with which the Commander in Chief has favoured the Board. If it be intended that Brigadier General Goddard ſhall move down with his Force from Surat to Bombay, and take the moſt advantageous Poſition which his Judgment ſhall point out to him for covering Bombay againſt an Invaſion, I approve of the Idea, and join in it, but I beg Leave to ſay, that this Intention does not appear upon the Face of the Motion. No Orders are propoſed to Brigadier General Goddard to move from his preſent Station, nor any general Inſtructions recommended to him, upon the Suppoſition that the French may appear upon that Coaſt. From the Terms of the Motion, I ſhould conclude that the Reinforcement was to proceed from Bombay to Surat, and there to join General Goddard; underſtanding the Motion in that Senſe, I muſt confeſs, I thought it liable to the ſame Objections, which have been ſtated by Mr. Wheler; if it is not ſo, there can be no Difference of Opinion on this Part of the Propoſition. The Commander in Chief is undoubtedly the beſt Judge, whether the Force which he means to draw out of Bombay will be more uſefully employed for the Purpoſe of defending that Place, by joining Brigadier General Goddard's Army in the Field, that is, in a Station calculated to cover Bombay, or by being kept in the Body of the Place. On this Point, I ſubmit to the Commander in Chief's Authority. I agree that the Madras Troops now at Mahé ſhall proceed to Bombay, or to the Neighbourhood of that Place, and there join General Goddard, but not to Surat. With reſpect to any further Detachment from the Forces of Madras, I muſt declare that my Opinion entirely concurs with that of Mr. Wheler, and that if I recede from it, it is ſolely from the Confidence I place in the ſuperior Judgment of the Commander in Chief, who aſſures us that the Forces of Madras and of this Eſtabliſhment, are fully ſufficient to protect our Poſſeſſions on this Side of India, after making the Detachment in queſtion to the other Coaſt. With reſpect to our reinforcing Brigadier General Goddard's Army by Drafts from hence, I am ſorry that ſuch a Meaſure ſhould be found neceſſary, becauſe I deem it a very great Addition to the Weight and Difficulty of maintaining a War on the Malabar Coaſt. I ſhould acquieſce however if the Mode of conveying the Drafts from this to the other Side of India were ſtated and aſcertained: I foreſee great Difficulty in the Attempt; and no Probability that our Sepoys, ſuppoſing them arrived at their deſtined Station, will continue to ſerve for any Length of Time at ſo great a Diſtance from Home. The Deſertions I fear will at leaſt keep Pace with the Supplies, and the Operation will be endleſs.

Agreed to the Motion of the Commander in Chief, for reinforcing the Army under General Goddard.

Governor General—The firſt Duty of this Board upon the Subject now before us, and the firſt expreſs Object of the Commander in Chief in his Minute, is to provide for the Defence of Bombay in the Event of an Invaſion from the French; ſo far the Opinions of the Board ſeem to be united, and perhaps we ſhall agree in what I now recommend to that Effect, viz. That in our Advices to Brigadier General Goddard, we inform him of the Subſtance of the preſent Reſolutions: That our Deſigns in endeavouring to furniſh him with this Addition of Strength, is to enable him to give ſuch effectual Aſſiſtance and Support to the Government of Bombay in the Caſe of a French Invaſion, as may defeat it: That therefore he muſt regard this as his firſt Object, until there ſhall be no longer any actual Ground of Apprehenſion from the French; and make ſuch a Diſpoſition of the Detachment under his Command, as to inſure his Co-operation with the Garriſon of Bombay; at the ſame Time that he is not to withdraw his Attention from the other Points which we have given him in Charge. This I propoſe for that Part of our Inſtructions to him, which relates to the Subject immediately before the Board. For the other Subjects contained in his Letters, theſe conſiſt chiefly in Matters of Information, which require no Reply, but in his Letter of the 12th June, there are Three Points propoſed by him for his Negociations with the Adminiſtration at Poona, which require ſome Order of the Board upon them. From the Advantage which he conceives we have derived from the Eſcape of Ragonaut Row, and from our having obtained the Poſſeſſion of his Perſon from the weak and diſtracted State of the preſent Rulers and Partizans of the Government at Poona, and from the Encroachments which Hyder Ally has lately made upon their Borders, General Goddard ſeems to be of Opinion that the Miniſters are neither in a State to ſupport a new War againſt us, nor of courſe to refuſe their Aſſent to any reaſonable Demands which

may be made on them as the Conditions of Peace. The Points which he propoſes to be demanded from them are theſe, viz.

1ſt. The Payment of the Debt due from Ragonaut Row to the Company.

2d. The Reimburſement of the Expences incurred by the Expedition under his Command; and,

3dly. The Ceſſion of Baſſein, Chowl, and the other Places which were agreed to be ceded by the laſt Treaty with Ragonaut Row.

I do not think it neceſſary, nor would I propoſe that he ſhould be expreſsly enjoined to make theſe or any other ſpecific Demands, beſides thoſe which he has been poſitively commanded to make in his Inſtructions of the 5th April; neither do I ſuppoſe that theſe Inſtructions can be deemed to preclude him from gaining any other Advantages which a fortunate Concurrence of Circumſtances might enable him to obtain: In Anſwer therefore to this Part of his Letter, I would recommend that it be written to him, that we ſtill abide by the Letter of our Inſtructions of the 5th April, which are to form the Rule of his Conduct in all his Negociations with the Adminiſtration at Poona; but that if it ſhould be in his Power to obtain greater Advantages for the Company, and he ſhall not have concluded a Treaty with that Government at the Time of his receiving the preſent Diſpatches, we authorize him in ſuch Caſe to uſe his Endeavours for that Purpoſe; and particularly approve of the Three Points recommended in his Letter of the 12th June: That we think it moſt probable, either that the Maratta Government will have accepted of the firſt Offers which were made to them long before the probable Receipt of this Letter; or that either depending on their own ſuperior Strength, or expecting the Arrival of a French Armament, they may have refuſed to relinquiſh any Part of their Pretenſions derived from the Convention of Worgaum. In the firſt Caſe, it is not likely they will yield to any new Demands on our Part, if they have thought themſelves in a Capacity to enforce their own; but in the latter we conceive it not improbable, either that a Diſappointment of their Expectations, if theſe ſhould not be ſpeedily realized, or the Effect of their mutual Jealouſies, produced by ſuch Expectations, may induce them not only to wiſh for Peace, but even to ſolicit it, and to offer large Conceſſions to obtain it: And it is on this Suppoſition principally, that we approve of his looking to the further Acquiſition of the Terms which he has recommended to us.

Mr. Barwell—I have already given my Opinion upon the Propoſition of the Commander in Chief: I did not limit that Opinion to any partial Object, but had in view the general Intereſts of the Preſidency of Bombay, and a final Settlement with the Maratta Government. I approve entirely of the Inſtructions now propoſed by the Governor General, which ſeems not to have omitted any Point to which it is neceſſary General Goddard ſhould give his Attention; none ſtrike me at preſent; ſhould any afterwards occur to my Recollection, I leave to myſelf a Latitude for extending theſe propoſed Orders.

Mr. Francis—At a Time when the French are expected to attack Bombay, every Reaſon which heretofore induced the Board to wiſh for a ſpeedy Accommodation with the Marattas, muſt acquire additional Strength.

I am ſorry that any Circumſtance foreign from the immediate Execution of his Inſtructions, ſhould have engaged Brigadier General Goddard's Attention, or diverted it from the Object we have ſo ſtrongly recommended to him.

His reſolving to protract the Concluſion of any thing deciſive in the Negociation with the Durbar until he can hear from us, is unauthorized, and may be attended with fatal Conſequences. If a Peace be not concluded before the expected Arrival of the French on the Malabar Coaſt, we may be morally certain, that we ſhall then have both the French and the Marattas to contend with. The Entrance into India, which has been happily ſhut, will again be opened to our natural Enemies. The Marattas will be ready to receive and aſſiſt them; and if once they get Footing upon the Continent, their being driven out again will depend upon the Event of a new Conteſt, in which we are far from having a certain Proſpect of Succeſs. For theſe Reaſons I would direct Brigadier General Goddard to adhere literally to his Inſtructions, and cloſe with the Marattas as ſpeedily as poſſible. As to the Views now held out to us by Ragoba, or any new Advantages ſuppoſed to be attainable by our having him with us, I would poſitively order Brigadier General Goddard not to engage in them on any Account. Ragoba is a deſperate ruined Man, whoſe Situation may make it indifferent to him what Terms he conſents to, or what Promiſes he makes; but he has no Power, and can perform nothing. In the mean Time the Negociation with the Durbar, which it is ſo much our Intereſt to conclude, will be protracted; the French may arrive from the Coaſt; the Marattas of courſe will take Advantage of that Circumſtance, and either refuſe to treat with us at all, or inſiſt on Conditions which they would not pretend at the preſent Moment. With reſpect to Ragoba, I would adhere to the Orders given to Brigadier General Goddard in our laſt Letter of the 8th July; viz.

" We entirely approve of the Offer which you have made with Ragonaut Row, and direct that you
" continue to afford him the Protection of the Camp, ſo long as he ſhall continue to demand it;
" provided he ſhall not forfeit his Right to it by any Act of Infidelity, or attempt to defeat the Effect
" of your Negociations, to which you will give your entire Attention, without Regard to any other
" Conſideration."

" For the reſt we leave you to act under our Inſtructions of the 5th April, in which we ſee no
" Cauſe to make any Alterations on account of this Event."

Governor General—If I have not been ſufficiently underſtood, I ſhould have thought it unneceſſary to have added an Article to General Goddard's preſent Inſtructions, had he not himſelf ſuggeſted Doubts where I think he ought to have entertained none. I have propoſed to refer him to his preſent Inſtructions for the ſole Rule of his Conduct, and have only ſaid what I believe agrees with every Member of the Board, that if he can obtain better Terms in Addition to thoſe we have already preſcribed, he may do it; but we do not enjoin it, nor is he to ſuffer the great Object of his Negociation to be ſuſpended or impeded by the Proſecution of any other Views. Much might be ſaid in Anſwer to the other Parts of Mr. Francis's Minute. I wiſh to avoid a Debate: I ſhall therefore only briefly obſerve, that it is not with the Maratta State that Brigadier General Goddard has to treat, but with the Partizans of a Government diſtracted and totally deprived of its conſtitutional Form and Powers; and that the Event ſuppoſed of the Arrival of a French Armament, while our Negociations with them were in Suſpence, would be more likely to excite a decided Diviſion among them, and to throw the principal Strength of the Maratta Nation into our own Hands, than to unite it againſt us; when it is remembered, that the firſt Invitation of the French proceeded from the firſt Member of the Civil Government at Poona; and muſt, if ever it takes place, give him an Aſcendency over the Men who now rule by the Sword.

Mr. Wheler—I agree to the Governor General's Propoſition, as it now ſtands explained.

Sir Eyre Coote—I agree to the Governor General's Propoſition.

Mr. Francis—Undoubtedly General Goddard will not refuſe any extraordinary Advantages that may be offered to him; the Danger is, that while he is purſuing them he may miſs the Opportunity of concluding upon the Terms already preſcribed to him.

Agreed to the Governor General's Propoſitions; and reſolved, That the following Letters be written to Fort St. George, to Bombay, and to General Goddard:

Gentlemen,

From the Accounts which have been lately received of the Strength of the French at the Iſlands, we have Reaſon to apprehend that an Invaſion is intended againſt the Preſidency of Bombay: We therefore deem it of the utmoſt Importance to provide for the Safety of that Settlement, by reinforcing the Army commanded by General Goddard with a reſpectable Body of Troops, and to direct him to grant the moſt effectual Support and Protection in his Power to the Government of Bombay, for defeating any hoſtile Attempts which may be made againſt them.

The Commander in Chief has informed us that One Battalion of Europeans, Three Battalions of Sepoys, and 50 Artillery, may be ſpared from your Eſtabliſhment, now the Works of Pondicherry are demoliſhed, without any Riſk or Inconvenience to the Service; and that the Reſidue of the Forces under your Preſidency will be ſufficient for the Protection of your Poſſeſſions; beſides which, as you may daily expect a conſiderable Addition of Strength from Europe, we earneſtly recommend it to you, to iſſue immediate Orders to the Officer in Command of the Forces at Mahé, to detach from thence as great a Number of Men as he can ſpare at this Time to join General Goddard without Delay, and the Remainder of his Forces when Mahé ſhall be diſmantled. We alſo requeſt that you would be pleaſed to complete the Reinforcement recommended by the Commander in Chief to be ſent to General Goddard as expeditiouſly as poſſible from the moſt convenient Stations of your Army; allowing him to fix the Rendezvous.

We are, &c.

Gentlemen,

From Accounts which have been lately received of the Strength of the French at the Iſlands, we have great Reaſon to apprehend that an Invaſion is intended againſt your Preſidency; we deem it therefore of the utmoſt Importance to provide for its Safety, by reinforcing the Army commanded by General Goddard with a reſpectable Addition of Troops: We ſhall direct him to be prepared for the expected Event, and to make it his firſt Object to afford you the moſt effectual Support and Protection in his Power, for defeating any hoſtile Attempts which may be made againſt you.

The Commander in Chief has informed us, that one Battalion of Europeans, Three Battalions of Sepoys, and 50 Artillery, may be ſpared from the Fort St. George Eſtabliſhment; and that you can likewiſe contribute 300 Europeans, Two Battalions of Sepoys, and 100 Artillery for this Service, without any Inconvenience or Diſtreſs to the Garriſons where your Army is now ſtationed. We have written to the Preſident and Select Committee at Fort St. George on the Subject of their Supply; and earneſtly recommend it to you to iſſue immediate Orders for your Quota of this Reinforcement to be aſſembled, and to join General Goddard at ſuch Place of Rendezvous as he may appoint, without Delay.

We are, &c.

To Brigadier General Goddard.

Sir,

We have to acknowledge the Receipt of your Letters of the 12th and 18th from your Camp near Surat.

We

We receive great Satisfaction from the circumſtantial Intelligence which they contain reſpecting the State Diſſenſions, and probable Views of the different Parties exiſting in the Maratta Government. We do not diſapprove of your endeavouring to obtain the additional Conceſſions propoſed in your Letter of the 12th June; nor did our Inſtructions of the 5th April (though reſtricted to certain Points) preclude you from availing yourſelf of any Occaſion which might be preſented to you, to exact other Conditions by which the Intereſt or Influence of the Company might be certainly promoted, provided they did not impede or retard the Accompliſhment of your original Commiſſion. In this Senſe, and with theſe Proviſions, we repeat that we ſhall approve of the Addition of the Demands recommended in your Letter of the 12th June, to thoſe which we have already preſcribed in our original Inſtructions, if you ſhall not have concluded a Treaty with the Maratta Government before the Receipt of this Letter.

From Advices which have been lately received of the State of the French Forces at Mauritius, and from other concurring Cauſes, we have Reaſon to apprehend that an Attack has been meditated againſt the Settlement of Bombay: We have therefore thought it expedient to apply to the Preſidency of Fort St. George and Bombay, to reinforce the Army under your Command as ſoon as poſſible by Detachments from their Eſtabliſhments, conſiſting of the following Corps and Numbers:

From Bombay,

300 European Infantry,
2 Battalions Sepoys,
00 Artillery.

From Fort St. George,

1 Battalion of European Infantry,
3 Battalions Sepoys,
50 Artillery.

We have deſired the Select Committee at Fort St. George to iſſue immediate Orders for the March of as great a Part of their Quota from Mahé as can be immediately ſpared, and for the others to join you when the Works are demoliſhed: The Remainder of the Number will be detached from the moſt convenient Stations of their Army.

We mean further to recruit your Corps with ſuch a Number of Sepoys, drafted from Bengal, as may be requiſite to augment it to its original Complement.

Our Deſign in endeavouring to ſupply you with this additional Reinforcement of Troops is to enable you to give ſuch effectual Aſſiſtance and Support to the Government of Bombay in the Caſe of a French Invaſion as may defeat it; you muſt therefore regard this as your firſt Object until there ſhall be no longer any actual Ground of Apprehenſion from the French; and make ſuch a Diſpoſition of the Detachment under your Command, as will enſure your Co-operation with the Garriſon of Bombay; at the ſame Time you are not to withdraw your Attention from the other Points which we have given you in Charge.

We have acquainted the Preſident and Select Committee at Fort Saint George, and at Bombay, that you will fix the Places of Rendezvous for the Junction of theſe Troops with your Army; we therefore deſire, that you will make him acquainted as early as poſſible with the Situation which you ſhall judge the moſt convenient for that Purpoſe.

We are, &c.

Approved. (Signed) W. P.

Mr. Francis—I cannot approve of the Firſt Part of this Letter, for the Reaſons aſſigned by me in the Courſe of this Debate: With reſpect to the Second Part, I ſtill think that ſuppoſing the Apprehenſion of Bombay's being attacked to be founded on Fact, Brigadier General Goddard ought to be ordered to remove from Surat towards Bombay.

(Signed) P. F.
E. W.
Warren Haſtings.
Edward Wheler.

The Commander in Chief having delivered into the public Department a Liſt of Officers recommended by him to fill the Vacancies in General Goddard's Detachment, the following Minutes paſſed in conſequence.

Mr. Francis—I beg Leave to aſk the Commander in Chief, in what Manner, and by what Route, the Drafts are to proceed to join General Goddard?

Sir Eyre Coote—By Land.

Mr. Barwell—The Queſtion aſked by Mr. Francis ſpeaks that Solicitude which I feel as ſtrongly as he does for the Succeſs of this Meaſure, ſo important to the recruiting General Goddard's Detachment; but this Solicitude, inſtead of having influenced me to propoſe the Queſtion urged by Mr. Francis to the Commander in Chief, has impoſed Silence upon me. I truſt in the military Knowledge of the Commander in Chief, and in the political Conduct of the Governor General,

General, to controul and influence the Indian Princes to convey the propoſed Recruits to Brigadier General Goddard's Camp; and I make no Doubt; that when the Meaſure is ripe for Execution, and ſuch Precautions taken as to enſure a Probability of Succeſs, timely Information will be given to the Government. If it ſhould become a Queſtion, whether in Policy or Prudence the Plan of ſupplying thoſe Recruits is proper, I think this a very improper Time to urge the Queſtion propoſed by Mr. Francis. It allows the Operation of various Acts, which the Want of Unanimity in our Counſils may encourage the Ill-diſpoſed to oppoſe againſt the Succeſs of the beſt concerted military and political Plan; I could therefore wiſh the Queſtion might reſt upon the preſent Anſwer given by the Commander in Chief, and wait the Fullneſs of Time for a more particular Reply. I am equally concerned with Mr. Francis, and equally anxious for the Proſperity of the Britiſh Dominions, and I can ſolemnly affirm myſelf totally unacquainted with the minute Parts of the Plan of furniſhing theſe Recruits; indeed I do not think they can have been perfectly digeſted, and where they are liable to Variation from the political Views of the different States through which the Recruits may paſs, I ſee not the leaſt Advantage at this Juncture that can ariſe from an Expoſition of the Steps that ſhall be taken to enſure the Junction of theſe Troops with General Goddard's Detachment, but much Miſchief: I therefore wiſh it may be left to the Governor General and Commander in Chief to communicate Particulars as ſoon as ſuch Communication ſhall not ſubject the Meaſure to be defeated.

Mr. Francis—Mr. Barwell is at Liberty to judge for himſelf. In the Execution of the public Duties of my Station I ſhall be guided by my own Judgment. In Reply to the Obſervations contained in the preceding Minute, all that I ſhall ſay is, that there is no Select Committee in this Board, nor any ſeparate Truſt veſted in any of its Members excluſive of the reſt. I do not mean to aſk any further Queſtions on the Subject: It is ſufficient for me to know, that the Party of Recruits is to proceed by Land. As to the Poſſibility of keeping the Meaſure a Secret, I deny it: A Detachment of Troops cannot move from any Part of theſe Provinces, without its being publicly known which Way they are going. I ſhall deliver in Writing my Opinion of the Meaſure as I now underſtand it, and will not take up the Time of the Board any longer at preſent.

Mr. Barwell—I would not be miſtaken in what I have ſaid on Mr. Francis's Queſtion. I never meant to aſſert that the Meaſure was to be a Secret, but that it was proper and neceſſary the Means of executing it ſhould remain ſo, and remain with thoſe executive Members of Government, to whoſe particular Province the anſwering a Vote of the Board depends. I do not ſuppoſe this Council competent to direct the Commander in Chief the particular Manner an Army is to be led into the Field. They are reſponſible only for their Reſolution, which orders that Army on Service; he for the proper Meaſures of executing that Service. The Reſolution for the Drafts is paſſed; it remains now to be executed in the moſt expeditious and beſt Manner.

Governor General—I muſt decline taking any Part in the preſent Debate, meaning to offer my Sentiments upon the Expediency of the Meaſure to which it alludes, whenever it ſhall be brought ormally before the Board, which I hope will not be till the Inſtant of its Execution.

APPENDIX, N° 212.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 13th September 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Edward Wheler, Eſquire,
and
Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote, K. B.
Mr. Barwell and Mr. Francis indiſpoſed.

THE Governor General propoſes the following Draft of a Letter to be written to Brigadier General Goddard, being an Anſwer to the firſt Part of his Letter, dated the 24th June, and recorded in Public Department Conſultation, 2d Inſtant; the other Part thereof, reſpecting Remittances, having been already replied to.

Sir,

Although the Inſtructions which we have already given you, are ſuch as would enable you to decide the Event of Peace or War, on the Anſwer which you might receive from the Miniſters at

Poona to the Advances which we have made to them for the Renewal or Confirmation of the Treaty of Poona; yet as we were willing to allow them as much Time for their Deliberations as could be ſpared from the Seaſon of Action, in caſe that contrary to our Expectation they ſhould reject our Offers of Peace, and to leave you at full Leiſure as Circumſtances would admit for obtaining the Objects of our Inſtructions by Negociation; we did not reſtrict you to any ſpecific Period of Time for demanding their Anſwer, or making your Declaration thereon.

We ought to conclude that by this Time, or at leaſt by the Time of the Receipt of this Letter, the Maratta Miniſtry will have accepted or rejected our Propoſals, and conſequently a State of declared Peace or Hoſtility will have enſued. But as there is a Poſſibility that they may have found Means to protract the Negociations, and you may ſtill remain in a State of Suſpence, we direct you in this Caſe to repeat our Offers to the Peiſhwa and Miniſters, and to demand their final Determination upon them in the Space of Twenty-four Hours from their being preſented; declaring at the ſame Time, that you ſhall conſider their Refuſal or the Delay of their Anſwer beyond the Time, as a Declaration of War, and act accordingly.

You will ſend this Requiſition to Poona by ſome Perſon of approved Fidelity and Firmneſs, that the Orders which you may give in conſequence of the above may be punctually executed.

For the reſt, we refer you to our former Orders.

Fort William,
the 13th September 1779.

We are, &c.

Sir Eyre Coote—I approve of the Draft.
Mr. Wheler—I object to it.

Agreed to the above Draft of a Letter to Brigadier General Goddard; and ordered that it be tranſcribed fair, and ſent to him immediately.

Reſolved, That the following Letter be alſo written to Bombay:

Gentlemen,

We have kept you fully adviſed of the Inſtructions under which Brigadier General Goddard has been ordered to act in his Negociations with the Poona Government for a Renewal or Confirmation of the Treaty of Poona; and although we have every Reaſon to ſuppoſe from the Powers with which he is inveſted, that the Reſult will have been a formal Determination on War or Peace with that Government before the Arrival of any Directions which we can now ſend him; yet it is poſſible they may have found Means to protract the Negociation; and as in that Caſe we think they will have had full Time allowed them for Deliberation, if they were at all inclined to eſtabliſh an amicable Connection with us, we have this Day ſent Injunctions to General Goddard to repeat our Offers to the Peiſhwa and his Miniſters, and to demand their definitive Anſwer within the Space of 24 Hours; declaring their Refuſal or Delay beyond that Time, to be equivalent to a Declaration of War, and that he ſhall act accordingly.

If he ſhall be reduced to this Extremity, we recommend it to you to grant him every Aid in your Power, and to endeavour by every Means that may be neceſſary to render his Succeſs ſpeedy and effectual.

Fort William,
the 13th October 1779.

We are, &c.

APPENDIX, N° 213 and 214.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 16th September 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Edward Wheler, Eſquire,
and
Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote, K B.
Mr. Barwell and Mr. Francis indiſpoſed.

READ the following Letter from Brigadier General Goddard:

Gentlemen,

I have not done myſelf the Honour of addreſſing you ſince the 24th ultimo, in Hopes of receiving the expected Anſwers from the Poona Durbar, which are at length arrived, and I have incloſed Copies of them to the Honourable the Governor General.

Although they breathe throughout manifeſt Inclinations for Peace, I think it neceſſary to prepare you for a different Event, and to ſtate certain Caſes that may happen; ſolliciting your particular Inſtructions how I am to act under them.

When the confidential Perſon ſaid to be diſpatched from the Durbar arrives, which I do not ſuppoſe will be before the End of this Month, I ſhall make known to him the Terms you have directed me to propoſe, as preliminary Articles; to which if he conſents, on the Part of his Government, every remaining Point will be eaſily accommodated; however from that known Practice of the Marattas, and the Delay they introduce in all public Tranſactions, I have Reaſon to apprehend this Man will have no full Powers from his Court, and that of courſe he muſt refer me for an Anſwer to my Propoſals to the Paiſhwa and Miniſter; in which Caſe it will be the latter End of Auguſt or Beginning of September before I can know their final Sentiments, ſhould they then pleaſe to communicate them; though it appears to me moſt probable they will wiſh to protract the Negociation by ſome evaſive Reply, and attempt to amuſe us with the Proſpect of a Peace, till the Seaſon is too far advanced to effect any thing material in the Field.

To obviate the Inconveniency this would cauſe, I have in my preſent Letter to the Paiſhwa and Miniſter, propoſed to them, that ſhould the Conditions I have to offer on the Part of my Government be conſented to by them, they will ſignify the ſame to me, and ſettle the Mode of an immediate Interview betwixt the Miniſter and myſelf, as the only Means by which an End can be ſpeedily and ſucceſsfully put to the preſent Buſineſs. If they heartily concur in the Wiſhes for a Peace, it will be ſhewn by their Compliance with this Propoſal; and ſhould they decline it, even admitting they do not object to the Terms of the Treaty itſelf, it would be a Mark of Diſingenuity that might give the moſt ample Room to ſuſpect the Sincerity of their Intentions.

Although I have already requeſted your Orders how I am to act, in caſe the Miniſters ſhould diſcover an Inclination to amuſe with ſtudied and unneceſſary Pretexts for Delay, let me again entreat you will be pleaſed to give me your particular Inſtructions on this Head, and explain how far it is your Intention, upon a Conviction of their Duplicity and Deceit, I ſhould make known to them your juſt Reſentment of their Behaviour, the hoſtile Part I am authorized to take, and the particular Meaſures I am further to purſue, in conſequence of the political Advantages that may ſuggeſt themſelves from the Situation of Affairs already ſubmitted to your Conſideration.

As it may appear ſtrange, when the Paiſhwa and Miniſter have expreſſed themſelves in Terms of the higheſt Friendſhip to the Engliſh, and have conſented to my Deſire of ſending a confidential Perſon to receive my Propoſals, that I ſhould ſtill entertain the Idea of their Views being of a hoſtile Nature towards us, and be ſo particular in obtaining your conditional Inſtructions for my Guidance, I think it neceſſary to explain the Reaſons why my Suſpicions prevail of their Inſincerity, which, excluſive of the Argument furniſhed by the Character univerſally given the Marattas of a cunning and treacherous Nation, are principally occaſioned at this Time by the Intelligence I have received from moſt credible Authority at Poona, that the Perſon ſent by the Miniſter is intended more as a Spy to communicate to his Maſter what is tranſacting, than as a Vackeel to negociate; that Nanna is making every poſſible Preparation for War, and is ſoliciting for that End the ſeveral Powers in his Neighbourhood to join againſt the Engliſh. A Copy of a Letter recently written from Nizam Ally to him, in Reply to an Application of the above Nature, has been ſent me from Poona, which I have tranſmitted to the Honourable the Governor General. I alſo underſtand that Three French Letters have been received through their Agent Neamut ulla Cawn at Poona, but their Contents I cannot learn. All theſe Circumſtances, added to the Reluctances with which the Miniſter will be brought to relinquiſh the Advantages claimed by the late Treaty, make me wiſh to be prepared for the Reverſe of what I hope may happen taking place.

With reſpect to what the Paiſhwa and Miniſter have mentioned relative to Ragonaut Row, I before addreſſed them particularly on the Subject of his Reception, Copy of which Letter I have tranſmitted for your Peruſal: I have Reaſon to think they will be far from reſenting my Treatment of that Chief, from the Purport of a Letter this Inſtant received from the Paiſhwa; Copy of which I have forwarded to the Honourable the Governor General; in which, after mentioning the ill Effects Ragoba's Arrival had occaſioned in the Sircar, and bordering upon Guzerat, he takes Notice of the Means I had uſed to induce his Collectors to continue in them without Apprehenſion of being moleſted, and recommends them to my further Care and Protection.

When I received your Orders of the 5th of April to open a Negociation with the Poona Durbar, I applied to the Government of Bombay for every Information they could give me regarding the State in which the Treaty of Poorunder then ſtood, and how far the ſeveral Articles of it had been complied with by the Miniſters. To this Requiſition I have ſince received a full and ſatisfactory Reply: and among other Papers which they incloſed for my Peruſal, was a Copy of a Letter from the Select Committee of the Honourable the Court of Directors, dated Auguſt the 31ſt 1778, and received ſince the Concluſion of the laſt fatal Expedition.

The Purport of this Letter being known to you, I ſhall only beg Leave to remark, that as it contains Sentiments and even Directions the moſt friendly and favourable for the Intereſts of Ragonaut Row, the Part I have taken in affording him Protection, excluſive of the immediate political Advantages attending it, will, I flatter myſelf, prove in every Reſpect acceptable to you, and conſiſtent with the Views of the Honourable Company.

I am alſo the more anxious to receive your Orders reſpecting the Terms to be ſtipulated in his Favour at the preſent Negociation, which I make no Doubt you would wiſh ſhould be as honourable and as advantageous as poſſible.

I have the Honour to be, &c.

(Signed) Tho[s] Goddard.

Camp near Surat,
the 15th July 1779.

Read the ſeveral Papers mentioned in the above Letter as being ſent to the Governor General, which are entered in the Perſian Correſpondence.

Read a Letter from the Paiſhwa, and Nana Furneſſe the Miniſter at Poona, to the Governor General, which is alſo entered in the Perſian Correſpondence, under Date

From Nanna Purnaveeſe; Received 14th September 1779.

I have already addreſſed you on the Subject of the bad Conduct of the Governor of Bombay in Non-execution of the Treaty which Colonel John Carnac, &c. Engliſh Chiefs, of their free Will and Accord, inſtigated by the Sentiments of Friendſhip, executed under the Seal of the Company, and delivered to the Sirkar through the Channel of Toocojee Row Holcar, and Madajee Row Scindeah; and alſo ſtated to you the Affair of the hoſtile Conduct of the Chief of Bauncote, who in Violation of a Treaty concluded under the Government of the deceaſed Seremunt Nanna Saib and Row Pundit Purdhaun, prohibited the Paſſage of the Grabs of the Sirkar; and having ſeized Two of them laden with Grain, ſunk them at Sea, and ſent a Grab of War with military Stores againſt the Fort of Soorundurk, belonging to the Sirkar; which having cannonaded and made War on the Sirkar, he applied by Letter to the Governor of Bombay. I further related in this Letter the Particulars of the evil Deſigns of Seremunt Dada Saib, and of his having contrived by Artifice to eſcape from Hurry Babajee, a Chief who was ſent to guard him; and of his having taken the Route of Surat and Broach, with other Particulars; which I doubt not you have received and underſtand. But I ſhall now repeat, for the greater Security, that Seremunt Dada Saib Ragonaut Row, after the Concluſion of Peace between John Carnac, &c. Engliſh Chiefs on the one Part, and the Chiefs of the Sirkar on the other, and the Execution of a Treaty under the Seal of the Company, came here, and agreeable to Engagement ſet off for the Talook of Janſey; on the Way upon the Banks of the Nerbudda, diſregarding every Obligation laid on him by the Treaty, he by Artifice got Hurry Babajee, who was ſent with a Party to eſcort him, into his Power, and changing his Route, ſet out for Surat: This you have doubtleſs heard.

You are inveſted by the illuſtrious King of England, and the Engliſh Company, with the Supreme Authority. The Governor of Bombay ſtill continues to purſue the ſame Line of improper Conduct as formerly, and acts in direct Oppoſition to the Engagements concluded by John Carnac, &c. Engliſh Chiefs; notwithſtanding that all your Letters, from the Concluſion of Peace to the preſent Time declare, that no Deviation ſhall take place in the common Friendſhip; and that the good Faith of the Engliſh; which is univerſally acknowledged, ſhall never receive a Blemiſh. To what Cauſe then am I to attribute the Violations of Treaty and bad Conduct of the Governor of Bombay?

I have lately received a Letter from Colonel Goddard to this Effect: That he has received Letters from the Nabob Amaud-ul-Dowlah; that for the Adjuſtment of the Diſputes which have ariſen between the Chiefs of Bombay and the Maratta Chiefs, to the Deſtruction of that Friendſhip and Harmony which had ſo long ſubſiſted between the Two States, to remove all Cauſes of Enmity, and to re-eſtabliſh Friendſhip on a ſolid Baſis, full Powers had been given to him, that a truſty Agent

on the Part of the Sirkar ſhould be ſent, as he has many Particulars to communicate. This Letter was accompanied by a Copy of Commiſſion given to Colonel Goddard under the Seal of the Company and Signatures of the Supreme Council of Calcutta, for my Inſpection.

Be pleaſed, Sir, to conſider maturely and with Equity, the Cauſes of Enmity between the Governor of Bombay and the Chiefs of this Government; they are Two-fold. In the firſt place, Colonel John Upton, your Ambaſſador, when Peace was concluded, and the Treaty executed, although I repeatedly pointed out to him the Neceſſity that ſome Perſon of Credit on the Part of the Governor of Bombay ſhould join in it, declared to me, that Amaud-ul-Dowlah Bahadre was inveſted with the Supreme Power by the King of England and the Company, and that his Orders were binding on the Chiefs of all the Engliſh Settlements. Secondly, Colonel John Carnac Bahadre, and other Engliſh Chiefs, with the Advice and Concurrence of the Governor of Bombay, in concert with Seremund Dada Saib, tranſported themſelves into the Neighbourhood of Poona, and were in the End obliged to return to Bombay, overwhelmed with Shame for their fruitleſs Attempt.

Theſe are the Two Points which have excited the Enmity of the Governor of Bombay. No other Cauſe has been given from this Quarter; and no Breach of Friendſhip has taken place on our Part.

The Government of Bombay's preſent Plan is, by a Miſrepreſentation of Facts, to excite Doubts in your Breaſt, although there is nothing in this World which I value equally with Friendſhip and Sincerity of Heart. I therefore requeſt that you will not give Credit to the Repreſentations which he may make to you with a Deſign to create a Breach in our Friendſhip. My Eyes are turned to the Candour and good Faith of the Engliſh Nation; it is therefore incumbent on you to iſſue poſitive Orders to the Governor of Bombay, that conformably to Treaty he deſiſt from affording the Engliſh Protection to Seremunt Dada Saib, that he refuſe him all kind of Support, and, agreeable to John Carnac's Treaty, relinquiſh all the Places belonging to the Sirkar, create no Diſturbances in the Government Territories, and make it a Point with the Chief of Bancote, whoſe Character is univerſally infamous, that he, according to eſtabliſhed Cuſtom, leave the Paſſage free to the Veſſels of the Sirkar.

Theſe Meaſures will promote the Eaſe and Happineſs of the People, and augment the Friendſhip between the two States.

As you are known to be poſſeſſed of Penetration, Juſtice, and Honour, it was unneceſſary to point out theſe Steps. I have written the above Particulars merely for your Information. Let your Meaſures be guided by Equity, and the approved Maxims of Government. Fortune and Empire are the Gifts of God.

From the Peſhwa; received the 14th September 1779.

Your agreeable Letter, expreſſive of ſincere Friendſhip, and intimating that you have heard by various Channels, and have alſo received ſome little and imperfect Intelligence relative thereto from the Gentlemen of Bombay; that they have, without the Knowledge or Authority of the Company, engaged in Meaſures deſtructive of the Friendſhip and Harmony which ſubſiſted between the two States, and concluded a Treaty highly diſadvantageous; but that you cannot form a Judgement reſpecting the Rectitude of the Conduct of the Bombay Chiefs, until you obtain more complete and authentic Intelligence, that there is no Alteration in your Friendſhip, and that you have now inveſted Colonel Goddard with full Powers to re-eſtabliſh the Friendſhip and Connection between our States, with other Particulars which I underſtand arrived, and from a Peruſal of it I received the greateſt Pleaſure.

I have very frequently given you Information of the bad Conduct of the Governor of Bombay, and of his Diſregard to the Stipulations of the Treaty. I have on every Occaſion ſteadily preſerved my Friendſhip and Engagements with the Engliſh Nation, and placed implicit Confidence in the Seal of the Company; and ſince the Chiefs of Bombay have, in Diſobedience of Orders, engaged in Meaſures without your Knowledge in open Violation of the Duties of Friendſhip, why are they not brought to Puniſhment by the European Laws?

When John Carnac and others of the Engliſh Chiefs, in concert with Dada Sahib, lately came to this Quarter, I received a Letter from the Governor of Bombay, informing me that that Meaſure was determined on with the Concurrence of the Governor General, and all the Members of the Supreme Council of Calcutta. When John Carnac made Propoſals for Peace through the Channel of Tocojee Row Holcar and Madajee Row Sindeah, and delivered to the Sirkar a Treaty under the Seal of the Company, a Letter was received from him, declaring, that he poſſeſſed full Powers from the Company's Chiefs over all Matters, and, notwithſtanding their hoſtile Acts, I, actuated only by Sentiments of Friendſhip, gave them an Eſcort, who conducted them in Safety to Bombay; yet to this Day the Chiefs of Bombay have not performed any of the Conditions of the Treaty, or paid any Attention to their Engagements. I place the utmoſt Confidence on the Seal of the Company, and the Acts of the Company's Chiefs, and entertain no Sentiments but thoſe of Friendſhip and Sincerity, which are Qualities ſuitable to illuſtrious Perſonages.

You alſo wrote that I ſhould give no Place or Encouragement in my Territories to the French Nation; on the Peruſal of which I was filled with Aſtoniſhment. If you are poſſeſſed of Friendſhip and Candour towards me, what ſhould induce me to cultivate the Friendſhip of the French?

When a Perſon on their Part came formerly here, induced by Friendſhip for you, I complied with your Deſire, and ſent him away. If this Matter has been miſrepreſented to you by Perſons who are the Diſturbers of the common Friendſhip, and by their falſe Colouring has created Suſpicions in your Breaſt, there is no Remedy; there is no Alteration in my Friendſhip, and your Letters are filled with Aſſurances to the ſame Effect. Write therefore in poſitive Terms to the Chiefs of Bombay, that they execute the Terms of the Treaty without the leaſt Failure; that they give no Protection to the Enemies of the Sirkar, nor excite any Diſturbances. Dada Sahib, who has again broken his Engagements and gone towards Surat and Broach, you formerly directed them to ſhew no Countenance to. I now requeſt that the moſt poſitive Orders may be ſent on this Subject to all the Engliſh Company's Chiefs, forbidding them ever to protect him with their Influence.

I have received a very friendly and candid Letter from Colonel Goddard, incloſing a Copy of the Commiſſion which he has received from you and the Supreme Council of Calcutta, and deſiring that I will ſend a truſty Perſon to confer with him; and I have accordingly diſpatched a Vackeel to him.

Be pleaſed to give expreſs Directions to Colonel Goddard to carry the Treaty into Execution, and to give Orders for that Purpoſe to the Chiefs of Bombay, and they muſt not give an Aſylum to Dada Sahib, it being prohibited in the Treaty, nor pay Attention to his Repreſentations. I am at all Times deſirous of Friendſhip.

From Nanna Purnaveeſe; received 14th September 1779.

Of the ſame Tenor.

Encloſures in a Letter from General Goddard; dated the 15th July, received the 14th September 1779.

N° 1. Copy of a Letter from the Peiſhwa Pundit Purdhaun Sewac Madho Row Narrain, to Colonel Goddard.

Your agreeable Letter, full of Friendſhip and Candour, and informing me of your having received Letters from the Nabob Amaud-ul-Dowlah, Governor General, Mr. Haſtings, and all the Members of the Supreme Council of Calcutta, to this Effect, That between the Maratta Chiefs and the Chiefs of the Engliſh Nation, who are famous throughout the Univerſe for their Fidelity and ſteady Adherence to Treaty, the Bands of Friendſhip have long ſubſiſted, and that they have now inveſted you with full Powers for the Purpoſe of confirming and giving additional Strength to the Ties of mutual Friendſhip and Connection; and you therefore requeſt that I will ſend a truſty Perſon on my Part. This Letter, together with Copy of your Commiſſion, I have received, and the Peruſal of it affords me the higheſt Pleaſure.

As I out of a Regard to Friendſhip, and from a Reliance on the Seal of the Engliſh Company, which the greateſt of the Chiefs of the Engliſh Nation hold in the higheſt Reſpect, have no other View than Friendſhip and Regard; you will therefore pay Regard to the Acts of the Company's Chiefs, and to the Seal of the Engliſh Company which is affixed to the Treaty; and those Individuals, who without the Knowledge of the Company have diſobeyed the Orders under which they acted, and engaged in improper Meaſures, it is expedient to puniſh according to the European Laws.

Look with the Eyes of Friendſhip and Equity into the Matter, and ſee who has been guilty of the Violations of Treaty, and from what Motives the Enemies of the Sirkar were protected under the Engliſh Power, Quarrels raiſed, and Inſults offered.

I have lately received Letters from Mr. Haſtings, expreſſed in the Terms of the warmeſt Friendſhip, informing me of the Powers with which you have been inveſted; and agreeable to your Deſire, I am about to diſpatch a Perſon of Truſt to you; he will ſoon arrive: Whatever you have to ſay, ſay it to him, and write in ſuch Terms to the Chiefs at Bombay, that they faithfully perform the Terms of the Treaty, and not protect by the Engliſh Power any Inſurgents of this Government, or create any Diſturbances.

I formerly wrote you that Dada Sahib Ragonaut Row was proceeding to that Quarter, and that you ſhould not afford him the Engliſh Protection; and I now repeat my Deſire, that in regard to our Friendſhip and intimate Union, you will not, as ſpecified in the Treaty, give an Aſylum to Dada Sahib, or afford him any Support. Send a Pair of Coſſids before to ſecure the Road, and conduct my Vackeel to you. I am well acquainted with your Wiſdom and Penetration.

For the Security and Protection of my Territories which lay in your Neighbourhood, that the Ryots may not be diſtreſſed or alarmed on Account of Ragonaut Row, and that weak and bad Men may be prevented from joining with him, I have ſent an Army towards Goondrebarry. I write this for your Information.

APPENDIX, N° 213 and 214.

N° 2. Copy of a Letter from Balajee Pundit, commonly called Nanna Purnaveeſe, to Colonel Goddard.

Your agreeable Letter, expreſſive of ſincere Regard, and intimating your having received Letters from the Nabob Amaud-ul-Dowlah, Governor General, Mr. Haſtings, and all the Members of the Supreme Council of Calcutta, to this Effect, &c. (the ſame as the foregoing.)

No. 3. Copy of a Letter from the Nabob Nizam-ul-Dowlah to Nanna Purnaveeſe, in Reply.

I have received your Arzie, and underſtand its Contents, to wit, that the evil-minded Engliſh, having given their Protection to Seremunt Dada Sahib, and afforded an Aſylum to the turbulent Gauzi ul dien Khan, and collected Magazines of military Stores, have entered the Path of Hoſtility with the moſt malignant Deſigns; and from the Invitation which you have given to me, I underſtand it to be your Deſire that a formidable Army of mine, under the Command of one of my moſt renowned Brothers, ſhould be ſent to act in concert with your Forces and thoſe of Madho Row Sewac, againſt that puſillanimous Race, and to root them out. As it is the Seaſon of the Rains, my Forces, agreeable to eſtabliſhed Cuſtom, have received their Diſmiſſion, and are gone to their reſpective Homes, and cannot be now recalled; particularly at this Period, when from the exceſſive heavy Rains, and the Badneſs of the Roads in conſequence, and the Inundations of the Rivers, the Journey could not without Difficulty be performed by Coſſids the moſt acquainted with it: I have therefore determined, that as ſoon as the Rains are at an End, I will ſend a diſtinguiſhed Chief with a reſolute Army, and good Train of Artillery, or if I find it poſſible, I will repair in Perſon to you, and rouſe that bad Race from their Dream of Security, and overthrow all their ambitious Deſigns: You will therefore, depending on my Friendſhip for Pundit Purdhaun, which is univerſally known, and regarding my Intereſts as the ſame, begin your March with the Forces and Artillery of the Sirkar, taking Care to have very large Cannon with you, in Conjunction with Madho Row Sindeah and Subahdar Holcar, about the Time when I ſhall ſet out, and contrive your Marches ſo that we may meet in the Zillah of Kojeſtabunyaud, and then purſue ſuch Meaſures as we ſhall deem adviſable. It is ſaid by Molana Nizamee, that when Two Hearts are united, they are able to break a Mountain in Pieces, and diſſipate the moſt numerous Bodies.

For further Particulars I refer you to the Letters of Sooraje Bund and Kiſhen Row Billaul.

Whatever further Plan you may form, make me acquainted therewith, and I will write my Sentiments thereon.

N° 4. Copy of a Letter from the Peiſhwa Pundit Purdhaun Madho Row Naraln to Colonel Goddard.

I ſome Time ago informed you by Letter, that Seremunt Dada Sahib, after the Concluſion of the Peace between the Two States, through John Carnac, &c. Engliſh Chiefs, ſet out from hence for his Reſidence at Janſey, and in the Way, after croſſing the Nurbudda, got Hurry Babajoe, who was appointed to eſcort him, into his Power, and changing his Route, proceeded towards Surat: This Letter has doubtleſs reached you.

I have juſt learnt that he is arrived at Surat, and has injured and moleſted the Territories of the Sirkar in the Neighbourhood of Gojeraut; and that you hearing this, have taken Meaſures to ſatisfy the Gomaſtahs of the Sirkar. As the Ties of Friendſhip between me and Jelladut Jung Bahadre are firmly knit, and you likewiſe are poſſeſſed of Friendſhip and Attachment to this Sirkar, and as you have likewiſe received Letters from the Governor to promote the Increaſe of Friendſhip between us; it is therefore incumbent on you, in Conſideration of this Friendſhip, to provide for the Security of thoſe Territories, and to ſupport the Gomaſtahs of the Sirkar.

N° 214.

Reſolved, That the following Reply be written to General Goddard.

Sir,

We have received your Letter of the 24th July; for an Anſwer to which we refer you to the Contents of ours, dated the 13th Inſtant, and to the Tenor of our former Inſtructions; but that you may be at no Loſs with reſpect to the Plan of your future Conduct, we think it proper to direct, that you conform literally to thoſe Orders, in all Caſes where they are Expreſs, and that in any other where no Proviſion is made, or an Option left you to uſe your own Diſcretion, you adhere,

here, as nearly as poſſible, to the Spirit of them, without waiting the Reſult of further Reference to us.

We obſerve, with ſome Degree of Pleaſure, the Notice taken by the Maratta Government in their Letters to you, of the liberal Attention which you had ſhewn to the Intereſts of that State, in the Protection given to their Aumils in Guzzerat, againſt the Irregularities of Ragoba's Dependents; and we recommend a Continuation of the ſame Kindneſs and Moderation in all your Conduct towards them.

The Miniſters have complained to us of Violence offered to ſome of their Veſſels, in their Paſſage along the Coaſt; and of an Attack made on their Fort of Soorundurk, by the Chief of Bancoote; for the Particulars of which we have written to the Preſidency of Bombay.

Fort William,
the 16th September 1779.

We are, &c.

Ordered, That a Copy of ſuch Parts of the Peiſhwa, and Nana Furneſſe's Letter, as relate to the Oppoſition made to the free Paſſage of the Maratta Veſſels at Bancoote, and the Attack of the Fort of Soorundurk, be ſent to the Preſident and Select Committee at Bombay; and that they be required to tranſmit a full and clear Explanation of the Facts alluded to.

The following Letter is accordingly written to the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay:

Gentlemen,

In a Letter which we have lately received from the Government of Poona, we are adviſed of Acts of Hoſtility, committed in the Name of the Engliſh, by a Perſon ſaid to be Chief of Bancoote, who is accuſed of ſeizing two Grabs, belonging to the Marattas, off the Malabar Coaſt, and of ſending a Force to attack the Fort of Soorundurk; we incloſe an Extract of the Letter, as far as it relates to this Complaint; and as we have not received any Communication from you of the Facts alluded to, which could enable us to give a ſatisfactory Anſwer to it, we requeſt that you will furniſh us with an Explanation of the Particulars.

We are, &c.

Fort William,
the 16th September 1779.

Warren Haſtings,
Edw[d] Wheler.

APPENDIX, N° 215.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 25th October 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Philip Francis, } Eſquires.
Edward Wheler, }
Mr. Barwell indiſpoſed.
Sir Eyre Coote gone to viſit the different Stations of the Army.

READ the following Letter from General Goddard.

Gentlemen,

I did myſelf the Honour to addreſs you the 15th ultimo, acquainting you with the Letters I had received from the Maratta Government, conſenting to ſend a confidential Perſon to me, whoſe Arrival I expected towards the End of July. In this Hope I was however diſappointed; for, by delaying a Month on the Road, he did not reach Surat until the 14th Inſtant. He received his firſt Audience on the 15th, and as it was my Object to bring the Matter to a Point as ſpeedily as poſſible, for which he ſeemed equally inclined with myſelf, in the Second Conference, which happened the Day following, I fully explained to him the friendly Sentiments of your Honourable Board, and the Propoſals you had authorized me to make to the Poona Government. In order to give you the cleareſt Idea in my Power of the State of the Negociation, and enable you to form a Judgment of the Miniſters Inclinations, I have taken the Liberty of incloſing, for your Peruſal, the Particulars of the Converſation I had with the Vackeel, on the Subject of my Embaſſy to his Maſter, which, together with a few Remarks I ſhall here ſubjoin, from Obſervations made on the Man's Behaviour and Expreſſions, will, I am hopeful, convey to you the moſt full and ſatisfactory Information.

I am

I am of Opinion, in the firſt Place, that the Miniſter is perfectly diſpoſed to make a Peace with the Engliſh; but the Confidence and Spirits ariſing from his late Succeſs againſt the Bombay Troops, had, it is plain, given him Hopes of obtaining one, upon Terms very different from what I have propoſed; and on that Account he will not be eaſily reconciled to the Sacrifice demanded from him, of relinquiſhing his Claim to all thoſe Advantages acquired by the late Convention with Mr. Carnac; I therefore expect, notwithſtanding the poſitive Declaration I have made, of the Neceſſity there is that he agrees to this preliminary Article previous to the Settlement of any Treaty, that he will endeavour to ſtipulate for certain Conceſſions to be at the ſame Time made on the Part of the Engliſh: It appears to me probable that he will demand the Perſon of Ragonaut Row to be delivered up; but as this would be totally inconſiſtent, and impoſſible to be complied with, I ſhall abſolutely decline conferring on it, or any other Point whatever, till the preliminary Articles are firſt fully agreed to.

I hope the Particulars I have already condeſcended upon with the Vackeel, which appear in the incloſed Journal, as they were intended to ſhew the ſincere Intentions of your Government, and to remove any Cauſes of Doubt or Apprehenſion the Miniſter might have Reaſon to entertain, will not be conſidered by you as in the leaſt derogatory, and prove the arduous Zeal with which I have, and ſtill ſhall continue to proſecute the Object of a Peace, ſo ſtrenuouſly recommended in your Inſtructions.

There appear Two very powerful Motives why the Miniſter is at this Time ſolicitous for a Peace; the one is acknowledged by the Vackeel in the Wiſh expreſſed by his Maſter to be at full Liberty to oppoſe and check the Progreſs of Hyder Ally; and the other, of no leſs Force than the former, ariſes from the Differences that ſubſiſt betwixt Nana Furneſe and Madajee Scindia. Though the Name of the latter was not publicly introduced by the Vackeel, it was mentioned in the Courſe of Converſation; and he made no Scruple of ſaying, that Nanna was exceedingly incenſed againſt him for his late Conduct reſpecting Ragoba, and wiſhed for nothing more than to get him into his Power. This Speech of the Vackeel's is corroborated by a Variety of other Reports; and it is certain, that Scindia has lately made ſome conſiderable Requiſition of the Miniſter, which the other is by no Means inclined to comply with. He has not either viſited Poona ſince the Eſcape of Ragonaut Row, though invited and preſſed by the Miniſter to go there.

As theſe ſeveral Circumſtances all conſpire in Favour of my preſent Negociation, I ſhall ſo far pay Attention to them in the Proſecution of it, as to uſe them to proper Advantage without materially interrupting or preventing the Concluſion of the Treaty you have entruſted to my Management. It is needleſs to obſerve to you, ſince it will appear in the accompanying Proceedings, that Nanna Furneſe is the only oſtenſible Perſon who, with the Name of Miniſter, ſtands forth on his Occaſion to negociate on the Part of the Paiſhwa and Maratta State. The Authority which was before divided amongſt a Number, ſeems now, ſince the Confinement of Moraba and Saccaram Bapoo, to be ſolely centered in himſelf; and the only Controul he has to apprehend, is from the overgrown Power of Scindia, and the other military Officers of the Government.

I have noticed in the Diary now ſent you, that no Overtures reſpecting Ragoba were made by the Vackeel on the Part of his Maſter, and the Reaſons which occurred to me on that Head. I judged it proper, in relation to this Subject, to repeat to him what I had before written to the Paiſhwa; and to expreſs my Satisfaction at the Proſpect there now was of finally adjuſting all paſt Difficulties in an eaſy and amicable Manner; but as I am hopeful of receiving Letters from your Board every Day in conſequence of the News of Ragoba's Eſcape, I was happy at his Silence on a Subject that ſaved me the Neceſſity of making any particular Declarations, and did not therefore wiſh to preſs him any further on that Subject.

As regular Dawkes have been placed all the Way to Poona, I may receive Anſwers to the Letters now diſpatched to the Miniſters in Eight Days. They muſt however arrive in Twelve Days Time; when it may be known with a Degree of Certainty, what the Reſult of my Negociations may be. In the mean Time ſhould any thing occur worth communicating, I ſhall not fail to addreſs you.

I have endeavoured in the preſent Addreſs, and the incloſed Paper, to be as full and as explicit as poſſible. You will perceive, that after condeſcending upon Particulars in the moſt ample Manner, in order to ſatisfy every poſſible Doubt and Apprehenſion, I have propoſed to him the Two preliminary Articles; upon the Acceptance or Refuſal of which my future Negociation muſt depend. Should he give his full Conſent, I am perſuaded the remaining Points to be diſcuſſed will be eaſily ſettled; but ſhould he, which I muſt confeſs there is ſome Reaſon to ſuppoſe he may, reject the Firſt of them, it will not be in my Power to treat further. In this Caſe you muſt be ſenſible how anxiouſly I ſhall look for the conditional Inſtructions I before entreated you would furniſh me with, and how neceſſary they will be for my further Guidance and Direction.

I have before repeatedly addreſſed you reſpecting the Supplies of Money; on which Subject I have not been honoured with any Letter from your Board, ſince the One of the 16th February, incloſing a Bill of Exchange for Three Lacks on the Gomaſtah of Gopaul Doſs. Uncertain as to the Event of my Negociation, and foreſeeing the probable Occaſion there might be of all the Treaſure collected on this Side of India the next cold Seaſon, I have endeavoured to avoid being obliged to uſe any Part of it towards defraying the Expences of the Detachment till after the Rains; but I have, contrary to my Inclination, been neceſſitated to receive from the Company's Treaſury at Surat, Four Lacks of Surat Rupees; as the Merchants of this Place, after the greateſt Trouble

and Difficulty, could only furniſh me with Money for Bills drawn upon you in their Favour amounting to Three Lacks and Forty-four thouſand Rupees.

The Rate of Exchange at which theſe Bills are granted, is 100 Morſhedabad Sicca Rupees for 93 Surat Rupees, which is Two per Cent. worſe than was given the Merchants of this Place before, and One per Cent. better than Gopaul Doſs's Gomaſtah received, for Reaſons aſſigned in a former Letter, but which is, upon the Whole, when every Circumſtance comes to be conſidered, as favourable as could have been expected.

I have the Honour to be, &c.

(Signed) Tho' Goddard

Head Quarters,
Camp near Surat,
16th Auguſt 1779.

Subject of the Conferences betwixt Colonel Goddard and the Vackeel from the Government of Poona, Auguſt the 15th 1779.

Lutchman Row, Vackeel on the Part of the Maratta Government, having arrived, together with Nehab Chund Mounchy, a confidential Perſon, and in a Manner connected with him in that Embaſſy, and having received their firſt Audience they produced Letters from the Paiſhwa Madhurow Narrain, and the Miniſter Nanna Furneſe, addreſſed to me, and importing that they had ſent Luckman Row, a Perſon of Underſtanding, and poſſeſſing their full Confidence, to whom they begged I would truly communicate whatever I wiſhed to ſay.

As the Expreſſion uſed on this Occaſion implied no Powers to treat or conclude being veſted in them, I firſt demanded of Luckman Row, if his Government had employed him in the ſame ample Manner the Supreme Council of Bengal had authorized me to ſettle and agree in their Name, as they would ſee from my original Credentials then produced; or if not to the Extent given me, how far they were empowered to treat?

In Reply to this, they obſerved, that their Orders were to receive whatever I had to propoſe to them, that though they might not poſſeſs Powers to agree to every Point, there were ſome which they were intruſted to conſent to on the Part of the Miniſter, and whatever was of a Nature contrary to theſe muſt be referred to him; to which they added, more than Eight Days would not be required to obtain an Anſwer, as Dawkes were ſtationed all the Way to Poona.

Willing to bring Matters to as ſpeedy a Concluſion as poſſible, I aſked the Ambaſſador if he would enter upon Buſineſs immediately, or if it was his Inclination to defer it till the next Meeting? It was therefore ſettled that the Conferences ſhould be deferred till next Day, when the Buſineſs ſhould be particularly entered upon and diſcuſſed; but as in the Courſe of Converſation many Things were generally touched upon, from which ſome Judgment may be formed of what may be expected during the Progreſs of the Negociation, I ſhall note them down with the Remarks that occur.

The Vackeel, after declaring in the Name of his Government, the ſtrongeſt Inclination to live upon Terms of Friendſhip with the Engliſh, added, that an Alliance had ſubſiſted for many Years between the Two States; that at the Time of Narrain Row's being put to Death by Ragonaut Row, and the Purſuit of the latter by Siccaram Baboo, Nanna Furneſe, and other confidential Chiefs, to puniſh ſo atrocious an Act, Mr. Moſtyn, then Reſident on the Part of the Bombay Government, was left behind at Poona; that he took Advantage of their Abſence, and was guilty of many underhand Practices; and having fled to Bombay, the Engliſh ſeized the Opportunity of the Security of the Maratta Government to poſſeſs themſelves of the Iſland of Salſette; that afterwards Ragoba marched to Surat and was joined by Colonel Keating with an Army of the Engliſh. He obſerved, that the Governor General and Council of Bengal, highly diſpleaſed with theſe Proceedings, had ſent Colonel Upton to ſettle the Differences that had aroſe betwixt the Miniſters and the Bombay Council.

Reſpecting this Treaty he ſaid, that on Colonel Upton's firſt Arrival, the Miniſters told him that Treaties of Peace were then ſubſiſting betwixt the Maratta State and the Government of Bombay: let us adhere to that; what Occaſion to make a freſh one? Colonel Upton in Reply ſaid, That the Treaty he would enter into with them ſhould be of ſo ſtrong and binding a Nature, that it ſhould laſt to the lateſt Generation. They then propoſed that ſome Perſon on the Part of the Bombay Government ſhould be preſent; to which Colonel Upton objected, ſaying, it was by no Means neceſſary; that however a Letter was received from the Gentlemen of Bombay, declaring themſelves bound by whatever Colonel Upton might conclude on the Part of the Engliſh.

Reſpecting Salſette, he obſerved that on demanding Reſtitution of that Iſland, Colonel Upton told them, that he could not agree to that without the Authority of his Government. It was ſettled therefore that a Reference ſhould be made to the Governor General and Council, and both Parties mutually abide by their Deciſion. This Man ſays, that Colonel Upton aſſured them in the moſt ſolemn Manner that that Place ſhould be reſtored.

The above is the Subſtance of what was mentioned by the Vackeel in the Firſt Day's Conference. I only replied in general Terms, That it was the ſincere Wiſh and Intention of my Government to perpetuate that Friendſhip he talked of as ſubſiſting betwixt the Engliſh and Marattas; and ſince his Maſter profeſſed to be directed by the ſame Sentiments, I made not the ſmalleſt Doubt but we ſhould ſoon agree upon the Means by which that might be effected: That what I had to propoſe was

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ſolely with a View to accompliſh that End, in the Manner beſt calculated for the mutual Honour and Intereſt of both Parties, totally to remove all Doubts and Animoſities from the Minds of either, and eſtabliſh in their room the moſt perfect and good Underſtanding and friendly Confidence.

Little more paſt at this Time, but the Vackeel's begging Leave to aſk one Queſtion, which was, If the Seal of the Company was not always to be conſidered as ſacred? adding, that all his Government deſired was, that Juſtice might be done them on this Occaſion. The Vackeel then took his Leave.

From what the Vackeel has dropped To-day, I plainly perceive he means to lay the Streſs of his Argument upon the following Circumſtances: The Treaty concluded by Colonel Upton, notwithſtanding which the Government of Bombay entered into a War with the Marattas, and the little Security the Paiſhwa has therefore, that in caſe of a Peace being now concluded, they will not again commence Hoſtilities. What he alludes to, ſpeaking of Juſtice, muſt be the Terms of the late Convention, by which the Bombayers deſervedly ſuffered.

Though I mention Vackeel, the Perſon oſtenſibly ſo does not carry on the Conferences. The conducting the Buſineſs of this Negociation is wholly left to the Nehal Chund, who ſeems to be a Man of Acuteneſs and Abilities, and behaves himſelf with great Propriety and Judgment.

Auguſt 16th 1779.

The Conference of this Day, after the ſeveral Compliments, began with the Vackeel's reviving the Subjects of the preceding one, regarding the Detention of Salſette; the Injuſtice of which he founded on the Mode by which it had been ſurprized. As this, and ſome other Circumſtances he was about to mention, happened previous to the Treaty of Poorunder, when all paſt Diſputes were finally adjuſted, I thought it neceſſary to ſtop his further Proſecution of theſe Subjects, by obſerving that referring thus to ancient Feuds and Differences, were we to indulge it mutually, would lead to an endleſs Train of Argument, and carry us further from the Point we wiſhed to attain, an honourable Peace, than we firſt ſet out; that for my own Part, if I looked back to any Thing it ſhould be to our former Friendſhip; and that I conſidered whatever had paſſed previous to Colonel Upton's Treaty, to be no longer the Subject of Conſideration and Debate. I then aſked him, If his Government did not think themſelves bound by the Articles of that Treaty? He replied, They did, till the late Engagements made with Mr. Carnac at Worgaum.

I then thought it proper to open myſelf more fully to him, and explain the Sentiments of my Government, and the Propoſals they had empowered me to make; which I did in the moſt ample Manner, uſing the ſeveral Arguments contained in the Plan I had prepared for my Guidance in this Negociation, to prove the Propriety and Juſtice which dictated them, and the mutual Advantage that muſt be the inevitable Conſequence of their being accepted.

Regarding the Propoſal of receding from the Pretenſions the Marattas had acquired by the Engagements made with Mr. Carnac at Worgaum, the Vackeel obſerved, That the Seal of the Company, the ſame Seal which had been uſed in the Treaty of Poorunder, was in Poſſeſſion of that Gentleman; that he had aſſured him, that whatever he agreed to under the Impreſſion of that Seal, muſt be binding upon the Engliſh; and that they themſelves, ſenſible of the ſacred Light in which we held it, had fully truſted to the faithful Performance on our Part of all Mr. Carnac's Engagements, conſiſtent with which Belief they had been guided by the moderate Conduct they had purſued.

I replied, They judged rightly of the Force in which we conſidered an Agreement entered into under the Seal of the Company, from which it was never known that the Government of Bengal had in the ſmalleſt Degree departed; that they had not done ſo in this Inſtance, and they could not, conſiſtent with their own Honour, the important Intereſts committed to their Charge, and the Dignity of the Engliſh Name, conſent that a Treaty ſolemnly entered into and inviolably obſerved by themſelves, ſhould be ſet aſide without their Sanction and Authority.

To this the Vackeel pertinently remarked, That his Maſter could not help being of Opinion, from what had formerly happened when the Bombay Government poſſeſſed themſelves of Salſette, and the Arguments now uſed, that had the late Attempt proved ſucceſsful, a very different Judgment would have paſſed upon their Conduct.

I obſerved, The Government of Bengal had never interfered with the Maratta Affairs, previouſly to the Settlement made by Colonel Upton; that of courſe the Occurrences preceding that Period could not be admitted in Compariſon of the preſent Inſtance.

I then exemplified the Juſtice of the Sentiments of my Government, by ſuppoſing an Inſtance of a ſimilar Nature was to happen in the Maratta State, would the Peſhwa, who had entruſted the Care of his Provinces to one of his Sardars, conſent to relinquiſh them to another Perſon, becauſe the Chief in whom he had confided had been conſtrained to enter into an Agreement for that Purpoſe, from his having purſued a Conduct contrary to the Orders, or at leaſt without the Authority of his Maſter? I pointed out to the Vackeel, that the Governor General and Council of Bengal were ſupreme in all Matters of Government, and that particularly reſpecting Peace or War with the ſeveral States of Hindoſtan, the ſole Power was veſted in them. I then told him to adviſe his Maſter, if he put any Value on the Friendſhip of the Engliſh, to embrace the Propoſal now made him; that excluſive of its Juſtice and Propriety, which I had fully explained, his Acquieſcence in it would be the ſtrongeſt Proof he could give of his wiſhing to remain on Terms of Amity with us; and that unleſs

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he did agree to it, I could not, conſiſtent with the Orders and Inſtructions of my Government, conſider him as a Friend and Ally of my Nation.

His concluſive Reply on this Subject was as follows: That he acknowledged the Arguments I had advanced were not without Reaſon, but that by their Conſequence his Maſter was deprived of that Juſtice which he alone ſolicited and expected; that it was true he had no Cauſe of Complaint againſt the Governor General and Supreme Council of Bengal, though their Name was uſed as a Sanction to the Manifeſto publiſhed by the Bombay Government and Ragoba; ſince, I had declared it was done with their Authority: But ſtill he ſaid his Maſter and the Miniſter were of Opinion, that the Seal of the Company, into whatever Hands entruſted, ought to be conſidered by us as inviolable, and that the Governor General and Supreme Council of Bengal would ſhew the ſacred Regard in which they held it, by adhering ſtrictly to the Terms of the late Convention with Mr. Carnac; ſince, although it might be attended with Loſs to themſelves, it would alſo be a laſting Proof of their Conduct being influenced by the moſt rigid Principles of Juſtice and good Faith.

I then repeated all the Arguments I had before uſed, with aſſuring him in the End, that as my Government conſidered the Propoſals they had impowered me to make, to be entirely conſiſtent with Juſtice, and for the mutual Intereſt and Honour of both Parties, I had not the ſmalleſt Doubt but the Peſhwa and Miniſter would alſo upon mature Deliberation and Reflection view them in the ſame Light, and give their Conſent accordingly; ſhould it unfortunately be otherwiſe, I was under the Neceſſity of telling him that I was not impowered to treat with the Maratta State until this Condition ſhould be acceded to; and requeſted he would intimate this to his Maſter.

With reſpect to the Second preliminary Article relating to the French, the Vackeel gave me every Aſſurance on the Part of his Maſter that Words could expreſs, promiſing to acquieſce in whatever might be propoſed for the Satisfaction of the Engliſh, in adjuſting that Point. He denied the Connection his Government had been accuſed of holding with that Nation, and juſtified their Behaviour to Monſieur Saint Lubin in the following Manner:

When the Diſputes firſt commenced betwixt the Engliſh and Marattas, Intelligence of it was carried to the French King, who judging this a favourable Opportunity, ſent Monſieur Saint Lubin with Letters to his Maſter. The Cuſtom of all Monarchs, and particularly where the Embaſſy came from ſo diſtant a Kingdom, betwixt which and the Maratta State no Enmity exiſted, ſurely intitled Mr. Saint Lubin to a Reception. From this Conſideration only, he was permitted to viſit the Durbar, and received with every proper Ceremony and Reſpect; but when it was known to the Miniſter that theſe Circumſtances had given Offence to the Bengal Adminiſtration, Saint Lubin was immediately diſmiſſed. The Man affirms, that no Part of the Propoſals made by the French were attended to; that no Agreement whatever was concluded; and that even afterwards, when it was certain that the Engliſh were marching from Bombay to ſupport Ragoba, and Saint Lubin wrote to encourage the Miniſter with Promiſes of being protected by the French, his Offers were rejected, and he was told in Reply, that the Engliſh and Marattas were ancient Friends, and though temporary Differences might ariſe betwixt them, they would ſoon be reconciled, and did not deſire the Interference of any Foreign Power.

Notwithſtanding theſe poſitive Declarations, and the ſpecious Language uſed by the Vackeel, the Proofs of the Miniſter's former Connection with the French ſeems to be perfectly clear, and the Emiſſaries of that Nation have, and ſtill continue to labour very ſtrenuouſly, to prevail with the Marattas to unite with them againſt the Engliſh. But though I am perſuaded that a Correſpondence is at preſent carried on betwixt them, I am ſtill of Opinion that the Miniſter, finding by repeated Experience the Folly of truſting to their Promiſes of Aſſiſtance, will wiſh to depend no longer upon ſo precarious a Support, and readily and ſeriouſly agree to ſhake off all Connection with them.

In ſpeaking of the mutual Advantage that would reſult to the Engliſh and Marattas from a ſincere and firm Friendſhip, the Vackeel obſerved, theſe Two were the only powerful States now left in Hindoſtan and Decan, and that unleſs the Marattas were the Enemies of the Engliſh, the latter would meet with no one to oppoſe their Arms, nor could any other Power but the Engliſh contend with the Marattas.

On this Occaſion, he ſeemed to have forgot the Progreſs made, and the Encroachments ſtill making by Hyder upon the Maratta Dominions; though in the Courſe of our Converſation, he obviated this Circumſtance, by declaring that the March of the Army from Bombay had put a Stop to the Operations againſt Hyder laſt Seaſon; but that it was the Intention of the Miniſter firſt to conclude a Peace with the Engliſh, and afterwards recover the Country wreſted from them by Hyder; hinting at the ſame Time a Hope of being aſſiſted by the Engliſh in this Buſineſs.

My Reply to this was in general Terms of Friendſhip, intimating, that where a ſincere and firm Alliance ſubſiſted betwixt Two Nations, they would ever conſider the Enemies of one another as their own.

Although, till the Aſſent of the Miniſter was given to the Two preliminary Articles I had propoſed, I could not treat upon the remaining Part of the Treaty, I judged it proper to aſſure him, that as it was the Deſire of my Government to eſtabliſh an honourable and laſting Peace with the Maratta State; I was convinced the Points now left to be diſcuſſed would be attended with no Difficulty, and that I ſhould readily agree to whatever was juſt and equitable reſpecting them.

He obſerved of Jambooſeer, that when Aſſignments were given upon it of the Twelve Lacks, it was ſettled that a Perſon ſhould be ſent to ſuperintend the Collections of that Purgunnah on the Part

Part of the Marattas, but the Government of Bombay afterwards refuſed to admit him. With reſpect to this, I told him it could make no Difference, as the Annual Amount of its Revenue had been regularly carried to the Account of the Maratta Circar, charged with the Sums for the Payment of which it had been given over, and that it was better that no Perſon had reſided at Jamboofeer from the Marattas, ſince Differences could not but have ariſen, which were now happily avoided.

He ſaid of Veriow, &c. ceded to the Engliſh by the Guicawars, that Futty Sing had wrote, acknowledging that he had no Power to grant Sunnuds of thoſe Places without the Authority of the Peſhwa; that his Letter had been ſhewn to Colonel Upton, and, according to the Treaty, theſe Diſtricts ought to have been reſtored.

I remarked, that as theſe Letters of Futty Sing muſt have been produced to Colonel Upton previous to the ſigning of the Treaty, wherein it is ſtipulated that they ſhould be given up when Proofs were brought to the Effect he mentions, it was plain that theſe Letters were not then judged ſufficient Authority, and as no further Proofs had been ſince adduced, my Government conſidered the Right of the Engliſh to the Poſſeſſion of thoſe Places legal and unqueſtionable.

It gave me a good deal of Surprize, that both in this Conference and that of the preceding Day, no Overture whatever was made by the Vackeel reſpecting Ragonaut Row, nor his Name mentioned by him, but in general Terms when relating Circumſtances that had happened. This Silence regarding a Perſon who cannot but be the principal Object of their Negociation, I muſt aſcribe to the Deſire of Nanah, and his Inſtructions given to the Vakeel accordingly, to obtain a Confirmation and Performance of the Engagements made with Mr. Carnac, by which Ragoba would again be delivered into their Hands.

A true Copy of the Conferences.

(Signed) R. Dunkley, Sec^{y}.

APPENDIX, N° 216.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, dated the 28th October 1779.

At a Council; PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,

Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
and
Edward Wheler,
} Eſquires.

Sir Eyre Coote gone to viſit the different Stations of the Army.

READ a Letter from Brigadier General Goddard as follows:

To the Honourable Warren Haſtings, Eſquire, Governor General, &c.

Gentlemen,

I have been honoured with your Two Letters, of the 14th June and 8th July; the former of which, on account of the expected Cypher from Bombay not arriving before, I did not obtain an Explanation of till within theſe few Days. With reſpect to the Subject of the latter, the ſeveral Letters I have had the Honour to addreſs you ſince that of the 6th June, to which yours is an Anſwer, will have fully ſatisfied you in every Part of my Conduct that might have been affected by the Injunction contained in it relative to Ragoba; and I hope you will find Cauſe to approve of the Line I have hitherto laid down to be obſerved towards that Chief, as conſiſtent with your Pleaſure now ſignified to me.

Many of the political Points expreſſed in your Letter of the 14th June, will have been in a good Meaſure diſcuſſed and explained by the Contents of thoſe I have already written you. I think it neceſſary however at this Time to be as full upon them as I poſſibly can, and to ſum up in one View what may have been at different Times communicated to you.

To begin then with what more immediately relates to the Negociation for Peace. In my Letter of the 10th ultimo, I gave you an Account of what had paſſed at the Conference I had held with

the Maratta Vackeels, the Opinion I had thence derived of the Inclinations of their Government, and the Hopes I had of receiving poſitive Anſwers to the Propoſals tranſmitted to the Miniſters in Twelve Days at fartheſt. Twice that Period has elapſed without receiving any Reply whatever; this Delay may have been occaſioned by Artifice or Deſign in the Miniſters, or it may be attributed to ſome Diſturbances which I know have happened on the Road to Poona, and make it probable our Correſpondence has been intercepted. At any rate I have thought it expedient to obviate all in my Power any Inconvenience ariſing from further Delay, and with that View have diſpatched Lalla Neſſaul Chund (one of the Maratta Agents, by his own Deſire and Concurrence) expreſs to his Maſter, fully informed in every Particular. He has undertaken to return in Twenty Days at fartheſt, ſo that I have Reaſon to expect to be ſoon able to give you certain Information of the Event of my Commiſſion at the Court of Poona. In the mean Time I will acquaint you with ſuch Particulars as have occurred in the Courſe of my Negociation, from which any Concluſion may with Probability be drawn of the Views of Government, and of its Succeſs or Diſappointment.

I before told you of my firm Opinion that Nana was inclined to make a Peace, nor have I yet ſeen any Cauſe to alter that Opinion; on the contrary, I am perſuaded that whatever Obſtacles may be thrown in the Way, will originate from Madajee Scindia. This Chief, notwithſtanding the Sentiments entertained of his favourable Diſpoſition towards the Engliſh by the Gentlemen of Bombay, appears to me their moſt inveterate Foe, and I ſhould expect much ſooner to ſee a particular Connection with the Miniſter than with him. Their relative Situation to each other is this; the one with the Name of Miniſter and the Share of Authority is almoſt entirely under the Controul of the other, who poſſeſſing in Jaghire, ſome of the firſt Provinces of the Empire, receiving a moſt Princely Revenue, and at the ſame Time having it in his Power from Circumſtances to ſucceed in obtaining new Demands from the Miniſter, whenever he finds it for his Convenience to make them, enjoys every ſubſtantial Advantage he can wiſh for, and has in Reality the Direction of every public Buſineſs of the State. It is eaſy to ſee, in this Point of View, which of them has moſt Reaſon to be ſatisfied with his Situation, and whoſe Intereſt it is to wiſh or endeavour at any Change. Scindia gave remarkable Proof of the Independance he has aſſumed, by keeping Poſſeſſion of Ragoba's Perſon himſelf, although the Miniſter was earneſt for having it delivered up to him, and even offered a Crore of Rupees in Exchange. Nanah may be ſaid to owe every Thing to Scindia. It was by his Aſſiſtance he roſe ſuperior to the Blow that had been ſtruck at Poona in the Beginning of laſt Year; through his Means he annihilated the remaining Influence of Moraba and Siccaram, and fixed himſelf alone in the Seat of Government: Theſe Services might merit the moſt grateful Return; but the Sentiments that would dictate this, do not belong to a Politician, and Nana is one. He fears the Power of Scindia, and as it is now the only remaining Check to his Views of abſolute Rule, he earneſtly wiſhes, and is led to entertain Hopes of being able to free himſelf from that alſo. I have enumerated theſe Arguments to prove that it can never be the Intention or Inclination of Scindia, while the Government exiſts in its preſent Form, to wiſh for any Alteration, or connect himſelf with the Engliſh in order to effect it. This is further evinced by his having never made any Overtures to me ſince the Power given me to treat with the Maratta State became known, and by the Aſſurances given me by Ragoba, that he had no Hope or Dependance whatever in Scindia, who would then only be induced to take an active Part in his Favour when he found he either actually had or was likely to ſucceed without his Aſſiſtance.

To ſuppoſe that we can offer Advantages to him ſuperior, or indeed adequate to thoſe he at preſent enjoys, does not, from the above Statement, ſeem reaſonable or conſiſtent; and when we further reflect, that by uniting himſelf with us in admitting into the Empire a Rival, from whoſe Jealouſy and Power he would believe he had every Thing to ſuſpect and fear, I am perſuaded you will be of Opinion, that no ſeparate Alliance can, under the Circumſtances I have deſcribed, be entered into with him.

My Negociation has been entirely with the eſtabliſhed Government of the Maratta State, as you will have perceived, by the Accounts tranſmitted you of it; and I have underſtood the ſeparate Convention with Scindia, and the Releaſe of the Hoſtages, as neceſſarily included in the Miniſters Conſent to relinquiſh all Claims upon the Treaty of Worgaum. Should this preliminary Article be agreed to, with the Advice and Concurrence of Scindia, it muſt take place in all its Parts, and ſhould the Miniſter be inclined to comply with it, contrary to the Inclination of the other, it might prove the Occaſion of a Rupture between the Parties, in which Caſe both would be equally ſolicitous for the Countenance and Aſſiſtance of the Engliſh.

From the Circumſtances above ſtated, and becauſe the Negociation with the Miniſter is ſo far advanced, I have thought it moſt conſiſtent with the Object of your Inſtructions on this Head, not to commence any excluſive Intercourſe with Scindia, until the Anſwers which may arrive from Poona, or other Cauſes of Convenience may point it out, for the Intereſt of your Affairs to do ſo; when I ſhall ſtrictly adhere to the Mode you have been pleaſed to lay down for my Guidance in conducting it.

With reſpect to an Alliance with Moodajee Booſla, the Anſwers I have received to all my Letters, written ſince my Arrival at Surat, and particularly to one, informing him of the Commiſſion you had been pleaſed to entruſt me with at the Court of Poona, as they contain nothing but general Expreſſions of Friendſhip, and earneſt Wiſhes for the Accompliſhment of a Peace with the Marattas,

ſeem

ſeem to warrant my conſidering the Negociation at Nagpore ſuſpended until ſuch Time as you ſhall be pleaſed to honour me with your Inſtructions for its Refuſal.

Permit me to repeat the Declarations I have before made, of exerting myſelf in the moſt ſtrenuous Degree to obtain the Object you continue to hold forth as the Termination of all your political Views on this Side of India; nor am I without Hope of being able to overcome the Difficulties which have preſented themſelves to counteract it; as it has been my firſt Endeavour to convince the Miniſter of the ſincere Wiſh you entertained of Peace, and the mutual Benefits that muſt reſult from it, without ſuffering him to encourage the moſt diſtant Idea that you could be induced to make any diſhonourable Sacrifice for the Attainment of it.

My moſt arduous Taſk has been to reſtrain Ragoba's Followers, who after accompanying him to this Place, looked for a Reward of their Services, little in his Power to give. Some of them diſperſed through the Villages neighbouring to Surat, committed Depredations upon the Subjects; which at ſo critical a Juncture as this, when every Act committed by Ragoba's People, though neither by his Authority or that of the Engliſh, would naturally be attributed to both, might have proved of the moſt fatal Conſequence to your Intereſts. To obviate this Evil, and to enable Ragoba to diſcharge the moſt burthenſome and uſeleſs, and ſatisfy the principal People, whoſe higher Demands could not be cleared off altogether, I have found it neceſſary to advance him ſince his Arrival in the Beginning of June 50,000 Rupees per Month, with which Supply he alſo ſupported the Expences of his Family, the whole of which are now with him.

Previous to Lala Neſhaul Chund's Departure, at his own earneſt Solicitation, that he might be able to ſatisfy his Maſter on the Point he had moſt at Heart, I judged it requiſite to inform him in general of the Intentions of the Engliſh regarding Ragoba, as far as I thought my Inſtructions warranted, and ſeemed to render neceſſary at this Time for facilitating the Object of Peace. I aſſured him they would never conſent to any Reſtraint being uſed towards his Perſon; that he muſt be permitted to reſide wherever he might chooſe, with a ſufficient Allowance from the Maratta State, and that on theſe Conditions he ſhould not be ſuffered to carry on any improper Correſpondence, raiſe any Commotions in their Dominions, or if he did, he ſhould forfeit the Allowance from them, and the Friendſhip of the Engliſh.

I had previous to your Letter conſulted the Select Committee on the Subject regarding their Preſidency in my Negociation, and had received every ſatisfactory Information; which Circumſtance I communicated to you in a former Letter. Let me now aſſure you, that I ſhall continue to avail myſelf of their Advice and Information, in executing the Truſts ſeparately committed to my Charge; and ſhould all my Endeavours for Peace prove ineffectual, and a War become neceſſary, I ſhall chearfully and zealouſly co-operate with them in every Plan that may be determined on for the Intereſt and Honour of the Company, and execute whatever military Service they may require conſiſtent with your Inſtructions, and the Proviſions you have been pleaſed to make for my Guidance. It is alſo with particular Satisfaction that I can at this Time take upon me to aſſure you of the prepared and ſerviceable State of the Troops under me, complete in military Stores, Artillery thoroughly repaired, and provided with every Requiſite for taking the Field, and entering upon Service immediately.

I have ſo often had Occaſion to expreſs my Acknowledgment for the diſtinguiſhing Marks of your Favour, that I want Words to declare at this Time my grateful Senſe of the new Honours you have been pleaſed to confer upon me. I am conſcious how unequal Language would prove, to convey the full Idea of thoſe Sentiments of Gratitude you have inſpired me with: I ſhall therefore not attempt the Deſcription, but truſt to the Zeal, Perſeverance, and undeviating Attention with which I ſhall labour to promote the Honour and Intereſts of the Company, for your future Teſtimony of my having exerted all my Abilities and Endeavours to merit the Reward you have ſo liberally beſtowed.

Camp near Surat,
12th September 1779.

I am, &c. &c.
(Signed) Thomas Goddard.

APPENDIX, N° 217, 218—220.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 29th November 1779.

READ the following Letters from Brigadier General Goddard:

To the Honourable Warren Haſtings, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Supreme Council.

Gentlemen,

I have been honoured with your Letter of the 2d Auguſt, and feel myſelf particularly happy at the Satisfaction you expreſs in the Receipt of my Addreſſes of the 12th and 18th June; I beg to

aſſure you that I ſhall pay the ſtricteſt Attention to the additional Inſtruction you have been pleaſed to give me reſpecting Ragoba, in my Negociation with the Maratta Miniſters, and ſhall uſe them only under the Latitude you have thought proper to confine me.

At preſent, on Account of the Anſwer to my Propoſals ſent by Nehal Chund, the Maratta Agent, not having yet arrived, the Buſineſs muſt remain a few Days in Suſpenſe; and indeed from the Nature of the Intelligence communicated to me from Poona, which I have Reaſon to conſider moſt authentic, the Reply I may expect to the Offers already made, will in all Probability be ſuch as to preclude me from the Opportunity of renewing the old or making freſh Demands.

I have in a former Letter mentioned to you the ambitious Views of Scindia, and the jealous Apprehenſions entertained of that Chief by the Miniſter's Conſiderations of mutual Intereſt, have been the only Bond of their Union, as the one found himſelf too weak to maintain his Authority without the Aſſiſtance of the other; and Scindia again, though not daring to take the Power into his own Hands, derived from the Weakneſs and Dependance of the Miniſters ſufficient Reſources to gratify his Avarice and Ambition in their full Extent. Nana Furneſe, ſince the compleat Triumph he obtained laſt Year, and the Removal of the Chiefs, who before ſhared the nominal Adminiſtration with himſelf, has diſcovered an Inclination to ſhake off all further Subjection to Scindia, which is not unknown to the latter; ſo that it would appear an open Quarrel between them is almoſt unavoidable. We muſt endeavour to trace the Cauſe why this Event, ſo natural to expect, has not yet happened. The cloſe Connection of Scindia with Holkar, and the Fear of their united Forces, together with the ſtrong Party the Influence of theſe Chiefs has created in the State, muſt deter Nanah from publicly declaring his Enmity; and till he does that, and the Rupture becomes avowed and open, Scindia will not unite himſelf with the Engliſh, or take Part in any reſpect againſt the preſent eſtabliſhed Government.

The ſecret Wiſhes of Nanah ought, one would think, to have induced him to make a Peace with the Engliſh at this Time, which would be ſo much for his own Intereſt, and not by entering into a War, give that Weight to his Rival, which his military Strength muſt ever claim in Time of Neceſſity. It appears, however, he has taken a contrary Part. He has made Conceſſions to Scindia to bind him to his Service; and has prevailed on him to viſit Poona, where they are in concert, making every Preparation for Hoſtilities, and ſettling the Plan for the enſuing Campaign. We muſt therefore look for another Key to his Conduct; and this I conceive to be the Proſpect the Miniſter has of Aſſiſtance from the French. The Promiſes made him of the Arrival of their Armaments, and the confirmed Belief this Opinion has received from our moderate and pacific Propoſals, which they it is probable attribute to our Apprehenſions of being attacked by the French in Combination with themſelves.

I am happy at the Proſpect of the Acceſſion of Force you have been pleaſed to make under my Command; and have, in Obedience to your Directions, written to the Preſidencies of Fort Saint George and Bombay, fixing upon the general Rendezvous at Surat; to which Place I have entreated the former to ſend their Proportion of Troops with all poſſible Expedition. The convenient Situation of Surat, open to a Communication by Sea ſo near Bombay that Diſpatches or Succours may at any Time be ſent to and from it, and in Addition to theſe, the firm Footing it gives us on the Continent, where, in caſe of the Arrival of a French Armament, the Preſence of the Army would be an effectual Check upon the Miniſter Goicawar to prevent their forming a Junction with the Invaders, have determined me in the Choice of it. And I hope you will from theſe, and another Conſideration, which it is unneceſſary to mention, approve of the Meaſure.

I think it proper to incloſe for your Peruſal, Extract of a Letter from the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, on the Subject of your Reſolution of the 14th June, and of my Anſwer to it. I make no Doubt they either have or will make known theſe Sentiments to you themſelves; and my Intention in communicating them at preſent, is principally to point out to you the fair Proſpect there is, that no Difference in Opinion will retard or injure the Public Service, and my fixed Determination to avoid every Subject of Conteſt and Contrariety of Intereſt whatever.

I have only to add, that although the Spirit of this Letter may ſeem to breathe an approaching War, I would not be poſitively underſtood in that Senſe; for although the Intelligence I have received, and other Circumſtances which have come to my Knowledge, are ſuch as to juſtify theſe Suſpicions, I do not think myſelf authorized to deliver a decided Opinion, till I hear from the Maratta Agent whom I ſent to Poona; and a very few Days muſt furniſh me with the Knowledge to be derived from his Intelligence.

I have the Honour to be, &c.

(Signed) Thomas Goddard.

Camp near Surat,
4th October 1779.

N° 218.

Gentlemen,

I have the Honour to acknowledge your Letter of the 13th ultimo. The Letters I have from Time to Time tranſmitted you, giving an Account of the Situation of Affairs here, and of the Progreſs and Proſpect of my Negociations with the Maratta Miniſters, will have been ſufficient to explain to you the doubtful and uncertain State in which it was found when your Letters arrived. It may not however be amiſs to mention ſome further Particulars that ſerve to juſtify the Suſpicions ſuggeſted to you in my laſt Letter, and which I cannot help ſtill entertaining, of the hoſtile and perfidious Inclinations of the Miniſter, and at the ſame Time prove the fair and ſufficient Opportunities given him of preventing the Evils of a War, and, ſhould he longer perſiſt in the ſame deſigning Conduct, the juſt and neceſſary Grounds on which we are compelled to undertake it.

I will take no Notice of the authentic Information, both public and private, ſent me of the hoſtile Intentions of the Maratta Chiefs; it is ſufficient that I at preſent remark ſuch Parts of the Miniſter's Behaviour, as may lead to a Diſcovery of his real Deſigns. When the confidential Perſons firſt arrived from him, I communicated through them without Loſs of Time the Propoſals you had directed me to make on the Part of your Government, and ſoon afterwards from an Apprehenſion that by truſting intirely to an epiſtolary Correſpondence, he would have it in his Power to practiſe the Art of Delay, ſo common a Part of Maratta Politics, I reſolved to diſpatch Nehal Chund, one of the Agents of Poona, fully and minutely inſtructed in every Point neceſſary to reconcile him to, and promote the Succeſs of my Negociations; with this I acquainted you in a former Letter; the Man faithfully promiſed to return himſelf, or tranſmit an Anſwer in Twenty Days. When your Letter of the 13th ultimo reached me, twice the ſtipulated Period had elapſed, and in the Courſe of this Delay, although repeated Advices had been received from the Miniſter by Lutchmanrow, the remaining Agent, he communicated to me no Information by which I could ſuppoſe the Propoſals were agreed to, on the contrary, he gave me to underſtand the Reverſe, by telling me, that frequent Conſultations had been held upon the Subject of my Propoſals, and that particular Anſwers had been prepared to each, which would be ſent by Nehal Chund; he had alſo at Two different Periods intimated to me that this Man had received his Audience for Leave of his Maſter, and would ſet off for Surat immediately. This Declaration he repeated on the Morning of the 18th to me more confidently than before; but upon my interrogating him cloſely, he acknowledged that he did not expect he would leave Poona till after the Celebration of the Duſſorah, which would happen on the 19th, ſo that by Calculation of the ſuppoſed Letters, mentioning his having been diſmiſſed, he muſt have afterwards remained at Poona at leaſt Fifteen Days.

From the manifeſt Duplicity and Artifice this Behaviour of the Maratta Agent diſcovered in his Maſter, and from a Conſideration of the Circumſtances above enumerated, as well as of the Diſtance to Poona, being near 150 Coſs, the Difficulty and Delay to which one Perſon would be ſubjected in travelling it, which might be productive of future political Inconvenience; conſcious alſo that the Object you had in View would be equally well anſwered at the Point to which Matters are now brought, and which could not be known to you at the Time you wrote, if I purſued a different Mode of putting the Sincerity and Friendſhip of the Miniſters to a Teſt than that contained in your Letter of the 13th ultimo. I adopted the following, which I hope will meet your Approbation.

On the Morning of the 18th Inſtant, when Lutchmanrow the Maratta Vackeel waited upon me, and communicated to me the Circumſtances reſpecting Nehal Chund's Leave and Departure, as mentioned above; I declared to him the Doubts I could not but entertain of the hoſtile Inclinations and Deſigns of his Maſter from the Delay that unneceſſarily aroſe in tranſmitting the Anſwer to Propoſals by Nehal Chund, as well as the evaſive Excuſes given by himſelf regarding it. That notwithſtanding theſe juſt Grounds for Suſpicion, the Engliſh were ſtill ready to ſhew their ſincere Inclinations for Peace, and grant every Indulgence they poſſibly could conſiſtent with a Regard to their own Honour and Safety, and that therefore I would wait 15 Days more, in which Time he ſaid a Letter might arrive in Reply to one he would diſpatch that Inſtant, at the Expiration of which, if Nehal Chund did not arrive, or a ſatisfactory Anſwer to the Propoſals I had tranſmitted by him in the Name of my Government, I ſhould conſider this Delay as a Declaration of War, and act accordingly.

I at the ſame Time delivered Lutchmanrow Letters for the Peſhwa and Miniſter, and to the ſame Effect. The Period to which I have thus limited them expires the 3d November, and as ſo many Days yet remain to that Date, I am not without the fulleſt Hopes that the Emiſſary Nehal Chund will previouſly arrive; at the ſame Time, I ſee great Reaſon to apprehend that the Propoſals I made to the Miniſter, if acceded to by him, will be complied with only upon Conditions that it may not be in my Power to give my Conſent to.

I ſhall not fail to write you upon the earlieſt Information I can obtain relative to this Buſineſs; and have the Honour to be,

With the greateſt Reſpect, &c. &c.
(Signed) Thomas Goddard.

Head Quarters, Camp
near Surat, 20th October 1779.

N° 220.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 29th November 1779.

Agreed, That the following Reply be written to Brigadier General Goddard.

To Brigadier General Goddard.

Sir,

We are ſorry to obſerve that you have made ſo large an Allowance as Fifty thouſand Rupees a Month to Ragoba, or indeed any Allowance. We do not think he has any Claim of this Nature upon the Company, and the Orders we had given you reſpecting him were merely confined to Protection. We therefore poſitively direct that the Allowances do ceaſe from the Receipt of this Letter.

If Ragoba's Influence is ſo far ſunk that he cannot procure for himſelf the Neceſſaries, we cannot conſent to ſupply him with the Superfluities of Life, nor can we ſee how the Company's Affairs will be benefited by an intimate Connection with a Man from whoſe Influence no Advantages can be derived; and we already find ſo many Difficulties in anſwering the Demands made upon our Treaſury for the neceſſary and unavoidable Expences of your Detachment, that we cannot agree to authorize any unneceſſary Diſburſements.

We are, &c. &c.
Warren Haſtings.
P. Francis.
Edwd Wheler.

Fort William,
the 29th November 1779.

APPENDIX, N° 219.

Bengal Secret Perſian Correſpondence.

Letter from Governor General to Ragonaut Row, 19th Auguſt 1779.

I HAVE been favoured with your Two Letters, and perfectly underſtand the Contents.

The Firſt of them I underſtand to have been written under Circumſtances which having been ſince totally changed, it is unneceſſary to reply to it further than to inform you, that Letters having been written to me at the ſame Time, containing the ſame Demands but in fuller Terms, I have replied, in Conformity to the Reſolutions of this Government, by a total Diſavowal of the Convention of Worgaum, as made without any Authority from this Government, and refuſed to abide by a Tittle of the Terms contained therein.

It will be my conſtant Rule, as it has been the invaried Practice of the Rulers of the Engliſh Government, to adhere moſt rigidly to the Faith of public Treaties.

You muſt have learnt from your Vackeels here, the Anxiety I was under for your perſonal Safety from the Time of the unfortunate Event which put you into the Power of your Enemies, until the joyful Tidings reached me of your ſafe Arrival at the Engliſh Camp at Surat. The Satisfaction this News gave me is not to be expreſſed. I was particularly pleaſed that this was brought about by your own Proweſs and Magnanimity, as well as that you made Choice of the Engliſh Army as an Aſylum. Letters have been written to General Goddard approving of the Protection he afforded you. To him whom you will regard as myſelf I muſt refer you for further Particulars. Regarding me as a ſincere Friend ever anxious for your Welfare let me frequently have the Pleaſure to hear from you.

APPENDIX, N° 221.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 29th November 1779.

Extract of a Letter from the Honourable the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay to Brigadier General Thomas Goddard; dated September 17th 1779.

WE likewiſe have received Advices from the Governor General and Council, dated the 14th June and 8th of July; wherein they communicate to us the Line of Conduct they have taken reſpecting this Preſidency, and the Powers and Inſtructions they have given to you.

Though we think thoſe Powers an abſolute Infringement of the Rights immediately inherent in us; yet from our Regard to the Public Service, which muſt ſuffer Injury by any Conteſt between us and the Governor General and Council, we have determined, firſt making due Reſervation of our Rights, not to oppoſe the Operation of their Orders, but ſhall unite with you with the ſame Confidence and Cordiality as before in promoting the Succeſs of whatever Meaſures Circumſtances may render it neceſſary to adopt.

In like Manner we conſider the elevated military Rank they have given you, confined to the Sphere of our Juriſdiction, as another Point in which our Rights are invaded; yet as it has taken Place, we feel Pleaſure in this Diſtinction being conferred upon you, and congratulate you upon it.

A true Copy.
R. Dunkley, Secr.

Extract of a Letter from Brigadier General Thomas Goddard to the Honourable Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay; dated September 29th 1779.

Whatever may be your Sentiments regarding the Reſolutions taken by the Governor General and Supreme Council, and the Line of Conduct they have been pleaſed to preſcribe for our mutual Guidance, it affords me the higheſt Satisfaction that no Injury can thereby happen to the public Service, from the Declaration you have made of uniting with me, with the ſame Confidence and Cordiality as before, in promoting the Succeſs of whatever Meaſures Circumſtances may render it neceſſary to adopt. Allow me on my Part to repeat the Aſſurances I have already given of being wholly guided in my Conduct by a fixed Regard to the Intereſts of the Company and of your Government, and cheerfully concurring in every Operation that may conduce to this uſeful and deſirable End.

I beg to offer my ſincere Thanks for the Congratulations you have made me on my late Appointent; and on this Subject, without preſuming to enter, in the moſt diſtant Degree, into any Sort of rgument on the Propriety or Legality of the Meaſure, I cannot but obſerve, that as the flattering ncomiums you were pleaſed to beſtow upon my Conduct muſt have proved a powerful Recomendation in my Favour to the Government of Bengal, of which I am myſelf fully ſenſible, they n alſo on this Occaſion to have been influenced by the Spirit of that Paragraph reſpect ing me, ntained in your Preſident's Minute, which in all its Parts has ſo juſtly merited and received their ttention and Approbation.

A true Copy.
(Signed) R. Dunkley.
Secr.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 6th December 1779.

Read a Letter from the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay.

We cannot but moſt ſenſibly feel the Invaſion upon the Rights and Powers immediately veſted in s by the Honourable Company, and thus illegally, as we conceive, transferred to General Goddard, y your Inſtructions of the 14th of June; your charging him excluſively with the immediate Intereſts f this Preſidency, with the Power of making Peace or War for us at his own Choice, and with an Army under his own independant Command, to proſecute whatever Meaſures he may think proper to adopt, are Inſtances of delegated Authority both unconſtitutional, and in the higheſt Degree injurious to the Rights abſolutely inherent in us, under the Subordination due to you by Act of Parliament. Thoſe Rights, Gentlemen, being eſtabliſhed on fixed and aſcertained Grounds, it is needleſs to enter into a Detail or argumentative Defence of them; we muſt appeal to a higher Power to reſtore to us the free Exercile of them; and in the mean Time, from our Regard to the Public Service which muſt ſuffer Injury in the Conteſt, we ſhall not oppoſe the Operation of your Orders; though we ſtill hereby make a ſolemn Reſervation of our Rights thus violently infringed, and which are not in the ſmalleſt Degree impaired or leſſened by our Conceſſion in this Inſtance.

As

As Moodajee Bouncello is a Power immediately connected with your Government, we have no deſire to interfere in the Negociation with him, further than the Intereſts of this Preſidency may be affected thereby or render neceſſary, even though it may be carried on within the Limits of our own Authority.

We have ever treated General Goddard with the Confidence and Attention due to his Station and Merits, and of our own Motion invited him to our Councils: Nor ſhall we now be leſs ready to conſult with him on any Meaſure that may have a Relation to your Inſtructions; though this does not appear very material, as he is placed independant of our Reſolutions.

Though any Diſtinction that could with Propriety have been conferred on General Goddard would have given us Pleaſure, your granting him an elevated Rank, confined to the Sphere of our Juriſdiction, is another of the Points wherein we think our Rights invaded, and may be productive of many bad Conſequences, which we ſhall be very glad may not happen; our Opinion of General Goddard's Merits, as an Officer, and our Reſpect for you, would no Doubt have led us to entruſt to him the Conduct of all military Operations, had the Opinion been left to us; but as he is totally independant in this Point, the Extenſion of Power in conferring ſuch an Appointment appears as inexpedient as it is unauthorized.

We ſhall to the beſt of our Comprehenſion obſerve your Directions in the Points where any Degree of Agency is left to us. The reputed Head of the Guicawar Family is totally inſane, and diſordered in his Mind; and the Priority of Right to the executive Office of Government has been long diſputed between the Two Brothers, Futty Sing and Govin Row, one claiming as the elder born, the other as Son of the Wife of firſt Rank; but the Pretenſions of the former have been generally ſupported by the Poona Durbar.

We have no Account of the State of General Goddard's Negociation; but we encloſe Copy of a Letter we ſent him at his Deſire under the 3d of July, giving an Account of the State of the Treaty of Poorunder, and the Articles which remained unperformed.

Bombay Caſtle,
the 6th September 1779.

We are with Reſpect,
(Signed) Wm. Hornby.

APPENDIX, N° 222.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 29th November 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler,
} Eſquires.

Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote abſent on a Viſit to the different Stations of the Army.

READ the following Letter from Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We had the Honour to receive your Letter of the 2d Auguſt, acquainting us with your Reaſons for thinking the French at the Iſlands meditate an Attack on Bombay, and requeſting in conſequence that we would detach One Battalion of Europeans, Three Battalions of Sepoys, and Fifty Artillery Men, from the Forces belonging to this Preſidency, to join the Army commanded by Brigadier General Goddard, whom you ſhould direct to grant the moſt effectual Support in his Power to the Government of Bombay, for defeating any hoſtile Attempt which may be made againſt it.

We ſhall always be led by Inclination, as well as Duty, to co-operate with you to the utmoſt of our Power, in any Plan you may adopt for the Security of the Company's Poſſeſſions; but in the preſent Caſe, we hope there will be no Neceſſity for ſuch great Succour to aſſiſt the Gentlemen at Bombay, even ſhould they be attacked, ſince we underſtand their Force is very equal to their Protection againſt any Attempt that can be made by the French in their preſent State; and we are inclined ourſelves to this Opinion, becauſe having written to Bombay in the Month of July, to inform the Preſident and Council of the Intelligence we had received relative to the Intentions of the French, they do not in their Anſwer expreſs the leaſt Apprehenſion of the Inſufficiency of their Force; and we ſhould ſuppoſe further, that had they any Doubt on this Head, they would have detained the Aſia Man of War, which was ſent from England purpoſely to aſſiſt in their Defence,

fence, and which they allowed to leave Bombay in the Month of Auguſt, to join the Admiral at this Place.

But after all, we conceive the French at the Iſlands will not be in a Condition to fit out an Armament againſt Bombay, without conſiderable Support from France; and, as far as we can learn from private Intelligence, their Nation is too much preſſed both in Europe and in the Weſt Indies, to ſpare any Reinforcements for this Country.

Brigadier General Goddard, in a Letter to General Sir Hector Munro, dated the 15th Auguſt, after mentioning that he is authorized to make a Requiſition of the Force at Mahé, writes as follows: "At preſent it is impoſſible for me to ſpeak with any Certainty of the Effect of my Negociation with the Maratta State, or whether I may have Occaſion for this Reinforcement or not; but I ſhall make it my Care to have every thing prepared for the Tranſportation of the Troops; I hope you will previouſly furniſh the Officer who is in Charge of them with ſuch Directions as may prevent any Cauſe of Delay in their Embarkation, ſhould Circumſtances ſo fall out as to render their Junction neceſſary."

We have likewiſe a Letter from our Commandant at Mahé, encloſing a Copy of one from the Governor of Bombay to him, in which he writes: "Brigadier General Goddard acquaints me, that he has been adviſed from Bengal, that the Troops under your Command at Mahé will be inſtructed to obey his Requiſition to join his Army, ſhould he not ſucceed in his Negociations with the Marattas."

From theſe Letters we ſhould conceive, that the Object of the Reinforcement was principally to ſupport General Goddard's Negociations with the Marattas, and this is certainly a Matter of ſo much Importance that we are diſpoſed heartily to concur with you in promoting it. We have ſent Directions to Colonel Braithwaite to obey any Requiſition that may be made by Brigadier General Goddard for the Troops at Mahé, which conſiſt of One Company of European Infantry, One Company of Artillery, Six Companies of Grenadier, and Eight Companies of Battalion Sepoys. We think it proper to mention, however, that we are under ſome Doubt, whether the Sepoys will voluntarily embark on this new Service, ſince they have been abſent from the Coaſt Nine Months; and though they went to Mahé (by Sea) with uncommon Alacrity, and have behaved remarkably well there, they have expreſſed an anxious Deſire to return to the Coaſt; and Colonel Braithwaite ſome Time ago ſaid, that if they were detained from it much longer he was apprehenſive that a conſiderable Number might deſert. We are inclined, notwithſtanding, to believe they will be prevailed on to proceed if the Service requires it; but ſhould they not, we have deſired the earlieſt Notice may be given us, that we may replace them with an equal Number which can be ſent from our Northern Garriſons to Anjengo in a very ſhort Time, and embarked from thence.

As to any further Reinforcement than the above, we are apprehenſive our Situation will not admit of it, at leaſt for the preſent. The Non-arrival of the Fleet leaves us at great Uncertainty concerning the King's Troops, and the Seaſon being now too late for the Ships to come on the Coaſt, we are at a Loſs where or when to expect them. We muſt obſerve likewiſe, that the Conduct of Hyder Ally makes it abſolutely neceſſary for us to be as much as poſſible on our Guard. The Language he holds in his Correſpondence, and the great Preparations he is making for War, manifeſt a ſtrong Intention to break with the Company; and we believe he only waits a favourable Conjuncture, which may ſoon happen. A War with Hyder, let the Event be ever ſo ſucceſsful on our Part, would diſtreſs the Carnatic beyond Meaſure, and prove a moſt expenſive Burthen on the Company. We ſincerely hope therefore, that General Goddard may conclude a Treaty with the Marattas and thereby free the Company from the Neceſſity of engaging with the Two moſt powerful States of India at the ſame Time, which will probably be the Caſe if he fail in his Negociation. Should we be at Peace with the Marattas, Hyder will be afraid to diſturb us; for, excluſive of our Strength, which he would then have no Hopes of reſiſting, the determined Enmity which the Marattas bear him, would induce him rather to court our Friendſhip than to provoke us into Hoſtilities; and this is preciſely the State wherein only we can expect to preſerve that general Tranquillity in the Carnatic, which is ſo neceſſary at all Times, but eſpecially at this Juncture.

We earneſtly requeſt you will be pleaſed to ſend by the Firſt proper Conveyance the Five Lacks of Rupees which were promiſed us in Auguſt laſt, and which are much wanted to anſwer our extraordinary Demands.

We have the Honour to be, &c.

(Signed) John Whitehill,
&c. Select Committee.

Fort St. George,
30th October 1779.

Agreed, That the following Reply be written to the Preſident and Select Committee of Fort Saint George.

Gentlemen,

We have received your Letters, dated the 6th, 7th, and 30th October.

The Honourable Company's Ship Ganges arrived the 13th, and the General Barker the 14th Inſtant, and have brought with them the French Recruits mentioned in your Letter of the 6th October.

Your Detention of the Recruits conſigned to this Preſidency by the Honourable Court of Directors, has been a very ſerious Diſappointment to us; the Reaſons which you have aſſigned for this Act is not ſatisfactory; a Courſe of Three Weeks, during which the Recruits were or might have been on Shore at Fort Saint George, was ſufficient, with proper Refreſhment, at leaſt to have

put them into ſuch a Train of Recovery as to have fitted them to undertake the Remainder of their Voyage to this Port; and the additional Argument which you alledge, namely, that you have not received any Liſt of them, was and ought, as we conceive, to have been underſtood as a Proof that they did not appertain to your Preſidency. Your Scruples excited by this Uncertainty, might have been eaſily removed by the Reflection that you had already a Number of our Recruits of the laſt Seaſon, more than equal to that of the preſent Importation, and that the latter might therefore have been ſpared without any Diminution of the Proportion altogether aſſigned to you.

We feel this Loſs the more ſenſibly becauſe it has fallen on us at a Seaſon in which it could not be retrieved in the ordinary Way for many Months to come; and of this you yourſelves ſhould have been aware, when you promiſed to ſend us our full Proportion of the Recruits arrived and coming in the Fleet as ſoon as you were acquainted with their Deſtination. This Promiſe affords but too much Ground for the Apprehenſion that you propoſe in like Manner to detain all the remaining Recruits which have been deſigned for this Preſidency.

We were greatly diſtreſſed by the like Detention of our Recruits the laſt Year; but yielded to the apparent Neceſſity, which was then urged a Plea for it, and confided in your Promiſe to reſtore them as ſoon as the Siege of Pondicherry was concluded; notwithſtanding this Promiſe, and our Demand for them in Letter of the 4th February laſt, they are ſtill withheld from us.

Our full Complement of European Soldiers is conſiderably below the Proportion which it ought to bear to the native Troops of this Eſtabliſhment, and with all the Supplies which it has hitherto been in the Power of the Company to ſend us, we have rarely exceeded One-half even of that Complement; but if you avail yourſelves of the Advantage which your Situation puts into your Hands, of intercepting our Recruits on their Way to us, you eventually hazard the Loſs of all the Company's Poſſeſſions in this Country, and of their Exiſtence with them.

Such a Diminution of our proper Strength is at this Time particularly diſtreſſing, and may be attended with inſtant Danger; it will either impoſe upon us the Neceſſity of ſupplying the Deficiency by new Levies of Native Troops, and increaſing the Proportion between them and our European Soldiery, or of leaving our Means of Defence inadequate to the Extent of our Territory and Connexions, or the many Calls to which we are become liable, for the Maintenance of the Company's general political Syſtem, and the Support of our Part in the War with France, and the Maratta State, which we now regard as inevitable.

From theſe Conſiderations, it is indiſpenſably incumbent on us to demand, in the moſt peremptory Manner, and we do accordingly ſo require you, immediately to ſend us all the Recruits, both of the laſt and of the preſent Seaſon, who were deſigned by the Court of Directors for their Service on this Eſtabliſhment, and whom you have detained; and that no Doubt may remain, either of their Identity or Deſtination, we incloſe you authentic Copies of the Liſt of the Military who were Paſſengers on each Ship, as far as our lateſt Receipts of them. As the preſent Seaſon will not admit of theſe being tranſported by Sea, we ſhall ſend Officers by the General Barker, to receive Charge of them, and to conduct them to Calcutta, either directly by Sea or by marching them firſt to Ganjam, as ſhall be deemed moſt adviſable; and we deſire that you will cauſe them to be delivered over to ſuch Officers immediately on their Arrival, and grant them every requiſite Aſſiſtance for conducting the Men in Safety to the Place of their Deſtination.

We are ſorry that you deemed it inexpedient to furniſh the Detachment under the Command of General Goddard at Surat, with the Reinforcement of Troops which we required; but we hope that your Orders to Colonel Braithwaite, to join him with the Forces under his Command, will prove effectual.

Fort William,
29th November 1779.

We are, &c. &c.

Reſolved, That Officers be directed to hold themſelves in Readineſs to proceed by the General Barker, to Fort Saint George, there to receive Charge of all the Recruits belonging to this Preſidency, and to conduct them to Fort William, either directly by Sea, or by Land to Ganjam, in order to proceed from thence in Veſſels which will be provided for them.

Ordered, That all the Officers belonging to this Eſtabliſhment, who are at preſent at Fort Saint George on Leave of Abſence, do return to Bengal by this Opportunity.

APPENDIX, N° 223.

Bengal Perſian Correſpondence.

Intelligence from Naigpore; dated the 21ſt of Jammadeaſſanie, 7th of July.

ADVICES from Poona ſay, that when the News of the near Approach of Dewajee Pundit, the Vackeel of Modajee Bhoſila, was received by Nanah Purnaveeſe, he propoſed to go out and meet him, together with Sewal Madho Row. When Dewajee heard it, he immediately ſent a Meſſage to him, deſiring that he would not give himſelf that Trouble, on Account of him, who was at all Times his Servant. On this Nanah laid aſide his Deſign, and ſent Hurry Pundit Purkeah to meet and

and conduct Dewajee to him: Hurry Pundit accordingly went and met him, and on the 8th of Jemmadeeaſſanie (24th June) they arrived at Poona, and went to the Houſe of Naroo Pundit. The Day afterwards he waited on Sewal Madho Row, and was very kindly received.

The Forces of Sindeah and Holcar purſued Ragonaut Row a great Way, but could not overtake him; he got ſafely to Surat. The ſaid Chiefs ſent Directions to their Forces, to canton Eight Days Journey on this Side of Goujeraut, and that other Forces ſhould be ſent to join them.

It is reported here, that the Engliſh Forces being joined, are encamped 16 Coſs on this Side of Surat. There is the Proſpect of Hoſtilities in Two or Three Months. Colonel Goddard is returned from Bombay, and joined the Army.

We hear that Modajee's Vackeel, who was with the Engliſh at Surat, has left them, and joined Dewajee Pundit at Poona.

From Maha Rajah Modajee Bhoſila: Dated the 4th Rujjib, 19th of July; received the 6th of October 1779.

I have been favoured after a long Silence with your Two agreeable Letters, written after the Arrival of Beneram Pundit, and your becoming acquainted with the Particulars of the Paper in his Charge; and received the greateſt Pleaſure from the Peruſal of them. You write that they are long, and breathe forth the Sentiments of Friendſhip, Wiſdom, and Judgment; but that the great Object of them all being entirely at an End, it is unneceſſary to recapitulate the Subſtance of them: That having fully underſtood the Contents of the Paper delivered to you by Beneram Pundit, you had, agreeably to my Deſire, returned it to him: That from the Contents of it, you underſtand it to have been meant to convey a clear and explicit Information of my Intentions to relinquiſh the Plan propoſed by you, which my Friendſhip would not allow me to make known to you by an abrupt Declaration, otherwiſe it was unneceſſary to have written Volumes on a Subject which required no more than a ſingle Line: That what is paſt is paſt; and that of the Deſigns which you had formed, you ſhall relinquiſh all future Thoughts, but that of my paſt Kindneſs in the Services I rendered the Engliſh Army on their Arrival at Hoſhungabad, in ſending a Perſon of Rank and Truſt to wait for them, and in furniſhing them with Proviſions and whatever they ſtood in need of, and in ſhewing them all the Dues of Hoſpitality, you ſhall ever retain a grateful Remembrance; and that you ſhall be happy to make every ſuitable Return to theſe Obligations whenever any future Occaſion of my Affairs ſhall demand it: That you have written to Major Camac to remain within the Borders of Bengal, and not to proceed any further, but have not recalled him to Calcutta, not having determined what Part of your Army he ſhall join, which will depend on future Contingencies.

The pleaſing Contents of theſe Letters, which though written under the Veil of Obſcurity, yet at leaſt declare your ſteady Adherence to the Friendſhip and Connection eſtabliſhed between us, I fully underſtand.

With theſe Letters there was none from Beneram Pundit, who is acquainted with the moſt ſecret Negociations between us, nor have I yet received the Paper I entruſted to him; but this is of no Conſequence, it will arrive.

Since on becoming acquainted with the Contents of the Paper I ſent you, you totally relinquiſhed your Deſigns, and regarded it as a clear and explicit Anſwer, and giving up all your Views, confined yourſelf ſolely to the Preſervation of Friendſhip between us, it would be equally uſeleſs and improper in me to repeat to you my Sentiments, Views, and Intentions, with reſpect to future Affairs, and would even carry the Appearance that I was acting a deceitful Part, watching my own Opportunity, and promoting the Cauſe of my Countrymen; yet, the ſtrict Ties of Friendſhip, Candour, and Confidence, which have taken place in the Courſe of our laſt Year's Correſpondence, (during which Space I have received more than an Hundred very friendly Letters from you) will oblige me to the Performance of what I conceive an indiſpenſible Duty of Friendſhip, viz. to communicate to one's Friend the Conſequences which are likely to attend any particular Meaſure, and the Advantages or Diſadvantages attendant thereon, whether ſuch Friend chooſes to pay Attention thereto or not.

The Caſe ſtands thus: As on the Deceaſe of the incomparable Mr. Elliott, all our Views remained under the Veil of Secrecy, you ſent for Biſſember Pundit to a private Audience, and entruſted the Points of Mr. Elliott's Commiſſion, which were of the moſt delicate Nature, to him, to be written to me, and informed me, that thoſe were the ſecret Matters which were intended to have been verbally communicated to me by the late Mr. Elliott; and that, having maturely conſidered them, I would adopt Meaſures to carry them into Effect, and write to you for whatever was required for that Purpoſe.

On peruſing this Letter in private, I perceived the moſt extenſive Deſigns and Views of univerſal Conqueſt. In the firſt Place, I found it impoſſible with my Pen, which is a Mode the Secrecy of which cannot be depended upon, to expreſs my Aſſent or Diſapprobation; and Secondly, I conceived beyond the Abilities of Vackeels to negociate an Affair of ſuch Importance, as the Views of every Perſon are enlarged or contracted according to their Character and Rank in Life, and therefore earneſtly wiſhed, agreeable to your Intimation, to ſend my Miniſter Dewagur Pundit Twelve Days Journey towards Cuttack, and that it might ſuit you to come and meet him, that ſo all Points might be clearly ſettled in a Conference without the Interference or Knowledge of a Third Perſon. As this, by reaſon of a Variety of Cauſes, did not take place on either Side, I was under the Neceſſity of committing thoſe important Matters to Writing, under the Sanction of the Mighty God, (who reads the Hearts of his Creatures, and from whoſe Omniſcience nothing, however ſecret,

can

tan be hid) in which I paid the ſtricteſt Attention to the Rights of the illuſtrious Family on the Rauze, and acknowledging my Obedience due thereto, propoſed Meaſures, which I judged indiſpenſably neceſſary for the Re-eſtabliſhment of the Affairs of the Rauze.

Theſe Propoſals, conſidered as the Production of the moſt complete Knowledge in the Myſteries of Government, were well worthy of Approbation: It is probable that the Reader of it to you did not lay the Streſs he ought to have done on the important Objects it contained, to carry Conviction to your Mind; or Beneram Pundit did not repreſent my Propoſitions to you in their real and proper Colours.

What is to be done? I cannot convey my Soul into the Body of another; or perhaps, learning from the News-papers the ill-concerted Plans of the Chiefs of Bombay, you ſuffered yourſelf to be led by your Indignation thereat, from the Paths of Equanimity and ſound Policy; and conſidering it is inconſiſtent with your Magnanimity to accept of the Aſſiſtance of your Friends, you rejected the Propoſitions I tranſmitted you, and regarding the Expences of that Plan as entirely unneceſſary and fruitleſs, determined to depend ſolely on the Bravery and Magnanimity of the Engliſh!

What can I ſay? or to what End ſhall I ſwell my Letter on this Subject? Were I preſent with you, I would, from Motives of the ſincereſt Friendſhip, ſet the Matter before you in its true Light, and point out to you the imminent Dangers attendant upon theſe Meaſures; and you would, I am convinced, give your Aſſent thereto. Had my Ambition the Wings of an Eagle, one Flight would bring us together, when every Point would be cleared up.

Although the Marattas are in Poſſeſſion of near 300 Forts, built of Stone, furniſhed with all Kinds of warlike Stores, and can in caſe of War collect into one Body near 200,000 Cavalry; beſides the Nabob Nizam-ul-Dowlah, and others alſo, who are all alarmed at the Incroachments of the Engliſh into the Decan, and are waiting a favourable Opportunity to repel them; and although their Mode of making War, and Activity is ſuch, that they will in one Night gain a Diſtance of 50 Cos, both eating and ſleeping on their Horſes; harraſſing an oppoſing Army on all Quarters, and cutting off all its Convoys and Supplies, making the moſt furious Attacks on it whenever they find an Opportunity; retreating and returning to the Charge; laying Stratagems by pretended Flight to draw Parties of the Enemy to purſue them, and then rallying and cutting them off, by which Policy they have defeated all the Chiefs and Rajahs of Hindoſtan, to wit, Seſoo Dhayeah, Hadah, Cotchouara, and Ranna, &c. as alſo the powerful Ameers in a Multitude of Battles, and reduced all thoſe Countries to their Subjection, and have at all Times afforded their Aſſiſtance to the King; yet notwithſtanding all this, the Engliſh propoſe, without having made Preparations or collected the Neceſſaries of War, to overcome them by a trifling Effort, and to reduce them to Obedience. This is really aſtoniſhing.

You write that one Line was ſufficient to have given an Anſwer to the propoſed Deſigns, and that there was no Neceſſity to have written ſo voluminouſly, that is to ſay, "Your Forces are arrived at "Hoſhungabad, my Troops ſhall join them, and ſhall ſettle the Buſineſs."

This cauſes me real Surprize, and the End of it would have proved a Parallel to that of the Plan of the Engliſh at Bombay.

To oppoſe a Mountain, a Mountain is requiſite, what Effect would be produced by throwing Pebbles at it? Should a Perſon attempt to extinguiſh a raging Fire, which had ſeized on a Jungle of Reeds, by throwing on it a Handful of Water, ſhould we not be induced to ſmile at his vain Attempt, when nothing leſs than an Ocean of Water would be ſufficient? Perſons experienced in the Affairs of War and Slaughter, and ſkilled in the Maxims of ancient States, make the Conſiderations above recited the Guide of their Conduct: By the Bleſſing of God you are known to have great Experience in Buſineſs. Regard what I have above written as dictated ſolely by warm Friendſhip; and on conſidering maturely, you will approve thereof.

As I had received your Letter, informing me that you had given up all Thoughts of proſecuting this Buſineſs, but remained firm in your Friendſhip, and repeating your Obligations to me, and had likewiſe got Letters from Colonel Goddard and Mr. Weatherſtone, aſking my Advice with reſpect to the Meaſures to be adopted, which was accompanied by a Letter from the Governor of Bombay, I judged it adviſable to diſpatch Dewagur Pundit to Poona; which I accordingly did. He arrived there in Safety, and had ſeveral Conferences with the Prime Miniſter, Nanah Purnaveſe, who is a Man of great Wiſdom, and ſteadily attached to his Word and Engagements. In the Courſe of theſe, he repreſented my Integrity and good Faith, and took an Opportunity to mention, in a proper Manner, the Apprehenſions conceived with reſpect to the French.

As Letters from Colonel Goddard, addreſſed to Row Pundit Purdhaun and Dewagur Pundit, informing them of the Powers with which he was inveſted from the Company to make Peace with the Marattas, and aſking Dewagur Pundit's Advice, as to his future Meaſures, had been received at Poona, Anſwers were returned thereto. The Subſtance of Dewagur Pundit's Reply, and the one which he cauſed Pundit Purdhaun to write, you will fully learn from another Letter which relates the Whole, as written me by Dewagur Pundit.

You will therefore write to Colonel Goddard to make Peace; a Meaſure highly proper, which will be the Means of eſtabliſhing Tranquillity in the Country, removing all Cauſes of Apprehenſion from the Deſigns of the French, and preſerving the Faith of Treaty to the lateſt Poſterity.

I wiſh to act as the Guarantee to this Treaty between Pundit Purdhaun and the Engliſh Chiefs, that it may be inviolably preſerved.

You will therefore regard all theſe Meaſures which I have taken, as the moſt convincing Proofs of my Friendſhip and Attachment to the Engliſh, and will ſend me an immediate Anſwer; for which I am very anxious.

Poſtſcript.

Poſtſcript.

With reſpect to what you mention of my not having given an Anſwer to Major Camac, the Caſe was this: Coſſids belonging to Colonel Goddard brought a Letter addreſſed to Major Camac from Burhanpore; which Coſſids requeſted a Letter from me to Major Camac; but it being Night, they departed without my Leave.

This proves the Ignorance of the Coſſids.

Had I received a Letter from Major Camac, I ſhould have returned a proper Anſwer to it.

What you now write, with reſpect to your having ſuſpended his March forward, is highly proper.

2d. Poſtſcript.

The Note incloſed in your Letter, was deſigned for the Preſervation of Secrecy, by informing me of the Impropriety of communicating ſuch Matters to Ramkaunt; but that I was the beſt Judge of my own Affairs. The Circumſtance is this: After the Deceaſe of Mr. Elliott, Ramkaunt was the only one of his Followers who made his Appearance before me; and as a Perſon ſent by you, of whatever Rank or Condition, is dear to me, I regarded him equally with Beneram Pundit.

Actuated by ſincere Friendſhip, I regard my own Intereſt as beſt promoted by your Advice: Such Advice is good as is founded on the Welfare and Intereſt of one's Friend, not on Self-intereſt.

From Moodajee Bhooſila; received the 31ſt October 1779.

Your friendly Letter informing me of your having recalled Major Camac, &c. (here follows a Repetition of the Particulars of the Governor's Letter of the 12th of May) arrived in a happy Hour; and by its Contents afforded me the greateſt Pleaſure.

Your unreſerved Communication on the State of Affairs, and of your Views and Sentiments, which is a Proof of ſincere Friendſhip, gave me the greateſt Satisfaction, and encreaſed my Attachment to you.

Some Time ago, on the Receipt of Letters from my Miniſter, Dewagur Pundit (whom I had thought proper before Colonel Goddard marched to Surat, to diſpatch at the Deſire of the Miniſters to Poona) which Letters contained the Particulars of the Converſations he had had with Nanna Purnaveeſe; in which, actuated by Friendſhip, he had uſed every Argument to convince him of your diſtinguiſhed Virtues, and particularly of your Sincerity and good Faith, and of the Steadineſs of the Engliſh Nation; as well as what he heard from Nanna Purnaveſe, what he ſaw of the State of the Maratta Armies, Forts, &c. and of the Meaſures which appeared to him moſt eligible to be purſued in future. I ſent them, accompanied by his Reply to your Letter, to Calcutta; from which you muſt have gained a compleat Knowledge of every Matter. Thoſe Letters were dictated ſolely by Friendſhip to the Engliſh, without Regard to any other Conſideration.

On the Receipt of your laſt Letter, I diſpatched it, together with your Letter addreſſed to him, to Dewagur Pundit; and likewiſe wrote to Row Pundit Purdhaun and his Miniſters, what I judged moſt expedient to induce them to adhere to the Engliſh Friendſhip.

In the mean Time Letters were received at Poona by Pundit Purdhaun, Nanna Purnaveeſe, and Dewagur Pundit, adviſing them, that he had been inveſted by the Governor General and Supreme Council of Bengal with full Powers to negociate and conclude a Treaty of Peace and Friendſhip with the Marattas; and that as it was his Wiſh to eſtabliſh a good Underſtanding, and to remove every Ground of Quarrel and Diſpute, he deſired that a Perſon of Truſt might be deputed from thence to negociate with him, having no Doubt but that on his Arrival, all Matters would be amicably ſettled; that he himſelf would repair to any Place that ſhould be fixed on for an Interview, where every thing might be perſonally adjuſted: A Letter to Pundit Purdhaun was likewiſe received from you, expreſſing your Deſire for an amicable Accommodation. All theſe Letters agreed in Subſtance with thoſe from this Quarter; in conſequence of which long Conferences were held between Nanna Purnaveeſe and Dewagur Pundit, on the Mode of re-eſtabliſhing Harmony and Friendſhip; the full Particulars of which you will learn from the Letters of Dewagur Pundit. A Perſon of Truſt was deputed on the Part of Pundit Purdhaun to Surat, to negociate with Colonel Goddard, and Dewagur Pundit wrote his Sentiments very fully to the Colonel; you will therefore write to Colonel Goddard ſuch Inſtructions as you judge expedient, to remove all Grounds of Diſputes and Hoſtilities. The Earneſtneſs and Zeal with which, prompted by my Friendſhip to you, I have all along acted, and ſtill act in this Buſineſs, and the conſtant and unreſerved Communications which I have made to you on every Event, you are, I doubt not, fully ſenſible of; an equal Return of Confidence on your Part, in communicating your Sentiments to me, will be highly advantageous; and I doubt not but you will therefore let me frequently have the Pleaſure to hear from you on this Subject, as well as reſpecting your Health.

Your Permiſſion to Beneram Pundit to go to Benares for the Recovery of his Health, was very proper. I underſtand what Beneram writes, and ſince I began this Letter, I have received Two other Letters from you of the ſame Tenor as your former ones, to which I have fully replied both before and in my preſent Letter. Beneram Pundit has Orders to return to you as ſoon as his Health

ſhall be eſtabliſhed. The Recall of Major Camac into the Provinces of Bengal was highly proper and expedient.

What you have repeatedly written on the Subject of Caution and profound Secrecy, I perfectly underſtand: All Men of Wiſdom, and more particularly Rulers of a State, will preſerve their Secrets in an equal, nay even in a ſuperior, Degree, to their Lives.

As Mr. Elliott died in the Way, and there was no Perſon left but Ramkaunt who was acquainted with the Languages, and was in Fact intelligent and well verſed in Buſineſs, for which he had great Abilities, I thought it adviſable to join him with Beneram Pundit; and to theſe Two alone I communicated both verbally and by Letter whatever I had to ſay to you; but except theſe Two, no one has been made acquainted with any Part of our Deſigns, nor ſhall any one in future.

APPENDIX, N° 224.

Bengal Perſian Correſpondence.

Tranſlation of a Letter in the Hindoſtanny Language, from Lalla Takur Doſs: Dated the 21ſt of Shabaun, 3d September 1779; received the 12th October 1779.

I HAVE been honoured with your gracious Letter, accompanied by Karetahs, from the Nabob Governor and yourſelf, addreſſed to Madho Row Sindeah, and Mhatah Sada Shinkur, Moonſhey. I cauſed the Karetah to be delivered to Pateel Sahib by the ſaid Moonſhey: Pateel Sahib ſent it to Nanna Purnaveeſe, who returned it Five Days afterwards in a Letter from himſelf. Pateel Sahib having peruſed the Letter, tore it, and gave Orders to prepare an Anſwer.

Appa Sabajee was ſome Time ago ſent from hence to Poona, to receive his Diſmiſſion from Nanna Purnaveeſe to repair to Calcutta; but on the Arrival of Dewagur Pundit at Poona, by his Advice his Commiſſion was ſuſpended. Some Time afterwards Pateel Sahib declared it as his Opinion, and that he would ſend a Meſſage through Apajee, that Lalla Takur Doſs ſhould be joined in Commiſſion with Apajee, and ſent to Calcutta; on this, Mhata Sada Sinkur ſaid, "As this "Meaſure will not meet with the Approbation of the Rulers of the Raje, if it is reſolved to "eſtabliſh a firm and perfect Friendſhip, let the Correſpondence with the Calcutta Chiefs on this "Subject be conducted through me, who am an old and experienced Servant." Pateel Sahib hearing this, continued ſilent. The Moonſhey related all theſe Particulars to me; and added, that his Diſpoſition was ſuch, that there was no Dependence on him; that he was puffed with Pride, and an arrogant Opinion of his own Abilities; and that it was to be apprehended, that after Propoſals ſhould be made he would not abide thereby, which would draw the greateſt Diſgrace on him.

You write, that whatever Acts are done by Colonel Goddard are valid, and will be ratified: This I underſtand. The Colonel has accordingly entered into a Correſpondence with Pateel Sahib and Nanna Purnaveeſe; and a Vackeel is gone to Surat, on the Part of the Peiſhwa. Pateel Sahib, under the Influence of Avarice, ſubmits entirely to the Authority of Nanna Purnaveeſe, who has the ſole Direction of Affairs. The Chiefs have publiſhed a Declaration, that they will make War againſt any one who ſhall enter this Country.

Some Time ago Intelligence having been received of the Arrival of an Engliſh Fleet at Bombay, a Vakeel on the Part of Nanna Purnaveeſe, and Apajee, on the Part of Pateel Saheb, went with Preſents to Bombay, where they were to continue; but have ſince returned hither with the Preſents.

Colonel Goddard has written ſeveral Letters to the Peiſhwa and Nanna Purnaveeſe; the Two firſt to the following Effect (See Modajee's laſt Letters). In the Third he propoſes an Interview, by which all Points might be ſettled; to which Anſwers have been returned. If an Interview is ſettled between the Colonel and Nanna Purnaveeſe, Pateel Sahib will likewiſe repair to it.

Nanna Purnaveeſe is ſatisfied, that the Engliſh Chiefs ſhould make their own Terms, upon Condition that they deliver up Ragonaut Row to him, or keep a ſtrict Watch over him.

Nanna Purvaneeſe ſends frequent Invitations to Pateel Sahib to repair to Poona, who conſtantly replies, that he is coming; but the Fact is, that he is employed in preparing a Place of Strength for his own Security, and his People have all Orders to the ſame Effect. After this is completed he will go to Poona.

Nanna Purnaveeſe is deſirous of ſending Pateel Sahib to the Carnatic, and Hurry Pundit against Ragonaut Row; and although Pateel Sahib diſapproves of the Deſigns, yet there is great Reaſon to believe that Nanna Purnaveeſe will ſend him thither.

Goolzar Khan, formerly an Officer of the Peiſhwa, but who is now attached to the Intereſt of Ragonaut Row, has connected himſelf with the Kellahdar of Aſeer; has raiſed 10 or 12,000 Horſe, and invaded Khandaſe; and levied large Contributions on the Villages under the Peiſhwa's Government: He is alſo conſtantly augmenting his Army. In conſequence of this, Pateel Sahib wrote to the Forces ſtationed in the Neighbourhood of Burhampore, who were formerly ſtationed with

with Ragonaut Row, to take Meaſures to reduce Goolzar Khan: This Body, conſiſting of 4 or 5000 Horſe, were defeated by Goolzar Khan: Nanna Purnaveeſe, receiving Advice of this, diſpatched the Brother of Bhum Row Panta, with 7000 Horſe and Foot againſt him, who likewiſe received a Defeat. Afterwards Behiree Rutt Sindeah, with a good Army, on the Part of Pateel Sahib; and on the Part of Nanna Purnaveeſe, a Body of Gardies, French, &c. were ſent againſt him. In the Two aforementioned Engagements, great Numbers on this Side were killed, and Goolzar Khan's People have taken Poſſeſſion of their Houſes, and placed Guards in them. Goolzar Khan is making vigorous Efforts to continue the War; and it is ſaid that Ragonaut Row has ſent a Party of Forces and ſome Artillery to his Aſſiſtance.

Baboojee Holcar is lately arrived in this Diſtrict from Hindoſtan; levied Seven Lacks of Rupees on the City of Indoſe; and removing all Tocojee Holcar's Officers, is making large Contributions on the Country, and raiſing Forces: He is connected with Ragonaut Row.

It is reported that Amrut Row, the adopted Son of Ragonaut Row, is gone on a Negociation to Bombay.

Nanna Purnaveeſe has ſent a Body of his Forces to take Poſſeſſion, and ſecure the Ghauts and Roads on the Side of Tellegong.

All the Chiefs here to outward Appearance are united in the Ties of Friendſhip; but in Reality after the Faſhion of Hindoſtan, the greateſt Hatred and Jealouſy prevails amongſt them all. In fact, Troubles exiſt in every Quarter. Hyder Naig, Nizam Ally Khan, &c. as well as the Maratta Chiefs, are all making the greateſt Preparations.

Dewajee Pundit, the Dewan of Modajee Bhoſila, lately arrived at Poona, and entered into Engagements with Nanna Purnaveeſe, with whom he is in high Favour. Dewajee repreſented to Nanna Purnaveeſe as follows: "What have all thoſe Men done for you, on whom you have expended Lacks of Rupees for their Services? Had you aided me with Money and a Body of Forces, the Affairs of the Country would long ere this have been ſettled on the beſt Footing; and the large Sums due from Bengal on account of the Chout would have been recovered. I am at all Times a duteous Subject of the Sirkar, and the Sums above mentioned were the Property of the Sirkar; but as you never once gave me the leaſt Hint that it was your Wiſh, we were under the Neceſſity of entering into a ſpecious Friendſhip with the Engliſh, and accordingly directed our Vackeels to conciliate the good Will of the Engliſh."

Nanna made Anſwer—"Write to Modajee to raiſe Troops; as whatever may happen, our Intereſts are one; but ſhould he fear that the Engliſh in conſequence of his encreaſing his Forces would be diſpleaſed at him, let him write to them, to conciliate their Friendſhip; a Meaſure which I myſelf am likewiſe contriving to effect."

Dewajee aſſented thereto; at the ſame Time obſerving, "The Engliſh Nation is a Thorn in our Side, which it is neceſſary to get rid of." Nanna replied, "I am not inattentive thereto, and ſhall leave no Means untried for that Purpoſe."

Modajee Bhoſila has a Vackeel with Pateel Sahib, and a conſtant Correſpondence is kept up.

Pateel Sahib, hoping to prevail on the Kellahdar of Aſeer to deliver up the Fort for a Sum of Money, means ſhortly to ſend him a Kellaat.

Of the Two Surat Gentlemen who were Hoſtages with Pateel Sahib, for the Performance of the Treaty, one was left at Poona on account of Sickneſs; he is now arrived at the Camp; he is allowed near 40 Servants, 15 Talingas, and from Pateel Sahib has 26 Horſemen to keep up his Dignity.

They are both treated with the greateſt Honour and Attention, and are ſuffered to amuſe themſelves with Hunting in Company with the Horſemen. You are acquainted with one of theſe Gentlemen, by Name, Farmer.

The Dewan of theſe Gentlemen went on ſome Buſineſs to Poona: Nanna Purnaveeſe ſuſpecting that he came as a Spy, threw him into Priſon; which when Pateel Sahib heard, he wrote to Nanna Purnaveeſe, and obtained his Releaſe from Confinement, and Return to the Camp.

From the Day when Ragonaut Row eſcaped from the Hands of Pateel Sahib, the latter has appeared very much aſhamed, and alſo greatly apprehenſive leſt Nanna Purnaveeſe ſhould entertain Suſpicions of him; and when the Time of Payment of the Sums ſtipulated arrives, ſhould diſpute the Claim on the Plea that he let Ragonaut Row go.

Nanna Purnaveeſe threw into Priſon the private Intelligence Writer, whom the Gentlemen at Surat ſent to Poona; and the Engliſh in return, as ſoon as they heard it, impriſoned a Perſon who was at Surat on the Part of Nanna.

Letters have been received here from Timur Shah's Vackeel at Shajehanabad to this Effect: That Timur Shah at the Invitation of the King Shah Allum is coming to Hindoſtan to drive out the Europeans and ſettle the Affairs of the Country: If you are deſirous of Friendſhip with him ſend an Arzie to him. Pateel returned for Anſwer to Timur Shaw's Vackeel, I am coming into Hindoſtan, and on my Arrival will inform you of my Sentiments.

To-day being the 21ſt of Shabaun, (3d of September) a Shakka from his Majeſty, and a Letter from the Nabob Abdulaed Khan were received. Thus much I have learnt of their Contents, that Rajah Baboo Pundit, on the Part of his Majeſty, and on the Part of Abdulaed Khan, Rajah Ram Cuſhmeery, have been diſpatched with Kellaats for the Decan Chiefs.

As long as Nanna is at the Head of Affairs, Pateel Sahib will reply to the Karetahs you tranſmit me, with Deceit and Artifice; no Confidence ſhould be placed in him, for he has no Idea of good Faith and Integrity.

APPENDIX, N° 225.

Bengal Secret Correſpondence.

From Dewagur Pundit; Received 31ſt October 1779.

ACKNOWLEDGING the Receipt and recapitulating the Contents of the Governor General's Letter of the 12th of May.

This Letter reached me in a happy Hour at Poona, afforded me the greateſt Pleaſure, and made me acquainted with every Matter.

Your unreſerved Communications on the late Events, and of your Sentiments, is a moſt pleaſing Proof of that Friendſhip which is ſo firmly eſtabliſhed between you and the Maha Rajah my Maſter, and was highly proper, it having encreaſed our Regard for you an Hundredfold.

I have already written you Volumes between the Time of Colonel Goddard's Arrival at Houſhungabad, to his Departure for Surat; in which I touched on the improper Meaſures adopted by the Bombay Chiefs for the Support of Ragonaut Row; the Inexpediency of the March of Major Camac; the Multitude of the Forces of Decan; their Mode of conducting War; the Conjunction of the Nabob Nizam-ul-Dowlah, &c. with them in their hoſtile Intentions; together with my Sentiments on the Meaſures you ought to adopt in future; to which I was induced by my ſteady and ſincere Friendſhip for you; which alſo led me to inform you and Colonel Goddard of my Intention to repair to Poona: And after my Arrival there, and having had frequent private Conferences with the Miniſters, I diſpatched a Letter for you to my Maſter, containing a full and particular Account of theſe Conferences; of my unreſerved Sentiments thereon; of the real State of Affairs in Decan; and of the Expediency at all Events of Peace and Friendſhip with Row Pundit Purdhaun; which Letter you have doubtleſs received before this Time, together with Letters from my Maſter, and are fully acquainted with the Contents. You have likewiſe undoubtedly, by this Time, been made acquainted with the repeated Letters of Advice which, prompted by Friendſhip, I wrote to Colonel Goddard, and the Anſwers which he returned to me, to Pundit Purdhaun, and his Miniſters; to wit, that by Letters from Calcutta he had been inveſted with full Powers to negociate and conclude a Peace with the Marattas; that he encloſed a Copy of his Commiſſion; and it being his Wiſh to introduce a friendly Intercourſe, and to remove all Cauſes of Diſpute or Quarrel, he propoſed that a truſty Perſon ſhould be ſent to negociate with him on the Part of Pundit Purhaun; and that in conſequence of this Letter Nanna Purnaveeſe had diſpatched a truſty Agent with Letters to him.

In the mean Time another Letter was received from Colonel Goddard, ſaying, That as much Time would be loſt in the Journey backwards and forwards of a Third Perſon, he earneſtly wiſhed for a Perſonal Interview; and that he would repair to any Place which ſhould be fixed on for that Purpoſe. The Miniſters in anſwer thereto, with the Advice of Sindeah Holcar and other Chiefs, wrote to Colonel Goddard preſſing him in the moſt friendly Terms to repair thither. It is highly probable, that ſhould Colonel Goddard come, all Cauſes of Quarrel and hoſtile Acts contrary to Treaty will be entirely removed, and all Matters be conducted in future with Friendſhip, Integrity, and good Faith; which will be productive of Happineſs to the People, and of innumerable other Advantages. Actuated by the moſt zealous Friendſhip for you which poſſeſſes my whole Heart, I employ every Degree of Wiſdom, Penetration and Foreſight with which the Almighty has endowed me, and to which you give ſuch liberal Praiſes for the Accompliſhment of this deſirable End. My Journey to Poona was ſolely with the View of eſtabliſhing Friendſhip between you and Row Pundit Purdhaun.

Your late Letters to my Maſter and me, in which, prompted by your Friendſhip, you unreſervedly communicated to us the State of Affairs, and your Determination to preſerve Peace, as long as it can be done with Honour to your Government, being ſent me from Naigpore, I in ſeveral private Conferences with Nanna Purnaveeſe, preſſed the Contents of them on him in the moſt forcible Manner; and your Letters to Pundit Purdhaun, expreſſing your Deſire to preſerve the former Treaties, arriving at the ſame Time, and agreeing exactly with your Aſſurances to my Maſter and to me, I ſeized the Opportunity of enlarging confidently to Nanna Purnaveeſe on the Subject of your diſtinguiſhed Virtues, your Magnanimity, Foreſight and Penetration; your Skill in the Myſteries of Government; your good Faith, Candour, and Integrity; your Adherence at all Times to Juſtice; your exemplary Piety; your Deliberation in reſolving in any Meaſure, and your Steadineſs in the Purſuit of it; and in ſhort, on every one of thoſe great Qualities which I have become acquainted with in the Courſe of our Correſpondence, and from the Relation of the Vackeels who have paſſed between us: I alſo propoſed to him a Mode of re-eſtabliſhing Peace and Friendſhip, from which the moſt important Advantages would accrue. To this he replied; "It has ever been a Maxim with "ſkilful Rulers of States, that the Preſervation of Peace and Friendſhip with their powerful

"Neighbours

" Neighbours, is infinitely preferable to War and Contentions; the one ſecuring Peace and Happi-
" neſs, and the other bringing Diſtreſs and Calamity to the People whom God has committed to
" their Care; and that whoever injures them, and from worldly Motives quits the Paths of Integrity
" and good Faith, and thereby plunges them into Misfortune, will ſurely feel the Reſentment of
" God, their peculiar Protector.

" Theſe Conſiderations have ever kept me in Awe, inſomuch that I never ſuffer the Treaties out
" of my Sight, and daily call myſelf to an Account; and I have the greateſt Attachment to all ſuch
" as make Integrity and good Faith the Rules of their Conduct, and with ſuch wiſh to be connected.
" The Praiſes which you give to the Nabob Amaud-ul-Dowlah, and which I have likewiſe heard
" from other Quarters, are due to his Virtues. But hear what I have to ſay to this Subject, and
" reply thereto. It is this:

" By Reaſon of the Vicinity of their Settlements, and the Traffic carried on to the Iſlands by
" Boats laden with the Merchandize of all Nations, the Ties of Friendſhip were knit between the
" Family of Pundit Purdhaun and the Engliſh Chiefs, an Intercourſe of Letters and Vackeels eſta-
" bliſhed very early, and alſo ſeveral Treaties concluded between them on certain Conditions: In
" the Time of the Troubles excited by Ragonaut Row, when he took Refuge with the Engliſh at
" Bombay, by the Deputation of Colonel Upton, who came from Calcutta with full Power to ne-
" gociate, notwithſtanding the Exiſtence of ancient Treaties, ſeveral Articles which may be found
" in the Treaty were added. Of theſe new Articles then concluded reflect impartially, and declare
" on whoſe Side has the Breach ariſen.

" The Arrival of a Trader of the French Nation to diſpoſe of Merchandize here, was conſtrued
" into a Deputation on the Part of his Nation; and Letters written on the Subject, although there
" was not the leaſt Truth in the Suppoſition or Grounds for it: Notwithſtanding this, ſolely from
" my Deſire to oblige the Engliſh Chiefs, I hove that Merchant diſgracefully from the Dur-
" bar, although the Meaſure was quite contrary to every Maxim of Government, intending
" thereby to give them complete Satisfaction. When ſuch Marks of Friendſhip were ſhewn on
" this Part, their liſtening to the Perſuaſions of Ragonaut Row, and conceiving the greateſt Ad-
" vantages might be derived from him, their furniſhing him with Warlike Stores, a large Train of
" Artillery, and a formidable Army, and precipitately advancing to Boregaut, and marching from
" thence, ſpreading the Flames of War around, can ſurely never be reconciled to Integrity and good
" Faith: Yet notwithſtanding this, in the Midſt of a furious War, when the Bombay Chiefs
" made Propoſals for Peace, and certain Conditions being mutually agreed to, and Ragonaut Row
" delivered into our Hands, they requeſted to be allowed to return to Bombay with their Followers,
" we furniſhed them with an Eſcort for their ſafe Paſſage, and with every thing that could afford
" them Convenience, and ſhewed them every Inſtance of Kindneſs. At the Time when the
" Bombay Chiefs began Hoſtilities, repeated Letters, with an Account of theſe Tranſactions, were
" written to Calcutta. Since the Nabob Amaud-ul-Dowlah has Authority over all the Settle-
" ments, how could the Invaſion of the Bombay Chiefs be of their own Accord?"

To this I replied, All theſe hoſtile Acts were highly diſapproved by the Nabob Amaud-ul-Dowlah; and all the Meaſures adopted by the Gentlemen of Bombay, were contrary to the Advice and Inſtructions of the ſaid Nabob and his Council; and of this Aſſertion the following is a Proof, that the Army which was arrived at Hoſhungabad remained on the Banks of the Nerbudda, whilſt theſe hoſtile Tranſactions were carried on almoſt in their very Sight, and never made the leaſt Attempt to join the Bombay Chiefs. Nanna Purnaveſe anſwered, " Had it happened that our Army
" had been defeated by that of Bombay, and all Matters had ſucceeded to their Wiſh, would they
" or would they not have received the higheſt Commendations from the Council of Calcutta,
" for their Services and the Advantages they had procured? If this Meaſure was really undertaken
" without the Approbation of the Nabob Amaud-ul-Dowlah and his Council, why does he not,
" ſince he has the Power of confirming and diſmiſſing in all the Settlements, puniſh the Chief of
" Bombay for his Diſobedience of Orders and Contempt of Authority, which would carry Con-
" viction with it? As the Nabob Amaud-ul-Dowlah has, in a late Letter which I have received
" from him, expreſſed his Intention to adhere to Treaty, and has inveſted Colonel Goddard with
" full Powers to negociate and ſettle all Points in an amicable Manner; and as Letters have like-
" wiſe been received from the ſaid Colonel, propoſing the Renewal of Engagements, and deſiring
" that a truſty Perſon may be deputed to confer with him on ſeveral Points; and declaring, that in
" receiving Ragonaut Row, he has no improper Deſign, but has done ſo ſolely from a Conviction
" that it was for the common Intereſt, as it would prevent him from exciting Troubles in any other
" Quarter, and offering to repair in Perſon to any Place that ſhall be fixed on for an Interview,
" where the Sentiments of each Party may be made known and diſcuſſed, and all Points amicably
" ſettled. I have in conſequence diſpatched a truſty Agent with a friendly Letter to him, and
" preſſed him in the warmeſt Terms to come hither: Should he come, I am ready to ſettle all
" Matters agreeable to Treaty. I ſhall not be the Cauſe of a Breach of Friendſhip, for I regard
" the Union of the Two States as productive of innumerable Advantages to both. Do you write
" to this Effect to Colonel Goddard, and to the Nabob Amaud-ul-Dowlah."

I have accordingly written to Colonel Goddard and to Mr. Weatherſtone, pointing out to them the Advantage of Peace, and the Expediency of their repairing here; and actuated by the warmeſt Friendſhip to you, I have, though highly diſagreeable to me, taken on myſelf the Part of a News-writer, to make you acquainted with every Tranſaction and Occurrence here; and I have

no Doubt but you will regard it as a moſt convincing Proof of my Zeal and Attachment to you. You will, I hope, write Inſtructions to Colonel Goddard to re-eſtabliſh a friendly Connection, to adhere to Treaty, and to give no Aſſiſtance to Ragonaut Row; for in my Judgment, ſuch a friendly Connection will be the Cauſe of Happineſs and numberleſs Advantages to both Parties.

1ſt Poſtſcript.

The Sum of this voluminous Letter is briefly this: The ſole Adviſer and Manager of the Affairs of Row Pundit Purdhaun's Government is at this Time Balajee Pundit; a Man poſſeſſed of Firmneſs beyond all the other Miniſters of this State; he is intelligent, penetrating, and true to his Word; and ſo faithful an Obſerver of his Engagements, that he would never deviate in the leaſt Inſtance from them, although by ſo doing he had a Proſpect of the greateſt Acquiſitions of Territory or Wealth, or even could he thereby enter into immediate Poſſeſſion of ſuch Advantages. After long Conferences and Arguments with him, he ſaid to me, "The good Faith of the Engliſh Chiefs, on every Occaſion, is ſo well known, that it becomes a Proverb throughout the Country. The Nabob Amaud-ul-Dowlah, who is a Perſon of Integrity, Truth, and upright Conduct, and poſſeſſes Authority to regulate the Meaſures of all the Settlements, and of confirming and diſmiſſing the Chiefs of them, writes in his late Letter, That he is ſteady to the Treaty concluded through Colonel Upton, who had full Powers from the Governor General and Council for that Purpoſe. This Aſſertion ſurprizes me; and my Aſtoniſhment increaſes when I ſee the Engliſh of Bombay acting in direct Violation thereof; and the ſaid Nabob taking no Means to puniſh them, or to ſhew his Reſentment for their Diſobedience and Contempt of his Authority, yet writes me, that he continues firm to the Treaty of Colonel Upton. What can I ſay to this? or in what Light can I regard it? As the Proſperity and Well-being of a State depends on a ſtrict Adherence to its Engagements, no Advantage will ever be gained by a Chief from the Breach of them; nor will any of his Meaſures in ſuch Caſe be crowned with Succeſs."

I replied, The Engliſh will never deviate from the Treaty concluded by Colonel Upton. To this Nanna Purnaveeſe anſwered, "Colonel Upton's Treaty is here, conſider it, and you will ſee that ſome of the Conditions of it we fulfilled, and others have been eluded, and ſtill remain in Diſpute." When the Treaty was produced, I perceived that there were ſeveral Points on which he had a Right to demand Satisfaction, and which appeared evident Breaches of Treaty; and that to leave them in their preſent unaccompliſhed State, would effectually prevent the Eſtabliſhment of a ſincere Friendſhip, it being primarily neceſſary to clear the Path of all Thorns and Obſtructions, which being done, every Matter might be ſettled to the Satisfaction of both Parties; my Friendſhip to you, therefore, will not ſuffer me to expreſs my Approbation at theſe Points being left unfulfilled, and I ſhall therefore point out to you the ſeveral Particulars to which I allude, and which are there ſtated by Nanna Purnaveeſe.

When, notwithſtanding the Exiſtence of ſolemn and ancient Treaties, they took the Opportunity of the Abſence of the Miniſter, who was gone towards Burhaunpore to make themſelves Maſters of Salſette by Stratagem; I would aſk, how this can be reconciled to the Faith of Treaty, and upon what Grounds they acted?

When it was made an Article in the Treaty, that they ſhould not afford an Aſylum to any of the Dependents of the Raje, much leſs give them Aſſiſtance; in what Light ſhall we conſider their Reception of Ragonaut Row; the Encouragement they gave to him, and the War which they entered upon under his Directions? and what can be ſaid on ſuch a Subject?

In Oppoſition to this Conduct on their Part, in diſregarding an Article of ſuch material Conſequence, that the Violation of it intirely deſtroyed the Treaty, and neceſſarily produced the moſt violent Tumults and Diſorders, I merely from a Deſire to oblige the Nabob Amaud-ul-Dowlah, acted contrary to every Maxim of Government, in refuſing Countenance, and violently expelling from the Durbar, a creditable Merchant of the French Nation, who came hither to trade, although there was not the ſmalleſt Mention in the Treaty prohibiting Chiefs of the French Nation being received here. Let theſe Two Circumſtances be fairly weighed in the Balance of Juſtice, and ſee which Scale predominates. Colonel Upton, who was inveſted with plenipotentiary Powers from the Governor and Council, inſerted in the Treaty, that no Aſylum ſhould be given by the Engliſh to Ragonaut Row: Notwithſtanding which, the Governor of Bombay takes every Meaſure to ſupport his Cauſe, and will not diſcontinue his Violation of Treaty: See and conſider then, on whoſe Side does the Blame fall.

In the Affair of Shaſhtie, which is a peculiar hereditary Poſſeſſion of ours, all the Acts of the Government of Bombay are clearly oppoſite to Juſtice and good Faith. As the Nabob Amaud-ul-Dowlah is well verſed in the Maxims of Government, and had we not demanded the Reſtoration of it, it would have been a Proof of the greateſt Weakneſs and Imbecillity; we referred the Determination of the Matter to him—Let me aſk you what Equity he ſhewed in the Deciſion.

The Governor of Bombay, regarding the various Treaties contracted between Row Pundit Purdhaun, and the Miniſters of the King of England, as the Playthings of Children, taking Ragonaut Row with him, repaired in an hoſtile Manner to Boregaut; we delayed entering on Hoſtilities for a full Month, on the Principle that the ſaid Chief would certainly, in the mean Time, receive Orders from Calcutta, forbidding him to proſecute ſo unjuſtifiable a War; but when they advanced beyond the Ghauts, we were remedileſs, but we conſtantly wrote to Calcutta a full Account of the Tranſactions and Events.—Conſider this Matter with Impartiality, and declare on which Side were the Flames of War excited.

The Declaration in their Letters to your Maſter and you, that they are deſirous to abide by and preſerve the Engagements, as far as they can with Honour, is highly right and commendable. As they wiſh to ſupport their own Honour and Dignity, by promoting the Proſperity and Succeſs of the Affairs of their State, it is likewiſe equally incumbent upon them to keep in View the Honour and Dignity of the Rajee of Row Pundit Purdhaun, which has ever been ſo illuſtrious, that it is needleſs to dwell on the Subject. If the Honour and Dignity of both States are regarded as One, and their Intereſts as the ſame, they will inviolably preſerve the Faith of Engagements, and promote the daily Increaſe of Friendſhip, and not when the Circumſtances of the Times ſhall render it expedient, ſpeciouſly to enter into Engagements at the ſame Time that they ſecretly mean to lay in wait for an Opportunity of breaking them to their own Advantage. As the Nabob Amaud-ul-Dowlah poſſeſſes Integrity and good Faith, let him maturely conſider the above Articles, and be himſelf the Judge; let him make Compenſation for the Non-performance of Terms which cannot be now fulfilled, and write to Colonel Goddard, on the Advantages of an Union between the States, and directing him to proſecute it; and I, on my Part, am ready to join therein with the utmoſt Good-will.

Actuated by the warmeſt Friendſhip to you, I have committed to Paper whatever occurred to me in the Peruſal of the Treaty, what I heard from the Miniſters, and what my own Judgment, free from Partiality, pointed out, together with my Sentiments thereon.

2d. Poſtſcript.

Reſpecting the Recall of Major Camac, &c. literally the ſame as what the Rajah ſays on thoſe Subjects.

3d Poſtſcript.

Colonel Goddard formerly wrote, that he was coming for the ſake of a Meeting, at which all Points ſhould be cleared up, and every Matter finally adjuſted. In conſequence thereof, the Miniſters preſſed him in the warmeſt Terms to come; in Anſwer to which, Balajee Pundit Purnaveeſe has lately received a Letter from the Colonel, that he has freely conferred on all Matters with the Agent who was ſent to him from Poona, who has written a particular Account thereof, that if he receive an Anſwer thereto, and any Mode of Accommodation is determined on, he will repair to any Place between Surat and Poona, to have a Meeting there with Nanna Purnaveeſe.

Nanna Purnaveeſe gave the Letter into my Hands, which I found to contain what I have written above. As he formerly of his own Accord wrote that he would come hither in Perſon to ſettle all Matters, which was earneſtly wiſhed at Poona, and now wrote in the Manner before recited, Nanna Purnaveeſe ſaid to me, "it was his own Propoſal to come hither, and now he heſitates, what is "to be ſaid on this Subject; there is no Ground for Heſitation. I am of a Diſpoſition abounding "with Candour and Integrity, and never violate the Faith of Engagements; notwithſtanding their "repeated Breaches of Treaty, I am ready to accommodate Matters through Colonel Goddard; and "will never, as long as Attention is ſhewn to the Honour and Dignity of this Family, relinquiſh "my Hold of their Friendſhip." From all that I have heard from the Poona Miniſters, it appears they are inclined to Peace; it is therefore incumbent on you to accommodate Matters in an amicable Manner.

It was my Intention to have ſtaid here till after the Arrival of Colonel Goddard, and his Interview with the Miniſters, and to have ſettled all Matters perſonally, by ſuch a Treaty as ſhould not in future have been expoſed to the ſmalleſt Deviation, and afterwards to have returned to Naigpore; but on the Receipt of the Letter from Colonel Goddard, which made it appear very uncertain if he would come, and at any Rate that there would be a conſiderable Delay; and as moreover it is a Cuſtom in my Family at the Seaſon of the Duſſarah, to dedicate Ten Days and Nights to the Honour of God, and as I wiſh to pay the greateſt Attention to this Duty, which draws down Bleſſings on me for the reſt of the Twelve Months, I am about to ſet out for Naigpore: You will therefore write to Colonel Goddard, if you judge proper, to purſue the Line of Peace, and to come hither to an Interview with the fulleſt Confidence and Security, and will regard me at all Times as your moſt warm and zealous Friend.

APPENDIX, N° 226.

Copy of a Letter from Dewagur Pundit, Modajee's Dewan, to General Goddard, incloſed in his Letter of the received the November 1779.

I HAVE received your agreeable Letter which you diſpatched at the ſame Time with your Reply to Row Pundit Purdhaun, but which by Accident did not reach me till Fifteen Days afterwards; and received the greateſt Pleaſure from its Contents.

Induced by Regard to you, and the Intercourſe which has ſubſiſted for ſome Time, I wrote to you in a Stile dictated by Friendſhip: After which you wrote me, that in the preſent State of Affairs my Journey to Poona was a very eligible and well-judged Meaſure, and highly pleaſing to you; and expreſſed your Wiſh, that as I was perfectly acquainted with the Negociations carrying on, and with your Sentiments, and was privy to the Repreſentations made by Mr. Weatherſtone, that I would ſtate the Facts to Row Pundit Purdhaun and Nanna Purnaveeſe, and remove all Doubts and Suſpicions from their Minds, being convinced that I was earneſtly deſirous of promoting Peace and Friendſhip between your State and that of Row Pundit Purdhaun, by every Means in my Power. You add, that the confidential Agent diſpatched by the ſaid Row will ſhortly reach you, and that as the ſending Mr. Weatherſtone would occaſion much Delay, you had judged it beſt not to diſpatch him, but that after the Arrival of the Deputies, if it can be ſo managed, you will repair in Perſon to this Quarter, and will have a Meeting with the Miniſter Nanna Purnaveeſe at any Place which ſhall be fixed on for that Purpoſe, and in my Preſence ſettle the Terms of a mutual Peace and Friendſhip. With regard to Ragonaut Row, you write that you have kept him with you, but not as conſidering him the Enemy of this State; that your Motives for detaining him have been that by ſo doing you ſhould promote the common Intereſt: My Friend, my coming to Poona was ſolely from Friendſhip and Attachment to the Nabob Amaud-ul-Dowlah, and Regard for you; that by my Endeavours all Miſunderſtandings and Heartburnings might be removed, and the Ties of Friendſhip ſo firmly knit, as to ſtand every future Shock. For this Purpoſe all Particulars were explained to Mr. Weatherſtone, and alſo written to Calcutta; to repeat them would be therefore ſuperfluous.

The Conduct of the Negociations with the Maratta State, and of the Correſpondence with Pundit Purdhaun and his Miniſters, for the Eſtabliſhment of Friendſhip and Alliance; the Propoſal that a Perſon of Truſt ſhould be deputed, and the Reſolution of repairing hither in Perſon after the Arrival of ſuch Deputy, to remove by a perſonal Interview all Cauſes of Miſunderſtanding; the reſtoring the Affairs ruined by the Conduct of the Bombay Chiefs, and by that Means acquiring immortal Honour in the Eyes of all the Engliſh Chiefs, were not Acts of a common Stamp, or to be undertaken by every one: You alone were equal to them, and by the Bleſſing of God every Point will be ſettled. All your Plans are maturely digeſted, and conſiſtent with ſound Policy, and I who am at all Times your ſincere Friend and Well-wiſher, in my Conferences with the Miniſter Nanna Purnaveeſe, have not forgotten the ſmalleſt Tittle of your diſtinguiſhed Virtues, but have placed them in the cleareſt Point of View; and ſhould you come here and have an Interview with the Miniſters, every Matter will be ſettled in the moſt ſatisfactory Manner.

No Obſtacle remains, and every Thing is for good Faith and a ſteady Adherence to Treaty, as you will more fully learn from the Letters tranſmitted to you from Row Pundit Purdhaun, and his Miniſter Nanna Purnaveeſe. After the Arrival of Row Pundit Purdhaun's Deputy, you will doubtleſs determine to repair hither, that by Means of a perſonal Conference, all Matters may be compleatly ſettled without the Intervention of Vackeels or Letters; you will ſuffer no kind of Delay to ariſe, which may obſtruct the Execution of a Meaſure which has been already ſufficiently weighed, and is ripe for Accompliſhment, and of the very firſt Importance.

I ſtated to Nanna Purnaveeſe in the ſtrongeſt Terms what you write reſpecting Ragonaut Row, and convinced him of the Propriety of your Meaſures.

A Karetah and Letters from the Nabob Amaud-ul-Dowlah, addreſſed to the Maha Rajah my Maſter, and to me, which were tranſmitted to Naigpore by the Way of Cuttack, were ſent from thence to me at Poona; the Purport of which is, that he is ready to confirm the Ties of Friendſhip and a mutual good Underſtanding with Row Pundit Purdhaun, in any Manner that ſhall not bring Diſhonour on the Engliſh Government. In Anſwer thereto, with the Approbation of Nanna Purnaveeſe, I have written what was required for the Preſervation of Friendſhip, and of the Faith of Treaty, and I doubt not but you have received Inſtructions from Calcutta, conformable thereto. In a Word, you will regard me at all Times and in all Places as ſincerely and unchangeably attached to you, and ready to fulfil every Duty of Friendſhip. May you ever enjoy Peace of Mind and undiſturbed Felicity!

Poſtſcript.

After I had made myſelf acquainted with the exact Situation of Affairs, and in long Conferences with Nanna Purnaveeſe diſcovered his Views, I wrote an Anſwer to the Nabob Amaud-

maud-ul-Dowlah's Letter, propoſing Means for the Removal of all paſt Miſunderſtandings, and e Eſtabliſhment of a firm and laſting Friendſhip for the future, which I ſhall tranſmit to him my Arrival at Naigpore, with a Letter from my Maſter. I incloſe you Copy of this Letter r your Information, which will give you a clear Inſight into every Matter. If you can write to frequently, and ſend your Letters with Expedition on the State of Affairs, as it will be at-ded with great Advantages you will not neglect to do ſo. Since writing the above, Letters from lcutta to the ſame Effect with the former ones addreſſed to my Maſter and me, have been re-ived. This is for your Information.

ſtſcript.

As ſince my Arrival at Poona Matters have been ſo far adjuſted, that all Doubts, Miſunder-ndings, and Suſpicions have been removed from the Breaſt of the Miniſter, and he has diſpatched chmun Row, the Son of Gobind Row Purnaveeſe, to you, with Letters expreſſive of his endly Diſpoſitions, and waits impatiently for your Arrival, which he looks forward to with the ateſt Pleaſure, knowing that it would be the Means of adjuſting all Points, and of giving Sta-ity to the Treaty, by diſregarding which the Chief of Bombay has thrown every Thing into nfuſion and brought Matters to their preſent Paſs; and as he has provided a Place at the ſtance of Two Coſs from the City, and erected Tents, Pavilions, and every Thing neceſſary your honourable Reception there, he means to give you a Meeting. I make no Doubt, that ing aſide the Medium of Agents and Letters, which only procraſtinate Buſineſs, you will with-Delay repair hither in Perſon, when all Matters may be adjuſted and finally ſettled in a Con-nce; and the Suſpicions which the bad Conduct and repeated Breaches of Faith on the Part of Bombay Chief have given Birth to, in the Mind of Nanna Purnaveeſe, may, by your Integrity l good Faith, which is founded on the good Faith of the Governor Amaud-ul-Dowlah and his uncil, be entirely removed.

As my Negociations have ſo far removed all Obſtacles to Friendſhip, that on your Arrival, the Bleſſing of God it may be eſtabliſhed on the firmeſt Baſis, and no Doubt or Subject of hteſt now remains, I have deſired Permiſſion of the Miniſters to return to Naigpore to celebrate Duſarah, as is my invariable Practice, and ſhall ſhortly ſet out. Do not attribute my Depar-e to any other Reaſon than what I have aſſigned, or ſuppoſe, that after having engaged in Ne-iations to effect a Conciliation, at the Time when they were nearly effected, and you on the int of coming hither, that I would quit Poona except from Neceſſity; my Tongue is the faith-Interpreter of the Sentiments of my Heart, and the Miniſter Nanah Purnaveeſe alſo poſſeſſes ſame Diſpoſition, and ſhould you come to Poona will receive you with every Mark of Ho-ar and Reſpect, will ſhew you all the Rites of Hoſpitality, faithfully adhere to his Engage-nts, and pay every Degree of Attention to your Words, which are in fact the Words of the Na-b Amaud-ul-Dowlah and mine. He will alſo make you acquainted with his own Propoſals, which Time I ſhall have finiſhed my Buſineſs at Naigpore, and impatiently expect Letters m you and Nanah Purnaveeſe; by theſe Means both your Affairs and mine may be properly cuted. Be ſatisfied therefore with my Departure, for whenever I may be wanted I am not far , but ſhall be ready on Notice given me by the Miniſter. Another Circumſtance which ren-s my Departure abſolutely neceſſary, is the News I have received of my Wife's Illneſs. I have ntioned this to remove every Kind of Doubt from your Breaſt, and you may depend upon it. gard me always near you.

APPENDIX, N° 227.

tract of General Letter from the Court of Directors to the Governor General and Council of Bengal, 14th May 1779.

r. 1. BY the Eagle Packet we have received your Advices relative to the Meaſures taken for eſtabliſhing an Alliance with the Rajah of Berar. At preſent we ſhall only re-rk, that the Undertaking appears to us contrary to the Company's former Policy, to our En-gements with Ragoba and Nizam Ally, and doubtful reſpecting any reaſonable Proſpect of lvantage to ariſe therefrom to the Company. Theſe are our general Ideas on a ſummary View your Proceedings; but as the Subject is important, it ſhall have an early and impartial Conſi-ration, and our further Sentiments and Orders thereon ſhall be communicated to you by the ips which remain to be diſpatched ſo ſoon as Convoy ſhall be ready to ſail for their Protection. the mean Time we encloſe a Tranſcript of Inſtructions ſent over Land by Colonel Capper to mbay, dated the 31ſt of Auguſt 1778, concerning Ragoba, Copy whereof, and alſo a Packet you, were tranſmitted by the ſame Conveyance, which we hope you have received, and that Injunctions contained in the Letter to you of that Date have been duly obſerved.

APPENDIX, N° 228.

Extract of General Letter from the Court of Directors to Bombay, dated 27th May 1779:

Par. 45. HAVING already acknowledged the Receipt of your Secret Letter of the 29th December 1778, we have only to obſerve, that as your Proceedings ſeem conſiſtent with our former Engagements to Ragoba, and your Treaty of the 24th of November conformable to that concluded with him in 1775, your Conduct on the Occaſion has our Approbation.

46. Before the Receipt of your Letter, we had been informed by our Governor General and Council of the Appointment of Mr. Elliott to treat with the Rajah of Berar; your Letter acquaints us with the Death of that Gentleman, and likewiſe that the Governor General and Council did not intend to appoint any other Perſon to ſucceed him, until Advices from the Rajah ſhould enable them to determine concerning the Expediency of the Meaſure.

47. We obſerve by an Article of Mr. Elliott's Inſtructions, that in caſe he ſhould have Reaſon to believe you had commenced any Negociation, or entered into Engagements for the Reſtoration of Ragoba, he was to ſuſpend his Negociation until ſuch Event ſhould have been verified by authentic Information from you, and from Mr. Moſtyn; and therefore we earneſtly hope, that upon your Negociation and Treaty with Ragoba being communicated to our Governor General and Council, they would concur with you in giving full Effect thereto, and deſiſt from entering into any new Connexions, which might ſet aſide or counteract your recent Agreement with Ragoba.

48. We expect the greateſt Œconomy and Frugality has been obſerved in the Diſburſement of Money, and Expenditure of Stores, on Ragoba's Account; and in this Stage of the Buſineſs can only direct, that the moſt effectual Meaſures be taken for procuring a certain and early Reimburſement of all Charges incurred by the Company, on Account of your preſent Undertaking in his Favour.

51. We tranſmit for your Information ſuch Parts of our preſent Letters to Bengal, as relate to the Payment of your Bond Debt, and to the intended Negociation with the Rajah of Berar.

APPENDIX, N° 229.

Extract of a Letter from the Nabob Wallah Jah: Received 21ſt September 1779.

THE hoſtile Meaſures of Hyder Ally Khan towards the Engliſh, his warm Attachment to the French, and his Endeavours to induce the French to make War on the Engliſh, I have clearly ſeen for theſe Twenty Years paſt, and I have repeatedly given my Friends Intimation thereof, and have at ſeveral convenient Opportunities collected Magazines, and propoſed to my Friends that we ſhould rid the Country of an Incendiary, who, whilſt ſuffered to remain, would ever be the Cauſe of Trouble, and that there would then be no future Cauſe to apprehend the French Intrigues in Hindoſtan, and the perpetual Tranquillity of the Country would be inſured; but the artful Profeſſions of the ſaid Khan ſerved him as a Veil to ſcreen his real Deſign.

War breaking out in Europe between the Courts of Great Britain and France, we loſt no Time in getting Poſſeſſion of Pondicherry, which Hyder Ally was prevented from ſuccouring by ſeveral Reaſons. At the Time when the Siege was opened, he was employed againſt the Fort of Chittuldurk, the Chief of which was his moſt conſiderable Opponent; he was alſo ſo ill with a Fiſtula as to leave little Hopes of Life: The Maratta Army was on that Side of the River Kiſtna, and to crown all, it was the Seaſon of the Rains. By theſe Reaſons alone he was prevented giving Aſſiſtance to the French. Afterwards, when the Engliſh determined to reduce Mhye, he did every Thing in his Power to deter them from the Attempt, and abſolutely forbad them to attack it, ſending publicly hoſtile Meſſages and Letters to them. All theſe Particulars I have already written you an Account of, and the Governor and Council here, and Sir Eyre Coote, are well acquainted therewith. Hyder Ally was prepared to ſupport the French; but for the Engliſh to begin Hoſtilities againſt Mhye, not doubting but the French would be able to hold out until a Reinforcement ſhould arrive from Mauritius, when he would join them, and throw the Blame of the Breach on the Engliſh. By the Bleſſing of God, through the Valour and Activity of the Engliſh, Mhye was immediately reduced; and the News of the Attack and Reduction by the Engliſh reached Hyder at the ſame Time. Vexed and boiling with Indignation at this Intelligence, he immediately marched

with his veteran and numerous Army againſt Kurpah, a Dependency of the Carnatic, and reduced it; and throwing Abdul Huckkeem Khan, the Fougedar of that Place, with his whole Family, into a diſgraceful Confinement, he ſent them to Serungpatam. He then ſent a numerous Body of Forces againſt the Zemindar of Winkutgerry, who is a Ryot and Aumil of mine, to demand in a haughty Stile a large Sum of Money, who ravaged that Country. As from Mullewar to Pulnar is dependent on the Carnatic, he ſent Bodies of his Horſe to infeſt the Borders, and obliged the Naibs of the Diſtricts to ſubmit to Contributions, by threatening them with an Invaſion. The Ryots being alarmed, neglected the Cultivation of the Lands, and Numbers of them fled from their Habitations. Hyder Ally waited in Hopes that, provoked by theſe Inſolences, I ſhould be induced to take ſome Step which might give him a Plea to invade my Dominions; he alſo looked for the Arrival of a French Force from the Mauritius, with which he was determined to join and make open War againſt us. Being diſappointed in this Expectation, he expreſſed himſelf in Terms of the higheſt Diſpleaſure to the French Vackeel, and to the French Gentlemen who went to him from Pondicherry and Mhye, ſaying, "Your Forces are not yet arrived; you have broken your Engagement "with me; had I confided in you, and commenced Hoſtilities, the whole Burden of the War "would have been left on my Shoulders." It was at this Time that he diſpatched a French Gentleman on a Ship of his own to the Mauritius, to require Forces to be ſent him from thence, engaging to pay their Expences. As ſoon as I heard of this Circumſtance, I made it known to my Friends. This Intelligence, which I firſt learnt from News-papers, is now confirmed by the Relation of Captain Fenwick, who ſaw Hyder Ally's Ship at the Mauritius. From this it is evident, that the French Forces will be received into Hyder Ally's Dominions, and from thence, in concert with him, will invade the Carnatic.

Hyder Ally, by the Reduction of Kurpah, has encompaſſed the Carnatic, and opened for himſelf a Road into the Circars of Guntore, Ellore, and Rajimundery, and by Means thereof no Intelligence from the other Side of Kurpah can reach the Carnatic but with his Permiſſion. From ſeveral News papers received from Hyder Ally's Camp, and by the Letters from my Officers, which mention, that large Bodies of his Cavalry are aſſembled on the Borders of my Country, and that they are taking every Means to facilitate the March of an Army, by clearing the Roads; it appears clearly that his Deſigns are hoſtile towards us. I have never entertained the Ambition of poſſeſſing myſelf of another's Country; my ſole Views, from the firſt, have been to ſecure the Tranquillity of my own Country, and to root out all the Friends of the French who are our Enemies. The favourable Opportunity which once preſented itſelf, is loſt for the preſent, until by the Favour of God, and the good Fortune of the Engliſh Nation, to whom the Almighty has ever been propitious, a glorious Peace is made with the French in Europe; it is highly expedient to preſerve Tranquillity in this Part of the Country, becauſe my Friends, by the Return of Ragonaut Row into their Protection, will once more be engaged in a War with the Marattas.

The Conduct of the Nabob Nizam Ally Khan, in his Negociations with Mr. Hollond, carries an unfriendly Appearance, ſince he has poſitively refuſed to diſmiſs the French from his Service, and, on the contrary, has ſettled a Lack of Rupees per Month, for the Pay of that Body, together with 5000 Country Infantry attached to them; and, placing the greateſt Confidence in them, makes them the advanced Body of his Army. He is alſo deſirous of contracting a Friendſhip with Hyder Ally Khan, and he is engaged in a ſtrict Treaty of Friendſhip with the Poona Miniſters; and any Marks of Support ſhewn to Ragonaut Row, will increaſe his Diſinclination to the Engliſh: Induced thereto by the ſincereſt Friendſhip, I have communicated my Sentiments to you without Reſerve.

Poſtſcript.

As, by the Favour of God, you, my Friend, and your Council, are poſſeſſed of Wiſdom, and a Knowledge of the true Intereſts of this Country, and have invariably ſhewn a Deſire to the utmoſt of your Power, to preſerve the Tranquillity of the Country; and I, on my Part, actuated by the Sentiments of Friendſhip, have made it my conſtant Rule to communicate to you my Sentiments on the Meaſures moſt conducive to the Intereſts of the Company and Engliſh Nation, and now repeat, that ſince Matters are in this State, that Enmity is declared with the Marattas at Poona, and the Nabob Nizam-ul-Dowlah is ready to take an adverſe Part, and Hyder Ally Khan, who bears an invincible Hatred to the Engliſh, is on the Eve of Hoſtilities, and all theſe Powers, notwithſtanding their Diſlike to each other, have united, for the Purpoſe of oppoſing the Engliſh; it therefore appears to me adviſable that a determinate Syſtem be immediately adopted. I will give you ſuch Particulars relative to theſe Three Powers as have come to my Knowledge, and you will then act as you ſhall deem beſt, to bring the Quarrel with them to a happy Concluſion.

Peace with the Marattas will at once procure the End deſired; for if this takes place, the Nabob Nizam-ul-Dowlah will be laid under the Neceſſity of relinquiſhing his Enmity, and the Marattas will join the Engliſh to chaſtiſe Hyder Ally Khan. It is not in the Power of the Nabob Nizam-ul-Dowlah to join in Friendſhip with the Engliſh, in Oppoſition to the Marattas, nor would an Union with him, if it could be effected, prevent a War with the Marattas.

In the Firſt Place, Hyder Ally Khan would never enter ſincerely into Friendſhip with the Engliſh. The Particulars of his hoſtile Conduct I have frequently communicated to you, and you have alſo ſeen them. It is therefore unneceſſary to repeat them afreſh. An Union with Hyder Ally Khan would

would only ſerve to augment the Enmity of the Marattas and Nizam-ul Dowlah; if therefore a ſpeedy Accommodation is made with the Marattas, it will put an End to the Deſigns of the Two other inimical Powers; of thoſe of Nizam ul Dowlah, by the Awe which the Junction of the Engliſh and Marattas will occaſion him; and of thoſe of Hyder Ally by the Chaſtiſement he will receive from their Joint Forces.

I have received certain Advice that Hyder Ally Khan has ſent an Agent to Poona, to ſolicit the Maratta Friendſhip, who preſſes the Poona Miniſters to keep up their Enmity to the Engliſh, and proffers his Maſter's zealous Aſſiſtance, and offers the Payment of 40 Lacks of Rupees to ſettle his former Accounts, and an Annual Peiſhcuſh of 11 Lacks of Rupees, and to reſtore the Country on the other Side of the Burmudder, which he wreſted from them. The Marattas have not yet agreed to the Terms, nor have they refuſed. They wait, meaning if a firm Peace is concluded with the Engliſh, in Conjunction with them to chaſtiſe the ſaid Khan, or if the Engliſh ſhould not chooſe to enter into that Scheme, to execute it in Conjunction with Nizam-ul-Dowlah; but if Peace ſhould not take place, then they will through Neceſſity agree to the Terms propoſed by Hyder Ally. I have accordingly received repeated Intimations on this Subject from the Principal of the Marattas, to the End that I might bring about a firm Friendſhip between them and the Engliſh, and enter into an Engagement that I will join in the Chaſtiſement of the common Enemy, alluding to Hyder Ally Khan.

I have written this for your Information. I encloſe you Copy of a Letter which I have lately received from the Nabob Baſſalet Jung, from Adoonie, informing me of the Diſtreſs he is under by Reaſon of the Non arrival of Colonel Harper with the Engliſh Forces, and the open Enmity declared againſt him by the Nabob Nizam ul Dowlah and Hyder Ally Khan, by Reaſon of his Connection with the Engliſh, and their having forbid him to relinquiſh Murtezzamagur, or hold Friendſhip with the Engliſh; he alſo ſends me Copies of Letters, which he has received from thoſe Chiefs which I likewiſe ſend to you. From theſe you will clearly perceive the hoſtile Deſigns entertained by Nizam-ul-Dowlah and Hyder Ally Khan againſt the Engliſh and Baſſalet. The Nabob Nizam-ul-Dowlah has therefore given the Fort Maccool with a Jaghier, in lieu of Kurnole, to Rummuſt Khan, the Talookdar of that Place, to ſatisfy and induce him to come to him. The ſaid Talookdar not being able to ſupport himſelf againſt Hyder Ally Khan, agreed to the Terms propoſed to him, and ſent off his Family; he continued himſelf at Kurnole till the 26th of Rujjib, but I do not know if he is ſtill there, or has ſince left it. The Nabob Nizam-ul-Dowlah has determind to ſend Lally, a Frenchman, with 6000 Sepoys, 300 Europeans, and 1000 Cavalry, to Kurnole, and has given the ſaid Talook in Jaghire to the French, which has greatly ſtrengthened their Power. It is a conſtant Cuſtom to ſend the Troops into Cantonments during the rainy Seaſon, but this Year they have not been ſuffered to depart, but kept together in a State of Readineſs.

APPENDIX, N° 230.

Letter to the Governor General from the Nabob Nizam ul Mulk Bahadar; received 3d December 1779.

AT the Time when Ragonaut Row took Refuge at Bombay, and the Chief of that Place made Preparation for his Support, induced by the Conſideration of the ſolemn Engagements which through the Council of Madras has been formed between my Government and the Engliſh Company, I wrote you Information, that in the Treaty ſubſiſting between me and the Engliſh Company, amongſt many other Articles, this was one, That the Enemies of this Government were the Enemies of the Engliſh; and their Enemies mine: And that Ragonaut Row, in conſequence of the Friendſhip and Connection between my Government and that of Row Pundit Purdhaun Madho Row Narain, was my Enemy; and therefore the Protection given him in Bombay, and the Meaſures adopted for his Support by the Chief of that Place, was highly improper and unaccountable to me. In Reply to this you wrote me, that the Faith and Engagements of the Engliſh Company were inviolable, and that no Breach of the Treaty eſtabliſhed through the Council of Madras, ſhould take place in any Quarter; and that the Engliſh Company were in Friendſhip with Row Pundit Purdhaun in the ſame Manner as with me; and had not the leaſt Idea of breaking thoſe Ties on account of Ragonaut Row. Implicitly relying on the Candour of your Profeſſions, I waited to ſee the Effects of them; but every ſubſequent Event has been in direct Oppoſition thereto, and every Act of which I have been a Witneſs, in Breach thereof: Witneſs the Endeavours uſed by the Chief of Bombay for the Support of Ragonaut Row, and the vigorous Exertions he has made to give them Effect; the Conſequences of which are well known. As it was my firm Reſolve to adhere ſteadily to my former Engagements, and to abide by your Declarations, I withheld my Aſſiſtance from Row Pundit Purdhaun againſt all Solicitation, though bound by the Laws of Friendſhip to have afforded it to him; and

before the Troubles actually broke out, I wrote very fully to the Poona Miniſters urging the ſtrongeſt Arguments to them, and thereby effected the Diſmiſſion of the French Ambaſſadors, who were at that Time at Poona endeavouring to eſtabliſh a Friendſhip between that Nation and Row Pundit Purdhaun and my Government, before they had been able to effect any thing; nor would I give any Countenance to the Advances which they likewiſe made to me: Yet I underſtand that notwithſtanding all this, the Chief at Bombay has formed new Deſigns for the Support of Ragonaut Row; and that the ſaid Row, upon Expectations, has again repaired to Surat; and that Colonel Goddard, who is come to Surat from Calcutta, is likewiſe joined with the Bombayer, or in the ſame Deſign: Moreover, Mr. John Hollond is lately come to me on the Part of the Governor of Madras; and excluſive of other Propoſitions of the moſt dangerous Tendency, deſires that the Paiſcuſh of Rajomundury, and other Circars, may be totally given up by me. And it further appears to be the Wiſh of the Governor of Madras to obtain Poſſeſſion, if it can be quietly done, of the Circar of Murtezzanagur, which my Brother Armeer ul Oruah Sujah ul Mulk Bahadar holds in virtue of a Treaty concluded by the Engliſh Company. As the Propoſitions are unreaſonable, and contrary to Treaty, and cannot be attributed to unjuſtifiable Views, I have anſwered Mr. Hollond, that ſuch Propoſitions are inconteſtable Proofs of a hoſtile Diſpoſition; that if it is determined to break the Treaty, it matters not to me; let them prepare to carry their Deſigns into Execution; and whenever they think fit to take the Field, that I am prepared for all Events that may happen; and thank God that the Breach of Treaty falls on them. Mr. Hollond has accordingly tranſmitted an Account of all theſe Particulars to the Governor of Madras; we ſhall hereafter ſee what Anſwer he will return. By the Bleſſing of God you, Sir, are endowed with an enlightened Underſtanding and clear Penetration, and are at the Head of all the Engliſh Settlements; I have therefore judged it proper to communicate all theſe Matters to you, and ſhall likewiſe write you whatever may hereafter occur. Knowing me anxious for your Reply, loſe no Time in tranſmitting it to me.

APPENDIX, N° 231.

Poſtſcript of a Letter from the Nabob Wallaw Jaw; received 21ſt September 1779.

AS by the Favour of God, you my Friend and your Council are poſſeſſed of Wiſdom and Knowledge of the true Intereſts of this Country, and have invariably ſhewn a Deſire to the utmoſt of your Power to preſerve the Tranquillity of the Country; and I on my Part, actuated by the Sentiments of Friendſhip, have made it my conſtant Rule to communicate to you my Sentiments on the Meaſures moſt conducive to the Intereſts of the Company and Engliſh Nation; and now repeat, that ſince Matters are in this State, that Enmity is declared with the Marattas at Poona, and the Nabob Nizam-ul-Dowlah is ready to take an adverſe Part; and Hyder Ally Khan, who bears an invincible Hatred to the Engliſh, is on the Eve of Hoſtilities; and all theſe Powers, notwithſtanding their Diſlike to each other, have united for the Purpoſe of oppoſing the Engliſh: It therefore appears to me adviſable that a determinate Syſtem be immediately adopted. I will give you ſuch Particulars relative to theſe Three Powers as have come to my Knowledge, and you will then act as you ſhall deem beſt, to bring the Quarrel with them to a happy Concluſion.

Peace with the Marattas will at once procure the End deſired; for if this takes place, the Nabob Nizam-ul-Dowlah will be laid under the Neceſſity of relinquiſhing his Enmity, and the Marattas will join the Engliſh to chaſtiſe Hyder Ally Khan. It is not in the Power of the Nabob Nizam-ul-Dowlah to join in Friendſhip with the Engliſh, in Oppoſition to the Marattas, nor would an Union with him, if it could be effected, prevent a War with the Marattas.

In the firſt Place, Hyder Ally Khan would never enter ſincerely into Friendſhip with the Engliſh. The Particulars of his hoſtile Conduct I have frequently communicated to you, and you have alſo ſeen them; it is therefore unneceſſary to repeat them afreſh. An Union with Hyder Ally Khan would only ſerve to augment the Enmity of the Marattas and Nizam-ul-Dowlah; if therefore a ſpeedy Accommodation is made with the Marattas, it will put an End to the Deſigns of the Two other inimical Powers of thoſe of Nizam-ul-Dowlah, by the Awe which the Junction of the Engliſh and Marattas will occaſion him, and of thoſe of Hyder Ally, by the Chaſtiſement he will receive from their joint Forces.

I have received certain Advice that Hyder Ally Khan has ſent an Agent to Poona to ſolicit the Maratta Friendſhip; who preſſes the Poona Miniſters to keep up their Enmity to the Engliſh, and proffers his Maſter's zealous Aſſiſtance, and offers the Payment of 40 Lacks of Rupees to ſettle his former Accounts, and an annual Peiſhcuſh of 11 Lacks of Rupees, and to reſtore the Country on the other Side of the Burmudder which he wreſted from them. The Marattas have not yet

agreed to the Terms, nor have they refuſed. They wait, meaning if a firm Peace is concluded with the Engliſh, in conjunction with them to chaſtiſe the ſaid Khan; or if the Engliſh ſhould not chuſe to enter into that Scheme, to execute it in conjunction with Nizam-ul-Dowlah; but if Peace ſhould not take Place, then they will through Neceſſity agree to the Terms propoſed by Hyder Ally. I have accordingly received repeated Intimations on this Subject from the Principal of the Marattas, to the End that I might bring about a firm Friendſhip between them and the Engliſh, and enter into an Engagement that I will join in the Chaſtiſement of the common Enemy, alluding to Hyder Ally Khan.

APPENDIX, N° 232.

Copy of a Letter from Brigadier General Goddard, to the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay.

Gentlemen,

SINCE my Addreſs of the 29th, I have received a Piece of material Information from Poona, which I have Reaſon to think may be relied upon, and therefore communicate it to you without Loſs of Time.

The Particulars of it are, that the Miniſter and Scindia, in conjunction with Hyder, Ruzam Ally, and Moodajee Booſla, mean to make a general Attack upon the Engliſh, at their ſeveral Settlements, and have entered into, and ſealed written Agreements for that Purpoſe.

However the Probability of their executing literally a Plan of this Nature, may be ſuſpected, I can now ſcarce entertain a Doubt of the hoſtile Views of the Miniſter; and as the Season for Military Operations opens immediately after the Deeſſora, to which Feſtival a ſhort Period now only remains, I beg to repreſent the Neceſſity of having the Army put into a Condition for inſtant and active Service, by collecting ſuch Force as may be ſufficient, either to attack ourſelves, or to reſiſt the Attacks made by them. For theſe Reaſons, I requeſt to urge the Expediency of bringing up the Troops from Mahé, without Loſs of Time; and to propoſe that the Detachment from your Preſidency be alſo ordered to join me immediately.

It will be abſolutely requiſite, to provide againſt future Exigencies, that a Magazine of Military Stores be prepared, as contiguous to the Scene of Operations as poſſible: I therefore hope you will give Orders for collecting a ſufficient Quantity at this Place, as well as at Broach, to anſwer any Demands I may find it neceſſary to make; and ſhould there be any Field Artillery in either of thoſe Garriſons, which can be ſpared from their neceſſary Defence, let me requeſt that you will be pleaſed to authorize the Chiefs to deliver them up to my Requiſition, ſhould I find it neceſſary, for the Good of the Service, at any Time hereafter to have them with me.

I ſhall write more fully very ſoon: And have the Honour to be, &c. &c.

Camp near Surat,
30th September 1779.

(Signed) Thomas Goddard.

Extract of a Letter to General Goddard.

Sir,

We Yeſterday received your Letters of the 29th and 30th ultimo, and immediately diſpatched your Packets for Madras and Colonel Braithwaite.

We can ſcarcely give Credit to the Information that has been given you of the Combination formed againſt the Company's Settlements: It may have been fabricated at the Durbar, now at this Criſis of your Negociation, to try what Effect it may have upon your Meaſures. Such Artifices form no inconſiderable Part of Maratta Politics. But as you acquaint us you can ſcarcely entertain a Doubt of the hoſtile Views of the Miniſters, we ſhall be prepared to give you all the Support in our Power, in caſe it may be requiſite.

We are, &c. &c.

Bombay Caſtle,
7th October 1779.

(Signed) William Hornby, &c.
Counſellors.

True Copies.

(Signed) Edw[d] Ravenſcroft,
Sec[y] to the Select Committee.

APPENDIX, N° 233.

Bengal Perſian Correſpondence.

From the Nabob Wallah Jah; received 17th October 1777.

I HAVE already informed you of the diſtreſſed State of my own Affairs, the Importunities which I labour under from my Creditors, and the Connection of Tulkajee with the French, Dutch, and Hyder Ally Khan. It now appears by evident Tokens that the Preparations of the French to diſturb the Tranquillity of the Country are completed. The French have Vackeels with Nizam ul Dowlah, and Hyder Ally Khan, and a Sirdar at the Head of a Body of Men with the Marattas; and by Means of their Connection with theſe ſeveral Powers, are employing every Art to bring them into an entire Compliance with their Views; the Tanjoreans they are ſure of, as they are ſtrictly connected with the French, and will as ſoon as the Diſturbances commence, ſupply them with all Kinds of Stores and Neceſſaries. Hyder Ally Khan is in Alliance with them to ſupport them with his Troops, Money, and the whole Produce of his Country. I alone who have from the Beginning uniformly partaken of the Proſperity and Adverſity of the Engliſh Nation, remain in every Situation their firm Ally; but the Injury done to my Rights in the Tanjore Country (on which the Company iſſued their Orders without being acquainted with the real Circumſtance of the Caſe, and which Lord Pigot oppreſſively carried into Execution in ſo improper a Manner) has been highly deſtructive to my Credit.

APPENDIX, N° 234.

Intercepted Letter from Nejiſhkan to General Bellcombe, without Date.

I FORMERLY wrote to you the State of Affairs here, and tranſmitted to Mr. Chevalier through the Channel of Mr. Viſage and Roy Manick Chund, an Engagement, which I learn from Mr. Chevalier's Letters he received and forwarded to you. I underſtand that at that Time you were at Mahé, and are ſince returned to Pondicherry. I have communicated all Matters to Mr. Viſage, and Roy Manick Chund; agreeable to what they will write you, ſend an Army here without Delay. Now that you are returned here, it is improper to delay the Commencement of Hoſtilities. Be fully ſatisfied with reſpect to me, and communicate to me the Affairs of that Quarter. Roy Manick Chund is firmly attached, and acts the Part of a good and zealous Servant. Let me frequently have the Pleaſure to hear from you.

Intercepted Letter from Nejiſhkhan to Mr. Chevalier, without Date.

On the late Intelligence of News from Europe, and that you, my Friend, though deſtitute of Forces in Bengal, had exerted ſuch Bravery and Execution as to eſcape ſingly from the Country of your Enemies, and were ſafely arrived at the Place of your Deſtination; I was greatly rejoiced, and offered up Thanks to God. You are well acquainted with all the Affairs of this Quarter, any Delay will now be highly impolitic. I am ready according to my Engagements. You muſt form your Plan without Delay.

I have fully communicated on the State of Affairs with Mr. Viſage and Roy Manick Chund; having, conformably to what they will write you, ſpeedily formed your Plan, make me acquainted with it. Manick Chund is with me; write me fully by the Dawk. I am come to Akberabad, and have ſummoned all the Chiefs under me to repair hither, and wait only for you. Every Delay is impolitic; let me have immediate Advices from you.

APPENDIX, N° 234, 235.

Bengal Secret Perſian Correſpondence.

From the Nabob Vizier; received 16th June 1779.

I wiſh not to dwell on the ſtrict Ties of Friendſhip, and the ſolemn Treaties which have ſubſiſted for ſo long a Time between the illuſtrious Engliſh Chiefs and my Family, ſince they are ſo well known as to make the Repetition of them totally unneceſſary: In fact, there is not the leaſt Diſtinction of Intereſts; and our Succeſs, Proſperity, and Advantage, are in common. On this Account I conduct all the Affairs of my Government agreeable to the Advice and Concurrence of the Engliſh Chiefs.

Copy of a Letter which I have juſt received from Litafut Ally Khan Bahadre, and of a Letter which he wrote to his Vackeel Niſſar Ulla Khan, I incloſe for your Peruſal and Information, and that of my Friends Intezam-ul-Dowlah, General Sir Eyre Coote, Bahadre Sciful Moulk, and the other Gentlemen of the Council: From their Peruſal you learn the Particulars depending on the Favour of God, and the Friendſhip of the Engliſh Chiefs. I ſuffer no Thought of any one elſe to diſturb my Mind; but am perfectly ſatisfied, and at Eaſe.

But you are wiſe and penetrative; reflect on the Tendency of theſe Accounts. His Majeſty's Miniſters have entered into a ſtrict Connection with the People of the South, and have perſuaded them to repair to Hindoſtan: They are likewiſe intriguing and laying Schemes, with a determined Reſolution to ruin my Affairs and thoſe of the Engliſh Company. I am the faithful Servant and loyal Subject of the Circar, and hold no Connection with any one: The Friendſhip of the Engliſh I keep ever in View. Write me a full Anſwer to every Particular. Mr. Hoſea likewiſe writes you very fully on this Subject.

APPENDIX, N° 235.

To Rajah Chite Sing; written 25th September 1779.

I Have received your Letter: From the Contents of which, as well as from the Letters of Mr. Graham, and the Copy of a Letter which you wrote to that Gentleman, and which he tranſmitted for my Inſpection, it appears but too clearly, that inſtead of a cheerful Compliance with the Requiſition of this Government in the immediate Payment of the Sum of Five Lacks of Rupees, as your Share of the Expence of the War for the preſent Year, a Requiſition which the great Burthen of Expence under which the Company labour for the Defence of the Country, renders neceſſary, and to which you, as a Subject of theirs, are bound to contribute, have thought proper, under the Plea of Inability, which is well known to be futile, to endeavour to amuſe the Reſident with vague and diſtant Promiſes, meaning probably to protract, if not entirely evade, Payment of the Sum required of you. In a Letter which I lately wrote you, I informed you in expreſs Terms, that this Government neither could nor would recede from ſo reaſonable a Demand; and added, that in caſe of Non-compliance on your Part, Mr. Graham was authorized to ſummon a Detachment of our Forces to enforce our Orders if it ſhould be found neceſſary. This I hoped would have opened your Eyes, and induced you to relinquiſh a Conduct which muſt, if purſued, bring the greateſt Diſadvantage on you; but ſince even this Intimation of our Determination has proved ineffectual, I now think it neceſſary to inform you, that we have deſired the Commander in Chief to diſpatch Major Camac with the Detachment under his Command to Benares, there to wait our further Orders: He will accordingly begin his March immediately, unleſs the Reſident in the mean Time, from the actual Receipt of the Subſidy, ſhall inform him, that it is unneceſſary for him to proceed further; and you will be pleaſed to obſerve, that ſhould you force us to a Meaſure ſo contrary to our Wiſhes, the whole Expence of the Detachment, from the Time of its March, will be required from you, excluſive of the Subſidy for the War.

From Rajah Chite Sing to the Governor General; received the 25th September 1779.

I have been honoured with your gracious Letter, urging me in the ſtrongeſt Terms to the Payment of Five Lacks of Rupees on account of the Share of the Expences of the War for the preſent Year, and underſtand your Pleaſure. Regarding your Highneſs as my Maſter, in the Repreſentation which I ſent you of my Poverty and abſolute Inability, I had no Views of preſerving my

my Property and deceiving you by falſe Pretences; but I had really no Property left but what is apparent to every Body, ſuch as Elephants, Horſes, &c. which for the Support of my Credit I am obliged to keep, ſince that Credit is the Gift of your Highneſs's Bounty; but ſince you have been pleaſed to direct that I ſhould raiſe the Sum by any Means I can, I regard it as the Effect of my evil Deſtiny, that the Repreſentation of my Situation had no Weight, and ſubmit to the Neceſſity of this once complying with your Order notwithſtanding the Greatneſs of my Poverty which exceeds all Deſcription. I will make good the Sum gradually by the Diſpoſal of my Effects and by Loans, the Particulars of which I cannot fully explain to you.

Since you have honoured me, your moſt faithful and obedient, with the greateſt Marks of Favour and Regard, even to the honouring me with the Title of your Son, I am hopeful, from the Continuance of that Regard, that you will in future continually keep in View my Welfare and Intereſt, and will be kindly pleaſed to excuſe me from Services which are beyond my Ability to perform, on a Compliance with which my Support, nay even Life and the Proſperity of the Country depends.

From Rajah Chite Sing; received the 16th December 1779.

Your gracious Letter, directing me to pay without Delay the Sum of Five Lacks of Rupees as my Share of the Expences of the War for this Year, honoured me by its Arrival and made me acquainted with your Pleaſure. My Protector! before the Arrival of your Orders I had paid 150,000 Rupees to Mr. Thomas Graham, and immediately on the Receipt I ſent the Balance of 35,000 Rupees to the ſaid Gentleman: I was not forgetful of it for one Inſtant. As the Troops were ſent here, I have given that Gentleman their Pay from the Day of their March till the Day that the Sum was diſcharged, which was not quite 15 Days. I am hopeful, that conſidering me to be attached to you from of old, you will protect and ſupport me by your Favour and Friendſhip, that my Honour and Dignity may be encreaſed by it.

APPENDIX, N° 236.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, 13th December 1779.

READ the following Letter from the Reſident at the Vizier's Court.

To the Honourable Warren Haſtings, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Members of Council.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

I have delayed thus long addreſſing you on the Subject of the Firſt Object of my Buſineſs at this Court, in the Hope of being able to inform you that I had obtained from his Excellency ſufficient Supplies for the Exigences of the preſent Year. I have had frequent Conferences with him upon this Subject, but have found him uniform and determined in a Refuſal of any more Tuncaws than thoſe obtained by Mr. Middleton prior to my having Charge of this Appointment. The encloſed Paper N° 1. will ſhew you what they are, and for what Services they are granted. N° 2. is an Eſtimate of the whole Demands upon the Nabob for this Year. From theſe Accounts it will appear, that the whole Amount required for the Expences of the Year is Rupees 1,36,12,188. 12, and the Amount granted, Rupees 68,82,000.

I have in vain laid before him the ruinous Conſequences of a Diſmiſſion of any Part of the Troops who are now employed under the Command of Britiſh Officers, the certain Deficiency in the Collections, and the laying of his Country open to foreign Marauders.

I have in vain urged him on the glaring Impropriety of refuſing Tuncaws upon the ſame Diſtricts as laſt Year; and giving them to his own Troops, without Diſcipline, to ſupport his Government, and always ready to plunder every Country to which they have been ſent. His Anſwer has been invariably, that while he had the Means of providing for the Demands of the Company, he has never refuſed it; but he is now deprived of that Ability by the Drought, which has obliged him to give Deductions to the Amount of Twenty-five Lacks of Rupees; and even now the Aumils are deſirous of being releaſed from their Engagements, upon the Plea of Inability to comply with them; his Family, and that of his Father and Grandfather, after repeated Promiſes made to them and broken, are ſtill unprovided for; that he did not believe the Council meant to ſeize the Expences of his Table and Houſhold, which was all that was now left him. When I quitted him, I declared I did not

not imagine the Governor would ever conſent to the Reform of the new Brigade, and the other preſent Eſtabliſhments for his Collections; that if they were not diſmiſſed, they muſt be paid, and from the Sources of that Country, for the Protection of which they were raiſed. That I would leave him, for the preſent, to conſider the Means of granting the Supplies, in the Hope of an Anſwer more likely to be pleaſing to our Government. A Day or Two after I received a Letter from him, a Tranſlate of which, N° 3, I think it neceſſary to lay before you. As I have never been able to induce his Excellency to adopt any other Sentiments than thoſe he firſt declared, and have received another Letter from him, expreſſing much Diſſatisfaction at my Urgency on a Point he had determined on, and would not give up unleſs he ſhould be compelled by the Governor and Council, I have thought it needleſs to preſs him further at preſent, but at his Requeſt have tranſmitted a Letter from him to the Governor General, ſetting forth his Diſtreſs.

In this Situation, it only remains for me to lay before you the following Extract of Mr. Nathaniel Middleton's Letter of the 5th Inſtant, the Day on which Charge was delivered to me.

" When I have of late preſſed his Excellency for further Aſſignments, he has pleaded Inability " to anſwer the very heavy Demands which will this Year fall upon him, on account of the Drought " which has unfortunately happened, to the almoſt total Deſtruction of the Khurreff Harveſt, and " the conſequent Diminution of his Revenue. I am concerned to confeſs, there are but too good " Grounds for this Plea. The Misfortune has been general throughout the Whole of the Vizier's " Dominions, obvious to every Body; and ſo very fatal have been its Conſequences, that no Perſon " of either Credit or Character would enter into Engagements with Government for farming the " Country, without a very heavy Deduction in the laſt Year's Jumma, which his Excellency has been " compelled to allow to all who have hitherto been appointed to Farms; and ſome who have en- " gaged, even under theſe Circumſtances, have to my Knowledge made moſt urgent Applications " to the Nabob and his Miniſters, to be releaſed from their Obligations, and allowed to relinquiſh " their Farms, which they found they could not hold but at a certain Loſs to themſelves. You " will be ſoon convinced, by undoubted Teſtimony, and loud Complaints from every Quarter, of " the Reality of this Misfortune, which has neceſſarily been the Means of delaying the general Settle- " ment of the Country, and of preventing my hitherto getting Aſſignments for more than Rupees " 68,82,000; but how far its Operation and Effects precludes the Nabob from anſwering the De- " mands upon him on public Account, you will be the beſt able to judge, from the Statements " you will obtain of his eſtimated Revenue."

As it appears from the Whole of this Extract, that Mr. Middleton had met with Obſtacles, from a Reaſon aſſigned, which no human Foreſight could prevent, I hope your Honourable Board will not imagine I have been remiſs or inattentive; nothing but a compulſive Order from me, upon an undefined Right, could obtain the Collection of a Rupee more than I have Tuncaws for; and nothing but a deciſive and ſpeedy Inſtruction from you, when the Time elapſed, may not occaſion a material Loſs in the Revenue, can poſſibly procure the Grants neceſſary for the current Diſburſements from my Treaſury.

Upon this Principle it is needleſs to add, that no Bill from the Preſidency can poſſibly be anſwered, ſince the Demands on the Treaſury upon the preſent Eſtabliſhment exceed the expected Income; and the laſt Drafts of the Honourable Board, and their Order for the Payment of Two Lacks and a Half of Rupees to Captain Popham, which has been complied with, have ſo effectually drained the Treaſury, that I have not yet been able to pay the firſt Brigade for October. Upon the Eſtimate of the preſent Year, that of the Troops under the Command of Britiſh Officers, paid by Mr. Wombwell, exceeds the laſt Years, by Rupees 4,25,533. 12. 6. and the Exceſs of the Eſtimate of the temporary Brigade is Rupees 8,13,559. 13. 9. The Paymaſters, upon being applied to by me declare, that the Reaſon of this Exceſs is, that the laſt Year's was only what was ſuppoſed would be the Expence, and the preſent Year's Eſtimate is made upon the actual Diſburſements of laſt Year. As his Excellency did not ſtart any Objections to particular Articles of theſe Eſtimates, but to the Whole, from a Want of Revenue to pay them, I have not thought proper to curtail any Thing. Your Letter under Date the 25th Auguſt laſt has occaſioned the Incluſion of the Army Donation, and the Loſs by Exchange I thought but a proper Demand.

Notwithſtanding what has paſſed, I ſhould not relax in my Endeavours to prevail upon his Excellency to grant the Tuncaws required, but he ſeems to be unmoveable in his preſent Reſolution. He is now preparing for his Departure to meet the General, and I imagine will not return before the Arrival of deciſive Inſtructions from your Honourable Board.

Lucknow,
19th November 1779.

I have the Honour to be with Reſpect,
(Signed) E. Purling.

From the Vizier; received the 16th December 1779.

In a former Letter, I repreſented you all the Particulars of my Diſtreſſes, and delivered it to Mr. Middleton, and wrote to the ſame Purport to Rajah Gobind Ram: I am confident that you and the Gentlemen of the Council will attend to my Honour, and I conſider my Country and Property as not in the leaſt ſeparate from the Company, from you and the Gentlemen of the Council; at

his Time Mr. Purling, who is arrived, at the Repreſentations and Inſtigations of intereſted Perſons, reats me in a Manner never before practiſed by any Gentleman who has been here. Although I epreſent to him that every Thing ſhall be done to his, the Company's and Gentlemen's Satisfaction; ut that ſuch a Mode of negociating, to which he is inſtigated by Self-intereſted Perſons, is not roper: That he ſhould write to the Governor and Council every Thing I ſay to him, and that whatever Anſwer they may ſend, he ſhould conduct himſelf thereby; but to this he does not agree, and cts according to his own Pleaſure. I have wrote all theſe Particulars to Rajah Gobind Ram, who will nake them known to you. As I know the Baſis of my Government to be founded on the Favour of God, and your's and the Gentlemen of the Council's Protection I hope you will ſend me an Anſwer agreeable to my Requeſt, keeping my Honour in View; and alſo write to Mr. Purling, hat as you and the Gentlemen of the Council pay Regard to my Honour, he alſo muſt in like Manner attend thereto, and not at the Inſtigation of intereſted Perſons adopt Meaſures, which bring Diſgrace and Diſcredit upon me. Should Mr. Purling converſe with me in the ſame Manner as he did efore, I cannot put up with the Diſgrace, but leaving all my Country under his Management, will repair to you and the Gentlemen of the Council.

Fort William, 31ſt Dec' 1779.

J. Ed. Colebrooke,
Perſian Tranſlator.

To the Nabob of Oude; written the 15th December 1779.

I have received your Excellency's Letter informing me, &c. (recapitulates the Contents of the Letter) I have likewiſe ſeen a Letter from your Excellency to Mr. Purling, the Reſident at your Court, to the ſame Effect:

It is a Cauſe of equal Concern and Surprize to me, that you ſhould object or heſitate to grant Puncaws for the Charges of an Eſtabliſhment which was formed at your own particular Solicitation for the Defence of Rohilchund and the Doaub, at a Juncture when your ancient and natural Enemies the Marattas are actually in Arms, and ready to enter your Dominions upon the firſt Opening which ſhall be given them; nothing in my Opinion will deter them from it, but the Preſence of a formidable and well-regulated Body of Troops to oppoſe them. The dangerous Conſequences of their entering your Country, and finding it in a defenceleſs Condition, are too obvious and ſtriking for me to mention. Yet this muſt certainly be the Caſe if the Company's Forces allotted to its Protection be withdrawn or diſbanded. You are not to imagine, becauſe you have enjoyed an uninterrupted Seaſon of Peace for ſome Years paſt, that you have no Enemies to interrupt you, and may therefore reſt in Security without the Expence of maintaining this Force: On the contrary, it is to their Power that you owe this Tranquillity; and the neighbouring States, whoſe Annual Incurſions and Ravages in the Territories of your late Father of bleſſed Memory, were the Cauſe of the Company's Troops being firſt applied for, and ſtationed in your Dominions to repel them, will not fail to diſturb you again as ſoon as this Bulwark is removed, and the Nakedneſs of your Country ſhall invite them. Excluſive of this important Conſideration, I think it proper to inform your Excellency, that I underſtand a mutual Obligation between us to have been implied in the Formation and Maintenance of this Eſtabliſhment. The Company are bound on the one Hand to protect your Dominions by its Means, and you are bound on the other to defray the Charges of it; while theſe Terms are complied with on both Sides, neither has a Right to complain, but you could never ſuppoſe when you applied to us to appoint this Force to your Service, that the Company would be at the Pains to raiſe and diſcipline ſo large a Body of Men, and to augment their Eſtabliſhment by the Addition of ſuch an extraordinary Number of Officers as were neceſſary to command them, if they were liable to be burdened with the ſole Weight and Expence of this Force by a ſudden Reſolution on your Side to diſcharge them without previous and timely Notice given to us, and our Conſent received; and this too at ſuch a Diſtance from the Company's Poſſeſſions, as the Countries in which they are now ſtationed.

I am convinced that a Reſolution ſo pernicious to the real Intereſts of your Government, ſo repugnant to the intimate Connection which ſubſiſts between us, and ſo dangerous in the End both to your Poſſeſſions and the Company's, cannot have been ſuggeſted to you by any but ſecret Enemies to your State; and that on a mature Conſideration of the Caſe, their Advice will appear to you as invidious as it does to me.

I therefore recommend to you in the ſtrongeſt Manner, not only to ſhun the evil Councils of ſuch falſe Friends, but to diſmiſs them from your Service and Confidence, as unworthy of both; I beg you to conſider that it is equally my Inclination and Intereſt to provide for the Support of your Government, and the Defence of your Dominions, againſt the Power and Invaſion of a foreign Enemy. For this Purpoſe General Sir Eyre Coote has thought it adviſable to viſit the different Stations of the Army in your Country, and he will be conſtantly attentive to take Means for your Security, while your Dependance is placed on the Company's Alliance and Aſſiſtance; but if you are determined to withdraw yourſelf from both, and to diſſolve the Union which has ſo long ſubſiſted between your Family and this Government, I expect that ſufficient Time and Notice of your Intention be given to prevent our being involved in Troubles from the haſty Execution of it. I cannot conſent to your diſmiſſing the Company's Troops at ſuch a Diſtance from Home, and at

ſuch

ſuch a Criſis, nor can I at preſent agree to recall them. As much Time at leaſt muſt be given to diſpoſe of this Force, when you ſhall have no further Occaſion for their Services, as was allowed for the raiſing of it; I therefore requeſt that you will attend to the Repreſentations of Mr. Purling, who has been ordered again to apply to you in the Name of this Government, for Tuncaws for the neceſſary Diſburſement of the current Year; and although your Revenues have ſuffered a Diminution by the unfortunate Failure of the Harveſt, yet I am perſuaded that they will be ſufficient, with Œconomy and Attention, to anſwer every Service required from them; and that you will therefore cheerfully comply with the Demand which Mr. Purling is ordered to make: At all Events, the Defence of your Country is the firſt Object to be attended to; and the regular Payment of a well-diſciplined Body of Troops, is indiſpenſably neceſſary for this End. Add to this, that your Engagements with the Company are of ſuch a Nature as to oblige me to require, and inſiſt on your granting Tuncaws for the full Amount of their Demands upon you for the current Year, and on your reſerving Funds ſufficient to anſwer them, even ſhould the Deficiency of your Revenues compel you to leave your own Troops unprovided for, or to diſband a Part of them to enable you to effect it.

APPENDIX, N° 237.

Extract of a Letter from General Sir Eyre Coote to the Governor General and Council.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

THE Day before Yeſterday I encamped near Allahabad, where the Vizier did me the Honour of a Viſit; and Yeſterday Morning, in my Way hither, I returned it, and was received by his Excellency with every Mark of Reſpect and Diſtinction.

This Morning he called here, and we had ſome general Converſation, which principally turned upon the Subject of his Attachment to the Engliſh, and his Readineſs to ſhew the Sincerity of it upon all Occaſions.

It is to be wiſhed we had employed the Influence which ſuch favourable Sentiments muſt have given us, more to the Benefit of the Country and ourſelves; but I fear the Diſtreſſes which evidently appear on the Face of the one, and the Failure of Revenues to the other, are not to be wholly aſcribed to the Vizier's Miſmanagement.

APPENDIX, N° 238.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 12th November 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
and
Edward Wheler, Eſquire.

Mr. Barwell indiſpoſed, and Mr. Francis at Houghley
Sir Eyre Coote gone to viſit the different Stations of the Army.

THE Governor General delivers in the following Minute and propoſed Heads of a Treaty with the Rana of Gohud for the Conſideration of the Board.

The Governor General informs the Board, that during their late Receſs he has had ſeveral Conferences with the Miniſter deputed by the Rana of Gohud, and inveſted with full Powers, on the Subject of a Treaty of Alliance offenſive and defenſive, propoſed by the Rana to be concluded between him and the Company. The Governor General lays before the Board a Draft of Conditions which he has formed on the Baſis of the Rana's Propoſitions for ſuch a Treaty; and which, with

with the Ranna's Letter and Propoſitions, he deſires may be entered in this Place for the Information and Opinions of the Board.

(Signed) W. H.

Article 1ſt. A Treaty of Alliance, offenſive and defenſive, ſhall be eſtabliſhed between the Engliſh Company and Maha Raja Ranna Lokinder Behadre.

2d. Whenever a War ſhall actually take place between the contracting Parties and the Marattas, if the Ranna ſhall require the Aſſiſtance of an Engliſh Force for the Purpoſes hereinafter deſcribed, ſuch a Force proportioned to the Exigency of the Service ſhall be immediately ſent, on his Requiſition made in Writing to the commanding Officer at the neareſt Station of the Company's Troops, ſhall remain with him as long as he ſhall require it, and return, when he ſhall diſmiſs it; the Expences thereof ſhall be defrayed by the Ranna, at the fixed Rate of Twenty thouſand Muchledar Rupees of the Currency of Benares, or any other Species of Rupees of the ſame intrinſic Amount, for each Battalion of Sepoys on their preſent Eſtabliſhment, with their Proportion of Artillery; the Payment to commence on the Day when the ſaid Force ſhall paſs the Borders of the Company's Dominions, or the Dominions of the Nabob of Oude; and ceaſe on the Period ſtipulated for its Return to either; Four Coſs being allowed for each Day's March.

3d. This Force ſhall be employed for the Defence of the Ranna's Dominions againſt all foreign or domeſtic Enemies, and for the Enlargement of his Dominions by Conqueſt on the Marattas.

4th. Whatever Acquiſitions in purſuance of this Treaty ſhall be made of Countries lying contiguous to the Ranna's Dominions, or formerly appertaining to them, whether effected by his or the Engliſh Troops ſeparately or in conjunction, or obtained by Treaty, ſhall be ſhared in the following Proportions, viz. Nine Annas to the Company, and Seven Annas to the Ranna. The mean Amount of the groſs Revenue of the Company's Share collected in Time of Peace, in the Ten Years preceding, after deducting the Charges of Collection, which ſhall be aſcertained by Aumils choſen by each Party, ſhall be fixed and paid by the Ranna, as a perpetual Tribute to the Company, and the Lands and Forts ſhall be ceded to the Ranna.

5th. In caſe it ſhall be judged adviſable to employ the combined Forces of the Company and the Ranna, in any diſtant Operations againſt the common Enemy, beyond the Borders and Neighbourhood of the Ranna's Dominions, on Requiſition made in Writing from this Government, he ſhall furniſh Ten thouſand effective Horſe for ſuch Service; and each Party ſhall bear his own ſeparate Expence; which ſhall continue ſeparate until the Return of the combined Army to the Borders of the Ranna's Country, or until it ſhall be again employed in the Services mentioned in the Third Article of this Treaty.

6th. Whenever the Engliſh Forces are employed for the Defence of the Ranna's Country, or for the Acquiſition of Territory, the Service to be performed ſhall be preſcribed by himſelf; but the Mode of executing it ſhall be left to the Officer commanding the Engliſh Troops.

7th. Whenever the combined Troops of the Company and the Ranna ſhall be employed in any remote Operations, ſuch as deſcribed in the 5th Article, the commanding Officer of the Engliſh Forces ſhall conſult the Ranna on the Choice of the Service to be performed; but the ultimate Deciſion, in caſe of a Difference in Opinion, and the Mode of conducting ſuch Service, ſhall be left entirely to the commanding Officer of the Engliſh Troops, with a Reſervation of the Ranna's complete Authority over his own Troops.

8th. Whenever Peace ſhall be concluded between the Engliſh Company and the Maratta State, the Ranna ſhall be included as a Party in the Treaty which ſhall be made for that Purpoſe; and his preſent Poſſeſſions, together with ſuch Countries as he ſhall have acquired in the Courſe of the War, and which it ſhall be then ſtipulated to leave in his Poſſeſſion, ſhall be guaranteed to him by ſuch Treaty.

9th. No Engliſh Factory ſhall be eſtabliſhed in the Dominions of the Ranna. No Perſons of any Denomination ſhall be ſent into the Dominions on the Part of the Engliſh Company, or with the Licence of the Governor General and Council, without his previous Conſent, neither ſhall his Ryots be preſſed for any Military Service, nor any Authority exerciſed over them, but his own.

Ordered, That the above Papers lie for Conſideration.

Warren Haſtings.
P. Francis.
Edwd Wheler.

From Maha Rajah Lokinder Sewae Rajah Ranna Chatter Sing Bahadre Dullar Jung: Received 7th June.

At the Time when the late Colonel Leſlie arrived I was honoured with a friendly Letter from you, ſince which Time I have been conſtantly wiſhing for the Happineſs of an Interview; and till I hear the pleaſing News, I cannot enjoy Peace of Mind. I am hopeful that, actuated by a ſincere Friendſhip, you will honour me with frequent Letters which will afford me a high Degree of Satisfaction.

I exert myſelf in complying with whatever the Gentlemen of this Diſtrict deſire of me, which I doubt not you have heard from them.

Tofuſſil Hoſſein Khan, who is lately gone to your Preſence, is fully acquainted with all my Affairs both paſt and preſent, and has doubtleſs repreſented the Particulars to you: I have now written further Particulars to him, which he will relate to you.

He has full Power from me to manage my Affairs; and I on my Part am ready to the utmoſt of my Power to promote the Company's Affairs. Conſidering me as inſeparably connected with them, let me have the Honour to hear often from you.

Liſt of Requeſts ſent to Tofuſſil Huſſein Khan.

You muſt obtain an Engagement under the Seal of the Company to the following Effect, and ſend it to me.

Maha Rajah Lokinder Sewae Rajah Ranna Chatter Sing Bahadre Dulleer Jung, who has the moſt dutiful Attachment to the Intereſts of the Company's Sirkar, in Conſideration that the ſaid Lokinder Bahadre is a Sharer of the Proſperity and Adverſity of the Sirkar, let not at any Time any Moleſtation be given by the Sirkar to the Places forming his Raje: Let them be entirely exempted, and let not the Sirkar in any Inſtance be diſpleaſed againſt him; and let no Officer of the Sirkar ſuppoſe any Diſtinction to exiſt; and on his Application let them not fail to afford him Aid and Support: Let him not be oppreſſed from their Factories or Officers: Let them ever keep in View his Proſperity, Welfare, and Honour. Let this be guaranteed by an Oath to God.

Whatever Country of his Raje the late bleſſed Nabob Sujah-ul-Dowlah Behadre beſtowed on him, let a Sunnud conformable thereto be granted him by the Company's Sirkar, of the 56 Mahals, with the Forts in the Diſtrict of Gowalier, to the Junction of which to his Raje the late bleſſed Nabob had ſet his Signature; of theſe, Sunnuds were obtained for 41 Mahals Two Talooks; the Sunnuds for the remaining 15 Mahals were not prepared when the Nabob died, which cauſed the Suſpenſion of them. I am now hopeful, that a Sunnud for the whole of the 56 Mahals may be granted me from the Company's Sirkar.

Whenever the Forces of the Sirkar are employed in Conjunction with my Forces on an Expedition on this Side the Jummun, whatever Countries to the Banks of the Nerbudda ſhall fall into the Poſſeſſion of the Sirkar, One Half thereof ſhall be relinquiſhed to me for the Expence of my Forces, and the other Half ſhall remain under the Government of the Sirkar, and be One Year kept under the Khalſa; and the Collections made that Year being made the Ground of a permanent Settlement, they ſhall be given over to me to make the Collections, and pay them to the Sirkar. Let whatever Expence may be found neceſſary for the Support of Tannahs, &c. be deducted; and whenever Neceſſity requires the Aſſiſtance of the Sirkar's Forces, let them join me on my Application for that Purpoſe. My own Forces ſhall be ſupported from my own Share, and no Charges required from the Sirkar.

If at this Time a Delay muſt ariſe in the Objects propoſed above, let the ſeveral Mahals in an annexed Liſt, which are on this Side the Jummun, in the Poſſeſſion of the Enemy, be granted to me; and let it be ſtipulated in the Treaty, that the new Mahals which have been now beſtowed by the Sirkar, ſhall not be at all moleſted.

Calpee, Zerujee, Coneh, Bhandaer, Buncha, Gourſenaie, the Purgunnah of Giaur, dependent on Sukraum; the Purgunnah of Cutchratah, Cummar Punjehautey.

To Maha Rajah Chatter Sing: Written the 5th July 1779.

I have had the Pleaſure to receive your friendly Letter, with a Liſt of Articles incloſed for the Formation of a Treaty between us; and perfectly underſtand the Contents.

I am much pleaſed with the Sentiments of Friendſhip with which your Letter abounds, and greatly approve of your Plan; but as I wiſh to form a Treaty with you on ſo firm and ſolid a Baſis, as to leave no Room for future Explanations, I would adviſe that you ſend a Perſon in whom you can confide, with full Powers to conclude the Treaty; or if you think proper, I will ſend a truſty Perſon to you for that Purpoſe. I requeſt you will ſend me an immediate Anſwer, as the Seaſon is paſſing. Knowing me, &c.

From Maha Rajah Sewae Ranna Chatter Sing Lokinder Bahadre: Dated the 5th Shabaun, 15th Auguſt; received 23d September 1779.

After aſſuring you of thoſe Sentiments of Friendſhip and Regard which I bear you, and which form my greateſt Happineſs, be it known to your enlightened Mind, that my daily Thanks are offered to the Almighty, who has eſtabliſhed this Friendſhip between us.

Your agreeable Letter, which I anxiouſly expected, has by its Arrival afforded me the greateſt Pleaſure, and by its Contents compleated my Wiſhes. You write, that you entirely approve of the Propoſals which I tranſmitted you; that I will therefore diſpatch a truſty Agent without Delay, who

who being joined with a confidential Perſon on the Part of your Sirkar, they may in Conjunction finally ſettle all Matters. This afforded me inexpreſſible Pleaſure.

As I regard Your Favour and Regard as my firmeſt Support, and the warmeſt Attachment to you as my higheſt Intereſt, I ſhall ſtudy to the utmoſt to improve the Connection ſo happily formed with your Sirkar, from the Period of which I date my Happineſs. The Country Powers of this Quarter are highly diſpleaſed with this Connection; but as I am now under the auſpicious Shadow of the Engliſh Fortune, I have nothing to do with any of them; and I am fully convinced that, ſupported by your Favour, any ill Deſigns formed againſt me can meet with no Succeſs.

Immediately on the Receipt of your friendly Letter I prepared to diſpatch a truſty Agent to you; God willing, he will ſhortly arrive at your Preſence, and will fully communicate all Matters to you. I have alſo written briefly to Tuffuſil Huſſein Khan, who will inform you of the Particulars.

Knowing me at all Times dependent on your Favour, let me be honoured with frequent Letters from you, which will inſpire me with Confidence, and afford me the higheſt Pleaſure.

Poſtſcript.

As Tuffuſil Huſſein Khan, who is perfectly acquainted with my Sentiments, is at your Preſence, here did not appear to me the leaſt Neceſſity to diſpatch any other Perſon to you; yet in Compliance with your Deſire, I have diſpatched Meer Muzhir Ally, who will repair to your Preſence by the Route of Cawnpore; but my Dependence for the Settlement of all Points is on the aforeſaid Khan, in whom I place implicit Confidence. I have mentioned this for your Information.

The preſent Situation of Affairs in this Quarter is as follows: Umpajee Kinkulla and other Agents, who were in the Zilla of Jyepore, at the Inſtigation of Madho Row Sindeah, the principal Miniſter at Poona, have advanced to my Borders, and have gained over to their Party Sewajee Uppetul, and the other Officers of Malwa; they purpoſe ſhortly to invade my Country, and to commit Hoſtilities againſt me. Having the good Fortune of the Engliſh on my Side, their Attempts will, I doubt not, fail of Succeſs; yet it is neceſſary to take Means to oppoſe them, that the Country may not ſuffer Injury.

Whenever they have invaded my Territories, they have gained nothing but Shame and Defeats, and will again be overcome. I therefore requeſt that you will write to the Gentlemen in Authority in this Quarter, that whilſt Meer Muzhir Ally Khan is with you, they will afford me their Aſſiſtance, ſhould I find it neceſſary to apply to them, to enable me to inflict on thoſe bad Men the Puniſhment of their evil Conduct. At preſent they have collected but a ſmall Force, and may be eaſily defeated; but ſhould they be allowed to gain Strength, and to begin Hoſtilities, the Flame of War once lighted up, may require great Efforts to quench it; all I require is, that on my Requiſition, a ſmall Party of your Forces may be ſent to join me, that an immediate End may be put to their Attempts. To root out a Shrub requires but little Exertion of the Strength of one Man, but ſuffer the ſame to take deep Root, and the utmoſt Efforts of an Hundred will be inſufficient.

Extract of a Letter from the ſame to Tuffuſil Huſſein Khan.

I am greatly ſurprized that you deſire me to ſend a truſty Agent; for whilſt a Friend like you, zealouſly attached to my Intereſt, and verſed in Affairs, is in Calcutta, what Neceſſity can there be for deſiring another Perſon to be ſent? but as I did not think it adviſable to refuſe Compliance to the Deſire of the Nabob, and to the Advice of Friends, I have thought myſelf obliged to ſend a Perſon, who will ſhortly arrive and inform you of the Affairs of this Quarter; but notwithſtanding his Arrival, I leave the Regulation of all Matters and the whole Negociations to you; you will do whatever you judge for my Intereſt.

APPENDIX, N° 239.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 2d December 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis, } Eſquires.
Edward Wheler,

Sir Eyre Coote abſent on a Viſit to the different Stations of the Army.

CONSIDERED the Governor General's Minute, entered in Conſultation 12th November, with the Heads propoſed for a Treaty to be concluded with the Rana of Gohud.

Read the Letter from the Rana recorded in the Books of the Perſian Correſpondence as received the 7th June laſt; alſo another Letter dated the 5th of Shawbaun, and received the 3d September.

Read the propoſed Heads of a Treaty with the Rana of Goad, entered in Conſultation the 12th November.

The Governor General lays before the Board the following amended Draft of a Treaty propoſed to be executed with the Rana of Goad, and deſires that it may be ſubſtituted for the former entered in Conſultation the 12th ultimo, as it contained ſuch Alterations propoſed by the Miniſter of the Rana as the Governor General deems reaſonable; and to the Treaty in this Form, the Miniſter who is now preſent declares his entire Concurrence.

Articles of Agreement made and concluded at Fort William in Bengal, between the Honourable the Governor General and Council for the Affairs of the Honourable Engliſh Eaſt India Company, on Behalf of the ſaid Company, on the one Part, and Maha Raja Luckindar Bahadur, Rana of Goad, for himſelf and his Succeſſors, on the other Part; viz.

Article 1ſt. Perpetual Friendſhip ſhall take place between the Engliſh Company and Maha Raja Luckindar Bahadur and their Succeſſors, and an Alliance be eſtabliſhed between them for the Proſecution of the Objects hereinafter mentioned.

2d. Whenever a War ſhall actually take place between the contracting Parties and the Marattas, if Maha Rajah Luckindar Bahadur ſhall require the Aſſiſtance of an Engliſh Force from the Company for the Defence of his Country, or for the Acquiſition of Territory, ſuch a Force, proportioned to the Exigency of the Service, ſhall be immediately ſent on his Requiſition made in Writing to the commanding Officer of the neareſt Station of the Company's Troops, ſhall remain with him as long as he ſhall require it, and return when he ſhall diſmiſs it. The Expences thereof ſhall be defrayed by the Maha Raja, at the fixed monthly Rate of Twenty thouſand Muckledar Rupees, of the Currency of Benares, or any other Species of Rupees of the ſame intrinſic Amount, for each Battalion of Sepoys on its preſent Eſtabliſhment, with its Proportion of Artillery; the Payment to commence on the Day when the ſaid Force ſhall paſs the Borders of the Company's Dominions, or the Dominions of the Nabob of Oude, and ceaſe on the Period ſtipulated for its Return to either, Four Coſs being allowed for each Day's March.

3d. This Force ſhall be employed for the Defence of the Maha Raja's Dominions againſt all foreign or domeſtic Enemies, and for the Enlargement of his Dominions by Conqueſt on the Marattas.

4th. Whatever Countries ſhall be acquired from the Marattas in purſuance of this Treaty, by the Troops of the Company or of the Maha Raja, ſeparately or in conjunction, whether by War or Treaty (except the Fifty-ſix Mahls which conſtitute the Maha Raja's Jagheer, and which are not now in the Poſſeſſion of the Marattas) ſhall be ſhared in the following Proportions; viz. Nine Annas to the Company and Seven to the Maha Raja. The mean Amount of the groſs Revenue of the Whole, ſhall be aſcertained by Ameens choſen by each Party, on the Collections made in the Ten preceding Years; and the Amount of the Company's Share as determined by the ſaid Ameens, after deducting the Charges of Collection which are cuſtomary in ſuch Countries, ſhall be fixed and paid by the Maha Raja as a perpetual Tribute to the Company, and the Lands and Forts ſhall be ceded to the Maha Raja.

5th. In caſe it ſhall be judged adviſable to employ the combined Forces of the Company and the Maha Raja in any hoſtile Operation againſt the Marattas, beyond the Borders of the Maha Raja's

Raja's Dominions, on Requiſition made to him in Writing from this Government, he ſhall furniſh Ten thouſand Horſe for ſuch Service, and each Party ſhall bear his own ſeparate Expence; and if upon the Return of the Engliſh Forces towards their own Borders the Maha Raja ſhall have Occaſion for their Services, and ſhall make a Requiſition to retain them, from the Inſtant of ſuch Requiſition he ſhall pay their Charge in the ſame Manner as ſtipulated in the 2d Article.

6th. Whenever the Engliſh Forces are employed for the Defence of the Maha Raja's Country, or for the Acquiſition of Territory, the Service to be performed ſhall be preſcribed by himſelf, but the Mode of executing it ſhall be left to the Direction of the Officer commanding the Engliſh Troops.

7th. Whenever the combined Troops of the Company and the Maha Raja ſhall be employed in any remote Operations, the commanding Officer of the Engliſh Forces ſhall conſult the Raja upon all Services to be performed; but the ultimate Deciſion in caſe of a Difference of Opinion, and the Mode of conducting ſuch Services, ſhall be left entirely to the commanding Officer of the Engliſh Forces, with a Reſervation of the Maha Raja's complete Authority over his own Troops.

8th. Whenever Peace ſhall be concluded between the Company and the Maratta State, the Maha Raja ſhall be included as a Party in the Treaty which ſhall be made for that Purpoſe, and his preſent Poſſeſſions, together with the Fort Gorvalier, which of old belongs to the Family of the Maha Raja, if it ſhall be then in his Poſſeſſion, and ſuch Countries as he ſhall have acquired in the courſe of the War, and which it ſhall then be ſtipulated to leave in his Hands, ſhall be guaranteed to him by ſuch Treaty.

9th. No Engliſh Factory ſhall be eſtabliſhed in the Dominions of the Maha Raja; no Perſons of any Denomination ſhall be ſent into his Dominions on the Part of the Engliſh Company, or with the Licence of the Governor General and Council, without his previous Conſent; neither ſhall his Ryots be preſſed for any Military Service, nor any Authority exerciſed over them but his own.

Signed, ſealed and concluded at Fort William this Second Day of December, in the Year of our Lord One thouſand Seven hundred and Seventy-nine.

Mr. Wheler delivers in the following Minute prepared in conſequence of the Governor General's former Propoſitions; which he thinks equally applicable to the preſent.

Mr Wheler—I feel myſelf a good deal at a Loſs in giving my Opinion on the Subject of the Treaty propoſed by the Governor General with the Rana of Gohud, as I think a Matter of ſo much Importance ſhould not have been introduced without being accompanied with the neceſſary Information, to enable the Members of the Board to judge of its Expediency.

The Rana of Goad is, I believe, almoſt a new Name upon our Records. I am entirely unacquainted with the Situation of his Capital, except by conſulting the Map; the Extent of his Territory, his Revenue, the Force he is able to bring into the Field, and his perſonal Character, are Points, on which I am equally uninformed; nor do I believe any Engliſhman, whoſe Authority can be depended upon, has ever been within the Territories of Goad, to aſcertain them; yet theſe are Points on which the Board ought to have the moſt accurate Information, before they proceed to decide on the propoſed Treaty, otherwiſe they may engage in a War with the Marattas, either to ſupport or make Conqueſts for a Man, who has neither Means nor Capacity to enable him to bear any Proportion in the Riſque or Charge which may attend ſuch a War.

Uninformed therefore as I am, I can only give my Opinion on the general Principle of the propoſed Alliance, which is, that having for its Object War, Conqueſt, and Increaſe of Territory, I conceive it to be contrary to the true Intereſt of the Company and Britiſh Nation, and to the fundamental Policy of the former; and in fact changes the Condition of the Company here, from a commercial to a military State; that it is likewiſe, in direct Oppoſition to all our Inſtructions, and peculiarly inexpedient at this Time, when our Treaſury is exhauſted, theſe Provinces drained of their Specie; when the Nation is engaged in a dangerous War in Europe, and the Company is threatened with a general Combination of the Indian Powers againſt all their Settlements.

How, under ſuch Circumſtances, the Condition of the Company is to be mended, by hiring out their Troops, and making Conqueſts for a petty Rajah, ſituated at ſo great a Diſtance from their Frontier, does not in anywiſe occur to me: I rather think that ſuch an Alliance, and the Meaſures propoſed in conſequence, are calculated to draw the neighbouring Marattas upon us; to expoſe our extenſive and unguarded Frontier to Waſte and Ravage, and to involve the Company ſtill more in Danger and Expence, without any adequate Proſpect of Advantage. I am therefore againſt the Treaty.

(Signed) Edw[d] Wheeler.

Mr. Francis delivers in the following Minute upon this Subject.

Mr. Francis,

The Rana of Goad is a Prince, with whom the Company have hitherto had no Connection, and whoſe Name, I believe, is unknown to them. I myſelf confeſs to have no other Information concerning

cerning him, than what I have been able to collect within theſe few Days. I ſee by Major Rennill's Map, that his Capital is ſituated in Latitude 26 D. 20 M. Longitude Weſt of Calcutta 9 D. 40 M.; Gwalior; the Place of which he wants to get Poſſeſſion, is a ſtrong Fortreſs in the Hills, about 80 Miles diſtant from Etawa, on the other Side of the Jumna. From ſome Officers who have been in that Part of the Country, I underſtand that the Rana is very poor; that his Country is wild, rocky, and uncultivated; and that his Army is little better than a Rabble, ill armed and cloathed, and without regular Pay or Diſcipline. The Governor General's Motion gives us no Information on any of theſe Points; yet, in the Conſideration of a Queſtion of ſuch Importance, as an immediate Alliance, offenſive and defenſive, to be followed by a future Guarantee of future Acquiſitions, it ſeems eſſential to us to know, what are the Strength and Reſources of the Prince with whom we are going to engage; the Situation and Extent of his Country; together with the Circumſtances and Diſpoſition of the Powers who border upon it, and in whoſe Differences with him, whatever they may be, we ſhall probably become Parties in conſequence of our preſent Engagements.

Whether the Conqueſt of Gwalior be the Rana's ſole and real Object, or whether another Expedition into Bundlecund may not be in fact the Conſequence of our ſending Troops to act with him, is in my Judgment very uncertain. Colonel Leſlie ſet out under Inſtructions, firſt to proceed towards Bombay, and afterwards to Berar. Inſtead of doing either, he marched into Bundlecund, took Poſſeſſion of the Capital, and remained there very quietly till he died. I think it not at all unlikely, that the Officer who may command the Expedition now projected, will follow the Example of his immediate Predeceſſor. There is nothing to be gained in the Country of Goad, or its Neighbourhod, whereas the Diamond Country offers every Temptation, it is the high Road to Fortune, and therefore the moſt likely to be purſued.

Having no authentic Information before me, on the State and Condition of the Rana of Goad, I muſt draw my Concluſions from the beſt I have been able to obtain; of courſe they cannot be in favour of a Man ſo circumſtanced as I believe the Rana of Goad to be: At the ſame Time I have no Difficulty in declaring, that if all the Facts were reverſed, it would not incline me to aſſent to the Meaſure. The Event of thoſe Treaties in which we have hitherto engaged, does not furniſh me with any Encouragement to enter into new ones, formed on the ſame Principles, or to follow that Line of Policy; I deem it unwiſe and dangerous in every Senſe. It is inconſiſtent with the *Safety* of Bengal to employ our Forces in diſtant Schemes of Conqueſt, whether for ourſelves, or others; it is inconſiſtent with the *Safety* of Bengal, to ſend our Troops beyond the Jumna, and much more to bind ourſelves to let them remain there at the Diſcretion of any of the Country Powers. The Diſtance is too great, and the Rana of Goad too inconſiderable, to ſuffer me to ſuppoſe it poſſible that the Impreſſion of any Efforts of *his*, or of ours in conjunction with him, can be felt on the Malabar Coaſt, or create a Diverſion that can be of the ſmalleſt Service to Brigadier General Goddard.

But this, in my Judgment, is not the moſt material Conſideration. The Extent of our preſent Frontier, to ſpeak moderately and without the Hazard of Exaggeration, is full as great as we are able to defend; and if it were not ſo, a Syſtem of Invaſion and Conqueſt is equally unnatural to the Condition of the Eaſt India Company as a mercantile Body, and to that of the Territory they poſſeſs in India.

What ſort of Concluſions muſt ariſe in the Minds of Men at Home, who are capable of judging of ſuch Queſtions, when they ſee that with all our preſent immenſe Poſſeſſions, and with all the Reſources which we ought to derive from them, it is neceſſary to their Security that we ſhould endeavour to enlarge them.

On the ſame Principle, and from the ſame Cauſes on which ſuch Meaſures are deemed neceſſary now, the future Neceſſity of them muſt increaſe with every new Acquiſition; we muſt continue to conquer as long as we continue to acquire.

They who think ſuch a Syſtem of Policy eſſential to the Safety of the Company's actual Poſſeſſions, muſt admit, that our Situation in India is not only very precarious, but incapable of being fixed once for all upon a limited and ſolid Foundation. But I am far from admitting, that our Eſtabliſhment here is of that Nature, or that the Meaſures in queſtion have any Tendency to ſtrengthen or ſecure it.

Mr. Wheler's Minute, to which I entirely ſubſcribe, has anticipated a great deal of what I intended to have ſaid. I ſhall therefore only add, that the Syſtem of which this Meaſure makes a Part, counteracts the fundamental Principles of the Company's Policy, and cannot be purſued without direct Diſobedience to their poſitive and repeated Orders and Inſtructions to this Government, nor without overſetting a Principle laid down by the Governor General himſelf; and in which I entirely concur with him, that, notwithſtanding the Superiority of the Britiſh Force in India, its general Line of Action is and muſt be *purely the Defenſive*.

The Terms of the propoſed Treaty are liable to many Difficulties and Objections. I ſhall only mention one. Guarantees between Princes and States are uſually (I believe always) reciprocal. There is a manifeſt Reaſon, I confeſs, for not calling upon the Rana of Ghode to guaranty, as regularly as he ought to do, the Poſſeſſions or future Acquiſitions of this Government; but it is ſuch a Reaſon as reduces the Rana very low, and ought to deter us from entering into any Alliance with him. It may involve us in the conſtant Support of his Quarrels with his Neighbours; but it offers us no Compenſation or Aſſiſtance in Return, ſuppoſing the Company's Poſſeſſions in any other Part of India were invaded, nor is it in his Power to afford it.

Whether this be a juſt Obſervation or not, I need not inſiſt upon it; becauſe my Oppoſition to the

the propoſed Treaty is founded on Principles which do not oblige me to canvas the particular Advantage or Diſadvantage of every ſpecific Article contained in it.

On that general Ground of Argument, which Mr. Wheler has taken, and to which I have only added a little without improving it, I entirely diſapprove of the Propoſition, and proteſt againſt it.

Mr. Barwell—The general Object of the propoſed Treaty appears to me pointed to the preſent Circumſtances of our Government, and that of the Marattas. It ſtrikes me to be well calculated to give Strength to both the offenſive and defenſive Means we hold within ourſelves, as to weaken thoſe of our immediate Enemies the Marattas. In a State of War with that Power, every Enemy that is raiſed up to their State, is an Advantage to our own Plans of Conqueſt; Acquiſition of Territory, and a Deſign to engage the Forces of the Company in diſtant Expeditions, to which the Objections of Mr. Wheler and Mr. Francis particularly point, are not meditated by the preſent Treaty. It is the Defence of theſe Provinces, and the Diſtreſs of the common Enemy, that appears to me to have led to this Treaty. If Acquiſition of Territory, or any Advantage ſhall ariſe from ſuch a Policy, the Company and the Nation will be benefitted without any of thoſe Riſks that ſeem to be regarded with ſo much Apprehenſion in the foregoing Minutes. I agree to the propoſed Treaty.

Governor General—I had no Suſpicion that the Members of this Government could be ignorant of the Conſequence, much leſs of the Exiſtence of the Rana of Goad; it was therefore unneceſſary for me to have inſtructed them on theſe Points, nor was I forward to introduce a Meaſure of ſelf-apparent Neceſſity, with Arguments which I know would be conteſted, and the Meaſure itſelf of ourſe oppoſed. We were upon the Eve of a War with the Maratta State, a War which is no leſs he Effect of the Company's decided Orders, than of the Meaſures of their Servants, to which this Government has given its Sanction. From General Goddard's Advices, it may be almoſt poſitively oncluded, that we are actually in a State of War with them, and poſſibly with other Powers comined with them; had this Government remained in total Inaction, had no Meaſure of this Kind een adopted, I ſhould have expected to have been reproached with ſuffering the Company to be rawn into a War with perhaps the firſt Power in India, without any Alliance to ſupport it, or to bviate the predatory Incurſions of ſuch an Enemy. I am now reproached with forming ſuch n Alliance, and on Grounds which will only apply to a State of perfect Peace and domeſtic Security; ere the Acquiſitions of Territory, or the Increaſe of Revenue the Object, the Operations of the reaty would not be limited to the Seaſon of War. If War has taken place, or ſhall take place ith the Maratta State, the Treaty ſecures the Support and Aſſiſtance of a powerful Prince, whoſe Dominions adjoin to our Frontier, and lie in one of the principal Roads through which the Marattas muſt paſs to invade us; and the Objects propoſed by the Alliance are ſuch as are moſt likely to weaken the Maratta State, by depriving it of its Reſources, and dividing its Attention; at the ſame Time the Principal in the Treaty with us, is a Man on whoſe perſonal Intereſts and Enmity to the Maratta State, we may depend for his faithful Adherence to it. He ſucceeded to his preſent Poſſeſſions by the Death of his Father, who loſt his Life and the Fortreſs of Gwalior at the ſame Time, in an Engagement with the Marattas, with whom the Son has been ever ſince in a State of Warfare. It is notorious, and will be probably known to many well-informed Perſons at Home, that the Marattas have made various Attempts to reduce the preſent Rana, with numerous Armies, conducted by their moſt eminent Leaders, and once by Ragonaut Row in Perſon, and have been as often repulſed with Diſcredit to their Government and Honour to the Rana. That he was the Protector of Two of the moſt important and obnoxious Characters in Hindoſtan, Gauzo O'Dien and Coſſim Ally Cawn, are Facts ſo notorious, that I cannot yet ſuppoſe any Member of this Board to be ignorant of them; and theſe alone are preſumptive, but very ſtrong Proofs of the Power of the Man whoſe State could prove an Aſylum to ſuch Fugitives. His perſonal Abilities are equally known, they are univerſally acknowledged and proved by his Actions.

I have ſaid that the Objects of the Treaty, and the Operations dependent on it, are reſtricted to a State of War with the Marattas. A War in which, with reſpect to the immediate Commencement of it, independent of former Cauſes, they muſt be the Aggreſſors by rejecting the Offers of Peace which we have made to them. If after all, my Suppoſition ſhall not be realized by the Event, but a Peace enſue, the Treaty becomes in itſelf null, being reduced to the ſimple Tie of Friendſhip, which alters nothing of the relative State in which we are at preſent with the Rana; and all the Conſequences which Mr. Francis concludes that it will entail upon us, which, ſuppoſe a War with the Marattas, are certainly more likely to happen from ſuch a War, if we have no Support, than with a Proviſion to avert them. I have had ſuch frequent Occaſion to complain of the unfair Manner in which Mr. Francis quotes my Words and Opinions, that I ſhall make no other Reply to his Aſſertion of the Contradiction of the preſent Meaſure to my own Principles, than that the Expreſſion which he has quoted appertains to a different Occaſion and a different Object, and bears no more Relation to the preſent Subject than the Diſpatch of Treaſure to Bombay or Surat.

Mr. Francis—Neither Mr. Wheler nor I have profeſſed to be ignorant of the Exiſtence of the Rana of Goad. But, when a Treaty of Alliance, offenſive and defenſive, is propoſed to be concluded with him, I preſume it is not enough to know that he exiſts. I for my own Part ſhould have held myſelf indebted to the Governor General, as I always am, for any Information he might have thought proper to give me of the Circumſtances and Situation of this Raja. It is probable that I might have endeavoured to obtain it myſelf from other Quarters, if at any Period ſince my Arrival in Bengal, I had thought it poſſible that an intimate Connection of Intereſts between the Company and him would ever have been propoſed. When a ſimilar Treaty was in Agitation with a much greater

Prince, (I mean Moodajee Boosla) the Governor General introduced the Proposition with a very particular Report of his Situation, Views, Family Connections, Resources, and Interests. The Lights with which the Governor General's last Minute have furnished me, do not tend to establish a favourable Opinion either of the Rana's Character or Strength. I do not wish to be connected with a Man, who is only known by the Protection he afforded to Persons so obnoxious to this Government and to India in general, as Cossim Ally Cawn and Gauzy O'Dien Cawn. And as to the Strength which enabled him to give them that Protection, I believe it to be purely defensive. He is a Hill Raja: I conclude he has strong Holds in the Mountains, and that it is not easy to come at him. Admitting it to be true, that at this Time, and to support a War which it is said is the Effect of the decided Orders of the Company, Alliances with some of the Country Powers might be useful and necessary, it does not follow that *all* and *every* Alliance deserves that Character. It is not at all unlikely, that we may find ourselves incumbered and embarrassed with the Burthen of a useless Ally. I mean to use the Words applied by the Governor General not long ago to our Connection with Moodajee Boosla; as I am sure I express the Sense of them. An offensive Union with Hyder Ally or the Nizam, or even with the Raja of Berar, if he could be separated from his Countrymen, might indeed on the Principles of the present War, be of Importance to its Success. The Rana of Goad is too inconsiderable to be of Weight in either Scale; but if his Strength were greater than it is, it would not necessarily follow that we should gain any Thing by uniting it to ours. Before such a Junction can be effected, we must cross the Jumna, and relinquish all the Security and other Advantages, which the Intervention of that great Barrier affords to all our Possessions, and to those of our Ally. By the same Act we divide our Force, and make it difficult, if not impracticable, for the different Parts of it so separated to assist each other. Every Operation we undertake on their Side of the River, so far from adding to our Strength or distressing the Enemy, is only laying ourselves open to Wounds in a Quarter where, if we stayed within our own Barrier, we might be invulnerable. We relinquish a Situation of superior Strength to meet our Enemy, if we do meet him, on equal Terms. I shall trouble the Board with but one Word more. The Governor General, it is true, has often complained of unfair Quotations, and this Complaint, I am informed, has been echoed in England; but I do not admit that it has ever been made with Reason. Let an Instance of any Moment be pointed out, and I am ready to join Issue upon it.

Governor General—I have never made the Complaint against Mr. Francis of an unfair Quotation, but I have pointed out the Instance, and proved it to be unfair. The present Instance is before us. I do remember, that when we were first informed of a War then supposed to be declared between Great Britain and France, I said, That our Part of the War must be purely defensive, because they had all to gain, and we to lose. I do not know whether these were the Words; but I am sure that this was the Substance and Sense of the Maxim which is now quoted as a Contradiction to the Proposal which I make of withstanding a predatory Enemy, already in Possession of a great Part of Hindostan, by distant and offensive Operations. For the rest of Mr. Francis's Minute, I do not think it necessary to reply to it, having, I think, in all our Contests generally allowed him the last Argument; and I think the Subject was sufficiently discussed in the preceding Minutes.

Mr. Francis—I admit that the Maxim which I have attributed to the Governor General was introduced on the Occasion he mentions; I nevertheless understood it to be a general one, at least it certainly could not be confined to the Case of a War with France, since at the same Point of Time, we strongly recommended, and by our Assistance promoted, the Siege of Pondicherry.

Governor General—Let it be added, that I at the same Time proposed a Measure which from its Tendency led to the Possibility at least of an offensive War with the Marattas, and this Proposition was made in the same Minute in which the Maxim now attributed to me was introduced; and I will venture to say, will not be understood from these Minutes, neither from those of Mr. Francis, or my own.

Agreed to the amended Draft of the Treaty.
Ordered that it be ingrossed fair, and executed.

Warren Hastings.
P. Francis.
Edw[d] Wheler."

Extract of Bengal Secret Consultations, 14th February 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Hastings, Governor General, President,
Philip Francis, } Esquires.
Edward Wheler, }
Mr. Barwell indisposed.
Sir Eyre Coote absent on a Visit to the different Stations of the Army.

The Governor General lays before the Board the following Minute, with a Letter and Inclosure, from the Commander in Chief.

Honourable

APPENDIX, N° 239.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have had the Honour to receive your Letter of the 6th Inſtant, incloſing a Draft of a Treaty propoſed to be entered into between the Honourable Company and Maha Raja Lookindein, Rana of Gohud; acquainting me that Captain Palmer is deputed to interchange the Ratification, and requiring of me in the mean Time to comply with any Application the Rana may make for the Company's Forces to act againſt the Marattas.

In Reply; while I beg Leave to aſſure you that the Company have no Officer more diſpoſed to obey and enforce your Commands, and that I ſhall punctually comply with thoſe now before me; yet as a Member of the Board I muſt, in Vindication of myſelf, and in Diſcharge of my Duty to my Country and the Company, not only proteſt againſt this Order, but againſt the Treaty itſelf; and requeſt they may both be recorded upon the Proceedings relative to this Object.

My Proteſt againſt the preſent Order is founded upon, and limited to the immediate State of our Politics reſpecting the Marattas with whom Hoſtilities are long ſince ceaſed, and with whom we have at this Inſtant an Agent negociating in Behalf of our Government to eſtabliſh a firm and honourable Peace.

In Oppoſition to this, when the preſent Order may be obeyed, we commence Hoſtilities and declare War at the very Moment perhaps when the Treaty is concluded between us, and in a Mode not as it ought to be; when we may, if obliged to renew the War againſt the Marattas by a vigorous Effort upon them from all our Preſidencies, in a Manner ſuitable to our military Fame, and likely to put an immediate and ſucceſsful End to it: No, we muſt by this Order carry it on under the Patronage of a petty Prince, a Tributary to Nudjiff Cawn, ſuppoſed not to poſſeſs above Six Lacks of Revenue, and Three to Four thouſand Troops, and commence a War at his Inſtigation and Pleaſure, while our own Policy and Intereſt leads us to aim at Peace.

My Exceptions to the Treaty I have ſeparately ſtated in the incloſed Proteſt.

But with regard to the Order, I repeat and beg to be underſtood that I intend the fulleſt Compliance, while I diſclaim in the ſtrongeſt Manner any Aſſent to the Meaſure.

I have the Honour to be, &c.

Allahabad, (Signed) Eyre Coote.
21ſt December 1779.

Allahabad, 21ſt Decr 1779.

Sir Eyre Coote—As a tacit Reception of the Treaty propoſed to be concluded with the Rana of Gohud, publicly ſent me by the Board, might ſubject me to a Suſpicion of aſſenting to a Meaſure, that I would upon no Conſideration ſubſcribe my Name to, I think myſelf obliged, in Support of my own Character and Conduct, for which alone I can be reſponſible, to give in the following Proteſt againſt it.

Againſt the 1ſt Article: I do not think that an Alliance, of the ſolemn Nature propoſed, with a Prince of ſo low an Eſtimation among thoſe of Hindoſtan as the Rana of Gohud is ſaid to be, can prove any Credit to the Company, as neither his Name or Power can ever benefit them, but on the contrary, his Weakneſs and Poverty make us conſtantly bear the Labour and Burden of his Avarice and Ambition, without reaping Benefit, or even Reimburſement; in ſhort, raiſe him at the gratuitous Expence of our Blood and Treaſure, not to mention the Sacrifice of our Fame.

Againſt the 2d Article: I muſt obſerve, that in caſe of a War with the Marattas, which it pre-ſuppoſes, it places the moſt extraordinary and unprecedented Power in the Hands of a Foreigner, that ever was deviſed by any Government for their own Deſtruction.

From the Poſts neareſt to him, which are our advanced Poſts, and moſt eſſential Stations, he may draw off and require what Numbers he pleaſes, and that by a ſimple Application to the Officer commanding thoſe particular Poſts, without Reference to our Government: And here permit me to aſk, what muſt be the Situation of the unfortunate Officer, who having eſtabliſhed thoſe Stations for the Defence of our Provinces, and the reſt of the Army perhaps entirely relying for our Security upon their being fully occupied, they are drawn off without his Knowledge or Conſent? and if he ſhould afterwards learn it, reinforce them; this again is liable to the ſame Reduction. He thus remains remedileſs, laid open to the Incurſions of the Enemy, without Means to ſave his Character or Credit, while alone reſponſible.

The Command of the advanced Part of our Army is hereby in fact tranſferred to the Rana, and enables him legally, and by our own Conſent, to become, if his Intereſt can be gained, the moſt powerful and dangerous Inſtrument againſt us that it is poſſible to conſtruct; and how far his Poverty may make him attainable to our Enemies, and in how much he is therein a ſafe Power to entruſt our Lives and Fame with, I leave to unbiaſſed Reflection to determine.

Further, when once poſſeſſing our Troops, without the Knowledge and Conſent of our Government he is alſo enabled legally to deprive us of the Power of recalling them; for they are to remain as long as he ſhall require it, and return when he ſhall diſmiſs them; and after all, the Expence of them not even inſured to us, for there is a bare Promiſe to pay, without the leaſt Mention of Security.

Againſt the 3d Article: It is to be obſerved, that the Treaty ſwerving from its oſtenſibly declared Object, of aſſiſting in his Defence againſt the Marattas, upon a Pre ſuppoſition of both Parties being engaged in a Maratta War, now launches into a general War upon all foreign and domeſtic Enemies

mies; thus at once plunging us into a War with all Hindoſtan, even againſt our own Allies, ſhould the Rana be pleaſed to bring them under the other Objects of his Policy.

Againſt the 4th Article: It is extraordinary, that after our Men and Treaſures ſhall have been employed, as propoſed in the 3d Article, againſt all foreign and domeſtic Enemies; we are only to reap the Benefit of Acquirements from the Marattas, for the Article of Diviſion is reſtricted to them alone. If the Sword is to be drawn againſt whomſoever the Rana may direct, we ſhould at leaſt be entitled to benefit equally by whomſoever may fall under it. The perpetual Tribute herein mentioned, is, like the Payment of the Troops, left without the Shadow of Security.

The 5th Article, while equally inconſiſtent with the reſt, in overſetting the foregoing Propoſals, gives the Rana a Pre-eminence, entitling him to an Attention and Conſideration from us, which he is not reſtricted by. We give him the Command of our Army, which is to obey at his Summons; but we are to addreſs him, and his Government, not in like manner, to command his Officers to attend.

But this Self Humiliation is immaterial, in compariſon to a further Point in this Article. By the 2d Article, a War is pre-ſuppoſed between the Marattas and the contracting Parties, and upon our Forces aſſiſting his, he is to pay for them; but here, if it is judged expedient to employ the combined Forces beyond the Rana's Dominions, each Party is to bear his own Expences. This totally overſets the former Article, for by that the combined Forces of the Rana, and the Company, are to be employed either in his Defence, which may be at Home, or to acquire Territory, which muſt be abroad, that is, beyond the Dominions of the Raja; and under both theſe Deſcriptions we are to be paid (if we can get it) by the 2d Article, and bear our own Expences by the 5th. And if we are to ſuppoſe our Forces not combined, in the Poſition of the 2d Article, then, we are to proceed alone, wherever the Rana may direct, which to any Perſon who may have any Feeling left for our Credit, is the worſe Option of the Two. Again, by the 5th Article, when the combined Troops may have marched to Oogein, or Indoor, to ſeek the Enemy and deliver Battle, he may then, agreeably to Treaty, leave us to ſtand the Brunt alone; Point of partial Convenience to him, by which, without ſuppoſing him to betray us, (which he may alſo do, agreeable to Treaty) our whole Army may be loſt. Further, when our Troops are returning, which ſuppoſes a Peace made, in which he is to be a Party, by the 8th Article he may even then ſtop our Troops, though perhaps under the moſt urgent Orders to defend our Southern Provinces; he may detain them to go amuſing himſelf in foreign Conqueſts, while we may be in the utmoſt Want of them at Home.

The 6th Article places the commanding Officer in a very diſagreeable Situation, limiting his Power to the mere Execution, while the Service required may be very diſhonourable for our Troops to be engaged in.

The 7th Article, of a Complexion with the reſt, does not omit, in whatever Caſe it may be, to leave the Rana a compleat Authority over his own Troops even in the Midſt of Battle; ſo that by a Difference of Opinion, they may prove the Deſtruction of our Army, inſtead of an Aid to it.

So that by the 2d Article, our Troops are taken from the advanced Poſts, without the Participation of our Government, or Knowledge of the commanding Officer, who ſtationed them for the Defence and Security of theſe Provinces, and then detained againſt the Power of recalling them; by the 5th Article ſtopt, if under March for our own Defence; and laſtly, may be left unſupported even in the extremeſt Danger, if we do not blindly follow his Opinion.

The 8th Article may make the trifling Object of the Poſſeſſion of an hereditary Fort, though it muſt undoubtedly be obtained by our Arms, an Obſtacle in all Situations to our making Peace with the Marattas; a Reſtriction, the Impolicy of which might, upon a foreign Invaſion, ſoon be felt. And here it may be obſerved, that Gwalior is not a Fort belonging to his Family, but the royal Line.

Having now ſtated my Objections to every Article of the Treaty, for the 9th has no public Object in it, I can ſee the Whole in no other Light than as dangerous to ourſelves, a Breach of Treaty to the Vizier, and impolitic in the ſtrongeſt Degree, without a ſingle ſecured Benefit. I therefore proteſt againſt the Whole, and leave the Conſequences upon thoſe who may carry it into Force.

At the ſame Time I muſt diſtinguiſh, that although I diſapprove of the Treaty now propoſed, veſting in a foreign Prince ſuch a Command of our Army as might be fatal to ourſelves, and prevent any Officer of Reputation taking Charge of it in theſe Quarters, a Power that no Ally ſhould have, yet I am ready now, and at other Periods, to enter into any convenient Agreement with the Rana, for co operating with mutual Benefit in Time of War, without ſubjecting ourſelves to the ſevere Reſtrictions of the propoſed Treaty.

But any Agreement with him I conſider as highly improper, until we have certain Information of the State of General Goddard's Negociation with the Marattas.

(Signed) Eyre Coote.

Warren Haſtings,
P. Francis,
Edwd. Wheler.

Extract

APPENDIX, N° 239.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 17th February 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Philip Francis, } Eſquires.
Edward Wheler, }
Mr. Barwell indiſpoſed.

The Governor General propoſes that the following Reply be written to the Letter and Proteſt from Sir Eyre Coote, entered in the laſt Conſultation:

Sir,

We have received a Letter from you, incloſing a Proteſt dated the 21ſt December laſt, againſt the Treaty concluded with the Rana of Gohud, which you had thought it neceſſary to make as a Member of the Board, in Vindication of yourſelf, and to ſend down to be recorded in our Proceedings relative to that Object.

The great Irregularity of an abſent Member's reviewing the Acts of Government, and proteſting againſt them, after they have been formally and finally determined by a legal Vote of the Board, obliges us to take Notice of your preſent Letter, and to acquaint you, that the Treaty with the Rana of Gohud became binding on the Faith of the Company from the Date of its Execution in Calcutta; and that the whole Board, as well as every Perſon ſubordinate to it, were obliged in Duty to give it Effect, ſo far as it might be their Province reſpectively to bear any Concern in the Accompliſhment of its Stipulations. In your preſent Situation, abſent from our Councils, we can only regard you as Commander in Chief of the Army, and not reſponſible for any Steps taken without your Participation. In this Light we tranſmitted a Copy of the Treaty to you, not for your Opinion upon it, but becauſe it became neceſſary to make you acquainted with its Contents, and to entruſt ſome Clauſes to be carried into Execution under your Orders.

We ſhall be at all Times willing to receive your Opinion upon any Meaſures which you may either think fit to propoſe, or which may be yet open to our Conſideration, and to allow every Degree of Weight to the Arguments on which it may be founded, that is due to your military Knowledge, and to the Reſpect which we perſonally bear to your Character; but you muſt be ſenſible that, in the preſent Caſe, they come too late to be attended with any Effect. The Impropriety of your preſent Claim cannot be more pointedly ſhewn, than by the following Clauſe in the Concluſion of your Minute: "Yet I am ready now, and at other Periods, to enter into any convenient "Agreement with the Rana for co-operating with mutual Benefit in Time of War, without ſub-"jecting ourſelves to the ſevere Reſtrictions of the propoſed Treaty." This is in Effect a Propoſition for cancelling a Treaty already executed with every Formality and Sanction which could be given to it, for the Purpoſe of admitting another in its ſtead, which may be propoſed by yourſelf at ſome future and indefinite Period; a Privilege which, if allowed, would annihilate all the Powers which the Board poſſeſs of making Alliances.

We do not know whether the Rana has yet made any Application to you, for a Detachment of our Troops to aſſiſt him; but if he ſhall, we think it proper to repeat our Injunctions, that ſuch a Proportion as you ſhall deem ſufficient to perform the Service propoſed, be immediately granted; and we hope, if any Requiſition has already been made to you for this Purpoſe, that you will have complied with it previous to the Receipt of this Letter.

Fort William,
17th February, 1770.

We are, &c.

Mr. Francis—Without departing from the Opinion I delivered, concerning the Treaty with the Rana of Gohud, while that Meaſure was under Deliberation, I agree in the general Reaſoning expreſſed in this Letter.

Mr. Wheler ſubſcribes to this Opinion, and agrees to the Letter.

Reſolved, That the Letter be written accordingly.

APPENDIX, N° 240.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 6th December 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis, } Eſquires.
Edward Wheler,

Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote abſent on a Viſit to the different Stations of the Army.

THE following Minute from the Governor General was ſent in on Saturday laſt; and agreeably to his Directions circulated to the Members of the Board:

Governor General—Having, in conſequence of a Treaty, paſſed the Board for an Alliance with the Rana of Gohud, required of his Vackeel to produce the Powers with which he was inveſted for executing it on the Part of his Maſter, he delivered to me a Paper which I ſhall lay before the Board at their next Meeting, containing ſimply the Rajah's public Seal; and which, with his Letters declaring the Vackeel to be deputed for the Purpoſe of concluding ſuch a Treaty, are deemed ſufficient and ample Authority, according to the Forms and Uſage of Indoſtan; but as the Rana has not ſet his Name to the Paper, and with us the Signatures of the contracting Parties are held indiſpenſable to the Validity of all public Engagements, I informed the Vackeel of this Defect in his Powers. He requeſted that they might, with the Addition of his own Seal and Signature, be admitted for the preſent Execution of the Treaty; and to remove all Doubt, and authenticate it according to our Forms, he made me a Propoſal, which I now lay before the Board, under his Hand and Seal, for ſending a Perſon on the Part of this Government to witneſs the Rana's final Execution of it, and exchange the Ratification; and I recommend it for their Approbation.

(Signed) W. H.

Arzie from Muzhir Ally, Vackeel of the Rana of Gohud.

As I underſtand from what you ſaid, that the Cuſtoms of your Country require that the contracting Parties ſhould ſign their Names to the Treaty to give it Credit and Validity, I am therefore hopeful, and make it my Requeſt, that ſince the Rajah in his Letters to you has aſſured you of the Validity of my Powers, you will for the preſent accept of a Furd, with my Signature, and the Seal of the Maha Rajah; and that a Gentleman of Truſt may be ſent to the Maha Rajah, that all the Points which have been ſettled here may be finally concluded there in the Preſence of ſuch Gentlemen; and that in like Manner as I have repreſented many things on the Part of the Maha Rajah, ſuch Gentlemen may obtain Satisfaction in all Matters, and ſee the Maha Rajah ſet his Signature to the Treaty. This will be highly pleaſing to the Maha Rajah, and gain me Credit with you.

The following Opinions were returned on the above Minute and Arzee:

I agree to the Propoſitions.

(Signed) Richard Barwell.

Mr. Francis—If the Vackeel be not inveſted with ſufficient Powers to execute the Treaty on the Part of his Conſtituent, we ought not to have proceeded with him ſo far as we have done: The Extent of his Powers ſhould regularly have been aſcertained in the firſt Inſtance. For my own Part, I am perfectly ſatisfied with the Rajah's Seal, and the Contents of his Letters. It is not likely that he ſhould refuſe to ratify a Treaty by which he is intitled and empowered to require the Aſſiſtance of our Forces *for the Defence of his Country, or for the Acquiſition of Territory*; without any other Limitation or Deſcription of the Amount of ſuch Force, to be ſent *immediately on his Requiſition*, except that it ſhould be *proportioned to the Exigency of the Service*, of which the Rana is to be the Judge. The deputing a Gentleman on purpoſe to Goad, to ſee the Treaty ratified, is in my Opinion a very uſeleſs, and I am ſure it will be a very expenſive Meaſure. I am therefore entirely againſt it: I do not even know that the Rana's Signature is wanted. The Public Seal, on both Sides, is the true Authentication of their Public Acts reſpectively.

(Signed) P. Francis.

Agreed. E. W.

Reſolved,

Reſolved, That a Perſon be deputed on the Part of this Government to the Rana of Goad for the Purpoſe of ſeeing the Treaty executed, and for exchanging the Ratifications.

The Governor General now produces to the Board the Paper mentioned in his Minute above recorded, under the Seal of the Rana of Goad.

Governor General—I move, That Captain Palmer, my Military Secretary, may be deputed to interchange the Treaties with the Rana of Goad according to the Propoſal of the Miniſter, entered in the former Part of this Day's Conſultation.

Mr. Wheler—It having already been agreed by a Majority of this Board to ſend a Perſon on the Part of this Government to witneſs the Rajah's final Execution of the Treaty, and exchange the Ratifications, I aſſent to the Governor General's Motion in favour of Captain Palmer.

Mr. Francis—I ſhould have thought it would have been more eaſy and leſs expenſive, to have ſent an Officer from the neareſt Station, but I have no Objection to Captain Palmer.

Mr. Barwell—I agree.

Reſolved, That Captain Palmer be deputed to the Rana of Goad to witneſs his final Execution of the Treaty entered in Conſultation the 2d Inſtant, and to exchange the Ratification with him.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, 9th December 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis, } Eſquires.
Edward Wheler,

Sir Eyre Coote abſent on a Viſit to the different Stations of the Army.

The Secretary lays before the Board Two Drafts of the Treaty with the Rana of Goad, engroſſed in the Engliſh and Perſian Languages, and reports that Meer Muzzer Ally, the Miniſter of the Rana, is in waiting.

Agreed, That he be admitted.

The Treaties are now ſigned by the Board and by the Miniſter of the Rana of Goad.

Ordered, That they be ſent to Captain Palmer to be ratified by the Rana in his Preſence according to the former Reſolution of the Board.

Warren Haſtings.
P. Francis.
Edw[d] Wheler.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, 13th December 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis, } Eſquires.
Edward Wheler,

Sir Eyre Coote abſent on a Viſit to the different Stations of the Army.

The Governor General propoſes, that Captain Palmer be permitted to draw the ſame Allowances during his Deputation to Goad, as were aſſigned to Mr. Elliott on his Deputation to Berar; and that Mr. Thomas Short be appointed Aſſiſtant to Captain Palmer with the ſame Allowances as were granted to Mr. Farquhar, Aſſiſtant to Mr. Elliott.

Mr. Wheler—I have not yet conſidered the Buſineſs or which Captain Palmer is going to undertake, in the ſame Light or of the ſame Importance with that which was intruſted to the Charge of Mr. Elliott; at this Diſtance of Time I do not perfectly recollect whether the Allowances given to that Gentleman were not objected to by me: However, I do not mean to revert to a former Opinion upon a Subject ſo perſonal as the preſent, though I would wiſh the Allowances

had been ſuch on this Occaſion as I ſhould have judged ſafe to have acceded to, which, as they are now ſtated, I muſt beg Leave to decline.

Mr. Francis—Mr. Elliott's Allowances amounted to Current Rupees 3,318 per Month, thoſe of his Aſſiſtant to 555, in all 3,873. I think they are much too high for the preſent Occaſion, and that as Captain Palmer is only deputed to ſee the Treaty with the Rana executed, he cannot have any Uſe or Employment for an Aſſiſtant.

Mr. Barwell—I think the Allowances of Mr. Elliott were regulated by thoſe allotted to Colonel Upton on his Embaſſy to Poona; and however large they may have appeared to the Court of Directors, I have Reaſon to think, that neither Colonel Upton nor Mr. Elliott were enabled to make any conſiderable Saving from their Allowances; the Circumſtances in which Captain Palmer is placed are nearly the ſame, and the Appearance he muſt make muſt be regulated upon the ſame Principle. The Difference of Rank between Colonel Upton and Captain Palmer can be no Rule to direct the Judgment on this Occaſion. He is the Servant of the Government in the ſame Line as Colonel Upton was, and he muſt ſupport the ſame Character; I therefore aſſent to the Motion.

Agreed, That Captain Palmer be permitted to draw the ſame Allowances as Mr. Elliott, viz. Lieutenant Colonel's Pay, and double Batta per Month, Sonaut Rupees 1,488. Fixed Salary 1000, and Contingencies, including Moonchies, Servants, &c. 500.

Agreed, That Mr. Short be appointed Aſſiſtant to Captain Palmer with the ſame Allowances as Mr. Farquhar, viz. the Pay and Batta of a Captain per Month, Sonaut Rupees 512.

APPENDIX, N° 241.

From Maha Rajah Ranna Chatter Sing: Received 13th March.

AFTER expreſſing the Earneſtneſs of his Deſire to have a perſonal Interview with the Governor, and lamenting the Impoſſibility of his enjoying that Happineſs at preſent, he proceeds thus:

This is the State of my Affairs. At this Time a War is on the Eve of breaking out between me and the Marattas, occaſioned by my having retaken a Diſtrict of which they had diſpoſſeſſed me, and which they will doubtleſs endeavour to recover, in which caſe I have no other Hope but in your Aid. I flatter myſelf that when I find it neceſſary to apply to you, you will grant my Requeſt and oblige me with an Army, for the Support of which I will agree to ſuch Terms as you ſhall be pleaſed to intimate to me.

I have given Wully Ulla his Diſpatches, and directed him to proceed to your Preſence; from him you will be informed of every Particular relative to this Quarter. I was ſome Time ago honoured with a royal Firmaund to take Poſſeſſion of the Fort of Goalear, to which 22 Mahals are attached. Regarding this as proceeding from the Bounty of the Almighty, and as a Means of raiſing me Credit, I, with very little Trouble, reduced the ſaid Fort and Mahals to my Obedience, and obtained a Sunnud thereof from the Vizier of the Empire. Knowing that this would afford you Pleaſure, I could not omit to communicate it to you. I hope that regarding me in the Light of a ſincere Friend you will frequently favour me with the News of your Welfare.

APPENDIX, N° 242.

To Rajah Chatter Sing Lochinder Behadre; dated the 16th May 1776.

THE Deſire which you expreſs of an Alliance with me, gives me Pleaſure; but it is impoſſible to afford you Aſſiſtance at this Time: I however recommend your living in Terms of Friendſhip with the Vizier, and conſulting him; you will favour me with frequent Accounts of your Health.

From

APPENDIX, N° 242, 243.

From the Nabob Mobarck ul Dowlah.

Shiek Wully Oatah, the Vackeel of Maha Rajah Sewae Ranna Chatta Sing, the Rajah of Gohud, has preſented me with a Letter from his Maſter, and a Nuzzir of Five Rupees. Having peruſed it, I encloſe it for your Information. As I hold no Connection nor Correſpondence with the Weſtern Chiefs, and place my ſole Reliance and Dependance on your Favour, be pleaſed to inform me of the Conduct you think it proper for me to purſue; if you would have me write an Anſwer, favour me with a Draft, agreeable to which I will write and deliver to the Vackeel. As he is very preſſing to be diſpatched, that he may return to his Maſter, I requeſt you will oblige me with an immediate Reply

Encloſure in the above.

Letter from Maha Ranna Swae Chatta Sing Lokindur Bahadre, to the Nabob Mobarck ul Dowlah; received the 7th Zehedja.

After the uſual Compliments:

I have long entertained an earneſt Deſire to enjoy the Happineſs of an Interview with you. Language is too weak to expreſs how greatly I am deſirous of this Event. May the Almighty grant the Accompliſhment of this Wiſh.

My Situation is as follows: I am on the Brink of a War with the Marattas, having recovered from them a Place which they had formerly deprived me of; they will doubtleſs reſent this I was formerly united in the Bonds of Friendſhip with your Highneſs's Anceſtors, and had great Hopes from the Nabob Sajah ul Moulk Hiſſam ul Dowlah, Mier Mahomed Jaffier Khan Behadre, Mohabut Jung. The Renewal of theſe Ties is greatly to be wiſhed.

I ſome Time ago addreſſed a Letter to the Governor Mr. Haſtings, Jelladut Jung Bahadre, requeſting his Aid; to which he replied, That as the ſtricteſt Union ſubſiſted between us, whenever I ſhould require it, Orders ſhould be ſent to the Chiefs ſtationed in this Quarter to aſſiſt me with their Forces: I therefore beg Leave to requeſt of you, who are the Maſter of that Country, that you will exert yourſelf in this Buſineſs with the Governor, who will pay Attention to your Deſire. I have no Doubt of his immediate Compliance with your Application, and that he will be kindly pleaſed to grant me the Services of a Brigade of his Forces whenever they may be requiſite. I will diſcharge whatever ſhall be fixed for the Expence of the Troops. I am hopeful, that regarding me as zealouſly attached to you, you will make me happy by frequent Letters.

I received a royal Firmaun for the Fort of Gonwalier, with 22 Mahuls, confirmed by a Sunnud from the Vizier. This I mention for your Highneſs's Information, and for further Particulars beg Leave to refer you to Sheik Wully Oatah, to whoſe Repreſentations I requeſt your Credit and Attention.

APPENDIX, N° 243.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 6th December 1779.

THE Governor General thinks it incumbent on him to lay before the Board the following Paper of Intelligence, which was incloſed in a Letter to him from the Commander in Chief:

Extract of a Letter from Futty Gurr; 20th November 1779.

I have likewiſe juſt now received from Goad the diſagreeable News of the Marattas having made themſelves Maſters of the Fort of Arhaund (which I had the Honour to inform you ſome Time ago was inveſted) and put the Garriſon to the Sword. The ſame Account informs me, that they are preparing to attack another Fort; and that the Rajah is by no Means in a Condition to oppoſe them; his Troops being not only inferior in point of Number to the Enemy, but alſo diſpirited and ready to mutiny on account of the long Arrears due to them, which he is at preſent unable to pay. In this Situation of his Affairs, the ſpeedy Conqueſt of his whole Country muſt be the Conſequence of the Enemy puſhing their Advantage with that Briſkneſs which the defenceleſs State of it ſeems to invite.

Governor

Governor General—Having communicated this Intelligence to Meer Muzzer Ally, the Rana's Miniſter, he informed me, that he had received no Letters from his Maſter ſince his Arrival; and therefore concluded, that the Danger ſtated as impending on his Country from the Maratta Invaſion, had been much exaggerated; but thought it probable, that the Fort of Arhaund, mentioned in the Intelligence, had been taken by the Marattas; that it was ſituated on the Southern Extremity of his Dominions, and not capable of much Reſiſtance. There can be no Doubt that a Maratta Force has entered the Territories of the Rana of Goad, though of itſelf not likely to be productive of any material Conſequences. It appears to me to be the Part of a Plan, which I was lately informed, by a Channel which I have hitherto experienced to be of good Authority, had been concerted by the ruling Adminiſtration at Poona, for the general Conduct of the War againſt the Company; namely, that Nana Furneeſe and Hurry Punt Furkia were to conduct the War againſt General Goddard; and that Moodajee Scindia and Tucoojee Holcar were to unite their Forces, and proceed immediately againſt the Rana of Goad to reduce his Country, and afterwards enter the Doab, and the Dominions of the Nabob of Oude, or into the Countries dependent on Bengal, as the Circumſtances of the Times ſhould direct them preferably to either. I have ſince heard that this Plan has been changed, and that all the Chiefs above mentioned had united their Forces, and were preparing to march directly againſt General Goddard. It appears, however, equally neceſſary to guard againſt any Attempts which may have been projected againſt the Rana of Goad, and to ſtrengthen his Hands to enable him the better to act in concert with us, if that Deſign, from whatever Cauſe, ſhall have been ſuſpended: I therefore move, That a Copy of the Treaty, which it has been agreed to conclude with the Rana of Goad, be immediately tranſmitted to the Commander in Chief, with Inſtructions to comply with any immediate Requiſition which the Rana of Goad may make for a Detachment of our Forces, proportioned to the Exigency of the Service required by it; of which he will of courſe be the Judge.

Mr. Wheler—I am againſt the Motion.

Mr. Francis—If the Board were diſpoſed to make a right Uſe of the Intelligence contained in the preceding Letter, I ſhould have thought it a fortunate Circumſtance that we had received it before any thing had been finally concluded with the Rana's Vackeel. The Rana of Goad's Situation, by this Letter, appears to be conſiderably worſe than what it was repreſented to me: One of his Forts was taken; the Marattas were preparing to attack another; and the ſpeedy Conqueſt of his whole Country was likely to be the Conſequence: If this be the Caſe, we are going to execute a Treaty with a Prince who may have neither an Army nor any Dominions left. His Army is diſpirited and ready to mutiny for want of Pay, which he is unable to give them. If he cannot pay his own Troops, how will it be poſſible for him to diſcharge the Subſidy which he engages to pay for ours? Inſtead of enlarging his Territories by Conqueſt, which is the profeſſed Object of the Treaty, our firſt Labour will be to recover for him what he has already loſt; and this muſt be attempted by marching a Part of our Army to a conſiderable Diſtance on the Side of the Jumna.

I do not conſider the preſent Invaſion of his Country by the Marattas, as belonging to or the Effect of any particular Plan of Operations againſt the Company. He is at conſtant Enmity with the Marattas; and I look upon this Attack as nothing more than a Continuance of former Hoſtilities againſt him. At all Events, we ſhall only diſtreſs ourſelves, and abandon the Protection of our own Frontier, by engaging in his Defence: I am therefore againſt the Motion.

Mr. Barwell—I agree to the Motion. I cannot adopt the Opinion, that to allow the Marattas to conquer a Country ſo near to our Frontier, and extend their Poſſeſſions quite up to it, will be attended with any of thoſe Advantages which have been ſuppoſed as the probable Reſult of our not oppoſing their Progreſs. The Intelligence that has been laid before the Board, rather determined me to engage our Government in the Support of the Rana of Goad, than to leave the Country an eaſy Conqueſt to the only Enemy from whom we have any Reaſon to apprehend any Miſchief.

Agreed to the Governor General's Motion; and ordered, That a Copy of the Treaty with the Rana of Goad be immediately tranſmitted to the Commander in Chief, with the following Letter:

To Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote, K. B. Commander in Chief, &c.

Sir,

Maha Rajah Luckinder Behadur, the Rana of Goad, having deputed confidential Miniſters with Powers to negociate and conclude a Treaty of Alliance with this Government and his, of which we incloſe a Copy for your Information, the Original will be formally ſigned and ſealed by us on one Part, and by the Miniſters of the Rana on the other Part; but we think it neceſſary that it ſhould be likewiſe executed by the Rana in Perſon, and have therefore deputed Captain Palmer to ſee it performed, and to exchange the Ratifications with him. In the mean Time, ſhould the Rana make any Application to you for a Detachment of the Company's Forces to act againſt the Marattas, we requeſt that you will comply with his Requiſitions, proportioning the Number of Troops to the Exigency of the Service on which they are ſent.

We are, &c.

Fort William,
the 6th December 1779.

APPENDIX, N° 244.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 23d December 1779.

RECEIVED the following Letter from the Commander in Chief:

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Captain Popham has juſt informed me, that his Party is ready to move, except the Candahar Horſe, which were not arrived. I ſpoke to the Nabob concerning them this Morning, who aſſures me they are ready to join him whenever they are demanded, and though he is a Lack and a Half of Rupees in Arrears to them, they make no Objection to marching, and receive the current Pay from us, provided they have Security that the Nabob will diſcharge this Debt in future; ſo that you will now, Gentlemen, pleaſe to give your final Orders reſpecting the Movement of this Detachment, which ſhall be followed by ſuch military Inſtructions as I may find neceſſary to give. However, I wiſh ſome further Accounts may come from General Goddard, relative to his Situation before thoſe Orders are put in Execution, for if all the flying Reports I hear be true, it may be neceſſary to move a great Part of the Troops here, in order to ſecure the Junction we meditate, as Captain Popham ſeems ſenſible, that from Delay, occaſioned by Lateneſs of the Seaſon, the Deſign is too well known through the Country.

Indeed, if War is to be continued with the Marattas, other and more conſequential Steps muſt be taken, than merely the ſupplying General Goddard's Army from hence; and I ſhould hope the Gentlemen at Madras have taken into Conſideration before this Time, the Letter we addreſſed to them upon that Subject.

I incloſe the Copy of a Return I have received from Brigadier General Stibbert, as a convincing Proof that the Golandauze have no Objection to enter into other Corps, either as Sepoys or Laſcars; and that you have conſequently a Right to expect, they will enliſt with equal Facility at Calcutta, unleſs Obſtructions are thrown in the Way of my Orders.

Upon a careful Survey of Chunar Ghur, I find myſelf exceedingly diſappointed in it as a Place of Strength; it is by no Means ſuch, as in its preſent State it can only be defended by Muſketry, and that to ſo little Purpoſe, that I will venture to ſay an Army, well conducted, would not be ſtopped Four-and-twenty Hours by it; but if its natural Advantages are properly attended to, it may, at a very moderate Expence be made a Poſt of great Conſequence, where Magazines of all Kinds of Stores, ſo neceſſary for the ſupplying of all different Stations, or to anſwer any Exigencies in theſe diſtant Provinces, might be laid up in Security. Captain Gardiner has already laid a Plan before you, which I have inſpected, and would recommend to the Board, as anſwering, with ſome ſmall Alterations which I mentioned to him and he approved of, every Purpoſe deſired.

The little Fort at Buxar will become entirely uſeleſs, unleſs it is kept in Repair, and as I think it a Poſt of great Advantage in many Reſpects, I ſhould adviſe its being attended to immediately; the Eſtimate is made at Ten thouſand Rupees, but the Sum of Five thouſand would, I ſhould imagine, anſwer the Purpoſe at preſent, and an Allowance of One hundred Rupees per Month be ſufficient to keep it up afterwards. By what I have ſeen of Captain Eaton, who commands there, I think he might very properly be entruſted with the Management of this Buſineſs, as his Attention to it has already been ſuch as to induce him to be at the Expence of ſeveral little Matters himſelf, rather than ſee them run entirely to Ruin.

Poppa Mow, near Allahabad,
the 11th December 1779.

I have the Honour to be, &c. &c.
(Signed) Eyre Coote.

Ordered, That the 6th Paragraph be referred to the Military Department, and the 7th Paragraph to the Board of Inſpection.

Reſolved, That the following Reply be written to the Commander in Chief:

To Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote, K. B. Commander in Chief.

Sir,

We have been favoured with your Letter of the 11th Inſtant. We beg Leave to incloſe, for your Information, Copy of a Letter, which we have juſt received from General Goddard, under Date the 28th of October; and that you may be apprized as early as poſſible of his further Proceedings, we have directed the Secretary to furniſh you with Copies of all the Letters which we may receive from him, immediately on their Arrival. With reſpect to the Expediency of ſending Captain Popham's Detachment to reinforce General Goddard's Army, as you will be the beſt Judge whether it can now reach him in time to render any effectual Service to the Cauſe in which he will be engaged, we requeſt that you will order it, or not, as you ſhall ſee neceſſary.

We are, &c.
Warren Haſtings,
P. Francis,
Edward Wheler.

Fort William,
the 23d December 1779.

APPENDIX, No 245.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, 23d December 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis, } Eſquires.
Edward Wheler,
Sir Eyre Coote abſent on a Viſit to the different Stations of the Army.

READ the following Extract of a Letter from the Preſident and Select Committee at Bombay:

Gentlemen,

We Yeſterday received Advices from Buſſora, dated the 21ſt ultimo, encloſing Extract of a Letter from His Majeſty's Ambaſſador at the Porte to the Conſul at Aleppo, dated 24th of July, and Copy of a Paper given in by the Spaniſh Ambaſſador, on the 16th of June, to the Lord Viſcount Weymouth; which amounting to a Declaration of War, we loſe no Time in tranſmitting you this intereſting Intelligence, and Copies of the ſaid Paper and Letter.

By the ſame Channel we learn that Sir Charles Hardy, with a Fleet of Fifty Sail of the Line, was to oppoſe the combined Fleets of France and Spain, which had not then joined, and that the latter Fleet of Indiamen, conſiſting of Nine Sail of Ships, had ſailed from Spithead the 11th June, convoyed to a certain Latitude by a Squadron bound for Newfoundland under Admiral Edwards.

The Packet from General Goddard, mentioned in his Letter of the 20th, will be forwarded in a few Days by the Fez Allum.

We are, &c. &c.

Bombay Caſtle,
31ſt October 1779.

(Signed) William Hornby,
and Council.

Read a Letter from General Goddard, as follows:

Gentlemen,

I had the Honour of addreſſing you the 20th Inſtant, and informed you of the Steps I had taken in conſequence of your Orders of the 13th September.

The Emiſſary Nehah Chund has however anticipated the Period limited for receiving a deciſive Anſwer by a few Days, and this Morning brought me Letters from the Peiſhwa and Miniſter, the Purport of which are referring me to this Man for a Knowledge of their final Sentiments; he has accordingly in plain and direct Terms declared to me, in the Name of his Maſter, that he will not accede to the Propoſals I had made him, or conclude Peace with the Engliſh, unleſs Ragonaut Row is delivered up to him, and Salſette reſtored to the Maratta Government.

I have in conſequence of this Reply broke off the Negociation, as I cannot conſiſtent with your Inſtructions, give my Conſent to either of theſe Points; and purpoſe ſetting out for Bombay immediately to concert with the Honourable Preſident and Select Committee the Plan of future Operations, upon which, as it will be neceſſary to loſe no Time in coming to a Determination, I hope ſoon to be able to ſend you the moſt full and particular Information.

At preſent I only beg Leave to obſerve, that as the Maratta Chiefs ſeem at this Time to be united in Council, and as I am well aſſured that the Sentiments of Sindia are the moſt hoſtile of any of them; to make the Overture to him as directed in your Letter of the 14th June, could not, I am convinced, at this Time be productive of any good Conſequences; on the contrary it might be conſtrued into a Conſciouſneſs of Inferiority, and would, it is to be feared, be received by him with Deriſion and Indifference. Under theſe Circumſtances I ſhall defer it until I obtain your further Inſtructions, or until Circumſtances in the courſe of our Operations may render it expedient and advantageous; for as the Connection of this Chief with the Miniſter is founded upon Conſiderations of Intereſt and Ambition only, a Door will be open for treating with him whenever he can be perſuaded it is for his political Advantage to liſten to us.

I have the Pleaſure to acquaint you that Veſſels have been diſpatched ſome Time ago from Bombay

bay down the Coaſt of Malabar, to tranſport the Mahé Detachment, and I have Reaſon to expect being ſoon joined by the Force.

I have the Honour to be, &c. &c.
(Signed) Thomas Goddard.

Head Quarters Camp
near Surat, 28th October 1779.

Ordered, That a Copy of the above Letter from General Goddard be ſent to the Commander in Chief, and that the Secretary do furniſh him with Copies of all Letters which may be received from General Goddard immediately on their Arrival.

APPENDIX, N° 246.

Extract of a Letter from the Governor General and Council in Bengal to the Court of Directors; dated 14th January 1780.

SOON after receiving a confirmed and particular Account of the late unfortunate Retreat of the Bombay Army before the Maratta Forces from Worgaum, which was tranſmitted to us with a Copy of the Letter written to you by the Preſident and Select Committee on that Occaſion, we heard of the ſafe Arrival of Colonel Goddard and his Detachment at Surat, whither this Event had induced him to proceed by direct and ſpeedy Marches.

Although the Preſident and Select Committee at Bombay had deputed Mr. Horſely, one of the covenanted Servants on that Eſtabliſhment, to us, with their Proceedings, in order to explain any Matters of Doubt which might ariſe, or to ſatisfy our Enquiries on any Point of Reference which we might make to him reſpecting them, we did not think proper to enter into a Scrutiny of the Conduct of that Board, or the Committee appointed by them to manage the political Affairs of the Expedition; neither did we conſent to paſs any Opinion on the Charges preferred by the Preſident againſt Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, which were alſo referred to our Judgment; but rather choſe to leave the grand Point to be decided by the Authority of your ultimate Sentence, on a full Review of the Tranſactions which had been reported to you, and to recommend a General Court Martial for the Trial of the Officers accuſed, over whom we could exerciſe no Juriſdiction, unleſs the Select Committee ſhould think neceſſary to ſuſpend them by virtue of their own Authority.

But we judged it neceſſary to enter into an immediate and ſerious Conſideration of the Difficulties into which this unfortunate Failure had brought your Affairs at Bombay, and to concert ſome effectual and decided Plan to retrieve them. In this View we reſolved to grant full Powers to Colonel Goddard to treat with the Maratta State for the Reſtoration of Peace on that Side of India, and drew up Inſtructions for him in conſequence; the Sum of which was, that he ſhould offer them the Terms ſtipulated in the Treaty of Poona, provided they would agree to recede from all the Claims which they founded upon the Convention of Worgaum, and engage never to admit a French Force into their Dominions, nor to allow that Nation to form any Settlements on the Maratta Coaſt; and the Conditions thus qualified were to be made the Alternative of Peace or War: But Colonel Goddard was allowed a diſcretionary Power to relax ſo far in his Demands upon the Maratta Government as to remit the Balance due from the Peiſhwa to the Company, on Account of the 12 Lacks ſettled by Treaty for the Expences of the former War, and to give up the Difference which had been inſiſted upon between the Eſtimates and real Value of the Country of Three Lacks, ceded to us by the ſaid Treaty, and conteſted by the Preſidency of Bombay upon the literal Conſtruction of it.

Upon the Arrival of Mr. Horſely, on the 2d of May, and after due Conſideration of the Materials which he laid before us, we thought proper to amplify and extend the Inſtructions to Colonel Goddard, allowing the former to remain as the Baſis of his Conduct, and directing him, if the Conditions therein preſcribed ſhould be rejected by the Miniſters, and a War become the Conſequence, to adopt the Plan laid down by Mr. Hornby in his Minute of the 30th March 1779, for carrying Hoſtilities into the Guzerat Country, or not, as the Colonel ſhould think proper; to declare the Negociation with Moodajee Booſla at an End, and not to be reſumed without our Authority, if he ſhould decline or héſitate to accept the proffered Alliance of the Company on the Terms ſuggeſted to him; and to treat ſeparately with Madajee Scindia, if he ſhould find that Chief diſpoſed to eſpouſe the Intereſts of the Company. The preſent critical State of Affairs at Bombay, induced us to commit theſe Points to the ſpecial Management of Colonel Goddard under our Authority, directing him however to apply to the Select Committee at Bombay on all Occaſions, and to avail himſelf of their Advice and Information, previous to the Concluſion of any Treaty, ſeparately entruſted

truſted to him. All other Matters of Negociation, Treaty, or military Operation, we left entirely to the Preſident and Select Committee: Yet as it is impoſſible to give a compleat Detail of Circumſtances which have employed ſo great a Portion of our Time in the Compaſs of a general Letter, we beg Leave to refer you to our Proceedings at large, and to requeſt your attentive Peruſal of the following Conſultations; viz.

5th April 1779,	3d May 1779,	31ſt May 1779,	10th June 1779.
12th ditto	24th May	7th June	14th ditto.

With reſpect to the Convention ſigned at Worgaum by Meſſrs. Carnac and Egerton, we thought it incumbent on us entirely to diſavow that Obligation, as having been concluded without any Authority from this Government, which the Miniſtry of Poona well knew to be neceſſary to give Validity to every public Act; and becauſe this was even declared at the Time in which it was ſubſcribed, to want the Authority of the Government of Bombay itſelf, on which it was immediately to operate, and therefore not binding on the Repreſentatives of the Company; but as ſome Conſideration appears to be due, in Remembrance of the perſonal Amity manifeſted by Madajee Scindia, in his Interceſſion for ſecuring the ſafe Return of the Bombay Army after their Defeat, we propoſed that the private Agreement made by the Committee with him at the ſame Time, ſhould not be totally diſregarded; and if his Conduct had not been ſuch as to forfeit his Pretenſions to our Conſideration, we authorize Colonel Goddard to allow him ſuch Gratification, in Compliance with that Agreement, as he might be willing to receive, and the Preſidency of Bombay able to afford.

The deceitful Conduct of Madajee Scindia has ſince ſhewn him undeſerving of this Conſideration, and was diſcovered before our Intentions could be imparted to him.

Ragonaut Row who has been ſurrendered a Priſoner to Madajee Scindia, was treated by him with every exterior Mark of Reſpect, and placed in Charge of one of his Officers, to be conducted to the Northern Part of the Maratta Dominions, where Scindia had promiſed to grant him a Jaghire of 12 Lacks of Rupees for his Support; but Ragoba diſcovering on the Road, that nothing was meant by this Appearance of Kindneſs, but a treacherous Pretext to carry him off, and to throw him into cloſe Confinement, at a Diſtance from the Capital, excited an Oppoſition in the Followers who were allowed to attend him, by which, and by a Degree of perſonal Bravery, which if Credit may be given to the Reports of it, chiefly contributed to his Succeſs, he overpowered the Troops of Scindia's Officer, and effected his Eſcape to Colonel Goddard, at Surat, who received him with Aſſurances of perſonal Protection.

We thought it adviſable to authorize a Continuance of the Protection which had been granted to Ragoba; but having bounded our Views to the Reſtoration of Peace, by the Terms of our original Inſtructions to Colonel Goddard, we made no Alteration in them on account of this Event, although we gave our Sanction to the Attainment of ſome additional Advantages which Colonel Goddard intimated his Expectations of being able to ſecure from it, if the Miniſters could be brought to enter into a Negociation with him; at the ſame Time, to prevent his being allured by this Hope, we directed, that they ſhould not be ſuffered to interfere with, or impede the general Line of Conduct preſcribed to him.

Colonel Goddard prevailed ſo far with the Miniſters, as to induce them, after repeated Promiſes, to ſend a confidential Agent to him, to receive the Overtures of Peace which he had to offer on our Part, and to treat with him upon them; but having protracted the Negociation a conſiderable Time longer than was neceſſary, and finding by the Conduct of the Agent, that he was only endeavouring to amuſe Colonel Goddard, and to waſte away the fair Seaſon in Promiſes and References to Poona, while the Chiefs at that Place were forming a League to oppoſe him if Circumſtances ſhould require it, we thought it not prudent to temporize any longer with them, and therefore ordered, that the Propoſals offered to the Miniſters ſhould be immediately repeated, and a peremptory Demand made for a definitive Anſwer to them within Twenty-four Hours of their being preſented; the Refuſal or Evaſion of which ſhould be deemed equivalent to a Declaration of War.

We had applied to the Preſidencies of Fort Saint George and Bombay about this Time, to reinforce the Detachment under Colonel Goddard, with ſuch Part of the Troops belonging to their Eſtabliſhments, as the Commander in Chief thought could be ſpared for that Purpoſe, in conſequence of Intelligence received by him of a French Force collecting at the Iſlands, which was ſuppoſed to be intended for a Deſcent upon the Malabar Coaſt; the Preſident and Select Committee at Bombay have agreed to furniſh their Quota of Men; and the Preſident and Select Committee at Fort Saint George inform us, that in the preſent critical Situation of their Affairs with Hyder Ally, whoſe Diſpoſition they apprehend to be hoſtile to the Engliſh, they cannot ſpare the whole Force required from them, but have ordered Colonel Braithwayte, with the Troops under his Command at Mahé, conſiſting of One Company of European Infantry, One Company of Artillery, Six Companies of Grenadier, and Eight Companies of Battalion Sepoys, to march on the Requiſition of Colonel Goddard, for the Support of his Army.

In the mean Time we find that Colonel Goddard received our final Orders to him, on the Subject of his Negociations, and having made a peremptory Demand conformable thereto, he was anſwered by the Miniſters, that they would not agree to treat with him for Peace on any other Terms than the Surrender of Ragoba's Perſon, and the Reſtitution of Salſette to the Maratta Government.

Colonel Goddard thought it neceſſary immediately to put an End to his Negociations, and to prepare for Hoſtilities; in conſequence of which he proceeded to Bombay, to concert a Plan of Operations

rations with the President and Select Committee there, and to receive Charge of the Forces which he expected to be furniſhed with from the Bombay Garriſon, and from Mahé, by a Veſſel which had been diſpatched for them ſome Time before.

By private Advices communicated to the Governor General, we underſtand that Colonel Goddard left Surat on the 3d November, and was returned on the 10th December, with a Reinforcement of the Troops from Mahé, and that a Detachment from Bombay had alſo joined his Army at Surat.

With this united Strength, conducted by Colonel Goddard, in whoſe Skill and Experience we place the greateſt Confidence, we entertain the moſt ſanguine Hopes of a ſucceſsful Iſſue to the preſent Campaign; notwithſtanding we have Reaſon to believe that all the Parties in the Maratta Government at Poona are now united againſt us.

We had reſolved to recruit Colonel Goddard's Army, by a Reinforcement of 2000 Volunteers, to be drafted from the Sepoy Corps on this Eſtabliſhment, and had given the Command of this Body to Captain Popham, who had ſerved under Colonel Goddard in his late March, and was returned to this Place: but as the Seaſon is ſo far advanced, and many Circumſtances have occurred to prevent the March of this Reinforcement hitherto from Cawnpore, the Place of its Rendezvous, and as we underſtand that Colonel Goddard's Detachment is already completed with Sepoys enliſted at Surat, we are in Doubt whether it will be neceſſary to ſend it, and have therefore left this Point to the Judgment and Option of the Commander in Chief.

In conſequence of the Encomiums paſſed by the Preſident and Select Committee at Bombay on the Conduct of Colonel Goddard, and prompted by the Experience we have had of his Merit and Abilities in every Part of his Expedition to Surat, we beg Leave to ſecond an Application which they intended to make to you, ſoliciting his Appointment to the chief Command of the Company's Forces on that Eſtabliſhment. In the mean Time we have thought proper to confer on him the Brevet Rank of Brigadier General, during the preſent Service; as well for the Purpoſe of ſecuring him in the principal Command of the Troops which might be employed againſt the Marattas, as to increaſe his Conſequence and Authority in that important Station, and to diſtinguiſh and reward his Merit by this Mark of our Attention.

The Preſident and Select Committee at Bombay, in their Letter to us of the 4th April, expreſs their Senſe of Colonel Goddard's Conduct, and ſolicit from us ſome diſtinguiſhed Mark of our and their Favour towards him. This we acknowledge was a great Incentive to our granting him the ſuperior Rank which he now holds, being in our Opinion the only effectual Means we had of complying with their Requeſt; and yet we could not grant it indefinitely, without injuring his ſenior Officers on this Eſtabliſhment, who had done nothing to forfeit our Favour: We were therefore obliged to confine his Commiſſion to the preſent Service, in which he was not likely to rank with any of thoſe Officers under whom he will conſequently take place on his Return to his Duty at Bengal.

We muſt obſerve that, notwithſtanding the Application from the Preſident and Select Committee at Bombay, and the Reaſons which we have aſſigned for the conſequent Promotion of Colonel Goddard, they appear to have conſidered themſelves injured by this Meaſure, as they ſay they diſallow our Right to grant ſuch partial Rank to any of our Officers; remonſtrating againſt it as well as againſt the ſeparate Powers which we thought it neceſſary to delegate on the late Occaſion to General Goddard, to negociate with the Government at Poona, as claſhing with the Privileges which you have allowed excluſively to them; yet we muſt do them the Juſtice to ſay, that for the Benefit of the Public Service, they have agreed to acquieſce in the Rank aſſigned to General Goddard, and to ſupport the Meaſures which he may adopt in the Execution of his Truſt as our public Miniſter.

In a Letter which we have received from General Goddard, he informed us that he had granted an Allowance of 50,000 Rupees per Month to Ragoba for the Support of himſelf and Followers, without giving a ſufficient Explanation of the Principles and Motives which induced him, to enable us to judge of the Neceſſity for it; but while we found ſo much Difficulty in providing Means for the indiſpenſable Charges of the Detachment, and that he himſelf experienced the ſame Difficulty in raiſing Money for his Draſts upon this Government, we could not but diſapprove of ſuch an Addition to his Expences; we therefore ordered the Allowance to be immediately diſcontinued, although we think that the Reſtraint which ſuch a Gratuity for the Time laid upon a Number of licentious Perſons, whoſe former Neceſſities impelled them to plunder the Subjects of the Maratta Government for their Support, might have ſufficiently evinced our Diſpoſition to Juſtice and Peace, if the Miniſters had been inclined to agree to any reaſonable Terms of Accommodation with us. To this we muſt add another Inſtance of Lenity ſhewn by General Goddard, and even acknowledged by the Miniſters themſelves, when on the Complaint of ſome of the Amildars in the Guzerat Province, he afforded them Redreſs againſt the Violences offered to them by Ragoba's Men.

A Reference was made to us by the Preſident and Select Committee at Bombay concerning the additional Rank granted by them to Captain Hartley in conſequence of Petitions from ſome of the Officers who conceived themſelves aggrieved by this Supereceſſion of them; but we declined any Sort of Interference in this Matter, both becauſe the Caſe complained againſt was not cognizable by our Authority, and becauſe direct Appeals had been made to you on the Subject.

Gauzy o-Deen Cawn, who formerly held the Vizarut of the Empire under the Two late Kings, having been found at Surat in the Diſguiſe of a Pilgrim was apprehended by the Chief of that Place,

and detained until the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay had conſulted us reſpecting the Diſpoſal of his Perſon. As we did not approve of any Acts of Violence which could neither be reconciled to Juſtice or immediate Neceſſity, we deſired them to releaſe this Man; but to forbid his appearing within the Company's Territories; which they accordingly did.

APPENDIX, N° 247 and 248.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 17th January 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell, Philip Francis, Edward Wheler, } Eſquires.
Sir Eyre Coote abſent on a Viſit to the different Stations of the Army.

THE following Minutes having paſſed in Circulation after the Draft of the General Letter had been ſent round, they are now recorded.

Minute of the Governor General—Informs the Board, and deſires that it may be notified in the General Letter to the Court of Directors, that he has Advices which he can depend upon, mentioning the Departure of General Goddard from Surat to Bombay on the 3d November laſt, and that he was neither returned, nor immediately expected at Surat on the 30th of laſt Month.

Agreed. Edw[d] Wheler.

Mr. Francis deſires it may be mentioned, that he is informed by a private Letter of the firſt Authority from Fort Saint George, "that it is now certain that the Marattas and Hyder Ally have "formed an Alliance."

Agreed. Edward Wheler.

Governor General—That a Peace may have taken place between Hyder Ally and the Marattas I do not doubt; my own Advices confirm it; but no Alliance between them can be of long Duration, as it is unnatural. I am convinced from the whole Tenor of Hyder Ally's Conduct and Diſpoſition, that he will never moleſt us whilſt we endeavour to preſerve a good Underſtanding with him. Theſe were lately Mr. Francis's Sentiments as well as mine; and his Diſtruſt of the ſame Authority on the ſame Subject I recollect to have been yet ſtronger marked than my own (ſee Conſultation 20th December). I therefore object to this Information being given to the Court of Directors in the General Letter, as only tending to alarm them without ſufficient Cauſe for it.

Mr. Francis—The Intelligence I have ſtated to the Board is of a much later Date than that which the Governor General alludes to: It contains the poſitive Aſſertion of a Fact to which I cannot refuſe giving Credit, conſidering the Authority I have for it. It does not ſay any Thing of Hyder Ally's Intentions to invade the Carnatic: That was the Point on which I entertained the Diſtruſt alluded to by the Governor; but even that Diſtruſt may be removed by new Facts and later Advices.

Governor General—I think it proper to inform the Board, that I learn by private Intelligence from Surat, that on the 30th of Zekoida, anſwering to the 10th of December, General Goddard was returned to that Place, and that he had brought with him the Madras Detachment from Mahé, ſaid by this Account to conſiſt of 500 Europeans and 2,000 Sepoys.

N° 248.

Intelligence from Decan, dated 22d Jawal, 3d November; delivered for Tranſlation 13th January.

Hemunt Pundit Pundham, Narrain Mudlo, Nanna Sahib, and Ballagee Jenandan, are encamped with 4 or 5000 Horſe without the Town of Poona, at Garnier, and are employed in the Adminiſtration of the Affairs of the Country. Hurry Pundit, who reſides in his own Houſe at Poona, has

has every Day a Conference with Nanna. Kiſhen Row Mullar is returned Home to Baraminty. Lalla Nihalchund, who had come hither after his Conferences with the Europeans of Surat, Nanna Sahib has ſent back again to Colonel Goddard to Surat, and told him to aſſent to the Payment of no Sum of Money which the Engliſh ſhould demand. If they will conform themſelves to that Treaty which the Europeans of Bombay made at the Time of their Defeat, and by which they agree to relinquiſh Taſly and the other Mahals, it is well, Peace may be made; but if they will not, do you and Luchmen Row both come away.

Dewajee Pundit, the Dewan of Moodajee Booſla, is gone towards Naigpore, after having made this Engagement with Nanna, that in Six Weeks he would march towards Bengal with a large Army, and lay waſte the whole Country; and at his Deſire the Kella of Hoſſungabad, and the City of Hooney, dependant on the Nabob Fize ul-Dowla Bahadre, the Chief of Bopaul Zaal, have been granted to Moodajee Booſla, and they have given Dewajee Pundit a Kareta addreſſed to the Nabob Heyat Mahomet Cawn, the Talookdar of Bopaultal, directing him to deliver up the Fort and City to Moodajee Booſla, which Dewajee will diſpatch to the Nabob.

Madjee Scindia is at Kamgonge; he has got ready about Sixty Guns of different Sizes; and a large Supply of Powder and Ball and other Stores for the Tope Khana, have been ſent to Madajee Scindia from the Sirkar of Heremunt. Sahib Tocojee Holkar remains ſtill at Babgoung. The News Writers in the Country of Cokem have written to Nanna that the Engliſh at Bombay have loaded Six Veſſels with Military Stores which are lying at Anchor; it is ſuppoſed that they are going to the Fort of Baſſire: Nanna Sahib has accordingly put a Reinforcement of about 2000 Horſe and Gardy Foot, belonging to Hurry Pundit and Jenanden Pundit towards Cokem, to the Aſſiſtance of the Fort of Baſſire, and the Remainder of the Gardy Infantry he is preparing to ſend as ſoon as he ſhall have collected them.

It is now reported that the Ships which were aſloat at Bombay have ſailed from thence to ſome Quarter.

Hurry Pundit, with the Advice of Nanna, carried Hereepunt Sahib to the Houſe of Byſajee Koorſe of the Benay Country. Byſajee Pundit preſented Clothes, Jewels, &c. to Heremunt Sahib, who after that ſeating him behind him on his Elephant, carried him to his own Houſe, honoured him with a Khellaat of Thanks, but Byſajee Pundit did not receive it; from hence it is conjectured that he will be reſtored to his former Station.

By the Reports of People arrived from Surat it has been learnt, that Dada Sahib Ragonaut Row and the Europeans, with Five or Six Battalions and 2000 Horſe, are encamped without the Town of Surat; Ragonaut Row has got a Boil in his Ear which continually emits Pus. About 2000 Horſe and Foot have been diſpatched by Dada Sahib towards the Purgunnah of Dahy, and Two Battalions are arrived from Bombay to Colonel Goddard, who has received from Calcutta the Title of General inſtead of that of Colonel, and all the Stores are brought out of the Town of Surat; ſuch is the preſent State. The News from Surat which comes in Maratta Letters by the Dauk, Nanna Sahib reads in private and keeps them in his own Poſſeſſion; and if it is neceſſary to give Madajee Scindia any Information, he writes it with his own Hand. He has now ſent Anket Row Running to learn the News of Surat, and has diſpatched Kiſhen Row and the Son of Aumid Row Houſſy at the Head of 400 Horſe and Foot, together with Hurry Sing Row the Vackeel of Hyder Naig, and a confidential Perſon on the Part of Aumil Row, for the Purpoſe of making a Treaty on theſe Conditions, to the Fort of Heringapatam, where Hyder Naig reſides, with Clothes, Jewels, &c. That he is to pay for the Expences of the preſent Year 20 Lacks of Rupees, and for all other Years 12 Lacks; and that the Country which has been taken from him will be reſtored to him: That if the Europeans ſhould come to their Quarter from Madras or Arcot, he muſt obſtruct their March: That as War ſeems inevitable in their Quarter with the Europeans he muſt ſend Troops to their Aſſiſtance; and that as ſoon as they ſhall have made a Peace with the Europeans they will march in conjunction with him towards Arcot and Madras, and take Poſſeſſion of the Country: That whatever Part of Arcot, &c. ſhould be taken would remain in his Poſſeſſion, and that he muſt therefore, in conſideration of all this, reſtore whatever Part of Heremunt Sahib's Country he has before taken.—We muſt ſee what will take place. Guldar Khan, the Son of Ameert Khan deceaſed, is in the Kella of Ranny here with 3000 Horſe and Foot. All the Environs of the Kellah are deſerted, and all the ſmall and large Pieces of Water are ſpoilt: There is a great Scarcity of Water, and the Army of Helmunt Sahib, amounting to about 10,000 Horſe and Gardy Infantry, with their Stores, have marched from the Fort Three Coſs of this Side, to the Nullah of the Village of Chomprah. Once or Twice ſmall Parties of them went towards the Fort, but ſeveral being killed and wounded, they returned. Deeſum Mug the Talookdar of Bhengar in the Neighbourhood of the Kellah of Ahmudnagur, having collected 1 or 200 Men, was deſirous of taking Mowajee Babba out of the Fort of Ahmudnagur. Mowajee Babba ſent ſecretly a Letter to Deeſum Mug, which the Guards getting Information of, ſeized and ſent to Nanna Sahib, who accordingly took up and confined all the Muteſeddies and People employed by Mowajee Babba, and has put Guards upon the Houſes of Mowajee and all his Muteſeddies, in which there is to the Amount of 20 Lacks of Money and Goods.

It is reported, that Diſputes have ariſen between Hyder Naig and the Nabob Mahomed Ally, the Soubahdar of Arcot. The Nabob Nizam Ally Khan is at Hydrabad; it is reported he is going to Aurungabad. An Anſwer is preparing to the Royal Shukka, which before arrived from his Majeſty to Heremunt Sahib. Nanna Sahib has wrote about 60 Maratta Letters to the Chiefs of

Mangry, who remain at Home from a Pique: They would not receive the Letters, and ſaid that they for Five Years were not deficient in their Duty, and had been put to great Expence without ever receiving any Thing from the Sirkar, and were not able to attend their Duty, from Want of the Neceſſaries of Life. On the 22d Jewal, Nanna Sahib Cawn invited Byſajee Goorſe, and preſented him with Clothes, Jewels, and every Thing belonging to his Jaghire and former State, from the Sirkar of Heremunt Sahib, and has raiſed him to his former Dignity.

Nanna has invited all the Sirdars of the Army, and determined with them upon declaring War with the Europeans. Gopaul Sumbajee and Sieearam Hurry are dead. Whatever I ſhall further learn I will inform you.

APPENDIX, N° 249.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, 17th January 1779.

RESOLVED, That the following Letter be written to Brigadier General Goddard:

Sir,

We have received your Letter of the 28th October, alſo your Duplicate Letter of the 10th ultimo; but as the Papers to which you refer us for Particulars were omitted, we remain ſtill uninformed of your Intentions with reſpect to Ragoba, or of the immediate Plan of Operations which you mean to purſue, further than what we are able to collect from the Letter itſelf.

With reſpect to the Penſion which you have granted to Ragoba, and on which you deſire our Inſtructions, we muſt refer you to our Letter of the 29th November, for the Senſe of our Diſſatisfaction with that Allowance; and we think it proper now to add the ſtricteſt Injunctions, that you do not in any Manner ſuffer him to become chargeable to the Company. The general Indifpoſition ſhewn towards him by the Maratta Chiefs, proves that he has little Influence in that Government, and that he is not likely to bring any Partizans to our Aſſiſtance; we are determined therefore to ſtand forth as the Principals in the War, and to maintain the Character through the whole Courſe of it, as the Miniſters, by rejecting the Terms of Accommodation which we propoſed to them, have in effect made us ſo. For this Reaſon we think it neceſſary further to direct, that you do not ſuffer Ragoba to become of too much Importance in your preſent Operations, and to caution you againſt entering into any ſpecific Engagements which may entitle him to a Participation in your Succeſs; unleſs he is able, contrary to our preſent Expectations, to afford you ſuch effectual and actual Support as ſhall juſtify his Admiſſion to ſuch Benefits.

We have received a Paper of Intelligence tranſmitted to us from the Preſident and Select Committee at Fort Saint George, which we deem it a Juſtice due to you to afford you an Opportunity of anſwering; we therefore enclose a Copy of it; and as the breaking off the Negociation at Poona is attributed to an exorbitant Demand on your Part, beyond the Terms which we had authorized you to propoſe, we think it incumbent on us to call upon you for an Anſwer; aſſuring you at the ſame Time, that the Declaration contained in the Paper has made no Impreſſion on our Minds, nor tended in any Degree to leſſen that Confidence which we have hitherto placed in your Fidelity, and which your Services, and our Knowledge of your Character, have merited from us.

The Seaſon being too far advanced for Captain Popham's Detachment, which is ſtill at Cawnpore, to render you any effectual Service by marching to your Aſſiſtance, we ſhall countermand our Order for that Purpoſe.

As it is very material for us to be regularly furniſhed with the Accounts of your Detachment, as well for the Purpoſe of fixing and providing your Supplies, as for Entry on our Books, we again deſire that you will be punctual in forwarding them to us.

We cannot comply with the laſt Paragraph of your Letter, dated 28th October, as the Power which you ſolicit, to grant Brevet Rank, and to fill up the Vacancies which may happen in your Detachment, would not only be incompatible with our late military Regulations, but tend to create Confuſion in the Army.

We are, &c.

Fort William,
24th January 1780.

APPENDIX, N° 249. N° 250, 251 and 252. A.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 24th July 1780.

Extract of a Letter from Brigadier General Goddard, dated 27th May 1780.

In Anſwer to the Paper of Madras Intelligence you have tranſmitted me, it is neceſſary to remark upon the little Dependance that can be placed upon Information originating from Sources ſo ill informed as the Perſon who tranſmitted it from Poona muſt be; and had not you been pleaſed to call upon me for an Anſwer to it, I ſhould not myſelf conſider it deſerving of the ſmalleſt Attention: At the ſame Time, Gentlemen, I muſt acknowledge with the warmeſt Senſe of Gratitude, the candid and honourable Expreſſions you have made uſe of on the Occaſion, from which I have the Heart felt Satisfaction of being perfectly aſſured, that the Paper you communicated to me has failed in making any Impreſſion on your Minds. I beg Leave however, in the moſt ſerious and ſacred Manner, as an Officer and a Man of Honour, to declare to you, that I never made any Demands of Money from the Poona Durbar, either publicly or privately, directly or indirectly, beyond what I was required to do, either by the expreſs Letter of your Inſtructions, or by an Attention to the Particulars communicated to me by the Select Committee of Bombay, relative to the Aurora Merchant Ship on the Maratta Coaſt, very little exceeding One Lack of Rupees in Value, and which had been previouſly admitted as a fair and legal Charge upon the Revenues of the Jamboolier Purgunnah, and communicated to you by the Gentlemen of Bombay.

APPENDIX, N° 250, 251 and 252. A.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 24th January 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell, Philip Francis, Edwd Wheler, } Eſquires.

Sir Eyre Coote on a Viſit to the different Stations of the Army.

RECEIVED the following Letter from Sir Eyre Coote:

Gentlemen, Lucknow, January 6th 1780.

I am juſt honoured with your Letter of the 23d ultimo, incloſing to me a Copy of Brigadier General Goddard's Letter of the 28th of October, and giving me diſcretional Powers for ordering the March of Captain Popham's Detachment.

It appears to me, by General Goddard's Letter, (the Contents of which I own I feel myſelf diſappointed in, as by his Correſpondence with me I had been led to a very different Expectation) that a War with the Marattas is inevitable, unleſs you chuſe to comply with the Terms upon which they offer you Peace.

In this Situation of Affairs, I cannot but expreſs ſome Uneaſineſs that the Information you give me is not accompanied by your Reſolutions in what Manner we are to proceed; whether you hold it beſt to accede to their Propoſitions for Peace, to commence an active and vigorous War, or to ſtand merely on the defenſive againſt them.

The Firſt or Second of theſe require the moſt ſpeedy Determination, leſt the Appearance of a French Force, which we have much Reaſon to expect, ſhould heighten their Demands in the one Caſe, or add Strength to the Union already formed among themſelves in the other.

I hardly need obſerve to you, Gentlemen, that the Circumſtances we are in, both at Home and here, require from us the moſt immediate, decided, and united Meaſures; and that in a Correſpondence carried on at this Diſtance from the Preſidency, it is abſolutely neceſſary, if we would avoid Delays, which may prove fatal to our Affairs, that I ſhould receive your Opinions upon Events of Importance, as ſpeedily as the Information itſelf.

For want of it, in the preſent critical Inſtance, I can do no more than endeavour to procure from the

Vizier, and to collect together what little heavy Artillery is to be met with in these Quarters. Our Army here is wholly unprovided with them, as well as almost every other military Store.

Captain Popham's Detachment is ready to march. The Undertaking will now be a hazardous one, and cannot be effected without moving an Army across the Jumna, to cover and screen his Motions, by calling off the Powers and Attention of the Enemy; and it may at the same Time prove a Check to them in collecting the large Sums they are actually employed in raising among the tributary Princes there, the Amount of which I shall very soon obtain exact Information of.

This, together with a well-timed Co-operation on General Goddard's Part, to accelerate and facilitate their Junction, can alone give Hopes of their making good our Aim.

But neither this nor any thing else can be attempted until your definitive Resolutions are given as to Peace, a vigorous War, or a defensive one.

General Goddard's Request at the Close of his Letter I must pointedly object to, as the granting it will undoubtedly increase that Confusion in the Army which I have been endeavouring to the utmost to relieve them from.

I inclose a Return of the Army under General Goddard, upon a Supposition that the Madras Detachment may have joined him.

I have the Honour to be, &c.
(Signed) Eyre Coote.

	Cavalry.								
	Lieutenants.	Cornets.	Serjeants.	Kiladars.	Jemautdars.	Duffadars.	Naggers.	Troopers.	Total Black Officers and Troopers.
Bengal Detachment	3	1	6	2	12	23	6	318	361
Madras D°	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Bombay D°	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Staff not returned	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	3	1	6	2	12	23	6	318	361

	European Artillery.					
	Captains.	Lieutenants	Lieut. Fire-workers.	Non commissioned.	Rank and File.	Total Non-commissioned Rank and File.
Bengal Detachment	—	—	—	9	—	9
Madras D°	1	2	1	11	31	42
Bombay D°	1	2	2	20	26	46
Staff not returned	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	2	4	3	40	57	97

	Golandaaze.					
	Lieut. Colonels.	Lieutenants.	Lieut. Fire-workers.	Subadars.	Jemautdars.	Havildars, Naicks, and Golandaaze.	Total Black Officers and Golandaaze.
Bengal Detachment	1	7	1	1	3	116	120
Madras D°	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Bombay D°	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Staff not returned	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	1	7	1	1	3	116	120

	European Infantry.						
	Major.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Enfigns.	Non-commiffioned.	Rank and File.	Total Non-commiffioned Rank and File.
Bengal Detachment	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Madras D°	1	3	10	15	16	54	70
Bombay D°	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Staff not returned	—	3	5	1	—	—	—
Total	1	6	15	16	16	54	70

	Sepoys.											
	Lieut. Colonel.	Major.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Enfigns.	Serjeants.	Drummers.	Subadars.	Jemautdars.	Trumpeters.	Havildars, Naicks, and Sepoys.	Total, including Native Officers and Sepoys.
Bengal Detachment	1	1	1	46	5	50	69	60	124	60	4,397	4,710
Madras D°	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1,058
Bombay D°	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Staff not returned	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	1	1	1	46	5	50	69	60	124	60	4,397	5,768

Included. { N. B. Sick, 20 Europeans.
443 Black Officers and Sepoys.

The Bengal Sepoy Battalions have been recruited with about 2,000 new Men, raiſed on the Malabar Coaſt; and appear to have 74 Men above their Eſtabliſhment.

Abſtract.

	Brigadier General.	Lieut. Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Subalterns.	European Non-commiſſioned Rank and File.	Native Officers and Sepoys.
Total,	1	2	2	9	101	223	6,249

(Signed) Arth. Owen,
A^t Genl.

Lucknow,
N. 1ſt January 1780.

N° 252.

Reſolved, That the following Reply be written to the Commander in Chief.

To Sir Eyre Coote.

Sir,

We have been favoured with your Letters, dated the 2d, 3d, and 6th Inſtant.

We receive with Pleaſure the Information which you give us of the ſucceſsful Iſſue of your Applications to the Vizier for the neceſſary Tuncaws on his Revenue to anſwer the Diſburſements of the Troops for the enſuing Year.

When we tranſmitted you a Copy of General Goddard's Letter to us, under Date the 28th of October, we ſhould alſo have imparted to you our Reſolutions upon it had we formed any; but a preciſe Line of Conduct having already been laid down for General Goddard in our Inſtructions to him, which provided for the Event of Hoſtilities, General Goddard having informed us, when he ſaw a War was unavoidable that he was going to Bombay to concert the Means of carrying it on to Advantage; and as the Plan of his Operations, whatever it might be, muſt be governed in a great Meaſure by local and incidental Circumſtances which we could neither foreſee nor have any timely Acquaintance with, we thought it unneceſſary to take any further Steps upon the Occaſion of his Letter.

We have now received a further Letter from General Goddard, dated the 10th December, informing us of his Return to Surat after having ſettled the Plan of his future Operations, for the Particulars of which he refers us to Papers omitted to be encloſed in this Letter which is a Duplicate: Our Secretary informs us that he has forwarded a Copy of it to you; and in order to complete your Information we now tranſmit you a Draft of our intended Reply.

We are of Opinion that the Seaſon is too far advanced to admit of a Junction between Captain Popham's Detachment and the Forces commanded by General Goddard, and that the March of this Detachment to the other Side of India is therefore no longer adviſable; but we think that it may be uſeful on the Weſtern Frontier of the Vizier's Dominions, either to repel an Invaſion from the Marattas, if they ſhould attempt to enter at that Quarter, or to proceed againſt them on the Weſtern Side of the Jumna if it ſhould be found expedient to ſend a Force for that Purpoſe, we therefore recommend its continuing ſtill embodied.

We are, &c.

Fort William,
the 24th January 1780.

APPENDIX, N° 253. A.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 29th October 1779.

At a Select Committee; PRESENT,

The Honourable William Hornby, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor,
John Carnac, Eſq; Daniel Draper, Eſq.

READ the Letter from Bengal, dated 14th ultimo, and a Letter received laſt Night from General Goddard.

Conſiderations on the preſent State of Affairs with the Marattas.

That it is our Buſineſs to procraſtinate with them.

Reaſons for our Opinion.

We are concerned to obſerve Matters appear ſo ripe for a Rupture, when we are ſo little in a Condition to contribute any Aſſiſtance, either of Men or Money, towards carrying on a War. In the preſent Situation of Affairs, it is undoubtedly our Buſineſs to endeavour to gain Time, and to protract the Criſis, which the Execution of the late Order muſt inevitably produce. It ſhould be conſidered that our Treaſury is very low, and that we have no Reſources of any kind for a Supply, nor have the Governor General and Council given us the ſmalleſt Aſſurances of any Aſſiſtance from them. The laſt Accounts from Tellicherry give us no reaſonable Expectation of the Arrival of the

Fleet,

Fleet in India before January; and in the mean time Prudence requires, that we ſhould have Regard to our own Safety, from any Attempts of the French, and muſt make us very cautious of diminiſhing the Force of this Garriſon, by giving any Reinforcement to General Goddard; the Addition of the Force from Madras can likewiſe by no Means be depended on, as we underſtand the Gentlemen there have ſent an Army into the Field, and it is very doubtful whether they will chuſe to ſpare us a Man till the Fleet arrives; and Colonel Braithwaite, by the laſt Diſpatch, acquainted the Preſident, that he had not received any Orders from his Superiors to join General Goddard, without which it appears he did not mean to do it. The Safety of Captain Popham's Detachment, which we learn is to march from the Bengal Provinces by the Way of Agra, ought likewiſe to be a very powerful Argument againſt urging Matters too faſt, as in caſe of an immediate Rupture, we apprehend there would be very great Danger of its being cut off before a Junction could be effected; at any Rate it muſt take up a very conſiderable Length of Time before the Troops from Madras and Mahé, and Captain Popham's Detachment, can be collected, and put in a Condition to act offenſively, which, with the State of our Finances, an Uncertainty reſpecting the Fleet, and the ſtrong Body of Forces on board, which would add ſuch Vigour to our Operations, make us clearly and deciſively of Opinion, that it is not our Intereſt, and likewiſe very impolitic, to precipitate Matters at this Juncture; and it is therefore Reſolved, That this our Opinion, and our Reaſons for it, be immediately ſtated to General Goddard; and that it be ſtrongly recommended to him, if the miniſterial Party will not accede to his Terms, to endeavour to procraſtinate, and gain Time, till we are in a better Condition to proſecute an active War.

To be recommended to neral Goddard, to ende to gain Time.

It will be alſo highly proper before we come to a Rupture, if ſuch ſhall be found to be inevitable, to form Connections with ſome of the Country Powers, and particularly the Guicawars, as well for proſecuting the War as for the better Security of our Northern Poſſeſſions, and obtaining a Body of Horſe, which we imagine will be found abſolutely neceſſary.

Country Powers: Nec of forming Connexions ſome Party.
The Guicawars deem proper one.

It is alſo highly proper that Stocks of Grain ſhould be collected and laid in at Surat and Broach, not only on Account of the Probability of a War, but the Unfavourableneſs of the Seaſon.

Stocks of Grain to be col ed at Surat and Broach.

Reſolved, That the Chiefs at thoſe Settlements be directed to conſult General Goddard reſpecting the Stock of Grain for his Army, and that they actually concert Matters ſo as to lay in a Quantity between both Settlements ſufficient for an Army of 6,000 Men for Six Months. The Chief of Surat ſhould likewiſe ſuggeſt to the Nabob, the Propriety on the above Conſideration, that Care ſhould be taken to prevent the City from ſuffering any Want of Grain, by ſome timely Precautions on that Head; and as Ghee can be provided cheaper at Bombay, the Chief muſt be acquainted that Article will be ſupplied from hence.

A Quantity ſufficient for Men for Six Months to be in.

Ghee to be provided fre hence.

Directions muſt alſo be ſent to Surat for ſalting a Quantity of Meat, of which we have none in Store.

A Quantity of Meat ſalted at Surat.

Our Reaſons for wiſhing General Goddard to temporize and procraſtinate Matters, muſt alſo be ſtated to the Governor General and Council, who, we cannot help remarking, muſt have been very well acquainted with the State of our Finances at the very Time, when, as by their laſt Letter they deſire us by every Means that may be neceſſary, to render General Goddard's Succeſs ſpeedy and effectual.

Reaſons for wiſhing G Goddard to temporize, ſtated to the Governor G and Council.

Read the Letter received the 26th Inſtant from Mr. Horſley at Calcutta, and the Advices from Tellicherry and Colonel Braithwaite.

The Preſident lays before us a Letter from the Nabob of Toll Bopall's Vackeel at Poona, as entered in the Book of Country Correſpondence.

Nabob of Toll Bopall, ter from his Vackeel at laid before us.

Paſſed, Practitioner Engineer Chriſtie's Bill for Landing and Re-ſhipping the Stores ſent to Mahé by the Aſia, amounting to Rupees 1,102. 1; the Factors at Tellicherry having acquainted us that Buſineſs was done at his Charge.

Chriſtie, Engineer, his paſſed.

Adjourned.

Wm Hornby,
John Carnac,
D. Draper.

Edwd Ravenſcroft, Sec^ry.

Gentlemen,

Goddard, General, Letter

I think it neceſſary to give you this early Information, that in conſequence of Inſtructions received from the Honourable the Governor General and Supreme Council, to put the Intentions of the Miniſters to an immediate Teſt, and obtain a deciſive Knowledge of their Sentiments upon the Subject of the Propoſals already made them, I think

think it neceſſary to declare to Luximon Row, their Vackeel, the Suſpicions I cannot but entertain of the hoſtile Deſigns and Inclinations of his Maſter, from the Delay that has unneceſſarily aroſe in receiving an Anſwer to my Propoſals, firſt tranſmitted in Writing, and afterwards fully communicated by Lolla Nehal Chund in Perſon, who had promiſed faithfully to return himſelf, or forward the Miniſter's Reply in Twenty Days at furtheſt; that twice that Period had now elapſed; and although he (Luximon Row) had repeatedly amuſed me with Accounts of Nehal Chund having received his Diſmiſſion, it appeared from his own Acknowledgments he had not yet ſet out, and would not in all Probability leave Poona till after the Duſſorah: That, notwithſtanding theſe Circumſtances of Suſpicion, the Engliſh were ſtill ready to ſhew their ſincere Inclination for Peace, and grant every Indulgence they poſſibly could conſiſtent with a Regard to their own Honour and Safety, and that therefore I would wait Fifteen Days more, in which Time he ſaid a Letter might arrive in Reply to one he would diſpatch that Inſtant; at the Expiration of which, if Nehal Chund did not arrive, or a ſatisfactory Anſwer to the Propoſals I had tranſmitted by him, I ſhould conſider this Delay as a Declaration of War, and act accordingly. This paſſed the 18th Inſtant, and of courſe the limited Period expires the 3d of November. I gave Luximon Row at the ſame Time Letters to the Peiſhwa and Miniſter to the above Effect.

A Letter to the Honourable Governor and Supreme Council, with a ſmall Parcel containing Part of the Survey of my Route to this Place, accompanies this Diſpatch, which I take the Liberty of recommending to your particular Care to give Orders for its being ſafely forwarded to them.

I have the Honour to be, Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
Thomas Goddard.

Camp near Surat,
20th October 1779.

Signed the following Letters to General Goddard, and the Chiefs of Surat and Broach.

To Brigadier General Goddard.

Sir,

We have received your Letter of the 20th Inſtant. We are concerned to obſerve that Matters appear ſo ripe for a Rupture when we are ſo little in a Condition to contribute any Aſſiſtance either of Men or Money towards carrying on a War. In the preſent Situation of Affairs it is undoubtedly good Policy to endeavour to gain Time, and to protract the Criſis which the late Order from Bengal muſt immediately produce if literally complied with. It ſhould be conſidered that our Treaſury is very low, and that we have no Reſources of any Kind for procuring an adequate Supply, nor have the Governor General and Council given us the ſmalleſt Aſſurances of any Supply from them. By an Account from Tellicherry we learn that the Fleet under Sir Edward Hughes was ſpoke with by a Daniſh Ship on the 19th of May, no further advanced than the Latitude of Seven Degrees North, ſo that we can have no reaſonable Expectation of their Arrival in India before the Month of January; and in the mean Time, Prudence requires that we ſhould have Regard to our own Safety againſt any Attempts of the French, and muſt make us very cautious of diminiſhing our own Force by any Reinforcement to your Army. Any Addition of Force from Madras can likewiſe by no Means be depended on, as we underſtand the Gentlemen there have ſent an Army into the Field under Colonel Harper, and it is very doubtful whether they will chuſe to ſpare us a Man until the Arrival of the Fleet. Colonel Braithwaite has alſo acquainted the Preſident, that he has not yet received Orders from his Superiors to join you, without which he may perhaps not mean to do it. The Safety of Captain Popham's Detachment muſt likewiſe be put to extreme Hazard by an immediate Rupture; at any Rate it muſt take up a very conſiderable Time before the different Bodies of Troops which are to compoſe the Army can be collected and put in a Condition to act offenſively, which, with the State of our Finances, and the diſtant Expectation of the Fleet with a Body of Troops that would diffuſe Strength to all our Settlements in India, all together form a Collection of Circumſtances that make us clearly and deciſively of Opinion it is our Buſineſs to procraſtinate and not to precipitate Matters at this Juncture, and we therefore think it our indiſpenſable Duty ſtrongly to recommend to you, if the Miniſters will not accede to the offered Terms, not to make any immediate Declaration, but, according to their own Policy, to endeavour to gain Time till we are in a better Condition for an active War.

It will alſo be very proper before we come to a Rupture, if ſuch ſhould be found inevitable, to form Connections with ſome of the Country Powers, particularly with the Guicawars, as well for the better Proſecution of the War as for the Security of our Northern Poſſeſſions; and we alſo apprehend it will be found very neceſſary,

to engage in our Service a conſiderable Body of Horſe, which cannot be done without a large Sum of Money, now abſolutely out of our Power to furniſh.

In the mean Time we ſhall give Orders for eſtabliſhing Magazines of Stores and Proviſions at Poona and Surat for the future Exigencies of the Army.

Bombay Caſtle,
29th October 1779.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
William Hornby,
&c. Committee.

To Rawſon Hart Boddam, Eſquire, Chief, &c. &c. at Surat.

Surat, Letter to the Chief.

Sir,

From the Probability of a War with the Marattas, and the Unfavourableneſs of the preſent Seaſon, we deem it highly neceſſary that timely Proviſion ſhould be made to ſecure proper Supplies of Grain and Proviſions for the Army in the Field; we therefore now direct, and have ſent the like Orders to the Chief of Broach, that after conſulting General Goddard with reſpect to the preſent State of his Magazines, you mutually ſo concert Matters as to lay in between both Settlements a Stock of Grain and Proviſions ſufficient for an Army of 6000 Men for Six Months. We deſire you will likewiſe ſuggeſt to the Nabob the Propriety on the above Conditions, of his uſing timely Precautions to prevent the City from ſuffering any Want of Grain.

As Ghee can be provided cheaper at Bombay than Surat, that Article will be ſupplied from hence.

The Shark is now returned with this Diſpatch, and a Letter for General Goddard.

We are your loving Friends,
William Hornby,
&c. Committee.

Bombay Caſtle,
29th October 1779.

The ſame to the Chief of Broach, omitting the laſt Paragraph, and recommending to the Chief to take timely Precautions for preventing the Town from ſuffering any Want of Proviſions.

Saturday 30th.

Received from the Factors at Buſſorah a Copy of the Declaration delivered by the Spaniſh Ambaſſador at the Britiſh Court to the Secretary of State, Lord Weymouth; which amounting to a Declaration of War, it is judged neceſſary immediately to diſpatch Advice thereof to the Preſidencies of Bengal and Madras, and to Sir Edward Vernon, and to the ſubordinate Settlements.

Sunday 31ſt.

Signed the following Letters to the Governor General and Council, the Select Committee at Madras, Sir Edward Vernon, and the Reſident at Anjengo, and circular Letters to the Subordinates, all encloſing Copies of the Spaniſh Manifeſto.

To the Honourable Warren Haſtings, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Council at Fort William.

Governor General and Council, Letter to.

Gentlemen,

We now encloſe a Duplicate of our laſt Letter, dated the 7th Inſtant, and have ſince received your Favours of the 16th Auguſt and 14th September.

General Goddard has alſo received your Inſtructions correſponding with the laſt-mentioned, and has adviſed us of his Proceedings in conſequence; which if the Poona Government is not pacifically inclined, muſt bring on a Criſis much ſooner than we are prepared to meet it. We have explained ourſelves fully on this Head to General Goddard, and ſtrongly recommended to him not to precipitate Matters, but to endeavour to gain Time, and defer any Declaration until we are in a better Condition for an active War; the good Policy of which we are perſuaded you will be convinced of, when you have attentively conſidered the Circumſtances we have ſtated to General Goddard in our Anſwer to his Letter, of both which Copies are encloſed, and to which we beg Leave to refer.

In our laſt Letter we mentioned the State of our Finances, which was too minutely explained in the Preſident's Minute of the 30th March; and although we flatter ourſelves you have already taken Meaſures for ſupplying us, we have not received any Aſſurances to this Effect; and Prudence requires we ſhould be at an abſolute Certainty on this important Point, before we engage in Meaſures that will require the moſt ample Reſources: At leaſt we have done our Duty in giving the real State of the Caſe to General Goddard, with whom at laſt the Determination will reſt; aſſuring you at the

ſame

ſame Time, that ſhould he find himſelf reduced to the Extremity of recurring to hoſtile Meaſures, we ſhall grant every Aid our Means will admit, conſiſtent with a proper Regard to our own Safety, to render his Succeſs ſpeedy and effectual.

We yeſterday received Advices from Buſſora, dated 21ſt ultimo, encloſing Extract of a Letter from His Majeſty's Ambaſſador at the Porte to the Conſul at Aleppo, dated the 24th of July; and Copy of a Paper given in by the Spaniſh Ambaſſador on the 16th of June to the Lord Viſcount Weymouth; which amounting to a Declaration of War, we loſe no Time in traſmitting you this intereſting Intelligence, and Copies of the ſaid Paper and Letter.

By the ſame Channel we learn that Sir Charles Hardy, with a Fleet of 50 Sail of the Line, was to oppoſe the combined Fleets of France and Spain, which had not then joined; and that the latter Fleet of Indiamen, conſiſting of Nine Ships, had ſailed from Spithead the 11th of June, convoyed to a certain Latitude by a Squadron bound for Newfoundland, under Admiral Edwards.

The Packet from General Goddard, mentioned in his Letter of the 20th, will be forwarded in a few Days by the Faz Allum.

We are, with Reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
William Hornby,
&c. Committee.

Bombay Caſtle,
31ſt October 1779.

Fort Saint George, Letter to.

To the Honourable Sir Thomas Rumbold, Baronet, Preſident, &c. Select Committee at Fort Saint George.

Gentlemen,

The Governor General and Council have acquainted us of their Reſolution to form a reſpectable Army on this Coaſt, and of the Quota of Troops to be furniſhed from your Preſidency, of which you have been duly adviſed by them; and we wait your Advices on the Subject. But as we underſtand the Forces at Myhie are intended as a Part of the Proportion to be contributed by your Preſidency, and as Matters with the Marattas appear to converge faſt to a Rupture, we have, on General Goddard's Repreſentation of the Neceſſity of having his Army put into a Condition for inſtant and active Service, ſent down a ſufficient Number of Tranſports to bring up the Forces, Ordnance, and Stores from Myhie, and hope Colonel Braithwaite will have been furniſhed in Time with proper Orders from you for complying with our Requiſitions.

The Fortifications of Bombay having lately been conſiderably augmented with ſeveral new Works, we were much in want of Cannon for them; and obſerving by a Return ſent us by Colonel Braithwaite, the conſiderable Quantity of Ordnance taken at Mahé, we judged it a very good Opportunity for ſupplying our Wants, and ordered them to be tranſported to Bombay on the Company's Veſſels, which will alſo ſave the very heavy Expence of freighting them round to Madras; and we hope be ſatisfactory to you.

We Yeſterday received Advices from Buſſora, dated 21ſt ultimo, incloſing Extract of a Letter from His Majeſty's Ambaſſador at the Porte to the Conſul at Aleppo, dated 24th of July; and Copy of a Paper delivered by the Spaniſh Ambaſſador on the 16th of June to the Lord Viſcount Weymouth, which amounting to a Declaration of War, we loſe no Time in tranſmitting you this intereſting Intelligence, and Copies of the ſaid Letter and Paper.

By the ſame Channel we learn that Sir Charles Hardy, with a Fleet of 50 Sail of the Line, was to oppoſe the combined Fleets of France and Spain, which had not then joined; and that the latter Fleet of Indiamen, conſiſting of Nine Ships, had ſailed from Spithead the 11th of June, convoyed to a certain Latitude by a Squadron bound to Newfoundland, under Admiral Edwards.

We incloſe Packets for the Governor General and Council and Admiral Vernon, and requeſt the former may be forwarded with all poſſible Expedition.

We have the Honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
William Hornby, &c.
Committee.

Bombay Caſtle,
31ſt October 1779.

APPENDIX, N° 253. A.

To Sir Edward Vernon, Rear Admiral of the Blue, and Commander in Chief of His Majesty's Ships in India. Vernon, Admiral, Letter to.

Sir,

The Two Paragraphs from the preceding Letter to Madras, containing the Intelligence from Europe.

We are, Sir,

Bombay Castle, 31st October 1779. Your most obedient humble Servants,
William Hornby,
&c. Committee.

To Brigadier General Goddard. Goddard, General, Letter to.

Sir,

(The same as the preceding Letter to Admiral Sir Edward Vernon.)

31st October 1779. William Hornby,
&c. Committee.

To Mr. John Torlesse, Resident at Anjengo. Anjengo. Letter to the Resident.

Sir,

We dispatch this Boat express with a Packet for the Presidency of Madras, which we desire you will forward thither with all possible Safety and Expedition.

Bombay Castle, 31st October 1779. We are
Your loving Friends,
William Hornby,
&c. Committee.

Circular Letter to the Subordinates. Circular Letter to the Subordinates.

We Yesterday received Advices from Bussora, dated the 21st ultimo, inclosing the Extract of a Letter from His Majesty's Ambassador at the Porte to the Consul at Aleppo, dated the 24th of July; and Copy of a Paper delivered by the Spanish Ambassador on the 16th June to the Lord Viscount Weymouth, which amounting to a Declaration of War, his Excellency has in consequence left the Kingdom, and our Ambassador at the Court of Madrid is ordered to withdraw without taking Leave. We think it material to lose no Time in transmitting this Intelligence.

And we are your loving Friends,

Bombay Castle, 31st October 1779. William Hornby,
&c. Committee.

November.

Brigadier General Goddard arrived from Surat.

Monday 1st.

At a Select Committee; PRESENT, Tuesday 2d.

The Honourable William Hornby, Esquire, President and Governor,
John Carnac, and Daniel Draper, Esquires.

General Goddard having arrived last Night from Surat, now meets the Committee, and acquaints them of the Declaration he sent to the Poona Ministry, in consequence of the last Order from Bengal, as already advised in his Letter of the 20th ultimo; but before he could receive the Durbar's Answer thereto, Neal Chund, whom he had formerly dispatched to Poona, with his Terms, returned from thence on the 27th ultimo, with Letters from the Peshwa and the Minister, the Purport of which was, simply to acknowledge Receipt of the Proposal written and sent by Neal Chund, and referring to him for an Answer as being fully informed of their Sentiments, which he was to communicate. Goddard, General, meets the Committee; informs us of the State of his Negociation.

That Neal Chund, in answer to the Overtures made to the Durbar, plainly declared, That his Master would not make Peace with the English, unless Salsette was relinquished, and the Person of Ragonath Row delivered up: That upon these Conditions, and these only, he was ready to agree to the Proposals that had been sent to him, and declared in the most pointed Terms, that unless the above Conditions were agreed to, there was no further Occasion for Negociation. Terms upon which the Mahrattas will make Peace with the English.

Diſmiſſes the Maratta Vackeel;

General Goddard alſo acquaints us, that being at ſome Diſtance from Surat when he received this Anſwer, he did not give the Vackeel his Diſmiſſion till the next Day, but acquainting him he was going upon an Excurſion into the Country, promiſed to ſend his Reply to Surat, which he accordingly did, and immediately took Shipping for Bombay, to conſult with us upon the Meaſures to be purſued.

takes Shipping for Bombay.

lays before us a Return of the Army, which is in good Condition for Service.

General Goddard then lays before us a Return of the Army at Surat, which appears to be very complete and healthy; and he aſſures us it is in an excellent Condition for immediate Service, and well ſupplied with Proviſions for the preſent.

He alſo acquaints us, that he diſpatched immediate Advice of the Situation of Affairs to the Governor General and Council.

The Committee of Opinion that we ſhould endeavour to gain Time, and to protract Hoſtilities,

Although by this State of the Caſe it appears, that a War with the Marattas is inevitable; yet for the Reaſons aſſigned in our laſt Conſultation, we are ſtill of Opinion it is neceſſary to endeavour to gain Time, and protract any Declaration or Act of Hoſtility until Matters are more advanced, unleſs they actually commence Hoſtilities againſt us. The Letter in conſequence to General Goddard, of the 29th, which he has not yet received, is now read to him, together with the Account of the Rupture with Spain, and our Recommendation to obſerve temporizing Meaſures for the preſent, is ſtrongly repeated to him.

unleſs obliged thereto.

Temporizing Meaſures recommended to General Goddard.

Braithwaite, Colonel, a Requiſition ſent for the Troops under his Command.

To prevent as far as poſſible any Diſappointment in the Junction of the Troops from Myhie, it is reſolved immediately to ſend a poſitive Requiſition to Colonel Braithwaite to embark the Troops on the Veſſels ſent down to receive them, or he muſt be reſponſible for the Conſequences. A Letter to this Effect is now ſigned and diſpatched from the Council Table.

Madjee Scindia averſe to any Accommodation with the Engliſh.

General Goddard acquaints us, that he found Madjee Scindia ſo averſe to any Accommodation, and ſo much inclined to hoſtile Meaſures, that he did not think proper to commit the Honour of the Company, by making any Overtures to him.

The Meaſures neceſſary to be purſued conſidered.

The Meaſures to be purſued being conſidered, we are of Opinion that the Firſt Step ſhould be to endeavour to open a Negociation with the Guicawars, on the Grounds mentioned in the Preſident's Minute of the 30th of March, and with the Reſtrictions contained in the Letter from the Governor General and Council of the 14th of June. Futty Sing made Propoſals to us on thoſe Grounds in the Year 1772, which it was not then convenient for us to accept, but we hope we ſhall now find him inclined to renew the Negociation, upon Aſſurances of being ſupported againſt the Poona Government.

Reſolved, That we meet again To-morrow Morning, to proceed on the more mature Conſideration of this important Buſineſs.

Adjourned.

Wm Hornby,
John Carnac,
D. Draper.

Edwd Ravenſcroft, Secry.

Braithwaite, Colonel, Letter to.

To Colonel John Braithwaite.

Sir,

Matters are now come to that Extremity, that a War with the Marattas is really inevitable; and it is abſolutely neceſſary that the Army under General Goddard ſhould be put into the moſt reſpectable Situation to enable us to carry it on with Vigour and Advantage, and to prevent the Poſſibility of the Company's Arms being expoſed to any Diſhonour, or their Settlements to the Incurſions and Depredations of ſo numerous an Enemy. We therefore find ourſelves under a Neceſſity to prevent as far as we can a Diſappointment in the Junction of the Forces from Mahé, to inform you that the Company's Service abſolutely requires their Aſſiſtance at Surat; and to ſend you this poſitive Requiſition, immediately to embark them on board the Tranſports ſent down to receive them, in order that they may proceed to Surat without the ſmalleſt Loſs of Time, to join the Army under General Goddard; and if you do not think proper to comply with the Requiſition, you muſt be reſponſible for the Conſequences.

Bombay Caſtle,
2d November 1779.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
William Hornby,
&c. Committee.

APPENDIX, N° 253. A.

At a Select Committee, PRESENT,

The Honourable William Hornby, Esquire, President and Governor,
John Carnac, Esquire, Daniel Draper, Esquire,
General Goddard present.

Wednesday 30.

Met to resume the Subject of Yesterday's Consultations.

General Goddard lays before us a Letter as entered hereafter, on the present State of Affairs with the Marattas, which is attentively read and considered.

Artillery Detachment under General Goddard to be completed to a full Company.

Resolved, That the Artillery Detachment with General Goddard be immediately completed to a full Company by Two Gallivats under Orders for proceeding to Surat.

Consideration of the Measures to be pursued deferred till Advices arrive from Colonel Braithwaite.

As we may certainly expect to hear from the Coast in a very few Days, whether Colonel Braithwaite means to join General Goddard's Army, it is resolved to defer any further Consideration till that Time, as the only Question now seems to be, whether immediately to commence hostile Measures, or to pursue a temporizing Conduct till Matters are more advanced; and our Determination on this Question, as well as the Quota of Troops to be furnished by us, will in a great Measure be guided by our Advices from Colonel Braithwaite.

Adjourned.

Wm Hornby,
John Carnac,
D. Draper.

Edwd Ravenscroft, Sec^y.

Goddard, General, Letter from.

Gentlemen,

The Minister of the Maratta Nation having refused to listen to the moderate and equitable Terms of Accommodation proposed to him by me on the Part of the Honourable Governor General and Supreme Council, except upon Conditions dishonourable and destructive to the Interests of the Company, and thereby disappointed and rendered ineffectual their pacific Intentions, and my Endeavours to promote the Success of the Commission with which they had been pleased to honour me, I think it necessary to lose no Time in communicating this important Circumstance to you, in order that proper and effectual Measures may be concerted for carrying on the War into which we are thus necessarily and involuntarily compelled.

You are already fully informed of the Nature of the Proposals I was instructed to make, and the immediate Alternative of Peace or War that was to be the Consequence of their being refused or accepted: I shall therefore only mention to you in a few Words, the Answer I have received to them, which is perfectly pointed and concise, and from the complete Disgrace with which a Submission on our Part to the Conditions it prescribes (especially as I had previously explained to the Minister the Impracticability of acceding to them) would overwhelm us, carries a convincing Proof that his Inclinations are altogether hostile; and even justifies the Apprehension, that were we to give our present Consent to them, such Acquiescence would only subject us to more insolent and dishonourable Demands. The Terms which he instructed Neal Chund, the Emissary I before informed you had been dispatched to Poona, to stipulate as the only Conditions on which Peace would be concluded betwixt the English and Maratta Nations, were, "to relinquish Salsette, and deliver Ragonath Row into our Hands." It is unnecessary to make any Remarks upon these Proposals, neither of which could admit of a Moment's Thought or Deliberation. I therefore acquainted the Vackeel that I was not authorized to recede from my first Demands; that I sincerely regretted my Efforts to settle all past Differences had proved ineffectual; but that I must, according to the Instructions I had received from my Government, break off the present Negociation.

You see, Gentlemen, by the above Relation, that this Business is now brought to a Crisis; the Measure of War was necessarily involved in the Minister's Refusal, and in proposing to him the Alternative, the Choice he would make must of course become our own. The Question therefore now, is not, Whether we should conclude a Peace, or enter into a War with the Maratta State? but we are to determine in what Manner, and by what Means, this War into which we are thus involuntarily compelled, can be carried on with the greatest Advantage to ourselves, and most effectually to distress the Enemy. To depart from the Terms at first positively and solemnly proposed, or to attempt to delay and temporize at this Juncture, would, I am persuaded, be a Measure

equally

equally as inglorious: They would conſtrue every Advance into Timidity, or a Conſciouſneſs of Weakneſs; and inſtead of being lulled by it into Security or Forbearance, would become more preſumptuous and ſpeedy in their Operations.

The Neceſſity of the War being thus eſtabliſhed, it is perhaps ſuperfluous to point out ſuch Conſiderations as might be judged ſufficient to deter us from entering into it, was it a Matter where our own free Choice was left to decide; but I will briefly mention one Objection, and that indeed the only one that appears to me to preſent any Difficulty or to deſerve our preſent Attention, which is the Apprehenſion that we ſhall not be able to furniſh the neceſſary Supplies of Money for defraying the Expences of a War. This is a Circumſtance deſerving of our moſt particular Care and Deliberation. The heavy Loſſes which the Company have already ſuſtained in the unſucceſsful Attempts to ſupport Ragonath Row, ought it is certain to make us careful of involving them in new Troubles and new Expences; but here I muſt repeat that the preſent War is not a Matter of Choice but of Neceſſity. The Government of Bengal have been ſincere and urgent in their Deſires and Propoſals for a Peace, which I have zealouſly exerted myſelf to promote; but the Maratta Miniſter, deaf to every reaſonable Term of Accommodation, aims at the Annihilation of all our Power and Sovereignty on this Side of India, and compels us to take up Arms, not only in Defence of our Rights and of Juſtice, but to ſecure our very Exiſtence as an independant Nation on this Coaſt, and it may be added in its ultimate Conſequences throughout India.

This Leſſon which we are taught by the Incumbrances entailed upon us by paſt Failures, ſeems alſo to inſtruct us, that we ſhould not neglect the firſt Opportunity that preſents itſelf of relieving ourſelves from them; and this I am of Opinion the Marattas have of their own Accord offered, I may ſay forced upon us. The trifling and unequal Force the French at preſent have in India, and the certain Accounts we have from Europe to make us believe they cannot now be reinforced, ſecure us from any Apprehenſions of being interrupted in our Operations by them this Seaſon, and ſeems indeed to furniſh One very principal Reaſon why we ought to loſe no Time in ſtrengthening and firmly eſtabliſhing ourſelves during the Courſe of it. The Troops which will ſoon be collected at Surat, muſt be ſuperior to any Service that can poſſibly be required of them, and equal to the moſt complete and abſolute Succeſs. But the Bengal Army, together with the Detachment under Colonel Braithwaite at Mahé, and ſuch Proportion of Troops from this Settlement, as you may judge it expedient and conſiſtent with the mere Safety of the Iſland to detach, will be found able to execute any Plan of Operations that may be immediately reſolved upon, and againſt the whole Force of the Maratta Empire. Theſe, it is to be hoped, may reach Surat before the latter End of November; and as I have taken every proper Precaution, and given the neceſſary Inſtructions for ſupplying a Magazine of all Sorts of Proviſions, there will be nothing to prevent the Army from taking the Field at the Expiration of that Month. The only material Difficulty therefore which ſeems to occur, is the Article of Money before mentioned; and this I am led to believe is not without Remedy. You muſt know, that except Four Lacks of Rupees which I received from your Treaſury at Surat, I have ſubſiſted the Troops under my Command, by Money received from the Merchants at Surat; and in my own Camp, for Bills drawn upon the Government of Bengal. This, it is true, has been obtained upon Terms not the moſt moderate, and it is probable may become ſtill higher hereafter; but the Loſs ſuſtained thereby is ſurely a trifling Conſideration, when put in Competition with the important Intereſts of the Company now at ſtake; and I do not doubt, ſhould the Exigency of Affairs require it, being able to ſupport my Troops from the ſame Source Three Months longer, eſpecially as I can adopt the Expedient of paying a conſiderable Part of the Officers Allowance by Bills upon the Bengal Treaſury.

I am not however without Hope of the Arrival of a large Sum of Money in Specie very ſoon; as the Governor General and Supreme Council informed me, in a Letter dated the 2d of Auguſt, they intended to ſend round 15 Lacks; and there is no Doubt, when they underſtand we have been compelled to enter into Hoſtilities, and a Repreſentation made them of the neceſſitous State of Affairs, they will exert every Means to aſſiſt us in the Proſecution of a War, the Succeſs of which will ſo amply indemnify and compenſate for preſent Inconveniences.

Theſe, with the Money you can at preſent ſpare from your own Treaſury, and the Loans which may be made from Individuals who at preſent enjoy the Protection of your Government, are the obvious Reſources that may conveniently and juſtly be uſed till the Operations of a War, in purſuance of the Plan that may be adopted for ſecuring a Country and Revenue, ſhall have opened a ſurer and more extenſive Field of Supply; and to accompliſh this moſt effectually and as early as poſſible, ſeems, as Affairs are now ſituated, to be the grand and primary Object.

Having thus made ſome general Obſervations upon the preſent Poſture of Affairs, which I hope will appear to you juſt and proper, I ſhall venture to lay before you ſuch Propoſals as appear to me moſt ſuitable and conſiſtent to be purſued; premiſing only, that as my Views on this Occaſion will be directed to what I conceive to be the true Intereſts of the Company, and the Object of the Bengal Government, as contained in the Inſtructions they have given me for my Government, I ſhall moſt cheerfully and zealouſly concur with, and aſſiſt in executing, any Plan you may ultimately determine upon, provided it comes within the Limits preſcribed in their Letter to your Committee and to myſelf of the 14th of June.

I have before me Four Letters from the Honourable Governor General and Supreme Council under the following Dates, April 5th, June 14th, July 8th, and Auguſt 2d. The Firſt only conveys their original Inſtructions for concluding a Peace, and does not at preſent demand our Conſideration; the Second contains proviſional Inſtructions in the Event of a Failure in my Negociations, which, circumſtanced as Affairs now are, require our ſerious and deliberate Attention.

They have been pleaſed in it, ſhould the Miniſter by rejecting their Propoſals render a War indiſpenſably neceſſary, to leave me a Latitude of Action, under the Inſtructions of your Government, to avail myſelf of the Situation which Fortune may preſent, and have further authorized me to adopt any Part or the Whole of Mr. Hornby's Plan, laid down in his Minute of the 30th March, as I may think moſt adviſable for promoting the Diſtreſs of the Enemy.

The Reſponſibility with which they have charged me on this Occaſion, is Motive of ſingular Satisfaction; becauſe convinced within my own Breaſt of the Knowledge and Experience of the Honourable the Preſident, which dictated the Plan he propoſed, I have from the firſt Inſtant of its being communicated to me, conſidered it as the moſt wiſe and effectual Meaſure that could be adopted, without remarking on it more particularly, the advantageous Situation of Guzerat to the Company's Settlements on this Side of India; the Facility with which it might be conquered and retained; the Reſources of Men and Money we ſhould derive from its Poſſeſſion, and from which the Enemy would by theſe Means be cut off, are ſufficient Arguments to eſtabliſh its Wiſdom and Propriety. It is not however enough to expreſs any ſimple Aſſent to it at this Time; Circumſtances have ſo varied ſince its firſt Formation, that I doubt not the Honourable Preſident will himſelf find many Points that could not be foreſeen at that Period now meriting his attentive Conſideration.

In the Firſt Place, let it be obſerved, that Mr. Hornby's Propoſals were made in a Situation widely different from the preſent one; a few Months only remained of the dry Seaſon, and the approaching Monſoon, when it might be ſuppoſed all Military Operations muſt be at a Stand, would effectually prevent the Maratta Government from giving any vigorous Oppoſition to our Meaſures, and leave us full Leiſure to eſtabliſh ourſelves in the Poſſeſſion of the Guzerat without Interruption. The Caſe is now entirely altered in this reſpect, and ſhould we extend our Arms into that Province, we may be aſſured of having the Whole, or a very conſiderable Part of the Maratta Force to cope with. My Motive in making this Obſervation at preſent, is merely to point out the Neceſſity there now appears, ſhould it be judged expedient to make Guzerat the Scene of Action, of employing all the Troops which can poſſibly be ſpared on that Service, and leaving to ſome future Opportunity the Reduction of Baſſein, which, though a certain, might prove at preſent a tedious Conqueſt, and muſt, in the Event of more important Succeſs, become an eaſy Acquiſition hereafter.

The moſt material Change, however, which has occurred, and which calls for our principal Conſideration, is the Eſcape of Ragonath Row from the Miniſterial Party, and his having again demanded and received the Protection of the Engliſh. I ſhall begin my Remarks on this Subject with communicating to the Committee ſuch Parts of the Inſtructions I have received from the Government of Bengal relating to this Circumſtance, as may lead to diſcover the Meaſures which would be moſt acceptable to them on this Occaſion.

Their firſt Letter, dated 8th July, in Reply to mine, informing them of my having complied with his Solicitation to take the Aſylum of my Camp, has been already explained to you: In it they approved entirely of the Offer I had made him; and directed me to continue to afford him Protection as long as he ſhould continue to demand it; provided he did not forfeit his Right to it by any Act of Infidelity, or attempt to defeat the Negociation, to which they enjoined me to give my entire Attention, without Regard to any other Conſideration.

In the laſt Letter of ſo late a Date as the 2d of Auguſt, they expreſs the ſame fixed Determination and Wiſh for Peace; and in Anſwer to ſome Conceſſions I had ſuggeſted as likely to be obtained from the favourable Opportunity afforded us by the Poſſeſſion of Ragoba, they write as follows:

" We do not diſapprove of your Endeavours to obtain the additional Conceſſions propoſed in your Letter of the 12th June; nor do our Inſtructions of the 5th of April, though reſtricted to certain Points, preclude you from availing yourſelf of any Occaſion which might be preſented to you to exact other Conditions, by which the Intereſt or the Influence of the Company might be certainly promoted; provided they do not impede or retard the Accompliſhment of your original Commiſſion. In this Senſe, and with theſe Proviſions, we repeat that we ſhall approve of the Addition of the Demands recommended in your Letter of the 12th June to thoſe which we have already preſcribed in our original Inſtructions, if you ſhall not have concluded a Treaty with the Maratta Government before the Receipt of this Letter."

It is now neceſſary to obſerve to you what theſe Conceſſions were which I was in this limited Degree authorized to obtain: They were the Ceſſion of Baſſein as agreed to be given to the Company in the Treaty with Ragonath Row, and the Payment of a Sum of Money to defray the Expence of our Armies. I have been however precluded from every Opportunity of endeavouring to ſucceed in theſe Demands, by the preſent Refuſal of the Miniſter to accede to the Propoſals originally tranſmitted him; and as theſe were intended in the Event of my Negociation for Peace proving effectual, ſince that has failed, another Field for political Advantage may perhaps preſent itſelf.

I beg to obſerve, that the Honourable Governor General and Supreme Council in their Inſtructions to me, have made no Proviſion, or drawn any Line reſpecting Ragoba, they wiſhed to be followed, ſhould a War become neceſſary. There is however no Doubt but any Plan now fixed on which may tend to diſtreſs the Enemy and promote the Intereſt of the Company, will meet with their Approbation and Support; and with this Conviction, and with this Object in View, I ſhall venture to hazard the following Conjectures and Opinion, both with regard to the general Meaſures to be purſued, and the particular Attention that ought to be paid to Ragonath Row's Pretenſions.

The Honourable the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors have in their Letter, dated 21ſt Auguſt 1778, of which you encloſed a Copy for my Peruſal, ſignified in the ſtrongeſt Terms their Predilection in favour of the Cauſe of Ragoba, and their Pleaſure that it ſhould be effectually ſupported by their Servants in India; the Principles upon which they adopted theſe Sentiments are in the higheſt Degree juſt and political; as by placing the Adminiſtration of Poona in the Hands of Ragoba, a Perſon indebted to us for his Elevation, and depending upon our Aſſiſtance in a great Meaſure for being preſerved in his Authority, we ſhould be ſure of a Party in that Durbar friendly to the Intereſt of the Engliſh; and beſides particular Advantages to which we ſhould be at preſent intitled, our Poſſeſſions on this Side of India would attain an undiſturbed Conſequence and Stability in future; added to this, the Countenance and Protection continually afforded by this Government to Ragonath Row, furniſhes another Argument from its Propriety and Conſiſtency, why the ſame Meaſures ſhould if poſſible be now adopted. It remains therefore to be conſidered, whether the Means that offer themſelves for accompliſhing this End are ſuch as to give us reaſonable Hopes of Succeſs.

The grand Point in which we ought to be well informed, is the Degree of Conſideration Ragoba's Cauſe is held in by the Chiefs of the Maratta State, and the real Grounds he has to expect being joined or abetted by them, ſhould we again declare in his Favour. The Experience of the late Campaign, if it does not eſtabliſh an abſolute Proof, evinces beyond a Doubt that they are by no Means ſanguinely attached to his Intereſt; and from my own Obſervation ſince the Arrival of the Bengal Army at Surat, and even ſince his Eſcape to, and Reception with it, when it might be ſuppoſed thoſe who ſecretly wiſhed well to his Affairs might have been encouraged to hint their favourable Inclinations, I am led to believe no Change has been ſince wrought in their Sentiments.

But what ought to carry the greateſt Weight is, the candid Declaration made by Ragoba himſelf, who acknowledges that he has no Hopes of being joined by any of the Maratta Leaders till they ſhall ſee his Affairs in ſuch a Train through our Means, as to be aſſured of Succeſs without them. This is in Fact promiſing Expectations of a moſt vague and indeterminate Nature, and amounts to little more than that, when we ſhall effectually overcome every Difficulty, Neceſſity will compel them to acquieſce. Reſpecting Holcar, whoſe Inclination he affirms to be ſecretly favourable, his Diſpoſition is naturally ſo timid, and he is ſo much under the Direction and Influence of Scindia, that no Dependance is to be placed on him. In ſhort, the general State of Parties ſeems to be this, that however much they may diſpute and differ among themſelves, they would be found to unite in Oppoſition to any Attempts of Ragoba to recover a Share in the Adminiſtration of Affairs.

From this general View, it would appear that in our Endeavours to reinſtate him, we muſt truſt entirely to our own Force for effecting it. It is probable a Number of needy Adventurers would flock to our Standard, and Mercenaries might be collected from all Quarters and with the Aſſiſtance of theſe, or indeed without it, we might be aſſured of Victory; but it is eaſy to ſee what little Progreſs muſt be made in eſtabliſhing Ragoba firmly in the Government under ſuch Circumſtances, without a Chief of any Name or Conſequence in the State to give Weight to the Confederacy.

I am far from meaning by theſe Remarks to exclude Ragoba's Intereſts from a Share in our political Syſtem, but I cannot help being of Opinion it will be more for our Advantage at preſent to look forward to the Reſtoration of Ragoba at ſome future Period when Circumſtances may render it more favourable, than by immediately ſetting out with that Project riſque another Failure, which could not but be productive of the moſt ruinous Conſequences to the Company's Affairs.

The Plan therefore I would propoſe to be purſued reſpecting Ragoba, is to hold out to him the Hopes of firmly eſtabliſhing him in the Government of the Maratta State, as our grand and ultimate Object; that in the mean Time it is neceſſary for us to ſecure to ourſelves ſome firm and ſolid Eſtabliſhment of territorial Poſſeſſion on the Continent, from which we may derive Reſources for the more important Services to be effected hereafter, when it ſhall be found that Matters are ripe for their Execution. The immediate Advantages we muſt derive from purſuing a Syſtem of this Nature are obvious: A Reimburſement of the Expences we have already incurred, and a Fund for future Exigencies will be at once provided; and from not having our Hands tied down by any poſitive

Engagement

Engagement with Ragoba, we ſhall be at Liberty to adopt ſuch Meaſures hereafter as Circumſtances may render wiſe and expedient; either to make an honourable and advantageous Peace with the Miniſter, and upon Conditions favourable to Ragoba; or ſhould it be found that our Succeſſes have encouraged the Partizans of the latter to declare themſelves, and win over any of the Maratta Leaders to his Party, which it is by no Means improbable may be the Caſe, to aſſert at once his Claim to the Sovereignty, and eſtabliſh him in it.

The principal Difficulty which ſeems to preſent itſelf, is to reconcile the Syſtem I have propoſed to Ragoba. He has been long accuſtomed to conſider himſelf as the Principal in all the Wars entered into by the Engliſh with the Maratta Nation; and there is no Doubt would expect to be put in Poſſeſſion of whatever Countries we might conquer from them. Many Arguments however might be uſed with him, among which the following, in Addition to thoſe above-mentioned, could not, I ſhould imagine, fail to have conſiderable Weight: The heavy Debts he has contracted to the Company, by which they have embarraſſed their own Affairs in Endeavours to ſerve him, that have hitherto proved ineffectual, render it neceſſary for their own Safety, and to ſupport the War they are now about to be involved in entirely upon his Account, to poſſeſs themſelves of a Reſource of Revenue not only to relieve them from the Weight of former Expence, but to furniſh a Supply for future Exigencies. On this juſt Pretext we may urge the abſolute Neceſſity of retaining in our Hands the Collections of the Diſtricts acquired by our Arms till the Concluſion of the War; the more ſo, as the Marattas have made themſelves the Aggreſſors, by refuſing the moderate and reaſonable Terms we offered them, and will of courſe conſider us as Principals on the Occaſion. A ſufficient and ample Allowance may at the ſame Time be made to Ragoba, for the Support of himſelf and Family; and he may be permitted to invite ſuch Chiefs as are well inclined towards him, and collect his ſeveral Adherents and Followers diſperſed through the Country; a Work which muſt neceſſarily require a Delay on his Part of a few Months.

From all theſe Conſiderations I am clearly of Opinion, that no new poſitive Engagement ſhould be at preſent entered into with Ragonath Row; that the Cauſe aſſigned for our Hoſtilities with the Maratta Miniſter, ſhould be the Encouragement they have given and ſtill give to the French, with whom we are at Variance, and their rejecting the Friendſhip we had proffered them upon Conditions equally honourable and advantageous to both Nations, which have compelled us involuntarily into a War; that our Inclinations are perfectly friendly to the Maratta State, and that our Intentions are to remove from the Adminiſtration thoſe who by their evil Counſels and Conduct have promoted its Ruin, and aſſiſt in eſtabliſhing it upon a ſolid, firm, and regular Baſis.

The Line to be purſued reſpecting Ragoba, and the Principles of our Difference with the Maratta State being once determined, the Point next to be conſidered is the particular Plan of Operations proper to be immediately entered upon; and here I beg to repeat my entire Approbation of and Aſſent to that contained in the Honourable Preſident's Minute of the 30th March, as far as it relates to the active Employment of our Forces to the Northward. With this View I would propoſe, that Authority ſhould be given me to conclude a Treaty with Futty Sing Guicawar, in the Name of your Government, upon the Principles and with a due Regard to the Reſervation contained in the Inſtructions of the Honourable Governor General and Supreme Council of the 14th of June.

The immediate Object of our Operations in the Guzerat ought to be the poſſeſſing ourſelves of the Share of that Province now ſubject to the Peiſhwa, and which Damulgie, the Anceſtor of the preſent Brodera Prince, was compelled formerly to relinquiſh. This Point might eaſily be reconciled to Futty Sing; and it would be even proper to make its Attainment ſubſervient to his Intereſt, which would be the Caſe if we relieved him entirely from all Dependance on or Fear of the Poona Government, and admitted him to a Participation of the Spoils we might take from them in the Guzerat. The moſt eligible Mode of making the Partition of the Province betwixt the Engliſh and Futty Sing, ſo as to connect our Poſſeſſions and place them in the moſt ſecure and defenſible State, might be hereafter adjuſted.

Should Futty Sing heartily concur in this Meaſure, the Taſk of Politics as well as War will then become very eaſy; and ſhould he, which from his Situation and Character I do not however think at all probable, refuſe to enter into any Engagements with us, the Army ought to march towards Brodera, and compel him to take a deciſive Part immediately; for it appears abſolutely neceſſary, that he prove himſelf on this Occaſion a firm and active Ally, or experience from us the Severity of Puniſhment due to a determined Foe.

The Nawab of Cambait, and ſeveral neighbouring Rajas, as mentioned in the Honourable Preſident's Minutes, will be of courſe aſſiſting according to their Abilities, and be conſidered accordingly; the former as the natural and inveterate Enemy of the Maratta State, will heartily exert his ſlender Means to promote the common Cauſe; I call them ſlender, from the reduced and ruinous Condition into which his Country is at preſent fallen: I do not however doubt they might be made of Uſe, from the Influence he muſt poſſeſs in that Part of Guzerat, were we to countenance and ſupport him, and deliver him from the Inroads and Ravages of the Free-booters, who over-run and deſtroy his Territory; but of this, future Circumſtances muſt be the Rule to judge by and direct. Should it, Gentlemen, be objected, that in the above Propoſals I have laid down no fixed and determinate Object as the ultimate Point to which our Endeavours ſhould be directed, I acknowledge the Remark to be juſt; and it is upon theſe very Principles I have grounded the Expediency of ſuch Syſtem, becauſe our Hands will be left free from all embarraſſing Ties, and we ſhall be at full Liberty

hereafter to reſolve and act as Occaſion may ſuggeſt. In the mean Time the Advantage immediately reſulting is obvious and certain; and while we are eſſentially ſerving our own Intereſts, we ſhall proportionably diſtreſs and injure the Enemy: One Argument in favour of the political Plan I have laid down, ſeems alſo to ariſe from the Attention which ought to be paid to the original Views of the Government of Bengal at the Court of Berar. Though in the preſent ſuſpended State of my Negociation with Moodajee Bouncello, it can only be eſteemed a ſecondary Conſideration; yet ſhould no other poſitive Engagement obtain a decided Preference at preſent, ſome future Period may render the Renewal of it expedient and political. I well know the intimate and cloſe Connection of the Naigpore Prince with the miniſterial Party; and I am alſo aware of the Abhorrence and Enmity he is actuated with againſt the Cauſe of Ragoba. I cannot believe he would chuſe to riſk a Rupture with the Engliſh, by openly aſſiſting Nana, nor would we perhaps have much to fear from the Efforts of his Power if he did; but of this I am perſuaded, that by a direct Declaration in favour of Ragoba, we at once deſtroy all Hopes in future of Moodajee, and render him irreconcileably inimical to our Intereſts; whilſt there is every Reaſon to believe, if we enter into a War upon the Principles I have adviſed, he will not only continue to act an entire neutral Part, but in the Event of our Succeſs, be once more ſolicitous to treat, and enter into an Alliance with us.

Another Argument which ſuggeſts itſelf in favour of my Propoſal, and which indeed might be urged with great Propriety to Ragonath Row, as One Cauſe of our not chuſing to march immediately to place him in the Adminiſtration of Poona, is the Proſpect we have of being called upon to defend our own Settlements againſt an Invaſion of the French. This Proſpect, we have Reaſon to believe, is very diſtant and indeed ſcarcely to be apprehended at all; but as it is however a poſſible Caſe, we cannot too much guard againſt a Circumſtance which might, by claiming our Attention, interfere with any Operations in which we might be employed, and occaſion a Failure in our poſitive Engagements with Ragoba, ſhould any ſuch exiſt.

A Third, and which is the laſt Reaſon I ſhall now mention, may be drawn from a Conſideration of the State of Parties within the Maratta State. An Account of the Riſe and Eſtabliſhment of the Peſhwa Authority under the Race of Bramins; the Syſtem of their Government, and its preſent Diſtraction; a Deſcription of the ſeveral Officers of State, and of the principal Diſunion now exiſting in it, from the jarring Intereſts of the Principal of them and the Bramin Leaders, are Subjects that have ſo often come under your attentive Deliberation, as to render it entirely ſuperfluous for me to make any Remarks upon them at preſent; I ſhall therefore, ſuppoſing theſe Circumſtances to be eſtabliſhed Facts, of which no further Proof is neceſſary, proceed to delineate as preciſely as poſſible, what I conceive the preſent Sentiments of the Parties, and trace from Conſiderations of their reſpective Intereſts, the Manner in which they may be differently affected by our preſent Reſolves.

I have not the ſmalleſt Doubt, indeed I have it from very good Authority, that the principal Difficulty in adjuſting the late Differences with the Maratta Court has originated with Scindia. The Wiſh of Nana Furneſe to have concluded a Peace with the Engliſh, is not by any Means to be attributed to his friendly Sentiments for us, but to intereſted Conſiderations of his own, as it would have left him at Leiſure to purſue the Schemes I am convinced he has in Agitation, of deſtroying the Influence of Scindia, and rendering himſelf ſupreme and independant. From the ſame Motives, for he is no Stranger to the Deſigns of the other, Scindia would exert all his Endeavours to deſtroy the Effects of my Negociation, as the Means not only of ſecuring his own perſonal Safety, but of preſerving to him that unbounded Sway he has acquired by his late Services, and which he will be aſſured of retaining, while his Aſſiſtance is wanted to carry on the War with the Engliſh; I cannot help therefore being of Opinion, that Scindia, as long as he can maintain his preſent Influence in the State, where he poſſeſſes all the Power, without the invidious Name of Authority (which latter indeed he could never hope to obtain) will not be induced by any Offers we could make him, or any Bribe or Proſpect we could hold out to his Acceptance, far inferior as it muſt be to the ſolid Greatneſs he now enjoys, to come over to, or make any ſeparate Treaty with us.

Should the Labour of a Peace be improved by the Miniſter, to the firm Eſtabliſhment of his own Independance; or ſhould Circumſtances ſo turn out, as to give a dangerous Superiority over Scindia, the latter might perhaps find it his Intereſt to court our Friendſhip and Aſſiſtance; but of this the War affords no Proſpect; and it appears to me at preſent a more probable Expectation, that the Miniſter ſhould wiſh to unite himſelf with us to cruſh Scindia, than that the latter ſhould chuſe to connect himſelf with ſo powerful, and of courſe in his Eſtimation, dangerous an Ally as the Engliſh, while he is able effectually to maintain himſelf without their Aſſiſtance. From theſe few Remarks it is plain, that the Miniſter and Scindia, however much united in the ſame common Cauſe, have mutual Sources of Diſcontent, which may break forth on ſome future Occaſion; and it will then prove a fortunate Policy, if we are not prevented by pre-exiſting Engagements, from chuſing to ſide with that Party, whoſe Connection will be productive of the moſt eſſential and important Benefits.

I begin in this Place to obſerve, that as the Orders from the Honourable Governor General and Supreme Council did not reach me till after the Diſpatch of the Propoſals to Poona, and when I might expect every Day to receive an Anſwer, I did not think it expedient to make known to him their favourable Sentiments till its Arrival; and from the Obſervations above mentioned, and the Knowledge I have of his Diſpoſition, I do not think it conſiſtent with Policy, or the Dignity of the Engliſh Name, to make any Overtures to him at preſent, as I am perſuaded they would be

received

received with Indifference and Contempt. I ſhall therefore be guided in my Conduct towards him, by Circumſtances, which Fortune may hereafter preſent in the Courſe of our Operations.

It remains now, that I ſay ſomething reſpecting the Foreign States who may be moſt affected by, or affect our Operations. Moodajee has been already mentioned. The only Two beſides of conſiderable Conſequence enough to deſerve Attention, are Nizam Ally and Hyder Ally. Both theſe Princes have availed themſelves of the Opportunities preſented by our Diſputes with the Marattas, and the diſturbed State of their Government, to diſmember from thoſe Parts of the Peſhwa's Dominions that lie neareſt their own, conſiderable Towns and Provinces, the Revenues of which they now collect themſelves: The former has ſucceeded by Negociation, and the latter by force of Arms; ſo that it may be ſuppoſed, the one from the Sacrifices peaceably yielded to him, has entered into Terms of the ſtricteſt Alliance with the Miniſter; and the other, it is well known, is now actually at War with him, although Reports have been induſtriouſly ſpread by the latter and his Creatures, that the Terms of a Peace have been mutually ſettled betwixt them.

The Situation of Hyder therefore appears entirely favourable to our Views; for it is not to be doubted, however much he may avoid forming any particular Connections with us, but he will immediately liſten to the Dictates of Enmity and his own Intereſt, and embrace the Opportunity given him, by our engaging the Attention of the Maratta Government in this Quarter, of proſecuting his Schemes againſt them to the Southward. I am not ſufficiently informed of the Sentiments of this Prince, to judge how far it would be practicable for us to form any Engagements with him on this Occaſion for our mutual Intereſts and the Diſtreſs of the common Enemy; but could it be effected, I am of Opinion it would be attended with ſtriking Advantages. You, Gentlemen, whoſe Affairs have frequently called upon you to negociate with him, and who, from your immediate Connection and Interference of Intereſt with each other, muſt have derived many Opportunities of informing yourſelves minutely of his Sentiments, will be beſt able to decide on this Point.

Reſpecting Nizam Ally, I have only further to remark, that notwithſtanding the little Reaſon there is to ſuppoſe he will chuſe to unite himſelf with us, I alſo believe he will not take an active Part againſt us, or join his Troops with the miniſterial Forces, but obſerve the ſame wiſe, prudent, and temporizing Conduct he has done on former Occaſions, and avoid becoming an Acceſſary to the War to either Party.

I have thus, Gentlemen, ventured to give you my Ideas of the State of Affairs, and to ſuggeſt the Line of the political Conduct which appears to me moſt expedient for the Honour and Intereſt of the Company, and beſt ſuited to improve preſent Circumſtances to future Advantage. I have not entered into a Diſcuſſion of the particular Plan of Operations to be purſued, any further than expreſſing my Opinion, that it ought to be immediately confined to the Guzerat, as it is ſo clearly explained and provided from the Honourable Preſident's Minute of the 30th of March. There is one obvious Advantage which preſents itſelf from thus drawing the Attention of the Marattas to this diſtant Quarter; an Opportunity may hereafter be found with a Part of the Force left at Bombay, when all Poſſibility of the Arrival of the French is removed, of ſeizing and maintaining the Paſs of Condola, and by that Means preſerving a Communication betwixt Bombay and the Entrance into the Decan, which, from its Vicinity to Poona, will fill the Mind of the Miniſter with the moſt alarming Fears; and from the Eaſe with which an Army can at any convenient Time fall upon the Capital, be attended with moſt conſiderable Benefit in the Courſe of the War.

I have only to add, that as I have thus freely expreſſed my own Sentiments, it would give me ſingular Satisfaction if they meet with your Concurrence and Approbation; at the ſame Time permit me to repeat the Declaration I have made in the former Part of this Addreſs, that whatever Plan may be ultimately formed, upon Principles eſteemed more uſeful and beneficial, I ſhall heartily and zealouſly concur in promoting it, according to the Inſtructions given me by the Honourable Governor General and Supreme Council for my Rule and Guidance.

I have the Honour to be, Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
Thomas Goddard.

Bombay,
3d November 1779.

At a Select Committee; PRESENT,

Wednesday

The Honourable William Hornby, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor,
John Carnac, Eſquire, Daniel Draper, Eſquire.

The Preſident lays before us the following Minute, containing his Sentiments of the Conduct proper to be obſerved by the Committee at this Juncture:

Preſident, his Minute.

The Preſident having reflected with the moſt ſerious Attention on the preſent critical Poſture of Affairs with the Marattas, and our preſent Circumſtances, together with the very limited Powers now held by the Select Committee, thinks it neceſſary to offer to their Conſideration ſuch Remarks as in his Opinion are pertinent, and proper for forming the Conduct to be purſued at this Juncture.

In the firſt Place, he would wiſh to have it clearly recorded on the Proceedings, and deſires a Vote may be accordingly paſſed, that the War now impending, without entering into the Neceſſity or good Policy of it, is not a Meaſure of the Select Committee of Bombay, but the Iſſue of a Negociation carried on under the diſtinct and ſeparate Orders and Inſtructions of the Governor General and Council, through an Agent of their own Appointment, and is not to be prevented or avoided by any Efforts the Select Committee can make; all Powers relative to Negociation, Peace, or War, having been removed from and taken out of their Hands. The War therefore, whether approved or condemned, is not to be imputed to this Committee; neither will they be in any Manner reſponſible for the Succeſs of it; the Governor General and Council having expreſsly acquainted the Select Committee, that Brigadier General Goddard is reſponſible to them for his Conduct.

After thus diſclaiming all Reſponſibility, both as to the Meaſure of War and the Succeſs of it, our undoubted Duty to the Company, and a juſt and honourable Conduct with reſpect to the Gentlemen of the Supreme Council, call upon us to contribute our Aſſiſtance moſt zealouſly and cordially to bring it to as ſpeedy and advantageous a Concluſion, both with the Forces of this Preſidency, and with ſuch Advice and Recommendation to Brigadier General Goddard, as our Experience and Knowledge may at any Time ſuggeſt. According to the Relation we now ſtand in to Brigadier General Goddard, whatever we have to offer to him can only amount to Advice or Recommendation; and the Preſident imagines the Select Committee will admit the Propriety of acting conformably to that Relation, more eſpecially as it will be ſtrictly conſiſtent with and diſclaiming all Reſponſibility. It muſt too be conſidered, we are not warranted by the Governor General and Council to give him expreſs Orders for his Conduct; ſince, according to the reſpective Powers now held by the Select Committee and Brigadier General Goddard, any Orders we might give are no further binding than according to his own Conſtruction of them; and it would be therefore ineffectual and needleſsly hazarding the Dignity of this Government, to aſſume any ſuch Power.

The Steps now immediately neceſſary to be purſued, appear to be to determine the Quota of Troops we can afford to reinforce Brigadier General Goddard's Army, and to tranſport them to Surat without Delay.

In ſettling this Point, the Preſident recommends, that our Garriſon ſhould not be ſo much weakened as to encourage the Enemy to inſult us in our Home Poſſeſſions, or even to place them above the Fear of offenſive Meaſures from hence; the Apprehenſion of which may be eaſily encouraged and kept up, and will favour the Operations of the Army to the Northward.

To furniſh Brigadier General Goddard with the neceſſary Powers for treating with the Guicawars, and effecting a Settlement of the Guzerat Province, according to my Plan laid before the Select Committee, dated 30th March laſt, and the Inſtructions from the Governor General and Council of the 14th June; it ſhould be recommended in the ſtrongeſt Terms to uſe his utmoſt Endeavours to effect this in an amicable Manner, which Futty Sing's Character, and his true Intereſt, give Hopes may be accompliſhed without Recourſe to hoſtile Meaſures.

The Preſident would be happy if it was in the Power of the Committee to contribute equal Aſſiſtance of Money as of Forces: He is concerned to obſerve, that ſo far as our Expectations carry us, we ſhall ſcarcely receive ſufficient for the unavoidable Monthly Expences; the uſual annual Supply from Bengal we have not received any Aſſurances of; but the Preſident muſt believe the Governor General and Council will make a Point of furniſhing Money adequate to carrying into effectual Execution, Meaſures reſolved with their Concurrence, and warranted by their Authority; more particularly too, from Conviction of our Inability to contribute any Aſſiſtance whatever in this Reſpect.

The Preſident thinks it not improper, here to urge the Advice and Recommendation conveyed from the Select Committee to Brigadier General Goddard the 29th ultimo, to defer as long as poſſible commencing Hoſtilities, and this among other Conſiderations, as bearing a particular Relation to the Security of the Reinforcement under Captain Popham. Brigadier General Goddard, on conferring on this Point, delivered a very different Opinion, and expects by immediate Action to facilitate the Junction of Captain Popham.

The Preſident however remains in his former Sentiments, and propoſes to continue to recommend to Brigadier General Goddard to delay the Commencement of Operations ſo long as the Conduct of the Marattas admit or countenance this Meaſure. The Importance of the Security of the Detachment under Captain Popham is great indeed; and its Junction of ſuch Moment, as to promiſe abſolute Succeſs in the Operations propoſed, which might be doubted, at leaſt as to Extent and immediate Benefit, ſhould a Junction not in due Time be accompliſhed.

The Object of Safety to the March of Captain Popham is alone ſufficiently important to recommend the Obſervance of Meaſures productive of that deſirable End; but there is ſtill another very powerful Conſideration claiming the like Meaſure of Delay, and that is the Harveſt in the Guzerat Province, which will be better ſecured the longer Hoſtilities are avoided. Duly attending to the preſent great Scarcity of Grain, together with our pecuniary Wants, and the Port of Mangalore being ſhut againſt the Exportation of Rice, it muſt be allowed to be a momentous Object, and highly meriting the moſt deliberate Conſideration of Brigadier General Goddard, together with the ſmall Proſpect there is of receiving the Troops that are under the Command of Colonel Braithwaite at Mahé, excluſive of thoſe ordered to be ſent from Madras by the Governor General and Council. It is probable that General Goddard may be able to face any Force the Marattas may bring againſt him in the Field with the Force he has, and what we ſhall furniſh him with from hence; but that is not all that is to be looked for, it is the Protection of ſuch Counties as he may take Poſ-

ſeſſion of, which I apprehend his Army will be unequal to, as it will conſiſt of little more than Half what the Governor General and Council intended it ſhould, for want of the Arrival of the abovementioned Troops.

General Goddard now coming in, the Preſident's Minute was again read, and alſo the Letters received ſince our laſt Meeting from Tellicherry and Colonel Braithwaite.

Draper, Daniel, Eſquire, Opinion.

Mr. Draper concurs in the Preſident's Minute; except that he thinks it would be more conformable to the Recommendation he propoſes ſhould be given General Goddard for deferring and delaying the bringing Matters to a Criſis, that no further Force ſhould be immediately ſent off the Iſlands with the General, but only that the Number of Troops ſhould be ſettled and kept in Readineſs here, to be ſent up whenever he may acquaint us it is abſolutely neceſſary; as Mr. Draper concludes, that the ſending any Forces from hence will be immediately known at Poona, and conſtrued into an actual Preparation for commencing Hoſtilities: That ſuch a Conduct would, in his Opinion, be likewiſe more conformable to the Advices tranſmitted to the Governor General and Council under the 31ſt ultimo, and were drawn up exactly agreeable to our Minutes of the 29th, and which he now again approves and confirms, as being a true State of Affairs at the Time. He likewiſe is of Opinion, that what ought ſtill further moſt ſtrongly to weigh with us for deferring bringing Matters to a Criſis for ſome Time longer, is the great Probability, from the Advices now before us, of the Company's being involved in a War with Hyder Ally as well as the Marattas, which Mr. Draper conceives the Governor General and Council had no Idea of when they gave their laſt Orders to General Goddard for demanding the Alternative of War or Peace.

Carnac, John, Eſquire, Opinion.

Mr Carnac is of Opinion, that the State of Affairs is totally altered ſince our Reſolution of the 29th ultimo, as we were then only under the Apprehenſion of a War, whereas we are now to eſteem ourſelves as abſolutely engaged in one with the Maratta State, from the Anſwer given to General Goddard by their Vackeel, who in conſequence received his Diſmiſſion. Mr. Carnac therefore thinks it our indiſpenſable Duty to do every Thing in our Power to procure to General Goddard as reſpectable a Force as our Circumſtances will admit of, to meet the Enemy, and to proſecute the War with Vigour, ſhould they enter our Territories, which it is probable they will in a few Weeks: That we have already experienced the bad Effects of dilatory and procraſtinating Meaſures, to which, in Mr. Carnac's Opinion, the unfortunate Iſſue of the late Expedition to Poona is principally to be attributed. Mr. Carnac is perfectly ſenſible that we are very ill in Condition to meet a War, but that we have no Option, and are forced into it; and that he has no Idea, but the Gentlemen who have thus forced us into it, will take Care that we are furniſhed with proper Means to carry it on. Mr. Carnac, though he allows we are deficient in Reſources, does not think we are wholly deſtitute of Means at leaſt for a preſent Supply. That the Nabob and ſome of the Government Officers at Surat muſt be poſſeſſed of large Sums of Money; and that they ought to be plainly told, that as they enjoy the Protection and Countenance of the Company, it is their Duty to aſſiſt them in Time of Neceſſity. Mr. Carnac therefore propoſes, that the Chief ſhould endeavour to prevail on them to advance ſuch Sums as they may be able, at the Company's Intereſt and on their Security, which are Terms that cannot in Reaſon be conſidered as any Hardſhip, or attended with any Riſk to the Lender.

Vote, diſclaiming all Reſponſibility in the preſent War, and its Conſequences.

The Reſolution of diſclaiming all Reſponſibility both as to the Meaſure of the War itſelf, and the Succeſs of it, unanimouſly paſſed by the Committee.

Quota of Force to be ſent with General Goddard conſidered.

The Quota of Force to be ſent with General Goddard being next conſidered, the State of our Garriſon is examined; when all Circumſtances being attended to, we are of Opinion, that excluſive of the Artillery already ſent, we cannot with Prudence ſpare a larger Number than 200 European Infantry, and a Force in Sepoys, equal to Two Battalions, which muſt be ordered to be held in immediate Readineſs.

200 Infantry and 2 Battalions of Sepoys to be ſpared.

Goddard, General, Powers authorizing him to treat with Futty Sing, to be prepared.

Powers and Inſtructions for General Goddard, agreeable to the Preſident's Plan of the 30th of March, and the Letter from Bengal of the 14th of June, muſt alſo be prepared: And

Chief of Surat, Inſtructions reſpecting borrowing Money to be drawn out.

Inſtructions to the Chief of Surat, reſpecting borrowing Money from the Nabob and Government Officers.

Information regarding the French.

Some Information collected from the Gunner of the Warren, reſpecting the State of the French at Mauritius, is now laid before us by the Preſident, as entered hereafter, and muſt be tranſmitted to the other Preſidencies, and to Admiral Sir Edward Vernon.

Adjourned.

Edw[d] Ravenſcroft, Secr[y].

Will[m] Hornby,
John Carnac,
D Draper.

APPENDIX, N° 253. A.

Wednesday 16th.

At a Select Committee; PRESENT,

The Honourable William Hornby, Esquire, President and Governor,
John Carnac, Esquire, Daniel Draper, Esquire.
General Goddard present.

Carnac, John, Esquire, lays some Hint before us respecting the Guicawars.

Mr. Carnac lays before us, some Hints of the Plan of Conduct, in his Opinion proper to be observed with the Guicawars, with respect to the Province of Guzerat, as entered hereafter.

Letter from General Goddard laid before the Committee.

General Goddard likewise lays before us, a Letter, requesting the Line of Conduct to be observed, may be determined as entered hereafter.

Further Reasons for wishing General Goddard to defer Hostilities.

The Consideration of this Subject being accordingly resumed, it is agreed that our Reasons for wishing General Goddard to defer Hostilities, must be stated to him when he proceeds to join the Army; and the President now reads to us an Extract of a Letter from the Chief of Surat, dated the 13th instant, acquainting him, that the Crops will be gathered about a Month and an Half, or Two Months hence; and that if Hostilities are commenced before that Time, it will occasion such Devastation and Destruction of the Country, as greatly to distress the Inhabitants of that City and adjacent Country. If, when these Points are stated to General Goddard, he should still judge it eligible, or find it necessary to enter upon immediate Action, the Determination must rest with him; as we by no Means intend to lay any Restraint upon him in this Point, but only according to the Principle we have laid down, to give him our Sentiments of the Conduct in our Opinion most expedient to be observed.

The Line of Conduct proposed by General Goddard respecting Ragoba, approved.

The Line of Conduct with respect to Ragoba, as laid down in the General's Letter of the 3d Instant, is approved; and we entirely concur with him, that it will be better for the present to avoid entering into any Engagements with him, or to appear as avowed Supporters of his Pretensions, hoping the General will be able to satisfy Ragoba, and convince him of the Necessity of our acting upon the Plan we have adopted.

No Time to be lost in opening a Treaty with Futty Sing.

We do not however mean that any Time should be lost in opening the Negociation with Futty Sing, which the General must be desired to commence as soon as possible, upon the Plan mentioned in the President's Minute of the 30th of March. For this Purpose he must be furnished with proper Credentials and Copies of the Treaty entered into at Brodera with Futty Sing, and of the Proposals made by his Agent to Mr. Price, for an Alliance with the Company, in the Year 1772; and it must be very strongly recommended to him, to effect the Settlement of the Guzerat Province in an amicable Manner.

The Footing upon which to put our Forces in the Field being considered, the Question is put to General Goddard, Whether he can take upon him to reduce the Bengal Troops to the Footing of the Bombay Troops, with respect to Field Allowances? when he absolutely declared, That he cannot venture upon such a Step just at the Point of entering upon Service; and strongly recommends to us to put the Bombay Detachment upon the same Footing as his Troops, as so very striking a Disparity must occasion great Jealousies and Heart-burnings, which will be very detrimental to the Service: The Committee, upon Consideration thereof, are fully convinced of the Force of the General's Reasoning, and the Justice of making no Distinction in the Forces of the same Master, employed in conjunction upon the same Service; and it is therefore unanimously agreed, to allow Bengal Batta to the Bombay Detachment ordered to join General Goddard's Army; but it must be clearly explained to the Army, that this Indulgence is not to be considered as a Precedent, and will not be allowed except when acting with the Bengal Troops.

George Green appointed Commissary.
Lewis, William, Paymaster.
Warden, Francis, and Hull, James W. permitted to accompany General Goddard.

Mr. George Green is appointed Commissary of Stores and Provisions to the Bombay Detachment, and Mr. William Lewis, Paymaster; and General Goddard being desirous of taking with him Messrs. Francis Warden and James Watson Hull, the Committee consent thereto.

A Commission for holding Courts Martial on the Bombay Detachment to be prepared.

A Commission must be given to General Goddard for holding Courts Martial on the Bombay Troops.

The Paymaster and Commissary must make their Drafts on General Goddard, for the Expence of the Bombay Detachment.

It being judged necessary to send Major Hopkins into the Field with the European Infantry, and his Battalion of Sepoys being in consequence taken from him; it is resolved, to grant him the full Appointment of that Rank, and to give him a Commission to take Rank from the 21st of July 1775, when he was first appointed to act as a Major.

Read the Letters from Tannah and Fort Victoria, when the President acquaints us, he will order the Prahm up Tannah River the ensuing Spring, and that immediately

mediately upon Receipt of the Letter from Tannah, Two Companies of Sepoys had been ſent to Gorabunder; a Gallivat muſt alſo be ſent immediately to Fort Victoria.

As many Troops muſt be ſent up by the Revenge as we can find Embarkation for, and General Goddard will proceed himſelf with the laſt Diviſion, which will be ſent up as ſoon as poſſible.

There being a Balance due to the Agent for the Cloathing made for the Bengal Detachment, amounting to Rupees 7,292. 1. 15; Ordered that the ſame be diſcharged; and that Preſidency debited accordingly.

Wm. Hornby.
John Carnac.
D. Draper.

Adjourned.

Edwd Ravenſcroft,
Secry.

Mr. Carnac's Minute.

As the Province of Guzerat is now likely to become ſoon the Scene of Action of the Forces under the Command of General Goddard, the moſt feaſible Mode of its Reduction becomes a natural Conſideration.

Our entering into Hoſtilities againſt the Guicawars would, it is to be feared, rouſe the Jealouſy of the great Jaghiredars, and be the Means of cementing a ſtrong Bond of Union amongſt them; and although we ſhould ſucceed in the Conqueſt of the whole Province of Guzerat, which I have no Doubt would in Time be effected, yet the ſecuring its Frontier only towards Mahé and the Decan, would ſubject us to the Neceſſity of having always there a conſiderable Detachment, not to mention the Force that is conſtantly required to make good the Collections in a Country where no Attention is paid to any Claims but thoſe ſupported by the Sword. A Junction with Futty Sing, the preſent Leader of the Guicawar, ſeems therefore to be the moſt adviſable Plan; and could this be brought about, we ſhould have only to eject the Poona Garriſons from Amidavad, and a few other Places ſcattered thinly over the Country, little capable of Reſiſtance. To Futty Sing might be ceded in Principality the Eaſtern Provinces, forming a Frontier towards the Decan and Malva, which would become a Barrier on that Side to the Part of Guzerat, which might be taken as the Company's Portion, and which would have for its other Boundaries, the Myhie to the South Eaſt, and the rugged Countries towards Merwar and Cutch, and the Sea, to the Weſt.

As the whole Weight of the Decan Arms could not be reſiſted by Futty Sing alone, he would neceſſarily have Occaſion for the Aſſiſtance of a Part of our Forces, which while employed for his Security, would be effectually promoting our own, both as acting againſt the common Enemy, and being a powerful Check on his Conduct.

Could the gaining over of Futty Sing be accompliſhed, making him bona fide an Ally, and enabling him at the ſame Time, without too much Subjection to ours, to ſhake off the Maratta Yoke, would, if not conciliate the principal Jaghiredars, at leaſt render them leſs alert in the common Cauſe, and might have a conſiderable Effect upon Madjee Scindia; who, as he would then become our Neighbour, we ſhould be better able to reduce his Power, and to keep him within due Bounds.

A fair Opportunity offers for an Opening with Futty Sing from the Difference which has lately ariſen between Futty Sing and Nannah, regarding the Jaghire given by him to Sacaram Bapoo; and which, ſince his Confinement, is claimed by the Poona Government.

The Baits we have to offer to induce Futty Sing to connect himſelf with us, are of ſo tempting a Nature, that if managed with Addreſs, they can ſcarce fail of having Effect on him: The procuring for and guaranteeing to him an independant Principality; the Uſe of our Troops in his Support and Defence; the enabling him to rely as little as he may chuſe on the Poona Durbar, in alienating him from which we gain an uſeful Aſſiſtant towards ſubverting that Power from which we have the moſt to fear; ſome Intimations to him reſpecting Govind Row's Claims, which unleſs he agrees to co-operate with us, we ſhall be neceſſitated to maintain, may operate upon his Fears.

It appears to Mr. Carnac, that the Nabob of Cambay may be uſefully employed in conciliating to our Government the Powers on the Northern Side of the Myhie, the Cattawar, Cutch, &c. who groan under the Oppreſſion of the Bramin Tyranny. As we have long experienced the favourable Diſpoſition of the Nabob towards the Engliſh, it would be good Policy to afford him our Aſſiſtance ſo as to enable him to ſet up for himſelf, and wholly to ſhake off the Maratta Yoke.

16th November 1779. John Carnac.

Gentlemen,

Goddard, General, Letter from

The ready Attention which you have paid to every Application of mine for promoting the Good of the public Service, calls for my moſt ſincere and hearty Acknowledgments; and I beg to expreſs to you in the moſt particular Manner, the warm Senſe I entertain of the ſpirited and deciſive Conduct you have purſued, in the Reinforcement of Troops which you have at preſent afforded me. Permit me further to declare, that I cannot but conſider this Compliance as the moſt happy Preſage of future Fortune; and by continuing to receive the ſame ſteady and reſolute Support from your

Government, I assure myself that my Endeavours to execute whatever Plan may now be resolved upon will be crowned with Success.

In my Address to you of the 3d Instant, I gave my Sentiments at large of the present Situation of Affairs, and Measures I thought most expedient to be followed; I now beg Leave to add a few Words: There appears to be no Doubt at present remaining of the absolute Necessity of the War itself; the Point now to be determined is, In what Manner this War is to be carried on: Whether we should act offensively or defensively? Whether we should move to distress the Enemy and possess ourselves of Resources immediately, or wait inactive to be insulted and attacked by them in our Camp?

Were there any Hopes of an Accommodation with the Maratta Minister, from the Knowledge I have of the sincere Desire of the Bengal Government for Peace, and the Advantages that might attend it, I should be the last to precipitate Matters, or recommend a Commencement of Hostilities on our Part; but it is now too late to negociate, and even this Object of Peace can only be obtained by our acting with Vigour and Resolution.

The fair and reasonable Proposals made to the Minister; the Alternative of Peace or War, openly and generously left to his Option, and his imperiously preferring the latter by rejecting the Terms that were offered him, and presuming to impose disgraceful ones upon us, amply justify our Conduct, in being the First to unsheath the Sword; I should have said, rendered it a Duty we owe to the Honour of our insulted Country and the Interests of the Company, to shew our Resentment of such Behaviour, by avenging upon the earliest Occasion. Every Circumstance also of political Concern unites in Commendation of our entering upon immediate Action. We shall, by possessing ourselves of a Tract of Country, open the Sources of present Wealth, and provide for future Supplies, and by these Means prosecute the War with anticipated Advantages, while our Enemies will be intimidated; and those whose Inclinations are wavering or secretly disposed to our Interests, will derive Courage from the early Success and Vigour of our Measures.

A most material Advantage that strikes me from this Mode of Conduct, is regarding the intended Connection with Futty Sing; for if we attack him while under the Impression of his present Fears, it would not be difficult to bring him over to our Views, either by Negociation or Force; or should even the former not succeed, it will be an easier Task to accomplish by the latter at this Time, than when joined or supported by the Force of the Ministerial Party.

To all these Arguments, as a further Motive of Encouragement to enter upon vigorous and active Measures without Delay, I am happy it is in my Power to acquaint you, that Ten Lacks of Rupees are coming round from Bengal, for the Expences of the Army, Five Lacks in Specie, and Five in Bills: These I have Reason to believe from the Nature of my Information, (which though not from the Supreme Board collectively, is wrote me by Sir Eyre Coote) must have left Bengal long before this Time; and it is not to be doubted, when the certain Accounts of War are communicated to them, they will take the necessary Steps for affording every effectual Aid towards the Prosecution of it.

Respecting Colonel Braithwaite I cannot help being of Opinion, but when your Letters which accompanied the Vessels sent to transport his Detachment arrive, and he reflects upon the Importance of the public Service that now calls for his Assistance, he will not hesitate a single Moment in forwarding it to Surat as expeditiously as possible, and I expect being joined by that Force some Time in the Month of November; should he not arrive so early, it need not I think be any Impediment to entering upon Action as soon as the Troops of this Presidency join, because I am convinced the Army under me will then be sufficiently strong for the Service to be performed, and I shall always have it in my Power to favour and effect his Junction with the main Body. I cannot help also being of Opinion that our Operations will tend to facilitate the Progress of the Reinforcement coming from Bengal, under the Conduct of Captain Popham; as the Division it must cause will not give the Marattas Leisure to attend to his Motions, nor will they think it safe to our Forces by detaching any considerable Number of Men to oppose and interrupt his March.

Having thus mentioned the several Arguments which forcibly strike me for entering upon immediate Hostilities, I am induced to hope they will meet with your Concurrence and Approbation, and that you will furnish me with the necessary Instructions and Powers, both regarding the general Plan, and the particular Object of the Operation to be at present pursued, previous to my setting out to join the Army, which I wish to be able to do in Two or Three Days, as my Presence there is absolutely necessary upon many Accounts; and the Appearance of Backwardness and Want of Vigour, which my too long Absence will carry with it, might also be productive of disagreeable Consequences.

The Points regarding which I am most solicitous, are the Mode of treating with Futty Sing, consistent with the Treaty now subsisting betwixt the Honourable Company and him, and the Line of Conduct to be pursued respecting Ragonath Row. On these Two Subjects, I have already ventured to give you my Sentiments; and I have only to repeat, that I shall cheerfully and zealously concur, and exert myself in successfully accomplishing your Views relative to them and the other Objects of the present Expedition, as far as lies in my Power. This Declaration I consider as sufficient for me to make; and doubt not its being fully satisfactory at this Time. In observing upon the former Part of the Honourable President's Minute of the 10th Instant, regarding the Powers that have been given me by the Honourable Governor General and Supreme Council, and the

the Relation in which I ſtand to the Government, the Sincerity of my preſent Aſſurances will I hope be fully apparent from the Conſiſtency of my future Conduct with them; and I truſt no Differences or Miſconception in Points that are not ſtrictly eſſential to the Succeſs of the Buſineſs in Hand, will ever ariſe to interrupt that Harmony and good Underſtanding that has hitherto marked the Councils and Reſolves of this Committee in the Meaſures concerted for the common Cauſe in which we are embarked, and which cannot fail under the ſame Circumſtances of being brought to a happy and glorious Iſſue.

I have the Honour to be, Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
Thomas Goddard.

Bombay,
15th November 1779.

Wedneſday. The Firſt Battalion proceeded with the Revenge, and the Boats under her Convoy for Surat, to join the Army, and Remainder of the 5th Battalion for Broach Garriſon.

Thurſday. Signed our Inſtructions to General Goddard, and Credentials for his negociating with Futty Sing, in the Name of this Government; alſo Inſtructions to Lieutenant Colonel Hartley in Command of the Bombay Detachment, and to the Commiſſary and Paymaſter thereof; likewiſe Letters to Surat and to the Chiefs of Surat and Broach, all entered in the Order now ſpecified.

Goddard, General, his Inſtructions.

To Brigadier General Goddard.

Sir,

The State in which Affairs with the Marattas now ſtand, ſince the Anſwer returned by the Miniſter to your Propoſals for a Pacification; your Diſmiſſion of the Vackeel in conſequence; and the intermediate Declaration made by you to the Durbar, in Obedience to the Inſtructions from the Governor General and Council, dated the 14th of September; together with the military Preparations, which we learn from all Quarters are making at Poona, leading us to conclude a War with that State inevitable, we have at ſeveral Meetings, to which you have been invited, conſidered with the moſt ſerious Attention, the Conduct proper to be obſerved in our preſent Circumſtances, as well as the Object to which the Efforts of our Force may with moſt Advantage be directed, whenever it ſhall be judged expedient to commence Operations; in order that we might aſſiſt you with our beſt Advice for the Benefit of the common Cauſe on this very intereſting Occaſion.

The Powers you had under the Governor General and Council, make it proper to acquaint you that we do not conſider the War now impending as a Meaſure of this Government, nor ourſelves in any Manner as reſponſible for the Succeſs of it. We do not ground this Poſition on any Opinion we have formed relative to the Neceſſity or good Policy of the War, which is a Queſtion we ſhall not enter into; but on the Principle that as the Negociation was opened and concluded under the ſeparate and diſtinct Inſtructions of the Governor General and Council, who have expreſsly acquainted us the principal Reſponſibility will reſt with them, and as you are in conſequence made reſponſible to them for your Conduct in the Operations of the War, we ſhould under ſuch Circumſtances be wanting in Juſtice to ourſelves, if we did not diſclaim all Reſponſibility, both as to the Meaſure of the War itſelf, which is the Iſſue of that Negociation, as well as the Succeſs of it when commenced; the Officer intruſted with the Conduct of the Operations being reſponſible to another Juriſdiction.

After this previous Explanation, it is equally proper to aſſure you that we ſhall, according to our Duty to the Company, and from Motives of Juſtice and Honour with reſpect to the Bengal Government, contribute our Aſſiſtance moſt zealouſly and cordially to bring the War to a ſpeedy and advantageous Concluſion both with the Forces of this Preſidency, and with ſuch Advice and Recommendation to you as our Knowledge and Experience may at any Time ſuggeſt, or you may require from us. In this Confidence you may take your Meaſures, and depend upon every Aid and Support in our Power to afford.

We have, as you have been before acquainted, diſpatched a ſufficient Number of Veſſels to bring up the Forces and Stores from Mahé, and a poſitive Requiſition to Colonel Braithwaite to embark them thereon, and to join the Army under your Command; but from his lateſt Advices, are uncertain whether he may think himſelf at Liberty to comply therewith, or whether he may not receive contrary Orders from his Superiors at Madras, who appear to be on the Eve of a War with Hyder Ally. We have alſo determined, in addition to the Detachment of One hundred Artillery Men before ſent, to reinforce you with a Body of 200 European Infantry, the Firſt Battalion of Sepoys, and a Battalion of drafted Sepoy Grenadiers, which is the utmoſt our Eſtabliſhment will afford at this Time, and the laſt Embarkation of this Force will now accompany you on the Revenge and other Veſſels to join the Army at Surat.

Though we have thus done our utmoſt to put your Army into the moſt reſpectable Situation, we ſtill continue to think it will be more adviſable to endeavour to gain Time, and to protract any Determination or Acts of Hoſtility till we are in a better Condition to meet the War, provided the Motions of the Enemy will in Prudence permit; and we accordingly ſtrongly recommend to you, to obſerve temporizing Meaſures for the preſent. Our Reaſons for this Recommendation have been fully explained to you in our Letter of the 29th October, before we knew of your Diſmiſſion of

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the Maratta Vackeel, and alſo perſonally at the Council Table; and when ſummed up, conſ[ider] the Uncertainty we are under of the Junction of the Troops from Mahé; the great Diſtan[ce] Captain Popham's Detachment; the Hazard to which any immediate Acts of Hoſtility may ex[pose] that very conſiderable Reinforcement; our Situation in point of Money, which totally diſ[ables] from giving you any Aſſiſtance in that Reſpect, or even bearing the Expences of the Bomb[ay] tachment in the Field; the Deſtruction of the Harveſt in the Guzerat Province, the firſt [Step] Enemy will probably take on your putting the Army in Motion; and the Diſtreſs ſuch a M[ove] will produce to the Country and the Company's Settlements, as well as the Effect it will ha[ve] the Supplies to the Army; all which Objections it appears to us may in a great Meaſure be re[moved] in a few Weeks, and the Army enabled to take the Field with much greater Advantage, by [the] nearer Approach of Captain Popham's Detachment; perhaps alſo the Arrival of the Troops fr[om] Mahé, and the Supplies of Money that may ſoon be expected from the Governor General and Co[un]cil, and the Magazines of Grain that may be ſecured after the Harveſt is collected.

But if after Conſideration of the Reaſons above ſtated you ſhould ſtill judge it eligible, or [even] neceſſary to enter upon immediate Action, the Determination muſt reſt with you, as we by no M[eans] intend to lay any Reſtraint upon you in this Point; but only according to the Principle we have l[aid] down for our Conduct, to give you ſuch Advice as in our Opinion is moſt ſuitable to preſent Cir[cum]ſtances, and moſt conducive to the Benefit of the common Cauſe.

Whenever the Objections now exiſting may be removed, and Circumſtances may be found favourable for commencing Operations, we entirely agree with you in the Opinion expreſſed in your Letter of the 3d ultimo, that the grand and primary Object ſhould be to ſecure a Country and Revenue which would afford a certain and extenſive Field of Supply for the Exigencies of the War, and we hope for the future Emolument of the Company. In this Light we regard the Plan laid before us by the Preſident the 30th of March laſt, of which you have ſo fully teſtified your Approbation, and we accordingly then recommend to you to adopt and carry it into Execution, ſo far as relates to the Settlement of the Guzerat Province, in concert with Futty Sing, and the Reduction of the Maratta Poſſeſſions adjoining to Surat and Broach, which we truſt will effectually anſwer the great Ends abovementioned, and tend materially to diſtreſs the Enemy.

We do not however mean, that any Time ſhould be loſt in opening the Negociation with Futty Sing, which may be immediately commenced; and we hope you will be able to convince him how much it will prove to his Intereſt to unite with us in the Settlement of the Guzerat Province; and from the Advantage which a Coalition with him will afford to your future Operations, and the Company's Poſſeſſions in that Quarter, can we doubt of your exerting your utmoſt Addreſs to bring this Point to bear by an amicable Compoſition, rather than by an Exertion of your Force. For this Purpoſe it ſhould be clearly explained to Futty Sing, that we mean no Injury to him, but only to take into the Company's Hands the Poona Share of the Revenues held in Participation with him, and thereby to diſtreſs our Enemies with whom we are at War: That it is our Wiſh to form the moſt friendly Terms with him; and that we have fully empowered you to make an amicable and equitable Settlement with him of the Province of Guzerat, upon Terms of mutual Advantage and Security to him from all future Dependance and Exactions by the Poona Durbar, or Grounds of Diſpute with the Honourable Company.

We accordingly herewith deliver you Credentials, under the Seal of the Honourable Company, authorizing you, in Behalf of this Government, to negociate and conclude a Treaty with Futty Sing Guicawar, whom we conſider as the Head of that Family, the elder Brother, Seajee, being diſordered in his Mind, and having no Concern in Matters of Government. It is, however, neceſſary we believe his Name ſhould be inſerted in any Engagement you may form with Futty Sing; and alſo a Clauſe, reſerving the final Sanction and Ratification of ſuch Engagement to the Governor General and Council, agreeable to their Inſtructions of the 14th of June.

The Grounds of the Engagement to be formed with Futty Sing, muſt be our ſupporting and defending him in Poſſeſſion of his Share of the Guzerat Province, independant of the Poona Government; and his engaging to ſupport us in the Share now held by that Government. To make the Settlement as convenient as poſſible to the Honourable Company, and to Futty Sing, and to avoid the continual Differences which muſt ariſe from both Parties having an Intereſt in the ſame Places; we recommend to you to propoſe to Futty Sing, to make an abſolute and ſpecific Partition of the Territory between him and the Honourable Company, according to the Proportion of the Revenues now reſpectively held by him and the Marattas; and each Party to have the diſtinct and ſole Government and Poſſeſſion of the Diviſion which may be allotted to them in the new Settlement.

The propoſed Mode of Partition, and the Revenues drawn by the Poona Circar, and the Guicawars, from the Province of Guzerat, are deſcribed with all the Accuracy our preſent Knowledge will allow, in the Preſident's Minute of the 30th March; a Copy of which has been already put into your Hands, and will ſerve in general as your Guide in the Diſcharge of this Part of your Commiſſion; the general Outlines of the Partition are,

The Company to be put in Poſſeſſion of the Guicawar Diviſion of the Country South of the Tappy, their Share in the Revenue of the City of Surat, and ſuch other Lands as may nearly make up an Equivalent to the Maratta Poſſeſſions North of the Myhie, which will be guaranteed to Futty Sing.

It is to be obſerved, that the Diſtricts between the Myhie and the Tappy, as far Eaſtward as Brodera, Dubhoy, Zinnore and Verſavee, which make Part of the Preſident's Plan, will be held by the

the Company as Acquiſitions gained from the Poona Circar, to which they ſolely belonged, except Coral, ceded by Futty Sing, in 1775, and for which the Guicawars are not entitled to any Conſideration; theſe Diſtricts will be taken Notice of in the Sequel of this Letter.

You may alſo ſtipulate with Futty Sing, that we will ſupport him in withholding the Tribute of 27 Lacks per Annum, now paid to the Poona Circar for his Jaghire in the Province, until a final Treaty of Peace is concluded between the Company and that Durbar, in which you may aſſure him his Intereſts will be carefully attended to, if he cordially unites in the Settlement now propoſed to him.

If you ſhould find it practicable, we recommend to you to obtain from Futty Sing the Ceſſion of Zinnore, which lies very commodiouſly for compleating our Line of Northern Territory, in which we apprehend you will find but little Difficulty, as a conſiderable Share is collected for the Poona Circar; and this Place was once before ceded by Futty Sing, in the Year 1755, but then relinquiſhed for Reaſons which had Weight at the Time.

There being alſo ſome Villages of Futty Sing's intermixed with the Broach Purgunnah, we recommend it to you to get them ſecured for the Company in the propoſed Treaty of Partition—the Gentlemen at Broach can inform you of the Particulars.

In conſequence of the Exchange propoſed to be made with Futty Sing, ſhould he requeſt the Company's Aſſiſtance for putting him in Poſſeſſion of the Territories of the Poona Circar, North of the Nerbudda, we conceive ourſelves authorized by the Governor General and Council's Letter of the 14th inſtant, to make a Stipulation for affording him ſuch Aſſiſtance, which we accordingly empower you to accede to in our Behalf; obſerving the following Caution, to which they have enjoined us to pay the ſtricteſt Attention, ſhould this Plan be carried into Execution; viz. That the Engagement you may enter into ſhall be offenſive only, for the Object of our immediate Operations, and in all other Reſpects purely defenſive.

As Govind Row has always ſhewn himſelf well diſpoſed to our Intereſt, and in order to preſerve the Country from the continual Depredations occaſioned by the Contention between the Two Brothers, we could have wiſhed in the Arrangement with Futty Sing to ſecure a ſatisfactory Proviſion for him; but the Governor General and Council have expreſsly forbad us to aſſume a Mediation between them, or to take any Part whatever in their domeſtic Diſputes, further than to ſupport the Party in Alliance with the Company and his Poſſeſſions againſt foreign Invaſion; and not to commit the Dignity of the Company, or pledge the national Faith in formal Treaty with a Perſon of Rank or Power unſuitable to ſuch a Diſtinction. If this Point can be accommodated without deviating from the above Reſtriction, we think the Company will derive Honour and Advantage from it.

The Nabob of Cambay likewiſe deſerves our Attention in the Settlement of the Northern Country, Part of which was formerly wreſted from his Dominions, and from his Enmity to the Marattas, and Attachment to the Company, may be made of Uſe to you in your Operations; we therefore recommend to you, to procure for him ſuch Ceſſion of Territory as you may find practicable.

The Company's Servants at the Northern Settlements will be directed to give you ſuch Information as you may require, of the Intereſts and Connections of the Country Powers in their Neighbourhood.

We have not at preſent any Thing further to offer on the Subject of the propoſed Alliance with Futty Sing; but in the Courſe of the Negociation ſhall give you any other Information that may occur, or that you may deſire from us: But as ſuch Materials may be of preſent Uſe to you, we herewith deliver Copy of the Treaty made with Futty Sing in 1775; alſo of a Letter from Lieutenant Colonel Keating, containing an hiſtorical Account of the Guicawar Family; a Copy of ſome Propoſals made by Futty Sing in the Year 1772 to Mr. Price, the Chief of Surat; and an Account of the Diſtricts formerly annexed to Surat, under the Name of Autoveezy, the Reſumption of which makes a Part of the Plan above recommended to you.

As ſoon as you may judge it expedient to commence Operations, we recommend to you to proceed in the Reduction of the Maratta Poſſeſſions South of the Tappy, and their Purgunnahs of Ulpar, Hanſood, Oocleeer, Deſbora, Ahmood, Dubhoy, and Verſavee: The Diſtricts above alluded to lying between the Tappy and the Myhie, Care ſhould be taken not to moleſt the Guicawars Choties and Collectors; and in the Reduction of theſe Places, the Chiefs of Surat and Broach will be directed to afford you every Aſſiſtance you may deſire, and to receive Charge of them from you when reduced, according to their reſpective Situation; that is, the Places North of the Tappy, except Ulpar and Verſavee, will fall under Charge of Broach Chiefſhip; and thoſe South of that River, with Ulpar and Verſavee, under Charge of Surat.

Theſe Places we apprehend will be reduced without much Difficulty, and by that Time you will be able to diſcover Futty Sing's Diſpoſition towards the propoſed Settlement, and to determine your future Operations.

We entirely concur with you in the Plan propoſed in your Letter of the 3d inſtant to be purſued reſpecting Ragoba, and avoiding any poſitive Engagement with him for the preſent. We truſt, that ſeeing the Neceſſity of the Syſtem we have adopted, he will be reconciled to it; and conſidering how deeply the Company is already involved on his Account, will allow the Juſtice of our ſecuring ſome Means of Reimburſement and Reſource for future Supply, before we can avowedly aſſiſt his Pretenſions; and more eſpecially when he conſiders, as you obſerve, that we ſhall enter this War

as Principals: We alſo further approve this Way of proceeding, as we may expect Orders reſpecting him from the Governor General and Council, when they are apprized of the Situation of Affairs.

Lieutenant Colonel James Hartley proceeds in Command of the Bombay Detachment, and we have directed him to put himſelf entirely under your Orders, as per Copy of his Inſtructions incloſed. A Return of the Force under his Command will be delivered you by himſelf.

Mr. George Green is appointed Commiſſary of Stores and Proviſions to the ſaid Detachment, and Mr. William Lewis, Paymaſter; and as it is not in our Power to furniſh Money for the Expences of their Department, we have directed them to make their Drafts on you.

As Samuel Richardſon, one of the principal Surgeons of our Hoſpital, and Surgeon Major of the Garriſon, proceeds in Charge of the Hoſpital for the Bombay Detachment, Mr. Durham, as Surgeon of the Artillery, and Mr. Clugſtone, as Surgeon of the Infantry, Mr. Toorney will now act as an Aſſiſtant Surgeon with Mr. Green, now proceeding; and they are all put under the Orders of Mr. Richardſon the Surgeon Major.

In conſequence of your Deſire, we have permitted Meſſrs. Warden and Hull to accompany you to the Army.

We now incloſe a Commiſſion, authorizing you to appoint and confirm General Courts Martial, and a blank Warrant for a Judge Advocate.

However averſe we may be to entail Expence upon the Company, yet as you have acquainted us, that you cannot take upon you to reduce the Bengal Troops to the ſame Footing with the Bombay Troops, in reſpect to Field Allowances; and as ſo conſiderable a Diſparity muſt occaſion great Jealouſies and Diſcontent, and be very detrimental to the Service, we muſt admit the Juſtice and Neceſſity of making no Diſtinction between the Forces of the ſame Maſter, employed in Conjunction upon the ſame Service; and therefore are entirely of Opinion, that the Bengal Batta ſhould be allowed to the Officers of the Bombay Detachment, ordered to join the Army under your Command: We deſire however, it may be clearly explained to the Troops, that this is not to be conſidered as a Precedent, and will not in future be allowed, except when acting in conjunction with the Forces of Bengal Preſidency.

A Company's Seal is herewith delivered to you; and heartily wiſhing you Succeſs, we remain,

Sir,

Your moſt obedient humble Servants,

Bombay Caſtle,
2d December 1779.

William Hornby,
&c. Committee.

Goddard, General, his Credentials for concluding a Treaty with Futty Sing.

To Brigadier General Goddard.

Sir,

We the Governor and Select Committee of Bombay, in virtue of the Powers veſted in us by the Honourable the Court of Directors, and having the Sanction of the Governor General and Council at Calcutta, relying on your Fidelity, Prudence and Integrity, do authorize and impower you, in the Name of this Government, and in Behalf of the Honourable United Eaſt India Company, to negociate and conclude a Treaty of Alliance and Friendſhip with Futty Sing Row Shamſker Bahadur, and to make with him an amicable and equitable Settlement of the Province of Guzerat, on ſuch Terms as ſhall be for the mutual Honour, Benefit and Satisfaction of both Parties; and we hereby give you full Powers to that Effect; declaring that we will ratify whatever Agreement ſhall be concluded by you in Behalf of this Government, and which will likewiſe be confirmed and ratified by the Governor General and Council, according to the Inſtructions herewith delivered to you.

L. S.

Given in Bombay Caſtle, under our Hands and the Great Seal of the United Company, this Second Day of December, in the Year One thouſand Seven hundred and Seventy-nine.

William Hornby,
&c. Committee.

Edward Ravenſcroft,
Secr.

Hartley, Lieut. Colonel, Inſtructions to him.

To Lieutenant Colonel James Hartley.

Sir,

Having appointed you to the Command of a Detachment of the Troops of this Preſidency, conſiſting of 100 Artillery, 200 European Infantry, and 2 Battalions of Sepoys, with which we have reſolved to reinforce the Army under General Goddard, and the laſt Embarkation now proceeding to Surat, we direct that you likewiſe take Paſſage on one of the Veſſels ordered for the Accommodation of the Forces; and on your joining the Army, to put yourſelf and Detachment under the Orders of General Goddard, to whom you will deliver a Return thereof.

Mr. George Green is appointed Commiſſary of Stores and Proviſions, and Mr. William Lewis, Paymaſter,

Paymaſter, to the Bombay Detachment; and as it is not in our Power to furniſh Money for the Expences of their Departments, we have inſtructed them to make their Drafts on General Goddard.

Mr. Samuel Richardſon, one of the principal Surgeons of the Hoſpital and Surgeon Major of the Garriſon, proceeds in Charge of the Hoſpital, Mr. Durham as Surgeon of the Artillery, and Mr. Clugſtone as Surgeon of the Infantry: Mr. Toorney will now act as an Aſſiſtant Surgeon with Mr. Green now proceeding; and they muſt all be put under the Orders of Mr. Richardſon the Surgeon Major.

The Bombay Detachment will be put on the ſame Footing in Point of Batta as the Bengal Troops; but this Indulgence is not to be conſtrued into a Precedent, or expected, but when acting in Conjunction with the Forces of that Preſidency.

To enable you to diſcharge the Duties of your Command with Satisfaction, we have thought proper to allow you a Staff, conſiſting of an Aid de Camp, Secretary, and Brigade Major; and are

Your loving Friends,

Bombay Caſtle,
2d December, 1779.

William Hornby,
&c. Committee.

To Mr. George Green.

Mr. George Green, his Inſtructions.

Sir,

Having appointed you Commiſſary of Stores and Proviſions to the Detachment of Forces commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Hartley, for the Reinforcement of the Army under General Goddard, we direct that you take upon you the Charge of that Department, and proceed on the Revenge to join the Army at Surat.

As we are unable to furniſh Money for the Charges of the Detachment in the Field, you muſt make your Drafts on General Goddard for ſuch Sums as you may require in your Department.

We are your loving Friends,

Bombay Caſtle,
2d December, 1779.

William Hornby,
&c. Committee.

To Mr. William Lewis.

Lewis, Wm. Inſtructions.

Sir,

Having appointed you Paymaſter to the Detachment of Bombay Forces under the Command of Lieutenant Colonel Hartley, for the Reinforcement of the Army under Brigadier General Goddard, you will accordingly take upon you the Charge of that Office, and proceed on the Revenge to join the Army at Surat.

General Goddard will ſupply you with Money for the Expences of the Detachment, on whom you will accordingly make your Drafts.

We are your loving Friends,

Bombay Caſtle,
2d December, 1779.

William Hornby,
&c. Committee.

APPENDIX, N° 254. A.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 24th February 1780.

THE 1ſt of January 1780, General Goddard wrote the following Letter to Bengal; viz.

Gentlemen,

I have the Honour to acknowledge your Letter of the 14th October, incloſing Copy of your Inſtructions to Captain Popham, and a Bill of Exchange for Bombay Rupees 1,927. 4. 3. which ſhall be negociated in the Manner you are pleaſed to direct.

When I laſt had the Honour of addreſſing you, I expreſſed my Intention of putting the Army in Motion in a very few Days: This Deſign I have found neceſſary to carry into Execution, on Account of the Circumſtances which have occurred in the Courſe of my intended Negociation with Futty Sing Guicawar, that tend to raiſe Doubts of his Inclinations being friendly towards the Engliſh, and juſtify a Belief that he wiſhes only to gain Time, until an Army from Poona may be ſent to his Aſſiſtance, to unite his Forces with their's againſt us. I have already informed you of the Powers delegated to me by the Government of Bombay, to conclude a Treaty on their Part with Futty Sing; the Object and Nature of which will be fully explained to you by

the ſeveral Papers I had the Honour to incloſe for your Peruſal in my Letter of the 10th ultimo; I accordingly communicated to Futty Sing, through the Medium of the Two confidential People whom I had ſent to attend me, the Propoſals of the Engliſh, in Terms calculated to give him every Confidence in, and Aſſurances of, their Sincerity, if he truly and heartily entered into their Views; and at the ſame Time, to convince him if he acted on this Occaſion with Duplicity and Deceit, he muſt expect to be treated by them as an Enemy.

The Period requiſite for a Reply, which I requeſted he would ſend without Loſs of Time, had elapſed many Days, when at laſt my own Hircarrahs returned with a Letter from Futty Sing, in which he took no Notice whatever of the Propoſals that had been made him, nor referred me to his Vackeels for further Information. He only repeated the common Profeſſions of Friendſhip and Regard for the Engliſh, and Aſſurances of his Intentions to maintain the ancient Alliance mutually ſubſiſting between them inviolable. The Vackeels themſelves, when queſtioned upon the Cauſe of this doubtful and improper Delay, would anſwer me only with the moſt obvious Subterfuges and Evaſions; my Hircarrahs alſo informed me, that the Night before their Departure from Brodera, Futty Sing's capital Meſſengers had arrived from Poona, with Letters from the Miniſter and Scindia, exhorting him not to unite with the Engliſh; and promiſing to ſend an Army immediately to his Aſſiſtance. I further learn, that Futty Sing is augmenting his own Strength, and collecting in Troops from all Quarters to join his Standard; and is at preſent Two Coſs from his Capital, at the Head of an Army, which may conſiſt of about Ten thouſand Men.

Notwithſtanding all theſe ſuſpicious Appearances, I am far from relinquiſhing the Proſpect of bringing over Futty Sing to become an Ally in the preſent War; nor ſhall I treat him as an Enemy, until he gives me certain Proofs that the proffered Friendſhip as actually required by him, famed as he is for Treachery, even above the perfidious Stamp that marks the whole of the Maratta Race; it is neceſſary to take every political Precaution againſt his Deceit, and bring his Conduct to an immediate poſitive Teſt; ſo that by marching towards him I ſhall obtain the deſired Object of winning him to a decided Declaration in our Favour; or ſhould he be refractory, and adverſe to our Meaſures, accompliſh a Stroke that muſt be of the moſt beneficial Conſequence, in the Commencement of the War, before the Succours from Poona ſhall arrive to his Aſſiſtance. From this laſt Place, my Advices mention, that a few Bodies of Horſe have been already detached, and that the main Army is expected ſoon to follow.

Let me repeat, that induced by the ſeveral Reaſons above related, I have put the Troops in Motion, and this Morning croſſed the Tappy River, on the North Bank of which I am at preſent encamped. I have the Pleaſure further to acquaint you, that moſt of the Purgunnahs belonging to the Poona Government, South of the Myhie River, have been taken Poſſeſſion of in the Name of the Eaſt India Company, and delivered over to the Chiefs of Surat and Broach, to be collected in the Neighbourhood of whoſe Reſidencies they are ſituated. The Inhabitants, accuſtomed to a Change of Maſters, ſeem to embrace the Dominion and Protection of the Engliſh, with an unuſual Joy and Alacrity, and no Doubt, anticipate the Proſpect of being delivered from the Oppreſſion of their Tyrants.

The only principal Diſtrict now remaining on this Side of the Myhie is Dubhoy; and as that contains a Fortreſs, and is within 12 or 13 Coſs of Brodera, it will be ſubjected upon the Arrival of my Army, for the March of which this Pretext alone would be a ſufficient Point of Direction, and furniſh a juſt Reaſon to ſatisfy Futty Sing.

I ſhall continue to communicate to the Select Committee of Bombay, every Occurrence regarding the preſent Service, and receive ſuch Inſtructions and Information from them as may aſſiſt in promoting the Succeſs of it, according to the Rules you have laid down for my Guidance.

The ſeveral Papers incloſed in my Letter of the 10th ultimo, will have fully explained to you the Object of our preſent Plan, and furniſhed ample Grounds for you to tranſmit us Inſtructions for our future Direction, conſiſtent with the political Views you may find it proper ultimately to form; to which I ſhall pay the ſtricteſt Attention and moſt implicit Obedience.

The Point on which I am moſt ſolicitous to know your Pleaſure, relates to Ragonaut Row. I have already apprized you of the difficult Taſk I knew I ſhould find in reconciling the Meaſure now adopted by us, to the high Hope with which his Mind was filled; nor was I deceived in my Expectations. I however conſidered it as an Object of the higheſt political Importance at preſent, and what was likely in the End to crown the War we are engaged in with the moſt complete Glory and Benefit, to keep him in good Humour and Dependance upon us; and ſpared no Arguments for that Purpoſe; and I have the Satisfaction to tell you that I have ſucceeded to my Wiſh. I pointed out to him the juſt and good Policy of ſecuring to ourſelves ſome certain Fund for reimburſing paſt heavy Expences, and ſupporting the Charges of the preſent War in which we were involved, and conſidered by the Miniſters as Principals, ſolely from our Friendſhip and Regard to him; but at the ſame Time aſſured him, that as the Engliſh had invariably and long protected him, and exerted themſelves for his Intereſt, it was ſtill their Wiſh to reſtore him to the Station and Grandeur to which his Birth entitled him, whenever Circumſtances might render ſuch an Attempt favourable, or a Party in the State declare themſelves decidedly in his Favour. He acknowledged the Propriety of what I had ſaid, and profeſſed an entire Confidence in the favourable Intentions of the Engliſh to accompliſh his Wiſhes; but he obſerved, that unleſs ſome Increaſe was made him to his Allowance on a Part of the conquered Purgunnahs ceded for his Uſe, thoſe who ſecretly favoured his Intereſts would be doubtful of Deſign to ſerve him; and beſides would want the chief Inſtrument of

Reward

Reward in Proſpect to join his Standard. In anſwer to this I repeated my former Arguments, adding, that the Succeſs of our Army, while he remained under our Protection, would be ſufficient to bring over thoſe who were really well affected to him; that he might in the mean Time take every conſiſtent and neceſſary Step to encourage his Partizans in the State; and that if any reſpectable Party ſhould ſtand forth, the Inſtructions which I expected to receive from your Government regarding him, would arrive in Time to execute the Plan you might deem beſt calculated for the Honour and Benefit of himſelf and the Engliſh Nation.

On the Subject of Money, although he pleaded the Neceſſity of an Addition to ſupport thoſe who might flock to his Standard, I would promiſe nothing; I only told him, that when the ſeveral Leaders, his Partizans, with a ſufficient Force ſhould join him, it would then be Time to provide a Fund for their Subſiſtence. The Sufficiency of theſe Arguments, though it did not altogether convince, yet he ſeemed to acquiesce in: They were contrary to his Sentiments and Ideas of his own Greatneſs and Station; and Men find it difficult to reconcile to their Choice, what militates againſt their favourite ruling Paſſion, which I believe among the Bramins may be confined to Two, Avarice and Pride.

The infirm and ſickly Condition of Ragonaut Row prevents his accompanying the Camp at preſent, but he ſent his adopted Son Omrat Row, with about Two thouſand Horſe and Foot; theſe he expects will daily encreaſe on the March, and will look to be ſubſiſted; to afford them ſome Encouragement is the only Teſt by which we can try Ragoba's Cauſe, therefore beg Leave to propoſe ſome Queſtions both on this Subject and in what relates to the Buſineſs of Ragoba altogether: Your Directions, and the Knowledge of your Pleaſure regarding which will be very uſeful and neceſſary for my Guidance.

1ſt. Is it your Wiſh to adopt and take active Meaſures in favour of the Cauſe of Ragoba, if Circumſtances ſhould hereafter render it favourable, by an Overthrow of the Miniſterial Forces, or by a Declaration of a ſtrong Party in the State in his Favour?

2d. In the Event of a ſucceſsful War, if no conſiderable Party makes its Appearance, is it your Intention to aſſert his Claim?

3d. What are the expreſs Limitations you think it neceſſary to lay me under with regard to the Two foregoing Points?

4th. With regard to Money for the Subſiſtence of his Troops, I beg to receive your Inſtructions, how far and under what Reſtrictions it is your Pleaſure he ſhould be aſſiſted; and as it is requiſite to keep him in Hopes, and at the ſame Time ſacrifice as little as poſſible to that End, what Advances in Money, and what Ceſſions of conquered Country ariſing from the ſucceſsful Operations of a War, you may think it adviſable to give or admit him to a Participation of, till the abſolute Proof of his real Weight and Influence in the State can be obtained.

I have mentioned the above Circumſtances which ſuggeſt themſelves to me; and as no Doubt others will occur to you as neceſſary on this important Occaſion to be provided for, I hope to receive your full particular Inſtructions as early as poſſible.

I beg to acquaint you, that no Part of the Madras Reinforcements have yet joined me. Colonel Braithwaite, the Officer in Command at Mahé, writes me that he had ſhipped off the Artillery and Europeans of his Detachment for Surat, as the Natives to whom the Choice had been left by the Select Committee of Madras, of returning Home or ſtaying to ſerve on this Coaſt, had to a Man preferred the former. The Colonel ſince writes me, that on Account of ſome Troops belonging to Hyder Ally being in Motion towards Tellicherry, he has found it abſolutely neceſſary to re-land the Europeans and Stores, ſo that I have no Proſpect of being ſoon joined by any of the Mahé Forces, nor have I received any Advices from the Madras Government, by which I can form a Judgment when the Troops coming immediately from that Preſidency may arrive.

I am alſo in the State of Ignorance reſpecting Captain Popham's Detachment as when I laſt wrote you, none of the Hircarrahs whom I ſent to meet him and bring me Intelligence having yet returned; ſo that I have Reaſon to ſuppoſe that he has not yet croſſed the Jumna.

I beg Leave to repreſent to you my Situation with reſpect to Caſh: I have received Part only of the Bills tranſmitted me for Five Lacks in your Letter of the 6th September, and there is no News of the Britannia. This Government, as you would perceive by their Letter to me of the 2d of December, have not been at all aſſiſting to the Charges of the War, for which they urge the very impoveriſhed and neceſſitous State of their own Circumſtances. The Junction of the Detachment from Bombay has occaſioned an Increaſe of Expence, and this, added to the Delay in the Arrival of the Five Lacks in Time, has entirely exhauſted the Treaſury, and left me without any Reſource for the Subſiſtence of the Army, than that of drawing Bills upon your Government, which I have done upon the moſt favourable Terms I could poſſibly obtain, to the Amount of between Four and Five Lacks. I hope you will be pleaſed to approve of my Conduct in this Particular; and as I can have no certain Dependance even upon the Expedient of Drafts, and the Sum I am at preſent poſſeſſed of is barely ſufficient to pay off all the Troops for November, including December's Pay, I hope you will take ſuch Meaſures for the Supply of this neceſſary and indiſpenſable Article as you may find moſt ſpeedy and effectual.

I have the Honour to be, &c.

(Signed) Tho' Goddard.

Head Quarters, Camp near Cuttore,
North Banks of the Tappee, 1ſt Jan. 1780.

APPENDIX, N° 255. A.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 14th February 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Philip Francis, } Eſquires.
Edward Wheler, }
Mr. Barwell indiſpoſed.
Sir Eyre Coote on a Viſit to the different Stations of the Army.

READ the following Letter from the Preſident and Select Committee at Fort St. George.

Gentlemen,

We Yeſterday received a Letter from Colonel Braithwaite, giving an Account of his Proceedings in conſequence of our Orders to him for evacuating Mahé, and ſending the Detachment to Surat: A Copy of this Letter we tranſmit for your Information, and you will perceive by it the diſagreeable Situation of Affairs at Tellicherry, and the Reaſons which induced Colonel Braithwaite to remain there with the whole Detachment to act in Defence of that Settlement; we wiſhed the Europeans had been ſent at all Events to Surat; but ſtill we cannot blame Colonel Braithwaite for uſing his Diſcretion, in a Caſe where one of the Company's Poſſeſſions was to be defended againſt an actual and powerful Attack; the Part taken by Hyder Ally in fomenting theſe Diſturbances, and marching a large Body of his Troops to take Poſſeſſion of the Ruins of Mahé, on Account of its Proximity to Tellicherry, ſhew no very favourable Diſpoſition towards us, and might well warrant the Conjecture formed by Colonel Braithwaite, that he would probably aſſiſt the Nairs in their Attempt upon that Factory. There is however Reaſon to fear from what Colonel Braithwaite writes, that the Gentlemen of Tellicherry have imprudently provoked Hoſtilities by interfering in the Country Diſputes, and giving Protection to People obnoxious to Hyder and the Nairs. If ſo, they have certainly been very culpable, and we hope their Superiors will inſtantly take Meaſures to promote an Accommodation, for we are ourſelves averſe from engaging our Troops in ſo unjuſtifiable a Quarrel. We made it a Part of our Inſtruction to Colonel Braithwaite during his Command at Mahé, to have no Interference directly or indirectly with any Powers or Chiefs beyond the Limits of his Authority; and he appears to have ſo ſtrictly conformed to our Orders in this Reſpect, that we do not believe he has had the ſmalleſt Share in any of the Tranſactions which may have given Riſe to the preſent Troubles.

The Moment we heard of theſe Diſturbances, and the conſequent Detention of our Troops at Tellicherry, we came to the Reſolution of ſending, at all Events, immediately from hence, a reſpectable Reinforcement to join General Goddard's Army at Surat; and ordered a complete Battalion of Europeans, a Company of Artillery, and a Battalion of Sepoys, to be held in Readineſs to embark at a Moment's Warning. His Majeſty's Ship Sea Horſe being here, we applied to Captain Panton for his Aſſiſtance on this Occaſion, and we have taken up the Horſendor, a Country Ship, as a Tranſport; theſe Two Veſſels, which are all we have at preſent, will receive the Battalion of Europeans and Company of Artillery, and ſail with them in Five or Six Days at furtheſt, directly for Surat: The Battalion of Sepoys we ſhall embark upon the Beſborough and Britannia, which we underſtand may be hourly expected from Bengal on their Way to Bombay or Surat; we ſhall alſo hold a Battalion of Sepoys more in Readineſs to the Southward, to embark from Anjengo, ſhould there be Occaſion for them; and we have ſent Directions to Colonel Braithwaite to forward the Europeans with him, by the firſt Opportunity, to Surat, unleſs Circumſtances ſhould have materially changed ſince he wrote laſt; that is to ſay, unleſs Hyder ſhould have openly taken ſuch a Part in the Attack of Tellicherry as to render it abſolutely neceſſary for the Europeans to act in its Defence.

This Exertion, we aſſure you, is the utmoſt we are capable of making in the critical Situation of our Affairs with Hyder, and it is ſuch, that ſhould a powerful Invaſion take place, we muſt act entirely upon the defenſive, and look chiefly to the Care of our Garriſons; nevertheleſs, in the preſent State of Affairs on the other Side of India, we conceive it to be our Duty to ſacrifice much to promote the Object of Peace, and we hope and truſt that the conſiderable Reinforcement we are ſending to General Goddard, may enable him to accompliſh it upon ſafe and honourable Terms.

We are, &c.

Fort St. George,
31ſt December 1779.

(Signed) Tho° Rumbold,
&c. Council.

APPENDIX, N° 256. A.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 24th February 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Philip Francis, } Eſquires.
Edward Wheler, }
Sir Eyre Coote abſent with the Army.

READ the following Letter from Bombay Secret Committee:

Gentlemen,

Having been fully engaged in a Diſpatch of conſiderable Length to the Honourable Company, it has prevented us ſending you an Account of the Reſult of General Goddard's Negociation, or the Meaſures reſolved upon in conſequence; and which was the leſs material, as that Gentleman acquainted us he had himſelf fully written on the Subject; but a ſafe Conveyance now offering by Sea to Anjengo, we take the Opportunity of tranſmitting by that Route to Madras, Copies at Length of Letters delivered to us by General Goddard during his Continuance at Bombay; of a Letter of Inſtructions and Credentials we delivered him on his Departure to join the Army; and of a ſubſequent Correſpondence; which explain ſo fully our preſent political Situation with reſpect to the Marattas, that it is needleſs to ſay any Thing in addition, further than to confirm our Aſſurances in the Letter to General Goddard of the 3d Inſtant, that we ſhall moſt zealouſly ſupport him in the vigorous Proſecution of the War upon the Principle therein laid down, though without any Share in the Reſponſibility.

We have already in our Letters of the 7th and 13th of October repreſented to you the reduced State of our Finances, and our preſſing Demands for Money. Since the Month of September laſt, we have advanced General Goddard no leſs than Six Lacks of Rupees; a moſt heavy Deduction from our limited Income, only made equal by Supplies from your to our ſtated Expences, and for which of courſe we muſt be proportionably unprovided. We were the more induced to make the laſt Advance of Two Lacks, that he might not be under the Neceſſity of taking up Money at Surat for Bills on your Government, which we were apprehenſive from your Letter of the 14th October might be the Means of defeating your Endeavours to procure Remittances both from the Army and this Preſidency, and thereby adding to our preſent Difficulties. In order to raiſe a Fund for our immediate Exigencies we have given Directions for a Loan being made at Surat, which the Chief acquaints us will not amount to more than Five or Six Lacks of Rupees; out of which, the beforementioned Advance of Two Lacks is to be deducted, and with our ſmall ſtated Receipts, the Expences of this Preſidency, and alſo of the Madras Detachment at Tellicherry, are to be defrayed till we receive Supplies from you. We will not pretend to ſay what Reſources we may find from the Succeſs of the Meaſures committed to General Goddard; but whatever future Advantages they may produce, it would not be prudent to place much Dependance upon them for any conſiderable immediate Relief, and we therefore truſt you will have taken Meaſures for ſending us our uſual Supply hitherto received in Part of this Seaſon, and that you will make Allowance alſo for the extraordinary Demands we may be expoſed to in the preſent Situation of Affairs.

APPENDIX, N° 257. A.

Extract of a Letter from the Preſident and Select Committee at Bombay, to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, dated the 31ſt December 1779.

WE had the Honour to addreſs you on the 30th of April by your Ship, the Royal Admiral, and the ſame Time tranſmitted a Triplicate of our Addreſs, dated the 27th of March, diſpatched to England expreſs by the Betſy Snow.

The moſt material political Tranſaction communicated in the laſt mentioned Addreſs, was our Reſolution to the Governor General and Council, the Determination of the Meaſures to be purſued

ſued with reſpect to the Poona Government, and to refer to their Deciſion a Plan propoſed to us by the Preſident for the Line of Conduct that appeared to him beſt adapted to our then Circumſtances; a Copy of which was tranſmitted by the Royal Admiral. Juſt at the Time this Plan was laid before us, the Letter was received from the Governor General and Council, dated the 8th February; and came at the ſame Time under our Conſideration at a Meeting to which we had invited Colonel Goddard, who then laid before us Credentials given him by thoſe Gentlemen to act as their Miniſter at the Court of Poona, on certain Points independant of our Controul; and alſo acquainted us, that as in the Event of the Failure of our Plan for the Reſtoration of Ragoba, he was directed to reſume the Negociation with Moodajee Bouncello, he ſhould forthwith take the neceſſary Steps for that Purpoſe; and requeſted that Aſſurances might be given to the Rajah on our Part of the full Support and Concurrence of this Government in any Meaſures which might be concerted between them; which we accordingly complied with.

As our engaging in any Meaſures hoſtile to the Poona Government, might afford Moodajee a Pretence for breaking off the Negociation, if he was not ſeriouſly inclined to an Alliance with the Company, and might interfere with the Views of the Governor General and Council, with whom we were truly deſirous of acting in concert upon ſome ſettled and aſcertained Plan; theſe were the Conſiderations that impelled us to the above Reſolution, and which we have judged it neceſſary to recapitulate in this Addreſs to preſerve Connection in the Account of our Proceedings, in caſe our Advices by the Royal Admiral ſhould have miſcarried.

We alſo in our ſaid Addreſs ſtrongly recommended Colonel Goddard to your moſt favourable Notice; and ſolicited ſome diſtinguiſhed Mark of Regard from you for his judicious and deciſive Conduct in quitting the Negociation with Moodajee Bouncello, and his ready Determination of advancing to our Aſſiſtance, as well as for the Activity and military Skill with which he conducted ſo difficult and dangerous a March through a Country never before traverſed by the Company's Troops.

Remaining therefore in Expectation of Directions from Bengal to fix our Meaſures, we on the 20th of May received a Letter from the Governor General and Council, dated the 5th of April, after Advice had reached them, of the Failure of the Expedition; in which they acquainted us, that they had inveſted Colonel Goddard with full Powers, as Miniſter of that Government, to treat with the Peſhwa and Miniſters of the Maratta State for the Renewal or Confirmation of the Treaty of Poorunder; provided they would recede from the Pretenſions they had acquired by the late Treaty at Worgaum, and would agree not to admit any French Force to their Dominions, nor allow that Nation to form any Eſtabliſhment on the Maratta Coaſt; impowering him to conclude a Treaty with them on thoſe Conditions, the Acceptance or Refuſal of which was to determine the Alternative of Peace or War.

The Governor General and Council further ſignified to us, that their firſt Object in this Negociation was to obtain Peace on honourable Terms; and in the mean Time they recommended to us to be prepared either for repelling any hoſtile Attacks of the Marattas, or for any other Service which they might hereafter judge neceſſary; but they formally forbad us to undertake any offenſive Meaſure, without explicit and poſitive Orders from them.

Colonel Goddard commenced his Negociation upon theſe Grounds; and we gave him every neceſſary Information to aſſiſt him in the Conduct of it, furniſhing him with Extracts from your Commands of the 7th of May, and a Copy of thoſe of the 31ſt of Auguſt 1778. Before his Negociation was brought to any Point, a very unexpected Circumſtance happened, which may produce very important Effects on the political Syſtem of this Preſidency.

Ragoba, ſince his Separation from our Forces at Tellagaum, had remained under Charge of Mhadjee Scinda; who, though deſirous of retaining Poſſeſſion of his Perſon for Purpoſes of political Advantage, treated him with every external Mark of Reſpect, and even left him his Artillery and moſt of the Forces he had brought with him from Bombay, to accompany him on the March to the Place deſtined for his Reception. Scindia's Duan, with 4,000 Horſe, was appointed to eſcort him; and his Intention appears to have been to carry him into the diſtant Provinces in his own Direction and Diſpoſal. In this Scheme he was however baffled; for upon their Arrival at the Nerbedah, and preparing to croſs that River, Ragoba found an Opportunity of executing a Plan, no Doubt previouſly concerted, for his Eſcape; and an Action enſuing, which we are informed was commenced by Scindia's Horſe, upon ſome Suſpicion of Ragoba's Deſign, Scindia's Troops were totally routed and diſperſed, and the Duan himſelf mortally wounded.

Ragoba, immediately after the Action, made the beſt of his Way to Occlaſeer, near Broach, with about Three or Four thouſand Horſe and Foot and his Guns, to the Number of Twenty. After remaining there a ſhort Time, he joined Colonel Goddard's Camp near Surat, the 13th of June, having previouſly requeſted Permiſſion to come in, together with his Family, and receive the Protection of the Camp; which the Colonel acquainted us he judged proper from political Conſiderations, ſo far as it extended to their Perſonal Security, to grant him in the Name of the Bengal Government, till he could receive their Pleaſure regarding him.

The Governor General and Council were immediately adviſed of this Event, by a Veſſel diſpatched Expreſs; but on the firſt Intimation we received of Ragoba's Eſcape and Deſign to put himſelf under our Protection at Surat, we reſolved, in order that no Step on our Part might tend to fruſtrate the Negociation they had been pleaſed to commit to Colonel Goddard, to direct the Chief to deſire him to ſeek an Aſylum in ſome other Place; and we at the ſame Time intimated, that as the Colonel muſt be the beſt Judge how far the Company's taking Ragoba under Pro-

tection, might interfere with the preſent Views of the Governor General and Council, it would reſt with him to act in this Point according to his own Judgment; and he muſt be reſponſible for the Conſequences. The Execution however of this Order was ſuperſeded by Ragoba's making Application in the firſt Inſtance to Colonel Goddard; and he has ſince, at the Colonel's Deſire, had a Habitation aſſigned him in the City of Surat.

It was not till the 29th of Auguſt, that we received from the Governor General and Council their Reply to the Diſpatches ſent them by Mr. Horſley, relative to the Failure of the late Expedition and the Plan propoſed by the Preſident. This was conveyed to us in a Letter, dated the 14th of June; in the Preamble of which they acquainted us, they ſhould decline all Review of our paſt Proceedings, and confine themſelves to the Choice of Meaſures that appeared to them beſt calculated to retrieve our Affairs.

Theſe Meaſures, ſtriking at the very Exiſtence of Our Rights, and the Power eſpecially entruſted to us, and being in our Opinion abſolutely inconſiſtent and incompatible with the avowed Object of them, namely, Peace with the Maratta Government, ſuperadded to their Directions being conveyed in Terms ſo intricate and liable to Miſconſtruction, that it would be very difficult to give a faithful Abſtract, make us deem it very material to ſend you a Copy of it at full Length by the preſent Diſpatch.

Mr. Horſley, who was allowed Acceſs to this Letter before it was diſpatched from Bengal, ſet before the Governor General and Council, in a very able and maſterly Manner, the general Objections which lay againſt the extenſive Powers they had conferred on General Goddard, as well as the particular Parts of the Letter which ſeemed likely to prove detrimental to the public Service; we have therefore accompanied this Letter with a Copy of Mr. Horſley's on the Subject, in which you will find he has diſtinguiſhed the Powers of the Two Governments with the utmoſt Accuracy, and aſſerted our Right with becoming Spirit, and unanſwerable Strength of Argument.

You may believe we felt moſt ſenſibly this Invaſion upon the Rights and Powers immediately veſted in us by you, and thus illegally transferred to Brigadier General Goddard, on whom the Governor General and Council have thought proper to confer that Rank for the Service on which he is now employed. Their charging him, to our entire Excluſion, with the immediate Intereſts of this Preſidency; with the Power of making Peace or War at his own Choice; and with an Army under his own independant Command, to proſecute whatever Meaſures he may think proper to adopt; are Inſtances of delegated Authority, both unconſtitutional, and in the higheſt Degree injurious to the Rights abſolutely inherent in us, under the Subordination due to the Governor General and Council by Act of Parliament. This Conduct is directly repugnant to the Sentiments you expreſſed on their Interference with the Rights of this Government, though in a much more limited Degree, in the Inſtance of Lieutenant Colonel Upton: And without intending the ſmalleſt Reflection on General Goddard, but only as an Obſervation naturally ariſing from the Caſe itſelf, we muſt remark, that by their uniting in a military Man, poſſeſſed of the uncontrolled Command of an Army, the Charge of a Negociation, the Powers of making Peace or War, and of conducting that War himſelf, and planning the Operations in any Manner he may think proper, they have formed a Truſt of ſuch an oppoſite and diſſimilar Nature, and ſo much at Variance with profeſſional Principles, that in the Diſcharge of it a Bias, though perhaps imperceptible to the Agent, muſt prevail in favour of military Meaſures; and that Choice will the more juſtly excite Surprize, as the Governor General and Council have repeatedly expreſſed, that their predominant Wiſh is for Peace; and that they look to the Iſſue of this Negociation, if it ſhall prove ſucceſsful, as their primary Object, and the Termination of all their political Views on this Side of India.

We alſo obſerved with Concern, as a Circumſtance that muſt tend to the Diſadvantage of your Affairs, the little Inclination manifeſted by the Governor General and Council, of acting on any Terms of Union or Concert with us, which we had ſo anxiouſly wiſhed for, and in the Hope of which, though the Neceſſity was imminent, we had deferred fixing upon our Meaſures, without their previous Concurrence; but as we have had nothing in View but your Intereſt, and the Good of the Service, which muſt ſuffer Injury in any Conteſt between the Two Governments, and eſpecially on Points of ſuch a Nature as our preſent Cauſe of Complaint, we came to a Reſolution not to oppoſe the Operation of their Orders, or of General Goddard's Power, and to unite with him cordially and confidentially in the common Cauſe, ſtill making Reſervation of our Rights thus violently infringed, and declaring them not to be conſidered as in the ſmalleſt Degree impaired or injured by our Conceſſion in this Inſtance.

We flatter ourſelves you will approve the Reſolution we have taken, conſidering our Circumſtances, and the bad Conſequences that muſt have followed from an Oppoſition to General Goddard's Powers; between which and the Line of Conduct we have taken, there appeared no Alternative. The Confuſion an oppoſite Conduct muſt have produced, ſo raſhly hazarded by the Governor General and Council, will we truſt be a ſtrong Recommendation of the Moderation we have ſhewn, and evince our Diſpoſition to contribute our beſt Services for the Advancement of your Intereſt, even to the Injury of our own Rights and Privileges; but at the ſame Time that we make this Sacrifice to the Public Service, we look up to your Juſtice and Authority to reinſtate us in the free Exerciſe of the Powers conſtitutionally inherent in us, and to prevent all future Infringements of them, which alone can reſtore to this Government the Weight and Conſequence of which it has been ſo unjuſtly and impolitically deprived, or enable your Delegates here to carry on your Affairs with any Degree of Honour to themſelves, or Advantage to the Company.

Though any Diſtinction that could, with Propriety, have been conferred on General Goddard would have given us Pleaſure, and we had recommended him to the Governor General and Council for ſome Mark of their Favour, we could have no Idea of their rewarding him at the Expence of the Rights of this Government, by giving him a local Rank, confined to the proper Sphere of our own Juriſdiction. It requires no Arguments to prove, that they have no Right to grant ſuch a Commiſſion, the Validity of which we are apprehenſive might be diſputed, in caſe of the Arrival of any Officers, ſuperior in Rank to General Goddard's Standing upon the Bengal Eſtabliſhment; and as there would be no poſſible Doubt but that Officer, with his former Rank, and in the Station he held, would have been intruſted with the Chief Command of the Army in the Event of a Maratta War, had the Option of ſhewing him this Mark of Confidence been left to us, and we had it not even in our Power to ſuperſede him in the Command, had we been ſo inclined; their conferring ſuch an Appointment appears therefore quite inexpedient, and an unneceſſary Uſurpation of Power, unſupported by any legal Authority veſted in the Governor General and Council.

Thoſe Gentlemen in a ſubſequent Letter, dated the 8th of July, acquainted us that they have entirely approved the Protection granted to Ragoba, and that they have directed General Goddard to continue to afford it to him ſo long as he ſhall demand it; provided he ſhall not forfeit his Right to it by any Act of Infidelity, or attempt to defeat the Effect of the Negociation to which General Goddard was to give his entire Attention: Without regard to any other Conſideration for the reſt, they left him to act under their Inſtructions of the 5th of April, in which they ſaw no Cauſe to make any Alteration on account of that Event.

To give you an Idea of our political Situation with reſpect to the Marattas, we muſt principally take our Accounts from General Goddard's Letters, as no Degree of Agency being left to us, we can give you no direct Account from ourſelves. The firſt Information of any Conſequence relative to his Negociation was contained in a Letter, dated the 10th of September at the Camp near Surat, from whence he carried it on, in which he acquainted us, that his Propoſals were communicated to the Miniſter by Letters diſpatched expreſs the 19th of Auguſt; but from what Cauſe he knew not, either a ſtudied Delay on his Part, or by reaſon of ſome Diſturbances on the Road, no Anſwer had been received. That to obviate as much as poſſible any further Inconvenience from Delay, he had diſpatched the Aſſiſtant to the Maratta Vackeel, who attended him, expreſs to Poona, with the Terms on which he was authorized to conclude a Peace, and had limited his Return to Twenty Days, which he had faithfully promiſed to do.

He inferred from this Account the Uncertainty of the Event of his Negociation; and obſerved, as he had Reaſon to apprehend, (notwithſtanding his poſitive Declarations he would never conſent to grant any) that the Miniſter would demand ſome conſiderable Conceſſions on our Part, in return for their ſacrificing all Claims derived from the Convention of Worgaum, it was a very probable Circumſtance that we might be compelled to take up Arms. At the ſame Time he remarked, that he had hitherto received nothing from the Miniſter, but the ſtrongeſt Aſſurances of Friendſhip for the Engliſh, and that the Profeſſion of his Emiſſary promiſed only the moſt favourable Iſſue to the Negociation.

You will doubtleſs obſerve, that when we have mentioned the Poona Adminiſtration with any Relation to Perſon, we have made uſe of the Singular Number, the Reaſon of which is, that Nannah Furneeſe is at preſent the ſole Miniſter, Sacaram Bappoo being, as we underſtood, under Confinement through his Means.

General Goddard in the ſame Letter writes: "Should however a War become neceſſary, the "Seaſon is ſo far advanced, and ſo little Time can hereafter be ſpared for Deliberation, that it will "be expedient to conſult and to determine upon ſome Plan of Operations as early as can be done "with Convenience." He alſo aſſured us of his Zeal and Readineſs to promote any Views he might have formed for the Honour and Intereſt of the Company in general, or the particular Advantage of this Settlement; and requeſted we would communicate ſuch Parts of them as we might judge proper at that Time, that he might be fully prepared to aſſiſt and co-operate in their Accompliſhment.

He accompanied this Letter with Indents for Stores of all Kinds to complete the Army for Service, which we immediately furniſhed from our own Magazines.

In our Anſwer we acquainted him, that if he found his Negociation likely to break off, we were of Opinion it would be more adviſable for him to come down to Bombay to conſult with us reſpecting the Plan of Operations in ſuch Caſe to be purſued, and which would thereby be determined with more Expedition and Accuracy than by Letter. In the mean Time we ſent for his Conſideration a Copy of the Preſident's Minute of the 30th of March; obſerving only to him, that that Plan was concerted without any Relation to Ragoba, who was then in the Power of Mhadjee Scindia.

At this Period we received a Letter from the Governor General and Council, dated 2d of Auguſt, acquainting us, that from Accounts lately received of the Strength of the French at the Mauritius, they had great Reaſon to apprehend an Attempt was intended againſt this Settlement; they therefore deemed it of the utmoſt Importance to provide for its Safety, by reinforcing the Army under General Goddard with a reſpectable Addition of Troops, and ſhould direct him to be prepared for the expected Event, and to make it his firſt Object to afford us the moſt effectual Support and Protection in his Power.

That the Commander in Chief had informed them, One Battalion of Europeans, Three Battalions

lions of Sepoys, and Fifty Artillery, might be ſpared from the Madras Eſtabliſhment; and that we could likewiſe contribute 300 Europeans, Two Battalions of Sepoys, and 100 Artillery, for that Service, without any Inconvenience or Diſtreſs to the Garriſon; they had therefore written on the Subject to the Select Committee at Madras, and they earneſtly recommended it to us to iſſue immediate Orders for our Quota to be aſſembled to join General Goddard at ſuch Place of Rendezvous as might be appointed, without Delay.

General Goddard, immediately after this Information reached him, acquainted us under the 29th of September, that in his Opinion, Surat was the moſt eligible Rendezvous for the Army; and requeſted that Veſſels might be inſtantly diſpatched to bring up the Troops from Mahé, which were to compoſe Part of the Quota to be furniſhed from Madras; and that our Quota might be in Readineſs to join him, whenever it might be judged expedient from Circumſtances to put them in Motion.

In the ſame Letter, he acquainted us, he had not received any Advices from the Maratta Agent he had diſpatched to Poona; but would as ſoon as poſſible adviſe us of the Reſult of his Journey.

We will not enlarge upon the Inconſiſtency of detaching any Part of our Garriſon to join General Goddard's Army at Surat, for the avowed Purpoſe of protecting this Iſland from Invaſion, but proceed to acquaint you, that in his next Letter, dated the Day after the one laſt noticed, and received at the ſame Time, he related a material Piece of Intelligence he had juſt received from Poona, which he ſaid he had Reaſon to believe might be relied on; the Particulars of which were, that the Miniſter and Scindia, in conjunction with Hyder Ally, Nizam Ally, and Moodajee Bouncello, meant to make a general Attack upon the Engliſh, at their ſeveral Settlements, and had entered into formal Agreements for that Purpoſe.

General Goddard further obſerved, that however the Probability of their executing literally a Plan of ſuch Extent might be ſuſpected, he could then ſcarce entertain a Doubt of the hoſtile Views of the Miniſter; and ſtrongly repreſented the Neceſſity of having the Army put into a Condition for inſtant and active Service, by collecting ſuch a Force as might be ſufficient to attack or to reſiſt the Attacks of the Enemy. For theſe Reaſons, he again urged the Expediency of bringing up the Troops from Mahé; and propoſed, that the Detachment from this Preſidency ſhould be ordered to join the Army immediately.

In conſequence of this Requiſition, and Intelligence of the hoſtile Intentions of the Miniſter, we reſolved to diſpatch with the utmoſt Expedition a ſufficient Number of Veſſels to bring up the Forces and Stores from Mahé; the Fortifications of which were nearly demoliſhed, except ſome few Works for the mere Protection of the Garriſon; but at that Time (being the 6th of October) we did not judge it prudent to detach any Part of our Garriſon, until the Seaſon might be ſo far advanced, as to put it out of the Power of our Enemy's Fleets to come upon us by Surprize, which would be the Caſe by the Time the Troops might arrive from Mahé, and in the Interval our Preparations would be in Forwardneſs.

Our Veſſels ſailed from Mahé the 17th of October, and on the 22d, we received a Letter from the Governor General and Council, dated the 14th of September, in which they acquainted us, that as it was poſſible the Poona Government might have found Means to protract the Negociation, and as in that Caſe they would have had full Time for Deliberation, if they were at all inclined to eſtabliſh an amicable Connection, they had therefore ſent Injunctions to General Goddard, to repeat their Offers to the Durbar, and to demand their definitive Anſwer within the Space of Twenty-four Hours, declaring their Refuſal or Delay beyond that Time to be equivalent to a Declaration of War, and that he would act accordingly.

If General Goddard ſhould be reduced to this Extremity, they recommended to us to grant him every Aid in our Power, and to endeavour by every Means that might be neceſſary, to render his Succeſs ſpeedy and effectual.

Theſe Orders reaching General Goddard before they arrived with us, we on the 29th received a Letter from him, acquainting us, that in conſequence thereof he had declared to the Maratta Vackeel in his Camp, the Suſpicions he could not but entertain of the hoſtile Intentions of his Maſter, from the Delay that had unneceſſarily aroſe, in ſending an Anſwer to the Propoſals ſo long before tranſmitted to him, to which an Anſwer had been faithfully promiſed in Twenty Days; that twice that Period was then elapſed, and the Vackeel had repeatedly amuſed him with Accounts of the Agent before mentioned to have been ſent to Poona, having received his Diſmiſſion—it appeared from his own Acknowledgments, he had not then ſet out, and would not in all Probability leave Poona till ſome Time after: He had however declared to the Vackeel, that notwithſtanding theſe Circumſtances of Suſpicion, the Engliſh were ſtill ready to ſhew their ſincere Inclination for Peace, and that therefore he would wait Fifteen Days more, in which Time an Anſwer might be received from Poona, to a Letter the Vackeel would that Inſtant diſpatch; at the Expiration of which Period, if the Agent did not arrive, or a ſatisfactory Anſwer to the Propoſals tranſmitted by him, he ſhould conſider the Delay as a Declaration of War, and act accordingly. This paſſed the 18th of October, and the limited Term was to expire the 3d of November.

We beheld with Concern Matters verging ſo cloſe to a Rupture, when we were ſo little in a Condition to meet the War: Our Treaſury was very low; we had no adequate Reſources; nor had the Governor General and Council given us any Aſſurances of Aſſiſtance of Money from Bengal; General Goddard had ſhortly before drawn Four Lacks from the Surat Treaſury, which was the utmoſt we could ſpare; and we had juſt received Advice by private Letters, of the Loſs of the Stafford in Bengal River, with a conſiderable Sum for the Service of his Army; we had no reaſonable

Expectation

Expectation of the Arrival of the Fleet in India before the Month of January, an Event which would diffuſe Strength to all your Settlements, and give Confidence to our Meaſures; nor could we expect till then to receive the Quota of Troops from Madras, that Preſidency having, as we learnt from private Advices, ſent an Army into the Field under Colonel Harper; the Object of which, having no Information from them, we do not underſtand, but have heard it was with an Intention to take Poſſeſſion of Guntoor, ceded by Bazalet Jung, in which he had been oppoſed by an Officer of Hyder Ally's, ſtationed at Cuddapa, lately ſubdued by him; and that they were on very doubtful Terms with that Nabob. Colonel Braithwaite likewiſe did not ſeem to intend to join the Army with the Forces from Mahé, until he received Orders from Madras; and we further knew from undoubted Authority, though not directly from the Governor General and Council, that a ſtrong Detachment conſiſting of 49 Artillery, 2000 Sepoys, and 750 Horſe, was to march from the Bengal Provinces under the Command of Captain Popham, the Safety of which might be put to extreme Hazard by an immediate Rupture with the Marattas: All which Conſiderations, and the Time it muſt neceſſarily take up before the different Bodies of Troops that were to compoſe the Army could be collected and put in a Condition to act offenſively, made us clearly of Opinion, that it was right Policy to endeavour to gain Time, and to protract the Criſis which a literal Execution of the Orders from Bengal muſt immediately produce; we therefore on the ſame Day, the 29th October, diſpatched a Letter to General Goddard, ſtating the above Reaſons, and ſtrongly recommending to him, if the Miniſter did not accede to the offered Terms, not to make any immediate Declaration, but according to their own Policy, to procraſtinate and protract, till we were in a better Condition for an active War, if a Rupture ſhould at laſt be found inevitable.

Before our Letter could reach Surat General Goddard himſelf arrived here in a Gallivat on the 1ſt of November, and perſonally acquainted us, that before any Anſwer could arrive from Poona to the Declaration he had made to the Maratta Vackeel, in conſequence of the laſt Order from the Governor General and Council, the Agent formerly diſpatched thither with his Terms, as mentioned in the 19th Paragraph, had returned with Letters from the Peiſhwa and the Miniſter, the Purport of which was ſimply to acknowledge the Receipt of his Propoſals, and to refer him to the Agent for an Anſwer, as being fully inſtructed and informed with their Determination, which he would communicate.

That in a Conference with the Agent on the Subject he had in anſwer to the Propoſals made to the Durbar, plainly declared, that the Miniſter would not make Peace with the Engliſh, unleſs Salſette was relinquiſhed, and the Perſon of Ragonaut Row delivered up: That upon theſe Conditions, and theſe only, he was ready to agree to the Propoſals that had been ſent to him; and declared in the moſt pointed Terms, that unleſs they were agreed to, there was no further Occaſion for Negociation.

General Goddard gave the Vackeel his Diſmiſſion the next Day, and immediately embarked for Bombay, to conſult with us upon the Meaſures to be purſued. He gave us his Sentiments very fully on the Subject, ſtrongly urging vigorous and deciſive Meaſures; and the Preſident alſo propoſed to us, a Plan of Conduct to be obſerved in our preſent Circumſtances, on which we ſeverally gave our Opinions; but as a Detail of Particulars would lead us to a Length much beyond the Limits of an Over-land Addreſs, we ſhall, as moſt material, adviſe you only of the Reſult of our Deliberations, and of the Meaſures finally determined.

From the above State of the Caſe, and the military Preparations we learnt from all Quarters were making at Poona, we were of Opinion, that a War with the Marattas was inevitable, and that it would become our Duty to afford our utmoſt Aſſiſtance to carry it on with Vigour, when no longer to be avoided; of which we were neither competent Judges, nor able in any Manner to controul the Event; the Negociation, as well as all Powers relative to Peace and War, being taken off our Hands: But without entering into any Queſtion of Neceſſity or good Policy, we judged it neceſſary to mark it clearly on our Proceedings; and we requeſt it may be fully underſtood, that the War now impending is not a Meaſure of the Select Committee of Bombay; and that whether it is approved or condemned, we do not conſider ourſelves as reſponſible either for the Meaſure itſelf, or the Succeſs which may attend it. Our Reaſons for this Poſition are founded on the Principle, that as the Negociation was carried on under the ſeparate and diſtinct Inſtructions of the Governor General and Council, who have expreſsly acquainted us, that the principal Reſponſibility will reſt with them; and as General Goddard is in conſequence made reſponſible to them for his Conduct in the Operations of the War, we ſhould be wanting in Juſtice to ourſelves, if we did not diſclaim all Reſponſibility both as to the Meaſure of the War itſelf, which is the Iſſue of that Negociation, as well as the Succeſs of it when commenced; the Officer entruſted with the Execution being reſponſible to another Power. We are alſo of Opinion, that after thus diſclaiming all Reſponſibility, whatever we might have to offer to General Goddard in the Courſe of Service, could only amount to Advice or Recommendation; neither were we warranted by the Governor General and Council to give him direct Orders for his Conduct; ſince according to the reſpective Powers now held by the Committee and General Goddard, any Orders we might give are no further binding than according to his own Conſtruction of them; and that it would therefore be ineffectual, and needleſsly hazarding our own Conſequence to aſſume any ſuch Power.

The Grounds upon which we ſhall act being thus aſcertained, and which we clearly explained to General Goddard, we beg Leave to aſſure you, that according to our Duty to the Company, and from Motives of Juſtice and Honour, with reſpect to the Bengal Government, we ſhall contribute our

our Aſſiſtance moſt zealouſly and cordially to bring the War to a ſpeedy and advantageous Concluſion, both with the Forces of this Preſidency and the beſt Advices and Information in our Power to give to General Goddard.

In order to make his Army as reſpectable as poſſible, we immediately upon the General's acquainting us of the Negociation being broken off, ſent a poſitive Requiſition to Colonel Braithwaite to embark the Forces at Mahé, upon the Veſſel ſent down to receive them, and to join the Army at Surat without Delay; making him reſponſible for the Conſequences of a Non-compliance: And we determine forthwith to complete the Artillery Detachment to 100 Men, and further to reinforce the Army with a Body of 200 European Infantry and Two Battalions of Sepoys, one of which conſiſted of drafted Grenadiers, which Force we put under the Command of Lieutenant Colonel Hartley, and was the utmoſt our Eſtabliſhment could afford at this Time; they were ſent up to Surat as we could procure Conveyances, the laſt Embarkation accompanying General Goddard, who on the 3d Inſtant proceeded on the Revenge to join the Army, when we delivered him a Letter of Advice for his Conduct, the Heads of which were as follow:

We repeated our Reaſons before-mentioned, for thinking it more adviſable to endeavour to gain Time, and to protract any farther Declaration or any Acts of Hoſtility, provided the Motions of the Enemy would in Prudence permit; and we again ſtrongly recommended to him, to obſerve temporizing Meaſures for the preſent; but we likewiſe obſerved, that if after Conſideration of our Reaſons he ſhould judge it eligible or neceſſary to enter upon immediate Action, the Determination muſt reſt with him, as we by no Means intended to lay any Reſtraint upon him, but only to offer him the Advice in our Opinion moſt ſuitable to preſent Circumſtances.

Whenever the Objections now exiſting might be removed, and Circumſtances might become ſufficiently favourable for commencing Operations, our Sentiments then entirely coincided with General Goddard's upon the Plan of Action to be purſued; this will be to ſecure a Country and Revenue capable of affording an extenſive Field of Supply for the Exigencies of the War, and we hope for the future Emolument of the Company; and the Preſident's Plan of the 30th of March, ſtriking us both in this Light, and General Goddard aſſuring us his Force was fully equal to the Undertaking, we have recommended to him, as his firſt Object to carry it into Execution, ſo far as relates to the Reduction of the Maratta Poſſeſſions adjoining to Surat and Broach, and the Settlement of the Guzerat Province, in concert with Futty Sing.

We however deſired him to loſe no Time in commencing a Negociation with Futty Sing, and to endeavour to convince him of the Advantage which will enſue to him from uniting with us in the Settlement of the Province upon the propoſed Plan; recommending ſtrongly to the General to uſe his utmoſt Addreſs to bring this Point to bear, by an amicable Compromiſe rather than by an Exertion of Force.

For this Purpoſe, we deſired him to explain clearly to Futty Sing, that no Injury was meant to him, but only to take into the Company's Hands the Poona Share of the Revenues held in Participation with him, and thereby to diſtreſs our Enemies with whom we are at War; but that it is our Wiſh to be on the moſt friendly Terms with him; and that General Goddard was fully empowered to treat with him for an amicable and equitable Settlement, upon Terms of mutual Advantage and Security to him from all future Dependants on the Poona Government, or Ground for Diſpute with the Company.

The Grounds of the Engagement to be formed with Futty Sing will be our ſupporting and defending him in Poſſeſſion of his Share of the Guzerat Province independant of the Poona Government, and his engaging to ſupport the Company in the Share now held by that Government. To make this Settlement as convenient as poſſible, and to avoid the continual Differences which muſt ariſe from both Parties having an Intereſt in the ſame Places, it will be propoſed to Futty Sing to make an abſolute and ſpecific Partition of Territory, according to the Proportion of the Revenues now reſpectively held by him and the Marattas, and each Party to have the diſtinct and ſole Government and Poſſeſſion of the Share which may be allotted to them in the new Settlement.

The propoſed Mode of Partition is to put Futty Sing in Poſſeſſion of, and guarantee to him, the Maratta Poſſeſſions to the Northward of the River Mahie, and for him to make over to the Company the Guicawar Diviſion of the Countries South of the Tappy, their Share in the Revenues of Surat, and ſuch other Lands as may nearly make up an Equivalent to the Countries to be guarantied as above to Futty Sing. When a Settlement is made on theſe Terms, and the Maratta Garriſons expelled, the Honourable Company will receive Poſſeſſion of the Diſtricts anciently annexed to Surat, and particularized in an Account entered in the Select Committee's Diary, under the 6th May 1772.

It is alſo to be ſtipulated with Futty Sing, that we will ſupport him in withholding the Tribute of 27 Lacks per Annum, which he now pays to the Poona Circar for his Jaghires in Guzerat, until a final Treaty is concluded between the Company and that Government, and that his Intereſts will be carefully attended to therein, if he cordially unites in the propoſed Settlement.

Theſe are the general Outlines of the intended Settlement; beſides which, we recommended as leſſer Points to General Goddard to attend to the Intereſt of the Nabob of Cambay and Govind Row, ſo far as he could, conſiſtently with the Inſtructions from the Governor General and Council, dated the 14th of June, and alſo to ſtipulate with Futty Sing for the Ceſſion of ſome few Villages he ſtill retains in the Broach Purgunnah, and of another Diſtrict adjoining thereto.

Whenever it ſhall be determined no longer to obſerve temporizing Meaſures, General Goddard will proceed in the Reduction of the Maratta Poſſeſſions adjoining to Surat, and the Purgunnahs between the Myhie and the Tappy, comprehending the Country in Guzerat, ceded to the Company by the Treaty with Ragoba, taking Care not to moleſt the Guicawars, Cheties, and Collectors, in their ſeveral Stations. The Object of his future Operations will be determined by the Reſult of his Negociation with Futty Sing, whom we moſt ardently wiſh he may be able to detach from his Connection with the Poona Government, and to fix him in an Alliance with the Company, which will be attended with the grand Advantages of giving Security to your Northern Poſſeſſions, and depriving the Enemy of the Aſſiſtance of a powerful Ally.

Another moſt powerful Recommendation of the propoſed Plan, is the Neceſſity of continuing the Army in the Guzerat Province, until a Junction is effected with Captain Popham's Detachment, which we learn is to march by the Way of Agra and Azmere to Amedavad; and we hope before Hoſtilities are commenced, will have made conſiderable Progreſs, ſo as to be rendered ſubſervient to the Execution of the Plan by the Reduction of the Countries to the Northward of the Myhie, which are to be guarantied to Futty Sing, while the Poſition of the Army under General Goddard will facilitate their Approach, and take up the chief Part of the Enemy's Attention: We have yet no Accounts of the Situation or Motions of that Detachment.

The Line of Conduct to be purſued reſpecting Ragoba was likewiſe ſeriouſly conſidered, when we concurred with a Recommendation from General Goddard, not to enter into any poſitive Engagement with him at preſent, or appear as the avowed Supporters of his Pretenſions, but to look forward to his Reſtoration at ſome future Period when Circumſtances may be more favourable. General Goddard will however hold out to him the Hopes of firmly eſtabliſhing him in the Government of the Maratta State, as our grand and ultimate Object, and we hope will be able to reconcile him to the Syſtem we have adopted, by repreſenting to him in its true Light how indiſpenſable it is for us to ſecure ſome, firm and ſolid Eſtabliſhment of territorial Poſſeſſion and Revenue, before we ſhall be in a Condition to proſecute any other Plan more immediately tending to his Advancement.

General Goddard acquainted us that he had found Madjee Scindia ſo averſe to any Accommodation, and ſo much inclined to hoſtile Meaſures, that he did not think proper to commit the Honour of the Company, by making any Overtures to him, according to the Inſtructions from the Governor General and Council.

You have now before you the State of Matters when General Goddard left Bombay; and we have the Satisfaction to acquaint you that we received his warmeſt Acknowledgments for the ready Support and Aſſiſtance afforded him by this Government, and the Harmony and good Underſtanding mutually obſerved in our Deliberations, from which he drew the happieſt Omens of Succeſs, nor ſhould we omit to acquaint you that he at the ſame Time gave us Notice of his having received Advice of Ten Lacks of Rupees being remitted from Bengal for his Army, Half in Specie and Half in Bills, and a Packet containing Bills has been lately forwarded to him, but we know not to what Amount.

Your Affairs at Tellicherry are in a diſagreeable Situation, and particularly embarraſſing to us at this Juncture. The Prince of Cherrika, of whoſe unfavourable Diſpoſition to the Honourable Company repeated Mention has been made in our late Advices, has at length in conjunction with the young King of Cartenaddue, openly commenced Hoſtilities, and entered Tellicherry Diſtrict with a conſiderable Force. The Enemy had poſſeſſed themſelves of ſome adjoining Hills, in Conſequence of which, the Reſident and Factors thought it neceſſary on the 1ſt ultimo, to deliver over the Keys of the Fort to the Commanding Officer, and to leave to his Direction the Meaſures for repulſing the Enemy, who though they appeared numerous, your Servants acquainted us they were not under any Apprehenſions for the Safety of the Fort or your Property.

Several Skirmiſhes and Attacks of Poſts happened in the Month of November, and the Enemy gained ſome Ground, when our Officers finding Tellicherry garriſoned, not equal to the Taſk of diſlodging the Enemy, made Application to Colonel Braithwaite, who accordingly after compleating the Deſtruction of Mahé, brought in his whole Force and took upon him the Command of the Fort the 1ſt Inſtant.

It is not material at this Time to enter fully into the Cauſes which may have induced theſe Malabars to act in this hoſtile Manner, but Colonel Braithwaite is ſtrongly of Opinion their Conduct is principally influenced by Hyder Ally, and he even expects they will be joined by a Body of the Nabob's Troops which had taken Poſſeſſion of the Ruins of Mahé, it is ſaid with an Intention to fortify it again. A more confidential Communication on the Part of the Gentlemen at Madras would enable us to form a better Judgment of the Foundation of Colonel Braithwaite's Opinion; but, we however have the ſtrongeſt Hopes the reſpectable Force now in Tellicherry, will be able effectually to defeat and diſlodge the Enemy, and Colonel Braithwaite has aſſured us his moſt active Efforts will be exerted for that Purpoſe. The Preſident has likewiſe written to Hyder Ally, and we hope by his Anſwer to be able to judge with ſome Certainty of his Intention. This Event has delayed the Junction of the Forces from Mahé with General Goddard's Army, but the Veſſels have brought up to Bombay the Ordnance and Stores taken there. We have no Advice from the Gentlemen at Madras reſpecting the Remainder of the Quota they were deſired by the Governor General and Council to furniſh for the Army under General Goddard; and we only learn from Colonel Braithwaite, that they had directed the Europeans

peans of his Detachment, conſiſting of one Company of Artillery, and one of Infantry, in the Whole not 100 Men, to be ſent up to the Army with one Battalion of Sepoys.

Monſieur Picot, late Chief of Mahé, having requeſted our Permiſſion to take Paſſage to Europe in a Portugueze Ship bound from Goa to Liſbon, we conſented thereto, as there was no Probability of a Ship being diſpatched from this Place for ſome Time, and the Charge of ſupporting him and his Suite would thereby be put an End to; we allowed him 12,000 Rupees for the whole Expence to be incurred on that Account, and took his Parole to return to France according to his Capitulation. We were afterwards acquainted by Mr. Briſtow with the Directions he was commiſſioned by the Deputy Chairman to ſend to the different Preſidencies reſpecting the Return of French Priſoners, which we ſhall duly obſerve.

The only Letter we have received from General Goddard ſince his Arrival at Surat, is dated the 15th Inſtant, in which he acquainted us, that having made every neceſſary Arrangement, he expected ſoon to inform us of the Troops being in Motion; that he had opened the Negociation with Futty Sing, and communicated his Propoſals, to which he expected an Anſwer in a few Days, though as the Succeſs thereof would rather be advanced than retarded by the Movement of the Forces, he ſhould not remain inactive on account of any Delay in Futty Sing, but enter upon military Operations whenever Circumſtances might render it convenient, obſerving the moſt ſcrupulous Attention to the Preſervation of the Country belonging to the Guicawars.

The General being very preſſing for a further Supply of Money till his Remittances arrive from Bengal, which the Governor General and Council acquaint us under the 14th of October, they ſhould find Means to furniſh without allowing him to draw upon them, we agreed to advance him Two Lacks more out of a Loan of Five to Six Lacks we had been under a Neceſſity of impowering the Chief of Surat to raiſe there for our own immediate Expences; and having applied on this Occaſion to the Nabob, the Sum offered by him was ſo trifling, that we did not think it proper to accept it.

By Letters from Tellicherry of the 20th Inſtant, we do not find Colonel Braithwaite had taken any Steps for diſlodging the Enemy, but had been engaged in a long Correſpondence with your Servants. Major Cotgrave had juſt arrived from Madras to relieve him in the Command.

APPENDIX, N° 258. A.

Extract of a Letter from the Governor General and Council in Bengal, to the Court of Directors in their Public Department; dated the 14th January 1779.

THE Drafts made upon us by General Goddard ſince his Arrival at Surat, have amounted to Sicca Rupees 32,49,090. 7. 1.; beſides which, we have ſupplied him by Bills 5 Lacks, in Specie by the Britannia 8 Lacks, and by the Beſborough 2 Lacks.

The great Diſadvantage ſuffered by the Company in the low Rate of Exchange obtained by General Goddard for his Bills, ſome of which were drawn at 93, and none higher than 95, Surat Rupees for 100 Calcutta Siccas, induced us to put a Stop to his Power of drawing, and to adopt the Remittance of Bullion, as a preſent Mode of Supply, which may enable us to bring back the Exchange ſomewhat nearer to its original Standard.

The united Demands upon us from Bombay, General Goddard, and the different Offices here, for the neceſſary Charges of our own Eſtabliſhments, added to the Total Loſs of 5 Lacks in the Stafford, have ſo far dried up our immediate Reſources, that we have been obliged to refuſe any further Compliance with the Application of the Preſidency of Fort Saint George for Caſh, and to excuſe ourſelves from ſending the Balance, being 5 Lacks, which remained to complete the Supply of 15 Lacks promiſed to them in March laſt.

APPENDIX, N° 250. B:

Extract of a Letter from the Governor General and Council of Bengal, in their Secret Department, to the Court of Directors; dated the 3d March 1780.

Par. 16. WE find by Letters received from General Goddard, ſince his Return to the Command of the Army at Surat, that the Plan which he has adopted with the Concurrence and Aſſiſtance of the Preſident and Select Committee at Bombay, is to open a Negociation, and conclude a Treaty of Alliance and Support with Futty Sing Guicawar, to engage him in which he is to be rendered independant of the Poona Government, and the Guzerat Country is to be divided with him, the Company retaining that Share of the Revenue now paid to the Marattas, and releaſing Futty Sing's Proportion from all the Claims formerly made upon it; there being no Object either to invite or juſtify an immediate Attempt on the Capital itſelf, the Succeſs of which, though more ſplendid, would be acquired with greater Hazard, and yield no ſubſtantial Advantage, nor ſo near a Proſpect of terminating the War, as the Plan which has been adopted.

17. In Conformity to this Plan, Offers were tranſmitted by General Goddard to Futty Sing; but whether from Doubt of their Sincerity, or Dread of the Reſentment of the Maratta Chiefs, he endeavoured to protract or avoid any Determination upon them, by evading to acknowledge the Receipt of them in Letters which he afterwards wrote to General Goddard; as the Subject of thoſe Letters was confined barely to Profeſſions of Friendſhip and Attachment which he bore towards the Engliſh.

18. Thus ſituated, General Goddard thought it adviſable to force him to an immediate Declaration of his Intentions, by marching the Engliſh Army directly towards Brodera his Capital. The Troops have accordingly croſſed the Tappy, and were under March on the 1ſt January to the Northward.

19. In the preſent Plan of Operations, Ragoba is excluded from any poſitive Share in the Succeſs of the War: He has been informed, that the Revenue which will be collected from Guzerat is a neceſſary Fund for the Support of the Army which may hereafter be employed to further his Views in the Maratta Government, when a Party ſhall have been made ſufficiently ſtrong to enable him to purſue them with Advantage. In the mean while, being drawn into the preſent War as Principals, we have reſolved to act as ſuch, and ſupport it ourſelves; allowing Ragoba no direct Participation in the Conqueſts which may reſult from it. On this Principle we have forbid General Goddard to enter into any Engagement with him whatſoever, or to ſuffer him to become chargeable on the Company, but to confine his Connection with him to perſonal Protection only. This will leave us at Liberty to purſue ſuch Line of Conduct with regard to him as may hereafter be thought expedient. General Goddard himſelf, before he could have received our final Orders, had cautiouſly avoided any Participation of Intereſts with him, and reſerved an Opening to adopt any other Meaſures that might be reſolved on; but we are ſorry to ſay, that ſuch an univerſal Indiſpoſition ſeems to prevail towards Ragoba, either from the Character which he bears, or the ſuppoſed Conſequence of his Pretenſions, that we muſt fear an open Declaration in his Favour would only multiply our Enemies, and draw upon us the Oppoſition of Perſons naturally averſe to his Intereſts, who might not otherwiſe interfere in our Diſputes with the Marattas; a nearer Alliance with him would therefore, we apprehend, be detrimental to our Views and burthenſome to the Company.

20. General Goddard has been reinforced by a Detachment from Bombay, conſiſting of

100 Europeans Artillery,
1 Battalion Sepoys,
1 Ditto drafted Grenadier Sepoys.

21. The Troops expected from Mahé had been prevented from joining him by Diſturbances within the Limits of the Company's Territory at Tellicherry, which required their immediate Preſence and Aſſiſtance, and obliged Colonel Braithwaite to repair to and take the Command of that Garriſon, in order to prevent his being attacked by the Nairs, ſubject to the Prince of Cherickee, with whom the Company's Troops ſtationed at Tellicherry, had previouſly had ſome Skirmiſhes, in ſupport, as Colonel Braithwaite writes, of the Protection given by that Factory to the King of Cartinada, who is at Variance with the other Chief, and has an Army drawn out to oppoſe him.

22. The Preſident and Select Committee, on hearing that the Force intended for the Succour of General Goddard was thus diverted from its Deſtination, reſolved to grant him a military Aid immediately, from their own Eſtabliſhment, and ordered 1 Battalion of Europeans, 1 Company of Artillery, and 1 Battalion of Sepoys, to be embarked without Delay for Surat, and 1 Battalion of Sepoys more to be in Readineſs at Anjengo, if their Services ſhall hereafter be required.

23. The

23. The Preſident and Select Committee at Fort Saint George likewiſe inform us, that they have ordered Colonel Braithwaite to ſend the Europeans under his Command to join General Goddard, unleſs Hyder Ally ſhall have taken Part in the Diſputes of his Tributary Dependants, and conſequently given Orders for Hoſtilities to be committed on the Company's Factory at Tellicherry.

24. General Goddard expecting to receive a Reinforcement of the Madras Troops, has mentioned his Intention of keeping open the Communication for a Junction with his Army, to be formed by the Way of Surat.

25. He likewiſe mentions, that the Collections of the Countries adjoining to Surat and Broach, over which the Power of his Arms extended, had been delivered to the Charge of the Company's Civil Servants there, and that the People appeared to be very well ſatisfied with their Change of Maſters.

APPENDIX, N° 251. B.

Bengal Secret Perſian Correſpondence.

From Moodajee Bhoſila; Received 19th January 1780.

THE Letters and numberleſs Meſſages which have paſſed between us in the Courſe of One Year, cannot be conſidered as ſimple Letters of Compliment and Friendſhip; but every Letter may be looked upon as a Record, ſince they have contained Remarks on the Acts of Government, and every Affair, both the moſt inconſiderable and of the greateſt Conſequence; the declining and adopting every Deſign; and the pointing out with Caution and Foreſight Conditions in every Affair which required Prudence and Circumſpection; together with your ſtrict Attention to Truth, which has never admitted of the ſmalleſt Deviation; and your impartial Juſtice, before which, from the reſolute Firmneſs of your Mind, the weighty Mountain and the light Straw are of equal Balance; and repeated Remarks of the Affairs of Bengal, which muſt all have certainly been underſtood by you.

Of Three of your Letters, containing the Whole of your Deſigns and the Situation of your Quarter, One on your Apprehenſions from the Reception of a French Vackeel in the Territories of Pundit Purdhaun, and your having no Confidence in his Actions and thoſe of the Rulers of Poona; on your Deſire in conſequence of ſending an Army with a Chief in your Confidence for the Protection of Bombay, and that a Perſon ſhould be diſpatched to ſupply the Army with Proviſions and other Neceſſaries, who, conducting them to Hoſhungabad, might diſmiſs them in Safety from my Territories: And the Third written after the Death of Mr. Elliott, on your having committed to Beneram Pundit every thing that had been entruſted to the Deceaſed; his ſetting off with Ramkaunt with my Anſwers; his Arrival at Calcutta; and your being made acquainted with the Contents of all my Letters on theſe Subjects, were received.

What I underſtand by your Letters, although they ſeem to contain much, is in few Words, that you conſider my Deſigns as inconſiderable, and do not approve of my Views. I have therefore laid aſide my Intentions for ſome Time, and dropped the Proſecution of them; but I am nevertheleſs ready, at all Times, to perform the Duties of our ancient Friendſhip and Connection; and from the open and friendly Intercourſe between me and Colonel Goddard, I am prompted to aſſiſt him with my Advice and Counſel. By the Bleſſing of God, when it ſhall be neceſſary, I will adviſe in the beſt Manner. But you have ſaid in moſt of your Letters, that every one thinks his own Opinion beſt. Thus Colonel Goddard, contrary to my Advice, marched towards Surat; and the Chiefs of Bombay, without Caution and Circumſpection, and without your Permiſſion, marched into the Territories of Poona to the Support of Ragonaut Row; but their Projects did not ſucceed, and Ragonaut Row put himſelf under the Protection of Sindeah; and the Chiefs of Bombay having for their own Safety made a new Engagement in the Room of the Treaty of Colonel Upton, returned to their own Territories. The Engliſh of Bombay, in this Quarrel and open Hoſtilities, in which they were worſted, were guilty of many Breaches of Faith towards the Miniſters of Poona, and did not regard the Treaties which all Rulers of States pay the greateſt Attention to, and without any Conſideration of their Honour and Dignity, acted contrary to Prudence and to your Directions, as you informed me in a great Number of Letters, and as Colonel Goddard alſo wrote to me.

From my Knowledge of the State of Affairs, and from the Exerciſe of our Friendſhip, which has been kept up for upwards of a Year, by a mutual Communication of the Situation of Things, and of the moſt inconſiderable as well as important Matters, I diſcover Three Things in your Letters and thoſe of Colonel Goddard; One, That the Bombay Chief ſupported Raganaut Row without any Authority from you: The other, That you have dropped your great Deſigns, but are reſolved to keep up our former Friendſhip; and the Third, what you mention in all your Letters, that every one thinks his Opinion the beſt. The Firſt is Fact, that whatever the Chief of Bombay has done has been contrary to your Advice, who are alone able to adviſe: And the Second, That in every Situation you will maintain our Friendſhip, is alſo to be depended on: And the Third, That every one thinks his own Opinion the beſt, is a common Proverb, but it is not however

the Notion of wiſe Men, who never have any Connections with powerful States, except thoſe of Peace and Friendſhip. This you muſt have written in your Diſpleaſure, upon hearing of the Bombay Chief having acted ſo imprudently, but you cannot conceive it to hold good in every Inſtance.

The 2d Article, which is worthy to be followed, you ſhould maintain: But that Friendſhip which is kept up and openly ſhewn by Letters only, and which when wanted, does not exert itſelf; ſo far from being of any Advantage, may bring the greateſt Detriment. My Maxim on the contrary is this, that with whomſoever I enter into Alliance, although there ſhould be innumerable Diſadvantages in it, I never turn myſelf aſide from it. My advantageous Connection with Pundit Purdhaun, and the friendly Connection of Letters with you, which you commenced upwards of a Year ſince, are equally firm.

The Arrival of Colonel Goddard with his whole Army, Stores, Artillery, &c. on the Borders of my Territories; his remaining there Two Months; the Intercourſe of Preſents between us; my lending, when neceſſary, Proviſions and every thing which he deſired; that Mr. Watherſtone, who came here with few Attendants, departed with the Money for his Bills on Benares, with Oxen and every Article which he deſired of me; that Two Gentlemen of your Confidence who were with Mr. Elliott ſhall remain here Two Months; all this you cannot conſider as ſmall Matters. For although I perceived the Danger of expoſing myſelf to the Reſentment of the People of Decan, who are Maſters of large Armies, powerful Reſources, Treaſures, Forts, and ſtrong Places, notwithſtanding what my Apprehenſions from them might be, I, from the Duty of Friendſhip towards you, reſolved to take upon me the worſt of their Reſentment, in conformity to the Proverb which ſays; "You muſt not, with your open Eyes, throw yourſelf into a Whirlpool; but ſhould you find yourſelf in one, you muſt not give yourſelf up to your Apprehenſions."

Reflect maturely upon what I write; for from what can ariſe my expoſing myſelf to Deſtruction, by not obeying the Summons, and not performing what might be expected from my ancient Connection with Pundit Purdhaun and the Nabob Nizam ul Dowlah, except from my Friendſhip for you, although there are no immediate Advantages to be drawn from it?

At preſent that I have received a Karetah from you, in which, like a Honey Bee which contains both Sweetneſs and a Sting, you drop your great Deſigns, but reſolve to preſerve the Duties of our Friendſhip, and finiſh by ſaying, that every one thinks his own Opinion the beſt; in conſequence of my Apprehenſions, I laid aſide the Sting and adopted the Sweetneſs, and accordingly diſpatched Dewagur Pundit to Poona, and ſent this Meſſage by him to the Miniſters of Poona: "I am a Branch of the illuſtrious Family of the Raje; you are the Rulers of all Matters belonging to it: If you chuſe to keep up Friendſhip and Connection with me, I will continue attached to you; but I have not Need of the Aſſiſtance of the Raje; for, from of old I have been cloſely connected with the Soubahs of Bengal, and with one who has the ſupreme Direction over all the Countries, and who from his Wiſdom and ſuperior Prudence is faithful to his Word and ſtrict to his Engagements. That Peace may be firmly eſtabliſhed between us by Treaty, you muſt entertain no Thoughts of War, ſince none of thoſe Advantages which are to be acquired by Peace can be found in Diſſenſions and Hoſtilities."

Dewagur Pundit after his Arrival at Poona had many Conferences in free and unbiaſſed Terms, either by Fear or Partiality with the Engliſh Gentlemen; and for Three Months was employed in oppoſing, both openly and in private, the Demands of the Miniſters, in ſuch a well reflected Manner, that if you had a Perſon there to have ſeen and heard it, he would certainly have written it to you, and you could not have diſbelieved it. Nanna Purnaveeſe, who is the Chief Miniſter, is poſſeſſed of ſuperior Wiſdom and Prudence, is well adviſed, of ſtrict Truth, and in his Attention to his Treaties, like a Leaf which trembles at the leaſt Wind, he has dreaded the ſmalleſt Innovation in them, from the Time of Ballajee Biſhennaut, till the Treaty of Colonel Upton, and from that Time till the Formation of the new Treaty which was made with the Bombay Chiefs, by Pundit Purdhaun, through the Means of Sindeah, after the breaking out of the War and the Arrival of Ragonaut Row. He made Dewagur Pundit acquainted with all the former Tranſactions and the preſent State of Affairs, and ſhewed him all the Treaties which have been made, and deſired him to ſee on what Side the Breach of Faith was, and which Part was guilty of Infractions: And yet, ſaid he, they declare that they ſtick to their Engagements. Dewagur Pundit, after diſcovering the Situation of Affairs, wrote repeated Letters to Colonel Goddard, adviſing him to be cautious and prudent in his Proceedings, and to keep in View the Conditions of the Treaty, which he muſt know to be an hundred Times better than War and Hoſtilities, and wrote alſo in the ſame Terms to you, and diſpatched thoſe Letters, together with Rhautahs from me from Naigpore to Calcutta. You will doubtleſs have underſtood all theſe Particulars, which were dictated by the ſincereſt Friendſhip; but I have been for this long Time to the preſent Inſtant in Expectation of your Anſwer to them.

Repeated Letters are received from Colonel Goddard, by Pundit Purdhaun and Dewagur Pundit, at Poona; the Firſt to acquaint them, that as he had many ſecret Things to communicate, they ſhould ſend a confidential Perſon to him, to whom he might impart every Circumſtance, and ſettle with the Terms of the Treaty. Nanna Purnaveeſe in compliance with this diſpatched, with the Advice of Dewager Pundit, a Perſon in his Confidence to Surat: He was not yet arrived there when a Second Letter was received from the Colonel, that as it would be a long Time before the Arrival of the Agent, he was therefore determined to come in Perſon with all Expedition by the

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Dauk to the Neighbourhood of Poona, and have a Perſonal Conference: That he had been appointed to the ſole Management of the Negociations with Pundit Purdhaun, and that the ſole Deſire was to ſettle to mutual Satisfaction the Terms, that ſo all Diſputes and Differences might be ended, and the Treaty faithfully obſerved by both Parties: That they ſhould be aſſured that there was no other Reaſon for his keeping with him Ragonaut Row, who had come of himſelf to Poona, than to preſerve the Treaty and Friendſhip ſubſiſting with Pundit Purdhaun, and to prevent the Diſputes from proceeding further. Nanna Purnaveeſe, in anſwer to this, wrote himſelf, and made Dewagur Pundit write, that nothing could be more adviſable; that his Houſe was the Colonel's, and that he ſhould come without Delay, as they were anxiouſly expecting him: That they had erected for his Reception a Tent and Pavilion without the Town.

About this Time Letters were received from Colonel Goddard, that he did not aſſent to the Treaty made by the Bombay Chief, but that both Sides muſt conform themſelves to the Treaty executed by Colonel Upton: Karetahs likewiſe for me, and Letters from Dewagur Pundit, were received at the ſame Time from you, as alſo for Pundit Purdhaun, and Nanna Purnaveeſe, that you had no Inclination for War, but were reſolved to maintain the Treaty of Colonel Upton: That you could not aſſent to the new Engagements entered into by the Bombay Chief, or agree to any Thing by which the Honour and Dignity of the Government might be impaired.

When Dewagur Pundit had, agreeable to that, repreſented every Thing that was to be expected from his Friendſhip, Nanna Purnaveeſe brought out the Treaty of Colonel Upton, and ſaid to him, "See what a Number of Conditions of this Treaty even have not been complied with; and in the "Inſtance of Ragonaut Row, they have infringed every Treaty, by giving him a Place of Refuge "with them, which is forbidden by numberleſs Articles: In giving up Jeiſpore and Salſette, &c. "Mahals, belonging to Gojeraut, what Numbers of Excuſes have they not made. But without "mentioning the Enmity and Reſentment which they have conceived againſt us, for ſending back their "Army in Safety to Bombay, they have again received Ragonaut Row, and are buſily employed "in preparing for War; tell me now on which Side the greateſt Attention to Treaty is ſhewn?" Dewagur Pundit having made a Copy of many of the Articles of Colonel Upton's Treaty, ſent it, with Letters directed for your Quarter, to Naigpore, which were diſpatched by the Way of Cuttack, with Karetahs from me, containing cautious and prudent Reſolutions, dictated by Foreſight and long Reflections, and by my Friendſhip and Affections, by which the good Adminiſtration of Affairs, and the Security of the People are eſtabliſhed, and in which no Duty of my Friendſhip was forgot; doubtleſs after their Arrival all their Contents were made known to you. This is the Fourth Month ſince my diſpatching thoſe Letters, but as yet I have received no Anſwer to them, that, in Conformity to that, the Negociations might be ſet on Foot.

Upon the Arrival of the confidential Perſons from Pundit Purdhaun, at Surat, and their having a Meeting with Colonel Goddard, he laid aſide his former Intention of going to Poona; and ſent back one of the Agents of Pundit Purdhaun to Poona, with this Meſſage, That they muſt pay for the Expences of his Quarter One Year's Kiſt, for the Mahals of Gojeraut, which they gave the Year after the Formation of Colonel Upton's Treaty, and of which at preſent, ſince the making the new Treaty, there appears to be One Year's Kiſts due by the Accounts; and that they muſt reſtore all Ragonaut Row's Money or Effects, which may be in their Poſſeſſion, and allot him a Place for his Habitation, and diſcharge the Pay due to his Followers; together with many other Articles, which would be too prolix to be written. Nanna Purnaveeſe, upon hearing all theſe Particulars, ſaid to Dewagur Pundit, "Do you hear what Meſſage they have ſent? you may recollect what they before "uſed to write, and how they have ſince acted."

As from the Time of the Death of Narain Row, for the Space of Four Years, the Nabob Nizam ul Dowlah has been, from his Heart, attached to Pundit Purdhaun, and agrees with him in every Reſolution both for War and Peace; and as the Miniſters of Poona conſult the Nabob in every Matter, even of the ſmalleſt Moment, and will ſupport him with all their Power, they have therefore written to him every thing that has taken place with Colonel Goddard, and the Conference of Dewagur Pundit; and the Nabob has wrote in Anſwer, that Mr. Hollond was arrived from Madras, for the Purpoſe of negociating with him; but that in the Affair of Shinkakull Rajebundry, and the Dependency of Arcot, which by the Treaty belongs to him, what that Gentleman ſays, is contrary to the Treaty; that he had ſaid to Mr. Hollond, and wrote to Madras, whatever was proper to be ſaid in Anſwer, and would wait the Event of the Negociation; and that he ſent Letters to Calcutta, that they ought to conform to the Conditions of the Treaty with Pundit Purdhaun, and with him, and not infringe them in the leaſt, but that he did not expect to receive a ſatisfactory Anſwer. That which ever Way theſe Matters may end, they ought to be ready for either Peace or War; that this muſt be done by collecting Troops, and preparing Quantities of all Kind of Stores: That as the Engliſh are ſituated on Three Sides of them, they alſo ſhould oppoſe the Engliſh on the Three Sides, and gain over Hyder Naig to their Aſſiſtance: That in the Tranſactions with the Three Quarters (whatever might be expected from the Engliſh, whether War or Peace) they ought to proceed in this Manner, to chuſe out one Perſon from ſeveral (either Pundit Purdhaun, or himſelf, or the Bhoſilas) to whom they might commit the Negociations for Peace with the Engliſh, on the Three Sides, and not remain obſtinate in their Demands, as by ſo being, Peace would be delayed. That ſuch was his Advice, and the only one he could give; but that they were the Maſters, to follow it or not.

Upon

Upon the Arrival of theſe Letters to the Poona Miniſters, of which Tenor there were alſo Letters for me and Dewagur Pundit, Nanna Purnaveeſe ſaid to the Pundit, that he knew of no better Advice; and that he had been thinking of the ſame himſelf, and was employed in negociating a ſtrict Alliance with Hyder Naig, and in raiſing Troops, and collecting military Stores: That it was likewiſe neceſſary for him (Dewagur Pundit) to raiſe Troops and defend the Third Side; for that as he was ſo cloſely connected with him, whenever their Power, or that of the Nabob Nizam ul Dowlah, ſhould be in Danger, his Country and Power would not be ſafe from the Attacks of the Engliſh. Dewagur Pundit replied to him, That the Branches of the illuſtrious Family of the Raja, who were ſupported under the Shadow of the Muſnud of the Raje of Pundit Purdhaun, had no other Employment but to aſſiſt him with all their Power. That in conformity to the Reſolution before mentioned, he would collect Troops, and take charge of the Side he ſpoke of, and would employ himſelf in Negociations with the Engliſh Gentlemen agreeable to the Treaty. Nanna Purnaveeſe anſwered, If Negociations can be carried on through you, agreeable to the Treaty, and be brought to a Determination, it is well; but let it not be in ſuch a Manner, that while the Engliſh are putting you off with Excuſes and Delays, they ſhould be raiſing Troops, and of a ſudden break out in Hoſtilities, whilſt I am off of my Guard and not ſuſpecting it. You muſt therefore employ yourſelf buſily at Home in theſe Matters, and ſettle in whatſoever Manner the Circumſtances ſhall require.

As your Anſwers have been late in coming, and the Conferences with Colonel Goddard are at a Stand; Dewagur Pundit not thinking adviſable to carry theſe Matters any further without your Permiſſion, after he had procured his Diſmiſſion, came by long Journies to Naigpore, and repreſented to me all the Particulars above written.

I have in the mean while received frequent Letters from the Nabob Nizam Ally and Pundit Peiſhaun to get ready my Troops and march them out. Accordingly my Son Jemmajee Boofla on the Duſs are encamped; and after having got together Stores for the Cavalry, and other Neceſſaries, was ſent towards Andery, with Counſellors of known Wiſdom and Experience, that remaining for a Time at the Ghaut of Andery, he may collect the Troops of the Duſs Sirdars, from moſt of whom Vackeels have come offering their Services, till Anſwers to my Letters ſhall arrive from Calcutta and from Colonel Goddard.

As in this our Intercourſe of Friendſhip, you have written Letters of equal Length with thoſe of the News Writers; and as our Connection and Alliance is well known to Pundit Peiſhwa and the Nabob, and all the Decan People; and it is a Saying with them, That the Engliſh and Boofla are as one: From the arriving of Colonel Goddard at Hoſhungabad, and his remaining there Two Months from my Advice; from the Conferences of Dewagur Pundit at Poona, and his ſending frequent Letters with my Opinion on the beſt Terms to be ſettled upon by the Miniſters with the Engliſh, and adviſing them to Peace: And as our Friendſhip cannot be carried any further, and the Connection between the Family of the Raje and Pundit Purdhaun and the Nabob, which is able to laſt from Generation to Generation, cannot be dropped; I am therefore deſirous, that through my Mediation Peace may be eſtabliſhed with you, by Pundit Peiſhwa and the Nabob, at any Rate, and by you with theſe Two Chiefs; and that on the ſettling the Negociation, a Treaty may be made between you on ſuch ſolid Grounds as to admit of no Breach of Promiſe, but may ſerve for ever the Peace and Security of your Subjects. Whenever the Negociations on the Part of the Two Chiefs ſhall be tranſacted through me, I have no Doubt of ſucceeding in making Peace between you. Having maturely reflected and reſolved in your Mind my Communications to you, which have been greater and more unreſerved than what is thought neceſſary in Friendſhip, and which I made for your Information, you will without Doubt adopt whatever is moſt likely to promote Friendſhip, and to preſerve the Treaties exiſting, without my pointing it out to you; and for ſuch Conduct a Reward is to be expected from God.

I accordingly requeſt you would write to me explicitly, agreeable to my former Letters, in which I encloſed you Papers reſpecting the Treaty of Colonel Upton, whether the Negociations are drawing to a Concluſion, and whether the Conditions with the Nabob can be ſettled; that in conformity to that, Peace may be made with Pundit Purdhaun and the Nabob; and that you will write to Colonel Goddard whatever you think adviſable in this Matter, that he may apply himſelf with my friendly Aſſiſtance to the Eſtabliſhment of Peace, and not go in the leaſt aſide from the Tenor of the Treaty, of which none but the Wiſe are able to judge. You muſt reflect maturely on what I have written, which is the Dictates of my Heart; for what Purpoſe I have written it: not for my own Advantage, but ſimply from my Friendſhip. I have no Doubt but this will gain me your good Will, and that you will not forget theſe Proofs of my Friendſhip, but remove my Anxiety, by favouring me with an Anſwer. In ſhort, as long as Ragonaut Row ſhall remain with the Engliſh, no Concluſion or Repoſe from theſe Diſputes and Miſunderſtanding can take place; but his Stay will be an endleſs Source of Quarrels and Breaches of Treaty. On the contrary, the delivering him up to Pundit Purdhaun is extremely adviſable, and will be the Means of preſerving the Treaty, and of keeping the Rights of all Sides entire.—But one Word to the Wiſe is ſufficient.

APPENDIX, N° 251. B.

From Dewagur Pundit, dated the 21ſt Likaida, December 1779; received the 29th January 1780.

Before this I wrote you frequently from Poona, in my Anſwers to your Letters, whatever was moſt adviſable after my Interviews and repeated Conferences with Nanna Purnaveeſe, and my diſcovering and being Witneſs to the Faith and ſtrict Attention to Treaties in all the Miniſters, and the Firmneſs and Courage of the Generals, ſuch as Madajee Row Sindiah, Tocojee Holcar, and other Chiefs of note, and that the Nabob Nizam ul Dowlah was as one in all the Intereſts and Concerns of Pundit Purdhaun, and that all the Chiefs and Zemindars both of the Hills and Low Countries, from the River Nurbudda to the Banks of the Shoor, who inhabit the Six Soubahs of Deccan, and the Talookdars of the Carnatic, who are ſettled in that large Tract of Country, are attached from the Bottom of their Hearts to the illuſtrious Houſe of the Raje and the Family of Pundit Purdhaun, in ſuch a Manner, that if hoſtile Intentions ſhould be diſcovered from any Quarter, or any Inclination for War, or Breach of Faith and Treaty appear in any one, we ſhould all join with Pundit Purdhaun, and, as if in Defence of our own Poſſeſſions, bring our Quota to the War; not like the Friendſhip of thoſe who only court the World. You wrote in Anſwer, that you had not the ſmalleſt Inclination to break the Treaty, and that what was done by the Bombay Chief, aroſe from his Imprudence and Raſhneſs; that in whatever brought no Detriment to the Honour and Dignity of your Nation, you would preſerve every Tittle of your Treaties, and maintain your Friendſhip; that you had given Colonel Goddard the ſole Power of making Peace. Theſe Anſwers I received ſeverally, and alſo Letters from Colonel Goddard, full of Profeſſions of his Inclinations for Peace, and of his having given Ragonaut Row a Place of Refuge with him ſolely for this Purpoſe, that he might keep the Peace with Pundit Purdhaun inviolate, by preventing him from taking Refuge any where elſe, and raiſe Commotions there; that it was neceſſary a confidential Agent ſhould be diſpatched to him, to whom the greateſt Secrets might be imparted, and Peace concluded with him. Agreeable to this, a Perſon of Truſt was diſpatched to him from Poona, who was not yet arrived when a Second Letter was received from the Colonel, that many Delays would be occaſioned by the going and coming of the Agent, and that there were many Secrets of ſuch a Nature as not to be properly communicated except in a perſonal Conference; that he was therefore greatly deſirous of a Meeting with the Miniſter, and that if they would ſignify their Approbation he would come.

The Miniſters being greatly pleaſed with this Offer, wrote that they ſhould receive the moſt ſincere Satisfaction from his Arrival, and pitched a Tent for him without the Town, and remained in the Tent anxiouſly expecting his Arrival, and I myſelf wrote him Letters full of the moſt friendly Aſſurances, to inform him of the Pleaſure which his Arrival would give; indeed, his coming hither was moſt adviſable, as he could have added Strength to the Peace and Friendſhip, and removed all Cauſes of Miſunderſtandings, confirmed the Treaty for ever, and relieved them for all Apprehenſions for the Safety of their Country and Poſſeſſions.

On the Arrival of the Agent from hence, Colonel Goddard diſpatched in a Dauk Palowkeen one Neal Chund, an Agent, who had been ſent from hence with the Agent to this Quarter with Karetahs from him, who on his Arrival at Poona delivered theſe Karetahs of Colonel Goddard, containing every Particular; and ſaid in the Preſence of Nanna Purnaveeſe, Madajee Row Sindeah, myſelf, and other Perſons, whatever Colonel Goddard had verbally committed to him; the Subſtance of which was, Firſt, That they muſt make good whatever appears by his Accounts to be deficient in the Performance of Colonel Upton's Treaty: Secondly, That as at the Time of making Peace, Mahals to the Yearly Value of Three Lacks of Rupees, dependent on Gougeraut for the Jaghier of the Kaikwars were made over to the Engliſh, it was neceſſary that they ſhould have been delivered over to us at that Time, but as they were not ſurrendered till a Year after, Three Lacks of Rupees are due for One Year's Collections: Thirdly, That as there are not Three Lacks of Rupees collected from thoſe Mahals, but a Deficiency of 96,000 Rupees ariſes, they muſt make out the Account, and ſend the Difference; that reſpecting Ragonaut Row they muſt grant him a Diſtrict to ſupport his Expences, in the ſame Manner as it was given him by the former Treaty; and that the ſaid Row ſhould be permitted to reſide wherever he may think proper; together with many other Particulars on the ſame Subject, which would be too voluminous, were all repreſented to us by Neal Chund. After hearing the Whole of the Meſſage from that Quarter, Nanna Purnaveeſe and Madajee Row Sindeah, turning to me, ſaid "You inſiſt that the Words of the Engliſh Gentle-
" men are to be depended on, and that they have no Intention but that of maintaining their
" Treaties. You have now heard what Kind of Meſſage they have ſent, and are alſo acquainted
" with what they before wrote. Colonel Goddard firſt determined to come here, and has now laid
" aſide that Reſolution; and with reſpect to Ragonaut Row, whom he declared that he kept with
" him for good Reaſons, and not from any Enmity to us: And in the Mahals, which by the
" Papers of the Sircar are ſettled at Three Lacks of Rupees, they pretend that there have been
" Deficiencies, and demand the Balance from us, and require of us ſeveral Lacks of Rupees: Such
" Conduct cannot be agreeable to God. With reſpect to a French Merchant who came here, they
" wrote ſo many angry Letters, and accuſed us of ſo many Breaches of the Treaty, that we diſ-
" miſſed him contrary to the Cuſtom of the Durbar. Ragonaut Row, from whom Commotions
" and Loſſes have ariſen, they have again given a Refuge to under their Protection: And after
" the Concluſion of the War, we on the contrary made this Agreement with the Bombay Army,

 " that

" that they ſhould return in Peace to their own Territories." It is a Proverb, " That if you do " Juſtice, although you ſhould throw it into Water, it will be favourably received by God." But ſince Affairs are come to this Paſs, we have determined by the Advice of Nizam ul Dowlah, upon preparing for War with the Three Quarters; and Hyder Naig is likewiſe attached to us.

I then ſaid to Nanna Purnaveeſe, that as yet Anſwers to our Negociations were not arrived from Calcutta; and that, as I had no Doubt but that they would be ſuch as would tend to Peace, what Reaſon could he have for preparing for War? He anſwered me, that it was adviſable for every one to be prepared at Home, and not, while the others are collecting every Thing neceſſary for War, for him to be unſuſpecting and unprepared; but that ſhould Anſwers tending to Peace be received, he would readily agree with them. After learning all theſe Particulars, I took Leave of Nanna Purnaveeſe, and arrived by long Journies at Naigpore, where I paid my Reſpects to the Rajah my Maſter, and informed him of all my Conferences with the Poona Miniſters, and of their having determined, according to the Advice of Nizam ul Dowlah, to carry on War with the Four Quarters, and of Hyder Naig's being attached to them; and alſo made him acquainted with the Contents of all Colonel Goddard's Letters, which you will learn from the Rajah's Kawtahs, where he has written them without the leaſt Reſerve. My only Wiſh is, that a Peace and Treaty may be made between you and Pundit Purdhaun and the Nabob Nizam ul Dowlah, through the Mediation and under the Guarantee of the Rajah my Maſter, agreeable to the former Treaty before War ſhould break out with the Four Quarters; and that Ragonaut Row, who is the Cauſe of all theſe Miſunderſtandings, may be delivered up to Pundit Purdhaun. This would be a Hundred, nay a Thouſand Times better than War and Hoſtilities. Attend with mature Reflection to theſe Particulars.

Before this, numberleſs Letters on this Subject have been written to you, and at preſent nothing has been omitted in the Rajah's Letters. You will make yourſelf thoroughly acquainted with them, and will be aſſured that they were dictated ſolely by Friendſhip and good Will towards you; and will ſend an Anſwer without Delay, and write to Colonel Goddard whatever you may think adviſable; ſince a Word once ſpoken, and an Arrow ſhot away from the Bow, cannot be recalled. I am a ſincere Well-wiſher to you, and for this Reaſon alone have written all theſe Particulars to you.

From the Nabob Nizam Ally Khan; received 19th January 1780.

Your gracious Letter under Date the 25th Shawaul, 6th November, to this Purport, That the Governor and Council of Madras, had deputed Mr. John Hollond to Hydrabad, to explain to me thoſe Points, which might tend to the ſtrengthening our Friendſhip; after having informed you of it, and that whatever that Gentleman has mentioned further than what may tend to this End, is contrary to the Intentions and Permiſſion of the Council, that you have therefore directed the Governor and Council of Madras to attend particularly to this Matter; and that you have written to Mr. Hollond to put a Stop to his Negociations till he ſhall receive explicit Letters from Madras; was delivered me by that Gentleman; and from the Contents of it I received great Satisfaction.

The Friendſhip and Faith to their Treaties in the Engliſh Company, have been from the Beginning the Admiration of all the Rulers; and I, after the Concluſion of the Treaty in 1182, (1768) from my own Experience found this Maxim of the whole World to be true. At the Time of your coming to the Government in that Quarter, and the Superintendance of the Affairs of all the Engliſh Settlements; and of your writing to me that you had learnt from all Quarters, and by the actual Situation of Affairs, the Firmneſs of our Friendſhip, you were made particularly acquainted with the Negociations which with the Approbation of the Governor and Council of Madras, had been entered upon between the Company and this Quarter. I alſo gained Information of the Situation of all Matters from Colonel Upton, when on the breaking out of Ragonaut Row's Quarrel with the Sirkar, he came here in his Way to Poona, to ſettle the Negociation between Row Pundit Purdhaun, Madho Row Narrain. But of late many evident Infringements of the Treaty ſhould occur, is Matter of the greateſt Aſtoniſhment to any one who reflects on the former Alliance, and the eſtabliſhed Cuſtom of the Company.

Whatever I diſcovered on the Subject of Ragonaut Row, I formerly wrote to you, and now encloſe you a Copy of it; and you wrote to me in Anſwer, that all the Negociations and Tranſactions of the Engliſh Company were the ſame, and that no Alterations or Infringement ſhould ever be made in the Treaties entered into by the Governor and Council of Madras; but whatever has ſince happened contrary to this Declaration, is not of Conſequence to be repeated, ſince Ragonaut Row is now in the ſame Situation in which he was formerly.

Mr. Hollond, upon his Arrival here, requeſted of me, contrary to all Right, to annul the ſmall Tribute for Rajemundery and the other Sircars, for which formerly I received from that Quarter Lacks of Rupees; the Particulars of which I before informed the Company in an encloſed Paper, and for which ſince I have not received altogether the Tenth Part of what I formerly did: And the Governor and Council of Madras have by Violence ſeized on the Sircars of Murtezzanagur, which by the Treaty belonged to my Brother Ameel ul Omrah, Sujah ul Mulk Bahadur Biſſalet Jung. Reflect now what can be concluded from ſuch Conduct, except a Breach of the

Treaty. I accordingly wrote to you on the 2d Rejjab and the 2d Ramzaun, all theſe Particulars by Two Hircarrahs with a Copy of my former Letter. As your Anſwer was late in arriving, and in the mean while the Violences of the Governor and Council of Madras encreaſed, I was on the Eve of revenging them as was proper, when your Letter arrived; and on the Peruſal of the explicit Contents of it, I put a Stop to my Preparations. If what you write is from your Heart, and the Governor and Council of Madras will remain ſtrict to the Treaty and Alliance, and give over all further Demands to have the Tribute to the Sircar annulled, and will relinquiſh Poſſeſſion of the Sircar of Murtizzanagur, it is well; if they will not, I have nothing of more Conſequence than the preſerving and defending my Country, and the Spark of Diſpute and Enmity will be raiſed to a Flame: That I have overlooked and connived at the Provocations which have been given me, and which I before informed you of, was owing to my Deſire to preſerve the Treaty, not to my Inability to revenge myſelf. By the Bleſſing of God I am prepared, and am in no Want of Aſſiſtance; for the Rulers of Poona, whoſe Dignity and exalted State of Power is owing to my Protection and Aſſiſtance, are attached to me, and would ſupport me to the utmoſt: And Moodajee Bhoſila is my Ally, and is as one with the Rulers of Poona; and Hyder Naig, who entertains Enmity againſt the Engliſh Company, having lately entered into a Treaty with the Poona Miniſters, agrees with us in all Matters.

Do you, who are prudent and foreſeeing, and able to determine on the right Plan, reflect maturely upon theſe Circumſtances, and conſider attentively in your Mind, that it is from this new Line of Conduct of the Engliſh Company, that the Foundations of Enmity have been laid in the whole Country of Hindoſtan; and ſhould your Views be hoſtile, which Appearances ſeem to point out as immediately impending, let not the Time be loſt in fruitleſs Pretences; but whatever is proper to be written, do you write to the Governor and Council of Madras, without Delay.

Further Particulars will be made known to you by the Letters of Mr. Hollond, who, agreeable to your Orders, remains ſilent till the Arrival of explicit Directions from Madras.

My Views and ſole Deſire, which you requeſt of me to write to you, are, that no Infringements be made in the Treaties between me and the Company; and that our Friendſhip and Alliance may remain firm and ſtedfaſt.

Knowing my Anxiety, write without Delay, Anſwers to my former and preſent Letters.

From Nizam Ally Khan; Received 24th February 1780.

I have received your Letter to this Purport, That in your former Letters you had ſaid, that your Government had never any Intention of ſupporting Ragonaut Row, but that every Event has ſince appeared contrary to it. That in fact, what you write in your former Letters, was ſtrictly true; but that ſince, from a Concurrence of Circumſtances in that Quarter, which you could by no means foreſee, ſo as to prevent them, the Governor and Council of Madras had joined with Ragonaut Row, and taken Steps for his Aſſiſtance, the Event of which is well known: But that the preſent Diſputes of your Government have no Connection with Ragonaut Row, but have ariſen from their Want of Foreſight, Preſumption, and Pretenſions to which they have not the leaſt Right, and which cannot be agreed to without Diſgrace and Diſhonour: That you have given them Notice that you are ready to ſtick to the Conditions of the Treaty made by Colonel Upton; but they have not complied with this; that Peace and War depends upon them, and not on you, and that One of the Two muſt be already determined on: That you have been deſirous of a Peace, but if contrary to your Inclination, War ſhould be begun for your own Defence and from Neceſſity, it is agreeable to the Cuſtoms of all Nations, and to common Prudence, that every One who can be of Aſſiſtance to you, ſhould be made a Friend of; that in this View, Ragonaut Row alſo may become your Ally, but that no ſuch Connection ſhall be formed, as may produce any Detriment to the Sirkar, or the ſmalleſt Deviation in the Treaty which has been long eſtabliſhed.—All theſe Particulars I perfectly underſtand.

I know that Ragonaut Row has taken Refuge with the Engliſh Company, and that they will not refuſe to deliver him up. His Father and Grandfather were brought up, ſupported, and protected by my Family; and all the Country of Decan, as far as the Banks of the Nurbudda, was under this Sircar: After the Death of the late Nabob, the deceaſed Aſoph ul Dowlah committed the ſame Innovations that have now happened in the Country of the Marattas; by this, great Injury was done to the Sirkar. At that Time the Marattas, while Ballajee Row was ſtill alive, and when their Limits extended in Decan and Hindoſtan, as far as the Boundaries of Attuck, and they had great Authority in it, waged War with this Sirkar, and during the Life of the late Aſoph ul Dowlah, poſſeſſed themſelves of many Countries; after that, while Madho Row, and Ragonaut Row tranſacted the Affairs of the Pundit Purdhauny, in Conſort, Madho Row attempted to confine Ragonaut Row, who flying, unattended, arrived at Kojeſtabuniand, at the Preſence, and gave to the Preſence Sunnuds of Relinquiſhment of the Country, and the City of Burhanpore, and of the Fort of Aſhier, &c. Chiefs were ſent with an Army, from the Preſence, with Ragonaut Row, who begun Hoſtilities with Madho Row, defeated his Army, and eſtabliſhed Ragonaut Row, who got Madho Row into his Power. Of the Engagements and Sunnuds for the Relinquiſhment of the Country, which he had made, he broke moſt of the Articles; on which Account War took Place between him and the Preſence, and my victorious Army conſumed Poona with Fire. A little after this, Madho Row, by Treachery, confined Ragonaut Row; by which means, after the Death of Madho Row, Narrain Row,

Row, his younger Brother ſucceeded to him, whom Ragonaut Row by Treachery put to Death, and aſſumed the Government; he having begun, in Appearance, Negociations of Alliance with the Preſence, and having, under Pretence of War with Hyder Naig, aſſembled a large Army, and by frequently declaring to the Preſence, that he was marching againſt Hyder Naig, having gained intire Confidence to his Aſſurances, of his going to War with Hyder Naig, which ſet at Eaſe, with reſpect to any Hoſtile Intentions in him, while the Chiefs and the Army of the Preſence, who had returned to their Habitations, were not aſſembled to oppoſe him; of a ſudden he began Hoſtilities againſt the Sirkar; at that Time I, with what ſmall Number of Troops attended on me, marched to the Fort of Buder, and approached near Ragonaut Row; the War laſted for about a Month, when he finding that my victorious Army was invincible, ſurrendered himſelf up to me, and entered into a new Engagement, and then turned towards Hyder Naig. The Inſtant he had departed, he forgot every Letter of his Engagement, and marched againſt Hyder Ally, ravaging the Country of the Sirkar in his Way. The Miniſters of Poona united themſelves with the Preſence, and on Account of the Treachery and Want of Faith in Ragonaut Row, an Engagement was made with them, and they were aſſiſted by the Preſence; at that Time Row Pundit Purdhaun was not born, his Birth happened ſoon after, and a Treaty of Alliance took Place with the Miniſters. I then drove Ragonaut Row from the Country, and I have always before been ſtedfaſt to the Treaty, and am reſolved to remain ſo for ever.

You write that no Detriment ſhall come to the Sirkar from Ragonaut Row. At the Time that the Limits of the Marattas extended as far as the Boundaries of Attuck, when there was no Diſputes in their Country, and their Power was entire, at that Time he could cauſe no Injury, and he was always reduced, and kept in Subjection to me; ſince God is the Protector and Succourer of my Government at preſent, that he is driven out of this Quarter, and can effect nothing in that Quarter; what Injury can ariſe from him to the Sirkar? You write that you are ready to abide by the Treaty of Colonel Upton; the Marattas alſo declare that they are ſteady to Colonel Upton's Treaty, and remained perfectly at Eaſe, that no Breach would ariſe from the Engliſh; but that the Governor and Council of Bombay uniting with Ragonaut Row, broke the Treaty and Engagements, and approached within 12 Coſs of Poona, the Event of which is well known; that the Breaches and Innovations in the Treaty of Colonel Upton came from your Side, and that ſuch being the Caſe, what Dependance can they have on Colonel Upton's Treaty, or in future upon any other new Engagements; for theſe Reaſons, the Marattas are reſolved that by any Means Ragonaut Row muſt be delivered up to them, that they may be at Eaſe as to their Government; the Governor and Council of Bombay, in open Breach of the Treaty formerly made by Colonel Upton, taking Ragonaut Row with them, approached within 12 Coſs of Poona; they after that delivered him up, and made a new Engagement, and have now received him again under their Protection. Should they yield up theſe Points, and ſhould the Company act again in the ſame Manner as before, this would be contrary to all Policy. How long ſhall I, neglecting the guarding the Adminiſtration of my own Country by Night and Day, watching this Enemy. While I am thus employed in obſerving him, how can I attend to the Management of my interior Concerns. It is therefore neceſſary for me firſt to remove this Cauſe of Apprehenſion. I have had many Proofs of the Treachery and bad Faith of Ragonaut Row. Since the Miniſters of Poona have united themſelves with me, and have made a Treaty with me; ſhould I now break that Treaty, what Dependence would the Engliſh Company have upon my obſerving the Engagements which I have with them. You write that the Friendſhip between the Engliſh Company and the Preſence daily encreaſes, and that no Detriment ſhall ariſe to the Friendſhip between us, ſo as to prevent our Intereſts being united. Reflecting on this, I have told Mr. John Hollond, that as it would certainly be a Diſhonour for the Engliſh to deliver up Ragonaut Row to the Marattas, I will procure for him a Jaghire in the Sirkar, on the Footing, that he is with the Engliſh, which will remove our mutual Objections. In the Time of the late Nabob, our Order was obeyed through all Decan and Hindoſtan, as far as the Limits of Attuck, and their Riches and warlike Stores were very conſiderable. The late Nabob employed himſelf a long Time in reducing Ragonaut Row, but from his great Power, was unable to effect the Expulſion of him. The Nabob died, and War was carried on a long Time againſt him by the Sirkar to ſuch Extremities, that Poona was deſtroyed by Fire. I can ſee nothing can be done except the Reduction of him by the Bleſſing of God; you are wiſe, and will ſee that it is adviſable that this Cauſe of Apprehenſion ſhould be removed.

From Moodajee Bhoſila; received 24th February 1780.

Before this I have ſent ſucceſſive Karetahs to you containing all Particulars, by the Way of Cuttack, and alſo by the Route of Benares; but as yet I have not received an Anſwer to any one of them; and Colonel Goddard likewiſe has delayed ſending Replies to my Letters. As our Friendſhip requires that we ſhould be explicit in our Communications on all Points, I have therefore written what was proper to Beneram Pundit, who is at preſent in his own Houſe at Benares for the Recovery of his Health, and directed him to repair immediately to Calcutta; and having made you acquainted with all the Particulars written to him to procure an Anſwer, and Diſpatch it to this Quarter; and to remain in future at your Preſence, that he may write me whatever you ſhall inform him

him of as adviſable and as being your Deſire. As our Correſpondence is of Service to keep up our Friendſhip and Alliance, it is neceſſary that you delay no longer to write an Anſwer to my Letters, which are all dictated by Friendſhip, Prudence, and Foreſight: You are wiſe and prudent, and will pay proper Attention to them.

APPENDIX, N° 252. B.

Bengal Secret Perſian Correſpondence.

To the Nabob Hyder Ally Cawn; written the 17th February 1780.

CONSIDERING you as a Friend of the Engliſh Company, both in virtue of the Engagements which have been formed between you and them, and by the Contiguity of your Country to the Borders of that of the Nabob Wallah Jah, their ancient Friend and Ally, I have long deſired to write to you; but I have been hitherto prevented, partly from a Conſideration of the Diſtance and Uncertainty of the Place and State in which you might be on the Receipt of my Letters, and principally by reaſon of the Intercourſe which ſubſiſted between you and the Preſident of Madras, which was in effect the ſame as if it exiſted with us, ſince we are the Servants of the ſame Maſter, and entruſted, though in a different Degree, with Portions of the ſame common Intereſts. But ſome Reports which have been lately and ſucceſſively conveyed to me, have induced me to addreſs you immediately on the Behalf and in the Name of this Government, for the Purpoſe of removing any falſe Appearance or Conceptions which might diſturb the good Underſtanding which it is my Deſire, and which I believe to be equally yours, to perpetuate between us.

It has been variouſly ſuggeſted at one Time, that you propoſed to invade the Carnatic; at another, that you had actually commenced Hoſtilities; and laſtly, that you had entered into Combinations with the Rulers of the Maratta State at Poona, and other Powers, againſt the Engliſh Government, and againſt their Ally the Nabob of the Carnatic. I have given no Credit to theſe Reports, becauſe I confide in your Wiſdom, that you will never ſuffer any Illuſion to draw you from the Line of your true Intereſt. It is not your Intereſt to make the Engliſh your Enemy: It is their Intereſt, and equally their Inclination, to preſerve your Friendſhip; but Suſpicions and mutual Jealouſies often create Enemies by the very Cautions which they excite on both Sides. And thus Two States, whoſe Dominions border upon each other, are often drawn into a War againſt the Intereſts and Wiſhes of both. Therefore, and to prevent ſuch Conſequences, I write to you, that being fully and certainly informed of the Sentiments and Intentions of this Government towards you, you may form your own accordingly.

You are well informed, that by the Regulations and Commands of the King of England, the Determination of Peace and War with any of the Engliſh Governments in India, depends on the Superior Council of Bengal. Of that Council I am the Chief; and I now in that Character in the firſt Place declare to you, that nothing hoſtile to your Perſon or Government is intended, nor ſhall be undertaken by any of the Engliſh Governments, as the Aggreſſors; and in the Second, to requeſt that you will acquaint me with your Intentions reſpecting the Conduct which we are to expect from you, that we may act accordingly.

I had an Opportunity when I was nearer to you than I am at preſent, of obtaining a Knowledge of your Character. I know that all your Meaſures are dictated by a wiſe and well-formed Policy, united with a Regard to Juſtice and public Faith, and the Courage of a Soldier, who has ever ſhewn himſelf ſuperior to the Arts of Deception; I ſhall therefore wait with Impatience for your Anſwer, in the Aſſurance that it will afford me the complete Satisfaction which I require.

To prevent the Conſequences of Delays I have written this, and ſhall diſpatch it to you by expreſs Coſſids. But if it is your Wiſh to improve the Connection between you and the Company by nearer Ties, I will either ſend a Perſon properly empowered and entruſted to you for that Purpoſe, or receive one ſo qualified from you, whichever Mode you ſhall moſt approve. In the mean Time, &c. &c.

APPENDIX, N° 253. B.

Bombay Select Committee Conſultations, 25th January 1780.

25th. RECEIVED the following Letters from General Goddard.

2d, General Letter from.

Gentlemen,

I am favoured with your Letter of the 27th ultimo, encloſing Extracts of Colonel Braithwaite's Letters to you; by which I find he is determined not to join me with any Part of the Mahé Detachment. The Event will hereafter prove upon what Grounds he has founded his Opinion of Hyder's Intentions being hoſtilely bent againſt us; and it will be alſo left to decide how far the Intereſts of the Company are moſt eſſentially ſerved, by ſtaying to watch the Motions of a ſuſpected Enemy only, or aſſiſting in the Operations of a War actually carrying on by the Engliſh Nation againſt the Whole of the Maratta Empire.

My Letter of the 30th ultimo would explain to you the Appearance of Affairs reſpecting Futty Sing in which no Change or Event from which to form more certain Conjectures of his real Deſigns has ſince taken place. One of his Officers, with about 3000 Followers, has ſtationed himſelf in the Purgunnah of Ahmood, and detached a ſmall Party of 300 Men into that of Deſbara, which has cauſed a temporary Suſpenſion in the taking Poſſeſſion of theſe Two Diſtricts by the Chief of Broach. The Man himſelf pretends that the Motives of his Stay are to receive ſome Money from them, promiſed by the late Poona Collectors on Account of Aſſiſtance he gave them in quelling ſome recent Diſturbances. I have ſent Word to Futty Sing, to withdraw his People from theſe Purgunnahs immediately; but a ſufficient Time has not yet elapſed to judge whether he means to comply or not; at any rate, they will be evacuated on the Approach of the Army.

I croſſed the Tappey the 1ſt Inſtant, as I informed you I would, and halted Three Days on the North Side of it, to put every Thing in proper Order. I Yeſterday put the Army in Motion, and have this Morning paſſed the Kein Nuddy; in Two Days more I expect to reach Soncleterrah on the Banks of the Nerbedah.

I am obliged to you for the Credit you have given me upon your Chief of Surat for Two Lacks of Rupees, which the moſt abſolute Neceſſity will too ſoon compel me to make uſe of; becauſe, but for the Expedient of paſſing Bills on Bengal, I ſhould have found it impoſſible to ſubſiſt the Army till this Time. In order to enable me to avoid having Recourſe to this Mode, which the Urgency of the Service only induced me to adopt, and which I have continued to follow with the utmoſt Repugnance, I muſt place my preſent Dependance upon the further Aid of your Government, which I truſt you will afford me in the moſt effectual Manner you poſſibly can; and for this End, beg to repeat the Requeſt contained in my laſt Letter, of permitting me to draw on your Treaſury in favour of Individuals, the Amount of which may remain depoſited in it, and Bonds granted by you in the uſual Form. This Mode of Negociation will furniſh me with a moſt uſeful Reſource, without diminiſhing your Treaſury; and at the ſame Time you will eſtabliſh ſuch Rules and Limitations reſpecting it, as you may judge requiſite and proper.

I hope in a few Days to be able to inform you more deciſively of what may be expected from Futty Sing; and have the Honour to be,

Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servant,
Tho'. Goddard.

Gujurram, on the Keim Naddy
Camp, 6th January 1780.

3d, General Letter from.

Gentlemen,

I have the Pleaſure to inform you of my having croſſed the Nubeddar Yeſterday at the Ghatt of Bowa Pur. I found it neceſſary to halt a few Days at Selecleturrut, to give Time for conducting the Four Eighteen Pounders and Military Stores from Broach, which joined me ſafe under Eſcort of a Battalion of Sepoys, I had ſent over the River at Sereeleturrut the Day of my Arrival at this Place.

It is with Pleaſure I can communicate to you the Proſpect I have Reaſon to believe there now is of adjuſting every Point to your Wiſh, and for the Intereſt of the Company; with Futty Sing. I have exerted every Endeavour to effect this Alliance, becauſe of the important Advantages it will immediately ſecure to the Engliſh in Guzerat, and of the future favourable Conſequences they muſt derive from it in the grand Conteſt they are now entering upon with the Maratta Government. The Leiſure allowed by the Inactivity of the Miniſter, which has, I conceive, been principally occaſioned by the Diſputes betwixt him and Scindia, has proved very convenient to the Settlement of the Gu-

zer-

zerat Province, which I hope may be finally concluded before any conſiderable Body of Troops can arrive from the Decan. For this Reaſon, as the Effect it muſt have had upon Futty Sing, in inclining him to take a more ſpeedy and deciſive Part upon the Occaſion, the early Movement of the Army towards Dubhoy and Broduı became a Point moſt neceſſary and eſſential to the Good the Service. He has promiſed to ſettle every Thing on my Arrival at the former Place, from ence I ſhall be able to addreſs you more fully, as the Sincerity of his preſent Profeſſions will then put to the Teſt, and till that can be done no certain Judgment is to be formed of the real ſigns of a Man ſo famed for Treachery and Deceit as Futty Sing is reported to be.

As you will ſo ſoon hear from me again I ſhall conclude at preſent, and have the Honour to ſcribe myſelf,

Gentlemen,

Your moſt obedient and moſt humble Servant,

Thomas Goddard.

Bowa Peir Ghatt, North of the Nurbedah, 16th January 1780.

Goddard, General, Letter from

Gentlemen,

In my Letter of the 16th Inſtant, I informed you I ſhould march towards Dubhoy the 18th: which Place arrived Yeſterday; and having ſummoned Ballagee Ragonath, the Perſon who held n the Part of the Poona Government, with a Garriſon of above Two thouſand Men, to ſurrender Place, and received a Refuſal, I immediately made the neceſſary Preparations for beſieging it. e Place of Attack being fixed upon, a Battery of Three 18 Pounders, within 200 Yards of the ill, was compleated by this Morning, at Day-break; when I found the Enemy had evacuated Town, which I have taken Poſſeſſion of in the Name of the Company, and congratulate you on this Acquiſition to your territorial Poſſeſſions in Guzerat. The Inhabitants, many of whom nained in the Place, ſeem perfectly well diſpoſed to obey and live under the Protection of the gliſh Government; and as the Fortifications, though inſufficient to reſiſt a regular European tack, might, with a ſmall Force, be defended againſt a conſiderable Body of Country Troops, Poſſeſſion of it muſt confer Stability and Security upon your Territories on this Side, and in the ent of an Accommodation with Futty Sing, from its Vicinity to Brodera, prove a Check and Reaint upon his future Conduct. I have wrote to Mr. Gambier, your Chief at Broach, to ſend proper rſons to ſettle and collect the Revenues of the Country, and ſhall afford him every further Aſſiſtance ceſſary for this Purpoſe.

I am happy at an Opportunity of mentioning to you the Satisfaction I received from the Skill and ſiduity of Major Spaeth, the chief Engineer, in conſtructing and completing the Battery with ſo ich Expedition. Lieutenant Charles Reynolds, who acted under him, and ſhewed himſelf exceedgly alert and active in his Duty, received a Wound in his Thigh, from a Matchlock, which however I am hopeful will not prove any way dangerous.

I have not heard from Futty Sing ſince my laſt of the 16th Inſtant. I expected the Return of his ckeels, with every Thing finally ſettled and agreed to, the Day of my Arrival here, or this Day at fartheſt: As they may yet arrive in the Courſe of it, or To-morrow Morning, I ſhall defer ſaying more upon the Subject of Futty Sing, till I can write you with an abſolute Certainty.

I have the Honour to be,

Gentlemen,

Your moſt obedient humble Servant,

Thomas Goddard.

Head Quarters, Dubhoy, January 20th 1780.

Goddard, General, Letter.

Gentlemen,

I had the Pleaſure of informing you Yeſterday of the Treaty concluded betwixt the Honourable Company and Futty Sing Guicawar, and now incloſe you a Copy of the original Treaty, the exact Counterpart of which is in the Poſſeſſion of Futty Sing, which I hope will meet with your Approbation. By the laſt Article, it is provided that Two Copies of this Treaty ſhall be forwarded by your Government to the Honourable Governor General and Council, for their Confirmation and Ratification; which I take the Liberty of requeſting you will be pleaſed to do by the earlieſt Opportunity.

I have thought it requiſite to retain the original Treaty at preſent with me, as in the Courſe of the Campaign Occaſions may offer to render the immediate producing it uſeful and neceſſary to the Good of the Service; and the authenticated Copy I now ſend, will be ſufficient fully to anſwer the preſent Purpoſe of your and the Bengal Government.

I have from Time to Time communicated to you the Progreſs of my Negociation, and the Difficulties I met with in the Courſe of it to bring it to a ſucceſsful Iſſue, which, from a Conviction of the real and ſolid Advantages ariſing to the Company by a Connection with Futty Sing, I have ſeriouſly and aſſiduouſly laboured to effect. It is unneceſſary to point out to you, who have ſo exact and perfect a Knowledge of the Province of Guzerat, the particular Advantages of Country and Revenue acquired and ſecured to the Company by this Treaty, whoſe Dominion in Guzerat I conceive now to be fixed upon the moſt firm and unſhaken Baſis; as the only Power, beſides the Engliſh, who can have any legal or juſt Claim to the Poſſeſſion of Country, is equally intereſted with them

them to exclude the Maratta Government from all Share of Participation in it whatever; and although the Alliance with Futty Sing may not bring any very material Acceſſion of military Force to the Company, the Influence it muſt have upon the Minds of the Maratta Leaders, renders it a favourable and fortunate Circumſtance at the Commencement of the preſent War, and effectually provides many prevailing Arguments of Right and Juſtice, ſo neceſſary to reconcile the Sentiments and Opinions of Men in all Changes of Government, to the Form that may be introduced and eſtabliſhed.

In conſequence of what you mentioned reſpecting the Neceſſity you ſuppoſed there might be of inſerting the Name of Seajee in any Engagement formed with Futty Sing, I propoſed that he ſhould alſo be mentioned, but was told, that ſince the Concluſion of the former Treaty betwixt Ragoba and Futty Sing, through the Mediation of the Engliſh Company, the Sunnuds of Rajah had been made out in the ſole Name of Futty Sing, and ſent him from the Court of Sittara. To avoid however every Poſſibility of Diſpute hereafter, I have conſidered Futty Sing, as he certainly now is, the Head of the Family, and made his Engagement with the Honourable Company in the Name of the Whole of the Guicawars.

According to the Wiſh you expreſſed of ſecuring a ſuitable Proviſion for Govind Row, I hinted your Inclination to Futty Sing; but found, if I ſucceeded in that Point, I muſt have poſitively inſiſted upon it; and as in doing ſo, I muſt have deviated from the Orders of the Honourable Governor General and Council, wherein they expreſsly forbid the aſſuming any Mediation betwixt the Two Brothers, to which you have alſo deſired me to pay particular Attention, I rather choſe to deſiſt from further Solicitation on that Subject, by recommending a Reconciliation betwixt them, as a Circumſtance that would be much to his Honour and Advantage, and give great Satisfaction to the Engliſh.

It was with a good deal of Reluctance that Futty Sing could be brought to conſent to the Ceſſion of Zinnore, and ſtrongly pleaded for having the Purgunnah of Dubhoy in Exchange given up to him; but knowing the Importance of both theſe Places, and particularly the latter, to the Company, I tried every Argument to induce him to comply; in which I at laſt ſucceeded, by proving to him the real and advantageous Compenſation he would reap from the preſent Treaty with the Engliſh. This is a Point I have endeavoured to perſuade him into a firm Belief of, through the whole Negociation, well knowing, that to ſecure the faithful and ſtrict Adherence of any Perſon to the Engagements he may have entered into, it is a material Object to convince him they are for his Intereſt. The Earneſtneſs expreſſed by Futty Sing, to be put in Poſſeſſion of Dubhoy, clearly ſhews that he conſiders that Place in the important Point of View it deſerves; and is apprehenſive of its being in the Hands of ſuch formidable Neighbours as the Engliſh.

I ſhall ſhortly write you of the particular Plan I mean to follow, in effecting what remains to be executed reſpecting the Settlement of the Province; and ſhall take Leave at preſent, by repreſenting to you the Neceſſity there appears at this Criſis, of augmenting the Number of Troops on your Eſtabliſhment, to maintain the flouriſhing State of the Company's Affairs in this Quarter, and to defend and protect the Company's Acquiſitions from any future Alarm or Depredation of their Enemies.

I have the Honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient and
moſt humble Servant,
Thomas Goddard.

Head Quarters,
Camp near Baroda Beſſwamuntry
Nuddy, 27th January 1780.

Copy of the Treaty entered into with Futty Sing.

Treaty between the Honourable Engliſh Eaſt India Company and Futty Sing Row Guicowar Shemſeer Bahaudar; concluded at the Village of Candeela, in the Purgunnah of Dubhoy, January the 26th 1780.

The Miniſters of the Maratta State having refuſed to accept of the reaſonable Terms of Accommodation offered them by Brigadier General Thomas Goddard, in the Name of the Honourable Governor General and Council of Fort William, and by their obſtinate Perſeverance in hoſtile Intentions againſt the Engliſh, compelled them to take up Arms in Defence of their own Rights and Poſſeſſions, the Honourable the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, with the Sanction and Approbation of the Honourable the Governor General and Council of Fort William, have appointed and authorized Brigadier General Goddard to ſettle and conclude a Treaty of laſting Peace and Alliance betwixt the Honourable Engliſh Eaſt India Company on one Part, and Futty Sing Row Guicowar Shemſeer Bahaudar, for and in the Name of all the Guicowar Family, on the other; and the following are the Articles of Convention mutually entered into.

Article 1ſt.

The Engliſh and Futty Sing Row agree to a League of Defenſive Alliance, and to protect each other againſt all foreign Enemies whatever.

Article 2d.

The Miniſters of the Maratta State by repeated Violations of Treaty, as well as their late Conduct, having drawn on themſelves the juſt Reſentment of the Engliſh, having alſo by undue Acts of Oppreſſion,

preſſion, proved themſelves the Enemies of Futty Sing; for theſe Reaſons, and becauſe the moſt firm and ſincere Friendſhip has long ſubſiſted betwixt the Honourable Company and Futty Sing, the contracting Parties mutually agree to enter immediately into an offenſive League, excluding the Government of Poona from all Share of Country in the Province of Guzerat whatever.

Article 3d.

The Engliſh agree to ſupport and defend Futty Sing in Poſſeſſion of his Share of the Guzerat Province, and Futty Sing is to aſſiſt and ſupport the Engliſh in poſſeſſing themſelves of and maintaining the Share now held by the Government of Poona.

Article 4th.

In order to accompliſh this Service, as a firm Friendſhip is now eſtabliſhed betwixt the Engliſh and Futty Sing, the latter agrees to join the Engliſh with 3,000 Horſe according to Cuſtom, and as many more as he can poſſibly raiſe, to act in Conjunction with them during the preſent War, whenever they ſhall call upon them to do ſo.

Article 5th.

As the preſent Mode of Partition betwixt the Poona Government and Futty Sing is attended with great Loſs and Inconvenience from the Diſputes that muſt ariſe from the Interference of the Officers of each in collecting the Revenues of the ſame Places, and that lay interſperſed with one another, it is agreed upon that a new Settlement of the Province of Guzerat ſhall take place for the mutual Benefit and Convenience of both Parties, the expreſs Object of which will be an abſolute and ſpecific Partition of the whole Territory betwixt the Honourable Eaſt India Company and Futty Sing, according to the Proportion of the Revenues now reſpectively held by him and the Marattas.

Article 6th.

Ahmedabad and its Dependencies, that is to ſay, the Country to the North of the River Myhé, now poſſeſſed by the Poona Government, to be allotted to Futty Sing; in lieu of which the Engliſh are to be put in Poſſeſſion of the Guicowar Diviſion of the Country South of the Tappey, known by the Name of Attaveezy, and their Share of the Revenues of Surat.

Article 7th.

The Engliſh will give ſuch Aſſiſtance of Force as Futty Sing may require to conquer and put him in Poſſeſſion of the Poona Share of the Country to the North of the Myhé.

Article 8th.

The final Partition and Settlement of the Guzerat Province being made, each Party is to have the diſtinct and ſole Government and Poſſeſſion of the Diviſion allotted him, and to hold his Share independant of, and unconnected with the other, except when united for their common Defence againſt a foreign Enemy, which they mutually and in the moſt ſolemn Manner agree to do; and this Partition and Settlement mutually agreed to, is to be binding upon them and their Poſterity for ever.

Article 9th.

Futty Sing having requeſted that the Engliſh ſupport him in withholding the Annual Tribute hitherto paid by him to the Poona Government, it is ſtipulated that the Honourable Company will do ſo, till a final Peace ſhall be concluded betwixt them and the Poona Government, in which the Intereſts of Futty Sing ſhall be carefully and equally attended to with their own.

Article 10th.

In Conſideration of the Advantage that will ariſe to Futty Sing from the above Article, and as a Proof of his ſincere Regard and Friendſhip for the Engliſh, he agrees to cede to them the Diſtrict of Zinnow, and the Villages ſituated in the Broach Purgunnah now belonging to him; both which are to remain for ever in the Poſſeſſion of the Company.

Article 11th.

All the Countries and Places made over to the Engliſh in this Treaty by Futty Sing, are to be delivered into their Hands, and the Collections accounted for to them from the Day that Futty Sing is put in Poſſeſſion of the City of Ahmedabad, and no Demands of Collection for any paſt Time is to be made in them by Futty Sing.

Article 12th.

It is agreed, that Two Copies of this Treaty be immediately ſent to the Honourable Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, for their Approbation, and to be by them tranſmitted to the Honourable Governor General and Council of Fort William, under whoſe Sanction it is concluded, in order to receive their final Confirmation and Ratification; after which, one Copy ſo authenticated is to remain with the Honourable Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, and another with Futty Sing.

A true Copy.

Thomas Goddard.

A true Tranſlation.
Dalhouſe Watherſtone,
Perſian Tranſlator.

The Seal of the Company.

APPENDIX, N° 253. B.

This Treaty was ſigned, ſealed, and delivered to the Contracting Parties by each other, in Preſence of us, who have hereunto ſigned our Names.

Signed { John Cockerell, Q^r Mr Genl.
Edwd Heard, Adju^t Genl.

N. B. A Copy of this Treaty was alſo written in Perſian, and the Articles reſpectively placed oppoſite the Engliſh ones, and ſigned as follows:

Thomas Goddard. [The Seal of the Company.] [Futty Sing his Seal.] Futty Sing's Signature.

GOVIND GOPAUL,
the Rajah's Duan.
ROLAGEE SCINDIA,
Married to the Daughter of Seajee,
Futty Sing's Brother.

Wednesday the 9th of February 1780.

Signed the following Letters to General Goddard, and the Chiefs of Surat and Broach.

Goddard, General, Letter to.

To Brigadier General Goddard.

Sir,

We have received your Letters of the 26th and 27th ultimo, and very ſincerely congratulate you on the Succeſs of your Negociation with Futty Sing.

We entirely approve of the Terms of the Treaty you have concluded with him, which promiſe to accompliſh the great Purpoſe of extending the Company's Poſſeſſions South of the Mahié, and of uniting the Guicowars to us by the ſureſt Tie, that of our common Intereſt. Futty Sing, we flatter ourſelves, will be thoroughly ſatisfied in receiving by your Means ſuch Acceſſion of Territory as is ſtipulated for him North of the Mahié, and in being relieved from the heavy Tribute formerly exacted from him by the Poona Government.

We ſhall be glad to receive the particular Plan you propoſe to communicate hereafter, with regard to what remains to be executed for the Settlement of the Province: By the 5th Article of the preſent Treaty, we obſerve that this remains open to future Adjuſtment; and indeed it would have been impoſſible for you at ſo ſhort a Warning, to have entered into all the Details which will be neceſſary to the Partition of the Province between the Company and Futty Sing, according to the Proportion of Revenue held reſpectively by him and the Poona Government; it was therefore neceſſary to reſerve this for a definitive Treaty, which after ſettling the grand Outlines, as marked in the abovementioned Article, may be compleated at greater Leiſure.

In order to ſupply you with the neceſſary Materials for this Purpoſe, we have directed the Chiefs of Surat and Broach, and the Reſidents of Jamboo ſier and Cambay, to ſend you the beſt Accounts they can procure of the ſeveral Purgunnahs and Diviſions of the Guzerat Province, with all the Extracts they are capable, the particular Value of each to the Poona Circar, Futty Sing, the Nabob of Surat and Cambay, and the Graſſias or other Rajahs. We flatter ourſelves likewiſe, that at Ahmedabad you will be able to procure very authentic and particular Information on this Subject from the Perſons who have been employed in the Collections, as well as from Futty Sing himſelf; which latter may have its Uſe, though it cannot certainly be relied on altogether, on Account of his private Intereſt to procure as advantageous a Bargain as poſſible in the Settlement of the propoſed Exchanges.

The Reſident at Cambay has been long in that Part of the Country, where our Information is at preſent moſt imperfect; and as you may perhaps find him uſeful in proſecuting your Enquiries on this Subject, we have given him Orders to attend you, ſhould you judge it proper to ſend for him.

We flatter ourſelves you will find Leiſure for the final Adjuſtment of this very eſſential Part of your Negociation. As ſoon as you may have reduced Ahmedabad, Futty Sing, on the Proſpect of ſo noble an Acquiſition, will probably be diſpoſed to ſettle Exchanges with a more liberal Spirit than can uſually be expected from a Maratta, in treating on a Matter of this Sort, which will ſave you both much Trouble and Time.

We concur with you in regard to the Neceſſity of augmenting the Number of Troops on our Eſtabliſhment for the Protection of the new acquired Countries, and ſhall ſhortly determine on the Meaſures to be taken for this Purpoſe.

We ſhall take the earlieſt Opportunity of tranſmitting a Copy of the Treaty with Futty Sing to the Governor General and Council agreeable to your Deſire.

We think it neceſſary to acquaint you, that by the laſt Advices from Major Cotgrave, at Tellicherry, dated 21ſt ultimo, he informs us, that he was finiſhing the Lines of that Place with all Expedition, and which he hoped would be compleated in Ten or Twelve Days, when he propoſed

embarking for Surat on the Eagle, with the Company of European Artillery and Company of Infantry, leaving the Grenadiers and Twentieth Battalion of Sepoys for the Defence of the Place, which in his Opinion would be fully ſufficient againſt their preſent Enemy.

We encloſe Copy of an Extract of News juſt received from our Reſident at Anjengo, and by Advices from Tellicherry, we learn that our Honourable Maſters Ship Hawke, which imported at Anjengo the 24th ultimo from Great Britain, on the 16th of the ſame Month off Ceylon, ſpoke with His Majeſty's Ship the Seahorſe, and other Ships in Company, both of which were bound to this Coaſt with Troops from Fort Saint George, and which we ſuppoſe are thoſe mentioned in the Extract of News.

Bombay Caſtle,
9th February 1780.

We are,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient,
humble Servants,
William Hornby,
&c. Committee.

Goddard, General, Letter from

Gentlemen,

I have been favoured with your Letter of the 11th Inſtant, and communicated to Mr. Richardſon, as you deſired, the Reſolution you had taken reſpecting his Reference; I at the ſame Time indulged him with the Choice of returning to his Duty in this Army, if he would comply with the general Regulations I had found it neceſſary to eſtabliſh for the Hoſpital Department; and received through Lieutenant Colonel Hartley, his Anſwer, Copy of which I have encloſed for your Peruſal.

It is Matter of Concern to me that Mr. Richardſon ſhould thus perſiſt in oppoſing an Authority which you have been pleaſed to give as your Opinion is veſted in me, for the internal Regulation of this Army, and which I am conſcious of having exerted for the Good of the Service. The Application he has made for a General Court Martial will, I make no Doubt, appear to you moſt ſtrange and improper. He has not been accuſed of Miſconduct; I have even thought proper to overlook his former Diſobedience of Orders, in declining to act under the Regulations I had eſtabliſhed, on account of the Reference made to your Government; and however his preſent Behaviour might juſtly deſerve the Severity of that ſtrict Enquiry he ſolicits, from the Diſregard ſhown to your Authority, in thus perſiſting to diſpute the Legality and Propriety of my Orders, I have, from a Regard to the preſent Service, declined bringing him to a Trial here, and given him Permiſſion to repair to your Preſidency, to anſwer to you for his Conduct; which I beg Leave to repreſent has in this freſh Inſtance, as well as through the Whole of the Buſineſs, been highly unjuſtifiable and unmilitary.

Having experienced on my March to the Nerbudda the Inconvenience that aroſe from tranſporting a Quantity of Stores which were in Charge of the Commiſſary of your Troops, and which were altogether unneceſſary to the Service; I directed them to be ſent to Broach, and delivered over to your Commiſſary there, by which Means a very conſiderable Reduction has been made in the Expence, and the Army eaſed of a heavy Incumbrance. In Proſecution of the ſame Plan of Œconomy, ſo eſſentially requiſite at this Time, when the Company are engaged in an important and expenſive War, I have alſo regulated the Bombay Hoſpital Department conformable to thoſe of the Bengal Army, which are ſufficiently ample for every Purpoſe of the Service, and have reſtricted the Commiſſary's Charges, as nearly as poſſible, to the ſame eſtabliſhed Standard. From a Conviction of the further Convenience it would be of to the Service, as well as the Diminution of Expence, if the Officers of your Troops were permitted to carry their own Camp Equipage, inſtead of proceeding upon the former expenſive Plan, I have taken upon me to grant the Allowance for that Purpoſe; but their Tents are furniſhed by the Honourable Company. The Advantage which the Company will derive from theſe Regulations make me aſſured of their meeting with your Sanction and Approbation, which I hope you will be pleaſed to favour me with.

The Charge of the Bombay Hoſpital by the Departure of Mr. Richardſon devolves upon Mr. Durham, the Senior Surgeon nominated in your Letter to me; but Mr. Grant Clugſtone, conceiving he has a prior Claim of Rank to him, has delivered me an Addreſs to you on the Subject, which I have now the Honour to encloſe to you, and beg to receive your Determination upon it.

I ſhall, agreeable to your Deſire, ſend the Papers relative to the Dutch Intrigues to Mr. Boddam, who will forward them to you.

I have the Honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servant,
Thomas Goddard.

Camp, near Broda,
30th January 1780.

Signed

ry 24th. Signed the following Letter to General Goddard, giving Cover to an Abſtract of the Revenues of Guzerat; alſo a Letter to the Chiefs of Surat and Broach.

rd, General to.

To Brigadier General Goddard.

Sir,

Having received Advice from the Chiefs of Surat and Broach, of your having reduced the City of Ahmedabad, we moſt ſincerely congratulate you on your Succeſs, hoping ſoon to receive the Particulars from yourſelf.

Since our Letter of the 9th Inſtant, we have been favoured with yours of the 30th ultimo; and entirely agree with you, that Mr. Richardſon's Application for a Court Martial was very improper, after the Reference made to us at his own Deſire, and the Opinion we had given on the Subject; and we have made known to him our Sentiments of his Conduct.

We ſhall always give our warmeſt Approbation of every Reduction you can make in the Expences of the Army conſiſtent with the Good of the Service; on which Principle the Regulations you have eſtabliſhed reſpecting the Bombay Detachment have our entire Sanction.

We requeſt you will ſignify to Mr. Grant Clugſtone, as our Determination on his Claim, that the Honourable Company's Orders give him no Pretenſions to the Charge he now ſolicits, nor to any higher Rank on the Liſt of Surgeons, until a Vacancy ſhall happen in the Bombay Hoſpital. He ought to conſider himſelf ſufficiently favoured in having the next Succeſſion in Preference to ſo many of his Seniors; and if, as he ſtates in his Letter, the Company's Appointment was grounded upon a Miſconception of his Rank and Pretenſions, his Argument operates againſt himſelf.

In conſequence of your Recommendation for augmenting our military Eſtabliſhment, we have determined forthwith to raiſe Two additional Battalions of Sepoys; but as you muſt be a perfect Judge of the Subject, we ſhall be glad to be favoured with your Opinion of what Force will be neceſſary for the Protection of our new Acquiſitions.

Since we wrote you on the 9th Inſtant, we have received an Account from Mr. Boddam, of the Revenues reſpectively collected by the Poona Government and the Guicawars from the Province of Guzerat. By this Account it appears, that the Ceſſions already made to the Company by the late Treaty, are much inferior in Value to the Territories Northward of the Myhie, the Poſſeſſion of which is to be ſecured to Futty Sing. And to explain this the more clearly, we now tranſmit an Abſtract of the Account, arranged in Diviſions, diſtinguiſhing the reſpective Values of the Purgunnahs belonging to the Peſhwa and the Guicawars, and their Situation, with reſpect to the Rivers Tappey, Nerbedah, and Myhé, by which you will at once diſcover the Amount in which, by this Account, the Company's Share falls ſhort of Futty Sing's. We will not anſwer its being altogether accurate; but we tranſmit it to you as containing the beſt Light we are able to afford to aſſiſt you in the new Settlement, which, according to the 5th Article, ſtill remains to be made of the General Province, not doubting but you will exert your utmoſt Efforts to ſecure ſuch a further Tract of Country, between the Nubedah and Tappey, or Nubedah and Myhé, as will make the Company's Diviſion fully equal to Futty Sing's, to which they have the ſtronger Claim for relieving him from the heavy Tribute before paid to the Poona Circar.

The Importance of ſecuring the Friendſhip of Hyder Ally during the preſent War with the Marattas, or even his Neutrality, and other Conſiderations, regarding the State of Affairs on the Malabar Coaſt, and the Company's Commerce in his Dominions, have led us to determine on ſending a Gentleman to his Durbar commiſſioned to treat on theſe Points; to which we have been the more encouraged by a late Letter the Preſident has received from him. We have appointed Mr. Horſley for this Commiſſion, and ſhall communicate to you as ſoon as poſſible ſuch Information as he may be able to obtain reſpecting the Nabob's Diſpoſition towards us, and what Expectations may be reaſonably formed from him with reſpect to the material Objects before mentioned.

The Chief of Surat having been invited to take Poſſeſſion of Gogo, we have given him an Authority for that Purpoſe, when Circumſtances may be convenient, as it will be a very deſirable Acquiſition to the Company. You have already had Notice from him of this Affair, that you might regulate yourſelf in your Negociations; and Mr. Malet can give you any Information you may want reſpecting this Place, and the Importance of it to the Company.

The Remainder of the Battalion of Europeans from Madras, is arrived here on the Hawke; and we ſhall forward him to Surat as ſoon as the Revenge returns into Port from Fort Victoria. We likewiſe ſoon expect the Europeans from Tellicherry, and a complete Battalion of Sepoys from Madras.

The Gentlemen at Madras expreſs much Anxiety to us for a ſafe and honourable Peace with the Marattas; to enable you to effect which they have ſent ſuch a large Force to this Side of India. They apprehend much Danger and Embarraſſment from a Combination between the Marattas, Hyder Ally, and the Nizam; and even acquaint us, the Two latter have actually conducted an offenſive Alliance againſt us, and that the latter is ready to join upon the firſt Signal.

We are, Sir,

Your moſt obedient humble Servants,

William Hornby,
&c. Committee.

Bombay Caſtle,
24th February 1780.

A General

APPENDIX, N° 253. B.

A General Account of the Revenues of Guzerat, as collected by the Peſhwa and Guykewars; diſtinguiſhing the Diſtricts according to their Situations from the Rivers Tappey, Nubedah, and Myhie.

South of the Tappey.

Peſhwa Share.		Guykwar Share.	
Parneyra — —	27,000	Chowraſſee, 17 Villages.	
Boodſur — —	6,200	Jaghire to Siccaram Bapoo —	169,800
Bowanee — —	8,800	Balliſer — —	104,000
Balſar — — —	85,000	Murdu — —	56,000
Parchde — —	107,000	Kannidge — —	88,500
Soopah — —	51,000	Tembah — —	46,400
Sabone — —	30,900	Conode — — —	46,400
Ballore — —	30,000	Beara — — —	14,000
Bamdu Cuſbah — —	7,900	Chowkey at D° — —	18,000
Wanſdal, Chout on it —	7,000	Tillanu — —	103,000
Durrumpore D° — —	9,000	Norvſanu Cuſdah — —	14,200
Surat, Chout on it — —	42,000	Gundavie — —	89,000
Chowkies South of the Tappey —	83,000	Billimora — —	8,000
	494,800	Mowah — — —	55,400
		Mulivanah — —	12,000
		Anarvil — —	12,000
		Wuſſentpore — —	18,900
		Antapore and Ranu Amba —	22,500
		Soongur — —	42,000
		Mootah Cuſbah — —	9,800
		Surat Chout — —	42,000
			971,900

Between the Tappey and Nerbedah.

Peſhwa Share.		Guykwar Share.	
Ulpar — —	316,000	Goſlah — —	42,000
Hanſood — —	85,000	Buſſore — —	85,000
Occlaſeir — —	78,000	Turhſhar — —	7,700
Nundavie, Chout on it —	65,000	Sevangea Hittana —	51,000
	5,44,000	Raju Piplia — —	30,000
		Chaikeys between the Nubedah and Tappey — —	65,000
			280,700

Between the Nerbedah and Myhie.

Peſhwa Share.		Guykwar Share.	
Dubhoy — —	200,000	Zinnore — —	81,000
Ahmood — —	125,000	Chandde Cundally —	12,500
Deſbara — —	35,000	Brodah — —	11,34,000
	360,000	Wagora Coolies — —	22,000
		Safoolu Gehat Coolies —	86,000
		Tilluck, Wara, and Neckora D°	40,500
		Sunkera Baderpore Coolies —	75,000
		Mea Gaum Chout from the Rajah	40,000
			14,91,000

APPENDIX, N° 253. B.

North of the Myhie.

Peſhwa Share.		Guykwar Share.	
Pitlad, Half Share —	700,000	Pitlad — —	613,000
Dundooka — —	100,000	Dehliah — —	410,000
Mamedabad — —	100,000	Neriad — —	225,000
Challa Bejelby — —	100,000	Moonda — — —	89,500
Bai Mavarra — —	50,000	Mater Kira — —	81,000
Kallicottah — —	50,000	Kuny — — —	185,000
Verum Gaum — —	100,000	Bejapore — —	100,000
Godrah Taſtah — —	100,000	Bamegur — —	100,000
Dus Coſs, or Diſtrict within Ten Coſs of Ahmedabad —	100,000	Biſſanagur — —	100,000
		Puttan — — —	300,000
Ahmedabad City — —	300,000	Dus Coſs of Ahmedabad —	100,000
Mullock Guny Cattywar, according to the Force employed therein	10,00,000	Collections of the City of Ahmedabad	210,000
		Mullock Guny, according to the Force, but reckoned —	500,000
	27,00,000		
			30,18,500

N. B. A Village in the Parchde Pingunah, was given to Saccaram Waſſo Deſſoy, its Name Aumil Sar; and is not mentioned above, valued at R' 10,000.

ABSTRACT of the foregoing.

Peſhwa's Share.		Guykwar's Share.	
Diſtrict South of the Tappey - -	494,800	Ditto — —	971,900
		Aumil Sar, See N. B. —	10,000
			981,900
Ditto, between the Tappey and the Nerbedah —	544,000	Ditto — —	280,700
Ditto, between the Nerbedah and Myhie — —	360,000	Ditto — —	14,91,000
Ditto, North of the Myhie —	27,00,000	Ditto — —	30,18,500
	40,98,800		57,72,100

Peſhwa's Share	—	40,98,800
Guykwar's Share	—	57,72,100
Total Revenues	—	98,70,900

Tueſday 14th. Received the following Letter from General Goddard, and one from the Chief of Surat, enclosing ſundry Grants to the Honourable Company from Futty Sing.

Goddard, General, Letter from. Gentlemen,

I have been favoured with your Two Letters of the 24th and 26th ultimo; and have had the Satisfaction to make known to the Army the Sentiments you have been pleaſed to declare in the latter I may not anſwer ſo fully to the ſeveral Points expreſſed in the former as they deſerve, for which the active Service in which I am at preſent engaged will I hope be accepted as an Apology.

In a Letter which I had the Honour to addreſs you the 1ſt Inſtant, acquainting you with my Intentions of marching the Day following, I took the Liberty of obſerving that it would be politically prudent, at this Juncture, to wave a Diſcuſſion of ſuch Points as might appear to you requiſite to ſettle in a final Adjuſtment of the Partition of Guzerat with Futty Sing, as the grand Outlines of his Agreement with the Honourable Company being effectually ſecured, the Taſk of providing for the leſs important Intereſts of our Settlement with him would become hereafter perfectly eaſy, and to urge them at preſent could not be productive of any real or adequate Advantage. Reſpecting the Statement, which you have been pleaſed to ſend me, of the Revenues of Guzerat as ſhared by the Peſhwa and Guicawar, but which, you add, you do not anſwer for its being

being altogether accurate, I beg to aſſure you that from the moſt exact Information I have received, it is exceedingly erroneous and incorrect: I ſhall take an Opportunity of laying before you an exact and ſatisfactory Statement of the Collections of the Province for your more particular Information very ſoon; at preſent only permit me to obſerve, that the Eſtimate made of the Peſhwa's Share of the Diſtricts to the North of the Myhie, exceeds the proper Value by at leaſt Fifteen Lacks of Rupees. I ſhall mention Three Inſtances in which they are greatly exaggerated: Firſt, Reſpecting Pitlad; the whole Amount of which may be reckoned at Six Lacks: Second, The City of Ahmedabad, whoſe Collections amounted to about Three Lacks, and little more than Half belonged to the Poona Circar: Thirdly, The Revenue mentioned under the Name of Mulluckgurry, the real Value of which depended upon the Force employed, and was never valued to the Peſhwa at more than Three Lacks. If to theſe Deductions be added the Expences neceſſary to collect the Revenues from the Zemindars, as well as to protect the Country from the Inroads and Depredations of the Cottywars and other Freebooters, it will be found that the real Value of the Purgunnahs ceded to the Engliſh by Futty Sing, excluſive of the Convenience and Advantage of their Situation, is equal, if not ſuperior, to that guaranteed to him by the Company in lieu of it.

As you have been pleaſed to expreſs your Wiſh to receive my Opinion on the propoſed Augmentation of your military Eſtabliſhment, I ſhall do myſelf the Honour of communicating it to you, and every Idea that may ſtrike me as eligible on the Subject, very ſoon; begging you will accept of the Reaſon mentioned in the firſt Part of my Letter as an Excuſe for not writing you fully upon it at preſent.

I have the Honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servant,
Thomas Goddard.

Camp at Fazilpore,
7th March 1780.

APPENDIX, N° 254. B.

Bombay Select Conſultations, the 25th February 1780.

Friday 2

RECEIVED the following Letter from General Goddard, adviſing the Reduction of Ahmedabad.

Gentlemen,

Goddard, ral, Letter

That no Time might be loſt in communicating to you the fortunate Intelligence of the Reduction of Ahmedabad, the Capital of Guzerat, I diſpatched a ſhort Note to Mr. Gambier, the Chief of Broach, the Inſtant of the Troops entering the Place, requeſting he would immediately tranſmit an Account of it to you; which I hope you will have received. Permit me to congratulate you moſt ſincerely, upon an Event ſo honourable to the Britiſh Arms, and ſo favourable to the Intereſts of my Government.

On the 10th in the Morning I arrived before the City, and wrote to the Maratta Governor, Rago Pundit Tattea, deſiring him to deliver up the Place to me: With this Demand he affected an Intention of complying, but his Conduct was entirely the Reverſe of any ſuch Intention, for the Troops from the Walls fired upon ſuch of the Camp People as approached them, and endeavoured to do all the Miſchief in their Power. In his Excuſe the Pundit alledged, that the Aral and Scindy Jemautdars, who garriſoned the Place, had large Arrears due to them, and would not be induced to give it up till a Sum of Money was agreed to be paid them, and that they kept his Perſon in Confinement, becauſe he was unable to ſatisfy them. There was, I believe, ſome Foundation for this Aſſertion: Theſe Arabs and Scindys had Arrears due to them from the Poona Government, they were hired Mercenaries, and it was in all Probability a Matter of Indifference to them what Power's Service they entered into; they would therefore gladly have accepted their Arrears, upon Condition of being continued in the Garriſon of the Place; but I am convinced they never would have permitted the Britiſh Troops to be put in Poſſeſſion, or have evacuated it themſelves, if required to do ſo, becauſe they had, from a Reſidence of many Years, been conſidered as the legal eſtabliſhed Militia of the City, and from the Succeſs with which they had always heretofore oppoſed the Efforts of the moſt numerous Armies, none of whom could ever conquer the Place, as well as the Strength of their own Garriſon, which conſiſted of at leaſt 6000 Arab and Scindy Foot, beſides 2000 Horſe, they were inſpired with a Degree of Self Confidence and Aſſurance that their Arms were invincible, and the City impregnable to our Force. Finding therefore all my Efforts to obtain Poſſeſſion of the Place by any other Means ineffectual, I made the neceſſary Preparations for beſieging it; and on the 12th, at One o'Clock P. M. opened the Batteries againſt it, which continued to play till the 13th in the Evening, when the Breach being practicable, I formed an Intention of ſtorming next Morning; but from Motives of Humanity and Compaſſion, as the

City

City was extenſive and populous, and I well knew the undiſtinguiſhing Slaughter that almoſt unavoidably attends the Fury of entering a City by Storm, I deferred the Attack One Day, in Hopes that the Enemy might accept the Mercy I had proffered them: In this Hope I was however deceived; and accordingly this Morning gave Orders for an Aſſault, which ſucceeded to my utmoſt Wiſh. The Enemy fled from their Works, after having endeavoured, without Effect, to oppoſe the fierce Onſet of the Grenadiers, who, with their Officers, diſtinguiſhed themſelves in a moſt remarkable Degree; and I beg Leave to recommend their Conduct to your Notice and Approbation, and generally that of the whole Army during the Siege. Near Three hundred of the Enemy fell near the Breach and about the Gateway, beſides others who were killed and wounded after entering the Place; and what makes the Enterprize particularly fortunate, conſidering the deſperate Reſiſtance of the Enemy, and the Difficulties we had to encounter, is the little Loſs on our Side with which it was atchieved. This Circumſtance I conſider as a Bleſſing, on which I beg Leave to congratulate you, and alſo on the Honour which the Britiſh Arms have acquired, by the Moderation and Mercy, ſo ſtrikingly marked in their Conduct, after getting Poſſeſſion of the Place, for not above Two of the Inhabitants were wounded, which might have been the Effect of Accident entirely; and many who were in Arms, upon ſubmitting and delivering themſelves up, had their Lives ſpared them.

Lieutenant Colonel Parker having received a Wound on the 14th, which I have the Satisfaction to acquaint you is not by the Faculty deemed dangerous, I committed the Conduct of the Attack to Lieutenant Colonel Hartley, and I am happy at an Opportunity of teſtifying the high Senſe I have of his Merit and Gallantry as an Officer, from the Whole of his Behaviour on this Occaſion. While I expreſs my warmeſt Approbation of Major Spaeth's Skill and Aſſiduity, I am concerned at the ſame Time to inform you of his being wounded by a Sabre in Seven Places, which he received in aſſiſting with his People and Materials to fill up the Ditch for the Paſſage of the Grenadiers; I cannot at preſent ſpeak with any Certainty upon the Nature of his Caſe. I am very ſorry to give you the diſagreable Intelligence that Captain Gough has this Evening expired of the Wounds he received in the Storm this Morning. Mr. Wright, a Volunteer of your Eſtabliſhment, was killed by the Accident of the burſting of a Shell on the 13th Inſtant. The Names of the ſeveral Gentlemen who have received Wounds, all of which I have Reaſon to hope are not dangerous, are as follow: Lieutenants Caldwell and Prole, of the Engineers; Lieutenant Stuart, Surveyor; Lieutenant Long, of the Artillery; and Lieutenants Mackintoſh and Croſsly, of the Infantry, and Two Volunteers.

I cannot help taking this Opportunity of recommending to your favourable Notice the Conduct of Mr. Fraſer, who acted as a Volunteer during the Siege, and accompanied the Forlorn Hope on the ſtorming Party: Let me hope that the Proofs of Courage he has ſhewn, will at my Inſtance be an Inducement to reſtore him to your Service with his Rank. Mr. Clanſey, who was ſome Time ago unfortunate enough to loſe your Service, and has ſince been admitted to the Bengal Eſtabliſhment, where he is now an Enſign, ſolicited an Opportunity for wiping away any Stain that might have been thrown on his Character, which I am happy to aſſure you he has effectually done by his gallant Conduct in mounting the Breach with the Forlorn Hope. Enſign Heirn's Behaviour, who carried the Grenadier Colours, merits particular Mention; he followed the Forlorn Hope with the Colours, and having mounted the Breach, ruſhed to the Gateway amidſt a Number of the Enemy, and planted them in Triumph.

The Volunteers of your Eſtabliſhment were in the Trenches during the whole of the Siege, and marched foremoſt to the Storm. Let me hope that you will find it conſiſtent to give ſome Promotion as a Reward for their good Behaviour. Serjeant Hugg, who led the Forlorn Hope, diſplayed extraordinary Marks of Bravery; and as he is well educated and very deſerving, I hope I do not intrude too much on your Indulgence, by ſoliciting he may be appointed a Cadet.

The Troops have taken a Number of Standards from the Enemy in aſſaulting the Breach, which I propoſe ſending to your Government to be hung up as Trophies of the Conqueſt of Ahmedabad by the Britiſh Arms, either in the Church at Bombay or your Armory, as you may think moſt proper.

The Return of the Killed and Wounded not being ready for this Diſpatch, I ſhall ſend it by the next Opportunity, when I will addreſs you particularly; at preſent I am taking Meaſures to protect the City and encourage the Inhabitants.

I have the Honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient and
moſt humble Servant,
Thomas Goddard.

Head-Quarters, Ahmedabad,
15th February 1780.

Goddard, General, letter from.

Gentlemen,

I had the Honour to addreſs you the 15th Inſtant, informing you of the Reduction of Ahmedabad by the Britiſh Arms; and now beg Leave to incloſe you a Return of the Killed and Wounded, from the Commencement of the Siege till the Period of its Concluſion.

Since my laſt I have received authentic and undoubted Intelligence that Scindia and Tockajee Holcar had paſſed the Gaut of Caſſubarry, and were encamped the 5th Inſtant at Arrahpore, which is reckoned about 60 Coſs from Broderah. Scindia had ſent off all his heavy Artillery to Burhampore: and with Ten or Twelve light Field Pieces, and about 1,500 Horſe, was himſelf advancing

vancing towards Guzerat. Should not the Intelligence of the Fall of Ahmedabad put a Stop to his Progreſs, which I hope it may not, I do not doubt being ſoon able to give you a good Account of him; at any rate I ſhall keep a ſtrict Watch over his Motions, and be prepared to receive him: Unleſs, which is alſo reported, the Miniſter is ſending another Army to his Support, I can ſcarcely think he would venture into the Guzerat with ſo ſmall a Force as he has at preſent with him. It is however pretty evident, that the ſuppoſed Animoſity betwixt thoſe Chiefs is leſs confirmed and violent than what we had Reaſon to believe from former Reports; though at the ſame Time Scindia it is well known has not been ſatisfied by the Miniſter reſpecting the Demands he made upon him, and will therefore moſt probably be the readier to act upon his Arrival the Part he may find moſt for his own Intereſt.

I ſhall not fail to communicate any new Intelligence I may receive; and have the Honour to be,

Gentlemen,

Your moſt obedient, humble Servant,

Thomas Goddard.

Ahmedabad,
18th February 1780.

Return of the Killed and Wounded at the Siege and Attack of Ahmedabad, 15th February 1780.

Mogul Regiment of Cavalry,
Killed 1 Rank and File.

Artillery,
European, Wounded 1 Lieutenant, 3 Rank and File.
Native, Ditto — — 2 Ditto.

Bengal Infantry.
Killed 1 Jemidar, 9 Rank and File.
Wounded 1 Lieutenant Colonel, 1 Captain, 3 Lieutenants, 1 Subedar, and 29 Rank and File.

Bombay Infantry,
European, Killed 1 Volunteer, 1 Drummer.
Wounded, 1 Lieutenant, 3 Volunteers, 1 Serjeant, 5 Rank and File.
Sepoys { Killed 2 Rank and File. / Wounded 2 Jemidars, 23 Rank and File.

Engineers,
Wounded 1 Major, 2 Lieutenants.

Laſcars,
3 wounded, 2 killed.

Bildars and Coolies,
5 wounded.

Beeſties,
2 wounded.

Total. 17 killed, 89 wounded.

List of Officers Killed and Wounded.

Killed, Mr. Wright Volunteer.

Wounded.
Bengal Infantry.
Lieutenant Colonel Parker.
Captain Gough, ſince dead.
Lieutenant Mackintoſh.
Duncan Steward.
Dury.

Engineers.
Lieutenant Caldwell.
Prole.

Wounded.
Bombay.
Major Spaeth, Field Engineer.
Lieutenant Long, Artillery.
Lieutenant Croſsley, Infantry.
Meſſrs. Boya, Kelley, and Teallen, Volunteers.

(Signed) Thomas Goddard,
Brigadier General.

APPENDIX, N° 254. B. 255. B.

ddard, Gene- Letter to.

To Brigadier General Goddard.

Sir,

We have had the Pleaſure to receive your Letters of the 15th and 18th Inſtant, with the Return of the Killed and Wounded at the Siege of Ahmedabad.

The Reduction of this important Place, in ſo ſhort a Time, with ſuch inconſiderable Loſs, and againſt ſo obſtinate and formidable an Enemy, will reflect the higheſt Honour on the Britiſh Forces, and the Officer under whoſe Command they have ſo eminently diſtinguiſhed themſelves. And we ſend off this Diſpatch purpoſely to convey our warmeſt Approbation of the Conduct of the Army during the Siege; and particularly of the Officers and Men engaged in the Aſſault, not only for their Gallantry in the Attack, but for the Moderation and Humanity they diſplayed after getting Poſſeſſion of the Place, which entitles them to every Mark of Applauſe in our Power to beſtow, and we therefore beg our Thanks may be particularly given to them in Public Orders, as well as to the Army in general.

We ſhall ſhortly reply to the other Points in your Letter of the 15th; and are with much Eſteem,

Sir,

Your moſt obedient humble Servants,

William Hornby,
&c. Committee.

Bombay Caſtle,
26th February 1780.

APPENDIX, N° 255. B.

day 10th. RECEIVED the following Letter from General Goddard.

Gentlemen,

ddard, Gene- Letter from.

I had the Honour to addreſs you the 15th ultimo, ſince which I have been favoured with your Letter of the 9th. I am happy at the Sentiments of Satisfaction you therein expreſs on the Subject of the Treaty with Futty Sing; in the Concluſion of which, independant of immediate Benefits of Territory and Revenue, I had principally in View the grand Object of the preſent War, and ſecuring an uſeful and laſting Alliance with a Power, whoſe Affairs being inſeparably connected with our own, would effectually bind him to our Intereſts in the Proſecution of it; and who from Situation, as well as Policy, would become an uſeful and faithful Ally to the Engliſh Company. This Point I conceive, as far as human Prudence and Foreſight can judge, is now completely attained. Futty Sing, ſenſible of the preſent Power and Strength of the Engliſh, feels himſelf through their Means raiſed to a State of Greatneſs and Independance, from which he muſt immediately fall, if deprived of their Support and Aſſiſtance. The Terms upon which he has been treated with were thoſe of the ſtricteſt Impartiality and Moderation, and the Exchange of Country made with him was proportioned to the Share he before held, and to that of the Peſhwa's given him in lieu of it. Of theſe Circumſtances he is himſelf fully ſenſible; and I only mention them now as Arguments, that he muſt from Intereſt as well as Inclination be ready to unite heartily with us in Defence of the Province, and in Proſecution of the War againſt the common Enemy. The Period calling upon him to do ſo ſeems now arrived, as my former Letters will have already acquainted you; for Scindia and Holcar, notwithſtanding the various Reports, firſt of their Diſputes with the Miniſter, and afterwards of their Intentions to march to the Malva Province, are I underſtand advancing with an Army rumoured to be about 40,000, towards Surat: I propoſe moving with all Expedition to oppoſe them; and have ſent off to Cambait the heavy Artillery, with a Quantity of the moſt weighty and cumberſome Stores, which might have proved an Impediment to the Rapidity of my March, to be tranſported from hence by Water to Surat.

In purſuance of the Engagements made with Futty Sing, I have put him in Poſſeſſion of the City and Collections of Ahmedabad, and have received from him, in the Name of the Honourable Company, Grants for the ſeveral Purgunnahs ceded to them, which I have tranſmitted with the neceſſary Papers to the Chiefs of Surat and Broach, in order that they may take Poſſeſſion of them in your Name, and begin to collect the Revenues from the 28th of February, the Day on which Futty Sing received the Government of Ahmedabad, agreeable to what is ſtipulated in the 11th Article of the Treaty. The Grants are Four in Number, One for the Chout of Surat, another for the Country of Autweezy, a Third for the Villages in the Broach Purgunnah, and a Fourth for Zeimore; the Two former I have ſent to Mr. Beddam at Surat, and the Two latter to Mr. Gambier.

With

APPENDIX, N° 255. B.

With reſpect to what you mention regarding the Points yet remaining to be ſettled with Futty Sing, it will be political to defer any Attention to or Adjuſtment of theſe to a future Opportunity, when the grand Objects of the War are ſufficiently ſecured to leave full Leiſure to enter into the Details of particular Intereſts; the Settlement already made generally provides for the equal Partition of the Provinces, in a Proportion drawn from the Shares before poſſeſſed by the Peſhwa and Guicawars; and to advance any further Claims at preſent, might only tend to alarm and excite the Apprehenſions of Futty Sing, prejudicial to our Views at this critical Juncture; that the Points about which we may be ſolicitous, would if attained be ſerviceable. In order to render eaſy the Diſcuſſion of ſuch Buſineſs as may hereafter require to be ſettled, and generally to conduct the Affairs of your Preſidency at the Court of Futty Sing, I have propoſed to him that an Engliſh Gentleman ſhall in future remain there in the Character of Reſident, to which he has cheerfully aſſented, and has addreſſed the Honourable Preſident accordingly; this Meaſure I beg Leave to recommend as beſt calculated to preſerve a mutual good Underſtanding betwixt the Engliſh and Futty Sing, and ſecure to them an uſeful and decided Influence in his Affairs, which may be improved as Circumſtances ſhall hereafter render eligible; and I have only to requeſt at preſent reſpecting this Appointment, that as the Nature of Futty Sing's Engagements with the Engliſh will neceſſarily connect him particularly with me in the Operations of the preſent War, you will give Directions to your Reſident to receive ſuch Orders and Inſtructions from me as I may find it requiſite to give him in purſuance of the Objects that may have been planned and concerted with you.

From the ruined and deſolate State of this City, and the Hopes that by proper Encouragement the Trade and Manufacture, for which it was once ſo famous, might revive and flouriſh, I have ſettled with Futty Sing, that the Engliſh ſhall eſtabliſh a Factory at Ahmedabad; this cannot fail to produce great commercial Advantages, as there is no Doubt but moſt of the Trade would ſoon paſs through our Hands from the Influence we ſhould poſſeſs in the Place, and the ſuperior Confidence which the Merchants and Natives would place in us, to induce them to put themſelves under our Protection. If the Plan ſhould meet with your Approbation, it remains with you to make ſuch Arrangements and Regulations for its proper Execution, as your Experience, and Knowledge of the Company's commercial Intereſts in this Part of India may ſuggeſt.

I am obliged to you for the Permiſſion you have given the Reſident at Cambait to come to my Camp, ſhould I judge it proper to require his Attendance, and beg to aſſure you that in every Part where I could have wiſhed to receive Information, I have found extremely ready and capable of giving me Satisfaction.

I have already mentioned my Intentions of marching towards Surat with all Expedition; and in order to remove every Obſtruction to the Rapidity of my Motions, I ſhall leave the Sick and Wounded of the Army behind at Ahmedabad; I have alſo thought it eligible to leave a ſmall Detachment of Eight Companies of Sepoys drafted from the Eight Battalions, and Two Guns here, under the Command of Major Fullarton: Theſe are in Poſſeſſion of a ſtrong Poſt within the City, formerly the Reſidence of the Collector, who reſided at Ahmedabad, on the Part of the Guicawar. The Weight which the Preſence of this Force, and in ſo reſpectable a Poſt, will give to the Engliſh in the Eyes of the Inhabitants, and the decided Influence it will ſecure to them againſt the Deſigns of any Governor who may command in the Place on the Part of Futty Sing, will be of the greateſt preſent Benefit to them, and render eaſy the future Accompliſhment of their Views reſpecting it.

It is with Pleaſure I can inform you, that in conſideration of the Nawab of Cambait's long and ſteady Attachment to the Company, your Recommendation of his Intereſts, and the commercial Benefits which he might be enabled to derive from any Increaſe of Influence at Cambait, I have obtained from Futty Sing, as a voluntary Act and Proof of his Reſpect for the Engliſh, a Relaxation in the Chout, formerly collected by the Maratta Government, and which by his late Agreements with us was become his rightful Claim.

The ſacred Light in which I ſhall ever conſider Engagements under the Sanction of the public Faith prevented me from too peremptorily inſiſting upon a Point which might ſeem be an Innovation of them, or requeſting an entire Acquittal of the Nawab's Chout; and the Nawab will have ſufficient Reaſon to be grateful to the Friendſhip of the Engliſh, for the partial Indulgence he has obtained through their Means, which exempts him from the Payment of any Chout within the City of Cambait, reſerving only to Futty Sing the Collections levied in the Purgunnahs.

The Paper ſpecifying this Releaſe, I have incloſed to Mr. Malet, the Reſident, and have confided in his local Experience and Information to propoſe ſuch Advantages in Commerce, and ſecure ſuch a decided Influence to the Company with the Nawab as may be found conſiſtent and practicable: I ſhall immediately forward to you the Reſult of what he may communicate to me in Reply on this Subject.

By Intelligence juſt received, I learn that a Body of 6000 Horſe have croſſed the Nubedah at Bowapeer; I ſhall march from this Place To-morrow Morning, and ſhall give you from Time to Time Information of my Progreſs.

I have the Honour to be, with Reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servant,
Thomas Goddard.

Head Quarters,
Ahmedabad,
1ſt March 1780.

APPENDIX,

APPENDIX, N° 256. B.

Letter from Preſident and Select Committee at Bombay, 7th March 1780.

To the Honourable Warren Haſtings, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Council, at Fort William.

Gentlemen,

OUR laſt Addreſs was dated 31ſt January, of which a Duplicate is encloſed.

We have ſince had the Pleaſure to receive Advice from General Goddard of having come to an Accommodation with Futty Sing, and a Copy of the original Treaty. Agreeable to the laſt Article, we now forward Two Copies for the Confirmation and Ratification of your Government; the Articles being inſerted in Perſian in the Copy to be delivered to Futty Sing.

We alſo now tranſmit a Continuation of our Correſpondence with General Goddard ſince the Date of our laſt Letter, with an Abſtract of the Revenues of the Guzerat Province, ſubdivided according to the Boundaries of the different Diſtricts, and the Shares reſpectively held by Futty Sing and the Poona Government. We requeſt your particular Attention to what we have urged to General Goddard in our Letters of the 9th and 24th ultimo, reſpecting the further Settlement and Diviſion of the Province, and the great Diſproportion of the Share at preſent allotted to the Company; not that we doubt of the General's moſt zealous Efforts to ſtipulate for a more adequate Diviſion, but that you may likewiſe ſee the Neceſſity which is ſuggeſted to us by our Knowledge of Futty Sing's Character, of not giving the Treaty your implicit Ratification as final and definitive, but guarding it with a Reſerve, providing for a new and equitable Settlement of the Province, according to the 5th Article.

After the Concluſion of the Treaty, General Goddard loſt no Time in moving with the Army to put Futty Sing in Poſſeſſion of the Country to the North of the Myhie, being accompanied by that Chief with a Body of his Forces. He arrived before the City of Ahmedabad on the 10th Inſtant, which he found garriſoned with at leaſt Six thouſand Arabs and Scindy Foot, beſides Two thouſand Horſe, and after ſome fruitleſs Negociation with the Maratta Governor proceeded to beſiege the Place. The Batteries were opened on the 12th, and continued to play till the 13th in the Evening, when the Breach being practicable, the General had formed an Intention of ſtorming the next Morning, but from Motives of Humanity deferred the Attack One Day, in Hopes the Enemy would ſurrender upon Terms. Being however diſappointed in this Hope, on the Morning of the 15th he gave Orders for the Aſſault, which he acquainted us ſucceeded to his utmoſt Wiſh; the Enemy being unable to maintain their Works againſt the vigorous Attack of the Grenadiers, who with their Officers, diſtinguiſhed themſelves in the moſt remarkable Manner. Lieutenant Colonel Parker having been wounded on the 11th, the Conduct of the Attack was committed to Lieutenant Colonel Hartley, of whoſe Gallantry and Merit as an Officer the General teſtified a high Senſe, from the Whole of his Behaviour on the Occaſion. Near Three hundred of the Enemy fell in the Breach, whilſt on our Side the Loſs was inconſiderable, as will appear by the encloſed Return. We are however concerned to mention that Captain Gough of your Eſtabliſhment died the ſame Day of the Wounds he received in the Storm, and that Major Spaith of the Bombay Engineers was very dangerouſly wounded, and we have juſt heard he is ſince dead.

We beg Leave to congratulate you on the Reduction of this important Place, which enables us immediately to fulfil the Company's Engagement with Futty Sing, and entitle them to the Poſſeſſion of the Places ceded to them by the Treaty. Our laſt Letter from General Goddard was dated the 18th inſtant, when he was employed in taking Meaſures to protect the City and encourage the Inhabitants, but we are impatient to hear of his having brought Matters in that Quarter to a Concluſion with Futty Sing, as the late Motions of the Maratta Forces appear to make his Preſence neceſſary more to the Southward.

A Body of Horſe, ſaid to conſiſt of about 20,000, under the Command of Madjee Scindia and Tookajee Holkar, have arrived within about Twelve Coſs of the Paſs of Soargur, near 40 Coſs from Surat; Mr. Farmer, who continues with Madjee Scindia, wrote the Chief under the 21ſt ultimo, that he learnt they were to remain in that Quarter until ſomething was ſettled by Negociations intended to be ſet on Foot with General Goddard and Ragonath Row. It was alſo ſurmiſed that a Surprize was intended, to plunder the City of Surat, and ſeize the Perſon of Ragoba, but the ſeaſonable Arrival of Colonel Brown's Detachment from Madras places us above all Apprehenſions of any Attempt of that Nature, and will make a moſt reſpectable Addition to the Army under General Goddard, who does not doubt of ſoon being able to give a good Account of the Enemy.

A Body of about 5,000 Maratta Horſe, under the Command of the Miniſterial Officer, has alſo approached Surat from the Southward, on which Account the Detachments placed at the ſeveral Diſtricts which had been taken Poſſeſſion of, have been recalled into Garriſon, and the Country muſt neceſſarily be expoſed to Ravage till General Goddard returns to the Southward.

In

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In our Letter of the 2d January we acquainted you, that the Preſident had written to Hyder Ally on certain Points of his Conduct; and we have now the Pleaſure to encloſe a Copy of his Anſwer, and of another Letter ſent him by the Preſident in conſequence. When theſe Papers were laid before us, the Neceſſity of ſending a Gentleman to Hyder was repreſented to us in a ſtrong Light by the Preſident in a Minute he delivered in upon the Occaſion, a Copy of which is likewiſe encloſed; and the Propoſal entirely coinciding with our own Opinion, and being ſtrictly conſonant to the Sentiments of the Honourable Company expreſſed in their lateſt Commands, we have appointed Mr. Horſley to this Commiſſion, on which he will ſhortly proceed; and he will be inſtructed punctually to communicate to you every material Information he may be able to obtain reſpecting Hyder's Diſpoſitions towards the Company, and Expectations from them in caſe he can be induced to join in our Views againſt the Marattas. It will likewiſe, in theſe Times, be of eſſential Importance to compoſe the Troubles on the Malabar Coaſt; and at any rate it will be a capital Advantage to obtain ſome preciſe Knowledge of the Views and Proceedings of a Power of ſo much Conſequence in the political Syſtem of India, neither of which Points can be effected but by ſending a Gentleman directly to his Durbar. This Meaſure having before met with your Concurrence when propoſed to you in the Year 1778, and the Exigency being ſo preſſing as not to admit of any Loſs of Time, we propoſe diſpatching Mr. Horſley as ſoon as the proper Paſſports arrive from the Nabob.

Our lateſt Advices mention that Scindia and Holcar were to croſs the Nubedah the 29th ultimo, and to puſh on into Guzerat, and we conjecture General Goddard would leave Ahmedabad about the Firſt of this Month to meet them. We doubt not the General will either bring them to Action or oblige them to quit the Province, unleſs their Views ſhould be to come to an Accommodation, of which their Conduct has not much the Appearance. Colonel Brown with his Detachment, conſiſting of One Battalion of European Infantry, and One Company of Artillery, is now at Surat, and the Enemy between him and our Army; nor do we know what Orders General Goddard has given reſpecting them; but ſhould he want them to join him before he reaches Surat, a Junction may be effected without Danger, by tranſporting them by Sea, if neceſſary, to any convenient Poſition.

We are, with Reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servants,
Wm Hornby,
&c. Committee.

Bombay Caſtle,
7th March 1780.

APPENDIX, N° 257. B.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 6th April 1780.

Extract of a Letter from General Goddard to the Preſident: Dated Camp at Pittoul, 24th March 1780; received Yeſterday.

I Am now about to ſpeak to you on a Subject which appears to me of the utmoſt Conſequence to the Intereſts of the Company in the preſent State of Affairs, and in which, before I can take any Step, it is neceſſary to receive the Sanction of your Government. The Want of proper Management in regulating the Revenues of Futty Sing; his own Weakneſs and Impolicy; and the Fluctuation of Power that attends a deſpotic Reign, added to the general Corruption and Avarice which pervades every Part of our Adminiſtration, governed by the narrow Views of Maratta Policy, which ſeek only the Gratification of the preſent Moment, has reduced him to the moſt extreme Diſtreſs and Poverty. He has repeatedly, and at different Times, ſince he firſt accompanied me to Ahmadavad, repreſented his Situation in this reſpect, and the Hopes he had of finding Relief from his Neceſſities in the Friendſhip and Aſſiſtance of the Company; but till this Period, as Circumſtances did not before this Period render the Opportunity ſo favourable, and the Riſk was not ſo imminent, his Troops have continued pretty ſilent: They now clamorouſly demand the Payment of a Part of their Arrears; and unleſs they can be ſatisfied in ſome Meaſure, the moſt alarming Conſequences are to be apprehended. It is not the Abſence of theſe Troops that would be any way prejudicial, but the Effect it muſt have, not only on the Enemy, but on the Mind of Futty Sing, and in his Intereſts who deſerves every Conſideration as an Ally of the Conſpiracy, who has proved himſelf ſo, and riſked the Enmity of his former Friends on their Account: He has urged me repeatedly to aſſiſt him with Five or Six Lacks of Rupees, for which he is ready to give Security and Aſſignments upon his own Purgunnahs, ſhould he fail in repaying it at the promiſed Period.

riod. To a Man thus in Poſſeſſion of Country there can be no Riſk in lending Money; on the contrary, the greateſt political Benefit may be derived, and Claims eſtabliſhed through his Kingdom, which the Company might hereafter aſſert at Pleaſure. Should our own Neceſſities be urged as a Reaſon why we cannot avail ourſelves of his preſent Diſtreſs, they may furniſh a Cauſe why we might not aſſiſt him to the Extent he wiſhes; but ſtill we ought to exert ourſelves all we can upon the Occaſion; and beſides it may not be neceſſary to pay the whole Amount at preſent, but to give Security for its being paid at the Expiration of One or Two Months: If this Plan meets with your Approbation, which I have Reaſon to hope from every Circumſtance it will, let me beg you will ſend Authority from your Committee to ſettle it on the moſt advantageous Footing for the Company, the Amount to which you think it neceſſary to limit me; and alſo give Directions to your Chief of Surat and Broach to advance ſuch Proportion of Money for this Buſineſs as you may deem moſt conſiſtent with their View and Means.

Friday, April 7th 1780. Signed the following Letter to General Goddard:

To Brigadier General Goddard.

Sir,

We have duly received your Letters of the 24th and 27th ultimo, with thoſe antecedent thereto, ſince your Departure from Ahmadavad.

The equivocal and myſterious Conduct of Madjee Scindia, leaves us much at a Loſs as to his real Views and Intentions; but whatever may be the active and vigorous Meaſures you have purſued, we think they cannot fail having a good Effect, and haſtening a Deciſion, which, as the Seaſon advances faſt, we moſt ardently hope will ſpeedily be produced, that you may be at Liberty to employ the Army to more Advantage than watching the Motions of Madjee Scindia.

In the preſent Situation of Affairs, and whilſt Futty Sing is actually in the Field as our Auxiliary in the War, it ſeems to us not neceſſary to ſend a Gentleman to his Durbar Reſident on the Part of this Government; but when it may be judged a convenient Time for ſettling the Point yet remaining to be adjuſted, this Meaſure can then be adopted. In the mean Time Mr. Malet may be employed on any occaſional Buſineſs with Futty Sing, in which you may judge his Aſſiſtance neceſſary, as his Situation at Cambay will enable him to attend at the ſhorteſt Warning, and his Knowledge of the Language and Politics of the Country fully qualify him for the Employment.

Neither do we as yet judge it expedient to make Uſe of the Privilege you have obtained for the Company of eſtabliſhing a Factory at Ahmadavad.

As Mr. Farmer's Application has been referred to the Governor General and Council, we cannot take upon us to decide upon it.

We are very ſenſible of your Attention and Trouble in giving us your Thoughts ſo fully on the propoſed Augmentation of our military Strength, from which we doubt not to derive very eſſential Advantage and Information, in the Arrangement we ſhall now very ſpeedily make.

The Preſident has laid before us an Extract of your Letter to him on the Subject of a propoſed Loan to Futty Sing.

Whatever Benefit or good Conſequences might be expected from our Compliance with this Propoſal, we can aſſure you with the utmoſt Truth, the Thing is in itſelf utterly impracticable in the preſent State of our Finances; you cannot but be ſenſible in what Difficulties it involved us to ſpare the Sums which we have ſupplied for the Service of the Army; and our Wants now preſs ſo hard upon us, that we can hardly raiſe Money for the Payment of our Garriſon and other indiſpenſable Occaſions, much leſs can we anſwer this unforeſeen Demand: And ſhould we even attempt to raiſe the Sum by a Loan, or in any other Manner, the Scarcity of Specie would alone inevitably prevent our Attempt ſucceeding; even could we entertain a Thought of diverting any Money, we could obtain to any other Object than the preſſing Exigencies of this Government.

We requeſt you will continue your Directions to Major Fullarton to enliſt ſuch Recruits as he may be able for this Preſidency, upon the ſame Footing as the other Sepoys upon this Eſtabliſhment.

We are,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servants,
Willm Hornby,
&c. Committee.

Bombay Caſtle,
6th April 1780.

APPENDIX, N° 259.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 14th March 1780.

RECEIVED the following Letter from General Goddard:

Gentlemen,

I wrote to you from Fazilpore, acquainting you of my having croſſed the Myhie, on the South Bank of which I remained encamped the 7th inſtant; and on the 8th marched to this Place, on the Beſwamuntry Nuddy, within Two Miles of Broach. I have yet met with no Sort of Attempt to moleſt the Followers of the Camp from Scindia's Troops; nor have they, by any Act, ſince quitting the Neighbourhood of our Pergunnahs, teſtified a hoſtile Diſpoſition in their Maſter towards the Engliſh; on the contrary, he has himſelf, as far as was in his Power, endeavoured to evince his own friendly Inclinations, by releaſing voluntarily and unaſked, Meſſrs. Farmer and Stewart from their Confinement, and diſmiſſing them to my Camp, where I have the Pleaſure to inform you they arrived ſafe the Evening of Yeſterday. He at the ſame Time deputed Appajee Subajee to deliver them over to me, with Letters from himſelf and Holkar, ſetting forth the Proofs he had formerly given of his friendly Intentions to the Engliſh at Worgaun, he having perſiſted in the ſame Sentiments towards them, till the preſent Period; which was ſufficiently manifeſted in the Treatment he had given Meſſrs. Farmer and Stewart, during their Reſidence in his Camp, and particularly in the Liberty he had now granted them to return; and that he wiſhed to know, whether our Inclinations were of a hoſtile or friendly Nature towards the Peiſhwa and himſelf, as from our Conduct hitherto, he had Reaſon to believe the former? In anſwer to this, I told Appajee Subajee, that his Maſter could not be a Stranger to the Diſpoſition of the Engliſh to live in Terms of Peace and Amity with the Peiſhwa's Government; that to effect this, I had made fair and equitable Propoſals of Accommodation to the Miniſter, which had been rejected by him; and that in conſequence of this Refuſal, the Engliſh had been compelled to enter upon a War, in Defence and Vindication of their own Rights and Honours; that their Quarrel was with the Miniſter, to whoſe obſtinate and pernicious Councils the Evil that might befall the Maratta State in the Courſe of this War muſt alone be attributed; that they had no Cauſe of Enmity againſt Scindia whatever, but on the contrary, were conſcious of the favourable Diſpoſition he had always ſhewn to their Intereſts; and if he continued to prove himſelf their Friend, were ready to teſtify their Senſe of his Services, and unite in any Plan that might be propoſed and adopted for their mutual Benefit.

After converſing ſome Time, the Vackeel told me that his Maſter was equally with us the Enemy of Nanah Furneeſe; ſince, notwithſtanding he was indebted for all his preſent Greatneſs and Security to the powerful Aid of Scindia, who had confined both Siccaram and Moraba, he had acted with the blackeſt Ingratitude, and had leagued with the Booſla and Nizam againſt Scindia. He dwelt much upon the Power of his own Maſter, and the inferior Light in which the Miniſter ought to be conſidered, being in fact entirely ſubject to the Controul and Direction of Scindia. He concluded with declaring, that the Inclinations of the Engliſh and Scindia were he found reciprocally friendly to each other, and hoſtile towards Nanah; and requeſted I would upon theſe Grounds make ſuch Propoſals to his Maſter as might be conſiſtent with the Views, and conducive to the Intereſts of both Parties.

I plainly perceived from the Converſation of this Man that his Driſt was to obtain from me the firſt Overtures towards a particular Connection with Scindia, either with a View of giving his Maſter a Superiority in the Courſe of the Negociation, if he was ſincere in the friendly Wiſh he then expreſſed; or if he meant to deceive, to draw ſuch a Diſcovery from me as might be of Service to his own Deſigns: I therefore contented myſelf for the preſent with obſerving, in addition to what I have above mentioned, that it would be a Circumſtance perfectly agreeable to the Engliſh, if Scindia heartily united with them againſt the Miniſter; and that with reſpect to the future Settlement of the Government of Poona, as he muſt be the beſt Judge how it might be effected in the moſt eligible and beneficial Manner, I wiſhed to receive his Sentiments upon the Subject, to which I would reply with Candour and Sincerity.

Senſible how important a firm Alliance with Scindia would be to the Intereſt of the Company at this Juncture; and how deciſive with reſpect to the Object of our preſent Operations, as well as on account of the Line of Conduct the Honourable the Governor General and Council recommended me to purſue regarding this Chief; I have at the ſame Time given him every proper Encouragement to unite himſelf with the Engliſh, and in general Terms held forth to him the Honour and Advantage he muſt ultimately derive from ſo conſiderable and diſtinguiſhing a Connection. The Vackeel has this Morning ſent off to his Maſter the Particulars of what paſſed; and I expect to receive an explicit Anſwer To-morrow, from which I ſhall be able to form a more certain Idea of his real Views, and what Plan muſt ultimately be reſolved upon regarding him. I beg to aſſure you, that I ſhall not be ſeduced by the ſhining Advantages this Alliance offers, to place any implicit Confidence in his

Profeſſions,

Profeſſions, but ſhall act in the Negociation with the utmoſt Circumſpection and Deliberation, and guard, as far as human Prudence and Foreſight can determine, againſt every Poſſibility of Deceit.

Permit me to requeſt that you will favour me as early as poſſible with your Sentiments on the Conduct proper to be purſued regarding this Chief; and in the mean Time believe that I ſhall be guided by an invariable Attention to the Objects contained in the general Plan concluded with you for the ſucceſsful Concluſion of our preſent Conteſts with the Maratta Empire. I ſhall not fail to give you the earlieſt Information reſpecting this Buſineſs in my Power.

And have the Honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servant,
Thomas Goddard.

Camp on the
Biſwamuntry Nuddy,
10th March 1780.

N. B. I forgot to mention above, that Scindia and Holkar, the Day after my Arrival here, moved off with their whole Force to a Place about 18 Miles diſtant from my Camp, and Eight from Pawn Gur.

T. G.

APPENDIX, N° 260.

Bombay Seleƈt Conſultations, 24th March 1780.

Gen. Goddard to Gentlemen,

Letter from.

SINCE my Letter of the 10th Inſtant, which informed you of the Arrival of Meſſrs. Farmer and Stewart in my Camp, and the Converſation I had held with Apajee Sabajee, who accompanied them on the Part of Scindia, I have entertained Hopes of being able to communicate to you ſomething deciſive with regard to the Negociation ſet on Foot by that Chief; but notwithſtanding the expected Anſwers have arrived, I am ſorry it is not in my Power to ſatisfy you further on this important Point.

Theſe Anſwers from Scindia and Holcar were delivered me laſt Night by the Vackeel, and contained only general Declarations of their own friendly Sentiments, and the Satisfaction they had derived from my Aſſurances of the favourable Inclinations of the Engliſh towards them; requeſting further, that as the Buſineſs to be mutually adjuſted was of the moſt important Nature, I would ſend a confidential Perſon to their Camp, fully informed of the Views of the Engliſh, with whom they might come to a final Settlement and Determination. After the Proofs ſo recently given by Scindia of his Wiſh to preſerve the good Opinion and Friendſhip of the Engliſh, I could not with any Propriety have heſitated to ſhew him this Mark of my Confidence, had it appeared neceſſary to the Succeſs of our Negociation, or even calculated to promote it in any Degree; but, excluſive of a certain Conviction in my own Mind to the contrary, I further conſider that the deputing a Perſon to him at this Time would carry the Appearance of being too eager in making Overtures which might be conſtrued in an unfavourable Light; and was beſides particularly improper, from the Circumſtance of Scindia's having correſponded with me under the Seal of the Peiſhwa; and that ſince the Refuſal of the Miniſter to accede to the Terms I had propoſed, all Propoſals for Accommodation ought to be firſt made by their Government.

I therefore declined ſending any Perſon immediately from myſelf to Scindia, but in ſuch a Manner as to avoid impreſſing him with a Belief that my Diſſent aroſe from any Motives of Diſtruſt, or a Want of Reliance on his Honour or Sincerity; and have given Apajee Sabajee Leave to return to his Maſter, empowered to offer every general Aſſurance on the Part of the Engliſh, of the proper Senſe they have of his Services, and their Wiſh to continue on Terms of Amity with him; if by his Conduct he will give them an Opportunity of proving their friendly Diſpoſition and Deſire to promote his Intereſts, in conjunction with their own. Apajee Sabajee ſet out this Day for his Maſter's Camp, which is about Ten Coſs diſtant, with a Promiſe of returning the Day after To-morrow; to which Period, I have thought it neceſſary to limit him, as Scindia will have ſufficient Leiſure to deliberate fully upon the Meaſures he wiſhes to propoſe, and at the ſame Time an Excuſe for further Delays be avoided. I have conſented, however much againſt my Inclination, to the Delay hitherto practiſed, from the Probability there appears of ſucceeding in this Negociation, and the certain and deciſive Advantages an Union of Intereſts with Scindia will give us in the preſent War. Since croſſing the Myhé his Army has alſo remained perfectly quiet in the Neighbourhood of Paun Ghur, and the Company's Purgunnahs do not experience the Effects of their Ravages and Depredations.

My

My next will, I flatter myſelf, give you that certain and poſitive Intelligence I am ſo deſirous of conveying to you.

I have the Honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servant,
Thomas Goddard.

Camp near Baroda,
13th March 1780.

Gentlemen,

On the 10th Inſtant I had the Pleaſure of acquainting you with the ſafe Arrival of Meſſrs. Farmer and Stewart in my Camp, ſince which I have received a Letter from the former, Copy whereof accompanies this. In Conſideration of the Circumſtances under which theſe Gentlemen became Priſoners in the Camp of Madjee Scindia, the Hardſhips they muſt have undergone during their Confinement, not ſo much on account of any actual Severity they may have met with, and of which indeed they do not complain, as from the Idea that their Lives were become forfeited to the capricious Pleaſure of a Perſon who might think himſelf juſtified in adopting the harſheſt Meaſures; I conceived a particular Happineſs in ſeeing them enter my Camp in Safety; and I conſidered this Conduct in Madjee Scindia, in voluntarily delivering up their Perſons, as moſt fortunate to themſelves, and highly honourable to the Engliſh Name. Goddard, General, Letter from

I ſhould therefore have been exceedingly happy to relieve Mr. Farmer from the Inconvenience he ſays he has ſuffered in his private Fortune, on account of the Money he found neceſſary to advance to procure his Enlargement, and to which, I beg Leave to add, he appears to me very well entitled; but as in my Inſtructions from the Honourable Governor General and Council, I received no Orders on the Subject of the Releaſe of theſe Gentlemen, nor was any Proviſion made for the Circumſtance that has now happened, and which indeed they could not foreſee; I have been under the Neceſſity of declining to comply with his Requeſt myſelf, but have, as he further ſolicited, referred and ſtrongly recommended his Caſe to the Conſideration of the Bengal Government.

I ſhould be wanting in Juſtice to Mr. Farmer, did I not avail myſelf of the preſent Opportunity to teſtify, in the ſtrongeſt and moſt public Manner, my Senſe of his Attention to the Company's Intereſts, as ſtrikingly proved in the Danger to which he expoſed himſelf, by tranſmitting me at different Times from the Camp of Madjee Scindia Advices of the State of Affairs there, and of the Movements of his Army, together with ſuch other uſeful Intelligence regarding the Intentions of the ſeveral Maratta Leaders, as could come within his Knowledge; I am for this Reaſon further induced to recommend his Caſe to your particular Attention, and, as he has repreſented to me the extreme Inconvenience he muſt ſuffer in his private Affairs from the Delay of the Payment of the Sum he has advanced, to hope you will deem it conſiſtent with your own Sentiments of Mr. Farmer's Merits to afford him immediate Relief from his preſent Embarraſſments, without waiting for the Reſult of the Reference I have thought it neceſſary to make to the Government of Bengal.

I have the Honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient,
humble Servant,
Thomas Goddard.

Camp, near Baroda,
15th March 1780.

Copy of a Letter from Mr. William Gamul Farmer to General Goddard.

To Brigadier General Goddard.

Sir,

It had been long ago propoſed to me to be deputed to you in order to endeavour at an Accommodation between you and Scindia; but the Mode was, that Mr. Stewart ſhould be left as a Security for my Return, which was in fact doing nothing effectual as to our Releaſe; becauſe in the Event that no Accommodation took place, we ſhould have remained juſt where we were. I perceived that they had it really in Mind to depute ſomebody, and they alſo wiſhed that I ſhould go with this Perſon: On this Ground I held out, that if Scindia would permit me to go, I would endeavour the moſt in my Power to effect the Buſineſs to his Satisfaction. I further obſerved, that if to the Services on which he founded certain Claims, he added the full and ample Releaſe of Mr. Stewart and myſelf, it would be an Act that, added to his Treatment of us, would give him great Calls on the Gratitude of the Engliſh, and go very far to convince them that he looked to a laſting Connection with them. This Suggeſtion I was told was a very good one, and that it would be made uſe of; but it was inſinuated to me that I knew the Miniſters of Scindia's Durbar were obliged annually to make large Preſents to their Chief; and that the only Reſources they had were the Opportunities of rendering Services to People in Affairs they might have at the Durbar; that the Releaſe of Mr. Stewart and myſelf was one of theſe Opportunities; and that I muſt reflect, that as the Agreements we were Hoſtages for were of no leſs Value to Scinda than the Sum of Twelve Lacks per Annum, at any

other Period than the preſent, he might perhaps inſiſt on ſome pecuniary Compenſation for himſelf; and that then as the Amount might be beyond my Abilities to ſatisfy it, we had little Proſpect, if the preſent Moment paſſed by, of any thing better than a very tedious Confinement; that it would therefore be wiſe in me not to let ſlip this Opportunity of extricating ourſelves from a very diſagreeable Situation. There ſeemed to me a great deal of Reaſon alſo in this Argument, and knowing that it was impoſſible to effect a Buſineſs of this Kind without previouſly ſecuring the Miniſters, I accordingly begun treating, on the Footing that the Ranſom would be entirely at my own Expence, as I had formerly taken Care to have them convinced that the Company would not pay a Rupee towards it. They began by talking of a Lack, then 75,000, from which I brought them down to Half a Lack; and after much Diſcuſſion, I finally concluded for 35,000, to be paid to the different Miniſters of Scindia's Durbar, Part on our receiving our public Diſmiſſion, and the Remainder on the ſafe Delivery of Mr. Stewart and myſelf into your Hands; there was then no Kind of Difficulty; the Buſineſs was taken up on the Footing I had pointed out; and we have once more the Happineſs of being reſtored to the Society of our own Countrymen.

When we became Hoſtages for the Treaty of Worgoaum, as far as I could then perceive it was deemed a meritorious Service, and I believe no one thought that we were to be left expoſed without Conſideration as Sacrifices to the Reſentment of the Marattas. I truſt therefore, that in the Opinion of every Man the Expence of our Releaſe ſhould be borne by thoſe for whoſe intended Benefit we did expoſe ourſelves to what we have already ſuffered. On this Footing it may perhaps happen, that in the Event I have acted for the Benefit of the Honourable Company; for ſhould no Accommodation take place, and I had not embraced the Opportunity of the preſent Moment, it would poſſibly hereafter have been requiſite to have made ſome pecuniary Compenſation to Scindia himſelf, and in that Caſe the preſent Sum is trifling to what would have been demanded; as it has been heretofore hinted to me, that if my Employers did not intend to comply with the Treaty, they ought in Juſtice to ſet on Foot ſome Endeavours for our Releaſe, and that for the Value of Five or Six Lacks to Scindia and his Miniſters, the Buſineſs might be effected. If I could have paid ready Money it would have been poſſible to have accompliſhed this Buſineſs for a leſs Sum, but it was only in my Power to pay a Part, and for the reſt I have paſſed ſuch Obligations, and given ſuch Security, as will render my private Fortune anſwerable for the Payment; and I have alſo left my Dewan and another Perſon there as further Security. I have thus, Sir, taken the Liberty to ſubmit the whole Tranſaction to you; and conclude by requeſting, that you will enable me, from the Public Caſh, to ſatisfy theſe Obligations.

Having underſtood that the Honourable Governor General and Council have veſted you with the entire and uncontrolled Conduct of all Affairs on this Side that may have any Relation with the Marattas, I thought that the foregoing could with Propriety, only be addreſſed to you; and I have been rather fuller than perhaps might at firſt appear neceſſary, in order to ſave you the Trouble of explaining the juſt Ground on which my Requeſt is founded: I muſt alſo aſſure you, that bad as our Situation would probably have been on the Event of Hoſtilities with Scindia, I would gladly have been content to have expoſed myſelf to the worſt, ſooner than bring any Expence on the Honourable Company; but from what I heard of the general Apprehenſions relative to the Fate of Mr. Stewart and myſelf, I thought that being freed from theſe Apprehenſions, you would alſo be freer to take every Opportunity againſt Scindia, without any Burthen to your private Feelings; and further, that in caſe by the Events of War any Chief ſhould fall into your Hands, whoſe Abſence would diſtreſs him or Holkar, that Advantage might be loſt by the Exchange that you might be induced to make of them for us; and I know perfectly that the Capture of certain Chiefs would diſtreſs them, becauſe without their Sirdars, the Men would either refuſe to act, or moſt probably altogether diſband themſelves.

I beg Leave to conclude by obſerving, That I make no Claims on the Company for all that I have ſuffered both of Body and Mind, during a tedious Confinement in the Maratta Camp, nor for the Hazard it is certain I have undergone; that my Life was not made anſwerable by the Marattas for the Failure of thoſe Engagements for which I pledged it in their Hands: I ſimply requeſt, that to theſe Sufferings and theſe Hazards may not be added a Loſs which would go far to conſume all I have been labouring for in this Climate during a Courſe of near 18 Years, devoted to the Service of the Honourable Company.

I am, with great Reſpect,
Sir,
your moſt obedient
humble Servant,
Will. Gam[t] Farmer.

Camp near Broderah,
10th March 1780.

A true Copy.
R. Dunkley Sec[y].

1, Gentlemen from.

Gentlemen,

The expected Propoſals on the Part of Madjee Scindia have at length been made me through Abajee Sabajee, who Yeſterday brought me Letters from his Maſter, filled only with general Expreſſions of Friendſhip, and referring me for Particulars to his Man. He accordingly, after repeating Scindia's Enmity to the Miniſter Nana Furneeſe, and his Wiſh to unite with the Engliſh

in removing him from the Adminiſtration, and ſettling it upon a Plan more conſiſtent with the Intereſt of both Parties, made me the following Propoſal: That formerly when Ragoba was at Tellaugaum, after the Return of the Engliſh Army to Bombay, an Agreement had been entered into betwixt him and Scindia, and written Engagements mutually exchanged for its Performance, wherein the former conſented to relinquiſh all Claims to any Share in the Adminiſtration at Poona, and to retire towards Jeney, where he ſhould receive an Allowance from the Peiſhwa's Revenue of 12 Lacks of Rupees per Annum; that the Sicca ſhould continue to be ſtruck in the Name of the Young Peiſhwa Maderow Narrain, and that Bajerow, the Son of Ragoba, ſhould be appointed his Duan; but that as he was too young to tranſact the Buſineſs of the Office himſelf, being only Four Years of Age, the Care and Management of it ſhould be left entirely to Scindia, by which Means the ſole Controul and Direction of the Government would come into his Hands. This Plan Scindia propoſed ſhould now be purſued, that Ragoba ſhould immediately go himſelf to Jeney, and Young Badjerow accompany him to Poona, in order to fix the Adminiſtration in the Manner above mentioned. This was the Amount of what Scindia had authorized Sabajee to propoſe, without any Reſervation or other Clauſe whatever; and as it appeared plain his only Drift was to get Ragoba and his Son into his own Power, by which Means he meant to aggrandize himſelf in the State, without Regard to the Intereſts of the Engliſh, and perhaps through their Means to make his own Terms with the Miniſter, I have thought it proper to diſmiſs the Vackeel with this pointed and poſitive Anſwer, That the Engliſh cannot, conſiſtent with their Honour, nor ever will, agree to put any Reſtraint upon Ragoba, or compel him to leave their Dominions, where he has received an Aſylum, againſt his own Conſent: That however much they might be induced to unite in the propoſed Settlement, they muſt be perfectly ſatisfied reſpecting the Safety of Young Bajerow, and every Thing muſt be quietly ſettled at Poona, before his Preſence would be expedient, or even neceſſary there; and that admitting the Engliſh did agree to aſſiſt in putting the Power of the State into the Hands of Scindia, it was neceſſary that he alſo ſhould, on his Part, and in the Name of the Peſhwa, conſent to the Performance of certain Conditions favourable to their Intereſts, as well in Conſideration of the important Advantages he was to receive through their Means, as to compenſate for the heavy Expence of the Wars, which formerly, and in particular at this Time, they had been involuntarily compelled to wage with the Maratta State. With this Anſwer I this Morning diſmiſſed Abajee Sabajee to his Maſter; and as in explaining fully my Sentiments to him, and giving him to underſtand I could not conſent to any that were of a diſhonourable Nature, I at the ſame Time uſed every Endeavour to convince him of my ſincere Inclination towards an Accommodation; if his Deſign is really to unite with the Engliſh, it will be at once proved by the Conduct he adopts on receiving my Anſwer. One Circumſtance which tends to eſtabliſh a Belief of his hoſtile Intentions, and which I think proper to mention to you, is, that he wrote to Govind Row, the diſaffected Brother of Futty Sing, who has long reſided with the Sundarvaree Rajah, inviting him to his Camp, and promiſing to put him in Poſſeſſion of the Guicawar Share of Guzerat; and I this Evening learn that he has actually arrived and been received by Scindia.

I propoſe halting To-morrow, when I ſhall determine upon the Steps it will be neceſſary to follow, and immediately inform you.

I have the Honour to be,
Gentlemen,
your moſt obedient
humble Servant,
Thomas Goddard.

Camp near Baroda,
17th March 1780.

APPENDIX, N° 261.

Bombay Select Conſultations, April 1780.

RECEIVED, the Two following Letters from General Goddard: Monday 3d

Gentlemen,

Goddard, General, Letter from

Agreeable to the Intention expreſſed in my former Letter, I have, in conſequence of your Deſire, taken the Liberty of ſending my Opinion on the Subject of the propoſed Augmentation of your Military Eſtabliſhment; in doing which, I have further preſumed to lay before you, ſuch Plan for the complete Regulation of your Army, as appears to me calculated to anſwer the uſeful, and at this Time, neceſſary Purpoſe of encreaſing your Military Strength, and at the ſmalleſt additional Expence poſſible. I have endeavoured to be as full and explicit as I could, in order to ſatisfy every Doubt, and remove every Difficulty, which muſt unavoidably ſuggeſt itſelf in the firſt Introduction of a Change, ſo entire and important as the Arrangements I have now propoſed in every

every Department will occaſion in your Service. If any Points yet remain to be explained, I ſhall eſteem myſelf happy at an Opportunity of elucidating to your Satisfaction; and I beg Leave only to add, that as I ſhall conſider it moſt fortunate and honourable to me, if the Thoughts I have expreſſed in the incloſed Papers meet with your Approbation, ſo I do not doubt being freely excuſed for the Trouble I may give you in the Peruſal of them, if they ſhould not be found to anſwer the good and uſeful Purpoſes for which they were intended.

In my laſt Letter, I informed you of the diſmiſſing Scindia's Vackeel, and my Intention to move towards him. I have accordingly advanced to a Place called Pittoul, on the Banks of the Biſwamuntry Nuddy, and about Eight Miles to the Eaſt of Brodra. On the Day of my Arrival here, I found Scindia had ſent his Camp Equipage, Buzar, Baggage, &c. for Security to the Neighbourhood of Paunghun, and himſelf with the greateſt Part of his Army, unincumbered with any Sort of Baggage whatever, had taken Poſt at the Diſtance of about Twelve Miles; the Remainder of his Troops he had diſperſed in different Bodies round himſelf, and on the Road leading to my Camp, ſo as to be effectually guarded againſt every Poſſibility of a Surprize, which he is much afraid of, and which I have ſtudied all in my Power to obtain an Opportunity of attempting with any Proſpect of Succeſs; but on Account of the Diſpoſition above deſcribed, hitherto to no Effect. I am anxious to accompliſh this, becauſe from the Nature of his Army, and the Mode of War he practiſes, I can neither approach near enough to attack him ſuddenly to Advantage, nor will he riſk the Hazard of meeting me openly in the Field. If I advance, he will certainly retreat; and to think of purſuing him beyond his preſent Encampment, would not be the Means of bringing on a deciſive Action, nor could it be attended with any real or ſolid Benefit, proportioned to the Inconvenience of expoſing the Company's and Futty Sing's Poſſeſſions in the Guzerat, to the Inroads and Depredations of a ravaging Enemy, from which they are at preſent entirely free. I think it neceſſary to mention to you, that ſince the Diſmiſſion of Scindia's Vackeel, I have received no Sort of Meſſage or Overture from him whatever; and that notwithſtanding the Reports, and the general Belief of an Enmity ſubſiſting betwixt him and the Miniſter; the Agents of the latter reſide in his Camp, and I am credibly informed, Letters are conſtantly paſſing and repaſſing betwixt them; from all theſe Circumſtances, I am confirmed in the Conjecture which Scindia's late Conduct ſuggeſted, that the Shew of his Animoſity againſt Nana Furneſe, was an entire Pretext to deceive the Engliſh, and get the Perſons of Ragoba and his Son into his Hands, for Purpoſes merely for his own Advantage, and attaining the Accompliſhment of his Views with the Miniſter. I ſhall write you very ſhortly; and have the Honour to be,

Gentlemen,
Your faithful and obedient Servant,
Thomas Goddard.

Camp near Pittoul,
Four Coſs from Brodra,
24th March 1780.

P. S. In conſequence of the Intention expreſſed in your former Letter, of raiſing Two new Battalions immediately, I gave Orders to Major Fullarton, commanding the Detachment at Ahemadavad, to entertain ſome Sepoy Recruits, of which Numbers were offering themſelves; and as I have Reaſon to believe that Country the beſt Nurſery for Soldiers on this Side of India, I take the Liberty of further propoſing that you will allow me to authorize Major Fullarton to enliſt ſuch Number as you may judge requiſite to complete the Augmentation propoſed to take place in your military Eſtabliſhment.

Thomas Goddard.

Goddard, General, Letter from.

Gentlemen,

My Letter of the 24th Inſtant informed you particularly how Affairs were ſituated reſpecting Scindia, in which State they remained without any Alteration till this Morning, when it became requiſite to move Ground on Account of a Scarcity of Water at the former Encampment; I accordingly determined upon marching to this Place, which was about Five Miles diſtant, and upon my Approach, found a large Party of the Enemy's Horſe had occupied the Village of Camloud, cloſe to which it was neceſſary to encamp. As I advanced nearer, their Numbers continued to encreaſe, till obtaining a more diſtinct View, I perceived their whole Army had collected in its Neighbourhood, covering a Space of at leaſt Three Miles in Extent, on the Right and Left, and the Rear of the Village. I therefore immediately ordered the Line to form, and advanced in Order of Battle to the Village, which, after firing a few Rockets, they precipitately abandoned; but as their Army ſtill ſhewed themſelves upon the Plain in Front, diſpoſed to annoy the Troops, I thought it neceſſary, for the Eaſe and Convenience of the Camp, to diſperſe them, and accordingly ordered a few Diſcharges of the Artillery, which had the deſired Effect, and they immediately fled with the Loſs of ſome Men and Horſes, nor have they ſince appeared to give me any Diſturbances.

I cannot exactly aſcertain their preſent Situation, any further than that their Guns and Baggage are moved to a conſiderable Diſtance out of reach, and where it would neither be conſiſtent with good Policy to follow them, nor could it be attended with any immediate Advantage, as they would contrive to carry them to a ſtill greater Diſtance as they advanced. I ſhall obtain every neceſſary

Information

hation reſpecting the Enemy, after which I ſhall determine upon the Steps proper to be taken,
ve you inſtant Intelligence.

Camp, Kimlade,
27th March 1780.

I have the Honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your faithful and obedient Servant,
Thomas Goddard.

APPENDIX, N° 262.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 8th April 1780.

ntlemen,

Goddard, General, Letter from.

my Letter of the 27th ultimo, I communicated to you the Circumſtances that happened the y of my Arrival at this Place; ſince which Time nothing of any Conſequence has occurred, till Morning, when finding the Enemy would neither venture to come to a fair and deciſive Action, elves, nor put it in my Power to attack them with all the Advantage I could have wiſhed g ſent their Guns and ſtanding Encampment at too great a Diſtance in their Rear for me poſ- o overtake them; I came to the Reſolution of diſlodging their Army from the Poſt they then ied with their Horſes and Arms, only about Six Miles from my Camp, and marched myſelf for Purpoſe at Two o'Clock with a Part of the Army, leaving the Remainder at the former Ground, the Command of Lieutenant Colonel Hartley. The Force I took with me conſiſted of 200 peans, Ten Grenadier Companies of Sepoys, the 4th and 7th Battalions of Bengal, and the 8th lion of Bombay Infantry, together with 2 Twelves, and 10 Six Pounders of Artillery: I alſo with me the Regiment of Mogul Cavalry and Candahar Horſe. Theſe I divided into Two s, giving the Command of the Rear Line to Major Hopkins, which conſiſted of Two Battalions poys, with the Cavalry divided on either Flank. Lieutenant Colonel Baillie and Major Forbes ſtationed to the Front Line.

he Situation in which I knew the Enemy to be poſted, the Care they took to prevent being ſurpriz- and the Eaſe and Expedition with which they would be able to move off upon the firſt Alarm g given, gave me no Hopes of coming upon them unprepared, and ſurprizing them effectually; he Objects I principally had in View were to induce them to venture an Action with only a Part e Army oppoſed to their whole Force; to drive them from the Poſt they then occupied; or if fled without Reſiſtance, to prove the manifeſt Superiority of our Arms in the moſt ſtriking and urable Manner. I am happy to inform you, the Event has far exceeded my Expectations: I oached much nearer to their Camp, without being diſcovered by any of their ſmall Out-poſts, I could have conceived poſſible, and a little before Day-break came upon their grand Guard, ſting of 6 or 7000 Men, and commanded by Parajee Punt and Baghretty Scindia, which I d through without diſcharging a Shot, determined to reſerve my Fire till I came to the Body under Madjee Scindia himſelf. This being a Mile and a Half in Front, I did not n till about Sun-riſe, when their whole Army was in Motion, and the Action immediately com- ced. Seeing the Inferiority of our Force, and preſuming upon their own Numbers, they ad- ced with much Appearance of Courage and Reſolution, but were received by ſo warm and well- ded a Fire from our Artillery, that they were obliged to give Way, and in the Space of about hour quitted the Field entirely. In order to diſlodge a large Body of the Enemy, who were very ubleſome to the Troops by firing Matchlocks and Rockets from behind the Cover of ſome hes on the Right Flank of the Line, I ordered the Regiment of Cavalry and the Candahar rſe to advance; which Service they performed with equal Spirit and Succeſs, and having drove n to the Plain, gave an excellent Opportunity for the Artillery to fire upon them as they ted.

After remaining Two Hours upon this Ground, and the Marattas not daring to make their pearance again, I ordered the Troops to return to Camp, which they did without any further oleſtation from the Enemy, or any Party of their Horſe ſhewing themſelves in the Rear. om this Circumſtance, and the Effect which it was plain our Artillery muſt have had among em, I am perſuaded the Enemy muſt have ſuffered conſiderably; I cannot at preſent aſcertain it actly; but the Reports of the Hircarrahs who are come in, make the Numbers who fell very con- derable, beſide thoſe who were carried off wounded.

We have ſuſtained no Loſs on our Side, except among the Candahar Horſe, of whom Fifteen re killed and wounded in charging the Enemy as before related, which they did very gallantly; ne Mogul Trooper is wounded, and alſo One Sepoy by a Matchlock Ball. I ſhall ſhortly inform u what Effect the Action of this Day has upon Scindia's Operations, and beg Leave to conclude

at preſent by expreſſing to you my Satisfaction at the ſteady, uniform, and proper Behaviou Major Hopkins, who had charge of the Rear Line, during the whole of the Engagement.

I have the Honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your faithful and obedient Servant,
Thomas Goddard.

Camp at Kimloul,
3d April 1780.

APPENDIX, N° 263.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 24th April 1780.

Minute reſpecting the Return of the Bombay Detachment.

rd, General, no Account of his moving to the rd.

rn to be expreſſed to he little Proſpect that Baſſein's being reduced Seaſon cloſes.

y not to be left deſti- ig the Rains.

etachment therefore to tway.

AS the Approach of the Monſoon is now ſo near, and we have received no Information of Gener Goddard's moving to the Southward, our Concern muſt be expreſſed to him, at the lit Probability there appears of his accompliſhing the moſt material Object of our Wiſhes, the R duction of Baſſein before the Cloſe of this Seaſon; and it muſt be ſignified to him, that at a rate if he does not move down himſelf, it is abſolutely and indiſpenſably requiſite for t Safety of this Place, that the Bombay Detachment ſhould be returned into Garriſon before t Rains; as it would be the Heighth of Imprudence to ſuffer this Settlement to remain in its pr ſent deſtitute and defenceleſs Situation, at a Seaſon when no Succour could be afforded us caſe of any Attempt from the French. The Return of our Detachment muſt for theſe Reaſo be inſiſted on, and the Chief at Surat muſt be directed to provide Boats for their Embar ation immediately on their Arrival from the Army.

APPENDIX, N° 264.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 30th April 1780.

To Brigadier General Goddard.

eneral, Letter to.

Sir,

OUR laſt Letters from you are dated the 3d and 4th of this Month.

We obſerved with much Pleaſure the Advantage gained over the Enemy in the Action of the 3d, but are impatient to hear from you what Effect your Succeſs may have had on Scindia's Operations; and what Plan you propoſe purſuing, which, as the Seaſon grows late, it is of Conſequence for us to be informed of as early as poſſible.

The Poſſeſſion of Baſſein, conſidered in every Point of View, is an Object of ſo much Importance to the Company, that we cannot help expreſſing our Anxiety at the Probability there appears of this Seaſon elapſing, and Baſſein ſtill unſubdued. The Danger of ſuch a Fortification ſo contiguous to our Poſſeſſions, remaining in the Hands of the Enemy in this Time of an European War, and the Advantage and Security the Acquiſition of it would give to this Preſidency, make us very earneſt in our Wiſhes not to leave the Reduction of this Place to the Hazard of future Accidents or Circumſtances; nor can we think that any other Object can claim a Preference to your Attention, or bring the Campaign to a more honourable and advantageous Concluſion. The Preſident has acquainted us, that he wrote to you ſome Time ago on this Subject; and the Rule we have laid down for our Conduct will not permit us to withhold our Advice on ſo very material an Affair; but ſhould you not intend to move to the Southward before the Cloſe of the Seaſon, a due Attention to the Safety of this Place, which you muſt be ſenſible is now in a very deſtitute and unprovided Situation with reſpect to Troops, makes it abſolutely and indiſpenſably requiſite that the Bombay Detachment under the Command of Lieutenant Colonel Hartley ſhould be returned into Garriſon as ſoon as poſſible, before the Monſoon ſhuts up the Communication by Sea; as it would be the Heighth of Imprudence to ſuffer this Place to remain with ſuch a ſlender Force for its Defence, at a Seaſon the moſt favourable for a ſudden Attack, and when no Relief can be afforded in caſe of any At-

empts from the French; if therefore your Operations for this Season should be confined to Guzerat, the weighty Reasons above recited, we doubt not, will convince you of the Necessity of immediately complying with our Requisition for the Return of our Detachment, a Measure we cannot dispense with, and shall accordingly depend on your ordering it to Surat to be embarked for Bombay, whilst the Weather will permit; on which Head we shall give the necessary Orders to Mr. Boddam.

The Number of our Europeans, and the present Disposition of them, will not, we think, for the present, admit of our carrying into Execution the Alterations proposed by you with respect to them, in any Manner that will prove of Advantage to the Service, adequate to the great Increase of Expence; but we have determined immediately to raise Seven additional Battalions of Sepoys, in order to complete our Establishment to Fifteen Battalions, which will be formed of the Strength and Model proposed by you; and we shall soon advise you of the particular Arrangement we propose making of them.

We have appointed Captains West, Waddington, and M'Culloch, now serving under you, to command Three of the new Battalions, and hope to hear of Major Fullarton's Success in raising Recruits at Ahmedabad.

We are, Sir,
Your most obedient
humble Servants,
Wm Hornby,
&c. Committee.

Bombay Castle,
30th April 1780.

APPENDIX, N° 265.

Bombay Select Consultations, 8th April 1780.

At a Select Committee; PRESENT,

The Honourable William Hornby, Esquire, President and Governor.
Daniel Draper, Esquire.

READ the Letter from Tannah received Yesterday.

The Village of Culwa and Bellapore Fort, to be taken Possession of.

As we may both take and keep Possession of the Village of Culwa, without Difficulty or Danger, it being entirely under the Command of the Guns of Tannah Fort; and as our being established there will command an Extent of Shore on the Continent, and leave an Opening for our getting Supplies of Grain and Provisions, by removing the Maratta Chowkees to a greater Distance; likewise, as our taking Possession of Bellapore Fort will answer the same Purpose in a much more extensive Degree, and give us the entire Command of the Maratta Shore, from Tannah to Bellapore, a Space of near 12 Miles; it is agreed to take Possession of both these Places as soon as possible, and the President will give the necessary Orders, with the utmost Secrecy, which is absolutely necessary to be observed; and it is most probable, that in the Execution of these Measures, large Quantities of Grain will be immediately secured, which will prove a very timely Supply in the present Scarcity of that Article

Tannah, no Batta to pass from Salsette to Bassein.

The Chief and Factors must not permit any Batta to pass to Bassein; by which Means it will remain in the Country, and there will be the better Chance of obtaining it for our own Inhabitants.

APPENDIX, N° 266.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 13th April, 1780.

RECEIVED the following Letter from Tannah, and one from Captain Campbell to the Chief and Factors:

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We have the Pleaſure to acquaint you, that in conſequence of Orders from the Honourable the Preſident to the Chief, Captain Campbell's Detachment took Poſſeſſion of Parſeek Fort early this Morning. Encloſed is Copy of his Letter juſt now received. A ſmall Party of Sepoys has alſo taken Poſſeſſion of Culwa.

The Major and Engineer will go over this Afternoon to examine Parſeek, and report to us what is neceſſary to be added to the Fort, and what Garriſon is requiſite for its Defence.

We ſhall be able to furniſh your Honour, &c. with further Particulars, we hope ſhortly.

We are, &c. &c.

Tannah,
12th April 1780.

John Halſey,
Gregory Page,
Lewis Cokran.

To John Halſey, Eſquire, Chief, &c. Factors at Tannah.

Copy of Captain Campbell's Letter to the Chief and Factors at Tannah.

Gentlemen,

At Day-break this Morning we arrived here, and marched up to the Water Gate, which we were obliged to break down, though the People within made no Reſiſtance, but kept the Gate faſt. There was not a Shot fired from the Fort, and there were in it but 15 Men as I learn, Four of whom we have laid hold of, and I ſend them to you, a Havildar and Three Sepoys.

This Fort is a miſerable Place, would ſcarce contain Forty Men; but from its Situation might defend itſelf with Thirty Men, againſt I think any Number, unleſs it were knocked all to Pieces. I have Poſſeſſion of the Church above the Fort and keep a Picquet there.

I think it would be impoſſible to bring Guns againſt the Fort, I have brought our Field Pieces up the Hill between the Church and Fort.

There is no Village here, and the Troops muſt be proviſioned from Tannah for any Thing I can yet ſee.

I wait your Directions for my further Conduct.

There are Six ſmall Guns mounted in the Fort, but they appear to me to be unſerviceable.

I ſend Two Boats that were found here; in one there are ſome Copper Pots.

I have no Colours for this Place but my Battalion Colours, therefore requeſt one may be ſent here.

I have the Honour to remain, with Reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
Rich[d] Campbell.

Parſeek Fort,
12th April 1780.

A true Copy,
Lewis Cokran, Secr[y].

Received the following Letter from Tannah, and ſigned one in Reply to that Settlement:

Tannah, Letter from.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

The Fort of Parſeek being in our Poſſeſſion, the Directions from the Honourable the Governor ſeem to be fully accompliſhed. The Enquiry after the Sircars Batty appears to us proper; but we requeſt your Honour, &c. Orders, whether we are to ſeize the Grain in the Autgams, or any other Place in the Poſſeſſion of the Marattas, without which we do not think ourſelves authorized ſo to do. We alſo wiſh for your Directions as to the other Villages near Bellapore, that we may, if they are put under our Orders, make the neceſſary Enquiries with reſpect to Batty, &c. as we have already done to the Villages near us.

We are with Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
John Halſey,
Gregory Page,
Lewis Cokran.

Tannah,
13th April 1780.

To

To John Halſey, Eſquire, Chief, &c. Factors at Tannah.

Gentlemen,

We have received your Letter dated Yeſterday.

The Batta belonging to the Sircar, which may be in the Autgams, or near to Parſeek, you have our Directions to ſeize, carefully avoiding to injure the Property of private Perſons, but giving every Encouragement to export their Batta hither. Tannah, Letter to.

You will make the ſtricteſt Enquiries reſpecting the Quantity of Batta laid up by the Marattas in your Neighbourhood, and ſend us your Report as ſoon as poſſible; at the ſame Time informing us of the State of the Country between Culwa and Bellapore.

We are your loving Friends,

Bombay Caſtle, 14th April 1780.

Wm Hornby, &c. Committee.

The following Five Letters were received by the Preſident from Captain Lendrum reſpecting the Capture of Bellapore and Panwell, and are entered for the Information of our Honourable Employers. Sunday.

Honourable Sir, 12th April 1780. 7 o'Clock.

I have ſent Mr. Read with the Flag of Bellapore, which I ſurprized at Four o'Clock this Morning: I took it by Eſcalade. The Bamboo Ladders exactly anſwered. I had only One European wounded; and killed Two of the Enemy. Mr. Read mounted the Ladder which I placed for him; nothing could be a completer Surprize; there were Three Europeans in the Fort that got off, to my great Concern. I have ſent to the Inhabitants, and given them Protection, as you was pleaſed to order. Letter from Captain Lendrum to the Preſident.

I ſhall wait here with the Whole of the Men, until I have your Orders.

With the greateſt Reſpect, I am,
Honourable Sir,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
John Lendrum.

P. S. I had Mr. Burchall from Tannah with me, who was at the Eſcalade, and one of them that did it.

Honourable Sir,

I embarked laſt Night with about 300 Men, and arrived here at Day-break. Finding the Enemy was apprized of our coming, by the taking of Bellapore, having an advanced Picquet at the Bunder, I was obliged to wait for the Two 6 Pounders being landed. As ſoon as the Men were formed, about 200 of the Poona Guardees, that is, diſciplined Sepoys, advanced within 400 Yards, and from an Eminence kept up a continual Fire from Matchlocks and Ginguls. Having the Guns with me, I advanced on them to about 250 Yards, gave them Two round Shot, which diſperſed them; they retired 300 Yards, and then ſtood and fired; I puſhed after them, but on account of the marſhy Grounds, I could not get the Guns up faſt enough to give them Grape; beſides, the Laſcars are great Poltroons, I could not get them on faſt enough. I advanced to the Pagoda, near the large Tank, and gave them another Shot, which diſperſed them. At this Diſcharge of the Gun, the Arm of the Axle-tree ſnapped off ſhort at the Linchpin, and the Gun became uſeleſs; the Axle very improperly is made of black Wood; I ſhall get the Axle-tree repaired here. I had not one Man killed from their irregular Fire; nor could I ſeize them although I ſent a Party round the Village of Panwell to the Southward, hoping to intercept them. I have taken Poſt at the Pagoda, where Captain Carpenter and I will put it in ſuch a State of Defence, that I am in Hopes it cannot be forced without Cannon. There are many Inhabitants in Panwell: I have not permitted one of them to be plundered or moleſted. 2d Letter Captain L drum to t Preſident.

Yeſterday a Man left this Place on our taking Bellapore, for more Troops. Now this is ſo near Poona, I make no Doubt both Men and Guns will be furniſhed againſt us; and having good Advice here, that there is not, nor did not come down, any Force worth mentioning to Buindy, as was reported; and conſidering the great Force in Tannah, if you would be pleaſed to order me One or Two Companies of Sepoys from Salſette, that I may give Captain Carpenter, for Bellapore is very thin, only 95 Men under the Command of Lieutenant Marſhall, which is enough for the Fort. The neceſſary Expenditure of Caſh I will ſupply for the Hire of Biggarees, &c. &c. until I receive your Orders. I ſhall this Evening load all the Boats I brought up with me with Batty, and ſend to your Honour to Bombay To-morrow. Next Springs I hope you will receive a plentiful Supply by the Merchants from hence, for there is a great Store that belongs to them here. The Rents of this Purgunnah are chiefly paid in Money, which have been moſtly paid. The Galivat will be well up the River this Tide. The Inhabitants are apprehenſive that you will not retain Panwell, which

which makes them uncertain about returning. I beg you will pleaſe to order Ten Barrels of Powder to Bellapore; and as I preſume that Place will be kept, alſo Six 4 or 6 Pounders, Iron, with their Carriages, to mount there.

With the greateſt Reſpect, I am,
Honourable Sir,
Your humble and obedient Servant.
John Lendrum.

Panwell, 13th April 1780.
4 o'Clock, P. M.

Letter from Mr. Lendrum to the Preſident.

Honourable Sir,

I have received your Honour's Commands of the 13th, and now ſend Mr. George Hutchinſon agreeable to them; the other Cadets I will collect and ſend alſo, and the Laſcars; but I hope to have your Orders regarding Panwell this next Flood, as I ſent an Expreſs at 3 o'Clock P. M. the 13th.; Panwell is the Capital of a large Purgunnah, not in any Manner dependant on Bellapore; it will require a good Force to remain in it; there is a great Quantity of Batty in Store. I ſhall not put any in the Boats until I have your Orders, either to evacuate it or maintain it. I have wrote to Lieutenant Marſhall, to deliver the Goods to the Vanjairahs, and let them carry them to Bombay. At my taking Bellapore, I gave theſe People Centinels to protect their Effects, and I believe they have not loſt any Part; I have ſent and enquired after the Goods of any of the Bombay Merchants here, but none can be found, for moſt of the People went off the Day before Yeſterday, when they found Bellapore was taken. There is Batty belonging to ſome of them here, which the Subedar had detained; it can't be well removed until the Springs, for the Shybars at the Town will not float until then. I ſhall examine the River that runs E. N. E. up to Tullaja, which I believe is about Six Miles from Bellapore. There are 82 Villages in Bellapore Purgunnah; the Revenues I believe is about 1 Lack, or 1¼ Lack of Rupees annually: The Parts moſt expoſed, are thoſe Villages between Tullaja and Parſeek, for the River runs no higher than a little above Tullaja; I ſhall have the Sircar's Book examined, and ſend a particular Liſt to your Honour.

Mr. Halſey has wrote to me to guard a Paſs over the Hills called Silcaum, near Bellapore, to the North, which I ſhall do as ſoon as I return from hence, as I propoſe leaving Captain Carpenter in Charge of this Poſt, with as great a Force as I can, provided I have your Orders for maintaining it.

With the greateſt Reſpect,
I am
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
John Lendrum.

Panwell, 14th April 1780,
3 in the Morning.

Letter from Mr. Lendrum to the Preſident.

Honourable Sir,

This Moment I have received your Honour's Letter of the 14th, and ſhall act accordingly. The Poſt at the Pagoda I am fortifying with Breaſtworks and Embrazures, and requeſt you will pleaſe to order me Six Bricklayers here, and the Three Pounders or Four Pounders that Captain Carpenter wrote your Honour for. I hope theſe Springs I ſhall ſend away 100 Boats with Batty belonging to ſeveral People here and at Bombay. The Tides are ſo low that I cannot get the Boats up until To-morrow to the Bunder; I am ſending away all the Merchants Things that were detained here, I aſſure your Honour nothing was taken from them.

I am not apprehenſive but I will always be able to retreat; the Company of Sepoys will be a great Reinforcement for me; I do not think I ſhall want any more, Bellapore is in no Danger; I ſhall viſit it myſelf occaſionally.

I beg you will pleaſe to order ſome here for Batty, not too long ones, on account of the Shoal Water.

Pray let the Six Pounders be left at Bellapore, with ſome Grape and Round Shot for them, and alſo Rammers and Spunges for them; and Ammunition likewiſe for the Guns you pleaſe to ſend to this Place.

There are only Six Shybars here, and many of the People have left them.

With the greateſt Reſpect,
I am
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
John Lendrum.

Panwell, 14th April 1780,
P. M.

P. S. I beg you will pleaſe to order me a Pair of Hircarrahs to procure Intelligence.

Honourable Sir,

Nothing extraordinary has happened ſince Yeſterday, except laſt Night, ſome People firing at our Boats as they paſſed from hence to Bellapore, at the Mouth of this River, joining to the Bellapore River. The Galivat is coming up to the Bunder; an armed Boat will protect theſe if you will pleaſe order one here, and I will ſtation her near the Village Balpara. There are Reports of ſome

Horſe collecting, their Number I cannot aſcertain with any Certainty. The Sepoys from Tannah are not yet arrived.

I ſend 16 ſmall Boats laden with Batty, to the Care of Mr. Martin, on account of the Merchants: I cannot prevail on them to go themſelves, or ſend it but through me; they are ſo intimidated by the ſtrict Order from Poona, I muſt give them Bills on Mr. Martin for the Amount. The Bundar is ſo bad, I cannot get away the other Boats. I hope you will pleaſe to ſend me ſome Boats, for I am afraid Panwell will be burned; and on account of its great Extent, I can ſcarce hope to protect it if the Enemy advance.

I ſhall appoint Captain Carpenter Commiſſary of Stores and Proviſions for this Detachment, if you will pleaſe to approve it.

The Firing laſt Night was on the 12 Men I detached from Bellapore to Shabajee, but no Damage done.

With the greateſt Reſpect,
I am
Your obedient humble Servant,
John Lendrum.

Panwell, 15th April 1780,
at 9 P. M.

P. S. I have juſt now Accounts of a Number of Horſe having deſcended the Ghauts, and an advanced Party appeared cloſe to us.

Signed the following Letter to Tannah:

Tannah, Letter to.

Gentlemen,

We have received your Letter dated Yeſterday. We approve of your giving Repairs to Parſeek Fort to the Amount mentioned in your Letter, and acquieſce for the preſent in the Garriſon allotted for that Fort.

If the Four Boats are loaded with Sircar's Batty, they muſt be taken Poſſeſſion of for the Benefit of the Honourable Company; but if private Property, the Proprietors muſt be directed to bring it to Bombay, to diſpoſe of it at this Market; and this Rule you muſt obſerve with reſpect to any Batty that may be found in the Autgaums, or in any other Place.

And here we muſt admoniſh you of the Purpoſe for which our Troops have been ſent to the Continent, and of the Neceſſity there is of Activity and Diſpatch in ſecuring all the Grain within your Reach, before the Enemy can come and deſtroy it. As to the Autgaums, they may be maintained with the ſmalleſt Force, and are at all Times at our Command; they need not however be neglected, but we think the moſt Service for the Troops, and not to be delayed, is for them to proceed up to Callian, and to eſtabliſh a Station and Collection of Grain there, in the ſame Manner as the Party from Bellapore have done at Panwell; and this we direct to be done as ſoon as poſſible, unleſs you ſhould judge it not practicable without too much Riſque to the Troops, which we think by proper Meaſures may be rendered very inconſiderable.

We are your loving Friends,
Willliam Hornby,
&c. Committee.

Bombay Caſtle,
20th April, 1780.

Tannah, Letter from.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

We have been favoured with your Commands of the 14th Inſtant.

The Engineer has been called upon to give his Opinion of the State of Perſeek Fort, and if any Repairs were abſolutely neceſſary: Encloſed is a Copy of his Letter. It ſeems eligible that this Place ſhould be maintained with a ſmall Garriſon, and as it can be made very defenſible with ſuch a one, for the trifling Expence of 500 Rupees, we have directed the Engineer to give it what Repairs he ſays is abſolutely requiſite, which we flatter ourſelves your Honour, &c. will approve.

The Commandant of the Troops having delivered it as his Opinion, that One European Subaltern, One Subedar, Three Jemidars, Six Havildars, Six Naiques, and One hundred Sepoys, with One Bombardier, Five Matroſſes, and Twelve Laſcars, will be ſufficient for the preſent Defence of Perſeek Port; we have in conſequence of the Orders contained in your Letter of the 14th, directed Captain Campbell to leave the above Detachment at Parſeek, and march with the Remainder of his Force to the Autgams and other Villages in the Neighbourhood, in Search of the Sircars Batty. He is deſired carefully to avoid injuring private Property, but to give every Encouragement to the Inhabitants.

Advice having been received by the Chief from the other Side, that a ſmall Party of Horſe and Foot were ravaging the Villages in the Bellapore Diſtrict, he deſired the Major to ſend a Detachment over, to prevent them from coming, at leaſt on the Weſt Side of the Diſtrict, but he ſaid he could not ſpare a Man; we have therefore directed him to recall a Company of Sepoys from the Outpoſts,

Outpoſts, who with Forty of thoſe at preſent at Culwa, will we hope be ſufficient to protect the Villages on this Side the Hills.

Ten Boats, containing about 70 Morahs of Batty (Two of which have been before mentioned to your Honour, &c.) that were proceeding to Baſſein, were brought into our Bunder ſome Days ago. We requeſt your Orders what is to be done with it.

The large floating Battery not being of any Uſe in her former Station now that we have Parſeek, ſhe has been ordered to lay off the Mouth of Bundy River.

We are, with the greateſt Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
John Halſey,
Greg. Page,
Lewis Cockran.

Tannah,
19th April 1780.

Copy of a Letter from the Engineer at Tannah to the Reſident and Factors.

Gentlemen,

Agreeable to your Orders I went this Morning with the commanding Officer, Major Weſtphall, to examine the Fort Perſeek, ſituated on the Right Shore of Callian River, and I have now the Honour to inform you, that the Walls of the Fort are here and there not above Eight or Ten Feet high from the Ground to the Embraſures and to the Creſt of the Parapets, which ſubjects thoſe Parts to be eaſily Eſcaladed; others, particularly thoſe which ought to command the Brow of the Hill, are ſomewhat too low, and therefore commanded from the Hill before them. The Embraſures are much damaged and too confined, and require therefore more opening; a good many Loop Holes ought alſo to be made, and the Banquets repaired, &c. Thoſe little Alterations and Repairs, abſolutely requiſite, if only a ſmall Garriſon of 50 Men ſhould be intended to be kept there, will not admit of a regular Eſtimate, but cannot, as I imagine, come to above 500 Rupees, including the Boat Hire for bringing the Chunam, Bricks, and other Materials from Tannah to Perſeek Fort. I have nothing more to add, but that I am, with Reſpect,

Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
T. Sartorius,
L[t] of Engineers.

Tannah,
13th April 1780.

A true Copy.
L. Cockran,
Sec[y].

APPENDIX, N° 267.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 12th February 1780.

RECEIVED the following Letter from Fort Victoria:

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I addreſſed your Honour, &c. the 25th ultimo.—A few Days ago, Fifteen hundred to Two thouſand Maratta Sepoys came from Poona to this Neighbourhood; they are collecting Stores, &c. and from Circumſtances their Deſign appears to be againſt this Place. I requeſt that your Honour, &c. will be pleaſed to ſend the Gunners and Artillery Laſcars with the Field Pieces as ſoon as poſſible.

I am, with the greateſt Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
your moſt obedient humble Servant,
Geo. Dick.

Received the following Letter from Fort Victoria.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I encloſe a Duplicate of my Addreſs to your Honour, &c. under the 10th inſtant.

Duplop's Fleet arrived this Morning at Sevendrog, and every Information ſays they are to act jointly

jointly with the Troops againſt this Place. I requeſt that your Honour, &c. will be pleaſed to ſend the additional Reinforcement immediately.

I am, with the greateſt Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
George Dick.

Fort Victoria,
13th February 1780.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

Surat, Letter from the Ch

Your Commands of the 28th January per Drake came to Hand the 9th Inſtant, and the Packet for General Goddard was immediately forwarded to him. By the lateſt Advices from him, dated the 5th Current, they were then on their March from Pidatt, about 25 Coſs from Ahmedabad, which Capital they expected to reach the 8th or 9th at fartheſt.

The Three Field Pieces and Howitzers have been landed, and the General duly acquainted of their Arrival; alſo the Ghee, and the Boat diſpatched on to Broach agreeable to your Directions; and in conſequence of General Goddard's Requeſt, I have taken Charge of the Conſignment of Treaſure for the Service of the Army brought by the Britannia.

A Party of Maratta Horſe having come up from Baſſein, I have been neceſſitated to withdraw our People placed in the Tannah at Verſaul, it being a Place entirely open, and not capable of being defended, as otherwiſe they would in all Probability have run the Riſk of being cut off, as the Town is ſituated Three Miles from the Landing Place, and it would have been almoſt impoſſible for them to have retreated, had the Enemy got between them and the Sea Shore. They are aſſembling near Polners, to about 3 or 4000 Horſe and a few Foot, under Gunniſs Punt, and another Officer. Of the above Circumſtance I have duly adviſed General Goddard, and at the ſame Time repreſented to him the abſolute Neceſſity of his ſending as ſpeedily as poſſible a ſuitable Force to protect the Southern Purgunnahs as well as thoſe adjacent to this Place, otherwiſe great Riſk there is of their being plundered and entirely ravaged by the Enemy, from our Inability to ſend into the Field any proper Force to prevent the ſame.

The General having forwarded to me the intercepted Letter from the Dutch Chief to the Poona Miniſter, as alſo the Vackeel's Letter that gave cover to it, I now tranſmit the ſame to you, having, agreeable to your Directions, taken exact Copies of the ſame. I alſo incloſe the Tranſlates, made by the General's Interpreter, of both thoſe Papers.

I am, with great Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servant,
Rawſon Hart Boddam

Surat,
12th Feb^{ry} 1780.

Tueſday

Received the following Letter from Fort Victoria:

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I addreſſed your Honour, &c. the 23d Inſtant, per the Revenge. The Marattas have collected all their Troops at Tarlee and Sevendrog, about 12 Hours March from hence; and they being daily expected here, I requeſt that your Honour, &c. will be pleaſed to ſend the Gunners and Field Pieces as ſoon as poſſible, the Guns here, in their preſent Condition, being unſerviceable.

I am, with the greateſt Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
George Dick.

Fort Victoria,
26th February 1780.

Friday

Received the following Letter from Fort Victoria.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I addreſſed your Honour, &c. the 25th ultimo, and 16th inſtant. Dulop's Fleet was ſeen Yeſterday off Anjenevall, by one of my own People, ſtanding to the Northward; he has been expected ſome Time at Sevendrog, and the Troops at Farlee only wait his Arrival; they are in Readineſs; and there being no Doubt of their immediate hoſtile Intentions againſt this Place, I requeſt that your Honour, &c. will be pleaſed to ſend the Gunners, and a Reinforcement of Sepoys directly; Eighty to Ninety Recruits are ready.

I am, with Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
Geo. Dick.

Fort Victoria,
12th March 1780.

Saturday 18th. Signed the following Letter to Fort Victoria.

To Mr. George Dick, Reſident at Fort Victoria.

Sir,

We have received your ſeveral Letters to that dated the 12th, on the Subject of the expected Attack, and the required Reinforcements.

By the Bombay Grab, which ſailed the 13th Inſtant, we ſent you the Gunner's Field Pieces, and the Stores mentioned in your Indent, amounting, as per the incloſed Invoice, to Rupees 1,855. 2. 11. and this is all the Supply that we can ſpare or think neceſſary.

We are your loving Friends,

Bombay Caſtle,
18th March 1780.

Wm Hornby,
&c. Committee.

APPENDIX, N° 268.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 25th February, 1780.

RECEIVED the following Letter from Colonel Browne.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have the Honour of acquainting you of my Arrival here the 21ſt Inſtant, with Six Companies of European Infantry and a Company of Artillery from the Coaſt, amounting to 472 Non-commiſſioned Rank and File.

In conſequence of the preſſing Neceſſity urged by the Governor General and Council at Bengal, the Gentlemen of the Committee at Fort Saint George were induced to put on board the above Number of Men on the Seahorſe, Horſenden, and Morning Star, beſides Two Companies which I found myſelf obliged to ſend on board the Hawke, as they were ſo crowded on the Horſenden as made me apprehenſive for their Health; which Two Companies Captain Cotton promiſed Captain Panton and me to return to the Horſenden, when we ſhould arrive off the Port of Bombay; inſtead of which he, apparently by Deſign, left us off Ceylon, and we have not ſeen them ſince; I therefore requeſt you will be pleaſed to diſpatch them with all Expedition on their Arrival, and ſhould Captain Durand, who commands them, be in want of Money during the Stay there, I beg you will order him to be ſupplied, and take his Bill on me for the Amount.

It was the earneſt Wiſh of the Gentlemen at Madras, that the Detachment at Tellicherry ſhould join me as ſoon as poſſible, for which Purpoſe they ſent the neceſſary Orders to Major Cotgrave; but as it is impoſſible for him to comply therewith, without you aſſiſt him with a Conveyance, I hope you will ſpeedily enable him to do it.

In addition to the above Two Detachments I am in daily Expectation of receiving another Battalion of Sepoys from Pondicherry.

I have the Honour to encloſe you a Letter from the Committee at Fort Saint George.

I am, Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
With the greateſt Reſpect,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
George Brown.

Surat,
23d February 1780.

Extract of Bombay Select Conſultations, 6th April 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable William Hornby, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor,
Daniel Draper, Eſquire.
Mr. Carnac, indiſpoſed and abſent.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Our laſt Addreſs, of the 17th ultimo, waited on you by the Drake.

We have the Honour to acquaint you, that the Madras Troops under the Command of Colonel Brown marched from hence the 21ſt ultimo, to join General Goddard's Army; and that in conſequence

quence of an Application from the General to the Chief, they were accompanied by a Detachment from this Garriſon of 500 Sepoys, which was to proceed with them to Soncleterrah Ghaut, and which the Chief informs us, will be back again in a few Days.

Encloſed we ſend for your Notice, Copies of Four Letters which have lately paſſed between us and the Dutch; and an Addreſs from the Dutch Directors and Council to the Honourable the Preſident and Council.

We are, with Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
R. H. Boddam,
Thomas Day,
Charles Bourchier,
Daniel Crokatt,
Daniel Seton,
Samuel Gambier.

Surat,
2d April 1780.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 23d April 1780.

Surat, Lette from.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Our laſt Addreſs is dated the 2d Inſtant. We have the Honour to acquaint you that our Honourable Maſters Ship the Beſborough arrived at this Bar Yeſterday, with a Detachment on board her from Madras, conſiſting of Five Companies of Sepoys, under the Command of Captain John Walker; which the Honourable the Governor and Select Committee of Madras acquaint us, is a Reinforcement for the Army under the Command of General Goddard. Five Companies more are on board the Atlas and Grafton, but the Beſborough parted Company from theſe Veſſels off Cochin.

We are, with Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
R. Hart Boddam,
Thomas Day,
Charles Bourchier,
Daniel Crokatt,
Daniel Seton,
Samuel Gambier.

Surat, 18th April, 1780.

APPENDIX, N° 269.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 2d January 1780.

To Major Cotgrave.

Sir,

COLONEL Braithwaite has acquainted us of your having arrived to relieve him in the Command of the Madras Detachment, and we conclude this will find you in Charge of the Forces at Tellicherry.

That Gentleman had alſo propoſed to us to ſend a ſufficient Force from hence to relieve the Madras Detachment from the Charge of Tellicherry, which is an abſolute Impoſſibility, as we have detached every Man we could ſpare to reinforce the Army under General Goddard; we however hope that your Detention at Tellicherry will only cauſe a temporary Delay to your Proceeding to the Northward, and that your active Efforts to diſlodge the Enemy, will be ſo ſucceſsful, as to admit of your quitting your preſent Charge, and leave you at Liberty to purſue the Purpoſe for which you were ordered to this Coaſt. We think it expedient to ſuggeſt to you, that if a vigorous Effort ſhould be found neceſſary to diſlodge the Enemy, and your preſent Force not be judged adequate, the Battalion deſtined to relieve the 20th, may be brought up to Tellicherry before the latter is ſent down to Anjengo, which will give you an Addition of Force not to be reſiſted by the Enemy, and when the Service is effected, the 20th may be returned, and you can proceed with the Remainder to join General Goddard.

We

We have alſo Hopes of ſome good Effect from a Repreſentation that has been made to Hyder Ally of the Conduct of his Tributaries.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
William Hornby,
&c. Committee.

Bombay Caſtle,
2d January 1780.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 23d January 1780.

Letter from Tellicherry.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Our laſt Addreſs of the 1ſt Inſtant was tranſmitted you the ſame Day per expreſs Boat, Duplicate of which is incloſed.

Major John Cotgrave having communicated his Intentions to the Reſident of proceeding on the Britannia, with the Companies of Artillery and Infantry of the Madras Detachment, to join General Goddard's Army, which Step we were of Opinion might at this Juncture prove highly prejudicial to the Honourable Company's Affairs here; we in conſequence thereof wrote him a Letter, Copy of which is incloſed, acquainting him therewith, and requeſted he would remain here ſome Time longer, but to which he has not replied.

We are with Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your obedient Servants,
Richard Church,
Samuel Stedman,
Michael Firth.

Tellicherry,
5th January 1780.

N. B. The above Letter being a Duplicate, did not incloſe the Addreſs of the 1ſt Inſtant.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We addreſſed you laſt the 5th Inſtant, by our Honourable Maſters Ship Britannia, Duplicate of which is now encloſed.

On the 16th ultimo, the Mahundy Savoy, commanded by Antonio Perez, laying in Mangulow Roads, was boarded and taken by Eight French, and Four Portugueze Sailors, belonging to the ſmall French Snow at Goa, (noticed before to your Honour, &c.) commanded by Captain De la But, and who had come from thence to Mangulore in a ſmall Boat, under Pretence of protecting their Captain, who had been at Mangulore for ſome Time paſt on his Return to Goa. We learn that the above Veſſel was carried to the latter Place, where the Government on finding in what Manner ſhe had been ſeized, took her under its Protection, and confined the Crew. It is alſo ſaid that Captain De la But is alſo confined at Mangulore, for being privy to the Capture.

Sadir Cawn is expected ſhortly at Callicut from Seringpatam; notwithſtanding the Nabob's Troops have been in Poſſeſſion of Mahé, we do not find any new Works have been made at that Place.

There has been no Alteration in our military Operation ſince the Britannia left this Place; the Nairs ſtill continue on the Hills and in the Poſts around us, as they ſeem determined not to quit us for ſome Time, the Reſident on the 5th Inſtant wrote a Letter to the Nabob Hyder Ally, (Copy of which is incloſed) acquainting him of the Prince of Cheuka's Proceedings.

A few Days ago a fiſhing Boat from Bombay was taken by one of Hyder's Gallivats, off Mangulore, and ſent into that Place.

We are, very reſpectfully,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
Richard Church,
Sam.l Stedman,
Mich.l Firth.

Tellicherry,
11th January 1780.

Copy of a Letter from the Reſident and Factors at Tellicherry.

To Major John Cotgrave, Commander in Chief of the Forces at Tellicherry.

Sir,

We have been favoured with your Letter in Reply to ours of Yeſterday's Date.

As you have been pleaſed to communicate to the Reſident your Intentions of proceeding upon the Britannia with the Companies of Artillery and Infantry of the Madras Detachment, to join General Goddard's Army, agreeable to the Orders you have received from the Honourable the Select Committee

mittee at Madras, we think it incumbent on us, in the preſent State of our Affairs, to requeſt will remain here for ſome Time longer.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
Rich[d] Church,
Samuel Stedman,
Michael Firth.

Tellicherry,
4th January 1780.

A true Copy.
Mich[l] Firth,
Secretary.

Copy Tranſlate of a Letter from the Reſident at Tellicherry to Hyder Ally.

fter Compliments:
the Month of October laſt, the Prince of Cherika entered the Province of Randaturah, and oyed the Villages with Fire and Sword: I ſent our Linguiſt to him to enquire the Reaſon of his luct; who anſwered him, That he came to deſtroy our Villages by your Order; and a ſhort Time Prince came and attacked Tellicherry. But as I knew of no War between you and the ourable Company, I therefore write you this Letter to acquaint you of the Conduct of the ce, and to deſire you will ſend him Orders not to act ſo contrary to the Friendſhip which ſub- between you and the Company. All this Seaſon we have not had any Rice from Mangalore. e you will give Orders for its being exported here as uſual.

A true Copy.
Mich[l] Firth,
Sec[y].

Bombay Secret Conſultations, 31ſt January 1780.

Copy of a Letter from the Reſident and Factors at Tellicherry.

To the Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General and Council, at Fort William.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
n a Letter received from our Superiors at Bombay, dated the 2d Inſtant, we are directed to ad- your Honour, &c. of the preſent State of Affairs at this Place, not doubting but that they now y acquaint you with the Cauſe of our Troubles with the neighbouring Powers, Tributaries to the bob Hyder Ally Cawn.
The Forces of the Prince of Cherika and King of Cartinadue, ſtill continue ſtrongly intrenched different Hills and Poſts in the Honourable Company's Diſtricts, the commanding Officer finding mpoſſible, from frequent Attempts, to diſlodge them with our preſent Force. Whether the my only intend to bring us to an Accommodation upon their own Terms, if poſſible, or have re extenſive Views, we cannot ſay; but underſtand, that Sadur Cawn, the Nabob's Governor Callicut, is expected from Seringapatam with a large Force to ſettle the Troubles on this Coaſt, l in particular our Diſputes with his Maſter's Tributaries.
The Honourable the Preſident of Bombay has wrote a Letter to the Nabob Hyder Ally, re- ſenting the Conduct of his Tributaries towards the Honourable Company; we therefore hope that it l have a proper Effect, though the extraordinary Conduct of his Officers at Mangulore, and other ſts, give us Reaſon to think that Hyder has ſecretly hoſtile Intentions againſt the Company.

We are, with the greateſt Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
Rich[d] Church,
Samuel Stedman,
Mich[l] Firth.

Tellicherry,
15th January 1780.

A true Copy.
Mich[l] Firth,
Sec[y].

February.

Received the following Letter from Major Cotgrave at Tellicherry: Wedneſday, 2d February.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
I have been honoured with the Receipt of your Letter of the 2d Inſtant.
I ſhould be extremely happy was it in my Power to effect the Service your Honours require of me; at it is now too late; the Enemy being ſo ſtrongly ſituated as not to be diſlodged without the oſs of more Men than can be ſpared at this Juncture. I have already made Attempts on Two of eir fortified Hills, one of which failed; and I am convinced, by the obſtinate Reſiſtance we met with,

with, that to ſubdue them would require a much greater Force than we can bring againſt the even ſhould the other Battalion arrive from Madras; the extraordinary Situation of this Coun putting the beſt diſciplined Troops in the World ſcarcely on a Par with theſe People. I am as as poſſible compleating the Lines, which I hope will be in Ten or Twelve Days, when I sh embark for Surat on the Eagle, with the Company of European Artillery and Company of Infa leaving the Grenadier Battalion and the 20th Battalion for the Defence of the Place, which in Opinion will be ſufficient againſt the preſent Enemy.

I am with great Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient,
and moſt humble Servant,
John Cotgrave

Tellicherry,
21ſt January, 1780.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 6th March 1780.

Read the laſt Advices from Tellicherry.

llicherry, Conſiderations ing Major Cotgrave, and roubles there.

We ſhould have been happy, had Circumſtances permitted of Major Cotgrave's quitting Te cherry, to join General Goddard with the European Force under his Command, which not be very conſiderable, a temporary Detention there can have no very material Effect upon the Gener Operations; more eſpecially ſince the Arrival of the very ample Force under Colonel Browne at Sur while the Major's quitting Tellicherry until the Troubles are in ſome Train of being adjuſt might greatly endanger the Safety of that Settlement, or give an unfavourable Turn to the Nego tions which appear likely to be opened with the Enemy. For theſe Reaſons we approve of Factors oppoſing their Departure, and Major Cotgrave muſt be deſired not to quit Tellicher with the Europeans till ſome Accommodation has taken place; but the Moment it can be done w Propriety, we ſhall give our free Conſent to his joining General Goddard, and the Reſident Factors will be then directed to ſend away the Madras Forces as expeditiouſly as poſſible, in ord reduce the heavy Expence of that Garriſon. In the mean Time we muſt be of Opinion Major Cotgrave, by continuing at Tellicherry in Defence of that Settlement, will perfo acceptable and real Service to the Company, than any Aſſiſtance he could afford to the Army Guzerat.

jor Cotgrave's Conduct roved of;

Reſpecting the general Orders iſſued by Major Cotgrave the 5th ultimo, and complained of by Reſident and Factors, we are of Opinion he has greatly exceeded the Powers veſted by the Regulations in military commanding Officers under his Circumſtances, and aſſumed an Autho which can in no Degree be ſuppoſed neceſſary for the Defence of the Settlement, to which Ob alone his Powers are confined. While we are pleaſed with the Moderation and conciliatory Cond obſerved by the Company's Civil Servants at Tellicherry, we cannot but obſerve with Diſappro tion and Diſpleaſure, the Proceedings of the military commanding Officer, ſo contrary to the Conſtitution of the Service, and which can produce no other Effect but Jealouſies and Diſcords trimental to the common Cauſe. Theſe Irregularities again recall to our Obſervation the bad C ſequences of the Inattention of the Government at Madras in ſending to this Coaſt a mil Force not ſubordinate to our Authority; which muſt be ſtrongly repreſented to the Company, tha ſuch Proceeding may be permitted in future, and in the mean Time, our Diſapprobation mu expreſſed to Major Cotgrave of the Conduct he has purſued.

flections on the bad Con- nces arifing therefrom.

e Factors to have Permiſ- to land Two and a Half from the Beſborough. llicherry, 50,000 Rupees ſent down immediately. e Reſident at Onore, to Permiſſion to land One from the Beſborough.

The Factors at Tellicherry muſt have Permiſſion to land from the Beſborough, Two Lacks a Half of Rupees, out of the Five Lacks expected from Bengal on that Ship; having no Method of ſupplying them to the Amount they require; and leſt the Ship ſhould have paſſed Port, 50,000 Rupees will be immediately ſent from hence on a Veſſel which will be ordered for Purpoſe. The Reſident at Onore muſt alſo have Permiſſion to land One Lack of Rupees from Beſborough.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 7th March 1780.

Thurſday 9th.

Received the following Letter from Colonel Browne:

ne, Colonel, Letter from.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

By the Officers who arrived Yeſterday in the Revenge, I am much concerned to find th Reſident at Tellichery has given poſitive Orders to the Captains of all Ships which anchor not to receive any of the Madras Troops on board; by which Behaviour, the Service here w much impeded, and the Officer commanding there is deprived of the Power of putting his C into Execution. I am therefore again obliged to trouble you, requeſting that you will be p to ſend Orders down to the Reſident, that no farther Obſtacles may be thrown in the Way of Embarkation.

I have the Honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servan
Geo. Browne

Camp near Surat,
4th March 1780.

APPENDIX, N° 269.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 13th March 1780.

To Colonel Browne,

Sir,

We have been favoured with your Letter of the 25th ultimo, and 2d and 4th Inſtant.

We have given Orders for the Rice and Water Caſks to be landed from the Horſendon; and when the Amount is aſcertained, ſhall adviſe you thereof.

We ſhould have been very glad, had Circumſtances permitted, of Major Cotgrave's quitting Tellicherry, with the European Infantry and Artillery under his Command; but their Force is not ſo conſiderable, as to allow us to think that a temporary Detention there can have any material Effect on the Operations of the Army in Guzerat, eſpecially ſince the Arrival of the reſpectable Force under your Command; whereas his quitting Tellicherry till the Troubles are in ſome Train of being adjuſted, might endanger the Safety of the Settlement, or give an unfavourable Turn to the Negociations which appear likely to be opened with the Enemy. For theſe Reaſons, we have approved of the Conduct of the Reſident and Factors, in oppoſing Major Cotgrave's Intentions of withdrawing the Europeans from Tellicherry; and we cannot doubt but Major Cotgrave will ſtand juſtified for a Delay in the Execution of his Orders, which ariſes from the Neceſſity of his not quitting an important Settlement of the Company's under his Charge for Defence, and with an Enemy actually before it carrying on an Attack.

We ſhall leave no Means untried to compoſe the Troubles at Tellicherry; and the Moment it can be done, will do our utmoſt to expedite the Junction of Major Cotgrave and his Party, with the Detatchment under your Command.

We have had Intelligence of the Select Committee at Madras having engaged Shipping to bring round the Battalion of Sepoys to this Coaſt, and their Arrival with you may be ſoon expected.

We are, Sir,

Your moſt obedient
humble Servant,
W. Hornby,
&c. Committee.

Bombay Caſtle,
13th March 1780.

To Mr. Richard Church, Reſident, &c. Factors at Tellicherry.

Gentlemen,

We have received your Letters of the 25th and 28th of January, and 2d, 9th, 11th, and 21ſt ultimo.

Having diſpatched a ſhort Letter to you by a Boat, under the 6th Inſtant, we now incloſe a Duplicate thereof.

The European Force, under Major Cotgrave, is not ſo conſiderable, that a temporary Delay in their joining General Goddard can have any material Effect on his Operations; eſpecially ſince the Arrival of the reſpectable Reinforcement under Colonel Brown; whereas their quitting Tellicherry at this Juncture, might greatly endanger the Safety of the Settlement, or give an unfavourable Turn to the Negociations which appear likely to be opened with the Enemy, and which we moſt ardently wiſh may terminate in an Accommodation. Upon theſe Grounds we approve of your Conduct in oppoſing Major Cotgrave's Intention of withdrawing the Europeans, as Circumſtances ſtood at the Date of your laſt Advices; but the Moment it can be done with Propriety you will ſignify your Conſent to Major Cotgrave's proceeding to Surat according to his Orders, and return the Madras Sepoys to Anjengo, with the utmoſt Expedition, as the Expence of your Garriſon is at preſent almoſt inſupportable.

We are of Opinion that Major Cotgrave, in the Orders you complain of, as recited in your Letter of the 9th ultimo, has much exceeded the Powers, veſted by the late Regulations in the commanding Officer, in ſuch Circumſtances, and aſſumed an Authority which can in no Degree be ſuppoſed neceſſary for the Defence of the Settlement, to which Object alone his Powers are confined. We ſhall, by this Opportunity, ſignify to Major Cotgrave our Diſapprobation of his Conduct; and we approve of your Moderation on the Occaſion. We muſt take Notice of your Omiſſion in not ſending a Copy, at Length, of the general Orders of the 5th ultimo, though mentioned in your Letter of the 9th to be forwarded with the other Papers.

The Reſident ſhould certainly have anſwered the Nabob Hyder Ally's Letter, and kept up the Correſpondence with him; as your taking no Notice of this Letter may give Diſguſt, and the Reſident's having wrote to him was no Reaſon for your diſcontinuing a Correſpondence with him. The Nabob's Anſwer to the Preſident, ſo far as it related to the Tellicherry Affairs, was much to the ſame Purport as his Letter to Mr. Church, and in other Points was expreſſive of Attention to this Government; but as the moſt effectual Method of coming to a right Underſtanding with the Nabob, and aſcertaining his real Diſpoſition towards the Company, as well as bringing the Troubles at Tellicherry to a Concluſion, we have reſolved to ſend Mr. George Horſley on a Deputation to him, who will be inſtructed to make a proper Repreſentation on the Conduct of his Tributaries, and to

endeavour to obtain ſuch Orders as may reſtore Tranquillity; and as in the Courſe of the Diſcuſſion of this Subject, he will have Occaſion for the moſt ample Information, we direct that you immediately forward to him at Onore, a full Account of the Origin and Cauſe of the preſent Troubles, and that you correſpond with him on all Parts, relating to our Settlement, in which the Exerciſe of the Nabob's Influence may be requiſite.

The Eagle arrived here the 7th inſtant with Mr. Petrie.

We have, as before adviſed, given you Authority to land Two Lacks and a Half of Rupees from the Beſborough out of the promiſed Supply from Bengal, and though it muſt be attended with Loſs to the Company, we can find no other Mode of ſupplying you to ſo large an Amount: But in caſe the Beſborough ſhould have paſſed Tellicherry before the Receipt of this Order, we now ſend you, by the Morning Star, a Supply of 50,000 Rupees for your immediate Expences, and ſhall furniſh you with the Remainder of the Sum required in the moſt expeditious Manner, which we ſhall be very glad to ſee appropriated to the Purchaſe of Pepper, inſtead of being expended in Military Charges.

We cannot give any Orders about the Works at Tellicherry till we receive what Mr. Dacer has to offer further upon the Method of putting them into a more compact State of Defence.

We incloſe a Copy of our Letter of this Date to Major Cotgrave, and an Invoice of the Treaſure and Stores on board the Morning Star for your Settlement, the Whole amounting to ..... Rupees.

After landing the Conſignments of the Morning Star you will return her to the Preſidency immediately.

Bombay Caſtle,
13th March, 1780.

We are your loving Friends,
W. Hornby,
&c. Committee.

To Major Cotgrave.

Sir,

We have received your Letter of the 21ſt January, and ſhould have been very glad, had Circumſtances permitted of your quitting Tellicherry with the European Detachment, in order to join the Army under General Goddard; but their Force is not ſo conſiderable, that a temporary Stay there can have any material Effect on his Operations, eſpecially ſince the Arrival of the Reinforcement under Colonel Brown, whereas your quitting Tellicherry till the Troubles are in ſome Train of being adjuſted, might greatly endanger the Safety of the Settlement, or give an unfavourable Turn to the Negociations which appear likely to be opened with the Enemy. For theſe Reaſons we think it proper you ſhould not quit Tellichery with the Europeans, till ſome Accommodation has taken place; but the Moment it can be done with Propriety, we ſhall give our Conſent to your joining the Army under General Goddard; and in the mean Time we muſt be of Opinion, that your Continuance at Tellicherry, in Defence of that Settlement, will recommend you more to your Superiors, and be a more acceptable and real Service to the Company than any Aſſiſtance you can afford to the Army in Guzerat.

The Reſident and Factors have made a Repreſentation to us upon the Subject of the general Orders iſſued by you the 5th ultimo, in which we likewiſe think you have much exceeded the Powers veſted by the late Regulations in a Military Commanding Officer in your Circumſtances, and aſſumed an Authority which can in no Degree be ſuppoſed neceſſary for the Defence of the Settlement, to which Object alone your Powers are confined. While we are pleaſed with the Moderation and conciliating Conduct obſerved by the Company's Civil Servants at Tellicherry, we cannot but obſerve with Diſapprobation and Diſpleaſure the Proceedings of the Military Commanding Officer, ſo contrary to the true Conſtitution of the Service, and which can produce no other Effect but Jealouſies and Diſcords detrimental to the common Cauſe.

You can have no Ground of Apprehenſion, that any Cenſure will revert to you for any Delay in joining General Goddard, that may be occaſioned by the Neceſſity of your not quitting one of the Company's Settlements, under your Charge for Defence, and with an Enemy actually before it carrying on an Attack.

We ſhall leave no Meaſure untried to accommodate the Troubles at Tellicherry, on which Subject Letters have paſſed between our Preſident and the Nabob Hyder Ally; and we find ſome Overtures have been made to Mr. Church; but as the moſt effectual Method, we ſhall inſtantly depute a Gentleman to the Nabob himſelf, who will have particular Inſtructions to make it his Firſt Object to ſettle all Diſputes with his Tributaries at Tellicherry. The Reſident and Factors having mentioned in one of their late Letters that you had written to us on the Subject of a large Indent for Stores, which we received under Cover of a Letter from Colonel Braithwaite, but without any Notice or Advice from him; we think it neceſſary to acquaint you that no ſuch Letter has been received from you.

Bombay Caſtle,
13th March 1780.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
W. Hornby,
&c. Committee.

APPENDIX, N° 269, 270.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 5th April 1780.

Signed the following Letters to Tellicherry and Fort St. George.

To Mr. Richard Church, Reſident, &c. Factors at Tellicherry.

Gentlemen,

We have received your Letters of the 9th, 14th and 15th ultimo.

We have already acquainted you in our Letter of the 13th ultimo, of the only effectual Method that has occurred to us, of reſtoring Tranquillity to your Settlement, but Mr. Horſley has not yet been able to proceed on his Deputation, owing to the Nabob not having ſent the proper Paſſports.

As by the reſolute Meaſures you have purſued, Major Cotgrave has been prevented from quitting Tellicherry, and a Continuation of the ſame Conduct, and our Letter of the 13th, will probably make him deſiſt from all Thoughts of that Nature; we ſee no Occaſion to ſend you a Reinforcement of Artillery ſolicited in your Letter of the 9th ultimo; and we now write to the Preſidency of Madras, deſiring them to revoke their Orders for his joining General Goddard, and to put him under the Orders of this Government.

We direct that you ſend up as ſoon as poſſible the Shybars now lying at Tellicherry, upon a heavy Freight, as if Circumſtances ſhould happily permit of your returning the Madras Sepoys to Anjengo, we conclude you will find no Difficulty in providing other Means of Tranſportation.

As it will be utterly impoſſible for us to ſend any further Supply of Money to Tellicherry this Seaſon; and if your preſent Balance is expended in Purchaſes of Pepper, there will be no Means left of defraying the Expences of the Troops now there for your Defence, which may be attended with the moſt alarming Conſequences; we muſt, however unwillingly, direct that if you ſee no immediate Proſpect of the Troubles being accommodated, you reſerve the Whole of your preſent Balance of Caſh for the Payment of your Garriſon, and diſcontinue your Purchaſes of Pepper.

We are your loving Friends,

Wᵐ Hornby,
&c. Committee.

Bombay Caſtle,
5th April 1780.

To the Honourable Sir Thomas Rumbold, Preſident and Governor, &c. Select Committee of Fort Saint George.

Gentlemen,

As it is not impoſſible but the Troubles of Tellicherry may prevent Major Cotgrave from quitting that Settlement before the Rains, we requeſt, for the Good of the Service, and to prevent the Confuſion and Embarraſſment which will continue to ſubſiſt whilſt he has the Sanction of your Orders for withdrawing from a diſagreeable Station to a more eligible Service, that you will revoke your Orders for his proceeding to join the Detachment under Colonel Brown, and put him under the Orders of this Government; aſſuring you that we will expedite his Junction with Colonel Brown as ſoon as Circumſtances will permit of its being done with any Degree of Propriety.

Incloſed is Copy of a Letter we lately found it neceſſary to write to Major Cotgrave, whoſe ſubſequent Conduct has increaſed the Neceſſity of the Meaſure we have above recommended to you.

The Interruption to our Communication with the Continent, in conſequence of the Rupture with the Marattas, having cauſed a very alarming Scarcity of Grain on this Iſland, we earneſtly requeſt you will if poſſible ſupply us with 20,000 or 30,000 Bags of Rice, as early as you may be able, after Receipt hereof, diſpatching the Veſſels on which you may lade it, by the Southern Paſſage; in which Caſe a Supply will arrive in Time to be of the moſt eſſential Service to this Settlement, and prevent much Diſtreſs.

We are, Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,

Wᵐ Hornby,
&c. Committee.

Bombay Caſtle,
5th April 1780.

APPENDIX, N° 270.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 23d April 1780.

RECEIVED per Beſborough the following Letter from Madras.

Gentlemen,

We have received your Letter of the 2d January, with the Papers of Intelligence.

If Hyder Ally has taken, or means to take, any Part in the Diſputes with the Nairs, we apprehend it muſt be from ſome Provocations, real or pretended, that have been given him by the Gentlemen of Tellicherry, in which we are the more confirmed by our Letter from Colonel Braithwaite; we have no Subject of Difference with him here that could induce him to take ſuch a Part, and we particularly ordered Colonel Braithwaite when at Mahé, to interfere in nothing relating either to Hyder or th:

the Nairs. Hyder's Conduct at preſent depends very much on the Tranſactions with the Marattas; a Peace with them would have kept him in Awe, and delivered us from every Idea of Trouble from that Quarter; but it will be difficult to ſay what Line he will purſue, now that the Negociation with the Marattas is at an End, and Hoſtilities commenced; for we ſuppoſe it muſt be known to you, that a Treaty has been concluded between the Marattas and him, with a View of encreaſing our Difficulties; and that the Nizam has been from the Beginning of theſe Diſputes directed ſolely by the Influence of the preſent Powers at Poona.

You expreſs your Wiſhes, that at this Time we may be full and unreſerved in our political Correſpondence; hitherto we are not ſenſible of having omitted to give you every Information that was neceſſary, and our Duty to the Company will certainly incline us to continue theſe Communications without Reſerve. Upon this Principle we deem it expedient to give it as our Opinion, that a War at this Time may unite againſt us all the principal Powers of India; and when it is conſidered, that we have an *actual War* to ſuſtain againſt the Two greateſt Powers of Europe, we think a Peace with the Marattas is ſafer and more deſirable upon almoſt any Terms, than Troubles which threaten ſo many Dangers, and for our own Part, ſetting aſide the Evils which preſent themſelves from War at this Juncture, we do not ſee from whence the Company are to derive Reſources ſufficient to manage Undertakings of ſuch great Magnitude.

For theſe Reaſons we ſincerely hope, that every conſiſtent Endeavour will be uſed to bring about a Peace; and we flatter ourſelves, from your Exertions, joined to thoſe of General Goddard, that an Event ſo much to be wiſhed may ſpeedily take place. We ſhould have been obliged to you if you had acquainted us with the Terms that were propoſed to the Marattas, and the Terms on which they were willing to come to an Accommodation. Theſe Particulars would have been very ſatisfactory, and we requeſt you will communicate them to us as ſoon as poſſible.

You will have been informed by our Letter of the 3d ultimo, a Duplicate whereof is now tranſmitted, what Reinforcement we had determined to ſpare General Goddard's Army. A complete Battalion of Europeans and a Company of Artillery went to Surat by the Sea Horſe, Horſenden, and Morning Star, and we ordered the Battalion of Sepoys we propoſed ſending, to be embarked on the Beſborough, Atlas, and Duke of Grafton, for Surat.

Should Captain Montgomery, by proceeding in conſequence of our Orders directly to Surat, be unable to fulfil his Engagements exactly to the Time with reſpect to the Delivery of his Ship to you, we requeſt and hope that ſuch Failure may be no Detriment to him, as the public Service only will be the Occaſion of it.

We have the Pleaſure to acquaint you that Sir Edward Hughes, with Six Sail of the Line, arrived here the 18th ultimo, together with ſeveral of the Company's Ships as per Liſt encloſed, and a Battalion of His Majeſty's 73d Regiment.

We are, Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,

Fort Saint George,
4th February 1780.

Thomas Rumbold,
John Whitehill,
H. Munro,
C. Smith.

Extract of Bombay Select Conſultations, the 29th May 1780.

To the Honourable Sir Thomas Rumbold, Baronet, Preſident and Governor, &c. Select Committee at Fort Saint George.

Gentlemen,

We have been favoured with your Letters of the 4th and 8th February and 18th March.

Your Wiſhes cannot be more ardent than ours for a ſafe and honourable Peace with the Marattas, nor will any Endeavours be wanting on our Part, to promote ſo deſirable an Event; but as Matters now ſtand, we have no direct Agency in the Meaſures now purſuing, the Governor General and Council having reſerved the Conduct of this War entirely in their own Hands.

General Goddard received his Powers for the late Negociation with the Poona Government, from the Governor General and Council, who acquainted us they had commiſſioned him to treat of the Renewal or Confirmation of the Treaty of Poorunder, provided they would recede from the Pretenſions they had acquired by the Convention of Worgaum, and agree not to admit any French Force into their Dominions, nor allow that Nation to form any Eſtabliſhment on the Maratta Coaſt; and that the Acceptance or Refuſal of theſe Conditions, was to determine the Alternative of Peace or War.

In Anſwer to theſe Overtures, General Goddard acquainted us, that the Durbar declared in plain Terms they would not make a Peace with the Engliſh, unleſs Salſette was reſtored, and the Perſon of Ragoba given up; and that on theſe Conditions, and theſe only, they would agree to the other Terms propoſed to them by General Goddard.

We have called upon the Commander of the Atlas reſpecting the Two Deſerters, but have not yet received his Anſwer.

Bombay Caſtle,
29th May 1780.

We are, Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
William Hornby,
&c. Committee.

APPENDIX, N° 271.

Bombay, Select Conſultations, 29th April 1780.

Copy of General Goddard's Plan for the Military Eſtabliſhment of Bombay.

THE Opportunity which the Select Committee have afforded me in their Letter of the 24th of February, to lay before them my Sentiments upon the preſent State of their Military Eſtabliſhments, and the moſt eligible Plan for increaſing them, has given me the greateſt Pleaſure, and I can only lament that I have not the Means immediately of affording you my Opinion, ſo fully as I could wiſh, on ſo important a Subject; I ſhall however generally obſerve, it is my Recommendation that your Military Eſtabliſhment ſhould undergo a Reformation in all its Branches; and to this End, I have put together ſome Remarks on the Means of a general Arrangement, which ſhall be compatible with the preſent State of your Settlements, and which I truſt will prove ſufficient for the requiſite Exigencies of the Service. I have for your more ready Information on theſe Points, ſeparated the different Departments into diſtinct Heads; and believe me I ſhall be happy if they produce the Benefit that is propoſed.

Artillery Department.

The Utility of this Corps, and its very reſpectable Advantages, are too obvious, to make any Comments thereon at all neceſſary. I would recommend the Augmentation of it to the ſerious Attention of the Committee. The Stability of your Poſſeſſions is intimately connected with the Degree of Perfection to which this Corps can be ſupported; the greateſt Caution therefore will be neceſſary in the Formation and compleating of it; and due Regard ſhould be had to the Characters of the Men, their Size, and Nation. It has long been a Regulation in the Corps at Bengal, that no Foreigners are admitted into it.

Propoſed that the Corps of Artillery for the Service of the Preſidency of Bombay be formed into a Battalion, to be compoſed of Six Companies; each Company to conſiſt of the following Strength.

Strength of a Company of European Artillery.

	Commiſſioned Officers.												
	Lieutenant Colonel.	Majors.	Captains.	Captain Lieutenants.	Lieutenants.	Lieutenant Fire Workers.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Drummers and Fifers.	Bombardiers.	Gunners.	Matroſſes.	Total, including Non-commiſſioned Officers, &c.
One Company of Artillery —	—	—	1	1	3	3	6	6	4	12	24	52	104
Complete Strength of the Battalion	1	2	6	6	18	18	36	36	24	72	144	312	624

That there be a Lieutenant Colonel Commandant to the Battalion, and Two Majors, as mentioned in the Strength; and that the Staff of the Battalion conſiſt of a Brigade Major, One Adjutant, and One Quarter Maſter, with fixed monthly Allowances, both for the Field and Garriſon: The Non-commiſſioned Staff to be regulated according to the Uſage of the Service. That on a Company or more being detached from the Battalion, an Officer receive the temporary Appointment of Adjutant and Quarter Maſter for the Duration of the Service, with the uſual Allowances.

Laſcars for the Service of the Ordnance, and Ordnance Stores.

Unacquainted with your preſent Eſtabliſhment of Laſcars, or the Mode by which you provide them, I can only recommend in general Terms, that this Corps ſhould be formed on a fixed Eſtabliſhment; that they ſhould be incorporated into Companies, cloathed, and paid, under the ſame Regulations as propoſed for the Sepoy Corps, and placed under the Direction of the Commandant of Artillery, who will on every Occaſion of the Service detach them with the Artillery, in ſuch Proportions as the Nature of the Service to be executed ſhall require.

European Infantry.

I recommend that this Corps be formed into a Regiment, to conſiſt of Two Battalions, each Battalion to be formed of One Company of Grenadiers and Eight Battalion Companies; but as I am aware of the Inability of the preſent State of the Settlement to effect this Plan, One of the Battalions might be compleated upon the propoſed Eſtabliſhment, until the Honourable the Court of Directors ſhall enable the more full Execution of it.

	Commiſſioned Officers.									
	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Enſigns.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Drums and Fifes.	Private.	Total, including Non-commiſſioned Officers, &c.
Propoſed Strength of a Grenadier Company — — —			1	4	—	6	6	4	64	80
Of a Battalion Company — — —			1	1	2	4	4	2	50	60
A Battalion conſiſting of 1 Gren[r] and 8 Batt[n] Companies —	1	1	9	12	16	38	38	20	464	560

The Staff of a Battalion to be
1 Adjutant,
1 Quarter Maſter.
Non-commiſſioned Staff, as uſual.

I have recommended that each Battalion ſhall have a Lieutenant Colonel and a Major; and it is underſtood that your Senior Military Officers, or the Commander in Chief, be conſidered as the Colonel of the Regiment.

The complete Strength of the Regiment will then be as follows, according to the aforegoing propoſed Eſtabliſhment:

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The Regiment of European Infantry.

	Commiſſioned Officers.										
	Colonel Commander in Chief.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Enſigns.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Drums and Fifes.	Private.	Total, including Non-Commiſſioned Officers and Private.
Total — — — —	1	2	2	18	24	32	76	76	40	928	1120

Sepoys, or Native Infantry.

As Pride in the Natives ſeems more the Adherent of Family or of Religion, than the Effect of Conſtitutional Virtue, from which Paſſion alone we can hope to remove the natural Prejudices under which they are bred, ſo as to impreſs them with that Deference and grateful Reſpect and Attachment to our Service, which has hitherto ſupported the Stability of the Company's Poſſeſſions to this Period; I cannot but view the confined Limits of the Poſſeſſions attached to Bombay, as a great Misfortune in the Advancement of the Sepoy Corps to the Perfection they might otherwiſe have acquired. I will hope, that the Extenſion of your Poſſeſſions in the Courſe of the preſent Service, will open a Field for the Ambition and Abilities of your Military, which will do them Credit in their Profeſſion.

The Maintenance of theſe Poſſeſſions will naturally require an Augmentation of your Native Battalions: But as it is my Wiſh to propoſe the Means of increaſing your Military Force with as little Increaſe of Expence as poſſible, I ſhall ſubjoin to the propoſed Eſtabliſhment ſome Remarks, that I truſt will tend to the Reduction of your preſent current Charges.

I would recommend that your Eſtabliſhment of Native Troops be formed ſolely on One Plan, without Partiality or Diſtinction. Two good Ends I propoſe by this; the Firſt and moſt material is, that by this Mode your Military Force will be united and connected, and will acquire an habitual Confidence in each other; the Second is the Advantages of Command being thus impartially diſtributed to your Military Commanders by Seniority, or Tour of Command, Emulation will be excited, and your Troops, by frequent Changes with each other to the different Parts of your Poſſeſſions, will extend your Influence, and that they will comply with Willingneſs and Confidence, on any Exigency that may require their acting at either Extremity, without Danger of Deſertion or Diſguſt.

I would propoſe, that on the arranged Plan being put in Practice, your Corps of Topaſſes, local Sepoys, and temporary Military, of every Denomination, now requiſite in your Subordinates to aſſiſt in the Branches of Collection and Traffic, be ſeverally diſcharged, as an Expence that is not only more burthenſome than regular Sepoys, but whoſe Want of Subordination and Diſcipline might rather tend to tarniſh the Credit of your Arms on Occaſion of Service, than to afford them Support; and I truſt you will be of Opinion with me, that the propoſed Eſtabliſhment of Native Battalions provides for the Security of your Poſſeſſions, and will admit of a very eligible Army being readily drawn together at a very ſhort Notice. The Marine Battalion may have its Uſes and Advantages; and as I do not deem myſelf a competent Judge of them, I ſhall only obſerve, that the Corps ought to be diſtinct from the regular Troops: The Officers to command and ſerve in it, may be ſelected from the Army Liſt; conſidering this Duty a Retirement for ſuch whoſe Wounds or other Infirmities have rendered them incapable of a more active Line of Employ.

I have formed the Eſtabliſhment of Native Troops upon the following Plan, for the Defence of the Line of your Poſſeſſions, viz.

Eſtabliſhment

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Eſtabliſhment of Battalions of Native Infantry.

N° of Battalions	Stations.
4	To garriſon the Iſland of Bombay, and to furniſh the requiſite Detachments to the Southward.
3	For the Iſland of Salſette and its Dependencies.
3	For the Defence of Surat, and its dependant Purgunnahs of Parnulla, Oorpaar, and the Eaſtward Frontiers of the acquired Lands upon the Taptee, or the Attawiſſee.
3	For the Garriſon of Broach, its Dependencies of Jamboſies, Ahmood, Oclaiſeer, and the Gauts of Suckleturat, and Bowahpeirah.
1	Garriſon of Dubay.
1	Extra Services in the Guzeratt.
15	Battalions.

I propoſe that theſe Battalions be formed upon the Eſtabliſhment here ſubjoined. They appear to be too unwieldy upon their preſent Strength, and it becomes more difficult to keep up the ſame Degree of Subordination, Diſcipline, and Appearance, than might be effected with a more compact Body, by the Charge being more divided; I cannot offer a more deciſive Argument for the Utility of this Reduction, than that ſome very able Military Characters have on mature Conſideration deemed it expedient, and as much recommended it: I therefore propoſe that the Battalions be formed of the following Strength, to be compoſed of Two Grenadier Companies, and Eight Battalion Companies.

	European Commiſſioned Officers.		Native Warrant Officers.				Non-warrant and Private.				Total Rank and File.	Staff Effective.					
	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Serjeants.	Drums and Fifes.	Subedars.	Jemadars.	Trumpeters.	Havildars.	Naicks.	Sepoys.		Commandant.	Adjutant, as Subaltern.	Doctors Native.	Writers.	Watermen.	Artificers.
Propoſed Strength of a Grenadier Company —	—	—	-	2	1	2	1	6	6	84	96		-	-	-	-	-
Of a Battalion Company —	—	—	-	2	1	2	1	6	6	64	76	-		-	-	-	-
A Battalion of 2 Grenadier and 8 Battalion Companies —	1	6	11	20	12	20	12	60	60	680	800	1	1	3	3	10	9

I recommend that there be attached to each Battalion of Sepoys, Two Six Pounder Field Pieces, Braſs Ordnance, and that for their Care Two European Gunners and Twenty Native Laſcars be alſo attached to the Battalions reſpectively; it being remembered, that the Sepoys are to work the Guns.

I think it expedient that the Native Infantry be brigaded, and recommend it as a Meaſure that will give Conſequence to the Eſtabliſhment, and promote a great Spirit of Emulation in the Corps.

I propoſe that the Eſtabliſhment of Fifteen Battalions be formed into Three Brigades, of Five Battalions each; that a Field Officer of the Rank of Major be appointed to the Command of each Brigade, and that there be a Lieutenant Colonel Commandant of the Eſtabliſhment of Native Infantry; that a Brigade Major be appointed to the Corps, and that each Brigade have an Adjutant and a Quarter Maſter. When a Battalion or more ſhall be detached, the temporary Appointment of Adjutant and Quarter Maſter ſhall be given to One of the Officers, with the uſual Allowances. You will

perceive

perceive I have reduced the Eſtabliſhment of European Officers to a Battalion, and that it is provided they ſhall be Lieutenants, the Senior of their Rank in the Army, unleſs when there ſhall exiſt Exceptions to wave this Right. It is a known Fact, that the Benefit to be expected from the European Officers, can only reſult from their knowing and being known to their Men.

The conſtant Fluctuation and Changes, attendant on the Promotion of Enſigns to Lieutenants, muſt fruſtrate this Intent, and the Service ultimately ſuffers. It is therefore I adviſe, that Lieutenants be the Subalterns Rank, to be attached to the Sepoy Corps, and that Removals from Battalions be never admitted but on very ſufficient Reaſons.

Another Point I recommend to the Attention of the Committee. It is, that Officers holding eſtabliſhed Staff Employments, be ſtruck off the effective Strength of their Corps, and their Vacancies filled up. It is a public Injury to the Service, that any Poſt ſhould become a Sinecure, and it is a partial Injury to the Army, by the ſevere Check it muſt conſequently give the Emulation.

I do not mean to infer by this Reduction of European Officers, that Six are fully equal to the Service of a Battalion. Whenever the State of your Army will permit, I am perfectly of Opinion it would be eligible to augment them again to Ten, or One to a Company; but my Arguments for their being all of the Rank of Lieutenants, will be worthy your Attention.

Having in the aforegoing drawn the Outlines of the Mode for augmenting your Military Eſtabliſhment, I ſhall proceed to lay before you ſome Remarks on the Means of reducing the attendant Charges on your Army Diſburſes, wherein your heavieſt Expences have heretofore been incurred; and I promiſe myſelf in the Event you will find that the Mode I have to recommend for the Charges of this augmented Force, will bear no comparative Proportion to the preſent Expence of your Military Eſtabliſhments: I have included the Commandant and Adjutant as Two extra Subedars, upon the Strength of the Battalion; it is highly neceſſary that the Rank of Subedar ſhould be annexed to the Poſt of Adjutant, in order to give the Office Weight in the Corps; and the Perſon holding that Poſt, is generally conſidered the Firſt for Promotion to the Rank of Commandant.

Commiſſary's Department.

I have had ſo much Occaſion to interfere in this Branch of your Military Diſburſe, but I muſt make my Obſervation on the Office as full as poſſible, for the Information of the Select Committee, from the Mode I found to be the Practice; I could not poſſibly form to my own Opinion, a Limit to the attendant Charges of this Office, and at length I was neceſſitated almoſt to annihilate the Duty of the Poſt, rather than involve the Company in Expences which could neither be confuted nor reſtricted upon the Principles under which they would have been incurred. It appeared to me, a Poſt without any Form, without any Regularity; a Poſt, which the greater Profuſion and Waſte of Stores, the greater the Emolument of the Commiſſary, and neither Authority or Voucher was to be collected for theſe Iſſues. To effect the deſired Check to theſe Charges, I muſt here remark on the Two moſt principal Points under which they are incurred.

1ſt. The Mode of your victualling your Troops, &c.

2d. The furniſhing of Stores to your Army, victualling Troops, &c. and Cattle.

Your preſent Regulations of victualling the Native Troops, Artificers, Labourers, &c. impreſſed in the Honourable Company's Pay, I moſt earneſtly recommend to the Committee to aboliſh; and that in Lieu thereof, a monthly Allowance, proportionate to the Value of Proviſions, be made to all Native Troops, Laſcars, Labourers and Artificers (to be ſtiled additional Pay or Batta) which ſhall be drawn from the Paymaſter monthly, in a ſeparate Roll, and iſſued to the People with their Subſiſtence. A Difference muſt be allowed between the Batta of Field and Garriſon, as an Inducement to your Troops and Labourers to bear the additional Fatigue and Expence of the Field with Alacrity and Eaſe.

It will be difficult to aſcertain how far this Alteration in the victualling Department will cauſe a Decreaſe of Expence; a reaſonable Judgment may nevertheleſs be formed, by recurring to the *firſt Expence of the Purchaſe of a Month's Proviſions, the Charge of Cattle neceſſary for its Tranſportation with an Army, the Pay of Servants in Charge of it, it's Loſs of Quality and Quantity by Carriage, and the poſſible Loſs by an Enemy.* Theſe ſeveral Charges accumulated and united would form the Compariſon, but it is needleſs to go further than one Reflection, i. e. The monthly Sum to be allowed the People will be leſs than the original Purchaſe of the Proviſions for a Month.

With reſpect to the victualling your European Soldiery, I would adviſe, that in caſe of ſmall Detachments they ſhould be allowed their victualling Money, and provide themſelves, as moſt acceptable to the Soldiery, and leaſt troubleſome: But when the major Part of a Corps is together, either in the Field or Garriſon, it would be preferable to victual them; not however by the preſent Mode practiſed at your Preſidency, but by Contract, as is the Cuſtom of the Bengal Army. The Contract to engage to ſupply each Man a certain daily Ration of Spirit, of wholeſome Butcher's Meat, and Rice, or Bread or Biſcuit, at a certain monthly Charge; the Contract to be formed under reciprocal Penalties, between the Contractor and the Company; to be renewable Annually or at Two Years, as may be moſt convenient; by this Mode the Returns of the Corps aſcertain the Propriety of the Contractor's Charges; and all Expences of Servants, Riſks, Tranſportation of Proviſions, &c. in the Execution of this Office, is at the ſole Charge of the Perſon who contracts; the Company experience but One Charge, and which cannot be abuſed. The Contract for Draft and Carriage Cattle, Camels, Carts, &c. neceſſary to the Service, is generally given to the victualling Contractor, and they are provided at fixed monthly Rates; theſe are muſtered monthly, and the Bills audited

audited by the Commiſſary of Muſters. The Number of Cattle are ſupplied on Indent, by the Authority of the reſpective Commanders of Detachments; and all Cattle deemed by him inſufficient, are rejected occaſionally, and muſt be replaced.

Supplies of Stores.

This Department ought to be regulated under the moſt poſitive Strictures. I do not in this comprehend all Stores whatever requiſite in an Army; I only allude to Articles of Stores which are not provided in a Grand Magazine, which are procurable almoſt in every Country Market, and which are very ſuddenly and caſually wanted in the Courſe of a Service. The Regulations I recommend for this Office are, that the Committee form a Plan to affix Prices for the various Articles of Stores which can be wanted in the different Departments of the Army, ſpecifying the Rates they ſhall be charged for in Bombay, Salſette, Surat, Broach, and in the Field; the Commiſſary to be allowed 15 per Cent upon theſe allowed Prices; and they ought to be formed ſo as to exceed ſomewhat the Average Prices of thoſe Articles at the afore-mentioned Settlements.

The Indents made to the Commiſſary, properly authorized by the Signature of the Senior Military Officer, become the Vouchers for his Charges.

The Commiſſary may provide his Stores when and where he pleaſes; the Service has nothing to do with them till they are iſſued upon Indent. This Plan aboliſhes the preſent Practice of their being purchaſed and carried at the Charge and Riſk of the Company. And the Arguments I have before aſſerted on the Article of Proviſions, will hold equal force in this Department, by the enhanced Valuation all Articles will bear in the Courſe of a few Months, from the Charges, Tranſporting, and Decay incident thereto.

The Poſt of Commiſſary of Muſters may be annexed to that of Commiſſary of Supplies; but it is inconſiſtent he ſhould have any Charge of public Stores.

The Commiſſary of Ordnance is the proper Perſon to have the Charge of public Stores, under the Inſpection of the ſenior Officer of Artillery.

Hoſpitals.

Were the Conveniencies of the Sick to bear the leaſt Proportion to the Expences the Company have been at on this Side of India, under the Head of Hoſpital Charges, I might have taken more Leiſure in the Alterations I directed for the Regulations of this Department, in the Troops furniſhed from your Preſidency to reinforce this Army. It was my Endeavour to provide for every reaſonable and neceſſary Indulgence to the Sick Soldiery, both European and Native, and by theſe Regulations I recommend your Field Allowances to be fixed.

Poſſibly theſe Allowances may admit of ſome Deduction in your Garriſons; of this you, Gentlemen, muſt be the moſt competent Judges, and can frame your Alterations by the current Prices the requiſite Conveniencies may bear at thoſe Garriſons ſeverally; I can only add, that the Allowances are equal to every poſſible Want of the Sick, and leave a handſome Emolument to the Chief of the Faculty for their Aſſiduity in the Care of them. The Returns of your Sick, and the Hoſpital Reports, become the Vouchers and Check to the Surgeon's Charges: Theſe Charges become leſs intricate, and conſequently are not only moderated but aſcertained: The Carriage of the Sick is the next Point in Conſideration: The Number of Doolies to be allowed will depend on the Seaſon of the Year, and the Nature of the Service; the Controul of this muſt reſt with the Military Officer. Six Bearers are allowed to each Doolie; their Monthly Pay I have fixed at 8 Rupees each Bearer; and it is provided that they ſhall be muſtered Monthly with all other Servants in the Pay of the Honourable Company. This Charge becomes aſcertained, and leſs liable to Abuſe, than the Mode heretofore followed. The Article of Pay to Bearers, might, I think, under the Direction of your Board, admit of a Reduction in the Courſe of Time; but the advanced Wages which Servants of every Denomination have been accuſtomed to, upon your Troops taking the Field on this Coaſt, made even this Pay to appear moderate, compared with the Terms private Gentlemen were obliged to comply with.

It is only neceſſary to remark further on this Head, that the ſick Europeans are victualled by the Surgeons, but no Interference is admitted in the victualling of the Native Sick; the Surgeon conſequently receives the Diet Money of the Sick Europeans from the Contractor, and reimburſes himſelf the Expence of their Maintenance; the Surgeon draws from the Company the Sum of Fifteen Rupees *per* Month for every Sick European, which includes all Charges of Servants, Hoſpital Cloathing, and Buzar, or Country Medicines, excepting when Quilts are requiſite, which are ſupplied by the Company.

The Charge to the Company for Native Sick is at the Rate of Four Rupees *per* Month each, no other Contingency allowed. The Sum of Ten Rupees *per* Month is allowed for every Native, Sepoy, or Follower, that may be wounded; all Sepoys in the Hoſpital with common Diſorders have a Deduction made from their Pay of One Anna One Pice *per* Day, which is accounted for by the Captains of Corps to the Senior Surgeon, to defray the Expence of Servants, &c. and prevent Men lingering. Europe Inſtruments and Medicines are ſupplied and carried by the Company.

I have now I think gone through the general Lines of the Reform I wiſh to recommend to you; I flatter myſelf that when you are enabled to draw the Compariſon of your Military Diſburſe, upon the preſent Regulations and thoſe now propoſed, you will find a conſiderable Deduction upon the Augmentation of your Forces, and that you will be enabled to form an accurate Idea of the Subſidy that will be Annually requiſite for the Maintenance of your Forces in the Field or Garriſon.

Thomas Goddard,
Brigr General.

Preſident's

APPENDIX, N° 271.

Preſident's Minute reſpecting the Augmentation of the Army.

General Goddard having furniſhed us with his Opinion of the Augmentation to be made of our Military Force, I think no Time ſhould be loſt in raiſing and forming the new Battalions that are wanted to compleat the propoſed Eſtabliſhment of Sepoys.

The Number of our Europeans, and the preſent Diſpoſition of them, will not for the preſent admit of carrying into Execution the Alteration the General propoſes with regard to them, in any Manner that will prove of Advantage to the Service, adequate to the great Increaſe of Expence. As we have Reaſon likewiſe to expect to hear ſhortly from the Honourable the Court of Directors, in Reply to our Repreſentations of laſt Year, on the Subject of the State of our Army, and may conclude that they have taken Meaſures for aſſiſting us with Field Officers of Experience and Ability, I think we ſhould not be precipitate in making Promotions to that Rank, nor in determining on general Arrangements which may render ſuch Promotions neceſſary, if they can with Propriety be deferred.

I ſhall accordingly propoſe for the preſent, to carry into Execution no more of General Goddard's propoſed Plan than relates to the raiſing of the new Battalions, and modelling thoſe now in the Service. Excluſive of the Topaz and Marine Battalions, we ſhall have Occaſion for Seven new raiſed Battalions to compleat our Eſtabliſhment, according to the General's Recommendation, to 15 Battalions of Sepoys, which will be formed of the Strength and Model propoſed by General Goddard as near as may be, if the other Members of the Committee concur with me in the Neceſſity of the Augmentation and Approbation of the General's Propoſal regarding the Form of our Battalions.

With the abovementioned Strength once compleated, I make no Doubt we ſhall be able to maintain all our new Acquiſitions in Guzzarat, as well as Baſſein when reduced, which I ſtill flatter myſelf may be effected either before the Cloſe of the preſent Seaſon, or at the very firſt Opening of the next. This Object accompliſhed, our Views in my Opinion ſhould be merely defenſive, and our Military Expences reduced as much within the Compaſs of our ordinary Peace Eſtabliſhment as poſſible, by which Means alone we can hope to render our Acquiſitions of any Value to our Employers.

Upon this Subject it will be neceſſary to communicate our Sentiments both to the Governor General and Council, and to the Select Committee at Madras, informing them of the Augmentation we have reſolved to make of our Troops, and our Hope that they will, when compleat, be ſufficient for the Defence of ſuch Territory as will be anſwerable to the Company's Expences on this Side of India. It muſt be pointed out to them how abſolutely neceſſary it is to reduce the preſent Military Charges within more Bounds than they can be brought to while the Troops of their Preſidency are acting with ours: That nothing but the moſt preſſing Exigence therefore can make us wiſh to detain them, and they may reſt aſſured of our returning them as ſoon as the State of our Affairs under our Management will permit, if their Stay or Return depends on us: That though there has yet been neither Concert nor Communication between the Three Governments on this important Subject, and the Newneſs of our Situation leaves us much at a Loſs with regard to the Plan of Conduct the Gentlemen of Bengal and Madras may think of, for relieving our Honourable Maſters from their preſent Burthens on this Side of India; yet we have thought it our Duty to put our Military Eſtabliſhment, with the Advice of General Goddard, on ſuch a Footing, as will render the neceſſary Meaſures for the Reduction of the Military Charges, practicable as far as depends on us.

True Copies,

Edw[d] Ravenſcroft Secr[y].

Agreed, according to the Preſident's Recommendation, to defer the Alterations propoſed by General Goddard, reſpecting our European Corps and the Promotion of Field Officers, as we have great Reaſon very ſhortly to expect Orders from the Honourable Company in anſwer to our Advices of laſt Seaſon, and that therefore it is unneceſſary at preſent to lay General Goddard's Plan before the Board, as we at firſt intended, according to our Minute of the 4th Inſtant. A Copy thereof muſt however be forwarded to the Honourable Company by the Hawke, and it muſt be brought on our Diary under this Date.

Preſident' poſal agr

But the Augmentation of the Sepoy Corps being immediately and indiſpenſably neceſſary, it is reſolved, That Seven Battalions be forthwith raiſed upon the Model recommended by General Goddard; and in order to expedite the Levies, that the Officers be now appointed to command them; and accordingly Captains Weſt, Samber, Lendrum, Bowles, Hayes, Wadington, and Maculloch, be appointed to command the 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, and 15th Battalions, reſpectively; which are to be formed by dividing the old Battalions fairly and equally, incorporating the Locals at Surat and Broach and compleated with new Levies which already are in great Forwardneſs in conſequence of former Orders. Two of the new Battalions muſt be formed at Surat, and Two at Broach.

The Aug tion of t poy Eſta ment de immediat ceſſary.

To be in to 15 Batt Manner o ing the ne talions.

Our Sent reſpecting Military, communi to Bengal Madras.

Our Sentiments on the State of our Military Eſtabliſhment and Expences muſt alſo be communicated to the Select Committee at Madras, and to the Governor General and Council, as propoſed to us by the Preſident.

W. Hornby.
D. Draper.

Adjourned.

Edw[d] Ravenſcroft,
Secretary.

APPENDIX,

APPENDIX, N° 272.

Extract of a Letter from the President and Select Committee of Bombay to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, dated 30th April 1780.

WE had the Honour to write to you fully in Detail upon the political Affairs of this Presidency, under the 31ſt of December and 16th of March; and the Ship Hawke being now diſpatched for England, we tranſmit Copies of our Addreſſes of theſe Dates, with our Diary in this Department, from the 1ſt of May 1779 to the 30th of April 1780; which will fully illuſtrate every Part of our Advices ſince the Diſpatch of the Royal Admiral.

We alſo ſend by this Ship a complete Secret Diary for the Year 1778.

The Advices from General Goddard, conveyed in our Addreſs of the 16th of March, tended to give us Hopes of a favourable Concluſion to the Negociation opened with Madjee Scindia, which however were ſoon deſtroyed by his ſubſequent Letters. The Anſwers from Scindia and Holcar to the explicit Declaration made to them by General Goddard, through Scindia's Vackeel, conſiſted only of general Profeſſions of friendly Sentiments, and were cloſed with a Requeſt to ſend a confidential Perſon to their Camp, fully informed of the Views of the Engliſh, with whom they might come to a final Settlement. This was declined by the General for the Reaſons explained in his Letter referred to on the Margin, but in ſuch a Manner as to avoid impreſſing a Belief that his Diſſent aroſe from any Motives of Diſtruſt or Want of Reliance on Scindia's Sincerity; and he gave the Vackeel Leave to return to his Maſter, empowered to offer every general Aſſurance on the Part of the Engliſh, of the proper Senſe they had of his Services, and of their Wiſh to continue on Terms of Amity with him, if by his Conduct he would give them an Opportunity of proving their friendly Diſpoſition and Deſire to promote his Intereſt in Conjunction with their own. The Vackeel promiſed to return in Three Days from Scindia's Camp, which was at the Diſtance of Ten Coſs; and the General judged it neceſſary to limit him to that Period, as Scindia would have ſufficient Leiſure to deliberate fully upon the Meaſures he might have to propoſe, and at the ſame Time an Excuſe for further Delays be avoided.

The expected Propoſals on the Part of Madjee Scindia were at length made on the 16th of March, after the Negociation had been open Seven Days, and were conceived in the following Terms: "That formerly, when Ragoba was at Tellaugam, after the Return of the Engliſh Army to Bombay, "an Agreement had been entered into between him and Scindia, and written Engagements mutually "exchanged for its Performance; wherein the former conſented to relinquiſh all Claims to any Share "in the Adminiſtration at Poona, and to retire towards Jancy, where he ſhould receive an Allowance "from the Peſhwa's Revenue of Twelve Lacks of Rupees per Annum: That the Sicca ſhould "continue to be ſtruck in the Name of the young Peſhwa Maderow Narrain; and that Bajerow, the "Son of Ragoba, ſhould be appointed his Dewan; but that as he was too young to tranſact the "Buſineſs of the Office himſelf, being only Four Years of Age, the Care and Management of it "ſhould be left entirely to Scindia. This Plan Scindia propoſed ſhould now be followed: That "Ragoba ſhould immediately go himſelf to Jancy, and young Bajerow accompany him to Poona in "order to fix the Adminiſtration in the Manner above-mentioned." This was the Amount of what Scindia had authorized the Vackeel to propoſe, without any Reſervation, or other Clauſe whatever. And as it appeared plainly, his only View was to get Ragoba and his Son into his own Power, by which he meant to aggrandize himſelf in the State, without Regard to the Intereſts of the Engliſh, and perhaps through their Means to make his own Terms with the Miniſter, the General thought proper to diſmiſs the Vackeel with this expreſs and poſitive Declaration, That the Engliſh could not, conſiſtent with their own Honour, nor ever would, agree to put any Reſtraint upon Ragoba, or compel him, againſt his own Conſent, to leave their Dominions, where he had received an Aſylum: That however much they might be diſpoſed to unite in the propoſed Settlement, they muſt be perfectly ſatisfied reſpecting the Safety of young Bajerow, and every Thing muſt be quietly ſettled at Poona, before his Preſence could be even neceſſary there: And that, admitting the Engliſh did agree to aſſiſt in putting the Power of the State into the Hands of Scindia, it was neceſſary he alſo ſhould on his Part, and in the Name of the Peſhwa, conſent to the Performance of certain Conditions favourable to their Intereſts; as well in Conſideration of the important Advantages he was to receive through their Means, as to compenſate for the heavy Expence of the War, which formerly, and in particular at this Time, they had been involuntarily compelled to engage in with the Maratta State. With this Anſwer the Vackeel was diſmiſſed; and as the General, in explaining his Sentiments, and giving him to underſtand that he could not conſent to any Terms that were of a diſhonourable Nature, at the ſame Time uſed every Endeavour to convince him of his ſincere Inclinations towards an Accommodation. The Conduct he adopted on receiving his Anſwer, amounted to a Proof that he had no real Deſign to unite with the Engliſh; but the General then began to entertain a Belief of his hoſtile Intentions, from the Circumſtance of his having invited Govind Row, the diſaffected Brother of Futty Sing, to his Camp, and promiſed to put him in Poſſeſſion of the Guicawar Share of Guzerat.

After

After the Diſmiſſion of the Vackeel, the General received no Sort of Meſſage or Overture from Scindia, and acquainted us that notwithſtanding the Reports and general Belief of an Enmity ſubſiſting between him and the Miniſter, the Agents of the latter reſided in his Camp, and he was credibly informed Letters were conſtantly paſſing and repaſſing between them; from all which Circumſtances, he was confirmed in the Conjecture, which Scindia's late Conduct had ſuggeſted, that the Appearance of Animoſity againſt Nanah Furneeſe was merely a Pretext, to deceive the Engliſh, and to get the Perſons of Ragoba and his Son into his Hands, for Purpoſes of his own Advantage.

He therefore put the Army in Motion, and advanced to a Place called Pittoul, about Eight Miles to the Eaſtward of Brodera. On his Arrival there, he found that Scindia had for Security ſent his Camp Equipage, Buzar, Baggage, &c. to the Neighbourhood of Paunghur, a ſtrong Fort belonging to him, about Thirty Miles to the Eaſtward of Brodera; and himſelf with the greateſt Part of his Army, unincumbered with any Sort of Baggage, had taken Poſt at about the Diſtance of Twelve Miles; the Remainder of his Troops he had diſperſed in different Bodies on the Road leading to our Camp, ſo as to be effectually guarded againſt every Poſſibility of a Surprize, which he ſeemed much afraid of, and which the General ſtudied all in his Power to obtain an Opportunity of attempting with ſome Proſpect of Succeſs. In his Letter of the 24th March, he expreſſed much Anxiety to accompliſh this Point, becauſe from the Nature of Scindia's Army, and the Mode of War he practiſed, our Army could neither approach near enough to attack him ſuddenly to Advantage, nor would he run the Hazard of a general Engagement in the Field. As our Army advanced, he retired; and to purſue him, the General was of Opinion would not be the Means of bringing on a deciſive Action, nor be attended with any real or ſolid Advantage, proportioned to the Inconvenience of expoſing the Company's and Futty Sing's Territories to the Inroads and Devaſtations of a ravaging Enemy.

On the 27th the General found it neceſſary to change his Ground, and advanced to a Village called Camloud, above Five Miles diſtant from his former Encampment, and found the whole Army of the Enemy collected in the Neighbourhood of that Village; but after a ſlight Cannonade, they retired with the Loſs of ſome Men and Horſes.

The Enemy ſtill continued to purſue the Plan of keeping their Guns and Baggage at a conſiderable Diſtance out of Reach, where it could be attended with no Advantage to follow them, as they would continue to move them to a greater Diſtance as our Army advanced.

The General at laſt finding the Enemy would neither venture to come to a fair and deciſive Action, nor put it in his Power to attack them with all the Advantage he could have wiſhed, came to the Reſolution of diſlodging their Army from the Poſt they occupied with their Horſes and Arms only, about Six Miles from his Camp, and marched himſelf for that Purpoſe, at Two o'Clock in the Morning of the 3d Inſtant, with a Part of the Army, leaving the Remainder on the former Ground, under the Command of Lieutenant Colonel Hartley. The Force he took with him conſiſted of 200 Europeans, Ten Grenadier Companies of Sepoys, Two Battalions of Bengal, and One of Bombay Sepoys, with Two Twelves and Ten Six Pounder Pieces of Artillery, and the Regiment of Mogul Cavalry and Candahar Horſe. The whole were diſpoſed in Two Lines, the Rear commanded by Major Hopkins, and Lieutenant Colonel Baillie and Major Forbes were ſtationed to the Front Line; and though the Precautions taken by the Enemy gave him no Hopes of ſurprizing them effectually, the Objects he principally had in View, were to induce them to venture an Action with only a Part of the Army oppoſed to their whole Force, to drive them from the Poſt they then occupied, or if they fled without Reſiſtance, to prove the manifeſt Superiority of our Arms, in the moſt ſtriking and honourable Manner.

The Event he acquainted us far exceeded his Expectations. He approached much nearer to their Camp without being diſcovered, than he conceived poſſible, and a little before Day-break came upon their Grand Guard, conſiſting of Six or Seven thouſand Men, which he paſſed through without diſcharging a Shot, determined to reſerve his Fire till he came up with the main Body, commanded by Madjee Scindia himſelf. This being a Mile and a Half in Front, he did not reach till about Sun-riſe, when their whole Army was in Motion, and the Action immediately commenced. The Enemy ſeeing the Inferiority of our Force, advanced with much Appearance of Courage and Reſolution; but they were ſo well received, that they were obliged to give way, and in the Space of about an Hour, quitted the Field entirely. In order to diſlodge a large Body which annoyed our right Flank from behind the Cover of ſome Buſhes, the General ordered the Mogul and Candahar Cavalry to advance, which they performed with great Spirit and Succeſs; and having drove the Enemy into the Plain, gave an excellent Opportunity for the Artillery to fire upon them with Execution as they retired.

The Enemy's Loſs on this Occaſion is ſaid to have been conſiderable, while on our Side it fell entirely upon the Candahar Horſe, of whom Fifteen were killed and wounded in charging the Enemy. The General has expreſſed his Satisfaction at the ſteady, uniform, and proper Behaviour of Major Hopkins, who had Charge of the Rear Line, during the whole Engagement.

We have received no further Accounts from the General of his Operations ſince this Action, but we underſtand the Armies were nearly in the ſame Poſition the 20th of this Month, and that he was joined by Colonel Brown's Detachment on the 14th. We have for ſome Time been very impatient to hear what Effect his Succeſs has had upon Scindia's Operations, and what Plan he propoſed purſuing, which as the Seaſon grows late, it is of Conſequence for us to be informed of, and is what the

the General promiſed, for we wiſh to ſee the Army employed to more Advantage than in watching the Motions of Madjee Scindia.

After waiting ſome Time in this Expectation, we ſet forth to the General the Importance of poſſeſſing ourſelves of Baſſein, and expreſſed our Anxiety at the Probability there appeared of this Seaſon elapſing, and Baſſein ſtill remaining unſubdued. We are exceedingly earneſt not to leave the Reduction of this Place to the Hazard of future Accidents or Circumſtances, eſpecially in the Time of European War; and have offered our Opinion to General Goddard, that no other Object can claim a Preference to his Attention, or bring the Campaign to more honourable and advantageous Concluſion. The Preſident had before written on the ſame Subject, which we flatter ourſelves will have its due Weight, and that General Goddard will be able to make ſuch a Diſpoſition of the Force under his Command, lately reinforced with a Battalion of Sepoys from Madras, as effectually to protect your Poſſeſſions in Guzerat, and undertake the Siege of Baſſein at leaſt on the very firſt Opening of next Seaſon, in which the Troops in Bombay and Salſette can materially aſſiſt, and enable him to leave ſuch a Force as the Enemy cannot withſtand, for the Security of your Northern Poſſeſſions.

Should he however not be able to move to the Southward before the Monſoon, we have wrote to him moſt preſſingly immediately to return the Bombay Detachment under Lieutenant Colonel Hartley into Garriſon, as it would be highly improper to leave this Place with no more than our preſent Force for its Protection during the Rains, when no immediate Relief could be afforded from the Army to the Northward.

In the preſent Situation of Affairs, and whilſt Futty Sing is actually in the Field as an Auxiliary in the War, we did not think it neceſſary to ſend a Reſident to his Durbar on the Part of this Government, which we acquainted you in our Addreſs of the 16th ultimo had been propoſed to us by General Goddard; but when it may be a convenient Time for ſettling the Points ſtill remaining to be adjuſted, this Meaſure ſhall be adopted. In the mean Time Mr. Mallet, the Reſident at Cambay, will be employed on any occaſional Buſineſs, for which his Knowledge of the Language and Politics of the Country fully qualify him.

We tranſmit under N°. 4, a Copy of the late Treaty with Futty Sing.

The General ſometime ago ſtrongly urged to the Preſident to make a Loan of Six Lacks to Futty Sing, on the Company's Account; which, whatever might be our Opinion of the Advantage or Expediency of ſuch a Meaſure, the State of our Finances would not permit us to entertain a Thought of.

General Goddard has tranſmitted to us a Repreſentation, made to him by Mr. Farmer, reſpecting a Sum of Money, to the Amount of Rupees Thirty-five Thouſand (35,000) which he found it neceſſary to advance, to procure his Enlargement from Madjee Scindia; and the General gives his Opinion, Mr. Farmer appears very well entitled to the Re-payment of this Money: But as he had no Inſtructions from Bengal on the Subject, he had, according to Mr. Farmer's Requeſt, referred and ſtrongly recommended his Caſe to the Conſideration of that Government. The General gave ſtrong Teſtimony of Mr. Farmer's Attention to your Intereſt, by tranſmitting, with much Hazard to himſelf, ſuch uſeful Intelligence as he could collect in the Enemy's Camp; for which Reaſon, and as a Delay in the Payment was an Inconvenience to him, the General recommended to us to afford him immediate Relief: But as he had himſelf referred the Affair to the Governor-General and Council, we thought it moſt proper to wait for their Determination, and ſend a Copy of his Letter, under N° 5, for your Notice.

The Extent of Country acquired by the Treaty with Futty Sing, and the Maratta Purgunnahs that have been reduced, neceſſarily requiring an Augmentation of our Military Eſtabliſhment for their Defence, and a proper Diſpoſition to be made for that Purpoſe, we conſulted General Goddard on theſe Points; who accordingly ſent us a Plan for the Augmentation and Regulation of the Army in all its Branches. He therein ſtrongly recommends, that a Major and Two Companies be added to the Battalion of Artillery; gives his Opinion, that the Infantry Eſtabliſhment ſhould be completed to Two Battalions as ſoon as poſſible; that the Sepoy Eſtabliſhment ſhould forthwith be encreaſed to Fifteen Battalions, excluſive of Marines; and that all Irregulars and Locals ſhould be diſcharged. Theſe Fifteen Battalians he propoſed ſhould be divided into Three Brigades, with a Major to each, and a Lieutenant Colonel to command the Whole; and for your more full Information we tranſmit a Copy of the Plan at Length, under N° 7.

When this Plan came under Conſideration, the Preſident laid before us a Minute on the Subject, which ſtands on our Proceedings under the 29th Inſtant; and we agreed with him in Opinion, that the State of our European Eſtabliſhment will not, for the preſent, admit of our carrying into Execution the Alteration propoſed by the General with reſpect to them, in any Manner that will prove of Advantage adequate to the great Encreaſe of Expences; and as we may with Reaſon expect to hear ſhortly from you, in Reply to our Repreſentation laſt Year on the State of our Army, and may conclude you have taken Meaſures for ſupplying us with Field Officers of Experience and Ability, we further agreed with the Preſident, not to be precipitate in making Promotions to that Rank, nor in determining on general Arrangements, which might render ſuch Promotions neceſſary.

We accordingly reſolved for the preſent, to carry into Execution no more of General Goddard's Plan than raiſing Seven new Battalions of Sepoys, and modelling thoſe now in the Service according to the Strength propoſed by him; but without forming them into Brigades. The new Battalions will be formed at Bombay, Surat, and Broach, as may be moſt convenient; and the large Bodies of Irre-

Bars at the Two latter Places, will be incorporated into them. Major Fullerton has alſo been directed ſome Time ago to entertain Recruits at Ahmedabad, and Levies have been formed at Bombay in Proportion for this Increaſe; ſo that the new Battalions will ſoon be in great Forwardneſs.

With this Strength once completed, we hope to be able to maintain our new Acquiſitions in Guzerat as well as Baſſein when reduced; and we can aſſure you, is no more than what appears to us really neceſſary, as we have not yet been in a Condition to take Poſſeſſion of the valuable Ceſſions made by Futty Sing adjacent to Surat, deſcribed by the Name of Autaveezy, for Want of a ſufficient Force; having hitherto been able only to afford One Battalion of Sepoys for Surat, whereas Three will now be the leaſt that can be diſpenſed with. We have in theſe Levies extended our Views no further than to form a proper Peace Eſtabliſhment, ſufficient for the Defence of your Poſſeſſions, which muſt in the End devolve upon us; and we ſhall have ample Means of defraying the Expence, when Matters are ſettled. We were clearly of Opinion it was highly expedient to carry this Meaſure into Execution without Delay; as, if the War continued, General Goddard will not be able to ſpare us any Part of the Force under his Command to garriſon our new Acquiſitions, the Benefit of which would be conſequently loſt to the Company; or if an Accommodation takes place, we ought to have a proper Force in Readineſs for our own Defence, as our firſt Wiſh would be to ſend back the Bengal and Madras Troops, which are maintained here at an almoſt unſupportable Expence; but which cannot be done, unleſs we make proper Proviſion for that Event.

We cannot pretend to ſay to what Extent the Governor General and Council carry their Views in this War; but if we were convinced that the French would not make any further Efforts to retrieve their Affairs in India, we ſhould be of Opinion, that after eſtabliſhing ourſelves in Baſſein and the Company's Share of Guzerat, which will afford a Revenue equal to our Expences on this Side of India, our Views ſhould be merely defenſive. Poſſeſſion, and a reſpectable Force to repel any Invaſion, will be a better Security for the peaceable Enjoyment of our Acquiſitions, than any Treaty, even if the Marattas could be brought to acknowledge our Title by any formal Engagement; and as in the Courſe of a few Months, we may hope our Views in Point of Territory may be accompliſhed, and a Force eſtabliſhed equal to its Defence, we propoſe ſtating our Sentiments on the Subject to the Governor General and Council, and the great Importance of reducing the Military Charges ariſing from this War within more moderate Bounds than they can be brought to whilſt the Troops of the other Preſidencies are acting with ours; and that, as nothing but the moſt preſſing Exigency could make us wiſh to detain them, they may be aſſured of our returning them as ſoon as the State of Affairs under our Management will permit, if their Stay or Return is left to our Option; having put our own Military Eſtabliſhment on ſuch a Footing as will render the neceſſary Meaſures for relieving the Company from this heavy Burthen practicable, ſo far as depends on us.

We cannot quit the Subject of the Army, without once more preſſing you to exert every poſſible Means to complete our very defective Eſtabliſhment of European Infantry to Two Battalions; and to provide for an Increaſe of Two Companies to the Battalion of Artillery, which General Goddard ſo ſtrongly recommends, and will become neceſſary, as Guns muſt be attached to the Sepoy Battalions in the different Purgunnahs, and we are averſe to inſtructing the Natives in the Practice of Artillery. About 800 Recruits will reſtore our Eſtabliſhment to a reſpectable Footing, and effectually enable us to ſupport our Plan of Self Defence, without ſubjecting you to the enormous Expence of Reinforcement from the other Preſidencies.

In order to get Footing on the Continent, and thereby to open a larger Avenue for Supplies of Grain for this Iſland, we lately ſent Detachments to ſurprize the Forts of Perſick and Bellapore; the former oppoſite Tannah, and the latter near the Extremity of Caranja; which was completely done, and we thereby obtained a preſent conſiderable Supply of Grain, and the Command of ſome Rivers, which will afford a conſiderable Source of Supply in future. The Purgunnah of Bellapore is, from ſome Advantages of Situation, eaſy of Defence, and eſtimated to produce a Revenue of near a Lack of Rupees; and being ſo ſituated as to give Security both to Salſette and Caranja, from any petty Incurſions of the Marattas, we look upon it as a conſiderable Acquiſition.

We know not in what Manner to account for the Conduct of Hyder Ally, in not having yet given any Anſwer to the Propoſal made him by the Preſident, of ſending a Gentleman to confer with him. The Gentlemen at Madras expreſsly acquaint us, in a Letter dated the 4th of February, that they have no Subject of Difference with him, but deliver Sentiments reſpecting Provocation ſuppoſed to be given him by your Servants at Tellicherry; which are plainly imbibed from Colonel Braithwaite's Repreſentations, who can certainly have acquired no more than a very ſuperficial Knowledge of the State of Affairs there; we ſhall however require them to clear up this Matter very particularly: But the Gentlemen at Madras in the ſame Letter tell us, that Hyder Ally's Conduct depends very much on the Tranſactions with the Marattas; that a Peace with them would have kept him in Awe, and delivered them from all Apprehenſions from that Quarter; but that it will be difficult to ſay what Line he will purſue now that Hoſtilities are commenced with them, on Account of the Treaty in Force between him and the Marattas, and the Influence of the Poona Miniſters in the Court of the Nizam.

The laſt Letter from Tellicherry, entered on our Diary under the 27th Inſtant, gives us ſome Hopes of ſeeing an End to the Troubles there, by a Treaty between the Nabob Hyder Ally and the King of Cotiole; but any Thing we can ſay on this Head will be no more than mere Conjecture, until we can obtain ſome more direct Knowledge of the Nabob's Diſpoſition towards us.

APPENDIX, N° 273.

Letter from the Preſident and Select Committee at Bombay, 25th July 1780.

To the Honourable the Secret Committee of the Honourable the Court of Directors for Affairs of the Honourable United Company of Merchants of England trading to the Eaſt Indies.

Honourable Gentlemen,

1. WE now diſpatch the Mercury Packet to the Gulph of Perſia, to afford a Convoy, and for any Diſpatches you may have forwarded by the Way of Buſſorah for this Preſidency, or any of your other Settlements in India, and that may arrive there after the Departure of the Ranger and Eagle; it being very material that at this critical Time every Order and Intelligence from Europe ſhould reach us with all poſſible Expedition.

2. We addreſſed you at length by the Hawke, under the 30th of April, in Continuation of our Advices, dated the 16th of March, tranſmitted under the Care of Mr. William Petrie. Theſe Diſpatches gave you a full Account of the Treaty concluded by General Goddard with Futty Sing; of the Attack and Reduction of Ahmadavad by the Company's Forces, and the Surrender of it to Futty Sing, according to the Treaty; of the March of Madjee Scindy and Tookajee Holkar into the Province of Guzerat; and of General Goddard's fruitleſs Negociation with Scindia; and of the military Operations that enſued, when the Overtures towards an Accommodation had proved abortive.

3. Though this Campaign does not produce any deciſive Advantages, the manifeſt Superiority of our Arms was evinced in the moſt ſtriking and honourable Manner; and your Poſſeſſions depending on Surat and Broach were effectually protected from the Incurſions of the Enemy, General Goddard having confined his Operations moſtly to the Eaſtward of Brodera, belonging to Futty Sing.

4. The Seaſon for Action being nearly elapſed, nothing material happened between the grand Armies after the Date of our Addreſs of the 30th of April; and ſhortly after General Goddard diſpoſed his Forces in Cantonments, at the moſt convenient Stations for covering your Poſſeſſions during the Rains. The General has lately written us, that Scindy and Holkar have certainly retired to their Capitals; and hopes it will be a grand Object to detain them in their own Provinces, while we purſue our Schemes, oppoſed ſingly by the Forces of Nanna Furneſſe. He had ſuggeſted to the Governor General and Council the Idea of cauſing a powerful Diverſion to be made on both the Sides of Malwa, which, he was of Opinion, would effectually anſwer that Purpoſe.

5. After the Separation of the Armies, a Detachment was employed with much Succeſs and Advantage under the Command of Lieutenant Welch. He ſurprized and totally routed a Body of the Poona Forces, which had made an Inroad from the Southward into the Diſtricts adjoining to Surat, now devolved to the Company by the late Treaty with Futty Sing, taking their Camp, Baggage, and Artillery, with a conſiderable Loſs of Men on their Side. He next reduced the Fort of Purenulla, and two other Forts, which are repreſented as Acquiſitions of Importance, from the Security they will afford to our new Poſſeſſions South of the River Tappy, to which they will ſerve as a formidable Barrier, giving us clear Poſſeſſion of the Country to the very Border of the Portugueze Diſtricts of Damaun, which now alone ſeparate the Southern Frontier of your Surat Province from the Diſtrict of Baſſein.

6. The Chief of Surat has acquainted us, that he has frequented the Company's Tappahs in the ſeveral Diſtricts heretofore annexed to the City of Surat, and until lately poſſeſſed by the Poona Government and Futty Sing; and that he hopes to collect a conſiderable Revenue therefrom the enſuing Seaſon.

7. The large Force the Enemy had in Guzerat, until the Retreat of Scindy and Holkar, and the Danger and bad Policy of leaving our new Acquiſitions and Futty Sing expoſed to their Depredations, made General Goddard judge it neceſſary to delay the Attack of Baſſein, the Reduction of which we had once hoped would have cloſed the Campaign. It will however, if nothing unforeſeen happens, be the firſt Object of his Operations, after the breaking up of the Monſoon; and we have, as more fully mentioned in our Addreſs by the Hawke, offered our Opinion to the Governor General and Council, that the Reduction of this Place ſhould be the Termination of our Views in Point of Territory, and the future Operations of the War become defenſive; that is, ſhould have no further Object than to eſtabliſh and confirm the Company in Poſſeſſion of their new Acquiſitions under this Preſidency.

8. In our preſent Predicament we have not that direct Information to afford, which you might expect from us, of the Extent to which this War is meant to be carried, or the further Meaſures that may be intended in Proſecution thereof, for the Attainment of Peace; the Governor General and Council not having communicated with this Government on theſe Objects: But being firmly fixed in our Opinion above expreſſed, which points out the moſt eligible Step that can be purſued in the preſent Situation of Affairs, next to obtaining a firm and permanent Peace, and very anxious to relieve the Company from the enormous Expence of the Bengal Army, we reſolved on the Meaſure already minutely explained

plained to you, and now only briefly repeated, of immediately forming a Force upon this Eſtabliſhment, equal to the Defence of our own Poſſeſſions, which muſt at any rate in the End devolve upon us. This is the only Meaſure that can make it practicable to relieve you from this heavy Burthen of Military Charge, and enable us to diſpenſe with the Aid of the Bengal and Madras Auxiliaries, the Expence of which we foreſaw muſt be an inſupportable Drain upon the Bengal Treaſury. For this Purpoſe we are now raiſing Seven additional Battalions of Sepoys, and have ſtated our Sentiments fully to the Governor-General and Council, that, if they concur with us, Meaſures may be taken for the Return of the Foreign Troops as early as may be judged prudent; though as our European Eſtabliſhment is ſo very imperfect or incomplete, we have recommended, that the Battalion of Madras Infantry and the Detachment of Artillery may be continued on this Coaſt, which, added to the Troops of this Eſtabliſhment, will effectually enable us to ſupport our Plan of Self Defence.

9. In our Addreſs by the Hawke, we wrote preſſingly for a Supply of Eight hundred Recruits, for our Infantry and Artillery, and Thirty Six Pounder Field Pieces for the Sepoy Battalions, which we earneſtly requeſt may be ſent out as ſoon as poſſible; and alſo a Supply of Seamen for our Cruizers, which are now almoſt entirely manned by Laſcars.

10. We judged it prudent before the Monſoon to recall into Garriſon the Detachment we had ſent to reinforce General Goddard, under the Command of Lieutenant Colonel Hartley; which, as well as the Footing we had gained on the Continent, were mentioned in our Addreſs by the Hawke. Shortly after Date thereof, Captain Campbell with a ſmall Detachment was ſent to take Poſſeſſion of the Town of Callian, in which he was ſoon after attacked by a large Body of the Enemy; who had, from Madjee Scindia, come down the Gauts, and forced One of our Poſts defended by Two Companies of Sepoys, who were diſperſed, and Three Officers killed, One taken Priſoner, and Three Pieces of Cannon taken. The Enemy elated with this, attacked Callian with great Vigour, which was defended with much Gallantry by Captain Campbell, and Reinforcements being ſpeedily ſent over, and the Arrival of the Detachment from the Northward enabling us to detach a ſufficient Force to meet the Enemy in the Field, Colonel Hartley ſoon drove them with Diſgrace and Loſs out of the Country, and we have ſtationed a reſpectable Force in Callian; from the Poſſeſſion of which, we hope to derive conſiderable Advantages in the Operations againſt Baſſein, and we truſt it will otherwiſe prove a beneficial Acquiſition.

11. We have the moſt alarming Apprehenſions of the Difficulties we ſhall experience the enſuing Seaſon for Want of Money; having lately received a Letter from the Governor General and Council, acquainting us, that their own Diſtreſs will put it out of their Power to make additional Remittances equal to the Support of this Preſidency, and the Pay of the large Army under General Goddard; and therefore deſiring that every Acceſſion of Income which may ariſe to the Company from the Succeſs of that Army, may be ſet aſide, and appropriated excluſively to that; and thus cutting off the principal Reſource we had Dependance on for our immediate Exigencies. We have only the Hope, that when they receive our Propoſal for the Reduction of theſe intolerable Military Charges, and ſee the ſtrong Meaſure we have actually taken, to make it practicable, which of courſe will require an extraordinary Proviſion for the preſent, they will at leaſt leave us in Poſſeſſion of our own Reſources; and, encouraged by the Proſpect of ſome End to ſuch heavy Drains, that they will make a vigorous Effort to give Succeſs to our Plan, and exonerate us from the Charge of maintaining ſuch ruinous Auxiliaries.

12. The Governor General and Council have propoſed ſome Alterations in the Settlement of the Guzerat Country made with Futty Sing, which it is not neceſſary at preſent to determine upon, or to trouble you with the Detail.

14. The Governor General and Council having acquieſced in Mr. Farmer's Claim, noticed to you in our laſt Addreſs, we have reimburſed him the Amount of the Charge he ſtated, for effecting the Releaſe of himſelf and Lieutenant Stewart, under this Preſidency.

We have the Honour to be,
with the utmoſt Reſpect,
Honourable Gentlemen,
Your moſt faithful and
obedient humble Servants,
Wm Hornby,
John Carnac,
D. Draper.

Bombay Caſtle,
25th July 1780.

POSTSCRIPT.

The Preſident has received an Account, that the Fort of Vingorla, where the Company had a ſmall Garriſon, has been treacherouſly taken by the Boundcello; and that the Reſident at Onore had been apprized by Hyder Ally of his Intent of ordering him away from that Settlement, and directed him to ſettle all his Accounts and Concerns.

Wm Hornby,
John Carnac,
D. Draper.

APPENDIX, N° 274.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 12th June 1780.

READ a Letter as follows from Brigadier General Goddard.

Gentlemen,

I had the Honour to addreſs you the 28th Ultimo, informing you of the Tranſactions with Madjee Scindia, and the Situation I found myſelf in reſpecting that Chief, who with an Army reported to be Forty thouſand ſtrong, had entered the Guzerat Province, and upon my Approach had moved off towards Pawen Ghur, a Fortreſs belonging to himſelf, ſituated betwixt the Provinces of Guzerat and Malva. I had advanced from Baroda in Hopes of bringing him to an Action, or in the Event of his declining it, and moving off on my Approach, which proved to be the Caſe, of manifeſting to the World the acknowledged Superiority of our Arms, and impreſſing the Maratta Nation with the Belief and thorough Conviction of their Inability to contend with us.

On the 3d Inſtant I marched with a Part of the Army to ſurprize Scindia, and drive him from a Poſt he occupied about Six Miles in Front with his fighting Men only, for he had uſed the Precaution of ſending off to a remote Diſtance his Artillery, Baggage, and Incumbrance of every Sort, as my former Letter adviſed you. The Particulars of this Enterprize I laid before the Commander in Chief the 4th Inſtant, and as they will have been communicated to you by him, it is unneceſſary to trouble you here with a Recapitulation. It is ſufficient to obſerve, that as I remained a conſiderable Time upon the Ground which the Enemy had abandoned, giving them full Leiſure to endeavour to retrieve their Diſgrace of being defeated by ſo ſmall a Part of my Force, and afterwards rejoined the Army without their daring to move towards me, or offer me the ſmalleſt Moleſtation, on my Return; the Triumph of our Arms has been as complete and decided, as could have been expected or wiſhed for. On the 16th Colonel Brown, with the Madras Europeans, arrived in Camp; and on the 19th, convinced, from the extreme Precaution and Vigilance of the Enemy, as well as the Diſpoſition they had made of their Force and Followers, that any Attempt to ſurprize them a Second Time would be ineffectual, I determined upon advancing with the whole Army to the Ground then occupied by them, which they abandoned at my Approach without any Oppoſition, except firing a Number of Rockets, which fortunately did no Damage. Owing to the Seaſon of the Year, and the Ravages committed by the Marattas, the County for near Twenty Miles round was an entire Deſart, and even the Branches of ſuch Trees as might have afforded Nouriſhment to the Cattle, were moſtly ſtripped of their Leaves; I was therefore under the Neceſſity of ſending to a conſiderable Diſtance for Forage, and of detaching a ſtrong Party for the Protection of the People, who were to bring it into Camp. On the Morning of the 22d Captain Campbell, with the 1ſt and 5th Battalion of Bengal Sepoys, proceeded on their Duty, and were attacked about Twelve Miles from my Camp by Scindia and Holcar in Perſon, with near 20,000 of their beſt Horſe. The Enemy advanced with great Appearance of Reſolution, and ſo near as to receive the Fire of Two Grenadier Companies, which threw them into a good deal of Confuſion, and being at the ſame Time warmly plied with Grape from Two Six Pounders, they ſoon fled with a good deal of Loſs, and did not venture to renew the Attack, but continued hovering in large Bodies, at a conſiderable Diſtance, all Day.

A very near Relation of Tuckajee Holcar, who was intruſted with the principal Management of his Affairs, fell among the Slain. Captain Campbell appears to have behaved with great Coolneſs and Intrepidity on the Occaſion, as well as the Troops under him; and having effected the Service on which he was ſent, returned to Camp early next Morning without any Loſs. This ſtriking Proof of our Superiority, has effectually compleated their Diſgrace; and they have not ſince that Period ſhewn themſelves in any Numbers, but have retired cloſe to Parvenghur: I have ſince moved back to within Ten Miles of Baroda, where I am at preſent encamped; and as the rainy Seaſon is ſo near at Hand, I purpoſe taking ſuch Meaſures, as, from a proper Attention to Circumſtances, may appear beſt calculated for the Safety and Protection of our new Acquiſitions, and the general Tranquillity of the Province, of which I ſhall not fail to give you immediate Information

You will perceive that my Operations ſince the Conqueſt of Guzerat have been chiefly defenſive; I have endeavoured to render them otherwiſe, as far as an Attention to the proper Line of Policy, and the Reaſons I have in a former Letter aſſigned for not purſuing Scindia into the Malva Province, would permit, by drawing him if poſſible to an Action, but to no Purpoſe; at the ſame Time I doubt not you will approve of the Steps I have been neceſſitated to take, which though not attended with the Glare of additional Conqueſt, have effectually ſecured thoſe valuable Acquiſitions already made to the Company; and put them in a Condition of ſupporting the War with every Advantage, and furniſhed Reſources in a great Meaſure adequate to the extraordinary Expences that may be requiſite for its Proſecution.

I ſhall

I ſhall ſoon write you very particularly upon the political State of Affairs, as well as the Military Arrangements and Diſpoſitions of the Army I may find it neceſſary to make for the Public Service, and have the Honour to be, &c.

Head Quarters, Camp near Camboull, 26th April 1780.

(Signed) Tho' Goddard.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 24th Auguſt 1780.

At a Council; PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Edward Wheler, Eſquire.
Mr. Francis indiſpoſed.
Sir Eyre Coote abſent on a Viſit to the different Stations of the Army.

Read the following Letter from Brigadier General Goddard.

Gentlemen,

I had the Honour to addreſs you the 27th Ultimo, acquainting you with the Enemy's Forces having deſiſted from further Attempts to make any Impreſſion upon the Guzerat Province, and that, from every Intelligence I could learn, it was Scindia's Intention to relinquiſh the Country altogether, and march either towards Ugein or the Decan. A few Days ſubſequent to the Date of that Letter, my Hircarrahs brought me certain Accounts of Scindia's having moved with his whole Army towards Ugein. Theſe Reports have been ſince confirmed, and it is now generally and confidentially believed, that he has laid aſide the Deſign it was ſuppoſed he had formed, of viſiting the Decan, and purpoſes to paſs the rainy Seaſon at Ugein. Holkar has accompanied him, and will reſide at Indore, a principal City in the Neighbourhood of Ugein, and the chief Reſidence of his Family.

In conſequence of the Departure of Scindia from the Neighbourhood of Guzerat, and the near Approach of the Rains, which did not admit of any Delay, I re-croſſed the Nerbuddah, and directed my March to Surat; where I arrived, with the greateſt Part of the Army, the 8th Inſtant. But as a Report prevailed, and indeed carried with it great Appearance of Probability, that Scindia meant to have a conſiderable Body of Horſe in the Neighbourhood of Pawanhghur, I thought it requiſite, in order to provide for the Security and Defence of the Diſtricts of Broach and the other Purgunnahs dependant on that Collectorſhip, almoſt all of which are ſituated North of the Nerbuddah, to ſtation a Force for their Protection on that Side of the River; and have therefore poſted Two Battalions of Sepoys at Zinnore, one of the Purgunnahs ceded by Futty Sing in the late Treaty, only Seven or Eight Coſs from Dubhoy, which will effectually ſecure all the Country between the Mahé and Nerbuddah Rivers from any ſudden Attack or Inroads of the Enemy, who indeed can enter it from the Eaſtward, that is, from Pawanghur, during the Rains.

Since my Arrival at this Place, the Detachment under Lieutenant Welch, with whoſe Succeſs againſt Gunneſe Punt, one of the Maratta Leaders, I have already made you acquainted, has effected a very material Piece of Service, and completely eradicated every Trace of the Maratta Power in this Neighbourhood, and deſtroyed every the moſt diſtant Hope he could have of giving further Diſturbance to our new Poſſeſſions, except by ſending a large Army into the Guzerat, which will not, I apprehend, in the future Operations of the War, be at all convenient, or even practicable for them to do.

The Enterprize I alſude to, is the taking of Parneiro, a Fort ſituated upon a high Hill, about Thirty Coſs from Surat, upon the Sea Coaſt. It was defended for Two Days by a Garriſon, conſiſting of about 400 Men, who finding Lieutenant Welch had with immenſe Difficulty and Perſeverance, and by his ſteady and good Conduct, with the Loſs only of Two Sepoys, brought up Two Pieces of battering Cannon to within a proper Diſtance of the Walls, which he had made a Breach in, thought proper to capitulate and ſurrender the Place into the Hands of the Engliſh.

Lieutenant Welch has ſince made himſelf Maſter of Two inferior Forts, called Arzen Ghur and Under Ghur. The former has a Diſtrict of one Lack of Rupees lying around and dependent on it. They are both built upon Hills, and defenſible, with a very ſmall Force, againſt any Number of Marattas. They are within Three Coſs of each other, and about Six from Parneiro, and they were conſtructed, as Report ſays, by the Marattas, to ſerve as a Check upon the Encroachments of the Portugueze, who have a Settlement, called Dumaan, on the Sea Coaſt, at the Diſtance of Four or Five Miles from them.

Theſe Acquiſitions have put the Engliſh in entire Poſſeſſion of the Sea Coaſt from Combait to Dumaan, comprehending a Tract of near 150 Miles. Baſſein only remains to complete the Conqueſt of the whole to the North of Bombay. I mentioned in my laſt Letter, Obſtacles that had prevented my undertaking that Enterprize, on which I had fixed my Mind, and that muſt ſtill delay its Execution for ſome Months, at the Expiration of which, as every previous neceſſary Preparation will be made, the Taſk of reducing Baſſein will be eaſy and expeditious. The Fall of this Place may, I conceive,

complete your Views of territorial Acquiſitions on this Side of India, and make the Company Maſters of a Tract of Country, capable in their Hands of becoming an inexhauſtible Source of Power and Wealth, from the commercial Advantages and Capability of Improvement in Trade and Manufactures it poſſeſſes, and which, from its convenient Situation, may be maintained and defended at a ſmall Expence of Men and Treaſure.

By poſſeſſing Baſſein, which appears eſſentially requiſite to the Proſperity and Safety of this Settlement, the Ghauts and Paſſes in its Neighbourhood leading into the Decan, muſt be at all Times commanded by us; and the Terror this would excite in the Government of Poona, from their Vicinity to that Capital, would create (more than any other Conqueſt or Advantage we could gain) a ſerious Inclination in the Marattas to accommodate the preſent Difference, and upon Terms of Honour and Benefit to the Company. This, notwithſtanding the paſt Succeſs of our Arms, and the Diſappointment all their Efforts to interrupt their Progreſs have hitherto met with, they will not at preſent conſent to, at any rate; they would never agree to cede Baſſein to us; without which I repeat my Opinion, the Company's Affairs on this Side of India cannot be conſidered as placed upon a firm and flouriſhing Baſis. From this powerful Conſideration, I do not think it political or expedient to make any Overtures to the Poona Government for Peace, which would not be productive of the wiſhed-for Effect, till Baſſein is ſecured, and our Army has Poſſeſſion of the Ghauts, ready to fall upon the Capital of the Empire, we ſhall be in a Condition to inſiſt upon ſuch Terms as may be judged fully conſiſtent with our Honour and Intereſt, and adequate to the heavy Expences we ſhall have incurred in proſecuting the War.

Affairs cannot arrive at this State till next October, long before which I hope to receive a particular Relation of your Sentiments, and the Inſtructions you may deem it proper to give, in conſequence of a thorough Knowledge of Circumſtances, and of the Situation of Affairs at the Concluſion of the Campaign. Convinced upon the moſt ſure and ſolid Grounds, that a Pacification cannot be brought about during the Rains, I ſhall venture to give you my Ideas at large of the Mode by which it appears to me the War ought to be proſecuted next Seaſon, and the which from a Survey of the political State of the Maratta Nation, promiſe to contribute to its Succeſs.

In the Negociation opened with Scindia in March laſt, Particulars of which have been laid before you, the chief Object of his Concern ſeemed to be, and I am perſuaded was, the Diſpoſal of Ragoba. That Point once ſettled, he affected to declare, the remaining Subjects of Conteſts between the Engliſh and Maratta Nations would be without Difficulty adjuſted. It muſt not be implied from this Aſſertion of Scindia's, that admitting the Obſtacle of Ragoba removed, a Peace could have been concluded; becauſe it is evident, from the Hopes he muſt at that Time have entertained, either of his Arms proving ſuperior to ours in the Field, or of being able to draw over to his Intereſts our new Ally Futty Sing, which would have gone near effectually to deſtroy the Fruits of all our Labours in Guzerat, that he would never have been induced then to liſten to Terms which even at this Period of bad Succeſs and Diſappointment in all his Projects, there is not any Reaſon to believe would be accepted. My principal Motive for mentioning the above Circumſtances, is to point out the important Light in which Ragoba is and muſt ever be conſidered by the Marattas, and how material the Poſſeſſion of his Perſon muſt prove to promote the Views and Intereſts of the Company, and bring about a happy Concluſion of the preſent War.

Here I do not, in any Shape, mean to recommend the abſolute, or even conditional Re-eſtabliſhment of Ragoba in the Government of Poona; what I contend for is the manifeſt and ſtriking Advantages we muſt infallibly derive from his Preſence with us; and this Poſition I found upon the following Reaſon: That the juſt and fair Claims Ragoba poſſeſſes to the principal Direction of the Adminiſtration, will ever make the preſent Party apprehenſive of his Intention to aſſert them; and that the certain Conſequence of his Succeſs, in ſpite of the moſt ſecure or ſolemn Engagements in Force, might to enter into, would ultimately prove their Ruin and Deſtruction. It is the ſame of all the principal Chiefs of the State, who have been more or leſs inſtrumental in reducing him to his preſent abject Condition, during a Space of Six Years.

This Argument, while it evinces the Imprudence and bad Policy of attempting to force a Ruler upon the Maratta Leaders, whoſe Cauſe none of them are inclined, or if inclined, are however afraid to eſpouſe, points out all at once the Utility, and even Neceſſity, of retaining in our own Hands a Man who muſt ever be a Terror to them, and whoſe Forbearance they would wiſh to purchaſe at any Expence from that Power whoſe Strength they muſt be ſure, if exerted in his Favour, would prove too dangerous to their Intereſts and Safety. I am therefore clearly of Opinion, that the ſame Line of Conduct hitherto adopted reſpecting Ragoba, ſhould continue to be purſued; that is, no formal or expreſs Engagements ſhould be entered into with him; but we ſhould leave ourſelves at Liberty to purſue ſuch Plan regarding his Diſpoſal, as Circumſtances might hereafter render eligible and convenient. His Pretenſions to Sovereignty ſhould be in no Degree ſupported, and we ſhould continue to afford him a ſafe and certain Aſylum in the Company's Dominions, whenever the War ſhall terminate: His Intereſts, at leaſt as far as they relate to perſonal Safety, &c. Proviſion for himſelf and Family ought to be attended to, and included in the general Plan of Peace.

This Line of Conduct reſpecting Ragoba being adopted, the next Object is the Mode of proſecuting the War; which, as it is a Meaſure at preſent of conſiderable Neceſſity, the more heartily and vigorouſly it is entered into the ſooner we may expect it will be brought to a Period. I have already hinted the Manner in which I propoſe to commence the Military Operations, by taking Baſſein, and poſſeſſing myſelf of the neighbouring Paſſes that lead into the Decan. Here it is pro-

bable

bable the Fears and Anxieties of the Miniſter may bring the War to an immediate Concluſion. Should they not, the Point next to be conſidered, is, whether you would chuſe to purſue it upon an offenſive Plan, and penetrate into the Decan, and ſeize upon the Capital, or confine your Operations to the Defence of the Territories lying between the Ghauts and the Sea Shore, comprehending Guzerat, and all the Track along the Shore from Cambay to Bombay.

The Determination of this Point will however depend a good deal upon Circumſtances: If Scindia continues at Ugein till the Cloſe of the Rains, which I now conceive will be the Caſe, a powerful Diverſion might be made in that Quarter, to prevent his paſſing to the Southward of the Nerbudda, to ſuccour Nanah Furneſe, and I would venture to pronounce, as far as human Probability and Reaſon may preſume, that without Scindia's Aid, the Miniſter would be immediately compelled to Terms, and enter into any Engagements that might be required of him. This is no chimerical Idea, for beſides Scindia and Holkar, there remain only Two Chiefs of Conſequence in the State, Nanah and Hurry Punt Furkia, and I do not believe that any Foreign Power will draw upon himſelf the future Enmity of the Engliſh, by openly declaring his Party, and marching to their Aſſiſtance.

In the Event of ſuch powerful Diverſion being made to the Northward, Scindia will find too much Employment at Home to have Leiſure to raiſe any Diſturbance in Guzerat; and indeed the Sepoy Force, which may very well be ſpared in that Province, acting with the Troops of Futty Sing, which it may not perhaps be convenient to carry with me to the Southward, will prove ſufficient for its Security and Defence, againſt a very large Body of the Enemy, ſhould any conſiderable Army (which in the Plan above mentioned appears ſcarcely practicable) be ordered to enter it.

What I have above mentioned comprehends almoſt every Thing that occurs to me, both with reſpect to the preſent political State of Affairs, and the Advantages we may expect to derive from it in the Courſe of the future Operations of the War. The Four leading Men now in the Empire, and indeed in whoſe Hands all Power is placed, are Nana, Hurry Punt, Scindia, and Holkar: Theſe, notwithſtanding the Cauſes of Diſpute that may be ſuppoſed to exiſt, from the former conceiving that no uſeful or meritorious Service has been performed by the laſt; and Scindia again arrogating a Merit derived him by the others, and claiming Rewards to which he will not conſent, will, I am perſuaded, be found cordially to unite in Oppoſition to the Engliſh.

As the Rains are now but little advanced, I truſt I ſhall receive a full and particular Reply to this Letter long before their Concluſion, that is late in Auguſt or early in September; and I earneſtly entreat you will tranſmit it me as expeditiouſly as poſſible, that I may be compleatly Maſter of your Object and Inclinations before the Opening of the Campaign, and act accordingly.

I have the Honour to acknowledge your Letter of the 20th April: My laſt Letter will fully have replied to what you are pleaſed to direct reſpecting Ragoba; and you will perceive I have, permit me to ſay, contrary to my own Inclinations and Opinion, thought it neceſſary to comply with your poſitive Inſtructions for withdrawing Ragoba's Allowance, in its fulleſt Extent and without any Limitation.

I am truly ſorry at the Directions you have been pleaſed to give reſpecting the Regiment of Cavalry, whoſe uſeful and even neceſſary Service I have experienced on many Occaſions, during the late Campaign, both in protecting the Parties that were ſent out to forage near the Camp, and in keeping off the Pendaries and other ſmall Bodies of the Enemy's Horſe, who approached its Environs, as well as covering and defending the Baggage on the Line of March: On all theſe Services, and whenever I found it neceſſary to employ them, they have behaved with Credit to themſelves and Satisfaction to me.

The Succeſs againſt Gunneſe Punt was entirely their own. The Battalion that accompanied them could not poſſibly have reached his Camp before the Alarm muſt have been given, and the Enemy have eſcaped unhurt, to moleſt and haraſs the Country by future Depredations. From all theſe Circumſtances, and the Inconveniencies that might attend the diſmiſſing of a Corps at this Diſtance from Home, that has ſerved with Credit from the Commencement of the Expedition, by the Damp it might throw upon the Ardour of the reſt of the Troops, added to the unfavourable Conſequences it might be of regarding the Enemy, who from repeated Proofs I know entertain a high Opinion of their Skill and Diſcipline, I have deferred the Execution of your Orders reſpecting this Regiment, until I can receive your further Inſtructions, in which I flatter myſelf you will approve and authorize its Continuance in the Service.

I ſhall not fail to obſerve the Rule you have laid down for my Direction, with regard to detaching any Part of your Forces for the Defence of the Country ceded to Futty Sing, independant of the general Plan of the Campaign. My Reaſon for not fixing a Subſidy for the Expence of the Troops left in Ahmedabad, was, that I conſidered this Meaſure as coming under that Predicament; and that in the Infancy of a War, before the Affections and Diſpoſitions of Men had been properly put to the Teſt, I thought it a Point of political Convenience and Expediency, to guard as much as poſſible againſt every unfavourable Conſequence that might ariſe from any Change of Sentiment or Party.

I ſhall, as far as poſſible, comply with your Wiſhes reſpecting the Fort Saint George Detachment: The Reinforcements that have at this Time joined me from that Preſidency, conſiſt only of One Company of European Artillery, Seven of Infantry, and One Battalion of Sepoys.

I have the Honour to be, &c.

Head Quarters, Camp near Surat, 20th June 1780.

(Signed) Thomas Goddard.

Ordered,

Ordered, That the above Letter be ſent in Circulation, for the Peruſal of the Members of the Board.

Warren Haſtings,
Edwd Wheler.

APPENDIX, N° 275.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, 24th July 1780.

READ a Letter from Bombay, as follows:

Gentlemen,

We incloſe a Duplicate of our laſt Letter, dated the 29th ultimo, and of the Correſpondence with General Goddard therein forwarded.

Our lateſt Letter from him is dated the 7th ultimo, when he was preparing to make a Diſpoſition of his Forces, for the Protection of the Diſtricts adjoining to Surat and Broach during the rainy Seaſon; but we underſtand he has ſince been under the Neceſſity of deferring the Execution of his Intentions, by the ſudden Appearance of the Enemy on his Line of March.

You will obſerve from General Goddard's Advices, that the cautious Plan of Conduct adopted by the Enemy put it totally out of his Power to effect any thing deciſive this Campaign; and rendered it neceſſary, in his Opinion, to defer the Attack of Baſſein, the Reduction of which we are very anxious may become an early Object of his Operations.

The Extent of Country acquired by the Treaty with Futty Sing, and the Maratta Purgunnahs that have been reduced, neceſſarily requiring an Augmentation of our Military Eſtabliſhment for their Defence, we conſulted General Goddard on this Point, who accordingly ſent us a Plan for the Augmentation and Regulation of the Army in all its Branches; a Copy of which is incloſed. He therein ſtrongly recommended, that a Major and Two Companies ſhould be added to the Battalion of Artillery, and gave his Opinion, that the European Infantry ſhould be compleated to Two Battalions as ſoon as poſſible; and that the Sepoy Eſtabliſhment ſhould forthwith be increaſed to Fifteen Battalions, excluſive of Mariners, and all Irregulars and Locals diſcharged. Theſe Fifteen Battalions, he propoſed, ſhould be divided into Three Brigades, with a Major to each; and a Lieutenant Colonel to command the Whole.

When the Plan came under Conſideration, the Preſident laid before us a Minute on the Subject (a Copy of which we think it neceſſary to tranſmit to you); and we agreed with him in Opinion, that the State of our European Eſtabliſhments could not for the preſent admit of our carrying into Execution the Alterations propoſed by the General in reſpect to them, in any Manner that would prove of Advantage adequate to the great Expence that would be incurred thereby; and as we may with Reaſon expect to hear ſhortly from the Honourable Company, in Reply to our Repreſentations laſt Year on the State of our Army, and may conclude, they have taken Meaſures for ſupplying us with Field Officers of Experience and Ability, we further agreed with the Preſident, to make no immediate Promotions to that Rank, and not to determine on any general Arrangements which might render ſuch Promotions neceſſary.

We accordingly reſolved for the preſent to carry into Execution no more of General Goddard's Plan than raiſing Seven new Battalions of Sepoys, and modelling thoſe now in the Service according to the Strength propoſed by him; but without forming them into Brigades. The new Battalions will be formed at Bombay, Salſette, Surat and Broach, and the large Bodies of Irregulars at the two latter Settlements incorporated into them. Major Fullarton has alſo been directed to entertain Recruits at Ahmedabad, and Levies had been made at Bombay in Preparation for this Increaſe; ſo that the new Battalions will ſoon be in great Forwardneſs.

With this Strength once completed, we hope to be able to maintain all our new Acquiſitions in Guzerat as well as Baſſein, when reduced; and we judge it to be no more than really neceſſary for that Purpoſe, as we have not yet been in Condition to take Poſſeſſion of the valuable Ceſſions made by Futty Sing, adjacent to Surat, for want of a ſufficient Force.

General Goddard gives his Opinion, that the propoſed Eſtabliſhment will admit of a very eligible Army being drawn together, and will provide for the Security of our Poſſeſſions, the Defence of which muſt in the End devolve upon us; and we were clearly of Opinion, it was highly expedient to carry this Meaſure into Execution, without Delay; as, if the War is continued upon an extenſive Plan, General Goddard will not be able to ſpare any Part of the Force under his Command to garriſon the new Acquiſitions; the Benefit of which muſt conſequently be loſt to the Company: Or if an Accommodation takes place, we ought to have a proper Force in Readineſs for their Defence; as our firſt Wiſh would be to ſend back the Bengal and Madras Troops, in order to relieve the Company from

from the moſt heavy Expence which muſt be incurred by their Service on this Coaſt; but which cannot be done, until we put ourſelves in a Condition to defend our Poſſeſſions without their Aſſiſtance.

We cannot pretend to ſay, to what Extent you may carry your Views in this War, which perhaps may depend on the Efforts the French may make in India; but in our Opinion, after Baſſein is added to our other Acquiſitions, the Company's Views in Point of Territory ſhould be terminated, as we ſhall then be Maſters of a Revenue equal to the Expences of this Preſidency, and our Military Operations become defenſive; that is, ſhould have no further Object than to eſtabliſh and confirm us in our Poſſeſſions: You muſt be the beſt Judges of your Ability to ſupport the Expence of the Army under General Goddard; and whether you have any other Object in View adequate thereto. But if you ſhould reſolve on any Meaſures to relieve the Company from this heavy Burthen, we are preparing with the utmoſt Expedition to put our own Army on ſuch a Footing as will render them practicable, ſo far at leaſt as depends on us. Our greateſt Difficulty will be, the Deficiency in our European Corps, which we particularly requeſt you will attend to in your Arrangements; and we hope the Reinforcements received this Seaſon at Bengal and Madras, will enable you to ſupply even this Deficiency; the moſt ready Method of doing which will be, to transfer the private and Non Commiſſion Officers of the Madras Detachment, now with General Goddard, to this Eſtabliſhment; which we hope that Government will now be in a Condition to ſpare.

We have ſtrongly recommended to General Goddard, to take Meaſures for the Protection of the Northern Diſtricts, during the approaching Monſoon, as the Reſources we may expect from them the enſuing Seaſon will entirely depend on the Degree of Protection he can afford to them. We have for ſome Time paſt experienced conſiderable Difficulties for want of Money, when the Supplies from Bengal, by the Britannia and Beſborough, arrived very ſeaſonably to our Relief; which we ſhall manage with the utmoſt Care, as at this Time of the Year we have no other Reſource; and until Affairs are in ſome Manner ſettled, we muſt ſtill look to you for further Aſſiſtance. We are therefore under the Neceſſity of requeſting, that you will continue making us Remittances as ſoon as poſſible, to at leaſt the uſual annual Amount, as our Revenue Receipts muſt be conſidered in ſome Meaſure as precarious; and we have, as above-mentioned, thought it for the general Intereſt to encreaſe our own immediate Military Expences.

We have thought it neceſſary to take Poſſeſſion of ſome Places in the Conkan, adjacent to Bombay and Salſette, to prevent the Enemy from ſtraightening our Iſlands too much for Supplies of Grain. We are now Maſters of the Forts of Bellapore and Perſich, and the Town of Callian, which command a conſiderable Tract of Country in the Diſtrict of Baſſein; but in the Courſe of this Service, one of our Poſts was forced, with the Loſs of Three Pieces of Cannon. On the Return of the Bombay Detachment, which, you will find by the enclоſed Correſpondence, we judged it proper to recall from the Army before the Rains, we ſent over Colonel Hartley with a more conſiderable Force, who attacked and routed the Enemy in their Camp, and obliged them to retire ſome Coſs.

In order to prevent as far as we can an apprehended Scarcity of Grain, we have ſent round Two of the Company's Ships to Madras, for Cargoes of Rice; and we requeſt you will encourage the Exportation of that Article from Bengal for the Service of this Preſidency.

Bombay Caſtle,
6th June 1780.

We have the Honour to be, &c.
(Signed) Wm Hornby, &c.
Select Committee.

APPENDIX, N° 276.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, 24th July 1780.

RECEIVED a Letter as follows from General Goddard:

Gentlemen,

I have the Honour to acknowledge your Two Letters of the 24th January and 23d March.

A Period of more than Three Months has elapſed ſince I addreſſed you in a Letter dated February 17th, upon the Subject of the Allowance granted to Ragoba, ſetting forth the Reaſons which induced me to conceive it for the Intereſt of the Company, and even neceſſary to the future Succeſs of our Conteſt with the Maratta State, that Ragoba ſhould be ſupported by us until the final Settlement of the preſent Diſpute.

I have waited with the utmoſt Anxiety for your Reply to that Letter, in Hopes it might arrive before the Concluſion of this Campaign, when alone I conſidered it would be adviſable to withdraw the Allowance from Ragoba, by which his Troops then actually in Service with me were ſubſiſted; but finding

finding by the Earneſtneſs expreſſed in your Letter of 24th January, that your Sentiments regarding Ragoba were not in any Reſpect altered, I thought it adviſable, in order to comply with your Wiſhes, and at the ſame Time to act in a Point of ſo much Importance to the Company with as much Regard to their true Intereſts as poſſible, to communicate the Whole of the Circumſtances to the Honourable Select Committee of Bombay, and conſult with them upon the Meaſures proper to be adopted in the preſent State of our Affairs here. They have in Anſwer concurred in the Expediency and Neceſſity of attaching Ragoba to us during the War, and the Impracticability of doing ſo, without allowing him a Maintenance; but they have recommended that it ſhould be reduced. This Plan of Reduction in its fulleſt poſſible Extent I meant accordingly to have followed; but receiving a Confirmation of your fixed Intentions that this Allowance ſhould be entirely withdrawn, by the Reference made in your Letter of the 23d March to the Inſtructions formerly ſent me on the Subject, I have determined implicitly to obey them, and ſhall not advance Ragoba a ſingle Rupee beyond the preſent Month, for which he has already received.

With reſpect to Ragoba, in the Conditions propoſed to be ſtipulated in his Favour, I adhered literally to the Terms made by Lieutenant Colonel Upton, except adding, that his perſonal Safety ſhould be effectually ſecured, and that he ſhould be at Liberty to reſide in whatever Place he might chuſe, the Company becoming Guarantees for his pacific Behaviour, and engaging not to afford him any Aſſiſtance, or even Protection, ſhould he attempt to raiſe Diſturbances in the Maratta State.

I come now to reply to your Letter of the 23d March; and it is not without the moſt ſenſible Pleaſure and Satisfaction I perceive the Approbation you are pleaſed to declare of the Treaty concluded with Futty Sing Guicawar, which the Tenor of my paſt Letters, and the preſent Situation of our Affairs in this Quarter, will have already pointed out, and now proves to have been productive of all the good Conſequences I promiſed to the Company in concluding it; and which I have already fully explained to you. I have communicated to Futty Sing your favourable Sentiments regarding him, for which he is exceedingly grateful, and anxiouſly looks for the Arrival of the Letter you mentioned would be written him by the Honourable Governor General, but which I fear may have met with ſome Accident on the Road, as it is not yet come to Hand.

My former Letters will have apprized you of the Expectations formed from the Diviſions ſuppoſed to ſubſiſt among the Maratta Chiefs engroſſing their Attention too much to allow them Leiſure to offer any Oppoſition in the Courſe of the preſent Campaign, having proved deceitful; Scindia has, I am convinced, always acted in concert with, and under the Influence of Nana Furneſſe, and there is Reaſon to believe, will continue to do ſo; ſenſible from the Beginning of his Inſufficiency to contend with our Arms, his Aim ſeems to have been, the preventing us from extending our Conqueſts into any other Part of the Maratta Dominions. In this he has ſucceeded ſo far, that although it was an Object I had much at Heart, to reduce Baſſein before the Commencement of the Rains, I have found it abſolutely neceſſary to confine my Operations this Campaign to the Defence and Security of the Company's new acquired Poſſeſſions in Guzerat, and the entire Excluſion of the Marattas from all Share or Participation of its Revenue.

I have now the Happineſs to acquaint you, that my Endeavours for the Purpoſe are fortunately accompliſhed; and that Scindia, unable to make any Impreſſion upon the Country, remains quiet in the Neighbourhood of Pawan Ghur; and by the beſt Intelligence I can learn, means ſhortly to relinquiſh it entirely. Whether he intends to direct his Courſe to Ugein, or return to the Decan, I cannot poſitively aſſert; various Reports are circulated; and though I am myſelf of Opinion that he will find his Preſence requiſite at Poona, where the Miniſter muſt feel his Authority in rather a tottering and precarious State, having lately diſcovered a Confederacy, formed by many principal Men in Favour of Siccaram Pundit, and ſeized upon ſome of the Ringleaders, yet I believe he will detach a ſtrong Force towards Ugein, in order to oppoſe the Progreſs of our Troops, who in Conjunction with the Rajah of Ghode, have, it is reported, entered the Northern Parts of the Malva Province. A ſhort Period will now determine his Deſign. At preſent I am well aſſured, he will not in any material Degree moleſt us in the Poſſeſſion of our new Conqueſts. It is however probable, and my Intelligence gives me Cauſe to apprehend, he may leave a Body of Horſe upon the Confines of the Province, to make Inroads into the Diſtricts of Broach, Jambooſeer, Zinnore, &c. and interrupt the Ryots in the Cultivation of their Lands. This Evil I ſhall be able eaſily to remedy, by ſtationing a ſmall Force for their Protection.

I beg now to give you a ſhort Detail of the Military Operations ſince my laſt: Finding every Effort ineffectual to bring Scindia's Army to an Action, and judging it improper to expoſe the Troops to unneceſſary Hardſhips and Difficulties, by remaining in a Country where not only Forage was to be procured with great Hazard and Trouble, but there was even a Scarcity of Water, I marched back to Baroda on the 5th Inſtant, at which Place I might form my future Plan at Leiſure; and on the 8th, in Compliance with a Requiſition from the Government of Bombay, I detached the Reinforcements from that Preſidency, who arrived at Surat, and embarked for Bombay the 15th Inſtant.

I alſo put the whole Army in Motion on the ſame Day, and on the 9th, proceeded to Carwan on the Road to this Place, when I received Intelligence of Scindia with his whole Force having advanced to the Neighbourhood of Dubhoy: I therefore thought it neceſſary to check his Career, and once more drive him from the Country, and accordingly marched back to the Dahder Nuddy, upon the oppoſite Bank of which Scindia lay. He retreated to his former Encampment the ſame Day,

Day, and not thinking it neceſſary or proper to purſue him, I continued upon the Ground he had quitted, till the 14th, when I moved towards the Nerbudda.

The Enemy's Troops have now entirely evacuated the Diſtricts belonging to the Company, and it is with the greateſt Pleaſure I can communicate to you Two ſucceſsful Enterprizes, which cloſed the Scene of our Operations in the Field, and have been attended by the moſt beneficial Conſequences to the Company, particularly the latter, both by the Splendour of the Action, and the peaceful Security it has given to the new acquired Purgunnahs.

A Body of about 6,000 Horſe, under the Command of Boghretty Scindia, and Parajee Punt, Two principal Maratta Officers, had advanced to the Nerbubba, within Six or Seven Miles of Zinnore, which is Four Miles above my Camp, and where I had before ſtationed Major Forbes, with Two Battalions of Sepoys, for its Defence and Protection, being the principal Town of the Diſtrict of that Name. The Deſign of this Force in coming ſo near, was merely to watch my Motions, and plunder and deſtroy the Country. Circumſtances appearing favourable, I ordered Major Forbes, on the 22d Inſtant, to march and ſurprize them; which Service he effected, coming upon them at Day-break in the Morning. The Enemy had little or no Baggage of any Kind; what they had, together with a few Horſes and ſome Grain (the Fruits of their Rapine) fell into our Hands. A few only were killed, as they precipitately made off, and ſoon after they joined their main Body under Scindia, where they have ever ſince continued.

The Second Action above alluded to was performed by Lieutenant Welch, whom on the 17th Inſtant I detached from this Place, with the Regiment of Cavalry, the Candahar Horſe, and the Seventh Battalion of Sepoys, towards Surat, in order to drive Gunneſſe Punt, an Officer belonging to the Miniſterialiſts, who with a Body of about 4000 Horſe, 300 Foot, and Three Field Pieces, was then encamped at a Place called Badouly, out of the Purgunnahs of Surat Atareeſſy, which he had for ſome Time paſt kept in Awe, and greatly infeſted.

On the 22d at Night, Lieutenant Welch moved from the Village of Cuttore, near the Ground where the Army was encamped laſt Rains, in the Neighbourhood of Surat, in order to ſurprize Gunneſſe Punt; and proceeded with his Detachment till Half paſt Two in the Morning, when, calculating the remaining Diſtance, he found it would be impoſſible to reach the Enemy's Camp with the Whole till after Day-light; in which Time they would take the Alarm, and eſcape. He therefore came to the ſpirited and enterprizing Reſolution of puſhing forward with the Cavalry only; and at Four o'Clock entered the Camp, almoſt undiſcovered. The Enemy fled in the beſt Manner they could, and in their Hurry could carry nothing off. The Guns, from which they had been able to fire only one Diſcharge, their Tents, Bazars, and every Thing they had, fell into our Hands. One Hundred of the Enemy were found killed upon the Spot, and near Twenty wounded; beſides more, which, when Lieutenant Welch diſpatched his Letter ſoon after the Action, he ſuppoſed muſt have ſuffered from their own Guns having been turned and fired upon them in their Flight.

On our Side, One Duffadar of Cavalry, and One Candahar were killed, and Two Troopers wounded.

I have ſince certainly learnt, that Gunneſſe Punt died a Day or two after, of the Wounds he received; and that Three other principal Men ſuffered with him.

This Action has been as deciſive as it was poſſible to be; and I beg to expreſs my entire Satisfaction with, and Approbation of the ſpirited and well-judged Conduct of Lieutenant Welch, together with the undaunted Bravery and Firmneſs of the Troops, of which only the Cavalry were engaged, and who have, on this Occaſion, rendered moſt eſſential and important Services.

The conſtant and uniform Succeſs our Arms have met with during this Campaign, and the Diſappointment the Marattas have experienced in their Endeavours to make any Impreſſion upon, or wreſt from us our new Conqueſts, cannot but convince them of the unprofitable and ruinous Conteſt in which they are engaged, and incline them to wiſh to put an End to it; but however much they may deſire Peace, I fear they are not ſufficiently humbled to grant it upon Terms ſo honourable and advantageous as we have a Right to expect.

Knowing the earneſt Wiſh you have to bring the War to a ſpeedy Concluſion, I ſhall readily liſten to and encourage every Overture the Maratta Government may make for that deſirable End; and I beg to aſſure you, that no Effort ſhall be wanting on my Part to accompliſh your Views on this Occaſion.

I have the Honour to be, &c.

Camp, near Bowater Gaut, Nerbudda River, 27th May 1780.

(Signed) Tho' Goddard.

Note, There is no Appendix numbered 277.

APPENDIX, N° 278.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 23d March 1780.

RESOLVED, That the following Reply be written to Brigadier General Goddard:

Sir,

In our laſt Letter to you dated the 24th January, we informed you of the Receipt of your's of the 10th of December, without the Incloſures which it referred to for our Information. The Original, containing thoſe Incloſures, has never come to Hand; but their Place has been ſupplied by Advices from the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, from whom we received Copies of your Inſtructions, and of the previous Correſpondence between you which had led to them.

We entirely approve of the Plan which has been adopted for conducting your Operations in the Guzerat Country. This Meaſure appears to us the more judicious, becauſe it not only promiſes immediate Advantage to the Company and Credit to their Arms, but ſeems the moſt likely Method to lead to a ſpeedy and advantageous Peace.

We have now before us your Letters of the 1ſt and 29th of January, with a Copy of the Articles of Agreement concluded with Futty Sing Guicawar, the Conditions of which meet with our entire Approbation and Concurrence, and ſhall be ratified in courſe, when the Treaty which you give us to expect from the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, ſhall be tranſmitted to us in Form for that Purpoſe. In the mean Time, the Letter which will be written by the Governor General to Futty Sing, will be ſufficient to ſatisfy him of our Sentiments with reſpect to the Treaty.

As we underſtand from different Quarters that the Troops of the Maratta Chiefs had not quitted their Capital at the Date of the lateſt Advices from thence, and that the Differences which had taken place amongſt the Miniſters were likely to engroſs all their Attention for ſome Time to come, we think it improbable that you will meet with any Oppoſition in the Courſe of your preſent Campaign; and there appears to us to be no Difficulty in ſecuring the peaceable Collections of the Revenue ariſing from your new Acquiſitions, during this and the Seaſon of the Rains; but we expect that every Effort will be exerted to recover them in the enſuing Campaign; and we hope, that you will not only be prepared to make the moſt effectual Reſiſtance in ſuch Caſe to the Attempts of the Marattas, but that you will do all in your Power to ſecure the quiet Poſſeſſion of theſe Countries in Perpetuity to the Company, adviſing us of the Meaſures which you may judge it neceſſary to adopt for that Purpoſe.

By our laſt Letter you will have been furniſhed with our Directions reſpecting the Penſion which you had granted to Ragoba: For the reſt, we obſerve with Pleaſure, that you have anticipated our Wiſhes, in your Conduct towards that Chief. We are more confirmed by your Advices, and by every other Circumſtance which has come to our Knowledge, in our Opinion, that no real Advantage or Support can be derived from an open Connection with Ragoba. We therefore repeat our Injunctions, that you enter into no Engagements whatſoever with him.

We have already forbid you to take any Part in the Family Diſputes which ſubſiſt between Futty Sing and his Brother, except as a Mediator. We obſerve, that you have taken this Line for your Conduct; and approve of your purſuing it, if you ſhall ſee a Probability of reſtoring them to Harmony; but by no Means to uſe any Kind of Authority to effect it.

We are, &c.

Fort William,
23d March, 1780.

Meſſrs. Francis and Wheler. Mr. Francis—I acquieſce in this Letter, deeming it conformable to the Plan of Meaſures heretofore reſolved on, and now in Execution; but without taking any Share in the Reſponſibility that may belong to thoſe Meaſures.

(Signed) Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler.

APPENDIX, N° 279.

Extract of Bengal Secret Consultations, the 20th April 1780.

PRESENT,
The Honourable Warren Hastings, Governor General, President,
Philip Francis, } Esquires.
Edward Wheler, }

READ the following Letter from General Goddard.

Gentlemen,

Since my last, which I had the Honour to address you of the 29th ultimo, inclosing a Copy of the Treaty concluded with Futty Sing Guicawar, I have marched to Ahmedabad the Capital of Guzerat, where I arrived the 10th Instant, in the Morning. The Governor, on the Part of the Poona Government, refusing to obey the Summons I sent him to deliver up the Place to the British Arms, I was constrained to lay Siege to it; and on the 12th, at Ten o'Clock P. M. opened the Batteries against the Walls, which were sufficiently breached the 13th in the Evening, to have stormed next Day; but from a Wish, dictated by Motives of Humanity, that the Enemy, seeing the Folly of Resistance, might have submitted upon honourable Terms, and prevented that Scene of Ruin to the Inhabitants, which I had too much Reason to apprehend, by carrying so large and populous a City by Storm, I put off the Attack: In this Hope I was however disappointed, and finding that the Enemy only meant to amuse me by Subterfuges and Excuses, till the Succours they expected from Poona might arrive; and indeed confiding in their own Numbers, and the frequent Repulses which powerful Chiefs and Armies had received before the Place, to imagine themselves invincible by our Force, I gave the Orders for storming on the 15th in the Morning; which I have the Happiness to acquaint you, succeeded to my Wish in every Point. A Number of the Enemy fell in the Assault, few of our own Men suffered, when compared with the Resistance they met with, and the Difficulties they had to surmount; and to their chief Honour, the Victory was not stained with any Act of Cruelty to the inoffensive unarmed Inhabitants; but on the contrary, many of those who were actually in Arms, had their Lives spared, upon submitting themselves to Mercy. I have laid before the Commander in Chief, the Particulars of the Troops good Behaviour, and have also transmitted him a Return of the Killed and Wounded.

Permit me to congratulate you upon this Success of your Arms, which cannot fail to strike a Terror into the Enemy, equal with the Confidence with which it has inspired our own Men, and be attended with the most eminent Advantages in the Prosecution of the War with the Maratta State.

By the latest Advices, I understand they have at last put their Forces in Motion; a Body of Ten thousand Horse are reported to be on their Way from Poona, to enter the Country lying to the Southward, by one Route, and Scindia and Holkar, with about Two Thousand Horse, had actually, the 5th Instant, Three Days marched from the Gaut of Cosserbory into the Kandeish Province, and were advancing through Part of the Malava District, by the Fort of Pawengheer, towards Ahmedabad. It is probable, the Accounts of the Reduction of this Place may induce them to alter their intended Route, and remain within the Limits of Malava, to look after their own Jaghiers, which lie mostly in that Province: This indeed may have been originally the chief Motive of their March from the Decan; for although it now plainly appears, the supposed Animosity between the Minister and Scindia is of a less violent and irreconcileable Nature than it was once suspected to be, the latter has not, I am certain, received full Satisfaction for the Demands he formerly made; and will in all Probability be ready to adopt such a Line of Conduct as he may think best calculated to serve his Interests. Should I be able, by encouraging any Disposition of this Nature in him, to improve it to the Advancement of Ragoba's Cause, I shall gladly embrace the Opportunity; but at present I see no Grounds to found such a Hope, and only mention it as a Circumstance that may happen, and which I mean to make every possible Use of.

While employed in the Siege of this Place, I was honoured with your Letter of the 29th of November; and cannot find Words to express the Concern I feel at the Disapprobation of my Conduct in the Strictures you have passed upon the Measures I ventured to adopt regarding Ragonaut Row, in giving him a Monthly Allowance for his Support, as I am conscious of having consulted, to the best of my Judgment, the Interests of the Company on that Occasion; and although I had not received your express Directions and Authority for what I did, of having acted in a Manner I conceived strictly consistent with the Spirit and Meaning of the Orders which you had given me; I will intrude upon your Indulgence and Patience, by explaining the Motives by which I was influenced.

In your First Instructions, dated the 3d of April, you were pleased to direct, that in the Treaty I was empowered to conclude with the Maratta Government, the Safety of Ragonaut Row should be made an indispensable Engagement; and further recommended, that I should endeavour to obtain a

suitable

ſuitable Proviſion for his Subſiſtence. Theſe were your Sentiments at a Time when Ragoba was in the Hands of his Enemies; and the very Perſons with whom you had empowered me to treat were delivered from the principal Object of their Fears, in poſſeſſing that Inſtrument ſo dangerous to their own Exiſtence, while under our Protection; but whoſe Fate they would then diſpoſe of as they pleaſed. Under theſe Circumſtances, the Difficulty of obtaining any Conceſſions in his Favour muſt have role in Proportion to the Security in which the Miniſters found themſelves placed, from any Attempts he could make to ſubvert their Authority: This I conſidered; and at the ſame Time reflected, that if the Maratta Durbar was ſincere in his Wiſh for Peace, the Proviſion you had authorized me to require in favour of Ragoba would be agreed to without any Difficulty; after promiſing his Perſon ſhould remain ſafe from Violation, the Charge of his Maintenance become a neceſſary Duty incumbent upon their own Government, and one which it was probable they would cheerfully take upon themſelves.

When Ragoba therefore was ſo fortunate as to eſcape from the Hands of the Miniſters, and once more find a ſecure and certain Aſylum with the Engliſh, I had every Reaſon to hope, that the Propoſals I had before made in his Favour, and in which no Alteration became neceſſary, except that he might be at Liberty to reſide where he thought proper, would have found a ready Acceptance with the Court of Poona: I accordingly, moved to it by his Diſtreſs and needy Situation, as well as the Conviction that by ſo doing I proceeded upon ſure political Grounds, made him an Allowance for his Support, till I could receive your further Inſtructions. If I exceeded in the Sum fixed upon, it fell infinitely ſhort of what Ragoba himſelf ſolicited, and was only Half of what the Maratta Government did agree to allow him when in their Hands; ſo that I made no Doubt, upon the Settlement of Peace, they would have readily conſented to reimburſe the Expence. Upon the Whole, my Inducements for granting this Allowance to Ragoba may be comprized in the following:

Firſt, The State of Diſtreſs in which he implored it, for the Subſiſtence of himſelf and Family.

Second, The ſtrong Claims he poſſeſſed upon the Company, from the Connections and Friendſhip ſo long ſubſiſting between them.

Third, The Conſideration, that if a Peace with the Maratta State was practicable, a Reimburſement of this Charge became a natural and certain Conſequence.

Fourth, If the Negociation proved ineffectual, the Preſence of Ragoba with us muſt become of the greateſt political Benefit, either in improving the Advantages which the ſucceſsful Operations of War might offer, or in ſtipulating the future Conditions of a Peace with the Maratta State.

Previous to the Receipt of your Letter, I had made the Advance for this Month. I have communicated to you many Circumſtances ſince your Letter dated November 29th, which may probably have effected ſome Alteration in your Sentiments from what they were at the Time you wrote; and we may hope hourly for an Anſwer to my Advices of the War, the Plan propoſed to be followed, and the Meaſures that were already taken for its Proſecution; all which is moſt particularly explained in my Letter of the 1ſt of January. I expect to know your final Pleaſure regarding Ragoba, before it becomes neceſſary to make him any further Advances; or that at moſt, he can receive only One Month's Payment more, till I am honoured with your particular Commands. I have thus candidly, and without Reſerve, explained to you the Motives of my Conduct, on this Occaſion; and I truſt they will meet with your indulgent Conſideration and Approbation. I ſhall write to you in a few Days, reſpecting Scindia's Motions, and whatever elſe material may occur.

I have, &c.

Head Quarters,
Camp at Ahmedabad,
17th Feb. 1780.

(Signed) Tho' Goddard.

Bengal Secret Perſian Correſpondence.

Letter from Ragonath Row; received the 30th April, 1780.

Knowing it to be incumbent on our Friendſhip, to inform one another of all Occurrences which happen on either Side, and to communicate any Advice and Counſel which may appear to us to be moſt conſiſtent with the preſent Circumſtances, I now write to you, that as I am conſcious all Increaſe of Dignity and Power in the Engliſh, adds equally to my Honour and Diſtinction, I therefore adviſed General Goddard, as the Circumſtances demanded it, to gain over to himſelf the Cavalry of thoſe Chiefs whoſe Friendſhip I could depend upon, having been ſtrictly united with them before the breaking out of the War; that a ſmall Sum would perſuade them to come over with their whole Force; that if he ſhould not approve of this Advice, it would be neceſſary for him to raiſe more or leſs Horſe himſelf. I have explained this by Word of Mouth to the General, and alſo by Letters; but he has not as yet raiſed any Cavalry, the whole Strength however is on his Side. He has now, on his Way to Gojeraut, entered into a ſtrict Alliance with Futtah Sing Row Gackwar to join Armies with him, and has taken the Town of Ahmadabad. All Particulars of this you will learn from the General's Letters; I am totally unacquainted with the Negociations and Articles which have paſſed between him and Row Gackwar. At this Time Sindeah Holcar, and other Chiefs, are marched from the Diſtance of Eleven or Twelve

Coss from Surat, towards Ahmedabad. By the Bleſſing of God, and the good Auſpices of the Company, no Neglect will happen on the Part of the General, in the Proſecution of the War. I am daily praying to the Almighty, that in the Time of Hoſtilities, the Want of Horſe may not be attended with bad Conſequences. The Courage of the Engliſh is ſuch, that they are certain of being victorious. I have written to Rajah Ram Winkar and Turneck Dadajee the Particulars of the Match and Victory of my Horſes, which they will make you acquainted with.

APPENDIX, N° 280 and 281.

N° 280.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 20th April 1780.

READ, That the following Anſwers be written to General Goddard:

Sir,

We have had the Pleaſure of receiving yours of the 17th February, and the Commander in Chief has tranſmitted to us a Copy of yours to him, of the ſame Date, both containing an Account of the Reduction of Ahmedabad.

This Succeſs has equalled the Hopes which he had conceived from the former and uniform Experience of your Activity and good Conduct. We deſire you to accept our Thanks, and to offer them in our Name in Public Orders, to the Officers and Men of the ſeveral Corps which compoſed your Army at the Siege of Ahmedabad, for the Firmneſs and Gallantry which they diſplayed during the Siege, and in the Storm of that City; particularly to thoſe Officers whom you have mentioned in your Letter to the Commander in Chief, as having in a more remarkable Manner diſtinguiſhed themſelves on this Occaſion. The Opinion which we have ever entertained of the Bravery of our own Troops, required no new Inſtance to ſupport or increaſe it; but we obſerve with an uncommon Satisfaction, the Part which you had aſſigned to thoſe of the Bombay Eſtabliſhment, and the Spirit with which they performed it; a Circumſtance which of itſelf cannot fail to retrieve our national Character, and to prove, that there is no Service of which the Diſcipline and Courage of our Forces is not capable, with the Advantage of an able Commander. We hope that the Enemy will be now convinced of the decided Superiority of our Arms, and that you will be able to accompliſh the Object which we have invariably in View, an honourable and advantageous Peace; ſuch a Service we ſhall eſteem of more Importance, nor leſs honourable to you, than the moſt ſplendid Operations in the Field. We authorize you to accept of any Propoſals which may be made to you for that Purpoſe, which may be conſonant to our former Inſtructions, and warranted by the preſent State of the War; and even to make Overtures for Peace on ſuch Conditions, if you ſhall have any reaſonable Grounds to believe that they will be immediately accepted, and not employed to amuſe and deceive; in the mean Time, we rely on your Activity for the Proſecution and Improvement of the Advantages with which your Campaign has been ſo happily begun. We reſerve the other Subjects of your Letter for a ſeparate Reply.

Fort William, 20th April 1780.

We are, &c.

Sir,

We now tranſmit you our Sentiments on the Subject of your Letters of the 29th January and 17th February, which have not been replied to. We are much concerned to obſerve that your Conduct, which has been ſo deſerving in general of our warmeſt Approbation, ſhould in ſome Inſtances be leſs ſatisfactory to us. Our Orders concerning the Penſion you had granted to Ragoba, were poſitive and peremptory, and we expected you would literally have obeyed them; but we are concerned to find by your Letter of the 17th of February, that you even intended to advance him 50,000 Rupees for the Month of March. We now therefore repeat our Orders, and poſitively direct, that not a Rupee ſhall be advanced in future from your Treaſury, for the Supply of Ragoba. We informed you in our Letter of the 24th November 1779, that it was with the utmoſt Difficulty we are enabled to furniſh Supplies for your neceſſary and unavoidable Expences; and we ſtill hope, that on re-conſidering this Part of our Letter, you have determined to pay a ſtrict Obedience to our Orders.

We are pleaſed to obſerve that you have propoſed to make certain Regulations for the Diminution of your Expences; your Example and determined Reſolution to check every unnneceſſary Change, will, we hope, produce the deſired Effect.

Our Reſources are no longer equal to the Payment of your Army without draining Bengal entirely of its Specie; nor can any Acquiſition on the other Side of India compenſate for the Diſtreſs which a

Continuance of the War, at the preſent Expence, would bring upon the Company: We therefore moſt earneſtly recommend to you, to obſerve the ſtricteſt Œconomy in your future Diſburſements; and we ſhall point out to you ſuch Savings as we think may be made without Injury to the Service. The Firſt Regiment of Cavalry is kept up at a very heavy Expence; which, we think, has not been compenſated by any Services which it has performed, or to be expected from it in future: We therefore authorize, and poſitively direct you, to reduce this Regiment.

The Commander in Chief has communicated to us your Letter of the 4th March, by which we find that Major Fullerton, with Eight Companies of Sepoys, was in Garriſon at Ahmedabad: We direct, if this has not been already done, that Futty Sing be called upon to fix a Subſidy for the full Expence of theſe Troops, and of any other of our Forces which may be detached for the Defence of the Countries ceded to him, independant of the general Plan of the Campaign. We wiſh you to return a Part or the Whole of the Fort St. George Detachment, as ſoon as the Seaſon will permit and you can diſpenſe with their Services, as the whole Expence of theſe different Corps will fall upon this Government, which is (as we muſt repeat) unequal to ſo accumulated a Charge.

Fort William,
April 20th, 1780.

We are, &c.

N° 281.

As the Succeſſes which have attended the Operations of the Army under the Command of General Goddard, now afford us a better grounded Expectation than we have entertained, of being able to terminate the War by an honourable and advantageous Peace; or in the Event of its Continuance, of proſecuting it with Advantage to the Company, by ſuch an Extenſion of Territory as may either compenſate for the paſt Expence, or furniſh the Means of a future Negociation; and as it is neceſſary, both with reſpect to the Length of Time which will be required for the Operation of any Plan which we may concert for either of the above Ends, that we ſhall enter upon the Conſideration of it as early as poſſible, even before the Cloſe of the preſent Seaſon; Reſolved, That we addreſs the Commander in Chief, and requeſt to be favoured with his Preſence and Aſſiſtance, informing him that we ſhall ſuſpend further Operations on this Subject, till his Arrival.

The following Letter is accordingly written to Sir Eyre Coote.

Sir,

As the Succeſſes which have attended the Operations of the Army under the Command of General Goddard, now afford us a better-grounded Expectation than we have hitherto entertained, of being able to terminate the War by an honourable and advantageous Peace; or in the Event of its Continuance, of proſecuting it with Advantage to the Company, by ſuch an Extenſion of Territory as may either compenſate for the paſt Expences, to furniſh the Means of a future Negociation; and as it is neceſſary, both with reſpect to the Length of Time which will be required for the Operation of any Plan we may concert for either of the above Ends, that we ſhould enter upon the Conſideration of it as early as poſſible, even before the Cloſe of the preſent Seaſon, we requeſt to be favoured with your Preſence and Aſſiſtance at our Councils; and at the ſame Time beg Leave to inform you, that we ſhall ſuſpend our Deliberations on this Subject until your Arrival.

Fort William,
20th April 1780.

We have the Honour to be, &c.

APPENDIX, N° 282.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 29th May 1780.

At a Council; PRESENT,
The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Philip Francis, Edward Wheler, Eſquires.
Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote, abſent on a Viſit to the different Stations of the Army.

READ the following Letter and Incloſure from Sir Eyre Coote.

Gentlemen,

I have the Honour to encloſe you an Extract of the laſt Letter I have received from General Goddard, which I take the Liberty of laying before you, as it contains Sentiments entirely conformable

to

to what I have already ſtated to you, regarding the Mode of carrying on the preſent War; though I did not want ſuch a Confirmation of my former Ideas upon this Subject.

General Goddard now declares himſelf confined to the Defence of the Territory newly acquired, which, as I foretold, was a neceſſary Conſequence of the Plan adopted. I cannot therefore avoid reiterating my Propoſals of ſome vigorous Meaſures being taken from theſe Quarters, as ſoon as the Seaſon will admit. This appears to me the more preſſing, as I find ſince I have left the Board, that we are become Principals in the War, and the preſent Plan promiſes nothing but an endleſs, ruinous Expence.

I therefore beg Leave to repeat, that while I recommend the moſt vigorous Exertions, it is only with a View to accelerate a Peace; which, in the preſent State of Politics at Home, would be, in my Opinion, the happieſt Event that could happen to us.

Lucknow,
5th May 1780.

I have the Honour to be, &c.
(Signed) Eyre Coote.

Extract of a Letter from Brigadier General Goddard, dated 28th March 1780.

My laſt gave you a very particular Information of the Situation of Scindia's Forces, which he was then collecting from all Parts of his Country to accompany him into Guzerat; ſince which Time he has been joined by 5000 Horſe from Eugein, and it is reported that another conſiderable Body is on its March towards him; *ſo that the Northern Provinces of the Maratta State, which are moſtly belonging to himſelf and Holkar, muſt be now greatly expoſed, and open to Invaſions from our upper Provinces, by the Way of Gohud and the extenſive Provinces of Ajmere*, the principal Rajah of which, the Marwar Rajah, is, I believe, by no Means well-diſpoſed to the Intereſts of Scindia. I have no poſitive Proof of this being the Caſe; having had no Correſpondence or other Communication with him whatever, ſince my Arrival on this Side of India; but it is a Circumſtance generally believed, and has its Foundation in former Diſputes and Animoſities, and I mention it to you, among other Incidents, to give you an Opportunity of judging how far it may be practicable; *as it would certainly be of Advantage to the Operations of the War on this Side, to cauſe a powerful Diverſion to be made on the other, which could not fail to diſtreſs and divide their Attention exceedingly.*

Having no Object to induce me to penetrate into Malwa, but on the contrary, riſking the moſt material Intereſts of the Company, by leaving the Province of Guzerat and the Sea Coaſt to the Inroads either of an European or Indian Enemy; I can only at preſent watch the Motions of Scindia, to prevent him from over-running and deſtroying the Country; and, if poſſible, ſeize ſome favourable Opportunity of attacking him; which, as it is his only Care to avoid, I ſhall find ſome Difficulty to effect.

A true Extract.
(Signed William Tierney,
Secretary to the Commander in Chief.

Ordered, That it lie for Conſideration.

Read another Letter as follows, from the Commander in Chief:

Gentlemen, Lucknow, 11th May, 1780.

1ſt. I have been honoured with your Letters of the 20th April.

2d. Previouſly to the Receipt of them, I was making every Diſpoſition and Preparation to avail myſelf of the firſt Swelling of the Waters, to leave this Place; the intenſe Heat of the Seaſon not permitting any other Mode of travelling, however deſirous I may be of ſetting out. Indeed, were I to attempt it during the Droughts, it would not at all haſten my Arrival at the Preſidency, as at preſent many Places of the River are not navigable for my Boats: I ſhall therefore anxiouſly await the Commencement of the Rains, to embark.

3d. With regard to my Opinion upon any preſent Plan to be adopted for the Proſecution or Termination of the Maratta War, my Idea remains invariably the ſame, that it is our Intereſt to procure, as ſoon as poſſible, an honourable Peace. But as Things ſeem to be now circumſtanced, I ſhould think it can only be attainable by proſecuting the War with Vigour, ſupported by every poſſible Exertion from theſe Quarters. But ſhould there in the mean Time between this and my Arrival, any new Circumſtance occur, unknown to me, neceſſarily prompting other Meaſures, my Opinion can without Delay be required; and will certainly be given with that Impartiality and Candour which I truſt ever has and ever will accompany it.

4th. I muſt at the ſame Time obſerve, that whatever Reſolutions you may deem proper, or find to be neceſſary, no Military Movements can be made from the Frontier Stations until ſome of the Deficiencies in Stores are ſupplied, and thoſe Repairs compleated which I informed you in my Letter of the 21ſt of March our Artillery ſtood ſo abſolutely in need of. This I beg Leave once more to recommend, as an Object of the firſt Attention; and with the ſpeedieſt Orders given for that Purpoſe, and all the Diligence which can be uſed in executing them, I do not imagine it can be rendered fit for Service before the Commencement of the next Seaſon, proper for opening a Campaign.

5th. In

5th. In Reply to the Opinion you require, upon diſbanding the Cavalry, I can only ſay, that after having, with much Trouble and great Expence, brought them to a Degree of Perfection, I muſt think it would be an imprudent Meaſure to deprive ourſelves of their Services, at a Time when they may be moſt eſſentially neceſſary to us. And my Opinion of their Uſefulneſs at this Time is ſuch, that I had rather reduce the Eſtabliſhment of Sepoys, to furniſh the Means of encreaſing their Numbers, than be enabled to raiſe more Sepoys by their Diſmiſſion. The Inference drawn in their Diſfavour, from what has occurred in General Goddard's Army, cannot properly affect their Credit; as when that Service was undertaken the Corps were but juſt raiſed, were ill appointed, and ſtill worſe mounted; ſo that no immediate Benefit could be expected from them. The Candahar Horſe, on the contrary, were old Soldiers, thoroughly diſciplined, and well mounted. In reſpect to the preſent Inability of the Nabob's Finances to ſupport the Expence, it might perhaps be worthy of your Conſideration, whether it would not be a more ſalutary Meaſure to enquire into the Cauſe of thoſe Deficiencies, and apply proper Remedies to the Evil, than to give up uſeful Eſtabliſhments, upon a ſuppoſed Want of Power to maintain them? For if, with an immenſe Addition to his Revenue, he is unable to keep up a much ſmaller Number of Troops, upon leſs and better regulated Pay than his Predeceſſor did with much fewer Reſources, there muſt be improper Management ſomewhere.

6th. I ſome Time ago wrote to Colonel Pearſe upon the Propriety of forming the Volunteers into a ſeparate Company in the Artillery, to remain under his Management, that he might be enabled to judge of their Merits before they were finally diſpoſed of. I find Colonel Pearſe had not received that Letter before he made his Report to the Board, which you have referred to me; and from that Circumſtance, I take it for granted you will agree to the Plan.

7th. I am juſt informed of the Death of Mr. Kirkman, Paymaſter to the Second Brigade. I therefore beg Leave, Gentlemen, to recommend Mr. Tierney to ſucceed to that Poſt, whoſe Integrity and Abilities I know, and can anſwer for; and ſhould my Requeſt meet with your Concurrence, I am perſuaded he will fill it with Honour to himſelf and Satisfaction to the Public.

8th. Was I inclined to enter into diſagreeable Diſcuſſions, ſome Points in your Letter would afford me ſufficient Matter for them; but as they can only tend to diſſipate the Time and Attention due to the public Welfare, it is by no Means my Intention to touch upon them. And allow me once more to aſſure you, Gentlemen, that it is not my Wiſh to arrogate, as to myſelf, any Powers inconſiſtent with the Double Offices I hold, as Member of the Board and Commander in Chief, or which do not come pointedly within the Act of Parliament and Orders of the Company. The utmoſt of my Ambition is to co-operate with you in every Meaſure of public Benefit, and to be enabled by that Means ſucceſsfully to ſupport the Honour and Intereſt of the Nation in this Part of the World, at a Time when the Event of Affairs at Home may render theſe Poſſeſſions of ſtill more eſſential Conſequence to us, than we have yet had Occaſion, valuable as they really are, to eſtimate them at.

I have the Honour to be, &c.

(Signed) Eyre Coote.

Ordered, That the Fourth Paragraph of this Letter be ſent to the Board of Ordnance; that the Sixth and Seventh Paragraphs be conſidered in the Public Department; and that the remaining Parts of it do lie for Conſideration.

APPENDIX, N° 283.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 20th April 1776.

Letter from the Commander in Chief to Captain Popham.

Sir,

THE Honourable Governor General and Supreme Council having entered into a Treaty with the Rhanah of Ghohud, he has in conſequence thereof demanded from me a Body of Troops, to be ſent to his Aſſiſtance againſt the Marattas. I therefore order you to march with the whole Detachment under your Command to Etawd, there to remain for the preſent, agreeable to the following Inſtructions.

I have explained to the Rhanah of Ghohud the Neceſſity there is, from Intelligence I have received relative to the Strength of the Enemy, for his ordering 10,000 Cavalry to join you immediately on your croſſing the Jumma; but ſhould the Rhanah not be able to ſend ſo large a Body of Cavalry, and that you think from the Intelligence which you receive, a leſs Number may ſuffice, ſo that the Marattas, againſt whom we are now ſuppoſed to have commenced Hoſtilities, cannot impede your joining the Rhanah's Army, you will then uſe your own Diſcretion in effecting the propoſed Junction, ſupported

that Mr. William Odell, a Volunteer in this Detachment, ſignalized himſelf at the Head of the ſtorming Party, in a Manner which proved him highly deſerving of immediate Admiſſion into the Service, and any other Mark of your Favour conſiſtent with his Situation. Permit me now Gentlemen, to ſolicit once more the Benefit of your Inſtructions for my Conduct in general, wherein it may be imperfectly pointed out, or totally neglected in the Treaty, at preſent its ſole Guide; but particularly reſpecting Conqueſts that may be made by the Troops under my Command.

Pardon me if I ſeem pointedly urgent in this Requeſt, which can only flow from an animated Deſire of executing the Service with the Charge of which I have been honoured, in a Manner invariably conſiſtent with your Intentions.

I have the Honour to be, &c.

(Signed) Wm Popham.

Camp, Lahaar,
29th April 1780.

The Governor General lays before the Board a Return of the Killed and Wounded of Captain Popham's Detachment at the Storm of Fort Lahaar:

Ordered, That it be entered after the Conſultation.

Reſolved, That the following Letter be written to the Commander in Chief:

Sir,

We have now to acknowledge the Receipt of your Letters to us in this Department of the 21ſt ultimo, and 3d Inſtant.

The Firſt of theſe Letters requires a minute and particular Reply. Beſides its general Tendency, and, as it appears to us, its ſtudied Object, to depreciate the Alliance which we have lately concluded with the Rana of Gohud, we find Two Charges contained in it, ſo ſerious in their Nature, and ſo pointed in their Appeal, that as we feel ſo we cannot help expreſſing the deepeſt Concern, nor leſs Surprize that you ſhould have thought yourſelf warranted to produce them before you were certain of the Grounds on which they were formed. The Charges themſelves we ſhall reduce to ſtated Propoſitions, and ſeparately reply to them.

The Firſt is, that we have engaged Captain Popham's Detachment in a Service to which it is unequal.

The Second, that we have wholly withheld from you the Information of our Plans for the Conduct of the Maratta War; and in particular, that we have neglected to anſwer a Letter addreſſed by you to us, dated the 6th January laſt, "deſiring" as you term it "Information of what was meant to "be the adopted Line."—The Firſt of theſe Charges is not directly expreſſed, but too ſtrongly and evidently implied by the whole Tenor of your Letter, to admit of our putting any other Conſtruction on the Expreſſions which mark it with that Tendency.

You ſtate the Inequality of the Detachment to the Service on which it has been employed, as the Conſequence of the extenſive Powers veſted in the Rana of Ghod by the Treaty, "in virtue of "which he has carried our Arms acroſs the Scind into the Maratta Diſtricts, and by falſe Information "held out to Captain Popham, of the Strength of Lahaar, induced him to appear before and attack "that ſtrong Hold;" which you repreſent in other Parts of your Letter as impracticable, and thereby likely to prove the Occaſion of our immediate Diſgrace, and in its Conſequences, of our utter Ruin. You ſtate, that the Detachment was not equipped for Sieges, though conformable to the Requiſition made by the Rana, and equal to the original Service expreſſed in it. We will repeat your Words, that we may not unintentionally miſrepreſent them.

"Four Battalions and their Guns was the Extent of the Rana's Requiſition, to drive the Ma-"rattas out of his Diſtricts, where they were found extending the Ravages of War both by "Fire and Sword."

"Captain Popham's Detachment formed of Cavalry, European Artillery, and Sepoys, anſwered "in Force ſuperior to his the Rana's Demands; and the Marattas quitting Gohud, on their Ap-"proach, evinced they were equal to the original Service meant to be performed."

Hence it appears that you have conſidered the Rana as inveſted with the Power of preſcribing the Strength of the Party required for his Aſſiſtance, as well as the Service to be performed by it; that you conformed to the Subſtance, though not to the Letter of his Requiſition; that you appointed a Detachment more than equal to the Strength preſcribed, and equal to the literal Terms of the Service aſſigned to it, but unequal to the Service on which he did employ it; this you impute to the extenſive Powers veſted in him by the Treaty, or in other Words (for the Inference is inevitable) to the Board who made the Treaty.

We entirely agree with you in Opinion, that the Detachment is not equal to ſuch Services as that on which it has lately been employed, though ſucceſsfully; but cannot admit this as a Conſequence imputable in any Reſpect to the Treaty concluded with the Rana of Gohud.

By the 2d Article of the Treaty, it is ſtipulated, that "if the Rana ſhall require an Engliſh "Force, from the Company, for the Defence of his Country, or for the Acquiſition of Territory, "ſuch a Force, *proportioned to the Exigency of the Service*, ſhall be immediately ſent on his Re-"quiſition made in Writing to the Commanding Officer of the neareſt Station of the Com-"pany's Troops." And the 3d Article declares, that "this Force ſhall be employed for the

ſhall alſo be attended to without Delay; though the Plan of Action ſeems to me very unequal to the critical Situation of Affairs, or to the Dignity of that Character which the Britiſh Arms have ſupported in India, with ſo much Splendor and Reputation, to the preſent Period.

Permit me the Honour, &c.

Lucknow,
21ſt April 1780.

(Signed) Eyre Coote.

APPENDIX, N° 285.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 15th May 1780.

READ another Letter as follows, from the Commander in Chief.

Gentlemen,

I have the Pleaſure of confirming the Account of the Capture of Lahaar, which I mentioned to you in my Letter of the 1ſt Inſtant. That Fort, by Advices this Day received from Captain Popham, I am informed was carried by Aſſault on the 21ſt ultimo. I incloſe you a Copy of Captain Popham's Letter, alſo one from Captain Palmer of the ſame Date. Sir Eyre C 3d May.

The exemplary Behaviour of both Officers and Men, who performed this Piece of ſpirited Service, I have the greateſt Pleaſure in communicating to your Board, and in recommending Captain Popham and his deſerving Detachment to your Countenance and Notice. But though I have the higheſt Senſe of the Military Conduct of Captain Popham, during the Whole of the Expedition, and of the intrepid Coolneſs of all the Officers and Men who have been employed under him; yet I muſt remark, that nothing could warrant the deſperate Attack obliged to be made on the Fort of Lahaar, where ſo many brave Men have ſuffered, but the diſgraceful Alternative that preſented itſelf, the being reduced to abandon a Service in which they were embarked, and on the Succeſs of which, once begun, the Credit of our Arms in a great Meaſure depended.

They were obliged to ſtorm the Fort, without having it in their Power to take off its Defences. I ſincerely hope we ſhall in future know the Value of ſuch Troops too well, to permit them to be oppoſed to Forts under ſuch Diſadvantages.

I lament the Loſs of Two very promiſing Officers, who led the forlorn Hope, and I recommend Mr. Odell (the Volunteer ſo particularly mentioned, who had juſt joined the Detachment by Permiſſion from me) to be appoined Cornet of Cavalry in the room of Cornet Gardiner, killed on the Breach, and whoſe Poſt Mr. Odell is reported to have filled on the Spot with ſuch gallant Propriety.

I have the Honour &c.

Lucknow,
3d May, 1780.

(Signed) Eyre Coote.

Ordered, That the Incloſures in the above Letter be entered after the Conſultations.

Read the following Letter from Captain Popham.

Gentlemen,

It is with great Pleaſure I have now to congratulate you on the Capture of Lahaar Fort, the Capital of Cutchooagur, which was taken Yeſterday Forenoon by Storm. At Eight o'Clock the ſpringing of One of our Mines threw down a great Part of the Curtin, and at Ten the Fire of our Batteries made as practicable a Breach as the Weight of our Field Pieces could effect; on which a Detachment under the Command of Captain M'Lary advanced to the Aſſault. The Two leading Officers fell, Lieutenant Logan and Cornet Gardiner, before they got to the Top of the Breach; the Aſſailants however puſhed up through an extreme heavy Fire, and drove the Enemy from the outer Rampart to the Citadel, a ſtrong Poſt ſurrounded by a Wall flanked with Towers; ſome of our Troops followed through the Gateway, ſome mounted the Wall, and after a great Slaughter, the Remains of the Garriſon (which had conſiſted of upwards of Five hundred fighting Men) reduced to the Kelladar and a few Dependants, intreated for Quarter, which was granted.

The Intrepidity and Steadineſs of the Troops gave me entire Satisfaction, but as theſe were moſt eſſentially promoted by the Conduct and Activity of Captain Mayaffre, commanding Officer of Artillery, Lieutenant Cameron, Field Engineer, and Captain M'Lary, it is my indiſpenſable Duty to recommend the Merit of theſe Officers to your Notice. I muſt alſo further preſume to point out,

dictates the Meaſure, and where Succeſs is certain. If our Enemies are accuſtomed to ſee the Crown of Victory diſputed, doubtful where to fix the fatal Error, will ſome Day or other leave us to lament the ſad Conſequences of our weak Ambition; and in ſearching for univerſal Power, we ſhall riſk diſadvantageouſly the extenſive Poſſeſſions we are now ſo happily Maſters of. The being obliged to abandon a Service in which we are once embarked, is a Defeat in the fulleſt Extent of the word. In the preſent Inſtance, we have been reduced to the diſagreeable Alternative, of either forfeiting our Honour by a Breach of Treaty, or, by ſubſcribing to the Ranah's ill-judged Plans, riſk a Diſgrace to our Arms; a Circumſtance which muſt neceſſarily place the Military Officer commanding on Service of the Kind, in a Situation truly diſtreſſing; and ſhew us to the different Powers in the Eaſt, in Colours which we have been unaccuſtomed to appear in.

It is not ſending a ſmall Detachment to Ghod, to cover that Alien Diſtrict from Deſolation, will bring the Maratta War to a Concluſion. If an offenſive and decided War is to be carried on with the Marattas, a more general and extenſive Scale of Action ſhould be purſued.

What are the Plans of Government on this moſt intereſting Point, I am ignorant of; or how our Country will approve the Want of Confidence, (to call it by no harſher Epithet) of your Government towards their Military Commander in Chief, in this Time of Danger, I know not; but certain it is, I have not been acquainted with either the Deſigns of Government, or my Opinion aſked on the Military Operations to be purſued.

My Letter of the 6th of January, addreſſed to your Board, ſtated Queries, deſiring Information of what was meant to be the adopted Line; the Reaſonableneſs of the Requeſt led me to ſuppoſe that the neceſſary Information would not have been withheld from me; but to my Aſtoniſhment the Subject is unanſwered.

On the 13th Inſtant I received a Letter from the Rana, purporting that he has left his own Country to be plundered by the Marattas, gone into that of our Enemy's, and deſiring that a Indent forwarded from Captain Popham for a Field battering Train, might be complied with. The Buſineſs mentioned which the Supply of Stores was deſigned to aſſiſt, is the Siege, or rather Blockade of Gwalior during the enſuing Rain.

The attacking Gwalior with that Detachment, is totally repugnant to my Military Ideas, for many Reaſons. It is reported to be a Place of conſiderable Strength; and for that Detachment, or any other, to attack it while the Marattas are in Force and unbeaten in the Field, would be abſolute Madneſs: A Covering Army, would be indiſpenſibly neceſſary to keep the Communication for Supplies open to our Troops before the Place, and to awe and hinder the Marattas from harraſſing and impeding the Beſiegers: Theſe are Conſiderations that ought to militate againſt attempting, with ſo weak an Armament, either the Attack of Gwalior, or penetrating too far into the Enemy's Diſtricts. The Difficulties before the Mud Fort of Lahaar are convincing Arguments of the Folly, under the preſent Circumſtance, of attacking Gwalior. But I was obliged to refuſe complying with the Rana's Deſires, and Captain Popham's Indent alſo, on other unſurmountable Grounds: Our Inability rendered it impoſſible to furniſh the material Article of Stores expreſſed in the Indent; viz. Two Eighteen Pounders and One Mortar of Ten or Eight Inches. There is not a Gun of that Calibre or Mortar of Size, either at Futty Ghur or Cawnpore; nor could I have ordered them from Chunar without diſmantling the Garriſon; the Situation there is much below the common Exigencies of that Garriſon, and the contingent Wants to be guarded againſt at the Brigade Field Stations.

The Situation of our Stores I have explained to you fully in my Letter of the 21ſt ultimo. Though this is a Subject of the firſt Conſequence, I have not received any Anſwer to that Letter.

My public Accounts ſay, that the Ranah is ſo beſet with Black Chiefs and Sirdars, whoſe Opinions are hoſtile to our Intereſts, and that they work ſo powerfully on the Ranah's Mind, that he is both puſillanimous in his own Councils, and irreſolute in executing what is recommended him by us.

I foreſee the Buſineſs of Ghod to be beſet with diſgraceful Difficulties; but ſincerely hope I ſhall be miſtaken in the Conſequences I have at preſent Reaſon to apprehend.

Captain Popham's Account that Gongador of Culpee, Luchmun Pundit of Jaaſie, with the Dettiah Rajah, are expected to join the Marattas againſt us with about Ten Thouſand Horſe and ſome Guns, is to be conſidered; his Repreſentation of the Utility of ordering ſome of our Battalions to the Aſſiſtance of the Sumpter Rajah, I do not think myſelf authorized by any Means to attend to. Any Reinforcement for the immediate Aſſiſtance of the Ranah, required by him, I ſhould comply with, in Conſequence of the Spirit of the Treaty; but as to ordering other Detachments to ſecond his Objects by making a Diverſion in another Quarter, I muſt wave entering ſo deeply into his Politics, without the poſitive Order of Government; nor can I ſuppoſe it to be your Ideas, that the Company's Troops are to be divided and ſubdivided into ſmall Detachments ſent to protect the Territories and fight the Battles of the Petty Rajahs of Indoſtan. Had it been thought adviſable by Government to have ordered a reſpectable Army to have croſſed the Jumma, and penetrated into the Enemy's Dominions during the laſt cold Seaſon, I may venture to affirm that the War would at this Minute have borne a more favourable Aſpect than it now preſents; and that the Expence of the Armament could have been ſecured from the Enemy's Country, with many other Advantages obtained, both for the Credit and Emolument of the Company.

Uninformed of your Plan of Politics, and no Latitude given me to execute what might appear to me proper at a Time of Exigency, I ſhall, while up the Country, confine myſelf to guarding our own Diſtricts from Inſult and Invaſion. As to the Scene on the other Side of the Jumma, your poſitive Orders and the Ranah of Ghod's Demands for Troops and Stores that can be procured and ſpared,

ſhall

ſupported even by a leſs Number of Cavalry than the Ten thouſand which I have required to join you.

As you are placed by the Treaty under the Command of the Rhanah of Ghohud, I can give you no Inſtructions how to act, further than that you will ſupport the Dignity of the Service to the utmoſt of your Power; and for your Guidance, I think it neceſſary to give you a Copy of the Treaty entered into with the Rhanah of Ghohud; I herewith incloſe it. My Inſtructions are, that you do not on any Account croſs the Jumma till the Rhanah has ſent the Ten thouſand Horſe, or ſuch a Number as you think ſufficient to cover the Junction of your Detachment with the Rhanah's Army.

You muſt be certain that a ſufficient Force is ready to join you on the other Side of the Jumma, previous to your croſſing your Detachment.

Lucknow,
February 10th, 1780.

I am, &c.
(Signed) Eyre Coote.

A true Copy,
Wm. Popham.

To Captain Popham,
Commanding a Detachment of the Army.

Ordered, That the Paymaſter General do tranſmit to the Paymaſter of Captain Popham's Detachment, the neceſſary Inſtructions for adjuſting the Subſidy to be paid by the Rhanah of Ghohud, to the Proportion that the eſtimated Expence of that Detachment bears to that ſpecified in the Treaty.

Agreed, That the following Letter be written to Captain Popham.

Sir,

We have received your Letter of the 12th February. It is our Orders, that you demand from the Rhanah the regular and punctual Payment of the Subſidy at every Period at which it ſhall become due; and as the Corps which compoſe your Detachment differ conſiderably in their Strength and Form from regular Battalions, we have directed the Military Paymaſter General to tranſmit the neceſſary Inſtructions to the Paymaſter of your Detachment, for adjuſting the Amount of the Subſidy accordingly, of which you will apprize the Rhanah, to prevent his entertaining any improper Suſpicions on this Account.

Fort William,
20th April, 1780.

We are, &c.

APPENDIX, N° 284.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 15th May 1780.

READ the following Letter from the Commander in Chief.

Gentlemen,

In conſequence of Information received this Day from Captain Popham, reſpecting the Detachment under his Command, its Situation, and the alarming Probability of our Arms being diſgraced, by not being able to carry the Point undertaken, I think it neceſſary to make you acquainted immediately with the Circumſtance. The Rana of Ghod by virtue of thoſe extenſive Powers veſted in him over our Troops by Treaty, has carried our Arms acroſs the Scind into the Maratta Diſtrict of Cutchoowagaar, and by falſe Information held out to Captain Popham, of the Strength of Lahaar, induced him to appear before and attack that ſtrong Hold.

The Detachment was not equipped for Sieges. Four Battalions and their Guns was the Extent of the Rana's Requiſition, to drive the Marattas out of his Diſtricts, where they were found extending the Ravages of War, both by Fire and Sword. Captain Popham's Detachment, formed of Cavalry, European Artillery, and Sepoys, anſwered in Force ſuperior to his the Rana's Demands; and the Marattas quitting Ghod on their Approach, evinced they were equal to the original Service meant to be performed.

It is of the greateſt Moment to us in this Country, not to ſuffer even our own ambitious Views to lead us to undertake any Military Meaſure but what we are almoſt ſure of carrying. Our acknowledged Superiority is to be preſerved only by adopting well-digeſted Plans, executed with invincible Force and Rapidity. We ſhould not attempt offenſive Enterprizes, but when ſound political Intereſt

" the Defence of the Rana's Dominions againſt all foreign or domeſtic Enemies, and for the Enlarge-
" ment of his Dominions by Conqueſt on the Marattas."

It was far from our Intention to allow the Rana a Right to determine the Strength of the Detachment that ſhould be ſent to his Aſſiſtance; and it was as far from our Conception, that he could be a competent Judge of ſuch a Subject; this was the proper Conſideration and Province of the Officer to whom the Requiſition was made: Such is the neceſſary Conſtruction of the Treaty itſelf; or if it could have admitted a Doubt, our Letter to you of the 6th of December, which conveyed to you the firſt Information of the Treaty, and our ſubſequent Letter of the 17th of February, contain ſo clear and decided an Explanation of it, that we cannot help expreſſing our Surpriſe, that you ſhould ſtill miſunderſtand it; we will quote both Paſſages at large.

" In the mean Time, ſhould the Rana make any Application to you for a Detachment of the Com-
" pany's Forces to act againſt the Marattas, we requeſt that you will comply with his Requiſition,
" *proportioning the Number of Troops to the Exigency of the Service on which they are ſent.*"

" We do not know whether the Rana has yet made any Application to you, for a Detachment of
" our Troops to aſſiſt him; but if he ſhall, we think it proper to repeat our Injunctions, that ſuch
" a Portion *as you ſhall deem ſufficient to perform the Service propoſed*, be immediately granted; and we
" hope, if any Requiſition has already been made to you for this Purpoſe, that you will have complied
" with it previous to the Receipt of this Letter."

We have marked in the above Quotations, the Words which expreſsly refer to your Judgment, the relative Strength of the Detachment to the Services which it was to perform; nor in whatever Terms the Rana's Application was worded, could that warrant a Deviation from ſuch clear Injunctions, and from the Rights and Obligations of a formal Treaty.

It is true that the Rana's Demand, as you have ſtated it, preſcribes the Expulſion of the Marattas from his Country, as the only Service to be performed by the Detachment; and to this you aſſert it to have been equal, though not equipped for Sieges: But we underſtand that the Territory of Gohud contains a Multitude of Fortreſſes, ſome of which were, or might be in the Poſſeſſion of the Marattas; and therefore required that the Detachment ſhould have been equipped for Sieges, to enable it to perform the Services aſſigned to it, the Expulſion of the Marattas from that Country; and your Inſtructions to Captain Popham, by enjoining his Obedience to ſuch further Demands as the Rana might make in virtue of the Treaty, did in Effect extend the Operations of the Detachment beyond the Line to which you underſtand it to have been limited; even to remote and offenſive Hoſtilities, if the Rana required them, and the Strength of the Detachment was equal to them.

You will permit us therefore to remark, either that the Operations of the Detachment ſhould have been reſtricted to its original and profeſſed Deſign, until it ſhould have been fitted for more difficult Services, or it ſhould have been immediately qualified for them. We mean not to retort, but to repel the Cenſures which have been caſt upon us. In Deference to your Station and Profeſſional Knowledge, we contented ourſelves with requiring your Conformity to the Treaty, leaving the Mode and Detail wholly to your Choice and Direction; and we ſo cautiouſly avoided every Act which might be deemed an Encroachment on your Department, that we have not even to this Date conveyed any Inſtructions to Captain Popham for his Military Conduct, little expecting to be reproached by you with the Inſufficiency of your own Meaſures, in the Proſecution of the Service which we had thus generally and liberally entruſted to your Charge.

We now proceed to your Second Charge; to which our Reply ſhall be as ſhort as concluſive.

The Plans formed by this Government for the Conduct of the War, in which we might eventually be, and in which we have ſince been actually engaged, with the Marattas, were debated and concluded by the Members of this Government, aſſiſted by yourſelf in Perſon, nor have ſince undergone any Alteration or Addition, except in the Treaty of Alliance formed with the Rana of Gohud, with which you have been duly and fully acquainted: We have not therefore withheld from you the Information of our Plan for the Conduct of the Maratta War. And to your Letter of the 6th January we returned a full and explicit Anſwer, in ours of the 24th of the ſame Month. As a Proof of this Aſſertion, we ſhall here ſubjoin Copies both of your Letter to us, and ours to you, of the preceding Dates; and with them cloſe the Subject; expreſſing our Regret that we have been reduced to the Neceſſity of ſaying ſo much upon Arguments of a Tendency ſo foreign from the Intereſts of the Service, the Duties of our Stations, or the Reſpect to which we are entitled by them, whether as equal Members of the ſame Adminiſtration, or as your Superiors in the actual Relation which ſubſiſts between us.

Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote, dated the 6th, and received the 20th January 1780.

Gentlemen,

I am juſt honoured with your Letter of the 23d ultimo, encloſing to me a Copy of Brigadier General Goddard's Letter of the 28th October, and giving me diſcretional Powers for ordering the March of Captain Popham's Detachment.

Copy of a Letter to Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote, dated the 24th January 1780.

Sir,

We have been favoured with your Letters, dated the 2d, 3d, and 6th Inſtant.

When we tranſmitted you a Copy of General Goddard's Letter to us, under Date the 28th of October, we ſhould alſo have imparted to you our Reſolutions upon it, had we formed any; but

It appears to me, by General Goddard's Letter, (the Contents of which I own I feel myſelf diſappointed in, as by his Correſpondence with me I had been led to a very different Expectation) that a War with the Marattas is inevitable, unleſs you chuſe to comply with the Terms upon which they offer you Peace.

In this Situation of Affairs, I cannot but expreſs ſome Uneaſineſs, that the Information you give me is not accompanied by your Reſolutions in what Manner we are to proceed; whether you hold it beſt to accede to their Propoſitions for Peace, to commence an active and vigorous War, or to ſtand merely on the Defenſive againſt them.

The Firſt or Second of theſe require the moſt ſpeedy Determination, leſt the Appearance of a French Force, which we have much Reaſon to expect, ſhould heighten their Demands in the one Caſe, or add Strength to the Union already formed among themſelves in the other.

I hardly need obſerve to you, Gentlemen, that the Circumſtances we are in, both at Home and here, require from us the moſt immediate, decided, and united Meaſures; and that in a Correſpondence carried on at this Diſtance from the Preſidency, it is abſolutely neceſſary, if we would avoid Delays which may prove fatal to our Affairs, that I ſhould receive your Opinions upon Events of Importance as ſpeedily as the Information itſelf.

For Want of it in the preſent critical Moment, I can do no more than endeavour to procure from the Vizier, and to collect together, what little of heavy Artillery is to be met with in theſe Quarters. Our Army here is wholly unprovided with them, as well as almoſt every other Military Store.

Captain Popham's Detachment is ready to march. The Undertaking will now be a hazardous one, and cannot be effected without moving an Army croſs the Jumna, to cover and ſcreen his Motions, by calling off the Powers and Attention of the Enemy; and it may at the ſame Time prove a Check to them in collecting the large Sums they are actually employed in raiſing among the tributary Princes there, the Amount of which I ſhall very ſoon obtain exact Information of.

This, together with a well-timed Co-operation on General Goddard's Part, to accelerate and facilitate their Junction, can alone give Hopes of their making good our Aim; but neither this nor any Thing elſe can be attempted, until your definitive Reſolutions are given, as to Peace, a vigorous War, or a defenſive one.

General Goddard's Requeſt, at the Cloſe of his Letter, I muſt pointedly object to, as the granting it will undoubtedly encreaſe that Confuſion in the Army which I have been endeavouring to the utmoſt to relieve them from.

I encloſe a Return of the Army under General Goddard, upon a Suppoſition that the Madras Detachment may have joined him.

Fort William,
the 15th May, 1780.

but a preciſe Line of Conduct having been already laid down for General Goddard, in our Inſtructions to him, which provided for the Event of Hoſtilities, General Goddard having informed us, when he ſaw a War was unavoidable, that he was going to Bombay to concert the Means of carrying it on to Advantage; and as the Plan of his Operations, whatever it might be, muſt be governed in a great Meaſure by local and incidental Circumſtances, which we could neither foreſee nor have any timely Acquaintance with, we thought it unneceſſary to take any further Steps upon the Occaſion of his Letter.

We have now received a further Letter from General Goddard, dated 10th December, informing us of his Return to Surat, after having ſettled the Plan of his future Operations; for the Particulars of which he refers us to Papers omitted to be encloſed in this Letter, which is a Duplicate. Our Secretary informs us, that he has forwarded a Copy of it to you, and in order to complete your Information, we now tranſmit you a Draft of our intended Reply.

We are of Opinion, that the Seaſon is too far advanced to admit of a Junction between Captain Popham's Detachment and the Forces commanded by General Goddard, and that the March of this Detachment to the other Side of India is therefore no longer adviſable. But we think that it may be uſeful on the Weſtern Frontier of the Vizier's Dominions, either to repel an Invaſion from the Marattas, if they ſhould attempt to enter at that Quarter, or to proceed againſt them on the Weſtern Side of the Jumna, if it ſhould be found expedient to ſend a Force for that Purpoſe: We therefore recommend its continuing ſtill embodied.

We are, &c.

APPENDIX, N° 285.

Minutes on the Letter to Sir Eyre Coote.

Mr. Francis—On the Principles of the Treaty concluded with the Rana of Gohud, I think the Obſervations contained in the former Part of this Letter are juſt.

In the latter Part, containing a Reply to the Second Charge brought againſt the Board by the Commander in Chief, I entirely concur. Suppoſing the Board to place the moſt implicit Confidence in the Commander in Chief, and to be ever ſo deſirous of availing themſelves of his Advice, I do not ſee how it is poſſible to concert political Meaſures, or Plans of Military Operations, which in their Nature require Secreſy as well as Diſcuſſion, at ſo great a Diſtance as that of Calcutta from Lucknow.

Mr. Wheler—I approve of the above Letter to the Commander in Chief, as far as it may not appear in any Part of it to contradict the Opinions which I have before delivered on the Treaty concluded with the Rana of Gohud.

Agreed that another Letter be alſo written to Sir Eyre Coote, as follows:

To Sir Eyre Coote.

Sir,

We cannot but exceedingly lament the Loſs of thoſe brave Officers, whoſe Example animated the advancing Party at the Attack of the Fort of Lahaar, and of the Men who fell on that Occaſion. We attribute theſe Loſſes ſolely to the Circumſtance of Captain Popham's Detachment not being provided with battering Cannon, to deſtroy the Defences of the Fort; and muſt therefore requeſt that you will order under a proper Eſcort Two Eighteen Pounders from Chuna Ghur, with their Proportion of Ammunition and Stores, to join Captain Popham, whenever you ſhall receive Advice from him, that he is required by the Rana of Gohud to perform any Service which ſhall render them neceſſary.

Fort William, 15th May, 1780.

We are, &c.

Agreed, That the following Letter be written to Captain Popham:

To Captain Popham.

Sir,

We have received your Letter of the 29th April, informing us of the Capture of the Fort of Lahaar by Storm, on the 28th of the ſame Month.

We with Pleaſure aſſure you of our entire Approbation of your Conduct, and deſire that you will in Public Orders return our Thanks to the Officers under your Command, and in particular, to Captains M'Clarey and Mayaffre, and to Lieutenant Cameron, for their gallant Behaviour in this Service, and to the Troops in general, for their ſpirited, ſteady, and Soldier-like Conduct, both on this Occaſion, and during the whole Courſe of the preſent Expedition.

The Commander in Chief has tranſmitted to us an Account of the ſucceſsful Attack which was made by Captain Bruce on the Enemy's Camp, on the Morning of the 16th of April; the Regularity and Spirit with which this Enterprize appears to have been conducted, has impreſſed us with a high Opinion of Captain Bruce's Abilities as an Officer, and of the Diſcipline as well as Bravery of the Troops which he commanded. We deſire that you will expreſs to Captain Bruce our Approbation of his Services, and return our Thanks to him and his Party, in Public Orders, for their gallant Behaviour on this Occaſion.

We have read with Pleaſure your Report of Mr. Odell's good Behaviour, and as a Reward to his Merit, we have appointed him a Cornet of Cavalry, in the room of Mr. Gardiner, to rank as an Enſign in the general Line of the Army, from the 28th ultimo.

Much as we are pleaſed with the Gallantry of our Troops at the Aſſault of the Fort of Lahaar, we cannot but exceedingly regret the Loſs of thoſe brave Officers, whoſe Example animated the advancing Party, and of the Men who fell on that Occaſion. We attribute theſe Loſſes ſolely to the Circumſtance of your not being provided with Battering Cannon, to deſtroy the Defences of the Fort; and we have therefore requeſted the Commander in Chief to order Two Eighteen Pounders, with their Proportion of Ammunition and Stores, to join your Detachment under a proper Eſcort, whenever he ſhall receive Advice from you, of your being required by the Rana of Gohud to perform any Service which ſhall render them neceſſary.

We deſire that you will deliver over to the Rana the Fort of Lahaar, with the Poſſeſſion of the Duties of Cutchooagaar dependant on it, and that you will appoint a Perſon duly qualified, in Conjunction with One nominated by him for the ſame Purpoſe, to aſcertain the Amount of the Revenues yielded by the Diſtrict of Cutchooagaar, from the Accounts of the actual Collections, employing ſuch Checks as your own Judgment ſhall dictate, to prevent any Colluſion in this Enquiry; and for this Purpoſe alſo, we deſire that you will cauſe exact Copies to be taken of the original Accounts, and tranſmit them to us, with your Report of the Amount deduced from them.

Fort William, the 15th May 1780.

We are, &c. &c.

A RETURN

A RETURN of the Killed and Wounded of the different Corps of the Detachment of Drafts, under the Command of Captain Popham, during the Siege and at the Storm of Fort Lahaar, April 30th 1780.

	Captain wounded.	Lieutenant killed.	Lieutenant wounded.	Cornet killed.	Matroffes wounded.	Subadars killed.	Subadars wounded.	Jemadars killed.	Jemadars wounded.	Havildars killed.	Havildars wounded.	Naicks killed.	Naicks wounded.	Sepoys killed.	Sepoys wounded.	Lascars wounded.	Total killed and wounded.
Artillery Draft - - - - - -	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	3
1ſt Battalion Sepoy Ditto - - -	—	1	1	—	—	—	1	—	2	—	—	—	—	3	34	—	42
2d Battalion Sepoy Ditto - - -	1	—	—	1	—	—	1	1	1	2	2	—	—	9	35	1	54
3d Battalion - - - - - - - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	2
4th Battalion - - - - - - - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	1	—	2	—	1	4	15	—	24
	1	1	1	1	1	—	3	1	4	2	4	—	1	17	85	3	125

(Signed) Wm Popham, Captn Commanding.

Received

APPENDIX, N° 285.

Received the following Letter from Sir Eyre Coote:

Gentlemen,

I have before me your Three ſeparate Letters, of Date the 15th May: That which is in Anſwer to my Letters of the 21ſt March, 26th April, and 1ſt May, it ſeems neceſſary only to acknowledge the Receipt of; but as the other Two can be conſidered in no other Light, than as an abſolute Attack on me in my Military Character, I think it neceſſary to reply to them minutely, under different Heads.

I flatter myſelf the whole Tenor of your Charges will be ſo eaſily confuted, that I ſhall have only to refer to your former Orders, to the Treaty with the Ranah of Ghode, and his Requiſition for Troops in conſequence of the ſaid Treaty, to prove that I acted up to the Spirit, as well as to the Letter of the Mandates of Government.

In order to be more diſtinct, I ſhall firſt take up the Subject of that Letter which is in Anſwer to mine of the 21ſt April. Notwithſtanding the deep Concern and Surprize you are pleaſed to expreſs at my venturing to produce before your Board thoſe Sentiments, which as they are to be found in the Letter alluded to, it becomes unneceſſary here to repeat; yet I moſt undoubtedly think, that I am warranted, not only to make you acquainted with my Ideas on the paſt and preſent, but alſo with my Opinion on what is likely to happen. If a Member of Government, who is at the Head of the Company's Army, is to be denied this moſt neceſſary Mode of contributing his Exertions for the Good of his Employers, the Advantages they can derive from his Services are limited indeed.

Your firſt Argument is thus expreſsly worded: "That I have accuſed the Board of having engaged Captain Popham's Detachment in a Service to which it was unequal." Acknowledging however, that I have not directly expreſſed the Charge, but that it is too ſtrongly and evidently implied by the whole Tenor of my Letter, to admit of your putting any other Conſtruction on the Expreſſions which mark it with that Tendency; ſuch Concluſions drawn from what I have not ſaid, but what you ſuppoſe my Meaning, I ſhall wave a Reply to: My other real Avocations oblige me to avoid entering on ſuch an ideal Detail. I did and do again ſtate, that the Detachment was not equipt for Sieges; and that the Ranah of Gohud never even hinted by Requiſition or otherways, to me, that they were meant to be employed on ſuch Undertakings: No Mention was made of attacking Forts, or the Neceſſity of a battering Train declared, till the 11th of April, at which Period the Detachment had for ſome Days inveſted Lahaar.

It was impoſſible to ſuppoſe, that the Ranah requiring heavy Cannon on the 11th April, could mean them for the Reduction of Lahaar, an Enterprize already begun; the Concluſion would have been too ridiculous, when it is explained that the neareſt heavy Guns to that Fortreſs could not have reached the Detachment in leſs than Two Months, (and for the Truth of this, permit me to appeal to your own Knowledge, that there is not a ſingle Piece of battering Cannon with the Field Brigades.) No, his declared Object in demanding a battering Train then, was to attempt Gwalior during the enſuing Rains: That Requiſition of the Ranah's I immediately informed you of; and as I have now only received your Inſtructions in conſequence of it, no Time has been loſt on my Part.

The Purport of the Ranah's Letters to me, previous to my ordering Captain Popham on that Service, were, that his Country was over-run with the Marattas; not a Word mentioned of their being poſſeſſed of any of his ſtrong Holds, but deſcribing them as a Body of Horſe, plundering and laying waſte his Diſtricts. The Soldier on ſuch an Application naturally equips the Force to repel ſuch an Enemy as lightly as poſſible; and does not burthen them with a battering Train, which would inevitably counteract their very Deſign, Diſpatch and Celerity of March in the Field.

The Ranah's Idea of quitting his Ghode Diſtrict, croſſing the Scind, and appearing before Lahaar, was ſudden; and the public Intelligence that ſuch was his Intention, was immediately followed by Accounts, that the Army was before the Place.

The Ranah did deceive Captain Popham, and the Fort was found much ſtronger than reported; otherwiſe it is impoſſible to ſuppoſe an Officer of Character could have depended on Six Pounders, for taking off the Defences, or breaching ſuch Walls. Another ſtrong Reaſon might alſo before have been given for my not encumbering the Detachment with any thing but light Field Artillery, even had it been in my Power to do it; I could not imagine that the Ranah was ſo totally defenceleſs in Ordnance, but that his Forts and ſtrong Holds could have ſupplied a few Pieces of battering Cannon.

I mean not to make any Remarks on the Treaty with the Ranah of Gohud, but it is abſolutely neceſſary to point out what ſeems required by you, Gentlemen, for my Juſtification. In order to prove that I have complied as far as reſted with me, both with the Letter and Spirit of it, I need no other Evidences than the 2d Article of the Treaty which you quote; your Explanation of what was your Intention and Meaning, apparent or concluſive, in ſuch 2d Article; and your own Orders, by Letters dated 6th December and 17th February, to ſhew, that I complied in full with the Word and Spirit of all and every Act of Government laid down for my Guidance. The Ranah made his Demand for Troops on the 5th February, and explained what Service the Troops were deſigned for; I accordingly uſed my Judgment, in ſending ſuch a Detachment immediately as I thought ſufficient to perform the Service propoſed. But the Ranah's hidden Plans which he meant to adopt after the

Junction of our Detachment with him, I could neither foreſee, or am anſwerable for. My Orders to Captain Popham were diſcretionary, with a Copy of the Treaty for his Guidance; all others that I could have given him, muſt have impeded rather than furthered the Service. I muſt obſerve, that when any Force demanded by the Ranah, and ordered by the Commander in Chief, has at length joined the Army of the former, the Commander in Chief, at a Diſtance from their Operations, cannot be anſwerable for the Mode of carrying on that Service; nor can the Term of *the Company's Commanding Officer*, ſo often made uſe of in the Treaty, have in like Inſtances any Reference to the Commander in Chief of the Forces; the Senſe will not admit being ſtrained to ſuch a Meaning. The Explanation of *the Company's Commanding Officer then*, is the Officer who abſolutely *heads* the Detachment; for on Service to be performed againſt an Enemy, who are there To-day and gone To-morrow, it would ſeem ſtrangely inconſiſtent in me, to tie up their Operations, by making them wait my Authority for their different Movements; I might with equal Expectation of Succeſs, iſſue my Orders from Calcutta as from hence, ſince it takes Ten Days at leaſt to get an Anſwer to a Letter from them.

You ſay that "the Operations of the Detachment ſhould have been reſtricted to its original and "profeſſed Deſign, until it ſhould have been fitted for more difficult Services, or, it ſhould have been im-"mediately qualified for them." I repeat again, that the Firſt Intimation I had of the intended Attack of Lahaar, was immediately followed by a Second, that the Troops were before the Fort: And would you have adviſed, after the Place had been inveſted and attacked Ten Days, (the neceſſary Time for my Orders reaching them, in conſequence of the Information received) that the Siege ſhould have been raiſed, and the Troops ordered to retire? The Service, hazardous and precarious as it was, appeared preferable to ſuch Meaſures. The Ranah, I muſt own, has been very moderate in his Demands of Aſſiſtance, when his Powers by Treaty are conſidered. And in Anſwer to your Inference drawn on the Quotation of my Letter, that I ſeem to have miſtaken the Senſe of the 2d Article; and that I ſuppoſe the Ranah is inveſted with the Power of preſcribing the Strength of the Party required for his Aſſiſtance; you muſt permit me to ſay, thoſe are by no Means my Ideas; that Part of the 2d Article which is in Point, will not admit of Two Conſtructions; but, that I may be thoroughly underſtood, the Senſe and Meaning of the Article alluded to I take to be as follows: That let the Ranah's Views and Deſigns be ever ſo unlimited, if he makes a Demand for Troops, Artillery, &c. and ſpecifies the Service meant to be performed, and the Commander in Chief is of Opinion, that the Operations mentioned cannot with Advantage be carried on without even our whole Force in theſe Parts, every Man and Store ought, *by Faith of Treaty*, inſtantly to move at the Requiſition of the Ranah of Ghode. The Service to be attempted depends upon the Ranah's Will, muſt be particularly ſpecified by him, and the Troops capable of undertaking ſuch Service with Advantage, is the Commander in Chief's Detail.

To your Candour I ſubmit the above, and expect from your Juſtice, that you exonerate me from that Reproach ſo unmeritedly caſt on me.

The Truth is, the Ranah of Ghode appears veſted with Powers which he has already miſapplied, in with-holding his real Deſign from the Commander in Chief, and demanding Troops for one Service when it is evident he meant them for another.

Your Reply to what you term my Second Charge againſt you, viz. That you have with-held from me the Information of your Plans for the Conduct of the Maratta War, and that you have not anſwered in full my Letter to you of the 6th of December ſtates, That there has been no Alteration or Addition to what paſſed in Council on that Subject when I was preſent at the Board, except the Treaty with the Ranah of Ghode; and that your Anſwer of the 24th January was a full one to mine of the 6th December. To the firſt Part I undoubtedly ſubſcribe, that if no Alteration had taken place you conſequently could not inform me of any; I ſhall only obſerve, that when I left the Board, a Treaty of Peace with the Marattas was in Agitation, and looked forward to as likely to be effected, though the neceſſary Preparations for War were ſtill carrying on; but when I had the Honour to addreſs you on the 6th December, the Proſpect of Peace, from the Terms demanded of us, ſeemed to be thrown to a Diſtance; and in conſequence of that material Change in our Situation it was, that I put to the Board thoſe eſſential and reaſonable Queſtions, Whether your Supreme Board meant to purſue the Line of Peace or War? and if the latter, whether it was to extend to the Operations of a vigorous one, or the more confined Scale of Defences? And in reſpect to your Aſſertion, that theſe were fully anſwered in your Letter of the 24th January, I muſt beg Leave to differ with you in Opinion; at leaſt I cannot ſee it in that Light.

To your Third Letter, wherein you attribute our Loſſes before Lahaar ſolely to the Circumſtance of Captain Popham's Detachment not being provided with battering Cannon, to take off the Defences of the Fort, I ſhould think it neceſſary to anſwer moſt circumſtantially, had I not already ſpoken fully, and I hope ſatisfactorily, upon it in my Reply to your Second Letter; and as I am clear, from what I have already ſaid, that our Superiors will allow the Force of the Reaſons advanced by me, and exculpate me from all Blame on that Head; ſo alſo am I induced to believe, that your Board will no longer hold me chargeable with either Miſinterpretation of Orders, or any Omiſſion in the Equipment of the Detachment required and ſent for the Aſſiſtance of the Ranah of Ghode.

I am ſorry I have been obliged to be ſo prolix upon the above Subjects; but what I owe my own Military Character, which is dearer to me than Life itſelf, rendered it neceſſary, that I ſhould not ſubmit to undeſerved Accuſations, or permit avowed Charges to remain unanſwered.

I have

I have ſent the neceſſary Order to the Commandant of the Garriſon of Chunar to hold Two Eighteen Pounders, their Ammunition and Stores, in Readineſs to proceed, whenever Captain Popham ſhall acquaint me that he is required by the Ranah of Ghode to perform any Service that ſhall render them neceſſary.

Lucknow, 7th June, 1780.

I have the Honour, &c.
(Signed) Eyre Coote.

Ordered, That this Letter lie for Conſideration.

Warren Haſtings,
Edw[d] Wheler.

APPENDIX, N° 286.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 29th May 1780.

THE Governor General delivers in the following Minute and Propoſitions:

The Governor General—The Commander in Chief has repeatedly declared, that the Detachment now at Ghode, under the Command of Captain Popham, is unequal to the Services in which it has been employed, and of courſe much more unequal to that in which the Rana is deſirous of engaging it. Such has alſo been the declared Opinion of the Board; it is in its preſent Form, as has already been obſerved, irreconcileable with the Treaty concluded with the Rana of Ghode, which apportions the Rate of Subſidy which he is to pay for ſuch Military Aid as is afforded him by this Government to Battalions of Sepoys on their preſent Eſtabliſhment. N° 4, Francis

It will be recollected, that Captain Popham's Detachment was formed for a very different Service from that in which it is now employed; conſiſting of 2000 Drafts, 40 European Artillery, a ſmall Party of Horſe, with Four light Six Pounders and a Howitzer: This Force was extremely well calculated for the Service originally intended to have been performed by it, and as ill calculated for the preſent. Inſtead of Four regular Battalions of 800 Rank and File each, with Eight Guns, the Rana has been furniſhed with Four weak Corps of 600 Men each, Four Guns and a Howitzer, and a Body of Horſe, which he neither wanted nor applied for, and which he will probably object to admit into the Account of his Subſidy.

On the Requiſition from the Four Captains who command the Drafts in Gohud, to be permitted to encreaſe their preſent Corps to Battalions, the General obſerves to us, "That thoſe Sepoy Drafts "are ſupernumerary to the Eſtabliſhment; and preſumes Government has no Idea of augmenting "their Number, by completing them to the Strength of Four regular Battalions." For theſe Reaſons, and from a Deſire to contract our Expences by every reaſonable Means, I ſubmit to the Board the following Propoſitions:

1ſt. That Captain Popham's Detachment be relieved by Four regular Battalions of Sepoys, with their Guns, &c. Three Battalions from Cawnpore, and the Battalion of light Infantry at Chaekye.

2d. That Captain Popham when relieved ſhall march to Cawnpore: The Sepoys to be incorporated into ſuch of our Battalions as may be in Want of Men, the Cavalry to join their Corps; the Artillery to be diſpoſed of as the Commander in Chief ſhall judge proper; and the Officers belonging to the Army in Guzerat to join it by ſuch Routes as they ſhall judge moſt practicable.

3d. That the Staff Officers of Captain Popham's Detachment ſhall be ordered to do Duty, and to hold their preſent Appointments, in the Detachment which ſhall relieve them.

4th. That the Battalion of Light Infantry, commanded by Captain James Browne, be ordered to march immediately to Gohud.

5th. That Major Camac be ordered to proceed immediately to Gohud, or whereſoever the Detachment may be which is to relieve Captain Popham, and to take the Command of it.

6th. That the Bullocks attached to the Guns of the Battalion and Stores, and the Eighteen Pounders ordered to join Captain Popham's Detachment, be furniſhed by the Contractor, from his preſent Eſtabliſhment.

7th. That as a conſiderable Time will be loſt, if the Reſolutions of the Board reſpecting Major Camac, and the Battalion of Light Infantry, are carried into Effect through the official Channel of the Commander in Chief, who did not propoſe leaving Lucknow, until the Commencement of the Rains;

Agreed, That the Orders to Major Camac and Captain Browne be immediately ſent from the Board, and iſſued in General Orders.

8th. That a Copy of theſe Reſolutions be immediately tranſmitted to the Commander in Chief; and

and that he be requeſted to iſſue the neceſſary Orders for forming the Detachment at Cawnpore, which is to relieve Captain Popham's.

I ſhall now beg Leave to offer a few Remarks on theſe Propoſitions.

By relieving Captain Popham's Detachment with Four regular Battalions, we ſtrictly comply with the Terms of the Treaty, and the Rana's Requiſition. It will prove a Reduction of our Expences, as the Battalions now propoſed for this Service are at preſent upon a War Eſtabliſhment, and the Subſidy will, or ought to defray every Expence of the Detachment.

By employing Captain Browne's Battalion on this Service, we render a Corps formed for active Service of real Uſe: At preſent it is in Cantonment, as the Purpoſes for which it was originally raiſed have been long ſince accompliſhed, and the Diſtricts to which it principally appertained, have been placed under the Controul of the Collector of Boglepore. Captain Crawford's Corps, which by the Regulations is to be completed to the Strength of a Battalion, (which it may by a Part of the Drafts ordered now to be relieved from Gohud) will be fully ſufficient for the Protection of Ramgur, and the Jungulterry of Chackye.

With reſpect to Major Camac, I ſhall briefly obſerve, that I have recommended him for the Command of the Detachment which is to be employed in Gohud, becauſe he belongs to the Brigade which is to furniſh the principal Force of which it will conſiſt; becauſe I know him to be peculiarly qualified for a Service of this Nature to which ſuch Requiſites are eſſential, and becauſe I believe that the other Members of the Board entertain a ſimilar Opinion of him.

Agreed to the Propoſitions recommended by the Governor General; and that the following Letter be written to the Commander in Chief:

To Sir Eyre Coote.

Sir,

We have received your Letters of the 5th, 11th, and 15th Inſtant.

We agree with you in Opinion, that the Detachment now at Gohud, under the Command of Captain Popham, is not equal to the Service on which it has been employed, and yet leſs to that in which the Rana is deſirous of engaging it.

For theſe Reaſons, and from a Deſire to contract our Expences as much as poſſible, we have reſolved, Firſt, That Captain Popham's Detachment be relieved by Four regular Battalions of Sepoys, with their Guns, &c. viz. Three Battalions from Cawnpore, and the Battalion of Light Infantry at Chackye.

Second. That Captain Popham when relieved, ſhall march to Cawnpore; the Sepoys to be incorporated into ſuch of our Battalions as may be in want of Men; the Cavalry to join their Corps; the Artillery to be diſpoſed of as the Commander in Chief ſhall judge proper; and the Officers belonging to the Army in Guzerat to join it by ſuch Routes as they ſhall judge moſt practicable.

Third. That the Staff Officers of Captain Popham's Detachment ſhall be ordered to do Duty, and to hold their preſent Appointments, in the Detachment which ſhall relieve them.

Fourth. That the Battalion of Light Infantry commanded by Captain James Browne be ordered to march immediately to Gohud.

Fifth. That Major Camac be ordered to proceed immediately to Gohud, or whereſoever the Detachment may be which is to relieve Captain Popham, and to take the Command of it.

Sixth. That the Bullocks attached to the Guns of the Battalions and Stores, and to the 18 Pounders ordered to join Captain Popham's Detachment, be furniſhed by the Contractor from his preſent Eſtabliſhment.

And we deſire that you will be pleaſed to give the neceſſary Inſtructions for carrying theſe our Reſolutions into immediate Effect; but as a conſiderable Time would be loſt were the Orders to Major Camac, and to Captain Browne commanding the Battalion of Light Infantry, to paſs through you, we have directed our Secretary to communicate them immediately to thoſe Officers.

Warren Haſtings.
P. Francis.
Edw[d] Wheler.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, 12th June 1780.

Extract of the Governor General's Minute.

By the propoſed Plan of Operations, the Subſidy which we have hitherto received from the Rana of Gohud will ceaſe: All that we can require of him, will be to join our Forces with the Quota of his Troops ſtipulated by the Treaty; it will therefore become neceſſary to provide a military Fund for the Payment of this Detachment. I propoſe to the Board, that as the Seaſon is now approaching in which our Demand upon Rajah Cheyt Sing, for the Payment of his annual Contribution towards the Expences of the War, ſhould be made, we do immediately inſtruct our Reſident of Benares to apply to him for the Sum of Five Lacks of Rupees, which Sum I propoſe ſhall be appropriated ſolely to the Payment of Major Camac's Detachment.

If the Board agree to this Plan, it will be neceſſary to make ſome Alterations in our late Orders, and theſe I ſhall reduce to diſtinct Propoſitions.

1ſt. That the Order for the Return of Captain Popham's Detachment be countermanded.

2d. That

2d. That the Sepoy Drafts of that Detachment be immediately formed into Three regular Battalions.

3d. That the Three ſenior Captains now with the Detachment, be appointed to the Command of theſe Battalions; and that the Commander in Chief be requeſted to iſſue the neceſſary Orders for completing them with ſubaltern and native Officers.

4th. That to complete theſe Battalions with their Proportion of Ordnance, Two Six Pounders be added to the Guns now with Captain Popham's Detachment.

5th. That theſe Battalions be added to the Detachment already ordered to be put under the Command of Major Camac, and the Whole formed into a ſeparate Corps during the Continuance of the preſent Service.

6th. That in Addition to the Guns attached by the Regulations to each Battalion of Sepoys upon Service, Two Twelve Pounders, the Howitzer now with Captain Popham's Detachment, and Two Cohorns, be ordered to join Major Camac's Detachment.

7th. That the Board of Ordnance be requeſted to iſſue Orders for ſupplying Major Camac's Detachment with the abovementioned Ordnance, and the Proportion of Ammunition and Stores agreeable to the Eſtabliſhment, either from Cawnpore, or either of the Military Stations contiguous to it.

8th. That a Brigade Major and an Aid de Camp be added to the Staff of Major Camac's Detachment, in conſequence of the additional Strength of it.

9th. That the Secretary be directed to draw out Inſtructions for Major Camac from the preceding Minute.

I entreat the Board to give me their Support in the Proſecution of this Plan. If they have been from its Commencement averſe to the War, let them join with me in proſecuting it with Vigour to its ſpeedy Termination. If they conſider themſelves as free from the Reſponſibility of it, let them allow me to acquit myſelf of mine. I wiſh I could venture my Life upon the Conſequences: I know the Man who is to conduct it; and am certain that if the Deſign is practicable, he will execute it to its fulleſt Effect; nor am I fearful of the Inference which this Declaration may draw upon me for the future Event of it.

Ordered, That the Opinions of the different Members of the Board be taken upon this Subject in Circulation.

Warren Haſtings.
P. Francis.
Edw[d] Wheler.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 19th June 1780.

At a Council; PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Philip Francis, } Eſquires.
Edward Wheler, }
Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote, abſent.

Read, and approved the Proceedings of the 12th inſtant.

Meſſrs. Francis and Wheler having delivered in the Minute which follows, on the 15th inſtant, it was immediately ſent to the Governor General.

N° 4. Mr. Francis's Packet.

Minute from Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler.

15th June 1780.

Convinced as we are of the indiſpenſable Neceſſity of bringing the preſent War, if poſſible, to a ſpeedy Concluſion, we ſhall heartily join in the Support of every Meaſure which appears to have Peace for its Object, and which carries with it any reaſonable Proſpect of Succeſs. On this Principle, we agree with the Governor General, that it may be adviſable to avail ourſelves of the favourable Diſpoſition of the Berar Government, and to invite the Rajah's Dewan to come for that Purpoſe to Calcutta. The Motives aſſigned for his late Conduct, and for the March of a Body of his Troops to Cuttack, are plauſible at leaſt, and appear to be confirmed by the Delays with which it has been attended, and by their preſent Inactivity. The Deſire he profeſſes of becoming the Mediator of Peace between us and the Marattas ſeems likely to be ſincere, becauſe we believe it to be founded in the Conſideration of his own Intereſt, and becauſe it is conformable to the Language which he has uniformly held to us. We do not mean to ſay, that Evidence of this Nature is to be implicitly depended upon; but it is now ſo eſſentially our Intereſt to ſecure the Friendſhip of Moodajee Booſla, or at leaſt to prevent his acting againſt us, that we ſhould think it imprudent to diſcover any Doubt of his Sincerity. It cannot be very difficult to maintain the Appearances of the moſt perfect Confidence in his good Faith, without ſuffering it to miſlead us, or neglecting any of thoſe Precautions which our Situation dictates, and which are never more neceſſary perhaps than in the Midſt of Security.

We therefore agree with the Governor General in this Part of his Minute: But we find with extreme Concern, that it is impoſſible for us to give our Aſſent to the ſubſequent Propoſition. The

Reaſons for which we object to it, ſhall be ſtated briefly, without reviving former Arguments, or reflecting on any Thing that is paſt. Taking our Situation as it ſtands, we declare it to be our moſt deliberate Opinion, that a Peace is indiſpenſably neceſſary to ſave the India Company, and every Intereſt connected with theirs, from the greateſt Diſtreſs, if not from certain Ruin; and that at whatever Diſtance this Object may be, it is not practicable for us to continue the War on any Terms without a very conſiderable Reduction in the Expence of conducting it. In the former of theſe Opinions we have never varied; in the latter we are aſſured of the Governor General's Concurrence. On this general Ground, we object to the propoſed Meaſure.

1ſt. Becauſe it reverſes a Reſolution very lately paſſed with the unanimous Approbation of the Board, for recalling and reducing Captain Popham's Detachment; the extra Expences of which, beyond our regular Eſtabliſhment, amounting to CR' 91,332 a Month would be ſaved, and their Place ſupplied by Four regular Battalions.

2d. Becauſe by the propoſed Plan of Operations, the Subſidy to be paid by the Rana of Gohud, and of which we believe no Part has hitherto been received, is to ceaſe; and our Reſources ſo far forth diminiſhed.

3d. Becauſe at a Time, when it is admitted that the War cannot be continued without a very conſiderable Reduction of Expence, we cannot, conſiſtently with that Principle, engage in a Meaſure which ſuppoſes the contrary to be true; and which in our Judgment leads to an Addition of Expence, which we cannot limit when once it is begun, and which we are very ſure this Government is not in a Condition to ſupport. We have ſeen into what enormous Charges we have been drawn by the Detachment under General Goddard, the Strength of which does not exceed that propoſed to be placed under Major Camac: We have ſeen the Expence of a Detachment of only Two thouſand Drafts under Captain Popham, ſwelled to more than Ninety-one thouſand Rupees a Month; and we firmly believe it to be an Evil inſeparable from diſtant Military Operations in this Country, that the Charge of them can neither be limited nor controlled. We do not mean to diſpute the Propriety of the Governor's perſonal Confidence in Major Camac; but in our Minds, ſuch implicit Confidence cannot exiſt without Experience, much leſs in Oppoſition to that with which the Conduct of ſimilar Expeditions has already furniſhed us. In this Obſervation, we allude only to the Expence that attends them.

4th. Becauſe the propoſed Anticipation of the Demand of Five Lacks from the Rajah of Benares, and the ſole Appropriation of it to this Service, is no Relief of Expence or Increaſe of Reſource, ſince the above Five Lacks make Part of our general Eſtimate of Reſources for the Service of the current Year; and, if applied to any Service not provided for in the ſame Eſtimate, will leave a Deficiency which muſt be made good out of ſome other Fund.

5th. Becauſe it appears to us, that the State of our Treaſury is not in any Degree equal to the exiſting and encreaſing Demands which preſs upon this Government: The apparent Balance on Monday laſt, including the Depoſit in the New Fort, without which we ſhould conſider ourſelves as totally unprovided for Meaſures of immediate Defence, if ſuch ſhould become neceſſary, amounted to no more than Current Rupees 42,09,453. Deduct the Depoſit in the New Fort, and let the Account be ſtated as it will then ſtand, and as it ought to ſtand:

C'.	CR.'	D'.	CR.'
Remainder, after deducting the Sum in the New Fort	6,13,453	Depoſits of private Property	14,87,958
		Amount of Orders unpaid	20,86,949
Balance, or actual Debt againſt the Treaſury	31,35,453	Bills drawn by General Goddard unpaid	1,73,999
	37,48,906		37,48,906

This View of our Situation undoubtedly leads to other important Concluſions: That to which we mean to confine it at preſent is, that we are in no Condition to undertake new Expences; nor if our Treaſury were better ſupplied than it is ſhould we think it prudent to expoſe ourſelves to the Demands of another Expedition, in the Plan of which we ſee no eſſential Difference from that which ſtill exiſts under General Goddard.

6th. Becauſe, admitting that all the preceding Objections on the Head of Expence could be anſwered or removed, we are not ſatisfied that the Plan itſelf would either end where it profeſſes to be directed, or that this is the Seaſon in which it ought to be attempted on its own avowed Principles. The declared Purpoſe of the Expedition is to invade Mhadjee Scindia's Country, and to attack his Capital, Ugein, in order to divert him from the War in Guzerat to the Defence of his own Territories. We underſtand and admit the Force of this Argument; though in our Judgment overbalanced by other Conſiderations, independant of which we ſhould only object to the Time choſen for the Expedition, and to the unneceſſary Charge of keeping up Captain Popham's Detachment. If it be meant

to withdraw Mhadjee Scindia from the War in Guzerat, and to diſtract his Force and Attention from that Country to his own, it ſeems to us that the Attempt ſhould be made as ſoon as poſſible after October, when General Goddard might be at Liberty to co-operate with it, and to favour its Succeſs by a ſimilar Diverſion on his Side; not in the Midſt of the Rains, when General Goddard's Army is in Cantonments, and unable to take the Field. The manifeſt Advantage of having the Two Armies acting in concert, and dividing the Attention of the Enemy between them, would be loſt, if they were not both in the Field at the ſame Time. But this, and every other Objection to the Meaſure, is in Fact removed by the Inſtructions which immediately follow it; and which, in our Opinion, are wholly inconſiſtent with the firſt propoſed Object. Major Camac is to be entruſted with "a diſcretionary "Power to remove the Force which the Maratta Government poſſeſſes in Culpee or Bundelcund "(and which is ſaid to be the only Obſtacle to the main Deſign) by any Means, either by Negocia-"tion or Force." If it be true, as we are ſure it is, "That the Maratta Power in that Country "is not very conſiderable, and that they who poſſeſs it are diſaffected to the Government on which "they depend," ſuch a Power can form no Obſtacle to the Execution of the main Deſign; nor can we ever admit of the Validity of ſuch a Pretence for invading Bundelcund, which we conclude would be the firſt, if not the only Effect of the Expedition. At all Events, the Latitude given to Major Camac leaves him at Liberty to purſue whatever Plan he thinks proper; but if, inſtead of proceeding towards Mhadjee Scindia, the March of this Detachment ſhould once be directed by the oppoſite Route to the Capital of Bundelcund, he will naturally conclude, that the Poſſeſſion of this Country is our true and only Object; of courſe he will have no Apprehenſions for the Safety of his own.

For theſe Reaſons we are of Opinion, that the Reſolution of the Board of the 29th May, for the Recall and Reduction of Captain Popham's Detachment, &c. ſhould not be ſuſpended.

(Signed) P. Francis.
Edw[d] Wheler.

The Minute which follows having been ſent by the Governor General to the Secretary on Saturday, and having been circulated and agreed to, the propoſed Orders were accordingly iſſued.

Governor General's Minute.

The Governor General—The Majority of the Board having rejected all the Propoſitions which were contained in my Minute of the 12th Inſtant, excepting the Sixth and Seventh, which do not appear to have been included in their Exception to the general Propoſitions, I now beg Leave to repeat them; and as it appears from the accompanying Letter from Captain Browne, that he has left his Field Pieces and Tumbrils behind him, I ſhall propoſe, N° 5, in Mr. Francis's Packet

1ſt. That Captain Browne's Battalion, on its Arrival at Cawnpore, be compleated with its Proportion of Field Pieces, Ammunition and Stores, from the Ordnance at that Station.

2d. That in Addition to the Guns attached to the Battalions of Major Camac's Detachment by the Regulations, Two Twelve Pounders, the Howitzer with Captain Popham's Detachment, and Two Cohorns, be ordered to join it.

3d. That the Board of Ordnance be requeſted to iſſue Orders for ſupplying Major Camac's Detachment with the above-mentioned Ordnance and their Proportion of European Artillery and Laſcars, Ammunition and Stores, agreeable to the Eſtabliſhment, either from Cawnpore or the Military Stations contiguous to it.

(Signed) Warren Haſtings.

Agreed.

(Signed) E. Wheler.
P. Francis.

The Governor General lays before the Board the following Draft of Inſtructions, which he propoſes to be given to Major Camac. N° 6. Mr. Francis's Packet.

Inſtructions to Major Camac.

1ſt. Having appointed you to the Command of a Detachment, ordered to be formed of Four Battalions of Sepoys, Three of which are to be furniſhed from the Army ſtationed at Cawnpore, and the Fourth, the Battalion of Light Infantry, commanded by Captain James Browne; we direct you to proceed to Cawnpore, or to the Station of that Detachment, wherever it may be, and to conduct it without Loſs of Time into the Dominions of the Rana of Gohud, there to relieve the Corps now under the Command of Captain Popham, in that Quarter.

2d. The Rana of Gohud having, in virtue of a Treaty lately concluded between him and this Government, required the Aid of a Military Force, on the Part of this Government, for the Defence of his Country againſt the Marattas, who had invaded it, Captain Popham was appointed to this Service; and to this you now ſucceed. We therefore direct that you comply with ſuch Requiſitions as ſhall be made to you by the Rana, for this and for ſuch other Conditions as he is entitled to demand by the Treaty, and ſhall be practicable with the Force under your Command.

3d. Whenever the Rana ſhall have no further Service for the Detachment, and ſhall diſmiſs it in the Manner preſcribed by the Treaty, and no Occaſion ſhall preſent itſelf for the Employment of the Detachment,

Detachment, in promoting the general Succeſs of the War in which we are engaged with the Maratta State, you are forthwith to return with it into the Dominions of the Nabob of Oude, and there wait for further Orders; and if before you march into Gohud, you ſhall receive an Intimation from him in Writing, that he ſhall not require the Aſſiſtance of your Detachment, you will in like Manner ſuſpend your March, and wait for further Orders.

4th. But as the Firſt Deſign of this Government in the Alliance lately formed with the Rana of Gohud, was to diſtreſs the Maratta State, by a Diminution of their Power, Revenue and Influence, and by uniting with other Powers in Enmity with them, to divert and weaken their Operations; and as the Maratta Dominions which lie contiguous to Gohud, appertain to Mhadjee Scindia, and Tuccojee Holcar, the Two principal Rulers of that State, and the Leaders of the Army, employed to oppoſe General Goddard; we authorize and inſtruct you, in caſe you ſhall deem it practicable and expedient, to carry the War immediately into that Quarter; requiring from the Rana the Proportion of Cavalry ſtipulated by the Treaty to be furniſhed by him for ſuch a Service, or in caſe of his Inability, whether from the Seaſon of the Year or from whatever other Cauſe, to fulfil this Condition in its complete Extent, to require and accept from him, ſuch other Aid in furniſhing Proviſions, and in forming Magazines of Grain, and other Means of Subſiſtence and Communication, as you ſhall judge equivalent to it.

5th. For your Guidance in maintaining the Relation of your Command to the Rana of Gohud, we herewith deliver to you a Copy of the Treaty executed with him; and we require and enjoin you to conform to it with the moſt ſcrupulous and literal Exactneſs.

6th. If any Caſe ſhall occur, for which we have not provided by theſe Inſtructions, and which ſhall not be contrary to them, we empower you to act therein according to your own Judgment; in all others, theſe Inſtructions are poſitive, and muſt be implicitly obeyed.

Ordered, That theſe Inſtructions lie for Conſideration.

Warren Haſtings,
P. Francis,
Edw[d] Wheler.

22d June, 1780.

Read the following Minute from Meſſrs. Francis and Wheler, in Reply to the Propoſitions made by the Governor General, and entered in the laſt Conſultation, containing Inſtructions to Major Camac.

Minute from Meſſrs. Francis and Wheler.

The Firſt, Second, and Third Paragraphs of the propoſed Inſtructions to Major Camac, being conformable to the Treaty concluded with the Rana of Gohud, we acquieſce therein. But we think it ſhould be added, That before our Troops depart from the Rana's Country, the full Account of the Subſidy due for their Pay, ſhould be demanded and received.

But we cannot conſent to veſt Major Camac with the Powers mentioned in the 4th Paragraph, viz. "to carry the War immediately into the Dominions of Tuccojee and Scindia, if *he* ſhall judge it "practicable and expedient; and to accept of ſuch other Aid from the Rana of Gohud, as *he* ſhall "judge equivalent to the Body of Ten thouſand Horſe, which the Rana is obliged by the Treaty "to furniſh." The Latitude given in the Firſt Article, leaves it in Effect to Major Camac, to carry the Company's Arms wherever he thinks proper. The Second empowers him to annul the moſt important, and apparently the moſt uſeful Article of the Treaty. In both Inſtances, the Government relinquiſhes its Controul over a Meaſure, which may lead us much farther than we are aware of; and be attended with the moſt ſerious Conſequences. We have already obſerved, that an Attempt to invade Scindia's Country, if adviſable, ſhould be made at a Time when General Goddard can cooperate with it, and ſupport it: This cannot be done till towards the Concluſion of the Rains, conſequently there is Time ſufficient to concert a Plan of Operations with the Rana of Gohud, and to aſcertain what Aſſiſtance may be depended on from him. The Board will then have proper Materials before them, to enable themſelves to judge, how far it may be ſafe or expedient, to embark in the Meaſure, ſuppoſing that a Peace, which is our firſt Object, ſhould not be effected in the Interim.

For theſe Reaſons, we cannot aſſent to the Propoſitions contained in the 4th Paragraph. We acquieſce in the 5th.

The Powers mentioned in the 6th ſeem to fall under the ſame Obſervations which have occurred to us on thoſe contained in the 4th.

(Signed) P. Francis,
Edward Wheler.

Warren Haſtings,
P. Francis,
Edw[d] Wheler.

The

APPENDIX, N° 286.

The Governor General lays before the Board the following Minute.

No 9. Mr. Francis's Packet.

Governor General—Two Minutes have been lately delivered by Meſſrs. Francis and Wheler, bearing their joint Signatures, in Anſwer to Propoſitions made by me to the Board.

It is not my Intention to follow theſe Minutes through every Aſſertion of Facts, and every Deduction of Argument; I ſhall only reply to ſuch Points as have a Relation to my preſent Purpoſe, which is ſtill to inſiſt on the Neceſſity of carrying the War into the Diſtricts appertaining to Mahdajee Scindia, and to this I intreat the Board to give me their Attention.

Except the Article of Expence, I can ſcarcely collect the Objections which are made to it.

It never was my Intention to employ Major Camac in an Invaſion of Bundlecund, nor ſuffer, if it were attempted on the Grounds of his Inſtructions, ſuch a Waſte of the Time required for the firſt and eſſential Object of his Operations.

The Ends propoſed by this Expedition are two immediate. 1ſt. To divide the Maratta Strength, and divert it from General Goddard; 2d. To make the principal Agent of the War, the principal Sufferer by it. And one ultimately, Peace. To this it is objected, that "the manifeſt Advantage "of having Two Armies acting in concert, and dividing the Attention of the Enemy between "them, would be loſt if they were not both in the Field at the ſame Time." This is by no Means a fair Concluſion, becauſe it ſuppoſes the Enemy to keep the Field, and our principal Army to be inactive: The Reverſe is the moſt probable; and my Purpoſe will be equally anſwered, whether both remain in Quarters, and Major Camac be ſuffered to proſecute the Plan aſſigned him without Oppoſition; or whether the whole Force of the Enemy be directed againſt him, and General Goddard left at Liberty to act in the Proſecution of his. The rainy Seaſon is no Impediment to our Troops, but a great one to the Maratta, which conſiſt only of Cavalry, and if the Meaſure which I have propoſed, be even now agreed to, I ſhould hope to bound it with that Seaſon, or to effect every material Purpoſe of it within the Rains.

The Deſign of the propoſed Inſtructions to Major Camac, has been miſunderſtood, and the intended Stile of it inverted. It is not meant "to give Major Camac a Latitude to carry the Company's Arms *wherever he thinks proper*;" but to order him to carry the Company's Arms to a preſcribed Scene of Action, *unleſs he thinks it improper.*

The Objection made to the Expence is a material one; but a vigorous Exertion cannot be made without Expence, nor can the War be either concluded honourably, or proſecuted ſucceſsfully, without ſuch an Exertion. Feeble Meaſures and Advances for Peace will but add to the Strength and Preſumption of our Adverſaries, diſcourage our Friends, and perhaps induce them to become Parties againſt us. The Reſources of this Government, exhauſted as they are, and withheld from it by its internal Imbecility, are yet equal to every probable Contingency of the preſent War, if it is conducted on a conſiſtent Plan, and that not varied by deſultory Votes of Council, on every Meaſure required for its Proſecution.

I muſt here take Notice, that the Expence of Captain Popham's Detachment has been greatly overrated. It is aſſerted, that the Expence of a Detachment of only 2000 Drafts under Captain Popham, has been ſwelled to more than 91,000 Rupees a Month, and in another Place, this Sum is ſtated as a fixed Amount. The Truth is, that the Expence of this Detachment has exceeded its due Bounds; yet not in the Degree imputed to it, which would be indeed enormous. The Detachment beſides the Two Thouſand Drafts (they are in fact 2,400) conſiſts of Artillery and Cavalry. The monthly Expence of the Whole was on a Medium about 82,000 Rupees; of this Sum

the Cavalry alone produce	—		12,811
and the Artillery	—	—	8,300
making both together	—	—	21,111

And this Sum deducted from the Total, leaves 61,000 Rupees for the Drafts, including the Staff and Contingencies of Four Battalions into which they were formed, though their Number was equal only to Three.

The Part which this Government has hitherto borne in the War, is mine, and has been made excluſively mine, the other Members having repeatedly diſclaimed their Share in the Reſponſiblity attending it. It is hard, that while they load me with the Weight of ſuch a Charge, they ſhould bind my Hands, and deny me the Means of ſupporting it.

If Mr. Francis (I am compelled to ſpeak thus plainly) thinks that he can better and more effectually conduct the War, to the Termination of which we both profeſs to aim at; and that he can in Honour deprive me of the Right which I claim to dictate the Means of accompliſhing it, let him avowedly take the Lead; but if I am to be charged with the Conſequences of it, or if the Right which I claim be juſtly mine, let him allow me to poſſeſs and exerciſe it. It is impoſſible to combine the Principles of Enterprize and Inaction in the ſame general Meaſure, and as impoſſible for his Sentiments and mine to be brought into Agreement on the Subject of the Maratta War. I have in vain laboured to accommodate them by a ſtudied Attention to his Opinions in every Meaſure which I have ventured to propoſe in the courſe of the laſt Fifteen Months, and have reſtrained myſelf from urging others, which however proper and neceſſary for the Occaſion, extenſively conſidered, were inconſiſtent with the actual State and Temper of this Government.

I now revert to my Propoſition, and requeſt the Board to re-conſider their Objections to the Inſtructions which I have propoſed to be given to Major Camac. I have not the Preſumption to expect that they will be influenced by any Reaſonings which I have uſed, having had too much Experience of the Inſufficiency of official Argument, to overcome a decided, and much leſs a confederate Oppoſition. But as the Expence which will attend the Meaſure which I have recommended is the only

only formal Objection made to it, I hope I may be allowed to remove it, by offering to exonerate the Company from it, and to take it upon myſelf. That this Propoſition may not be miſunderſtood, and that I may not bind myſelf by Engagements which may exceed my Power to fulfil them, I will explain myſelf.

The regular Pay and Batta of the Troops which are to form Major Camac's Detachment conſtitute no Part of the Expence of it, ſince theſe would be the ſame in their Amount although the Battalions remained in their original Quarters. Neither ought the Suſpenſion of the Subſidy to be charged to the Expedition, ſince it is probable, and I regard it as certain, that the Ranah having no further Call for our Aid within his Country, for the ſole Defence of it, will be glad to be relieved from the Expence attending it; and becauſe it is propoſed in the laſt of the Minutes of Meſſrs. Francis and Wheler, to withdraw it. The Contingencies of the Detachment are therefore the only Expence that can be reaſonably charged to the Expedition: Theſe I rate far below Two Lacks of Rupees; that Sum I offer to contribute to this Diſburſement. I have already depoſited it within a ſmall Amount in the Hands of the Sub Treaſurer, and I beg that the Board will permit it to be accepted for that Service.

(Signed) Warren Haſtings.

Ordered, That the foregoing Minute lie for Conſideration.

(Signed) Warren Haſtings.
P. Francis.
Edwd Wheler.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 29th June 1780.

Thurſday.

At a Council; PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Philip Francis, } Eſquires.
Edward Wheler, }
Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote abſent.

The Governor General—In my Minute of the 19th Inſtant, I propoſed that a Major of Brigade and an Aid de Camp ſhould be added to the Staff of Major Camac's Detachment, then propoſed to conſiſt of Seven Battalions. Although it has been ordered by the Board, that it ſhall conſiſt of only Four Battalions, and it ſeems to be the Determination of the Board to confine its Operations to a very limited Scene, ſtill it has been repreſented to me by Major Camac, as indiſpenſably neceſſary to enable him to execute with proper Effect the Functions of his Command, that he be allowed a Brigade Major and Aid de Camp; and I move, That they be allowed; and that Lieutenant Hicks be appointed to the former Station, and that Lieutenant Kennon to the latter.

Agreed to.

The Minute which follows having been ſent to the Secretary on the 27th Inſtant, it was immediately forwarded to the Governor General.

Minute from Meſſieurs Francis and Wheler.

No 10. Francis's Ket.

After an attentive Conſideration of the Governor General's Minute delivered in to the Board Yeſterday, we adhere to the Reaſons which have induced us to withhold our Conſent to the propoſed Expedition into Malva. To this, for the preſent, we ſhall only add the following ſhort Remarks, in Reply to ſome Aſſertions in the Governor General's Minute, which appear to us to be gratuitous.

1ſt. The actual Expence of Captain Popham's Detachment for the Months of November, December, and January laſt, is ſtated by the Commiſſary General at Current Rupees 2,73,996; (vide his Letter recorded on the 1ſt of May) and we have no Reaſon to think that the Expence has decreaſed ſince the Detachment has been on Service.

2d. We know not to what Paſſage in either of our Minutes the Governor General alludes, when he ſays, "That it is propoſed in the laſt of the Minutes of Meſſieurs Francis and Wheler to with-"draw the Aid granted to the Rana of Gohud." Notwithſtanding our original Diſapprobation of the Treaty, and though none of the good Effects which were promiſed from it appear to us to have been accompliſhed, we have not propoſed to depart from the Conditions by which this Government has been bound to the Rana. All we inſiſt on is, that the Subſidy ſhould be paid. The Governor General has not informed us, whether any Part of it has been diſcharged. It is ſaid, that the rainy Seaſon is no Impediment to our Troops, though a great one to the Marattas. The ſame Opinion was inſiſted on at the Time when Colonel Leſlie marched, and when the Governor's Confidence in him was not inferior to that which he now repoſes in Major Camac, and which we do not mean to ſay is ill founded. But Colonel Leſlie's Letters contain repeated Declarations of the Impoſſibility of marching amidſt the Torrents of Rain with which the Country was deluged. On this Point our Conviction remains unaltered. They who have not ſeen the Rains of India can have no Idea of their Violence, nor how entirely the whole Surface of the Country is changed by them.

In

In a few Days we mean to record our Sentiments more at large on the Remainder of the Governor's Minute, and on the general Situation of this Government. We could have wiſhed indeed, that the Governor's Plan had been more completely before us than it is, that we might have been able to compare the Whole of the Object with the Whole of the Means. Peace, he declares, is his ultimate Object; but he has not given us even a general Idea of the Terms on which he would make it; he has not intimated to us what would be the final Extent of his Demands on the Marattas, or what Conceſſions he would make to them. Before this Point is fixed, we have no ſolid Baſis, either for Action or Deliberation: The Firſt may be indefinite and unconnected, as it hitherto has been; the Second muſt be guided from Day to Day by Events. In this Uncertainty we cannot preſume to decide whether his Object be or be not attainable; but we promiſe to enter into the Conſideration of it with the utmoſt Candour, and with all the Attention which ſuch a Subject deſerves when it is laid before us.

27th June 1780. (Signed) Philip Francis, Edward Wheler.

Ordered, That the above Minute lie for Conſideration; and that the Secretary be directed to prepare a Draft of Inſtructions to Major Camac, in conformity to the different Minutes of the Members of the Board recorded on this Subject.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 13th July 1780.

At a Council; PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Edward Wheler, Eſquire.
Mr. Francis indiſpoſed.
Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote abſent on a Viſit to the different Stations of the Army.

The Secretary begs Leave to lay before the Board the following Minute from Meſſrs. Francis and Wheeler, delivered to him on Tueſday the 4th Inſtant, which he immediately circulated to the Governor General.

Minute from Meſſrs. Francis and Wheler, 29th June 1780.

No 11. Mr. Francis' Packet.

In our Minute of the 27th, we meant only to give an immediate Anſwer to the Propoſition before us. We ſhall now enter more particularly into the Reaſonings and Aſſertions with which it was introduced. The Terms and Tendency of the Governor General's Minute make this Taſk, however painful it may be, eſſentially neceſſary for the Information of thoſe, who are to judge of our Conduct, and of courſe, to our own Reputation and Safety.

The Governor General ſays, that, "except the Article of Expence, he can ſcarcely collect the Objections made to the Meaſure:" And again, "that the Expence is the only formal Objection to it." Yet ſome Pains are taken to anſwer another, which attacks the Meaſure on its own Principles, and which undoubtedly muſt have been felt by the Governor General, or he would not have attempted to remove it, by ſuppoſing a Fact ſo material to the Queſtion, as, that our principal Army is not in Cantonments and inactive; and that it muſt not continue ſo to the End of the Rains. The Truth is, that General Goddard's Army, or the major Part of it, is actually in Cantonments at Surat; and we hear that he himſelf is at Bombay. Laſt Year he did not take the Field until December; perhaps he now might move a Month ſooner; but we are ſatisfied, as well by his own Letters, as by every Information we have been able to obtain, that it is impoſſible for him to act before November. That the Rains would be no Impediment to our Infantry, incumbered with Baggage, Tents, Stores, Ammunition, and a Train of Artillery; but that it would be a great one to a Body of Maratta Cavalry; ſeems to us a moſt extraordinary Propoſition. Hitherto it has been contradicted by Experience, and we find no Arguments advanced to ſupport it. If one of the Objects of the Expedition be to divide the Maratta Strength, and to divert it from General Goddard, it is eſſential to that Object that General Goddard's Army ſhould be at the ſame Time in the Field, otherwiſe the Maratta Force is not divided; nor can there be a Diverſion on one Side, unleſs ſome Operations exiſt on the other, in favour of which the Diverſion is to be made. But we ſay that General Goddard's Army is in Cantonments, and muſt remain inactive till November; conſequently the undivided Force and Attention of the Marattas, if they think it neceſſary, may be turned entirely to Major Camac.

The Second Object is ſaid to be to make Madajee Scindia, "the principal Agent of the War, the principal Sufferer by it." Hitherto we have been told that Nana Furneſe was the Chief, moſt attached to the French Intereſt, and moſt hoſtile to ours; and that Scindia was diſpoſed to cultivate our Friendſhip; and it muſt be confeſſed he gave us a Proof of it, which ought not to be forgotten, when he ſuffered the Bombay Army to retire from Worgaum. Admitting nevertheleſs, that we ought now to conſider Scindia as our principal Opponent, it does not follow that this Expedition, in the Way it is planned, will be the Cauſe of much Diſtreſs to him, if any. In our Opinion, *we* are much more likely to ſuffer by it than he is. If every material Purpoſe of it is to be effected within the

the Rains, what can they be, but to make a haſty Incurſion into his Country, to plunder it, and to leave it? If General Goddard were in Motion at the ſame Time, we ſee a Poſſibility, in Speculation at leaſt, that Scindia might be diſtracted between them, and prevented from turning his whole Force, or the principal Part of it, to the Defence of his Dominions. As this is not the Caſe, Major Camac muſt act without the Support of a Diverſion on the other Side, againſt whatever Force Scindia may think fit to bring againſt him. They who are unacquainted with the Geography of India, can know nothing even of the Diſtance from our Frontier to Eugene, the Capital of Malva, much leſs of the Difficulties that are likely to attend ſuch a March. The Diſtance, however, is evidently ſo great, that in caſe of a Check we ſee no Likelihood of ſecuring a Retreat. But if, whether with or without an immediate Repulſe, the Retreat of the Detachment ſhould be cut off, we know what the Conſequence muſt be; another Body of Troops will be called for, and the Neceſſity of ſending them inſiſted on, to ſupport the Firſt Meaſure, or to diſengage us from the Effects of it. No Man can ſay to what Diſtreſs and Difficulties a Series of ſuch Steps may finally lead us. It may happen, that while we are ſtripping Bengal of the Force which ought to be reſerved for its Defence; while we are ſending our beſt Troops, and our beſt Officers, on theſe diſtant Expeditions, theſe Provinces may be invaded from different Quarters, and our Eſtabliſhment hazarded where it ought to be our principal Care to render it ſecure. In our Opinion, nothing eſſential to the Intereſts of the Company and of the Nation in India can be loſt, as long as Bengal is ſafe; but if this Country ſhould once be in Danger, or if, by the Loſs or Waſte of its Reſources, it ſhould no longer be able to ſupport itſelf, and to return a regular Tribute to Great Britain, no Conqueſts or Acquiſitions in any other Part of India will ever compenſate, in the ſmalleſt Degree, for the Diſtreſs to which Bengal may be reduced, and for the Conſequences that muſt attend it at Home. The Suppoſition of ſuch a Caſe will not appear wild or unwarrantable to thoſe who have a perfect View of our Situation. We are much afraid that it is little known, and leſs underſtood, in England.

The War with the Marattas, at more than Two Years after its Commencement, and after every Rupee we had reſerved in the Treaſury, or have ſince been able to collect, has been ſpent in the Support of it, is at this Day as far from a Concluſion as ever. New Expectations are propoſed to anſwer the ſame Effects which were promiſed from former Meaſures of the ſame Nature, and as it appears to us, with no better Proſpect of Succeſs; of ſuch Succeſs at leaſt as would be likely to make any further Efforts unneceſſary.

The Governor General talks of Friends who may be diſcouraged, and who perhaps may be induced to become Parties againſt us; we wiſh that the Names of theſe Friends had been mentioned. We do not know that this Government has a ſingle Friend or Ally in India, in the true Senſe of Friendſhip and Alliance, which ſuppoſes the Power of giving Aſſiſtance, and a Diſpoſition to give it.

The Condition to which we have reduced the Vizier's Country, makes that Connection rather a Burthen than Advantage to this State. We have now to defend the extended Frontier of a ruined Country, which at preſent barely pays the Troops that defend it; and which, according to all Appearance, will not do even that much longer. As for the Vizier himſelf, he is a Cypher, and has no Choice.

The Rana of Gohud is too inconſiderable to be mentioned; and if he were more powerful than he is, it is plain enough that either his original Purpoſe is anſwered, or that he has other Reaſons for being weary of the Preſence of our Army. Though the Board have not heard from Captain Popham, we conjecture from what the Governor General has let fall, that the Rana intends to diſmiſs Captain Popham, and that he will not require Major Camac to come into his Country.

On the other Hand, we ſee the principal Powers of India, either armed, or ready to arm againſt us. The Marattas have united, as we foreſaw they would do, in the common Defence of their Country. Hyder Ally, their natural Enemy, has concluded an Alliance with them, the Effects of which, though hitherto ſuſpended, are not averted. We know, by many Proofs, what his Diſpoſition is towards us; and we ought to conclude, ſince it is a Caſe againſt which we ought to be provided, that he means to act againſt us at the firſt favourable Moment; that is, when our Arms may have ſuffered another Check, or when our Strength and Reſources may be exhauſted by a Continuance of the preſent War.

It is true, our Endeavours have hitherto ſucceeded in preventing the Nizam from taking an open Part with our Enemies. It depends on the Gentlemen at Madras, whether the Conceſſion we have thought proper to make him ſhall take Effect or not; if it ſhould, we have ſtill no poſitive Security that he will be contented with it, or that his other Claims upon the Company will not furniſh him with a Pretence for joining our Enemies, whenever he ſees an Opportunity of doing it to Advantage. His Diſpoſition towards us, and the Confidence he repoſes in his own Strength, may be plainly collected from his Declarations to Mr. Hollond.

The Rajah of Berar ſeems lately, if not originally, to have adopted that Sort of Policy, which leaves it open to him to be guided by Events, and to purſue any Courſe he thinks proper. We have no Security that it will be favourable to this Government. He profeſſes to wiſh for an Accommodation between us and the Paiſhwa: He offers his Mediation, and, apparently to ſupport his Offers, he ſends a conſiderable Army to the Frontier of theſe Provinces. The Strength of this Army is unknown to the Board; various Reports ſtate it from 20 to 30,000 Horſe. Againſt their future Operations we ought to be as carefully provided as if we had no Dependance on their Friendſhip. We ought to treat them as Friends, but we ought to be prepared againſt them as Enemies:

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In this Situation we can never admit, *that the Reſources of this Government, exhauſted as they are, and withheld from it by its internal Imbecility, are yet equal to every probable Contingency of the preſent War*; on the contrary, we think that the preſent War, in whatever Manner it may be conducted, is liable to Contingencies, to which all our Reſources, if they were yet unimpaired, would not be equal, and that in our preſent Circumſtances we have no Choice.

We deny that this War has hitherto been conducted on a conſiſtent Plan, or any Plan at all; of which we need not give a more deciſive and ſtriking Proof, than that the Expedition under Colonel Goddard did not co operate with that from Bombay againſt Poona; that the Authority formerly given to the Preſidency of Bombay, over that Army, was withdrawn in favour of another Meaſure, of which they had no Information; and that General Goddard's final March to Surat, was merely Matter of Accident, and abſolutely contrary to the Governor General's Wiſhes and Intentions.

On the 4th March 1779, he declared, "he wiſhed equally with Mr. Francis, for the Return of the "Detachment to Berar, and equally dreaded to hear of its proceeding to the other Coaſt."

But if the Reverſe were true, and if the War had really been conducted on a conſiſtent Plan, we deny that it has been varied by deſultory Votes of Council on every Meaſure required for its Proſecution. We do not know, or believe, that there is a ſingle Inſtance of any Queſtion concerning the War being carried againſt the Opinion of the Governor General, except that now immediately before us; and even this we preſume was not in Contemplation with the Governor a Month ago, when the Reſolution was taken for recalling and reducing Captain Popham's Detachment with common Conſent, and as we thought with the Governor's entire Satisfaction.

It is not denied, "that feeble Meaſures, and Advances for Peace may give Strength and Preſumption to our Adverſaries, and diſcourage our Friends; or that the Principles of Enterprize and In-"action are not to be combined in the ſame general Meaſure." But we do not admit that theſe general Propoſitions are applicable to our Situation. Our Opinion is, that we are in no Condition to continue the War on any Terms which ſuppoſe the Continuance of the preſent Expence, or even with a conſiderable Diminution of it. Whether our Reſources be exhauſted, or whether they be withheld from us, it is equally true that there is no Money in our Treaſury. We hope, that in ſuch critical Circumſtances, it will not be propoſed to take the Depoſit out of the New Fort. We know not how near we are to the Extremity for which it was provided; but, even ſuppoſing our immediate Wants were relieved by that little Supply, let us conſider where it would leave us, after diſcharging the inſtant Demands upon the Treaſury. Our former Statements ſhew what a very inconſiderable Portion of it would remain in our Hands, while the Credit and Advantage of poſſeſſing ſuch a Reſerve in Specie, againſt an extraordinary Emergency, would be loſt: In Effect, we ſhould publicly avow, that the Diſtreſs, againſt which the Depoſit was reſerved, had actually fallen upon us.

We never meant to propoſe feeble Meaſures, which neceſſarily defeat themſelves; nor yet do we approve of vigorous Meaſures in the Senſe in which Vigour has been hitherto underſtood, becauſe we are convinced that this Government is unable to ſupport them; and that, if they could be ſupported a ſhort Time longer, they would not bring us nearer to our Object. Before the Commencement of the War, we foreſaw and foretold the principal Conſequences that would attend it; we now judge of it by its Effects, which we hope will be conſidered, though every other Sort of Argument ſhould continue to be diſregarded: We have ſeen the Event of Two Years Military Operations, and of a Succeſſion of Enterprizes, which in point of Effort and Expence, were as vigorous as any Thing we could now undertake.

The Expedition to Poona ended in a Diſgrace which, but for the Generoſity or Forbearance of the Marattas, might have left Bombay defenceleſs. We know not the Expence of this Meaſure, but we believe the Company will find it enormous.

The March of the Army under Colonel Leſlie had all the Appearances of an active and vigorous Reſolution; and has produced as much Succeſs as could reaſonably be expected: It has conquered an open Country, which at ſome future Day, and if ever the promiſed Collections from it ſhould be made, is to return Thirty Lacks a Year to the Company. Againſt this Acquiſition, the permanent Expence of an Encreaſe of Eſtabliſhments to regulate and defend it muſt be placed, and the Value of the Remainder compared with the Charge of the Expedition. The Company will then know, at what Price they have acquired a new Territory on the Malabar Coaſt. At the End of February laſt, the Sums remitted to this Detachment alone, amounted to almoſt Seventy-ſix Lacks of current Rupees, and we are convinced, that we are much within Bounds in computing, that a Crore of Rupees will not clear it to the End of October.

The March of a Detachment from the Coaſt, and of another from Bombay, to ſtrengthen General Goddard, has yet produced no Effect that we know of, but to raiſe their Pay on a Level with that of the Bengal Troops, which of itſelf is no ſlight Inconvenience.

The Detachment under Major Camac, which was ordered about the Beginning of laſt Year to join Colonel Goddard, after coſting the Company CR'. 4,36,793, returned without Effect.

Many Advantages were promiſed from the Treaty with the Ranna of Ghode, particularly that of dividing the Strength and Attention of the Marattas. If it has really produced that or any other Effect, that deſerves the Name of an Advantage, or that can be placed in Compariſon with the Expence of this Meaſure, we wiſh to ſee it ſtated. We are informed by the Commiſſary General, that the Total Expence of Captain Popham's Detachment to the End of April laſt, amounted to CR'. 5,55,953: At this Rate the preſent Expence muſt amount to CR'. 7,41,271.

With theſe diſcouraging Experiments in our View, we are called upon to embark in another Enterprize, for the avowed Purpoſe of ſupporting that of General Goddard. Yet the Governor's Expectations of Succeſs from this new Effort, cannot be greater than thoſe which he profeſſed to entertain of the former. Even after the Delay in Bundlecund,* he always conſidered Colonel Leſlie's Detachment *as capable of accompliſhing the Ends of its Formation*, and profeſſed the ſtrongeſt Conviction *that under a proper Conduct, the Effects would ſtill anſwer his moſt ſanguine Hopes.*

*Vide Secret conſultations, Oct. 1778.

It is true, that the Part which this Government has *hitherto* borne in the War, belongs to the Governor, and that we have no Share in the Reſponſibility attending it; but it is equally true, that in the future Meaſures of this Government, we *muſt* take our Part. We cannot transfer the Reſponſibility, though we might relinquiſh the Powers incident to our Stations; in many Caſes, we may find ourſelves compelled not to interrupt the Operation of Acts already reſolved on againſt our Opinion, eſpecially when the Government or its Repreſentatives, are once engaged in the Execution of them. In ſuch Circumſtances we have no Choice; but a Defence of this Sort will not apply to new Meaſures or new Plans, which cannot be reſolved on without our Conſent; for theſe and their Conſequences, we muſt of Neceſſity be anſwerable, jointly with the Governor, therefore cannot diveſt ourſelves of the Right of judging of both. If on the preſent Occaſion, we are miſtaken in our Judgment, it will not add to the Load with which the Governor General may be charged; we rather think he derives a viſible Advantage, from the Part we are forced to take in this Queſtion: There is no Difficulty in diſplaying the poſſible Benefits which might have reſulted from a Meaſure untried, while the Burthen of proving that ſuch Benefits were unattainable, together with the ideal Loſs of them, will be thrown upon the oppoſite Party.

We have as little Faith as the Governor can have, in the Sufficiency of official Argument, to overcome decided Opinions; what we have ſaid, is meant to ſtand for our Vindication at Home: We heartily wiſh it might have more Weight than we fear it will have in this Place; we wiſh to co-operate heartily and ſincerely with the Governor General in effecting a Peace on reaſonable Terms; Means of Negociation are in his Power, which are not within ours; to accompliſh a Peace ourſelves, againſt his Inclinations, we know to be impoſſible, till our Hopes very nearly amounted to Conviction, that we were all agreed on this Point, and that the Seaſons of the Rains, in which Hoſtilities muſt ceaſe on both Sides, would have been employed in effecting a Pacification. On this Principle we conſented to the Propoſition for accepting the Mediation of Moodajee Booſla. We wiſh to know if any and what Steps have been taken in Conſequence. As this Meaſure has no Connection with the propoſed Expedition, we hope it will not be deſerted. Without making improper Advances to the Marattas, other Means might be taken to the ſame End; but we are perfectly ſenſible that none can ſucceed in which the Governor General will not take an active Part. If after all, a formal Peace is not to be obtained, we do not think it follows, that a defenſive War muſt neceſſarily be continued. A general Outline of the Plan we allude to, has been ſuggeſted to the Governor General: We do not think it adviſable to enter into it in this Place, but we are ready to ſubmit our Thoughts to him on the Subject, whenever he thinks proper.

(Signed) Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler.

Mr. Francis—I beg Leave to add a few Words to the preceding Minute, in Reply to the Perſonal Appeal made to me, by the Governor General; I perſuade myſelf he would not propoſe an Alternative to me, which he thought I could not accept of with Honour, but as I underſtand it, there is no Point of Honour in Queſtion; I think it belongs to the Governor General to propoſe and recommend ſuch Meaſures as he thinks fit, to the Approbation of the Board, and circumſtanced as we now are, it muſt be ſome very eſſential Conſideration that can induce me to oppoſe him; I would neither attempt to take that Lead out of his Hands, nor yet engage implicitly to ſubmit to his Opinions. Every View to my own Eaſe and Happineſs would incline me to wiſh, that the Conſtitution of the Government permitted him to dictate, or to reſolve and act without me; but I am veſted with a Public Truſt, from the Duties of which I cannot be exempted, while I hold the Station that creates it.

I believe the Governor General yielded to my Opinion, in reſolving to recall and reduce Captain Popham's Detachment; but this was a Conceſſion to which he did not adhere: "That he ſhould have "laboured to accommodate his Sentiments to mine, by a ſtudied Attention to my Opinions, in "every Meaſure which he had ventured to propoſe, in the Courſe of the laſt Fifteen Months," is a Fact with which I declare moſt ſolemnly I was utterly unacquainted.

(Signed) Philip Francis.

The Secretary having prepared a Draft of Inſtructions for Major Camac, drawn up from the Minutes of the Board, and circulated by Order of the Governor General to the other Members, for their Approbation, as he thought it irregular in him to take any Part in them, they were returned ſigned.

Agreed.

Edw[d] Wheler.

Mr. Francis—I have already agreed to ſuch of the Inſtructions to Major Camac, propoſed by the Governor General, as were conformable to the Treaty with the Rana of Gohud, and to the unanimous Reſolution of the Board of the 29th May; the Draft now in Circulation appears to me to correſpond therewith, and I therefore agree to it.

(Signed) Philip Francis.

The Inſtructions being agreed to by Meſſrs. Francis and Wheler, they were copied fair, ſigned, and diſpatched as follows:

To Major Camac.

N° 7. Mr. Francis's Packet.

Sir,

Our Secretary has already notified to you your Appointment to the Command of a Detachment, ordered on Service with the Rana of Gohud; this Detachment is to be formed of Three Battalions of Sepoys from the Second Brigade, ſtationed at Cawnpore; the Battalion of Light Infantry commanded by Captain James Browne, and a Party of Artillery, to conſiſt of Half a Company of Europeans, and Half a Battalion of Laſcars.

In Addition to the Guns attached to the above Battalion, by the Regulations of the Army, we have ordered that your Detachment ſhould be ſupplied with Two Twelve Pounders, a Howitzer, Two Cohorns, and a proper Quantity of Ammunition and Stores.

We direct that you immediately proceed to Cawnpore, or to the Detachment, wherever it may be, and forthwith conduct it into the Dominions of the Rana of Gohud, there to relieve the Corps under the Command of Captain Popham in that Quarter.

The Rana of Gohud having in virtue of a Treaty lately concluded between him and this Government, required the Aid of a military Force on our Part, for the Defence of his Country againſt the Marattas who had invaded it, Captain Popham was appointed to this Service, and to this you now ſucceed; we therefore direct that you comply with ſuch Requiſitions as ſhall be made to you by the Rana, for this and for ſuch other Conditions as he is entitled to demand by the Treaty, and you ſhall deem practicable with the Force under your Command.

Whenever the Rana ſhall notify to you, that he has no farther Service for the Detachment under your Command, and ſhall diſmiſs it in the Manner preſcribed by Treaty, and no Occaſion ſhall preſent itſelf for the Employment of it, in promoting the general Succeſs of the War in which we are engaged with the Maratta State, you are to ſignify to him in Writing your Intentions to depart from his Country, demanding the full Amount of the Subſidy that may be due; which having received, you will immediately return with your Detachment, into the Territories of the Nabob of Oude, and there wait for further Orders; but in caſe of a Refuſal on his Part to diſcharge the Subſidy, agreeable to the Terms of the Treaty, we deſire that you will immediately ſignify the ſame to us, and not depart until you receive our Anſwer.

If before your March into Gohud you ſhall receive an Intimation from the Rana that he ſhall not require the Aſſiſtance of your Detachment, you will in like Manner ſuſpend your March, and wait our Inſtructions.

For your Guidance in maintaining the Relation of your Command to the Rana of Gohud, we herewith deliver to you a Copy of the Treaty executed with him, and we require and enjoin you to conform to it with the moſt ſcrupulous and literal Exactneſs.

The Commiſſary General having drawn out an Eſtabliſhment for your Detachment, which meets with our Approbation, we tranſmit it to you; deſiring at the ſame Time that you do not, on any Account, ſuffer the ſmalleſt Alteration or Deviation to be made in it.

We are &c.

Fort William,
13th July, 1780.

Warren Haſtings,
P. Francis,
Edwd Wheler.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 20th July 1780.

At a Council; PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Edward Wheler, Eſquire.
Mr. Francis indiſpoſed.
Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote abſent.

The Governor General—On Monday the 13th Inſtant I had prepared a Minute on the Subject of the late Debates relative to the Detachment ordered on Service under Major Camac; but was induced to withhold the Delivery of it, by the Proſpect which was then held out to me of an Accommodation of our Differences; and did underſtand that an Agreement had taken place, that all the Minutes which had

had paſſed on this Subject ſince the 19th of June ſhould be withdrawn: I am ſince informed that this is diſavowed by Mr. Francis. I am obliged to mention this Circumſtance, otherwiſe unneceſſary for public Record, to account for the late Delivery of my Minute, for which I deſire that a Place may be left on this Conſultation, as it might perhaps be deemed improper to introduce it in the temporary Abſence of the Perſon whom it immediately concerns.

The Governor General—Notwithſtanding the ill Succeſs which my former Motions have met with relative to Major Camac's Detachment, I muſt again revert to the Propoſition made by me to the Board on the 19th ultimo, for the Extenſion of the Powers to be given to Major Camac, in the Manner expreſſed in my propoſed Draft of his Inſtructions, delivered in on that Day: And I accordingly now move, That thoſe Inſtructions be granted to him.

I have little to ſay in addition to the former Arguments which I have urged in ſupport of the principal Meaſure preſented in them, but that it appears to me more neceſſary at this Time to create ſuch a Diverſion by the Declaration lately made by Hyder Ally Cawn, or at leaſt too ſtrongly implied to admit of a Doubt of its intended Conſtruction, in his Letter recorded in the laſt Conſultation. Every Accumulation of Difficulty requires an additional Exertion. For the ſame Reaſon I move, That the Order for reducing Captain Popham's Detachment be repealed; and that it be formed into Three regular Battalions, to be commanded by the Three ſenior Captains now with that Corps: But as I underſtand the Commander in Chief left Lucknow on the 6th Inſtant, and is proceeding with all poſſible Expedition to the Preſidency, I do not think it neceſſary to follow this Motion with any Propoſal for the Diſpoſition of this Corps until his Arrival.

Mr. Wheler—No Arguments are uſed by the Governor General in his late Propoſition, in addition to thoſe ſtated in his former Minutes upon this Subject, to induce me to alter my Opinion reſpecting the firſt Inſtructions to Major Camac: I muſt therefore adhere to it. I confeſs the Governor General's Second Propoſition is accompanied with a forcible Argument. Times of War and public Calamity are certainly not the Times for diminiſhing our Military Force; more eſpecially as we have every Reaſon to believe (both from the late Declarations which Hyder Ally has made to this Government, and alſo from the particular Meaſures which that Chief has lately purſued in relation to us) that an open Rupture between him and the Company is not very diſtant.

I therefore readily coincide with the Governor General in repealing the Order for the Reduction of Captain Popham's Detachment, and that it be formed into Three regular Battalions, to be commanded by the Three ſenior Captains now with that Corps.

The above Propoſitions being reſolved in the Affirmative, the following Inſtructions are iſſued to Major Camac:

To Major Jacob Camac.

Sir,

Having appointed you to the Command of a Detachment ordered to be formed of Four Battalions of Sepoys; Three of which are to be furniſhed from the Army ſtationed at Cawnpore, and the Fourth the Battalion of Light Infantry commanded by Captain James Browne, we direct you to proceed to Cawnpore, or to the Station of that Detachment, wherever it may be, and to conduct it without Loſs of Time into the Dominions of the Ranah of Gohud, there to relieve the Corps now under the Command of Captain Popham in that Quarter.

The Rana of Gohud having in virtue of a Treaty lately concluded between him and this Government, required the Aid of a Military Force, on the Part of this Government, for the Defence of his Country againſt the Marattas, who had invaded it, Captain Popham was appointed to this Service, and to this you now ſucceed. We therefore direct that you comply with ſuch Requiſition as ſhall be made to you by the Rana for this and for ſuch other Conditions as he is entitled to demand by the Treaty, and ſhall be practicable with the Force under your Command.

Whenever the Rana ſhall have no further Service for the Detachment, and ſhall diſmiſs it in the Manner preſcribed by the Treaty, and no Occaſion ſhall preſent itſelf for the Employment of the Detachment in promoting the general Succeſs of the War in which we are engaged with the Maratta State, you are forthwith to return with it into the Dominions of the Nabob of Oude, and there wait for further Orders. And if before your March into Gohud you ſhall receive an Intimation from him in Writing, that he ſhall not require the Aſſiſtance of your Detachment, you will in like Manner ſuſpend your March, and wait for further Orders.

But as the firſt Deſign of this Government in the Alliance lately formed with the Rana of Gohud, was to diſtreſs the Maratta State by a Diminution of their Power, Revenue and Influence, and by uniting with other Powers in Enmity with them to divert and weaken their Operations; and as the Maratta Dominions which lie contiguous to Gohud appertain to Madajee Scindia and Tuccoojee Holcar, the Two principal Rulers of that State and the Leaders of the Army employed to oppoſe General Goddard, we authorize and inſtruct you, in caſe you ſhall judge it practicable and expedient, to carry the War immediately into that Quarter, requiring from the Rana the Proportion of Cavalry ſtipulated by the Treaty to be furniſhed by him for ſuch a Service; or in caſe of his Inability, whether from the Seaſon of the Year, or from whatever other Cauſe, to fulfil this Condition in its complete Extent, to require and accept from him ſuch other Aid in furniſhing Proviſions and in forming Magazines of Grain and other Means of Subſiſtence and Communication, as you ſhall judge equivalent to it.

For

For your Guidance in maintaining the Relation of your Command to the Rana of Gohud, we herewith deliver to you a Copy of the Treaty executed with him; and we require and enjoin you to conform to it with the moſt ſcrupulous and literal Exactneſs.

If any Caſe ſhall occur for which we have not provided by theſe Inſtructions, and which ſhall not be contrary to them, we empower you to act therein according to your own Judgment. In all others theſe Inſtructions are poſitive, and muſt be implicitly obeyed.

The Commiſſary General having drawn out an Eſtabliſhment for your Detachment, which meets with our Approbation, we tranſmit it to you, deſiring at the ſame Time that you do not on any Account ſuffer the ſmalleſt Alteration or Deviation to be made in it.

Fort William,
20th July 1780.

We are, &c.

Reſolved, in the Terms of the Propoſition, viz. That the Sepoy Drafts, compoſing the Detachment under the Command of Captain Popham, be formed immediately into Three regular Battalions, of the ſame Strength as thoſe attached to the Brigades; and that the Three ſenior Captains now ſerving in that Detachment be appointed to the Command of them.

Reſolved alſo, That the Commander in Chief be requeſted to iſſue the neceſſary Orders for carrying into immediate Execution the above Reſolution.

The Governor General—Not having yet received any poſitive Advices tending to aſcertain the Deſtination of the Maratta Army lately ſent from Naigpore, and now at Cuttack, and deeming it neceſſary to make ſome early Proviſion for guarding againſt their Incurſions into theſe Provinces, from which they are only diſtant a few Days March, I move, That the Firſt Battalion of Sepoys for Duty at the Preſidency be ordered to proceed to Jellaſore, or to ſuch Place as the commanding Officer may deem moſt eligible for the Purpoſe of ſecuring the Boats on the Souban Rika, ſhould they attempt to croſs that River; and to watch their Motions. I do not mean this as a Force ſufficient to repel any Attempts that may be made by this Army, but a neceſſary and ſufficient Precaution for the preſent.

The above Propoſition being agreed to, it is

Reſolved, That the Battalion firſt for Duty at the Preſidency be ordered to be held in Readineſs to march at a Moment's Warning; and that the commanding Officer of the firſt Brigade be directed to iſſue the neceſſary Inſtructions to the Officer commanding it, to march to Jellaſore, or to ſuch Station as may be deemed moſt eligible for the Purpoſe of watching the Motions of the Marattas, and of ſecuring the Boats on the Souban Rika, ſhould they attempt to croſs that River.

Warren Haſtings,
P. Francis,
Edwd. Wheler.

APPENDIX, N° 287.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 7th September 1780.

PRESENT,
The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Eſquire, Governor General, Preſident,
Edward Wheler, Eſquire, and
Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote, K. B.
Mr. Francis indiſpoſed.

THE Commander in Chief delivers in the following Minute:

Sir Eyre Coote—In my Minute of the 4th Inſtant I remarked, that Accounts received from Brigadier General Goddard mentioned he ſhould, on opening the enſuing Campaign, find his Army ſufficient in Force, with the Aſſiſtance he was led to expect from the Preſidency of Bombay, to undertake advantageouſly thoſe Operations that ſeemed neceſſary to be attempted on that Side of India, provided we made a Diverſion from our upper Stations, favourable to his Movements, in order to call off the Force of the Maratta Chiefs, who have hitherto oppoſed him.

One of my principal Objects is, to act from this Country, in ſuch a Manner as will anſwer the above Purpoſe, and that upon a Plan which will be attended with the leaſt Expence to the Company.

I recommend therefore, the keeping up for the preſent the Corps of Drafts that have acted with ſo much Spirit under Major Popham, and who, from their Services during their late Campaign, may be juſtly ſtyled Approved Troops; and upon Conſideration of the Subject, I propoſe to the Board the following Query: Whether, inſtead of being ordered to join Brigadier General Goddard, to whom by our laſt Intelligence ſuch a Reinforcement is no longer neceſſary, provided we act with Vigour from hence, Major Popham may not, with the Troops now under his Command, be more advantageouſly employed, in Conjunction with Major Camac's Detachment on this Side of India?

By attacking the Poſſeſſions of Moodajee Scindia, and Tookajee Holcar, Two of the moſt powerful Chiefs, now oppoſed to Brigadier General Goddard, which have hitherto been left unmoleſted, and from whence they have obtained their principal Money Reſources, we ſhould oblige them to withdraw their Forces from the Malabar Side, to the Protection of their own Territories.

Major Camac's and Popham's Detachments conjunctively will, I ſhould ſuppoſe, be equal to this Service, as well as to any further offenſive Operations in ſuch Diſtricts, as it may be thought proper to employ them: But when ſeparate, Major Camac's Corps cannot be ſufficient to anſwer theſe Purpoſes, as a ſtrong Garriſon from it muſt be left in Gwalior, for the Defence of that Fortreſs; after which there will remain with him at moſt only Three Battalions.

In keeping up Major Popham's Corps, I would not recommend the burthening the Eſtabliſhment with an Addition of European Officers, but adviſe the letting them continue in the Form of Battalions of Drafts, not as regular Battalions on the Eſtabliſhment; appointing ſome additional Officers to thoſe already with them, to act only for the preſent, and who may be taken from ſome of the Brigade Stations, where their Services can be beſt diſpenſed with.

The Three Captains with Major Popham's Corps, to remain, commanding the Battalions of Drafts they are at the Head of. Three Captains from the European Regiments to be ordered in their Stead, to act with their Battalions under Brigadier General Goddard; and the Vacancies of Captains occaſioned hereby, not to be filled up in the European Regiments. Thus the Eſtabliſhment of Officers will not be increaſed, (the European Battalions in their preſent incomplete State can ſpare Officers for the Service) Brigadier General Goddard's Army will find themſelves very materially affected by Co-operation in their Favour, and by a Force that can from its Strength act with great Advantage on this Side of India; and the Corps of Drafts will thus be rendered, I think, of more real Utility, than by carrying into Execution the original Deſign of that Body's joining General Goddard's Army.

(Signed) Eyre Coote.

Mr. Wheler—The Propoſition now made by the Commander in Chief, bears ſo exact an Affinity to that contained in the Governor General's Minute of the 12th June, that I ſee no Reaſon to depart from the Opinion which I have already given, regarding the Relief of Major Popham's Detachment.

Agreed to the Propoſitions made by the Commander in Chief; and

Reſolved, That the Orders of the 20th July laſt, directing the Formation of the Detachment, under the Command of Captain Popham, into Three regular Battalions, be ſo far reſcinded, that the Three Battalions compoſing the Detachment be conſidered as Battalions of Drafts, and to act for the preſent as Three Battalions not upon the Eſtabliſhment.

Reſolved, That ſo many additional Officers as may be wanted for this Corps, be appointed from ſome of the Brigade Stations, to act with it for the preſent.

Ordered, That the Detachment under the Command of Major Popham do not proceed to Cawnpore, after the Arrival of the Detachment under the Command of Major Camac in the Territories of the Rana of Gohud, but make a Part of the Force under the Command of Major Camac.

Reſolved, That the Vacancies occaſioned in the Command of the Sepoy Battalions, ſerving with Brigadier General Goddard, in the Weſt of India, by the Appointment of Three of their Commanding Officers to do Duty with Major Camac's Detachment, be ſupplied for the preſent, by the Appointment of Three Captains of the European Regiments to command the vacant Battalions during the Abſence of Captains Clode, Maclary and Bruce, upon other Service.

Reſolved, That the Commander in Chief be requeſted to iſſue the neceſſary Orders for carrying the above Reſolutions into immediate Execution.

APPENDIX, N° 288.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 3d July 1780.

Recorded, 20th July 1780.

Governor General.

WHY Mr. Wheler has thus repeatedly choſen to join his Name to Mr. Francis's in the Minutes lately delivered by them to the Board, I can neither conjecture, nor ſeek to know. I can eaſily conceive Mr. Francis's Intention in obtaining this Aſſociation. But as the Rectitude of theſe Acts in Mr. Francis is to be judged upon very different Principles from thoſe in which he has a common Concern with Mr. Wheler, I ſhall conſider them ſolely as his, and reply to them accordingly: Indeed I have no Doubt of their being all the entire Compoſition of Mr. Francis. They are not the leſs his, by this apparent Diviſion of the Property; and his Name affixed to them gives me the Right of regarding them as entirely his.

I did hope that the Intimation conveyed in my laſt Minute would have awakened in Mr. Francis's Breaſt, if it were ſuſceptible of ſuch Senſations, a Conſciouſneſs of the faithleſs Part which he was acting towards me; I have been diſappointed, and muſt now aſſume a plainer Style, and a louder Tone. In a Word, my Objections do not lie to the ſpecial Matter of his Minutes, to which I ſhall ſeparately reply, but to the Spirit of Oppoſition which dictated them. I have lately offered various Plans, for the Operations of the War; theſe have been ſucceſſively rejected. As I have ſucceſſively amended and endeavoured to accommodate them to Mr. Francis's Objections, I had a Right to his implicit Acquieſcence. I have laſtly propoſed a Service, requiring immediate Execution, and I have freed it from the only Objection formally made to it.

In Anſwer he ſays, that he adheres to the Reaſons which had before induced him to withhold his Conſent; and compoſedly invites me to lay before the Board a complete Detail of the Plan for conducting the War; a comparative State of the Whole of the Object, with the Whole of the Means of attaining it; and the final Extent of my Demands on the Marattas, or what Conceſſions I would make to them: And he promiſes to enter into the Conſideration of theſe Points, with the utmoſt Candour. If his Deſign in this Enquiry was ſimply to gain Information, I might refer him to the large and confidential Diſcuſſions, in which I have laid all my Views open to his, with all the Grounds on which they were formed. If his Purpoſe was to enable him to form a more clear or competent Judgment of the Plans which I have propoſed, its Object would be loſt in the Time required for the Deliberation.

But in Truth I do not truſt to his Promiſe of Candour; convinced that he is incapable of it, and that his ſole Purpoſe and Wiſh are to embarraſs and defeat every Meaſure which I may undertake, or which may tend even to promote the Public Intereſts, if my Credit is connected with them. Such has been the Tendency, and ſuch the manifeſt Spirit of all his Actions from the Beginning: Almoſt every Meaſure propoſed by me has for that Reaſon had his Oppoſition to it. When carried againſt his Oppoſition, and too far engaged to be withdrawn, yet even then, and in every Stage of it, his Labours to overcome it have been unremitted; every Diſappointment and Misfortune have been aggravated by him, and every fabricated Tale of Armies devoted to Famine and to Maſſacre, have found their Firſt and moſt ready Way to his Office, where it was known they would meet with the moſt welcome Reception. To the ſame Deſign may be attributed the annual Computations of declining Finances, and an exhauſted Treaſury; Computations which though made in the Time of Abundance, muſt verge to Wrath at laſt, from the Effect of a diſcordant Government, not a conſtitutional Decay. To the ſame Deſign ſhall I attribute the Policy of accelerating the boded Event, and creating an artificial Want, by keeping up an uſeleſs Hoard of Treaſure, and withholding it from a temporary Circulation.

I am aware of the Anſwer which will be made to theſe Imputations, and I will anticipate it. Mr. Francis may ſafely deny them, for they are incapable of poſitive Evidence: He may complain of the Injuſtice and Indecency of aſſuming the Interpretation of his Thoughts, and aſſigning Intentions to him, upon the Reality of which he alone can pronounce with Certainty: He may claim an equal Right to recriminate upon me, and to paſs the ſame free Judgment on the Motives which have influenced my public Actions. Againſt ſuch Concluſions, I truſt that my Character will be ſufficient to defend me, unleſs ſome known Inſtance of it can be produced, as a Warrant for them; and ſuch I am certain do not exiſt, either known or unknown.

My Authority for the Opinions which I have declared concerning Mr. Francis, depends upon Facts which have paſſed within my own certain Knowledge. I judge of his public Conduct, by my Experience of his private, which I have found to be void of Truth and Honour. This is a ſevere Charge, but temperately and deliberately made, from the firm Perſuaſion that I owe this Juſtice to the Public and to myſelf, as the only Redreſs to both, for Artifices of which I have been a Victim, and which threaten to involve their Intereſts with Diſgrace and Ruin. The only Redreſs for a Fraud

for

for which the Law has made no Proviſion, is the Expoſure of it. I proceed to the Proofs of my Allegation.

In the latter End of the Month of February laſt Mr. Francis concluded with me an Engagement, of which One Article alone is neceſſary to the preſent Occaſion. It is as follows:

" Mr. Francis will not oppoſe any Meaſures which the Governor General ſhall recommend for " the Proſecution of the War in which we are ſuppoſed to be engaged with the Marattas, or for the " general Support of the preſent Political Syſtem of this Government. Neither will he himſelf either " propoſe or vote with any other Member who ſhall propoſe any Meaſure which ſhall be contrary " to the Governor General's Opinion on theſe Points."

By the Sanction of this Engagement, and the liberal Profeſſions which accompanied it, I was ſeduced to part with the Friend to whoſe generous and honourable Support ſtedfaſtly yielded in a Courſe of Six Years, I am indebted for the Exiſtence of the little Power which I have ever poſſeſſed in that long and diſgraceful Period, to throw myſelf on the Mercy of Mr. Francis, and on the deſperate Hazard of his Integrity. It was impoſſible to afford a ſtronger Demonſtration of the good Faith with which I entered into this Accommodation, nor of my Confidence in his, than thus conſenting to deprive myſelf of the Means of breaking the Engagement on my Part, and of preventing the Breach of it on his; and ſurely this Difference in our relative Situations ought to have impreſſed him with a Senſe of what he owed to the Delicacy attending it, and have made him dread even an Approach towards the preciſe Line of his Obligations, by the ſlighteſt Advantage taken of my Inability to repel it; and how much more ought it to have reſtrained him from the direct Tranſgreſſion of it?

I muſt now revert to the Article of Mr. Francis's Engagement which I have recited above, and to the Minutes lately delivered at the Board under the Signatures of Mr. Francis and Wheler. On theſe I reſt the Proofs which I have promiſed of the Charge herein preferred againſt Mr. Francis.

If it ſhall appear on a fair Compariſon of theſe Evidences, that Mr. Francis hath faithfully adhered to his Engagements, I have wrongfully accuſed him: If on the contrary, it ſhall appear, that in Violation of this Engagement, *he has oppoſed any Meaſures which I have recommended for the Proſecution of the War in which we are engaged with the Marattas, or for the general Support of the preſent political Syſtem of this Government; or that he has either himſelf propoſed, or joined with another Member in propoſing, a Meaſure, contrary to my Opinion on theſe Points,* my Charge is eſtabliſhed; I wiſh to avoid a Repetition of the Terms of it.

W. H.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 11th September 1780.

PRESENT,
The Governor General,
Mr. Francis,
Mr. Wheler,
Sir Eyre Coote.

Mr. Francis—The main Queſtion between Mr. Haſtings and me can be referred to no other Teſt but the public Opinion of our reſpective Characters: I appeal cheerfully to that Teſt, and am ready to abide by the Event of it. On the Point in Iſſue I can only declare, as I do now in the moſt ſolemn Manner, that I never was Party to the Engagement ſtated by Mr. Haſtings, or had a Thought of being bound by it. In one of our Converſations in February laſt, he deſired me to read a Paper of Memorandums, among which I preſume this Article was inſerted: I returned it to him the Moment I had read it, with a Declaration that I did not agree to, or hold myſelf bound by the Contents of it, or to that Effect; from that Time I have never ſeen the Paper. I never had a Copy of it, nor have I a poſitive Recollection of any thing it contained. The Agreement I meant to enter into with reſpect to the Maratta War was, to proſecute the Operations actually exiſting on the Malabar Coaſt, which, ſince the Campaign was begun, and General Goddard had already taken the Field, I thought ſhould be puſhed as vigorouſly as poſſible. I have no direct Evidence to produce in Support of this Declaration; but I imagine it will be ſtrengthened in ſome Degree by the following Conſiderations: It is not ſaid that the Plan of another Expedition from the Upper Country into Malva, or any other Part of the Maratta Dominions on that Side of India, had ever been ſuggeſted to me. The Reſolutions of the 29th May laſt, formed on the Governor General's own Propoſitions, conſtitute as I think a ſtrong Preſumption, that up to that Period the Governor General had not had that Meaſure in Contemplation, or that he muſt then have abandoned all Thoughts of it. On that Day it was unanimouſly reſolved, that Captain Popham's Detachment ſhould be recalled and reduced; and that he ſhould be relieved by Four Battalions under Major Camac. In this Arrangement nothing appears to have been in the View of the Board but to diminiſh the Public Expence without departing from the Terms of the Treaty with the Rana of Ghode. Our Letters of the 20th April to the Preſidency of Bombay, to Brigadier General Goddard, and to the Commander in Chief, expreſs the unanimous Opinion of the Board, *That our Reſources were no longer equal to the Payment of General Goddard's Army without draining Bengal entirely of it's Specie; and that no Acquiſition on the other Side of India could compenſate for the Diſtreſſes which a Continuance of the War at the preſent Expence*

would bring upon the Company. This indeed has been invariably my Opinion; but the Governor concurred in it, and drew up the Letters himſelf. The Evidence I appeal to, is public and authentic. It is not for me to determine how far it ought to be deemed concluſive. The Obſervations which I muſt now proceed to offer on ſome Paſſages in the Governor General's Minute, ſhall be as ſhort and moderate as I can make them. I mean to lead the Reflections of others, from fair Preſumptions to probable Concluſions, which is all that the Caſe will admit of; and by no Means to engage myſelf or the Governor in any further Controverſy.

1. I am not acquainted with the Governor General's Plan for carrying on the War, from what Funds it is to be ſupported, or on what Terms he would make Peace. It ſeems to me, that the Demand from Two Members of the Board was regular, and in its Place. A very few Words would have been ſufficient to tell us what were to be the final Objects of the War. I would not venture to ſtate the looſe Diſcourſes of a private Converſation, if I recollected them, on a Subject of ſuch very great Importance; nor can I agree, *that the Object of the Queſtion would be loſt in the Time required for Deliberation.*

2. The Governor General's Minute of the 28th of laſt Month, and the Letter from the Board of Trade of the 22d, are ſufficient to ſhew that my Annual Computations of declining Finances and an exhauſted Treaſury were well founded. Every Department of the public Service is, and has been for ſeveral Months, in Arrear. As to the Depoſit in the New Fort, it was placed there at my Motion; but long after Colonel Monſon's Death, and with the Governor's Conſent and Approbation. In the Secret Conſultation of the 21ſt of May 1778, he ſpeaks of it as a Fund *which we have appropriated for our own extraordinary Occaſions*, and which we ſhall not break in upon for any other Service. I cannot conceive that I am hoſtile to Mr. Haſtings in adhering to the Opinion which I have conſtantly and uniformly delivered on this Subject.

3. The Evidence of the Charge againſt me is drawn from a Paper written by the Governor himſelf, of which I never had a Copy; though from the Manner in which the Quotation is introduced it might naturally be taken for an Article in ſome formal Treaty between us. This is ſaid to be *the Proof of his Allegation*; that is, the Charge and the Proof ſtand on the ſame Ground. In another Place, he admits that *his Imputations are incapable of poſitive Evidence.* I ſubmit to Judgment, whether it even be preſumptive, except of his own Thoughts or Intentions, which I do not mean to queſtion. How would he receive, or how would he anſwer an Accuſation againſt himſelf no better ſupported than this?

I ſubmit to Judgment, whether the Engagement, as ſtated by Mr. Haſtings, does not prove too much againſt me. Under the Terms of it, I muſt have conſented to the March of every Battalion on the Bengal Eſtabliſhment to the Malabar Coaſt, if Mr. Haſtings had thought fit to propoſe it, or to any other Meaſure whatſoever, without Exception or Limitation, which he might have recommended for the Support and Continuance of the War, from the Date of the Agreement. I at once renounce all my former Declarations and Opinions, and all Choice, Will, and Judgment for the future. Some Men perhaps may think me capable of ſuch an Act; I hope and believe they are not many: But no Man who knows any thing of the World will think it poſſible that I could ſacrifice myſelf in ſo groſs a Manner without ſome ſecret adequate Compenſation, if any Compenſation could be equal to it. On this Head I have no other Evidence to appeal to, and I deſire no better than Mr. Haſtings himſelf. If any thing was done or propoſed by me for my Advantage, directly or indirectly, or if any thing was done or propoſed for the Advantage of any other Perſon whatſoever beyond what was publicly known and avowed (I mean the Reinſtatement of Mahomet Reza Cawn, Mr. Fowke, and Mr. Briſtow, in Conformity to the Company's Orders) I call upon him to declare it. That of Mr. Briſtow was the only Point of the Three which I yielded to ſuſpend until the Month of October, or until the firſt Advices of the Seaſon from the Court of Directors. In the actual Situation of Affairs here, and with the alarming and calamitous Accounts we had then lately received from England, I thought ſome Agreement between Mr. Haſtings, Mr. Wheler and myſelf, was eſſentially neceſſary to the public Safety: I therefore met Mr. Haſtings with a ſincere Diſpoſition to come to an Agreement, and to forward it by every poſſible Facility on my Part. During the whole Courſe of the Tranſaction nothing of any Moment was ſaid or done without Mr. Wheler's Knowledge and Participation.

With reſpect to Mr Barwell's Departure, and the Inferences drawn from it, it is a Subject of which no Man at Home can judge ſo well as they who are on the Spot, and ſee what paſſes. The little I ſhall ſay of it is offered as Matter of Opinion, not Evidence. I believe it, for Inſtance, to be the Opinion of many well-informed Perſons in this Settlement, as it is now firmly my own, that Mr. Barwell was determined to go Home laſt Seaſon at all Events, and that the Swallow was kept for ſeveral Months on purpoſe for him. If ſo, Mr. Haſtings gained ſomething, and could loſe nothing, by his Agreement with me. But as Mr. Barwell's going Home was never demanded by me, nor ever entered into the Agreement, I have no Concern in Mr. Haſtings's Motives for conſenting to it.

If I deſerved the Character attributed to me, I ſhould not acknowledge as I do the Force of an Argument deduced by Mr. Haſtings from the defenceleſs Condition in which he was ſuppoſed to be left by Mr. Barwell's Departure. It is ſuch an Argument as can only be felt by a Man of Honour. I admit the Principle laid down by Mr. Haſtings, as far as it can be urged with any Colour of Reaſon or Juſtice. Whether I have departed from it or not, is a Queſtion of Fact. Let it only be obſerved, that ſuch a Principle is as liable to be abuſed on one Side, as to be violated on the other. Puſh the Inferences from it as far as they will go, and who does not ſee that a Tyranny may be created by it over the Mind of a Man of nice Senſibility, and fearful of Reproach? With ſuch a Weapon, ſo exerciſed,

Mr. Haſtings would poſſeſs a Power which he aſſuredly never had while Mr. Barwell was in the Country.

The Whole of this unfortunate Queſtion between Mr. Haſtings and me, muſt ſome Time or other appear before the Public. I do not wiſh to prejudice the Mind of any Man againſt him. My Conduct perhaps may be condemned on other Ground; but I do not ſee how it can be fairly imputed to baſe or intereſted Views. The Cauſe which I have hitherto endeavoured to maintain, is not mine; I have no greater perſonal Concern in it than any other Member of the Community. After all, what is it to me more than to any other Man, whether there be a Maratta War or not, or in what Manner it is conducted?

P. Francis.

Conſultation, September 11th, 1780. Secret Department.

Mr. Wheler—It is not without ſome Pain that, in Obedience to the Dictates of my Judgment I beg Leave to refer to the Governor General's Minute of the 3d July, in order to offer a few Remarks upon the introductory Point which alone has Relation to me. If the Governor General does not in that Part leave it to be imagined that I have profeſſed Sentiments which were not my own, he at leaſt takes it for granted that there is ſomething extraordinary in the Junction of my Name with Mr Francis's in the Opinions we have delivered reſpecting the Maratta War. To this Inference I deem it my Duty to object. It is not in my Apprehenſion perfectly in Accord with that Freedom which eſſentially belongs to every Gentleman who is entruſted with a Seat at this Board, namely that of delivering ſuch Opinions as he judges proper, and in the Manner moſt agreeable to himſelf. The Minutes to which I have ſubſcribed were the Reſult of my own Reflections, and the only Opinions I have entertained on the Subject of the Maratta War. So long as I deliver Opinions thus genuine, it is a Queſtion of no Moment in what Form they are preſented. If my Actions or private Diſcourſes have been contrary to my public Opinions, then and then only is there any Ground given for queſtioning the Sincerity, or diminiſhing the Credit of them. I have thought alike with Mr. Francis on a particular Subject, and therefore we have ſubſcribed to the ſame Opinions, and I hope that ſo often as I have the Pleaſure of agreeing in Sentiment with the Governor General, he will give me Credit for following the Dictates of my Judgment only, believing that I ſhall join in no Opinion contrary to my own Sentiments, or inconſiſtent with my own Honour. I beg Leave to remind the Governor General, that this is no new Language with me, having ſpoken clearly to the ſame Purport before.

Whatever Difference of Sentiment may ariſe between the ſeveral Members of this Government, in Diſcharge of the great Truſt repoſed in them (and Differences will ſometimes unavoidably happen) it ſhall always be my Study and Endeavour to preſerve Candour and Moderation in our Councils. No other Temper I am certain can extricate us from our preſent Difficulties, or bring us heartily to unite in one Object, the Good of the Public.

E. Wheler.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 13th November 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Philip Francis, } Eſquires.
Edward Wheler, }
Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote abſent.

The following Minute from the Governor General having been received on the 5th Inſtant, it was circulated for the Peruſal of the Members of the Board:

5th November 1780.

Governor General—I have ſuffered Mr. Francis's Minute of the 11th September to lie thus long unanſwered, becauſe other Cares of a ſtronger Obligation have required and have engroſſed the Whole of my Attention; and I now revert to it with Reluctance, as to a neceſſary, yet unavailing Duty. To paſs in utter Silence the Aſſertions of Mr. Francis, would be implicitly to admit their Credit; nor can I enter on their Refutation without appearing to claim the public Notice to an Argument of a private Concern, for ſuch it may be deemed in the preſent State of it, though originating from a very different Source. I ſhall therefore begin by ſtating the original Queſtion on its proper Ground, and ſhall proceed as briefly as poſſible to free it from the falſe Colourings which may have been thrown upon it.

Let it be remembered, that I am a Servant of the Company and of the Public, and entruſted with the Intereſt of both. In that Character I have charged Mr. Francis with having uſed very unjuſtifiable Means to deprive me of the Power which I poſſeſſed of fulfilling that Truſt. My Charge is leſs a Complaint againſt him, than a Vindication of myſelf. This is a general State of the Queſtion. The particular Inſtance relating to it is, that Mr. Francis has broken an Engagement on his Part, to allow me the entire and unconditional Exerciſe of that Truſt, and to ſupport me in it. This I affirm and he denies.

What

What that Engagement was, I have expreſſed in Terms in my Minute of the 3d July. Mr. Francis in anſwer declares, and "in the moſt ſolemn Manner, that he never was Party to the Engagement ſtated "by me, or had a Thought of being bound by it."

What can I ſay to ſuch a Declaration, but to declare on my Part, and in as ſolemn a Manner, that Mr. Francis was a Party to the Engagement which I have ſtated? This I now do moſt ſolemnly declare; and may God be Judge between us!

The Manner in which it was concluded I will now relate: About the Month of January laſt, Sir John Day propoſed to me an Accommodation with Mr. Francis, and offered his Mediation to effect it, judging himſelf to be the beſt qualified for ſuch an Office by the Relation in which he ſtood of a common and equal Friend to both. I cheerfully accepted the Offer; but apprized him that there was One Preliminary Condition which I ſhould exert as indiſpenſable, namely, that Mr. Francis ſhould agree to depart from his Oppoſition to the political Meaſures propoſed by me, and allow me, without Exception or Qualification, to preſcribe the Mode of conducting the Maratta War. This Point was a long Time conteſted by Mr Francis, but was at length adjuſted finally in this Manner: That Mr. Francis ſhould not oppoſe me, nor yet charge himſelf with the Reſponſibility of any Propoſal made by me, which had any Relation to the War; but ſupport it by his Vote as the Reſult of a general Meaſure which he had originally diſapproved, and which he now left, with the Reſponſibility properly annexed to it, to its original Contriver.

This Point being thus ſettled, I drew it up in Writing on a ſmall Piece of Paper in the Words which I have already quoted, with other Propoſitions, of which ſome had, and others had not received our final and mutual Agreement.

This Paper, with ſome Apology, I ſhewed to Mr. Francis, deſiring him to read it attentively, and to inform me, whether he agreed to the Conditions as I had expreſſed them, or to point out his Exceptions. To the Firſt Article, which is that of the preſent Queſtion, he replied haſtily, and with every Appearance of Satisfaction, that he entirely agreed to it, adding among other Expreſſions, as I well remember, that his Meaning plainly was not to avail himſelf of Mr. Barwell's Departure from the Council, to oppoſe me in any political Point which he could not have carried had Mr. Barwell continued.

The other Articles received ſome Variations, and were all finally regulated at the ſame Meeting. Of theſe, as they do not relate to the Queſtion before me, I ſhall take no farther Notice. For the Truth of this Narrative I appeal to Sir John Day, to whom I daily communicated what paſſed on this Buſineſs, and to Mr. Barwell, to whom I in like Manner related the daily Progreſs of it. They will both atteſt that my Relation of it at the Time was exactly ſuch as I now repeat it. It is impoſſible to ſuggeſt a Motive which I could have had to deceive them at ſuch a Time, and on ſuch a Subject, and as impoſſible that I myſelf ſhould be deceived, when I took ſuch ſure Means to aſcertain it. Yet Mr. Francis affirms, "that he returned the Paper to me the Moment he had read it, with a Declaration "that he did not agree to it, or hold himſelf bound by the Contents of it."

But if I underſtand Mr. Francis's Minute in its general Tenor, it is intended to convey a total Diſavowal of his having entered into any Engagement whatever with me. He ſpeaks of "the "Agreement which he *meant* to enter into with reſpect to the Maratta War." He ſays that "he "thought ſome Agreement between Mr. Haſtings, Mr. Wheler, and himſelf, was eſſentially neceſſary "to the Public Safety, he therefore met Mr. Haſtings, with ſincere Diſpoſition to come to an Agree-"ment, and to forward it with every Facility on his Part." Yet in no Part of the Minute, neither in the Context of theſe Paſſages, where it might be expected, nor in any other Place, can I find an Expreſſion that indicates an Acknowledgment that any Agreement did actually take place, although ſuch was his Meaning, although he thought it neceſſary to the Public Safety, and met me with ſo ſincere a Diſpoſition to forward it by every Facility on his Part. If Mr. Francis does not deny the Agreement, why are theſe qualifying Expreſſions uſed to evade it? if he means to deny it, what poſſible Reaſon can be aſſigned for its not having been concluded, or for ſuch a Repugnance on my Part to ſecond a Diſpoſition ſo favourable on his, when the Conſequence of my ſuffering Mr. Barwell to depart without ſome Adjuſtment, would be a total Annihilation of my Influence and Participation in all the Acts of this Government?

But that there did exiſt ſome Engagement between us, I appeal to Mr. Wheler, "without "whoſe Knowledge and Participation," Mr. Francis affirms, that "nothing of any Moment was "ſaid or done during the whole Courſe of the Tranſaction;" I appeal to every Individual of the Settlement for the Notoriety of it, which is beyond the Conviction of all Evidence.

Mr. Francis has attempted to prove, that the Agreement which he meant to enter into with reſpect to the Maratta War, was to proſecute the Operations actually exiſting on the Malabar Coaſt, and no more, by Arguments drawn from my own Propoſitions. Theſe might prove my Senſe of an Agreement actually concluded, but are no Evidence of his Intention on a Point which was never brought to an Iſſue. But in Effect they prove nothing. My Propoſition of the 29th of May, was the Subſtitute of one much more extenſive, which I had formed for the Relief of Captain Popham's Detachment, by Four regular Battalions under Major Camac, and for the Employment of Captain Popham's Corps on another Service. At Mr. Francis's Inſtance I omitted the latter Clauſe, and yielded, very reluctantly I own, to recall and reduce Captain Popham's Corps. This was by every Opinion judged unfit by its Conſtruction and Equipment for the Service, and I was glad to obtain, almoſt at any Rate, the quiet Concurrence of the Board to its Exchange for a better. It is poſſible that at that Time I might not have had in View the immediate Proſecution of the Expedition againſt Malva, nor is this

material

material, either to the Engagement which I affirm Mr. Francis did conclude with me, or to the Agreement which he ſays he meant to enter into, ſince the Proſecution of the War againſt the Marattas was the general Object of both, and the Means of Courſe included in it. But that I certainly had this Plan in Contemplation, and that I had conſidered it as a decided Meaſure, long before the Period of my ſuppoſed Coalition with Mr. Francis, will appear from the Treaty concluded with the Ranah of Ghode, of which it forms an expreſs and principal Stipulation. To remove all Poſſibility of Doubt on this Head, I will quote the Article itſelf, which relates to it.

Article 5th. "In caſe it ſhall be adjudged adviſable to employ the combined Forces of the "Company and the Maha Rajah in any hoſtile Operations againſt the Marattas, beyond the Borders "of the Maha Rajah's Dominions, on Requiſition made to him in Writing from this Government, "he ſhall furniſh Ten thouſand Horſe for ſuch Service, and each Party ſhall bear his own ſeparate "Expence; and if upon the Return of the Engliſh Forces towards their own Borders, the Maha "Rajah ſhall have Occaſion for their Services, and ſhall make a Requiſition to retain them, from the "Inſtant of ſuch Requiſition he ſhall pay their Charge in the ſame Manner as ſtipulated in the Second "Article. But it ſhall not be required of the Maha Rajah, nor be in the Power of this Go-"vernment, to detach or employ his Troops beyond the furtheſt Borders of Oogein and Indoor "without his ſpecial Conſent."

Hence it appears, that the Plan for an Expedition into Malva, of which Oogein is the Capital, did conſtitute a Part of the general Meaſures adopted and in Force for the Proſecution of the Maratta War, and muſt have been neceſſarily comprehended, equally in the Agreement which Mr. Francis meant to enter into with me, and in that which I underſtood him to have entered into. When I propoſed the Execution of it, other Circumſtances had recently occurred. General Goddard had ſolicited us to make ſuch a Diverſion in his Favour, and the Commander in Chief had paſſionately recommended it as the only Means of bringing the War to a ſpeedy Termination.

That I regretted the Expence of the War, that I ſaw no Object in the Continuance of it that could compenſate for the Diſtreſſes of it, and that of Courſe I anxiouſly wiſhed to accelerate the Concluſion of it, is certain: and this was an additional Excitement to me to uſe every Exertion for that End, knowing that many Lacks effectually diſburſed with ſuch a Purpoſe was a Saving, compared to an indefinite Series of defenſive Operations, ſpun out by feeble and ſcanty Supplies.

Having already far exceeded the Limits which I had preſcribed to my Reply, I ſhall paſs with Speed through the remaining and leſs material Parts of Mr. Francis's Minute.

The Engagement, as I have ſtated it, was conformable to my Opinion of the Obligation of Mr. Francis's Public Office, independant of any private Compact: In his Situation I ſhould have gone yet further. Having acquitted myſelf of my Duty in oppoſing a great public Meaſure which I had diſapproved until it had been too far advanced for Recall, and would admit of no Reſource but in a ſpeedy Proſecution of it to its ſpeedy Termination, I ſhould have deemed it criminal to continue the Oppoſition; I ſhould have deemed it inſufficient even to withhold it by a negative Acquieſcence, but ſhould have given as active a Support to the Meaſure in ſuch a State of it, as if it had my original Approbation, leaving the Formation of the depending Operations, and the Reſponſibility of the Whole, to the original Author. Such was my Declaration at the Time; perhaps Mr. Francis will remember it; and on ſuch Principles, my own Conduct has been regulated in more than One Inſtance of my Public Life.

Mr. Barwell's Departure depended on the Iſſue of the Negociation between Mr. Francis and me. It was undetermined to the laſt Moment of the Swallow's final Diſpatch.

This Mr. Francis certainly knew, for I myſelf mentioned it to him, and by the Advice of Mr. Barwell. It is a Fact which does Mr. Barwell Credit, and I have therefore no Scruple in revealing it.

5th Nov. 1780. (Signed) W. Haſtings.

At Mr. Francis's Deſire, the following Minute, dated the 27th of November, in Reply to the preceding from the Governor General, is entered in this Place, with the Papers annexed to it.

Fran is's nute, dated November.

Mr. Francis—The preceding Paper leaves the main Queſtion where it ſtood, nor is it to be decided by any human Tribunal.

In my former Minute, I did not appeal, as I might have done, to the Teſtimony of ſeveral Gentlemen of the Firſt Rank and Credit in this Place, for the Senſe which I uniformly expreſſed to them, of my Engagement with Mr. Haſtings, reſpecting the Maratta War; partly becauſe ſuch Evidence, however it might eſtabliſh my Declarations, would not be concluſive to the Truth of them; but much more, becauſe I was unwilling to introduce the Names of Gentlemen whom I reſpect, into the Diſcuſſion of ſuch a Tranſaction, or to make them Parties in any Shape to a Queſtion of this Nature. The ſame Motives prevail with me ſtill.

Admitting that the Means taken by Mr. Haſtings, to aſcertain his Senſe of what paſſed between us, were proper on his Part, and neceſſary to prevent his being deceived, it was equally neceſſary that I alſo ſhould have the ſame Security, and that I ſhould have been furniſhed with a Copy of the Paper, by which I was ſuppoſed to be bound, otherwiſe One of the contracting Parties remains excluſively poſſeſſed of the only exiſting Evidence of the Terms of the Contract. In me it would have been irregular to demand a Copy of a Paper, by which I did not deem myſelf bound.

No

No Argument or Evidence is requiſite to prove what never was diſputed. I neceſſarily admit the Exiſtence of an Engagement, when I declare the Senſe in which I made it; by uſing Terms that referred particularly to my own Meaning or Intentions, my Purpoſe was to avoid the uſeleſs offenſive Language of Contradiction, in a public Minute, which had no Object but to explain and defend my own Conduct. This being ſaid, the Obſervations founded on the equivocal Import of a Word, or on a general Miſconſtruction of my Meaning, require no Reply.

From the Fifth Article of the Treaty with the Ranna of Gohud, it can only be inferred that, when the Treaty was formed in the Beginning of November 1779, the Poſſibility of an Expedition beyond the Borders of his Dominions was ſuppoſed, in which the Ranna was to join and aſſiſt, if we required it. This might have been one of the diſtant Objects in Contemplation, when the Treaty was conſtructed. But it ſtill remains a Queſtion whether it was, or was not relinquiſhed by Mr. Haſtings, in the Interval between that Period, and the Month of February following.

Reaſoning ſtrictly from the Treaty, I was not obliged to conſent to the March of Major Camac's Detachment in the Form in which it was propoſed. The eventual Execution of the Project of an Expedition beyond the Borders of the Ranna's Dominions, according to the Terms of the Treaty, was united with the Condition of his furniſhing a Body of 10,000 Horſe, for ſuch Service; but by the Inſtructions propoſed to be given to Major Camac, it will appear that this Aſſiſtance was not expected from him.

In the Third Article of the Inſtructions, it is ſuppoſed that the Ranna may diſmiſs the Detachment, or that before its March into Gohud, the Major might receive an Intimation in Writing, that he did not require its Aſſiſtance. In the former Caſe, Major Camac is to return into Oude; in the latter, he was to ſuſpend his March, and wait for further Orders.

By the 4th Article, Major Camac is directed "to require from the Ranna his Proportion of Ca-"valry ſtipulated by the Treaty; or in caſe of his Inability, whether from the Seaſon of the Year, "or from whatever other Cauſe, to fulfil the Condition in its complete Extent, to require and ac-"cept from him ſuch other Aid in furniſhing Proviſions and in forming Magazines of Grain, and "other Means of Subſiſtence and Communication, as Major Camac ſhall judge equivalent "to it."

Admitting therefore that according to the Treaty, an Expedition into Malva had conſtituted a Part of the general Meaſures adopted and in Force for the Proſecution of the Maratta War; my Aſſent to it could not be ſeparated from the Condition expreſſed in the Treaty itſelf, viz. that the Ranna ſhould furniſh 10,000 Horſe for that Service; but by the Plan of Major Camac's Inſtructions, this Condition is relinquiſhed, and ſome other Demands propoſed in the Place of it, from which I imagine no great Advantage was expected.

I have not ſeen any Letter from General Goddard, in which he ſolicits the Board to make a Diverſion in his Favour. The only one in which he takes Notice of the Advantages to be obtained by a Diverſion to the Northward, was dated the 20th June, and received the 24th Auguſt laſt, conſequently could make no Part of an Argument in Support of a Meaſure, propoſed and debated here in the Beginning of June; nor was it ever mentioned, that I know of, before this Time, as it naturally ſhould have been when the Meaſure was under Deliberation. An Extract of that Part of his Letter is annexed.

In an Agreement of this Kind, the ſtricteſt Preciſion of Dates ſhould be obſerved, and the Facts ſtated in the Order in which they happened. On this Principle I join Iſſue with the Governor General, and affirm, in his own Terms, that when he propoſed the Execution of the Meaſure (that is on the 12th of June laſt) General Goddard had not ſolicited us to make ſuch a Diverſion in his Favour. The Fact, if it exiſts, is capable of immediate and direct Proof.

But let it be admitted, that he had done ſo; that his Opinion or Requeſt had been before us on the 12th of June, and that it ought to have had a conſiderable Weight in the Choice of Meaſures neceſſary to ſupport him, ſtill it could only have Weight at the Time when we received it. It is undoubtedly juſt, and not natural, that General Goddard's Advice and Recommendation on ſuch a Point, ſhould have influenced Mr. Haſtings's Judgment. On this Principle I have a Right to conclude, that in January and February laſt, when I converſed and engaged with Mr. Haſtings on this Subject, he had no Idea of another Expedition from the upper Country to ſupport General Goddard, becauſe he could not then have entertained ſuch an Idea, without contradicting the expreſs Opinion of General Goddard, as it ſtood before us. I appeal to General Goddard's Letter to the Preſident and Council of Bombay, dated 3d of November 1779, and recorded in our Conſultation of the 24th of February, and to his Letter to us of the 10th of December 1779, received here the 20th of January laſt, from which the Extracts annexed to this Minute are literally taken.

With this Knowledge of General Goddard's Sentiments it now remains to be accounted for on any probable Ground, why Mr. Haſtings at the latter End of February ſhould have entertained a Thought of ſupporting General Goddard's Operations by another Expedition from hence, when he had it from General Goddard himſelf, that the Troops under his Command *muſt be ſuperior to any Service that could poſſibly be required of them, and equal to the moſt complete and abſolute Succeſs.*

Whatever Plan of Operations the Commander in Chief might have recommended from Lucknow, it certainly did not meet with the Governor General's Concurrence; whether Sir Eyre Coote approved of that which was adopted, is a Point on which I am not ſufficiently informed, to ſpeak with Certainty, but I am entitled to conclude generally, from the ſtrong and pointed Term of his Proteſt againſt the Treaty with the Rana of Gohud, that no Meaſures built on that Foundation were likely to meet with

his Approbation. The following Paſſage is in Point, as it expreſſes his Opinion of an Expedition into Mahé, in conjunction with the Rana, on the Principles of the Treaty. "Again, by the "5th Article, when the combined Troops may have marched to Oogein, or Indoor, to ſeek the "Enemy and to deliver Battle, the Rana may, agreeably to Treaty, leave us to ſtand the Brunt "alone—a Point of partial Convenience to him, by which, without ſuppoſing him to betray us (which "he may alſo do agreeably to Treaty) our whole Army may be loſt."

Other Obſervations on the Governor General's Minute occur to me, but as the Remainder of it is not eſſential to the main Queſtion, they may better be omitted.

(Signed) P. Francis.

Referred to in Mr. Francis's Minute.

Extract of a Letter from Brigadier General Goddard to the Governor General and Council, dated 20th June 1780: Received 24th Auguſt.

If Scindia continues at Ugein till the Cloſe of the Rains, which I now conceive will be the Caſe, a powerful Diverſion might be made in that Quarter, to prevent his paſſing to the Southward of the Nerbeddah to ſuccour Nana Furneſſe; and I would venture to pronounce, as far as human Probability and Reaſon may preſume, that without Scindia's Aid, the Miniſter would be immediately compelled to Terms, and enter into any Engagements that might be required of him. This is no chimerical Idea; for beſides Scindia and Holcar, there remain only Two Chiefs of Conſequence in the State, Nana, and Hurry Punt Fakier; and I do not believe that any Foreign Power will draw upon himſelf the future Enmity of the Engliſh, by openly declaring his Party, and marching to their Aſſiſtance.

In the Event of ſuch powerful Diverſion being made to the Northward, Scindia will find too much Employment at Home to have Leiſure to raiſe any Diſturbance in Guzerat; and indeed the Sepoy Force, which may very well be ſpared in that Province, acting with the Troops of Futty Sing, which it may not perhaps be convenient to carry with me to the Southward, will prove ſufficient for its Security and Defence againſt a very large Body of the Enemy, ſhould any conſiderable Army (which in the Plan abovementioned appears ſcarcely practicable) be ordered to enter it.

Referred to in Mr. Francis's Minute.

Extract of a Letter from Brigadier General Goddard to the Preſident and Council of Bombay, dated the 3d November 1779.

The trifling and unequal Force the French at preſent have in India, and the certain Accounts we have from Europe to make us believe they cannot now be reinforced, ſecure us from any Apprehenſions of being interrupted in our Operations by them this Seaſon; and ſeems indeed to furniſh one very principal Reaſon why we ought to loſe no Time in ſtrengthening, and firmly eſtabliſhing ourſelves during the Courſe of it. The Troops which will ſoon be collected at Surat, muſt be ſuperior to any Service that can poſſibly be required of them, and equal to the moſt complete and abſolute Succeſs. But the Bengal Army, together with the Detachment under Colonel Braithwaite at Mahé, and ſuch Proportion of Troops from this Settlement as you may judge it expedient and conſiſtent with the mere Safety of the Iſland to detach, will be found able to execute any Plan of Operations that may be immediately reſolved upon, and againſt the whole Force of the Maratta Empire.

Referred to in Mr. Francis's Minute.

Extract of a Letter from Brigadier General Goddard to the Governor General and Council, dated 10th December 1779: Received 20th January 1780.

I have been thus particular in deſcribing this Detachment, that you may know the exact Force I ſhall have under my Command, and how fully ſufficient to anſwer any Service that may be required of them.

With reſpect to the Troops from Mahé, for the remaining Quota to be furniſhed by the Madras Preſidency I have yet received no Intelligence; I do not expect even to be joined by any Part of them previous to the Commencement of Operations; at leaſt their Junction is ſo uncertain, that no Account can at preſent be made of the Acceſſion of their Force; nor indeed will this Circumſtance be of any material Conſequence for ſome Time, as the Strength of the Army now under me is ſufficient to accompliſh the Scheme of Conqueſt at preſent propoſed, and the Madras Reinforcements, if ſent, muſt arrive ſoon enough to aſſiſt in proſecuting any more important Views that may be hereafter found convenient and practicable.

The following Minute from the Governor General was delivered in reply to the above from Mr. Francis.

Governor General—I muſt be careful not to ſuffer myſelf to be drawn from the Point which is directly in queſtion, the Engagement which I affirm to have paſſed between Mr. Francis and myſelf; this I repeat, that it may not be forgotten: viz.

"Mr. Francis

" Mr. Francis will not oppoſe any Meaſures which the Governor General ſhall recommend for " the Proſecution of the War in which we are ſuppoſed to be engaged with the Marattas, or for " the general Support of the preſent Political Syſtem of this Government: Neither will he himſelf " either propoſe, or vote with any other Member who ſhall propoſe, any Meaſure that ſhall be con- " trary to the Governor General's Opinion on theſe Points."

Mr. Francis admits that ſome Engagement did exiſt between him and me, but denies the Terms of it; and I do again moſt ſolemnly affirm, that they were literally ſuch as I have quoted them in my Minute of the 3d July, and ſuch as I have here repeated. The Paper which I ſhewed to Mr. Francis was not intended as a Security, nor have I ever alluded to it as ſuch. My Security was in his Honour, on which I implicitly relied; nor did I commit the Terms of the Engagement to Writing for any other Purpoſe than to guard againſt the Miſapprehenſions to which an Agreement, formed and concluded in Converſation only, was liable; and his Anſwer ſatisfied me: I regarded it as equivalent to the moſt binding, legal Inſtrument. As to my own Senſe of its Obligations, I gave the fulleſt Proof by the immediate Performance of my Part of it; but were the Engagement otherwiſe than I have repreſented it, and did it even bear the limited Senſe which Mr. Francis has aſcribed to it, yet I have affirmed, that Mr. Francis was equally bound by it to yield his Aſſent, (his negative Aſſent, for more I claimed not) to the Meaſure which I propoſed in June, of a Diverſion in the Province of Malva, ſince it formed a Part of the Meaſures projected and actually exiſting before the Engagement took place: In Proof of this, I have quoted the 5th Article of the Treaty with the Rana of Gohud, which ſtipulates that he ſhall aſſiſt us, if required, in an Expedition againſt the Province of Malva. I do not underſtand Mr. Francis's Diſtinction, when he ſays, that from this Article, " it can only be inferred, that when the " Treaty was formed in November 1779, the Poſſibility of an Expedition beyond the Borders of his " Dominions was ſuppoſed, &c. &c." The Condition was poſitive and expreſs, and conſtituted as eſſential an Obligation of the Treaty as either of the other Two Points which compoſed it, and which may be equally ſaid to infer the like Poſſibility, ſince the Caſes ſuppoſed by either could not exiſt with the other Two. But Mr. Francis forgets the Purpoſe for which I have appealed to the 5th Article of the Treaty with the Rhana of Gohud, which was to prove " that " the Plan of another Expedition from the Upper Country into Malva, or any other Part of the " Maratta Dominions on that Side of India, had been ſuggeſted to him, and that I had had that " Matter in Contemplation," which Mr. Francis in his Minute of the 11th of September denies. I have proved that I had it in Contemplation, and that it had been ſuggeſted to Mr. Francis, ſince it was an Article of a Treaty concluded and executed Two Months before the Date of my Engagement with Mr. Francis, debated and paſſed at the Board, and executed by him.

" But (Mr. Francis adds) it ſtill remains a Queſtion, whether it was, or was not relinquiſhed by " Mr. Haſtings, in the Interval between that Period and the Month of February following?"— To this I cannot reply, for I do not know how this became a Queſtion, ſince nothing leſs than my formal Renunciation of it could poſſibly make it one, and I am certain I never did renounce it.

The ſubſequent Reaſonings of Mr. Francis on the additional Clauſe of the Fifth Article, do not appear to me to have any Relation to the Subject; I therefore paſs them. I have not Time to examine the Whole of General Goddard's Correſpondence received before the 12th June; but the following Extracts from Sir Eyre Coote's Letter to the Board, dated the 5th May, and of General Goddard's Letter to him, dated the 28th March, and encloſed in the former, contain ſuch ſtrong and pointed Evidence of the Sentiments of both, reſpecting the general Expediency of a Diverſion in favour of General Goddard, that any further Search for acceſſary Proofs is unneceſſary.

" To the Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, &c. &c. and Members of the Supreme Council.

Gentlemen,

I have the Honour to encloſe you an Extract of the laſt Letter I have received from General Goddard, which I take the Liberty of laying before you, as it contains Sentiments entirely conformable to what I have already ſtated to you, regarding the Mode of carrying on the preſent War; though I did not want ſuch a Confirmation of my former Ideas upon this Subject. General Goddard now declares himſelf confined to the Defence of the Territory newly acquired, which, as I foretold, was a neceſſary Conſequence of the Plan adopted. I cannot therefore avoid reiterating my Propoſal of ſome vigorous Meaſures being taken from theſe Quarters, as ſoon as the Seaſon will admit. This appears to me the more preſſing, as I find ſince I have left the Board, that we are become Principals in the War; and the preſent Plan promiſes nothing but an endleſs, ruinous Expence. I therefore beg Leave to repeat, that while I recommend the moſt vigorous Exertions, it is only with a View to accelerate a Peace, which in the preſent State of Politics at Home would in my Opinion be the happieſt Event that could happen to us.

I have the Honour to be, &c.

(Signed) Eyre Coote."

Lucknow,
15th May 1780.

Extract

APPENDIX, N° 288, 289.

"Extract of Brigadier General Goddard's Letter, dated the 28th March 1780.

My laſt gave you a very particular Information of the Situation of Scindia's Forces, which he was then collecting from all Parts of his Country, to accompany him into Guzerat, ſince which I have he has been joined by 5,000 Horſe from Ugein; and it is reported, that another conſiderable Body is on their March towards him; *ſo that the Northern Provinces of the Maratta State, which are moſtly belonging to himſelf and Holkar, muſt be now greatly expoſed, and open to Inveſions from our upper Provinces, by the Way of Golud, and the extenſive Provinces of Ajmeze*, the principal Rajah of which, the Marwar Rajah, is I believe by no Means well diſpoſed to the Intereſts of Scindia: I have no poſitive Proof of this being the Caſe, having had no Correſpondence or other Communication with him whatever ſince my Arrival on this Side of India, but it is a Circumſtance generally believed, and has its Foundation in former Diſputes, and I mention it to you, among other Incidents, to give you an Opportunity of judging how far it may be practicable, *as it would certainly be of Advantage to the Operations of the War on this Side, to cauſe a powerful Diverſion to be made on the other; which would not fail to diſtreſs and divide their Attention exceedingly.*

Having no Object to induce me to penetrate into Malva, but on the contrary, riſking the moſt material Intereſts of the Company, by leaving the Province of Guzerat, and the Sea Coaſt, to the Inroads either of an European or Indian Enemy, I can only at preſent watch the Motions of Scindia to prevent him from over-running or deſtroying the Country; and if poſſible, ſeize ſome favourable Opportunity of attacking him, which as it is his only Care to avoid, I ſhall find ſome Difficulty to effect.

A true Extract.

(Signed) Wm Tierney,
Sec^y to the Commander in Chief."

In Compliance with the Rule preſcribed by Mr. Francis, I have been careful to annex the Dates to the preceding Extracts; and for greater Preciſion will repeat them, with the Facts ſtated in the Order in which they happened.

General Goddard's Letter to Sir Eyre Coote is dated the 28th March, and was recorded in our Conſultation of the 29th May. My Minute, which contained the Firſt Propoſiton of the Expedition, was dated the 12th June.

Mr. Francis will now permit me to quote his Words for their Application to the Cloſe of this Argument: "On this Principle I join Iſſue with the Governor General, and affirm in his own "Terms, that *when he propoſed the Execution of the Meaſure*, (that is on the 12th June laſt) *General "Goddard had not ſolicited us to make ſuch a Diverſion in his Favour.* The Fact, if it exiſts, is capable "of immediate and direct Proof."

The preceding Extracts are an immediate and direct Proof of the Fact.

I do not anſwer the Remainder of Mr. Francis's Minute, becauſe it proves nothing but that my Opinion of the Meaſures neceſſary to be purſued for the Proſecution of the Maratta War, varied according to the Variations and Contingencies of the War; which I admit; ſtill inſiſting, in the Words of my laſt Minute, that this is not material either to the Engagement which I affirm Mr. Francis did conclude with me, or to the Agreement which he ſays he meant to enter into, ſince the Proſecution of the War againſt the Marattas was the general Object of both, and the Means of courſe included in it.

APPENDIX, N° 289.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 21ſt Auguſt 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Edward Wheler, Eſquire.
Mr. Francis indiſpoſed.

READ the following Letter from Captain Popham:

Gentlemen,

Since I had the Honour to addreſs you of the 8th ultimo, I have been endeavouring by Purſuit to oblige the Enemy to quit the Rana's Country. They have learnt Vigilance to ſecure themſelves from

from Surprizes by Night, and the Diſtance they keep from us have excluded every Poſſibility of Attack by Day; however, as we advance their Forts ſurrender to the Ranah, and probably from their Terror and Alarm they will ſoon retreat, for the Rainy Seaſon, to ſome diſtant Place of Security.

I have received from the Adjutant General, a Copy of the Board's Reſolutions for the Relief of the Detachment, and ſhall accordingly prepare for that Event, by uſing every Means in my Power to prevent ſo extraordinary a Change in the Face of an Enemy, from hurting the public Service. With a Hope that it may not be deemed a Deviation from the high Reſpects in which I hold the Pleaſure of the Board, permit me to remark, that nothing could equal my Aſtoniſhment at this Meaſure, but the Regret and Diſappointment I profeſſionally feel in being withdrawn from the Campaign immediately after receiving moſt honourable Marks of your Approbation. Such Proofs of your perfect Satisfaction, Gentlemen, that myſelf, my Officers, and indeed the whole Army, could not but conſider as Omens of your Intentions to employ us in the Proſecution of a Service we had ſucceſsfully began. But as my Conduct has not been deemed unworthy of your good Opinion, I ſhall ſtill retain Hopes of my Services being demanded on ſome future active Occaſion, and exerted to a happier Iſſue.

I have the Honour to be, &c.

(Signed) W. Popham.

Camp, Rhalnut,
4th July, 1780.

Letter from Captain William Popham to the Governor General and Council; in General Letter 26th Auguſt 1780.

To the Honourable Warren Haſtings, Eſquire, Governor General, and Council.

Gentlemen,

I Yeſterday had the Pleaſure of congratulating you on the Capture of Gwalior by the Detachment under my Command. Excluſive that it is my Duty to ſubmit my Conduct in every Reſpect to the Judgment of Adminiſtration, I flatter myſelf that a Detail of the Diſpoſition of ſo fortunate and honorary an Enterprize will be both pleaſing and ſatisfactory.

This Place, Gentlemen, having been pronounced, and with Juſtice, by the Princes of Hindoſtan, as far as their Knowledge in Military Matters extended, to be impregnable, and being ſo ſituated as to render an Examination of it which could be abſolutely relied on, a Service of Danger and Uncertainty, I have for a long Time balanced in my Mind the moſt eligible Mode of Attack. In order to gain this Information, after ſecuring the new Conqueſt of the Cutchwagaar Diſtrict, I marched to Ripore, a Village about Five Coſs diſtant from Gwalior. My Spies were then continually employed in ſearching for a Part of it fit for Eſcalading. After many and dangerous Trials they at length brought me Advice that one Part only bore the Appearance of Practicability: Their Deſcription of it reduced my Hopes to a Poſſibility of Succeſs. The Fort is nearly Three Coſs in Extent, built on an exceeding high Rock, ſcarped for the moſt Part all round, and garriſoned by a Thouſand Men. The Part that the Guides propoſed our Aſcent by, was where the Scarp was about Sixteen Feet high; from hence to the Wall a ſteep Aſcent of about Forty Yards; and the Wall to be Eſcaladed, about Thirty Feet in Heighth. I took the Reſolution immediately. The Object was glorious, and I made a Diſpoſition to prevent as much as in my Power, in caſe of a Repulſe, that the Loſs we ſhould ſuſtain might not tarniſh the Honour of the Attempt.

I formed the Detachment for the Service, without any Aſſiſtance from our Ally.

On the 3d at Midnight, Lieutenant Cameron, the Field Engineer, having prepared Ladders and every other Requiſite for ſcaling, with great Diſpatch and Secrecy, I ordered the Party for the Attack to be formed. Captain Bruce, whoſe Abilities are well known to you, at the Head of Two Companies of Grenadiers and Light Infantry, commanded by Lieutenants Wilſon, Archibald Scott, Allen, and Patterſon, led the Van of the Party. They were followed by myſelf, with Twenty Europeans under Lieutenant Legortwood, and Two Battalions of Sepoys, under the Command of Lieutenants Ford and Hamilton; Captain Maclary with his Battalion, Two Guns, and the Cavalry, received Orders to march at Two, in order to cover our Retreat in caſe of a premature Diſcovery; or, in the Event of Succeſs, to prevent Ambajee, with his Troops, from eſcaping. The Camp was left ſtanding, under Charge of Captains Mayaffre and Clode, with a Battalion.

At Break of Day the Van arrived at the Foot of the ſcarped Rock, where Wooden Ladders were immediately placed, and the Troops aſcended to the Wall, when the Spies climbed up and fixed the Rope Ladders; the Sepoys then mounted with amazing Activity: The Guards on the Alarm aſſembled to the Plain in order to diſlodge the Aſſailants, but our Fire ſoon repulſed them with great Loſs, and the Detachment pouring in very faſt, we puſhed on to the Body of the Place. The greateſt Part of the Garriſon had however taken Advantage of the Time employed in forming the Troops, and quitted the Fort with Precipitation. The Conqueſt was now complete; at Sun-riſe, or a little after, we were Maſters of the ſtrongeſt Hold in India. Many Priſoners, and ſome of Note, ſuch as Peer Khaun Keladar, and ſome particular Friends of Babajee, are fallen into our Hands. The latter was mortally wounded in the Attack, and killed himſelf with a Dagger in going out of the Fort.

I cannot conclude, Gentlemen, without again recommending to your Notice the tried Conduct and Valour of the Officers and Men under my Command, which has ſhone conſpicuouſly on this Occaſion.

I have the Honour to be,
with the greateſt Reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
and very humble Servant,
(Signed) William Popham.

Gwalior,
5th Auguſt, 1780.

Atteſted to be a true Copy.
E. Hay, Secretary.

Bengal Secret Perſian Correſpondence.

From the Rana of Gohud: Received 5th September 1780.

Yeſterday the 2d of Shabaun, by the Aſſiſtance and Bleſſing of God, the Fort of Gwalior was conquered. I was confident from your former Favours that all my Wiſhes would be brought to a happy Iſſue; and from the Beginning of my Life to this Time this was my moſt ardent Deſire, that by ſome Means I might be reſtored to my Habitation, and thus gain additional Honour in the Sight of my Cotemporaries; and accordingly I am now in peaceable Poſſeſſion of my Houſe, and have ſucceeded in my Wiſhes. What can I now return you equal to this Favour, except my Life? This Debt will remain for my lateſt Poſterity and Deſcendants to pay.

As I had no Confidence in my Army, on account of their being lately raiſed, and as I knew Secrecy and Caution to be neceſſary, I therefore had delayed ſending them; but upon the Receipt of your Orders to Toffuzzit Hoſſein Khan, directing him to give me Satisfaction that this Place will not be retained by the Sirkar, on that ſame Day I receive complete Satisfaction that you had in Conſideration of my Attachment entered into a Treaty with me, and had made known your friendly Intentions to Meer Muzhir Ally Khan; and I knew that my Dignity would increaſe daily, and that I ſhould be exalted in Power. Agreeable to your Orders, keeping this a Secret from even my Relations, I ſent to Captain Popham thoſe People in my Service who were acquainted with the Fort of Gwalior, that they might procure an eaſy Entrance for the Gentlemen into the Fort. Captain Popham ordered theſe Men to take ſome of his People with them, and ſhew them the Fort. That ſame Night they accordingly took Two Hircarrahs of the Sirkar with them, and went near the Fort, and at their Return gave great Satisfaction to the Captain, telling him that they would affix Ladders to the Fort and ſlay any of the Chokidars who might be awake and on Duty. Captain Popham having approved, I ſent all the Rope Ladders which were in Readineſs, and I and my People by the Bleſſing of God executed every thing which we had promiſed, and conducted the Captain ſafely into the Fort by the upper Road, and the Fort was thus taken. In all Five of the Enemies were killed, and Two of my People were wounded; they arrived at the Fort Two Gurries before Midnight. I have been making great Rejoicings that the Engliſh have beſtowed on me a Houſe, and deſign entering it in a Day or Two.

All the Rajahs of Hindoſtan are now convinced of your Favour to me, from your having reſtored to the right Owner his Right, after Thirty Years Diſpoſſeſſion. I will leave my People there, and proſecute the War till not One Man is left on this Side of the Nurbudda. I have now nothing left to hope for, my Country will now be cultivated. All the Rajahs now direct their Hopes towards you, and are in Readineſs at all Times. I ſhall remain fixed in my Attachment, and have forgot the Diſtreſſes and Anxieties which I before ſuffered, and which your Favour has now removed.

APPENDIX, N° 290.

Copy of the General Letter from Bengal, 26th Auguſt 1780, to Court of Directors, incloſing Copy of a Letter from Captain Popham to Governor General and Council.

To the Honourable the Court of Directors for Affairs of the Honourable United Company of Merchants of England trading to the Eaſt Indies.

Honourable Sirs,

THE Departure of a Daniſh Ship from hence to Europe, at this Time, affords us an Opportunity of informing you of the Capture of the important Fortreſs of Gwalior, poſſeſſed by the Marattas in the Country of our Ally the Rhana of Ghode. It was taken by Eſcalade on the 4th of this Month.

Month, by a Detachment of the Company's Troops under the Command of Captain William Popham. For Particulars relative to this Event, we beg Leave to refer you to the incloſed Copy of a Letter written to us by Captain Popham, under Date the 5th Inſtant, and think it neceſſary to add only, on the general Occaſion of it, that it has compleated the Expulſion of the Marattas from the Territories of our Ally, who before had ſuffered in a ſevere Degree by the Ravages they were committing, and to whom it had been ſome Loſs of Credit that the Marattas, his conſtant Enemies, ſhould be poſſeſſed of the principal Fort in the Heart of his Dominions.

We have the ſincereſt Pleaſure in tranſmitting you Intelligence of a Capture ſo favourable to the Intereſts of the Company, and ſo diſtinguiſhing to the Honour of their Arms; and we doubt not that the ſpirited and well-judged Conduct of Captain Popham, and Gallantry of the Officers and Men under his Command, will appear to you, as they do to us, deſerving of the higheſt Commendation. We have reſolved for the preſent, that the Fort of Gwalior ſhould remain in the Poſſeſſion of our Troops, as during the Continuance of the War in which we are engaged with the Maratta State, the Safety of the Acquiſition might be hazarded if it were left to be protected by the Rana's.

We have the Honour to be,
Honourable Sirs,
Your moſt faithful,
humble Servants,
Warren Haſtings,

Fort William,
the 26th Auguſt, 1780.

Edw[d] Wheler,
Eyre Coote.

APPENDIX, N° 291.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 9th October 1780.

READ the following Letter from Major Popham:

Gentlemen,

I have the Honour to acknowledge the Receipt of your Letter of the 24th ultimo. It is always Matter of the higheſt Satisfaction to me to find my Conduct honoured with the Approbation of Government; but the Teſtimony you have now given of your good Opinion, cannot fail of inſpiring the Breaſt of every Individual of the Detachment with the deepeſt Senſe of Gratitude and Reſpect, the moſt dutiful Aſſurances of which, we truſt, will not be unacceptable to you Gentlemen.

Your having thought proper to retain this Fortreſs as a Britiſh Poſt, it becomes a Part of my Duty to point out that the great Extent of the Fortifications, and of the Shiher Punnah, under its immediate Protection, require at leaſt a Garriſon of 50 or 60 European Artillery, a Battalion of Laſcars, and Seventeen or Eighteen hundred Sepoys, merely for the Duty of the Works without a Capacity of detaching a Man on any Occaſion.

The various Uſes to which the Fort may be applied, particularly in the preſent War, will however recompence amply for this, or even a greater Expence; and you may be perſuaded, I will neglect no Means of convincing our Ally of the Attention of Government to his Security, in this your Reſolution; and I make no Doubt he will coincide with the Wiſdom of a Meaſure which covers his Dominions from Invaſion, and inveſts him with the tranquil Poſſeſſion of the Fruits of our late fortunate Campaign.

I have the Honour to be,
(Signed) W[m]. Popham.

Gwalior,
12th September 1780.

Perſian Correſpondence, 1780.

To the Ranna of Gohud: Written 7th September 1780.

I received your Letter, informing me of the taking of Gwalior by Captain Popham, with the Aſſiſtance of your Troops; and this Intelligence gave me the greater Pleaſure, as from your long Silence on that Subject I began to fear that ſome Delays had ariſen in the Execution of a Plan, when the preſent Situation of Affairs required the greateſt Expedition. The Conqueſt of this Fort being an Object on which I had long fixed my Wiſhes, the Delays which ſeemed to have happened gave me ſome Apprehenſions that you might have conceived Doubts and Suſpicions reſpecting the future Diſpoſition of the Fort after it ſhould be taken; and I accordingly aſſured you through the

Letters of Rahmut Ulla Khan and your Vackeel, that this Government entertained no Ideas contrary to their former Promiſe on this Head.

I now find that the Conduct of Captain Popham has given you Apprehenſions of the Sincerity of our Intentions in this Point. The Caſe is this: You yourſelf are well acquainted with the Importance of this Place to us both, during the preſent War with the Marattas, and muſt be well convinced that the retaining Poſſeſſion of it is of the utmoſt Conſequence in the future Operations againſt our Enemies in that Quarter, I muſt therefore requeſt that you will ſuffer it to remain in our Poſſeſſion till the final Concluſion of the preſent War with the Marattas; declaring to you at the ſame Time, that as ſoon as Peace ſhall have taken place with them, the Fort of Gwalior ſhall be delivered up into your Hands. It is yours, it is your Right; nor have this Government any Idea of alienating it. In the mean while this Letter will remain with you as a Voucher, if any is neceſſary when it is expreſsly provided by the Treaty between us that it ſhall remain in your Poſſeſſion for ever, and that it ſhall not be given up to any other Power upon any Conditions or Terms whatever.

APPENDIX, N° 292.

Extract of Bengal Conſultations, 4th September 1780.

Extract of the Commander in Chief's Minute.

CAPTAIN Popham's well-judged and ſucceſsful Diſpoſition againſt the important Fort of Gwalior has given us a very ſtrong Poſt in that Quarter. Our poſſeſſing it is an Object of the utmoſt Conſequence during the Operations of the preſent War; and for this able-performed Service of Captain Popham's, I muſt beg Leave to recommend, what I am clear this Board will be as ready in agreeing to, as I am in propoſing; viz. That Government will confer the Rank of Major on Captain Popham, for his late Services. But though I recommend this Attention to be paid to Captain Popham's Merit, do not let it be underſtood that I have an Idea of propoſing the ſuperſeding of Two worthy Officers on his Account. I find Captain Popham the Third effective Captain on the Liſt of the Army, the Two above him are Captain Jones and Kyd; theſe I alſo recommend to be made Majors ſenior to him. The Vacancy occaſioned this laſt Week by the Deceaſe of Lieutenant Colonel Wilding, makes fair Room on the Eſtabliſhment for One of the Three above-named Captains to be made Majors, ſo that in fact there will be but One Supernumerary made to enable us on this Occaſion to come down in the Promotion to Captain Popham; and I muſt remark, that at this Time of actual Service, the Number of Field Officers on the Eſtabliſhment is very inadequate either to the Exigencies of our Detail, or to the Quota of Troops conſtituting the Bengal Army.

My Recommendations in regular Order ſtand thus; Major Alexander Hannay, the oldeſt Major on the Eſtabliſhment, I recommend to be promoted to the Rank of Lieutenant Colonel vice Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin Wilding, deceaſed.

Captain William Jones to be made a Major vice Major Hannay promoted as above; and that Captain Robert Kyd and William Popham be alſo promoted to the Rank of Majors.

Calcutta, 4th September 1780. (Signed) Eyre Coote.

Reſolved unanimouſly, That the Board do agree to make the Promotions recommended by the Commander in Chief; and that, as a laſting Teſtimony of the high Senſe which the Board entertain of the Merits and Services of Captain Popham, a Clauſe be inſerted in the Body of his Commiſſion, expreſſing, that it is granted as a Reward, and as an honourable Teſtimony of the high Senſe they entertain of his Military Services, it not being in the regular Courſe of Succeſſion.

APPENDIX, N° 293.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 11th September 1780.

READ a Letter as follows from Major Popham.

Gentlemen,

Herewith I have the Honour to tranſmit you a Return of the Ordnance, Stores, &c. taken in this Fort.

Since

Since the Conqueſt of Gwalior, the Marattas poſſeſſed of the neighbouring Country have entirely deſerted it and retired, ſome to Seronge and Belerah, others more Weſtward. They have even quitted Superee, a Part of the Narwar Rajah's Territory, but for ſome Time paſt held by them.

A ſtrong Detachment marched now into Serange might probably be a Means of bringing Scindia to propoſe advantageous Terms to our Government. That Chief is greatly alarmed and diſtreſſed at the Fall of this Place.

Gwalior,
23d Auguſt 1780.

I have the Honour, &c.
William Popham.

APPENDIX, N° 296.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, 15th May 1780.

THE Board think it proper to remark, that they are precluded from deputing another Minister at this Time to the Court of Hydrabad, for the following Conſiderations:

Firſt, That although it would be of very eſſential Advantage to poſſeſs ſuch Means of removing or preventing every Occaſion of Jealouſy or Diſſatisfaction in the Mind of the Nabob Nizam Ally Cawn, or of affording us a timely Knowledge of their Effects; yet this is not of itſelf a proper Object, nor ſuitable either to the Intereſts or Dignity of our Government to be avowed, and we can propoſe no other which might ſerve to give a ſpecious Colour to ſuch an Appointment.

Secondly, Becauſe the Idea which would be publicly ſuggeſted by it, of a confidential Connection with that Government, might tend to alienate from us that of Berar, which by a natural Oppoſition of Intereſts, is and ever muſt continue in a State of Variance with it, either open or concealed; and thus it might prove the Means of forcing the Government of Berar to the Side of our Enemies, at a Time in which it poſſibly is wavering in the Choice of the Party which it may finally be compelled to eſpouſe.

APPENDIX, N° 297.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, 12th June 1780.

THE Board deeming the Reſidence of Mr. Hollond at the Court of the Nabob Nizam Ally Cawn eſſentially and indiſpenſably neceſſary;

Agreed, That a Letter be immediately written to him, confirming his Appointment of Reſident at that Court on the Part of this Government.

And as it is incumbent upon this Board to indemnify Mr. Hollond by every Means in their Power from the Effects which he has unjuſtly ſuſtained by the Reſentment of the Preſident and Council of Fort Saint George, for his Obedience to the Inſtructions tranſmitted to him in Conſequence of thoſe he had received from Fort Saint George, which were notified to this Board by that Preſidency; and becauſe the Board are of Opinion that Mr. Hollond was the Means of preventing a Breach of the Alliance ſubſiſting between the Company and the Nabob Nizam Ally Cawn;

Reſolved, that the Circumſtances of this Tranſaction be particularly related to the Court of Directors, and that it be ſtrongly recommended to them, either to reſtore Mr. Hollond to the Service and to his Standing on the Madras Eſtabliſhment, or that he be transferred with his Rank to this.

APPENDIX, N° 298.

Bengal, Secret Conſultations, 11th September 1780.

READ the following Letter from Mr. Hollond, Reſident at the Court of His Highneſs Nizam Ally Khan.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I was honoured on the 13th ultimo, with your Orders of the 12th June; and immediately made known to his Highneſs the Nizam, your Reſolution regarding the Reſtoration of the Mortazanagur Circar to his Brother Bazalut Jung. His Highneſs, on my declaring to him theſe your Intentions, expreſſed great Satisfaction; and on my mentioning your Deſire of receiving his moſt poſitive Aſſurances, that he would not ſuffer any Debarkation of Men or Stores, belonging to the French, or the Enemies of the Engliſh Nation, at the Port of Mootapillee, he very readily engaged to give every Satisfaction you might deſire on that Head; I accordingly propoſed to him to ſign a Paper Writing to that Purport; to which he gave his willing Aſſent. His Highneſs took this Occaſion to mention his Expectation of having the Collections alſo of the Mortazanagur Circar reſtored to him, and deſired to know what was your Intention regarding the Peſhcuſh and the Arrears? I told him, with reſpect to the latter, that as you had declared to him your Intention of adhering to the Treaty of 1768, in which I was aſſured you were perfectly ſincere, it would, I hoped, prevent any Uneaſineſs from any little Delay that might happen in the actual Payment of what was due; that the War now on our Hands with the Marattas, and a Poſſibility, as his Highneſs himſelf had ſuggeſted, of a Rupture between Hyder Ally and the Company, made it unadviſable at preſent to diminiſh our Treaſure; and that I hoped he would acquieſce in the Reaſonableneſs of what I now ſaid to him. That as to the Guntoor Collections, the Subject had not been mentioned to me by you, but that in any Event there muſt be conſiderable Accounts to ſettle, before it could be known whether any Thing, or what, would be due on that Head. His Highneſs, after hearing what I had urged, and after declaring his Confidence in the Aſſurances I had made him, did not think proper at that Time to preſs the Matter any further.

Upon receiving on the 23d ultimo, the Governor General's Letter to the Nizam, and my Credentials encloſed to me under Date the 26th June, by Mr. Bruere, I again waited upon his Highneſs, ſhewed the renewed Credentials, and delivered the Letter; which he ſaid contained what I had before declared to him.

Upon my informing his Highneſs of your having re-appointed me Reſident at his Court, he again expreſſed his Surprize at the Meaſure you had lately adopted, of ordering me away; and made ſome Inquiries relative to thoſe Peculiarities in our Government, that had occaſioned a Step which appeared to him ſo extraordinary; obſerving, that the Appointment of a Company's Servant to tranſact Buſineſs under your Government, ſeemed to him a ſmall Act of Authority, in Compariſon of the other more momentous Affairs, with which, as it appeared, you were entruſted; he obſerved, that he ſhould ſtill have had Reaſon to be under ſome Uncertainty, with reſpect to the Efficiency of your Authority, had it not been for the Aſſurances you had now given him, relative to the immediate Reſtoration of the Guntoor Circar, which afforded him every Reaſon to be perfectly ſatisfied on that Head.

Hydrabad,
Aug. 12th, 1780.

I am, &c.
(Signed) John Hollond.

APPENDIX, N° 299 and 300.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, 12th June 1780.

READ the following Letters from Moodajee Booſla and Dewagur Pundit.

From Moodajee Booſla: Received 2d June 1780.

Your agreeable Epiſtle (every Letter of which was filled with Friendſhip, and every Line of which informed me completely of your favourable Deſigns) by which you acquaint me, that Beneram Pundit explained fully to you all the Particulars contained in the Letter of my Minister Dewagur

Dewagur Pundit, and that you had been long anxious for that Explanation; and that when you had attentively reflected and conſidered on the Contents of the Letters, you converſed in private with Benaram Pundit on the Subject of them, and that I ſhould learn all the Particulars from his Letters, and from yours to my Miniſter; arrived in a happy Hour, and gave me inexpreſſible Pleaſure.

At the End of your Letter, you write a few Lines in your own Hand, that your final Reſolution in your Affairs is delayed till you can receive my Opinion and Advice; this has exceeded every Thing which you had written before. I have learnt all the Particulars of your private Conference from the Letter of Benaram Pundit. God be praiſed, that after Two Years I ſtill receive from you ſuch Letters as no Friends, however intimate and pure their Connection, ever before wrote. You are truly in every Inſtance a complete Friend, and write ſuch Anſwers and Reſolutions as are becoming your Friendſhip. Had a Kareta to the Purport of the preſent Letter been received while the Miniſter was ſtill at Poona, many Things might have been done. At preſent, that in conſequence of the Meaſures of the Nabob Nizam Ally Cawn Behadre, Armies are marching from all Quarters towards the Engliſh Territories, and that General Goddard is engaged in open War with Scindia, and that the Execution of all theſe Matters is delayed till a proper Seaſon, and as the Rains are now approaching, we can wait to ſee what Anſwer will be returned from the Miniſters at Poona to the Advice which I have written to them, and which I will inform you of as ſoon as received.

As all my Deſires tend to keep up the Friendſhip with you, and as you are diſtinguiſhed from among all the Engliſh for prudent Counſels, and Knowledge in all Matters, Prudence and Foreſight, Attention to Treaties, ſtrict Friendſhip, and a complete Knowledge of the Rights of old Connections, for declining all Intercourſe with oppreſſive and tyrannical Chiefs, and for attending in all Caſes to the Voice of Juſtice and Right, by the Bleſſing of God, all Affairs will be ſettled. All theſe Particulars are mentioned more fully in the Letters from my Miniſter to you, and to Beneram Pundit, from which you will learn them fully. I am hopeful that you will favour me with Letters containing the State of your Health.

From Dewagur Pundit. Received 2d June.

Your gracious Letter, which notwithſtanding the apparent Shortneſs and conciſe Manner of it, in Reality contained the beſt and moſt ſolid Advice, and the greateſt Knowledge of all Matters, and Expreſſions of the firmeſt Friendſhip and Affection for the Rajah my Maſter, and of Favour to me, with other Remarks incumbent on your Friendſhip, informing me, that Beneram Pundit being arrived in Calcutta, had ſhewn you my Letters, and had fully explained all the Contents to you; that you had had a private Converſation with the ſaid Pundit, of which I ſhould learn all the Particulars from his Letters; that I may be well aſſured that you have ſo firm a Dependance on the Friendſhip of this Quarter, that in every Matter where the Intereſt or Views of this Country are concerned, you will be guided by our Advice, notwithſtanding your own Deſigns ſhould be thus delayed; arrived in a happy Hour, and gave me great Satisfaction. On the Back of it was written in your own Hand, that I ſhould learn all Particulars from the Letters of Beneram Pundit, and the Execution of your Deſigns is delayed till you receive my Advice and Opinion. From this Writing in your own Hand, I received great Encouragement in my Duty, and the Letter of Beneram Pundit, which was doubtleſs written agreeable to your Directions, has made me acquainted with all your Deſigns and Intentions. Agreeable to the former Cuſtoms of Bengal, and the preſent firm State of our Friendſhip, notwithſtanding the hoſtile Deſigns of all Quarters, which not only prevent an Intercourſe and Correſpondence by Letters and Meſſages, but have interrupted and deſtroyed the Peace and Friendſhip which has ſubſiſted for many Years with the People of Decan, and have occaſioned many conſiderable Difficulties, which would take up much Time to enumerate, and which may eaſily be learnt by you; I have continually written in ſuch a Manner, by the Directions of the Rajah my Maſter, both in what I wrote after the Arrival of Colonel Goddard at Horſhungabad, and of Mr. Watherſtone at Naigpore, and after it was thought adviſable and proper that I ſhould go to Poona, and undertake ſecret and open Negociations with the Miniſters of Poona, on ſeveral Matters relating to the Engliſh, and in writing about the Situation of all Affairs, however inconſiderable, in adviſing you to obſerve the Rules of Peace, and to remain ſtedfaſt to your Treaties, like the Branches of a large River, of which one runs towards Calcutta, and the other to Surat; that is to ſay, that I have written in this Manner to both Sides, and this not for my own Advantage, but ſolely from my Friendſhip to the Engliſh Gentlemen, to procure the Eaſe of the People, and the final Stop to all Diſputes and Miſunderſtandings, and a peaceable Reſt to all the Countries, Towns, and Villages, in ſuch a Manner as no other Perſon can ever have written. But as no explicit Anſwer was received from any Quarter, on which a Treaty might have been founded, through the Mediation and Guarantee of the Rajah my Maſter, being remedileſs, I took Leave of the Miniſters of Poona, and returned to Naigpore, and in conſequence of the Meaſures of the Nabob Nizam ul Dowlah Behadre, who before wrote to all Quarters, to demand Troops of them, I inſtantly began aſſembling the Troops, and raiſing new Forces on the Ghaut Lakenwara, on the Banks of the River Ganges in Decan; and remained employed in that Buſineſs, for near Three Months; but my Friendſhip and good Wiſhes lead me to write the Situation of all Affairs, in a full Manner, to Beneram Pundit, in a Hindoſtany Letter, and to direct him to return from Benares to Calcutta, and explain all the Particulars to you, and procure a ſpeedy Anſwer to them, thinking that till that Time, the Troops would remain inactive and preparing their Stores, &c. But when, from the great Diſtance, your Anſwer was late before it arrived, and as the Poona Miniſters, from their Foreſight into theſe Affairs, entered into a League with

Hyder

Hyder Naig, and Scindeah and Holcar met the Engliſh Army in Guzerat, upon the repeated Calls of the Nabob Nizam-ul-Dowla, and the Meſſages of Pundit Purdhaun, it became neceſſary to march the Army from Lakenwara towards Sumelpore, which is 300 Coſs, and even more diſtant from it, and at this Time Rajah Khundajee Bhaſila has undoubtedly reached Sumelpore, and even paſſed beyond it. Accordingly, immediately upon receiving your Kareta and Letter, and learning the Contents of what you wrote in your own Hand Writing, and of the Letters of Beneram Pundit, to which you referred me, I wrote to the Miniſters of Poona whatever I thought proper and adviſable towards the confirming and ſtrengthening their friendly Intentions. Now that General Goddard and Scindeah are in the Neighbourhood of each other with their Forces and are on the Eve of Hoſtilities, we muſt wait to ſee what Overtures will come from that Quarter, after they ſhall learn the Events in that Diſtrict, upon which their whole Attention is engroſſed; I will write them to you without the leaſt Reſerve or Omiſſion. Before any Letters written in your own Hand were received here, the Activity and Diligence which I ſhewed in bringing about theſe Matters, it is needleſs to mention, and would be only vain Boaſting; but now that I have received this explicit Letter, in which from your Confidence and Faith in me you refer the Settlement of all Matters entirely to this Quarter, how is it poſſible that I can be guilty of the ſmalleſt Negligence in them? On the contrary, I will exert myſelf in them as far as my Strength and Life will go, and even further. Had this Poſtſcript in your own Hand given me this Degree of Strength and Satisfaction before, every thing would certainly have been ſettled. At preſent alſo, by the Bleſſing of God, who aſſiſts and befriends all who pay ſtrict Regard to Truth, Faith, and Engagements, every Thing will end well.

Poſtſcript.—What you write to induce the Rajah to undertake theſe Negociations to this Purport, that the Determination in your Affairs is delayed for the Counſel and Advice of this Quarter, and that it matters not whether your Deſigns are delayed by it: The Caſe is this, that this Expreſſion is as ſecret and difficult to be underſtood as it ought to be; but what I can diſcover it is neceſſary ſhould be written plainly and without Reſerve, and is as follows: That when the Rajah for theſe Two Years has been pointed at by all Perſons high and low, like a Flag or the new Moon, on Account of his Friendſhip for the Engliſh Gentlemen, and has come into the Meaſures of the Nabob Nizam-ul-Dowlah, and agreed to raiſe an Army and ſend his Son towards Bengal ſuch a Length of Way, he has taken upon himſelf the Expences of the Troops, which for the ſole Pay amount to Four Lacks of Rupees per Month, and amount in the Year to a Crore of Rupees, not ſolely from the Hopes of having them paid by the Miniſters of Poona, but from his fixed Obedience to the Family of the Rajah, and Reſolution to keep up the ancient Treaties ſubſiſting with them, from their having reſided at the ſame Place, and from the Proximity of their Territories, and their agreeing in all Matters. All the Hopes which he has of being eaſed of theſe Expences, and of gaining other Advantages, are from your Friendſhip and Alliance, and the Rights of this Quarter are firmly obſerved by you. The Rajah my Maſter has written all theſe Matters fully in anſwer to Beneram Pundit's Hindoſtanny Letter. You will conſider them to be written agreeable to my Maſter's and my Directions, and will not be diſpirited in any of your great Deſigns; but having peruſed them with the greateſt Attention, ſend a ſpeedy Anſwer to them, as I am in great Anxiety for the Arrival of it. As the Friendſhip between the Family of Boofla and your Highneſs is encreaſed to ſo great a Degree, I am hopeful that you will frequently favour me with Letters containing the State of your Quarters and the Nature of your Deſigns, and conſider me as one whoſe Hopes are in your Favour.

Second Poſtſcript.—As in the preſent Scarcity of good Men you admit of no Equal either in Courage, Spirit, Reſolution and Magnanimity, or in your Knowledge of Mankind, or in Prudence and Foreſight, or in the faithful Obſervance of Treaties and Engagements, or in the Attention to the Rights of Friendſhip, or in Skill in diſcovering what is right or wrong, conſiderable or inconſiderable in the Affairs of Government, or in the keeping ſtrict to the Rules of Care and Caution, and of Juſtice, I am therefore greatly deſirous of ſettling a ſtrict Intimacy with Pundit Purdhaun, and with his Permiſſion to repair to the Preſence by the Road of Mundella or Ballaſore, and to have an Interview with you to make you acquainted with all the Attachments and good Wiſhes which I have for you, and to draw from that Fountain of Knowledge and Prudence ſuch Counſels as may be the Means of ſettling and bringing to an Iſſue all Deſigns, and may give me Satisfaction and Eaſe of Mind in many Matters. I am hopeful that you will ſpeedily favour me with an Anſwer, granting this my Requeſt, and may the Almighty grant, that it come to paſs!

A true Copy.
(Signed) G. F. Cherry.

N° 300.

The Governor General delivers in the following Minute:

The Governor General—The Members of the Board having been furniſhed with Copies of the Letters which have been written by Modajee Boofla and his Dewan to Beneram Pundit, their Vackeel or Miniſter at this Government, containing, in a very long Detail, the Motives and Views of the Go-

vernment

vernment of Berar. Theſe I think improper to be entered on our Records, but I recommend them to the Attention of the Board in their Conſideration of the Conduct which we are to obſerve towards that Government.

From the Declaration made in theſe Letters, and from other Advices, it appears that urged by the Demands of the Adminiſtration at Poona and the Menaces of the Nabob Nizam ul Mulck, the Rajah hath levied a conſiderable Force, ſaid to conſiſt of 50,000 Horſe, oſtenſibly deſtined to co-operate with the Peſhwa, by invading Bengal and the Dominions of our Ally the Nabob of Oude. That one Diviſion of 30,000 Horſe commanded by Chimnajee Booſla, the Rajah's ſecond Son, has been accordingly diſpatched to our Frontier by the Road of Cuttack, and has been ſome Time ſince arrived in the Neighbourhood of that City, where it is propoſed that it ſhall canton during the rainy Seaſon.

The Rajah and his Dewan both profeſs the moſt ſteady Attachment to the Company, and a Reſolution to preſerve the Peace and good Underſtanding which have ſubſiſted between that Government and the Engliſh ſince the Period in which the latter firſt obtained a Share in the political Concerns of theſe Provinces.

Theſe Profeſſions have been repeated in all their Letters, and ſanctified by the moſt ſolemn Atteſtations. However ſuſpicious ſuch voluntary Proteſtations may generally appear, there can be no valid Reaſon for refuſing a certain Degree of Credit to them on the preſent Occaſion, as they are perfectly conſiſtent with what we know to be the Intereſt of the Booſla Family, and with the Conduct which it has invariably obſerved towards the Government of Bengal from the Acceſſion of Tannoojee to the preſent Time. Its natural Enemies are the Chiefs whoſe Dominions border immediately upon the Diſtricts of Berar, and lie in many Places intermixed with them; that is to ſay, the Paiſhwa, Nizam Ally Cawn, and Mhadajee Scindia. The Company cannot be regarded in the ſame Light, becauſe the Line of Country which joins their Poſſeſſions to Berar is ſo wild and uncultivated that no Cauſe of Competition can ariſe reſpecting it, and the Territories of each in thoſe Parts yield little Advantage to the Proprietors. The Claim of the Berar Government to the Chout of theſe Provinces is ſo antiquated that though it might be revived as a Pretext, it could never operate as an Inducement to invade them, on any other Principles than thoſe which are the Grounds of original Conqueſts; nor could ſuch an Enterprize be formed without great and certain Hazards, a Length of Hoſtilities, and a proportionate Expence (to which the Reſources of Berar are inadequate) and the Expoſure of its own internal Poſſeſſions to the Ambition and Rapacity of its Neighbours.

The Habits of a long Intercourſe of Friendſhip, and the Benefits which are mutually and equally derived by both Governments from a Continuance of the ſame Degree of Union, may likewiſe be aſſumed as Arguments of the favourable Diſpoſition of that Government towards this, even under the preſent Appearances. Yet the contrary, notwithſtanding the ſtrong Grounds which appear for this Concluſion, may be the Caſe; and even with the beſt Intentions, the Steps through which the Berar Government, in the Accommodation of an oſtenſible Plan to its own ſecret Wiſhes, may be inſenſibly led, may terminate in Hoſtilities againſt us.

From the Whole of this Review it appears to be the proper Policy of this Government to conſider and treat that of Berar in the Character which it profeſſes, but to guard againſt the Poſſibility of its becoming hoſtile to us.

This Policy at the ſame Time fortunately coincides with the preſent Views of that Government, and may be made to promote them. The Rajah and his Miniſter have from the Beginning expreſſed the ſtrongeſt Deſire to become the Mediators of Peace between us and the Marattas; and this Deſire is more ſtrenuouſly urged in their laſt than in any of their former Letters, which may be accounted for on good Grounds, for it is certainly their Intereſt to be the Inſtruments of bringing the War to a Termination, by Means which muſt enhance their Conſequence, and relieve them from certain Difficulties and Expence. The Rajah informs us that he has written to the Peſhwa and offered his Interceſſion to accommodate Matters with us, confiding in the Aſſurances given him by this Government, of its Willingneſs to agree to Peace through his Mediation, and to his Guarantee for the Maintenance of it; and has propoſed that his Dewan ſhall come to Ballaſore or Benares with Credentials and full Powers from the Peſhwa to negociate and conclude a Treaty of Peace: Let us avail ourſelves of this favourable Diſpoſition; let his Mediation be accepted, and his Dewan invited to come for that Purpoſe to Calcutta. I am firmly of Opinion, that Peace can only be accompliſhed by this or ſome other Mode that ſhall put the Negociations for it within the Reach and immediate Controul of this Government. The Seat of War is not the Soil adapted by Nature for the Growth of Peace; yet while every Means are employed to promote this End, we muſt not ſlacken in thoſe which may give us an Advantage in the War, if our Hopes of a ſpeedy Termination of it ſhould be fruſtrated: On the contrary, this Seaſon and theſe Hopes require a redoubled Exertion on our Part in the Proſecution of the War, as a neceſſary Concurrence with the Meaſures which we may take for the Concluſion of it. For this Reaſon I recommend that the Order lately paſſed for the Reduction of Captain Popham's Detachment be ſuſpended; that the Sepoys of the Detachment be immediately formed into Three regular Battalions, and added to the Detachment allotted to Major Camac. Let it be given in Inſtructions to Major Camac, if he ſhall find it practicable, to march this Detachment, in Conjunction with the Forces which the Rana by his Treaty will be obliged in ſuch a Caſe to furniſh, directly to Oogein, the Capital of the Territory, dependant upon Mhadjee Scindia. This cannot fail to divert him from the War in Guzerat; and by bringing it home to his own Intereſts, which have hitherto been wholly exempted from it, induce him to be an equal Solicitor for Peace, to which at this Time he appears to be the only Impediment. In effect, all Advices confirm the Information contained in the Berar Let-

ters of the Oppoſition of Scindia's Wiſhes to thoſe of the Miniſter in this particular Inſtance: The only Obſtacle to this Deſign is the Force which the Maratta Government actually poſſeſſes in Calpee and Bundelcund. A diſcretionary Power ſhould be given to Major Camac to remove this by any Means, either by Negociation or Force, which he ſhall judge neceſſary, and which ſhall not be likely to detain him from his main Object. From all the Intelligence which has been lately received from that Quarter, this appears to be no difficult Work, as the Maratta Power in that Country is not in itſelf very conſiderable, and thoſe who poſſeſs it are diſaffected to the Government on which they depend. The Purpoſe of undertaking this Expedition and its Motives may be communicated to Moodajee Booſla; he cannot diſapprove it, nor is it likely to give ſuch Offence to the Miniſter of Poona (whoſe Jealouſy of Madajee Scindia is well known) as to excite in his Mind any new Objection to a Pacification.

APPENDIX, N° 301.

Letter from Dewagur Pundit; received 13th September 1780.

YOUR Letter dated the 1ſt Rejeb, containing an explicit Explanation of your Sentiments and your Wiſhes reſpecting Peace, &c. Friendſhip with Pundit Purdhaun and his Miniſters; that you had always been inclined to Peace, but you could not think of entering into one upon the Faith of a mere Piece of Paper, unleſs ſtrengthened by ſome ſtrong and binding Tye; that now conſidering the well-known Attachment to Faith, Adherence to Engagements, and ſteady Friendſhip which have always diſtinguiſhed the Bhoſila Family, and have been tried for Twenty Years by your Government, you have placed the moſt implicit Confidence on the Guarantee of the Maha Rajah; that you did not enter into the preſent War from your own Wiſh, but that the Failure of an Expedition from Bombay without your Knowledge, which brought the Honour of the Engliſh and their Safety into Danger, made it neceſſary for you to ſend General Goddard to their Aſſiſtance, for the ſupporting of your Dignity and the ſecuring your Poſſeſſions; that as by the Favour of God the General's Expedition had ſucceeded, you can accede to the bringing about an Accommodation between the Poona Miniſters and the Engliſh Company through my Mediation, on ſuch Terms as may be for the Honour and Intereſt of the Company. That on this Head you need not ſay any thing, but that as the Maha Rajah had made a voluntary Offer of his Mediation, his Juſtice and Friendſhip will prevent him from liſtening to any Overtures which it would not become you to receive. That whenever the Maha Rajah ſhall have obtained ſatisfactory Anſwers from the Miniſters of Poona, and their Credentials to treat with you, through my Intervention, you will be happy to meet me, for the Purpoſe of making a Treaty under the Guarantee of the Maha Rajah, and that without a perſonal Communication you cannot explain yourſelf further; honoured me, by its Arrival in a happy Hour, together with a Karetah for my Maſter; and gave me great Pleaſure by its Contents, which informed me of all your Sentiments, and of all Matters without Reſerve. Theſe Particulars were likewiſe fully underſtood by the Maha Rajah my Maſter. Before this, Three Letters and Karetahs arrived addreſſed to the Maha Rajah, containing important Matters, and having this written in your own Hand, that you had given full Powers to this Quarter for theſe Negociations; and had entruſted the controlling of all Points to this Side, and would agree to every Thing, even ſhould it occaſion Loſſes to yourſelf and Advantages to this Quarter; that therefore we ſhould act in ſuch Manner as ſhould ſeem beſt to us. In conformity to this, every thing which was thought adviſable and tending to the Advantage and Proſpect of Peace, was written to the Miniſters: In anſwer to this, it was written from Poona, that this Matter was of the higheſt Importance; and that the Negociation reſpecting the former, preſent, and future Treaties, could not be undertaken upon ſo vague a Letter, till every Particular was fully diſcuſſed. It was neceſſary that we ſhould write to you all the Articles of the former Treaties, which have been forgot and broken through, and write them after we ſhould receive an explicit Anſwer from you: That as you are reſolved to abide by the Articles of the Treaties, they likewiſe have always been ſtedfaſt in this Obſervance of Treaties, and know not the ſmalleſt Advantage in War and Diſputes. In conſequence of this, knowing it to be unadviſable to commit all theſe Matters to Writing, I have diſpatched to your Quarter Bejy Ram Pundit, a Man of Confidence, an Inhabitant of Benares, and a Relation of Beneram Pundit, with Letters, and Karetahs, and Memorandums of the Articles which have been broken and omitted, which the Poona Miniſters had wrote down; and have verbally committed to the ſaid Pundit, many Particulars of our Sentiments on all Points of this Buſineſs, and the many Advantages of Friendſhip and Obſervance of Treaties, together with the Evils and Loſſes attending Diſputes and War, which he will doubtleſs, directly after his Arrival, explain to you in a full and particular Manner through the Intervention of Beneram Pundit; and I am convinced that your Juſtice and Love of Truth, together with your Prudence, Foreſight, and extenſive political Knowledge, will lead you to approve of his Repreſentations, and to give an explicit and ſatisfactory Anſwer to them.

APPENDIX, N° 301.

After the Departure of Bigy Ram Pundit, what was written in anſwer to the Letters of Beneram Pundit which you had cauſed to be written by him, and at the Beginning and Ending of which you added a few Perſian Lines, purporting, that on account of the Sickneſs of your Moonſhey, you had delayed replying to my Letters, but that you would ſoon diſpatch an Anſwer; and that in the mean while, I ſhould conſider the Hindoſtanny Letter of the Pundit as written with your Approbation, and conveying your Sentiments; will have been underſtood by you. At preſent that this Letter from you with a Karetah for the Maha Rajah has been received; although it contains your Reſolution of making Peace and Friendſhip with the Miniſters of Poona, yet Two or Three Sentences in it have given me great Reaſon to think, namely, that by the Favour of God, the Expedition of General Goddard has ſucceeded, and that you can therefore enter into a Peace upon ſuch Terms as may be for the Intereſt and Honour of the Engliſh Company; and that we will not liſten to any Overtures from the Miniſters of Poona, which it will not become you to accept of, becauſe in your former Letters, you beſtowed on this Side in your Hand Writing, the ſole and full Powers of managing theſe Negociations; and in your preſent Letter, although you ſtill keep your firm Reſolution of making Peace, yet it may be ſeen that you reſtore more in your own Hands, and diminiſh the Powers granted to this Quarter. It is however of no Conſequence, for while a Negociation of great Conſequence in which the political Affairs of the Country, the Eaſe and Security of the Inhabitants, and the Protection of the Poſſeſſions are concerned, is in Agitation, till it has been adjuſted and properly cleared up and ſettled, the Events and Conſequences of it, and the open and hidden Parts are well conſidered, and the granting Powers, and the beſtowing unlimited Authority, or the reſerving the deciding Power, we maturely weighed, and after that the Matter is determined, agreeable to what Prudence, Foreſight, and Wiſdom requires, I am in all Caſes your true Well-wiſher and ſincere Friend; and never did, nor ever ſhall, by any Doubts in this Point, forget my Faith and Promiſes, or omit to write you on all Subjects, or neglect your Intereſts and Advantages, but am firm and ſincere in my Attachment. Before this I wrote you long and frequent Letters on the Subject of Peace and Friendſhip, and procured full Powers from you to act in this Buſineſs, and I now write again, and requeſt that you will give what I write room in your Breaſt; it is as follows: When I went the Second Time to Poona, I told Nanna Purnaveeſe plainly, that he muſt not conſider the Advantages they had gained over the People of Bombay as a Victory, nor imagine the Loſs which the Chief of Bombay had ſuffered, to be a Defeat of the Engliſh; that this Matter would be of long Continuance, and the Conſequences of it would be a long War, which would cauſe the Deſtruction and Devaſtation of the Confines of both Countries; that as the Engliſh poſſeſſed ſtrong Places, ſuch as Madras, Pondicherry, Sinkacool, Rajebundy, and other ſtrong Forts in the Decan, well ſupplied with Proviſions, and Military Stores of Powder, Ball, Cannons and Muſquets, and other powerful Supplies; and beſides, that whilſt their Power and Authority extended over many Soubahs, and Countries of Hind, while their Courage and Bravery was ſo great, and their Treaſures and Reſources ſo extenſive, and while ſo many Powers were attached to them from their Hearts, it was the moſt adviſable to ſettle this Matter upon peaceable and friendly Terms. Nanna Purnaveeſe replied, That he had not ſtepped out of the Line of Peace, and faithful Obſervance of Treaties; that whatever had happened proceeded from the Chief of Bombay; that whenever he, contrary to expreſs Engagements, had taken Ragonaut Row with him, and had croſſed at Bhore Gaut, and arrived within Four Coſs of Poona, the hoſtile Beginning of the Engliſh obliged him likewiſe to riſk an open Attack, and that he accordingly did what was incumbent on him; that notwithſtanding this, he is ſtill ſtedfaſt to the Treaties, and that I might judge which Side had been guilty of Breaches in their Engagements. That they openly aſſiſt Ragonaut Row, which is expreſsly forbidden by the Treaty, and that he left it to me to judge. At that Time Letters from Nanna Purnaveeſe, containing Profeſſions of Friendſhip and Peace, and Aſſurances of his abiding by his Treaties, were ſent, together with Letters from me to General Goddard, and Perſons of Truſt were diſpatched for the Purpoſe of Negociation; and beſides this, what was proper to be written was written to Calcutta; but however, in this Matter the Will of God was done, and ſtill takes Effect. The Short of all my former Attempts is this, that from my ſpeaking the Truth, which in the Time of Victory feels bitter, Nanna Purnaveeſe would not conſider the Conſequences and future Events of what had happened. All theſe Matters, together with the whole Particulars of the Decan, with which I am better acquainted than any one elſe, I from my old and firm Friendſhip wrote to you fully; namely, the Victories of the Maratta Army in Hindoſtan, and their Conqueſts in that Country, as far as the River Sindah, on the Borders of Cabill. That although from the Revolutions of worldly Affairs, which are continually ſhifting, the private Concerns of Pundit Purdhaun Peiſhwa ſhould ſuffer from his not acknowledging the Rights of Ragonaut Row; yet that in caſe of Neceſſity, they can bring Two Lacks of Horſe into the Field, where they conſider it a Victory to be able to fly off and return again, and never to expoſe themſelves within the Reach of Cannon, but to remain watching for favourable Opportunities, by which Conduct they always effect their Views, and have been able to poſſeſs themſelves of ſo large a Tract of Country, that they poſſeſs about 300 ſtrong Forts; that they have gained over Hyder Ally to be equally united with them as the Nabob Nizam ul Dowlah; that therefore to perſiſt without Cauſe in an open War with them, was a Reſolution of ruining the Country and Poſſeſſions; that it was therefore adviſable to keep ſtedfaſt to the Treaties, and to deſiſt from aſſiſting Ragonaut Row, which was an open Breach of them, and to give me full Powers to effect a Reconciliation. Although General Goddard, conſiſtent with the Honour of the Engliſh Gentlemen, ſuffered many Difficulties during Four Months that he oppoſed the numerous Armies of Sindeah and Holcar, and never made any Shew of Friendſhip, and never

never once in his Anſwers to the Meſſages of Pundit Peiſhwa, did he ſeem inclined to effect a Peace, yet you, from your great political Knowledge and true Wiſdom, in anſwer to the Letters of this Quarter, dictated by the moſt ſincere Friendſhip and Attachment, have till this Time continued to write Letters of the higheſt Sentiments of Affection and Friendſhip, and were never from the Beginning inclined to this War; but it is certain that General Goddard's March from Hoſhungabad was abſolutely after the Defeat of the Bombay Chief, neceſſary for the Defence of the Honour of the Engliſh, and for the Security of their Poſſeſſions: For this Purpoſe, from which the greateſt Advantages are to be derived, I ſhall exert myſelf to the utmoſt of my Power, and even further, as long as I have Life; and the Maha Rajah will take care to inſure and guarantee it; but it is equally of no Effect to ſpeak the Truth to either Side; for till the Light of the Sun ſhines clear and bright, the Violence of War will never ſubſide, and till the Negociation of Approvals and Refuſals, or Denials and Aſſents in many Points, takes place between you, the Wiſhes and Concerns of both Sides cannot be effected.

Immediately on the Receipt of your Letter, I diſpatched to Poona, Jadaſeo Pundit, who was here entruſted by Pundit Peiſhwa, together with Letters, containing the Points which can be aſſented to, and thoſe which will be refuſed; and informing them that if they wiſh to make Peace, it muſt be on thoſe Terms, and that they muſt inveſt me with complete Powers, in which Caſe every Thing may be equally balanced on both Sides, and neither Scale have leſs or more Weight than the other. After his Arrival at Poona, he will explain to them every Matter, both of Conſequence and inconſiderable, and whatever can be ſettled there, immediate Intelligence ſhall be given you; by that Time Anſwers will have been received from Bejy Ram Pundit who has been ſent to your Quarter, entruſted with all our Sentiments, and in Conformity to his Letters, whatever ought to be determined ſhall take Effect.

General Goddard writes about his own Victories, and Sindeah and Holcar in their Letters talk of their Strength and Succeſſes: Which of theſe Accounts are we to ſuppoſe true, and which falſe? Wherever there is War there is Falſhood, and nothing but Loſſes and Diſadvantages are to be expected from it: In my Opinion, neither are thoſe Victories Victories, nor are thoſe Defeats Defeats. When the Roots of both Sides remain ſtill firm in their own Poſſeſſions, like the Wall of Alexander, what has been derived from theſe Victories and Defeats? The Buſineſs is with the Root not the Top. As you have in this Matter mentioned the Honour and Credit of the Engliſh, and have written that we will not liſten to any thing from the Poona Miniſters which you cannot aſſent to; Sir, the Reputation and Honour of the Engliſh Gentlemen is firmly eſtabliſhed and ſpreads every where, and General Goddard to repair the ſmall Loſs of the Bombay Chief, ſhewed the greateſt Courage, Skill and Activity in the War, and brought the Water which had left its Banks back into its Bed. There now therefore remains nothing more to be done by War, and the Honour and Courage of the Engliſh has been publiſhed to every one; and beſides the Maha Rajah, from his great Friendſhip and Affection for the Engliſh, regards their Reputation and Honour more than his own Life; and conſidering his own Honour is connected with and dependant on it, how therefore can he ever liſten to any thing which will be improper for your Aſſent? Or how can I who am loaded with your Favours and Friendſhip, ever ſuffer it? But as you have now determined upon Peace, under the Guarantee of this Quarter, it is therefore incumbent on the Guarantee to conſult the Advantage of both Sides in his Negociation, and whatever may be done by either Part contrary to the Treaties and Engagements, firſt he ought to forbid it, and afterwards reprove them for their Conduct; and when he can bring them to a perfect Agreement, then to add this Guarantee to it, and to ſecure the Duration of it. To be Security between powerful and warlike Chiefs is not in the Power of every one, but requires a Perſon of great Strength. The whole Efforts of this Quarter will be neceſſary to terminate the Negociation, you have therefore done wiſely in committing this Office of Guarantee to ſo powerful a Chief as the Maha Rajah, for by his Means every Point will be properly adjuſted. This Quarter therefore is no backward in ſpeaking and writing the Truth to either Side; but conſiders that in ſo doing Friendſhip with both Sides and their general Reputation is increaſed. In a Word, what you write reſpecting the Honour of the Engliſh, will in every Negociation be our chief Care; but this is ſtill vague, nor have you ſufficiently explained it: As it is incumbent on this Quarter, in the Character of Guarantee, to attend equally to the Honour of both Sides, it is neceſſary that you write plainly in what Points you conſider the Honour of the Engliſh concerned. Before this, in your Letters to the Miniſters of Poona, you wrote that you were ready to aſſent to every thing which was conſiſtent with the Honour of your Government, and that you would abide by the Treaty of Colonel Upton, and that the new Engagements were entered into without your Knowledge; I have therefore entruſted with Bejy Ram Pundit a Memorandum of ſuch Articles in the Treaty of the Colonel which have been broken by the Aſſiſtance afforded Ragonaut Row and by the Affair of Shaſtie, &c. This he will deliver to you, and you will, after peruſing it, perceive whether it is true or falſe. If it is true, then you muſt determine upon conforming to them, and upon extinguiſhing the Flames of Diſcord with the Water of Peace. The Negociations which will at this Time take place reſpecting the Country of Gojeraut and the Aſſignments made by Futtah Sing Guicowar, &c. for the Expences of the new-raiſed Followers and the large Sum of Money which General Goddard collected in the Plunder of the Town and Villages, a ſeparate Memorandum of them has been likewiſe given to Bejy Ram, which when you have peruſed and determined on what is to be done, you will write to me. Thus every Matter is on the Point of being ſettled, and will ſoon be adjuſted by a perfect Reconciliation under the Guarantee of the Maha Rajah, when the Friends and Enemies of both Sides will become the ſame; the greateſt Benefits will

will be derived from the Accommodation, and the Loſſes of both Sides turned into Advantages. You muſt therefore write to General Goddard whatever is adviſable, and ſend Orders to the Chief of Bombay, who has invaded the Diſtrict of Cokun, where he is daily engaged in Hoſtilities with the Army of Pundit Purdhaun, to deſiſt from theſe Proceedings, which, during a Negociation for Peace, are very improper. As ſoon as I receive your explicit Anſwer in theſe Points, and when I ſhall have informed the Poona Miniſters of it, I will then begin my Journey to your Quarter, and have the Satisfaction of an Interview with you, which has long been my moſt earneſt Wiſh, and in Perſon make known to you many Particulars and Views which cannot be committed to Writing.

As from the Diſtance between us it requires Two Months for the Coſſids to go and return, and as there are ſtill Two Months to the End of the rainy Seaſon, it is adviſable that you loſe no Time in ſending a full and explicit Anſwer.

For further Particulars I beg Leave to refer you to Beneram Pundit, to whom I have written more fully, and from whoſe Repreſentations you will have complete Information. As I am a ſincere Well-wiſher to you, and entertain no other Thoughts but thoſe of the moſt ſtedfaſt Friendſhip and Attachment to you, you will therefore conſider to have been dictated by my great Affection to you, all that I have above written, without the ſmalleſt Reſerve, and knowing that I have given you full Intelligence of every Matter, reflect on it, and determine according to Juſtice

Poſtſcript.—In Anſwer to what you from your great Friendſhip write, of the Reports of our Enemies reſpecting the Army which is arrived at Cuttack, where a ſtrict Intimacy has been effected, and all Diſtinction removed, how can any Thing be done to be pointed at by the Enemies? Set your Mind at Eaſe, I will give you timely Information of any Thing that may be determined on.

From Modajee Bhoſila; received 13th September 1780.

Your Letter of the 1ſt Regeb, to the following Purport, &c. arrived on a happy Day, namely, the 1ſt Shabaun, which ſhew with a Light, giving Increaſe to Friendſhip, and which brought me the Completion of my Wiſhes and Deſires. This Letter, after firſt giving me the ſincereſt Satisfaction, informed me of your Intentions for Peace, and your Reſolutions for the Negociations with the Poona Miniſters, in Conſequence. The happy Conjunction of thoſe Two Days, which is a moſt bleſſed Occurrence, and does very ſeldom happen, brought with it theſe lucky Events, namely, the ſettling of every Matter agreeable to my Wiſhes, and cauſed ſuch additional Verdure in the Garden of our Friendſhip, that the fragrant Odour of it has in every Breath given new Life to my Soul; God grant that it may be daily increaſed, and for ever ſupported by a more intimate and affectionate Connection. As our mutual Friendſhip is publicly known through all the Soubahs of Bengal, from our long Intercourſe of Letters, and as all the Inhabitants of Decan talk of the Friendſhip of the Engliſh for this Quarter, and from that, entertain Suſpicions of me, my Heart is therefore at all Times, and in all Situations, conſulting and wiſhing for your Intereſts and Advantage, and I continually write in the moſt unreſerved Manner every Thing which appears to me adviſable; and you likewiſe are firmly reſolved to do whatever is proper and neceſſary for the maintaining this excellent Intercourſe, as may be plainly and clearly diſcovered from the Contents of your Anſwers; and although the triplicate Karetahs lately received contain many and long Particulars with this View, yet the Short of them can be collected from the Poſtſcript, written at the Foot in your own Hand, by which you give me full Powers in theſe Negociations, and in which you write, that although the effecting and ſettling this Treaty ſhould be to your Damage, yet ſhould it be for the Advantage of this Quarter you will agree to it. When Friendſhip and Alliance ſubſiſts upon ſuch intimate Terms, and the chief and full Authority is intruſted to one Side, the Loſſes of one Side become the Loſſes of the other, and the Advantages of both Sides are the ſame. Notwithſtanding the Difficulties I have brought on myſelf, by raiſing and keeping up this new Army, the Cauſes of which are well known to you, yet all my Views in bearing them, are from your Friendſhip and Juſtice. What now appears to be the moſt adviſable Policy, is the making and maintaining Peace and Alliance between the Engliſh and Pundit Purdhaun, the Advantages and Conſequences of which I have before this written to you at large in many Letters; and before the Arrival of your laſt Letter, I ſent to Calcutta Beju Ram Pundit, with a Liſt of the Omiſſions and Breaches in the former Treaty, and in that of Colonel Upton, and doubt not but that upon his Arrival he will, through the Intervention of Beneram Pundit, explain every Particular to you; and that you from your great Prudence and Knowledge will attend to and approve of them, and will be convinced, that there is nothing in this World to compare to Friendſhip and Unity; as ſoon as this important Matter is determined between Two powerful States, the Eaſe of the People, and the Securities of the Cities and Towns is inſured, and all the Poſſeſſions of both Sides are protected from Damages; I have therefore no Doubt but that you will ſend me an explicit Anſwer, and that from your Wiſdom and Foreſight you will approve of every Thing that I ſaid to my Miniſter Dewagur Pundit, after I had fully informed myſelf of the Contents of your Letter, which the ſaid Pundit has written to you in an unreſerved Manner, and will be able to diſcover whether they were dictated by true Friendſhip, or by mere Politeneſs. As the Office of Guarantee in this important Buſineſs is committed by you to me, it is therefore incumbent on the Guarantee to write the plain and open Truth to both Sides, and to bring both with equal Weight into the Scales of Friendſhip; for where the Guarantee does not attend equally to the Intereſts of both Parties, no Point can be ſettled properly; it was therefore neceſſary for my Miniſter, to write all Matters at large, and it is equally neceſſary and adviſable, that a full, and explicit Anſwer be returned to it as ſoon as poſſible. For the well ſettling and adjuſting of all theſe Points, I have ſent to Poona

Sadaſio Pundit, a confidential Perſon, who reſided here intruſted with all the Concerns of Pundit Purdhaun; we ſhall ſee what he will be able to effect, of which immediate Information ſhall be given you. A Memorandum of all the Omiſſions and Breaches in the Articles of Colonel Upton's Treaty, has been committed to Bejy Ram Pundit, who on his Arrival will preſent it to you; and a Note of ſuch Negociations as will take place reſpecting the Talooks and Tannahs of Goſſeraut, the Affairs of the Guicwars, the Accounts of the new Troops raiſed on both Sides for this War, and the Invaſions and Devaſtations of the Bombay Chief in Cokun, where he has taken ſeveral Places, is incloſed in the Letter to Beneram Pundit, who will preſent it to you for your Peruſal and Approbation; when you will write a full and explicit Anſwer to the preſent and former Memorandums, that no Miſunderſtanding may remain, but that all Diſputes may, by the refuſing and granting of all Points, be changed into a firm and laſting Friendſhip. In all my Proceedings in this Matter, I have had no other View, but the proving my Friendſhip and Affection for you, and I conſider the Honour and Reputation of the Engliſh, the ſame as my own; but in the Caſe of a Guarantee, the Honour and Credit of the other Side is likewiſe to be attended to in the Negociations, without which, nothing can be ſettled properly; whenever theſe Points are determined by you in a ſuitable Manner, it will be highly adviſable and proper for Dewagur Pundit to go immediately to Calcutta, for the Purpoſe of preparing the Treaty, and of acquainting you with many of my Views, which are entirely and ſincerely tending to your Intereſts and Honour. As there are Two Months to the End of the Rains, the ſooner an Anſwer can be received the better; and it is neceſſary that General Goddard and the Bombay Chief receive poſitive Orders to deſiſt from the Hoſtilities they have commenced in the Diſtrict of Cokun. In ſhort, I have no View or Intention in what I have written, but the performing the Duties of Friendſhip, and the conſulting your Intereſts and Advantage; of this be well convinced. For further Particulars, I refer you to the Hindoſtanny Letter of Beneram Pundit.

Poſtſcript. The ſame as the one to Dewagur Pundit's Letter.

Tranſlation of a Letter from Dewan Dewagur Pundit to Beneram Pundit: Written the 14th Shabaun, (16th Auguſt) received the 13th September 1780.

Your Letter diſpatched the 29th Jemadiaſſanie (3d July) and received the 25th Rejib (28th July) the Contents thereof fully explaining and particularizing your Conferences with the Governor General, written by his Order, and ſigned by him, I clearly underſtand, and have communicated the State and Circumſtances of every Matter, very particularly, to Bejy Ram Doby, and ſent him to you after his Arrival; he will acquaint you with his Commiſſion. You write me, that the Indiſpoſition of the Governor's Moonſhey and the want of a Karetah, has occaſioned the Delay of the Letter to the Preſence, but that you have at length diſpatched it, ſigned in Perſian and Engliſh; nevertheleſs, the Karetah containing the Governor's Letter to the Maha Rajah, with one to me, did not arrive till Eight Days after the Receipt of yours, and there was no Letter from you with it. The Governor's Letter is very particular, and the Purport of it is, that Peace and Amity with the Peiſhwa is neceſſary; but does he expect it is to be done by a Piece of Paper? he ſays, was I fully authorized on the Part of the Peiſhwa to ſettle this Buſineſs, he ſhould be very happy, for he is well convinced I would propoſe nothing that would not be acceptable to him, and propoſe the Rajah to be the Mediator and Guarantee, and to make Peace with the Peiſhwa, but how pleaſing ſoever the Words of Engliſh Gentlemen may be, they ſhould be open and undiſguiſed. My Friend, we are continually writing an Abridgement of real Facts, under the Veil of particular Arrangements. If the Miniſters of Poona will write, and give me Leave to go to Calcutta, fully authorized to confer on the Terms of Peace, then ſhould I arrive there, and any Evaſions or Diſputes ſhould ariſe, it would be difficult for me to ſhew my Face here again. Hitherto I have ſeveral Times been Mediator between the Sirdars of the Empire, and by the Bleſſing of God, Peace has been eſtabliſhed, ſo as to ſatisfy all Parties, and as yet, thank God, I have never been reproached, nor my Name abuſed, neither have I had any Contention or Diſpute afterwards. Between the Maha Rajah and the Governor the Tree of Friendſhip and Concord flouriſhes; but in future the Root of Friendſhip and Unity might be more firmly fixed, and with Poſterity might be immoveable, and the Engliſh and the Deſcendants of the Houſe of Bhoſila might be united by Ties of Friendſhip with One Heart and One Soul. If by the Will of God the Advantages of ſuch a Friendſhip ſhould on my Arrival be clearly ſeen and underſtood, and the Governor ſhould be perfectly deſirous and fully inclined to obtain them, I would then firſt ſtrengthen the Root of our own Friendſhip, and after that thoroughly cleanſe the Mind of Pundit Purdhaun Row of Hatred and Rancour, and ſo firm the Agreement by the Oaths and Faith of each Party, and in Security thereof the Maha Rajah ſhould be Guarantee; but ſhould I ſhould arrive at Calcutta, and any evaſive and deceitful Diſcourſe ſhould ariſe, then what Advantage can there be in my taking ſo long a Journey, although I am thoroughly convinced in every reſpect that the Governor would not deviate from the main Buſineſs, nor permit me to be hereafter reproached; but becauſe the Chiefs of the Bhoſila Family are famous for keeping Faith and fulfilling Engagements, ſo that in whatever they may ſay or write there is no Deceit or Ambiguity, and it being certain that the Mind of the Governor is diſpoſed to Peace, my Name and Reputation ſhould be alſo eſtabliſhed. Therefore as the Letters of the Governor are inveloped in Myſteries, I am under Doubts and Apprehenſions. It may be I may return in Diſgrace;

Diſgrace; and at this Time whatever Reputation and Friendſhip I have acquired, ſhall I throw it to the Winds? I have for this Reaſon been thus particular, that Preliminaries being ſettled, our Conferences may not be fruitleſs, but effectual and to the Purpoſe: When I can be certain of that, my going to Calcutta will be highly fit and proper.

Firſt Preliminary. Colonel Upton having concluded a Treaty at Poona, let that be obſerved and confirmed. If the Treaty which the Bombay Gentlemen entered into after the Battle of Worgaum appears to have been forced from them, yet ſurely that with Colonel Upton was voluntary, the Bombay Gentlemen not having adhered to that, the Blame of Perfidy and Breach of Faith lies on them, and they are the Cauſe of War, which has loaded each Side with the immenſe Expence of near a Crore of Rupees. This Year General Goddard and Sindia have been fighting for Three Months; but what Advantage has either obtained? Ruin and Devaſtation has been the Conſequence to both; it is to the Gentlemen of Bombay that the Cauſe of theſe Diſputes and Contention muſt be imputed: But let what is paſt be forgot; now it is prudent and adviſable for both Sides to ſtop the Current of Diſſenſion, that the Maha Rajah being the Mediator and Guarantee, may reſtore Peace, and thereby give Eaſe to Mankind and Satisfaction to the Creator; and a firm Friendſhip and Union being eſtabliſhed, the Enemies of both Sides ſhall be confounded. I am a warm Friend to both Parties; and when I ſay this, God is Witneſs of my Sincerity. It is true General Goddard has this Year taken Ahmadabad, and by the Attack of Brodrah has brought over Futty Sing Guickwar, one of the ancient Sirdars, on the Side of the Peiſhwa, to join him; he has alſo ſubdued Guzzerat, and the Gentlemen of Bombay have taken Kolean and Two or Three other Places in the Province of Kocun. At the Time then, when Overtures for Peace may be attended to by Pundit Purdhaun and the Governor, with a ſincere View to a Reconciliation, theſe Places ſhould be given up, and reſtored to Pundit Purdhaun in the ſame Manner he before poſſeſſed them; the Chout ſhould be collected from the City of Surat as before, and whatever Jaghires belong to the Sirdars of the Preſence (Peiſhwa) or others in the Province of Guzzerat, ſhould be reſtored them, and what remains after that, ſhould be equally divided by Pundit Purdhaun and General Goddard, and One Half given to Futty Sing, and the other to Gobind Row Guickwar, that the Honours of the Guickwars may be preſerved, and the Promiſe of General Goddard fulfilled.

Second. In reſpect to Ragonaut Row, Pundit Purdhaun ſhould conform to the Stipulations made for him by Colonel Upton, and if any Doubt ſhould ariſe that they will not be adhered to, one of the principal Sirdars ſhould be Security for the Performance thereof. Let God be Witneſs, that nothing ſhall be intended contrary to the Terms of the Treaty, and let Ragonaut Row deſiſt from Perfidy.

Third. For theſe Two Years paſt the Expence of the Engliſh Army has been very great; ſo has alſo the Expence been on the other Side, of Pundit Purdhaun: Let there be no Demand on either Side for re-imburſing this Expence, but let Pundit Purdhaun and the Engliſh Gentlemen recover their heavy Expence by uniting themſelves and jointly attacking their Enemies; then whatever Countries they may conquer from the Enemy after leaving the Jaghires free, what ſhall remain let them equally divide it like Brothers, and re-imburſe themſelves. Surely both Pundit Purdhaun and the Engliſh Gentlemen will readily agree to this.

Fourth. The Governor agreeing to the Firſt Propoſition, let him write a Letter to me under the Teſtimony of his Faith; and incloſing Letters to the Gentlemen of Bombay and General Goddard to this Purport, That they ceaſe Hoſtilities becauſe of the approaching Peace and Amity which is about to take place by Means of the Maja Rajah; that Dewan Dewagur Pundit is ſent by Pundit Purdhaun to Calcutta, to eſtabliſh and confirm the Reconciliation, and that they ſtir not from the Places where they now are; then, when I ſhall arrive at Calcutta, I may with Pleaſure aſſiſt to eſtabliſh Friendſhip and Unity to the Satisfaction of both Parties; and the General, Pundit Purdhaun, and Nanna Purnaveeſe, having a friendly Meeting, may ſtrengthen the Foundation of Friendſhip, and whatſoever ſhould be determined on between the Governor and me in our Conferences, the General ſhould conform thereto.

Fifth. After I ſhall have been a Month with the Governor in Calcutta, he ſhall permit me to depart, and ſhall ſend an Engliſh Gentleman of quick Penetration and ſound Judgment with me, that when we arrive at Poona he may deliver up Ragonaut Row; according to the Terms of the Treaty with Colonel Upton and General Goddard, Pundit Purdhaun, and Nanna Purnaveeſe ſhall have a Meeting at Poona in his Preſence, and fixing their Seals to the Treaty, it ſhall be witneſſed by ſome of the Chiefs in ſuch Manner as ſhall be preſcribed, after which he may return.

Sixth. The Gentlemen of Bombay having taken in the Province of Kocun, Kolean, Belipore, Argingur, and Indergur, and having ſubdued ſome other Places, theſe ſhall be given up, but Salſette having been Six Years in the Poſſeſſion of the Engliſh Gentlemen, it would ſhow a more ſincere Deſire for Friendſhip were they to give this up alſo.

Make theſe Conditions known to the Governor General immediately, and ſend me a proper Anſwer with all Expedition.

If the Governor ſhall be inclined to agree to the Terms of the Treaty made by Colonel Upton, then let Letters confirming this Agreement be ſent under the Pledge of an Oath, that my going to Calcutta, and the Maha Rajah's being Guarantee may be effectual, but if he ſay, how can the Engliſh Gentlemen agree to theſe Conditions? it may be ſo; yet they are poſſeſſed of excellent Wiſdom, Penetration, and Foreſight, and can ſee what is beſt for the Good of Mankind; they will therefore certainly agree, and the Friendſhip and Alliance will remain firm as the Baſis of the Earth to the End of Time.

Time. There is no Deceit in this; when theſe Preliminiaries ſhall be ſettled I ſhall go to meet the Governor. My Friend, may your Health and Intereſt daily increaſe.

Though I am a Stranger in the Decan, and not the principal Miniſter in the Service of the Maha Rajah, yet at this Time it happens that I ſhould be choſen to go to Calcutta to eſtabliſh Friendſhip; this is an extraordinary Piece of Fortune. When I ſhall arrive in the Preſence of the Governor, the Army which is in Cuttack ſhall be recalled, and the Plan which is the Nabob Nizam Ally Khan's, will be laid aſide.

In the Dewan's own Hand.

The Nabob Nizam Ally Khan having ſettled the Plan of Operations, has wrote ſeveral Letters to the Pundit Peiſhwa, to Nanna Purnaveeſe, and Scindia, and they have wrote to the Raja, that according to the Plan laid down he ought to invade the Engliſh Dominions, and give no Reſpite to the Decan in making Preparations for War; and they urge this convincing Argument, that his giving a free Paſſage through his Dominions has been the Cauſe of all theſe Evils. As every one has liſtened to the Advice of the Nabob Nizam Ally Khan, it was neceſſary for us alſo to ſend an Army to Cuttack; but it is of no Conſequence, for like the Waters of the Ocean, it has not gone beyond its juſt and proper Bounds. When Peace ſhall be eſtabliſhed between the Governor and Pundit Purdhaun, this Expence to us ſhall alſo be removed: This is the true State of our Mind, and for this Reaſon we ſhow ſo much Anxiety and Unſteadineſs: We are deſirous that Peace may be eſtabliſhed between the Governor and Pundit Purdhaun, that we may be relieved from theſe Importunities; to effect this, Shadaſeo, the Pundit Peiſhwa's Vackeel, is ſent to Poona, and Bejy Ram diſpatched to Calcutta. Whatſoever we may receive from Poona you ſhall be particularly adviſed; for that it is certain there are many who will obſtruct the Accompliſhment of the Treaty and who will endeavour to prevent its taking place, but the Nabob Amaud ul Dowlah Bahadre is poſſeſſed of Foreſight; in whatſoever Manner he may be inclined to Peace, it muſt be approveable. Let it be manifeſt that I am a ſincere Friend.

From Modajee Bhoſila: Received 21ſt September 1780.

Your agreeable Letter, and the Duplicate and Triplicate of it, informing me that you had, upon the Repreſentations of Beneram Pundit, given Orders for the furniſhing the Army at Cuttack with Proviſions, and that whatever elſe they might have Occaſion for ſhall be ſupplied them and that you conſider that Army as your own, arrived in a happy Hour, and gave me the moſt ſincere Satisfaction. This Act of yours I conſider to have proceeded from the Greatneſs of your Friendſhip, and the Sincerity of your Heart; and the many Offices and Duties which have mutually taken place between us in the Progreſs of this great Concern may be conceived and comprehended in the Mind, but cannot be deſcribed in Writing; and when Friendſhip is carried to this Pitch, the Armies of both Sides become truly the ſame in the Opinion of both. It is at all Times the Duty of both Sides to conſider as the ſame their mutual Concerns, and to acquaint one another with every Particular; but at preſent that our Friendſhip and Connection is arrived at ſo intimate a Situation, how can any Thing be concealed from either Side according to the Verſes of Huzzut Jamy. Although a Hundred Coverings ſhould be laid over the Muſk, yet the Scent of it will force its Way through the Hundred Coverings. For this Reaſon I have taken upon my Shoulders, and hold aloft, the Standard of Friendſhip of you and the Engliſh Nation, and what is more, I ſtyle myſelf by the Name of Amaud ul Dowlah.

I have ſent to Poona Sadaſeo Pundit, a Perſon in the Confidence of Pundit Peiſhwa, who reſided here as his Vackeel, and have charged him with many and important Points in the Negociations for Peace with the Engliſh. I am now waiting in Expectation of his Anſwer, and will inform you of it immediately.

As from of old you had a Friendſhip and Alliance with the Family of Pundit Purdhaun, it is neceſſary that you at all Events and in all Situations keep it up with Madho Row Narrain who is the youthful Remains of that Family, and a ſingle Orphan to whom by all Religions Protection and Friendſhip is commanded. The Friendſhip, Intimacy, and Agreement in all Matters and the keeping concealed no Secrets, Sentiments, or Views of either Side, and the other friendly Offices which you have done, induced me, and ſtill induce me to conſider you and the Pundit Peiſhwa in the ſame Light.

At preſent that I have ſtiled myſelf Amaud ul Dowlah, what is left to be done? It is accordingly neceſſary for you to inform me of all Points, however inconſiderate, of your future Advantages and Diſadvantages, without the ſmalleſt Reſerve. On this Subject I have many and long Converſations with my Miniſter Dewagur Pundit, who has written them fully to Beneram Pundit, which I requeſt you will attend to.

As I have already written 6 or 7 Propoſals to you, the moſt adviſable of all is this, That a Peace ought by all Means to be eſtabliſhed with Pundit Peiſhwa, and after this has been ſettled, Dewagur Pundit ſhall be ſent to you, entruſted with many Negociations, who will in Perſon explain to you all my Sentiments, at which Time whatever ought to be determined on ſhall be done. For the preſent be convinced that I have written theſe Preliminaries for Peace and Alliance ſolely from my Regard to Friendſhip, which is at all Times firm and ſtedfaſt. Loſe no Time in anſwering theſe Points to ſet my Mind at Reſt. The future Management of every Thing depends upon your Anſwer.

Poſtſcript.—With reſpect to the Aids required for my Son, whatever Beneram Pundit ſhall repreſent to you, you will undoubtedly comply with.

From

APPENDIX, N° 301.

From Dewagur Pundit: Received 21ſt September 1780.

The Triplicate as well as Duplicate of your agreeable Letter, informing me that you had, in conſequence of the Repreſentations of Beneram Pundit, given Orders for the Army which is arrived at Cuttack to be ſupplied with Proviſions from your own Provinces, and for them to be furniſhed with every other Neceſſary that they may deſire, and that you look upon that Army to be your own, arrived in a happy Hour. The Contents of it were properly peruſed and underſtood by the Maha Rajah, and I received the ſincereſt Pleaſure and Satisfaction from the many Marks it contained of your Friendſhip. What this Quarter has to this Day done in ſupport of their Friendſhip and Alliance, and the many friendly Offices you have done them, can be conceived and comprehended in the Mind, but are not reducible to Writing. At preſent that the Inclinations and Wiſhes for Peace which before were only on One Side, are now plainly reciprocal: Thanks be given to the Almighty for it.

When General Goddard arrived at Hoſhungabad, and by the Advice and Solicitations of this Quarter remained there Two Months; when People of Truſt were ſent to ſee that he was properly ſupplied with Proviſions and all other Neceſſaries; when Two confidential Perſons of Mr. Elliott's Train came here, and Mr. Watherſtone likewiſe arrived at Naigpore, to negociate many Matters and to procure ſeveral Neceſſaries, ſuch as Bullocks to draw the Cannon, and to get Money for his Bills of Exchange; when this Quarter, notwithſtanding that the Vackeels of Pundit Peiſhwa and the Nabob Nizam Ally Khan were preſent, aſſiſted and procured the Complerion of all that Gentleman's Objects; and when in the Points and Negotiations entruſted to Mr. Elliott, which after his Deceaſe were committed to Beneram Pundit and General Goddard, Karetahs and Letters were written you with the greateſt Caution, Foreſight, and Circumſpection, which, together with a Memorandum of our Views and Sentiments, were ſent by the Way of Cuttack, under Charge of Beneram Pundit, and Letters were written to the General deſiring him by all Means to ſtay at Hoſhungabad till the Receipt of Anſwers from Calcutta, and the General paying no Regard to our Advice departed for Surat, and an Anſwer was received from Calcutta, that you had for the preſent ſuſpended your Views, but were ſtill, and would continue in all Times firm in your Friendſhip to the Maha Rajah, and that on all Occaſions of Neceſſity, Aſſiſtance ſhould be afforded when Affairs had come to this Paſs, that we had loſt one Side, and had not gained the other, that is to ſay, that from our Friendſhip and Connection with the Engliſh, we had become obnoxious to the Nabob Nizam ul Dowlah and Pundit Purdhaun, and you had given this explicit Anſwer.

As to the Delays in furniſhing Aſſiſtance, and executing Engagements and Treaties, at that Time you yourſelf well know the Difficulties we were brought into, and I ſeeing none but the Poona Miniſters inclined to the putting an End to the Hoſtilities, being remedileſs, went to Poona. In the mean while were received Accounts of the Defeat of the Bombay Army, ſo that whether I was inclined or not, I was abſolutely compelled to go to Poona; for had you written a full Anſwer to the Memorandum ſent you, and had you afforded the proper Aſſiſtance, or had not General Goddard marched towards Surat, what Occaſion ſhould I have to go to Poona? On the contrary, I ſhould in that Caſe have ſent for Major Camac, who was arrived in the Dependencies of Jetteeſſgurra. I ſhould have aſſociated to myſelf many Friends, and ſhould by their Aſſiſtance have ſettled every Thing according to your Wiſhes; ſo that the Decan People could never have attempted to oppoſe me. As the Opportunity was loſt, and the Arrow had been ſhot from the Bow, it is impoſſible to recall it, and it is equally uſeleſs to talk of it.

After my Arrival at Poona, having ſeen and made myſelf acquainted with the Changes and Revolutions of the World, and the Occurrences of Time, and keeping in View my Friendſhip for you, and alſo upon receiving Letters from you to this Purport, that you would do whatever was conſiſtent with the Honour of the Engliſh, that you were ready to abide by the Treaty of Colonel Upton, but that any Thing which had been agreed to was without your Knowledge, the Attachment and Friendſhip I ſhewed, and the good Services I did the Engliſh in my Negociations, are well known to you from my frequent Letters. The putting away the new Treaty which had been entered into by the Bombay Army after their Defeat, the beginning Negociations agreeable to your Orders reſpecting the former Treaties, the writing continually to General Goddard and to Calcutta about Peace, the ſettling conformable to his Letters a Meeting between him and the Poona Miniſters, and making Ballajee Jenardun fix his Tent without the Town for this Purpoſe, and the ſending confidential Perſons to Surat to confer with the General, all theſe Matters were entirely effected by the Exertion of my Friendſhip and Attachment. When General Goddard, after firſt writing about Peace, afterwards contradicted it, and prepared himſelf for Hoſtilities, and in Poona likewiſe all the Supplies neceſſary were in Readineſs, and Scindia and Holcar were ready with their utmoſt Expedition, and by the Propoſals and Advice of Nizam ul Dowlah the Plan of a War in the Four Quarters was determined on, and Hyder Naig likewiſe has become an intimate Ally, at that Time, on Account of our Propinquity to the Soubahs of Bengal, it was determined by the Plan of the ſaid Nabob, that this Quarter ſhould ſend an Army towards thoſe Provinces. From a Regard and Knowledge of political Matters, we agreed to this Plan, and accordingly raiſed 30,000 new Horſe, and were brought to great Diſtreſs by the Expences of them. In this Matter Two different Things were to be obſerved, one the keeping upon Terms with Pundit

Purdhaun, which nothing but his being near us, and his Country bordering upon ours, renders neceſſary, and the other the maintaining a ſtrict and intimate Connection and Friendſhip with you; for it is as difficult to ſupport an Appearance of Friendſhip with Pundit Purdhaun and the Nabob Nizam Ally Khan, and at the ſame Time to keep our Connections with you entire, as it is to unite Fire and Water. Notwithſtanding open War and Hoſtilities had commenced between General Goddard and Scindia and Holcar, and repeated Meſſages were received from Pundit Peſhwa, hurrying us to march towards Bengal, we however diſpatched the Army in ſo ſlow a Manner, that they might be able to reach Cuttack at the Commencement of the Rains, and they are now ſtationed in the Province of Oriſſa.

Bejy Ram Pundit has been diſpatched to you reſpecting the Buſineſs of Peace with the Peiſhwa, and has Charge of a Memorandum of Colonel Upton's Treaty, by which you mean to abide, that Peace and Alliance may at any rate be eſtabliſhed with Pundit Peiſhwa, and that you may put a Stop to the preſent Hoſtilities. As many and great Loſſes and Diſtreſſes have been brought on us, as by the raiſing and keeping up a new Army, in caſe Peace ſhould be made, ſomething muſt be done by Pundit Peiſhwa, ſomething by the Nabob Nizam ul Dowla, and ſomething by the Engliſh Gentlemen, to make good the Expences of them.

As at this Time a Karetah and Letters have been received to this Purport, That you before had not the ſmalleſt Intentions or Thoughts of War with Pundit Purdhaun, and have none ſtill, but that from the Defeat of the Engliſh of Bombay, Hoſtilities had been determined on for the Defence of the Honour of the Engliſh Nation and for the Protection of their Poſſeſſions; that General Goddard had been victorious; that you could not give the Faith of a Treaty and Engagement to a mere Piece of Paper till the ſtrong Ties of the Guarantee of ſome powerful Chief is added to it; that as you have the greateſt Confidence in the Bhoſila Family, and are acquainted with them for Twenty Years, you agree to any thing guaranteed by the Maha Rajah, but that we will not liſten to any Propoſals from the Poona Miniſters which are improper for you to aſſent to; that we will do every thing which is conſiſtent with the Honour of the Engliſh; that when I have received from the Poona Miniſters Powers for theſe Negociations you will be much rejoiced if I come to Calcutta for the ſettling the Baſis of a Treaty, when our Sentiments may be explained in perſonal Conference without any Wrineſs: For this Reaſon Sadaſeo Pundit, a Perſon of Truſt who reſided here on the Part of Pundit Peiſhwa, has been ſent to Poona charged with the explaining all Points, and the receiving their Aſſent or Denial on all Points of theſe Negociations, of which no Part is concealed from or unknown to me. I have no Doubt but that within this Week he has reached Poona, and has explained every thing committed to him, and will write me the Anſwer which he finds them to have reſolved upon. We ſhall ſoon ſee what they will determine, and what Anſwer they will write. As we now received your Triplicate Letter, accompanying a Karetah for the Maha Rajah, about your having given Orders for the furniſhing the Army arrived at Cuttack with Proviſions from your Dependencies, and containing many other Particulars, ſuch as conſidering that Army as your own, and as you have plainly in many Inſtances ſhewed your Knowledge of the Virtues, Courage, and great Qualities of Rajah Chumnajee Baboo, whom you from your Friendſhip and Unanimity, and for the maintaining the Rights of Alliance, were equally ready and reſolved to aſſiſt as the Maha Rajah himſelf can be; our Friendſhip is thus carried to the higheſt Pitch, and nothing further is left to be done in it: The Reputation, Honour, and Name of both Sides are now of equal Weight, and we are even Two Bodies in one Soul, and the Army arrived at Cuttack is in Reality yours. But according to that Verſe of Hafiz, How can that remain a Secret which is mentioned in the Durbar? In the ſame Manner from the coming of General Goddard to Hoſhungabad, and the unreſerved Correſpondence of Letters between us, the Friendſhip of this Quarter for the Engliſh was proclaimed among all the Inhabitants of Decan, &c. both Friends and Enemies; and your Affection for the Family of Bhoſila was publicly ſpoken of in your Council and among all your Friends and Foes, and was believed by every one. Whatever can happen from this intimate Connection will give Pleaſure to our Friends and Grief to our Enemies; but nothing can happen which may rejoice our Foes and diſtreſs our Allies. To this Reaſon, not thinking it conſiſtent with the Sincerity and Openneſs of Friendſhip to keep the Secrets and Sentiments any longer concealed in our Mind, but exalting the Standard of our Alliance with the Engliſh in the Eyes of all Decan, we told Sadaſeo Pundit, the Vackeel of Pundit Peiſhwa, every thing which was proper, and ſent him to Poona. We muſt now wait for his Anſwer; and we have through Bejy Ram Pundit ſent you a Memorandum of the Articles of Colonel Upton's Treaty, which have been omitted and broken, at the ſame Time adviſing you to give up the aſſiſting of Ragonaut Row, and to remain ſtedfaſt in the Articles of the former Treaty; and beſides this, a Paper of ſuch Articles which will now be propoſed reſpecting the Dependencies of Gojeraut, together with Karetahs and Letters, have been delivered to the ſaid Pundit, with which he has been diſpatched to your Preſence, and which when you receive, will, I doubt not, explain all Matters to you.

As we have at this Time received your Triplicate and Karetah and Letter, reſpecting the Orders you have given for furniſhing the Army arrived at Cuttack with Proviſions, and that you conſider that Army as your own, it becomes neceſſary for the Maha Rajah to remove the Covering which had been kept over the Eyes of his Friends; to make public to all Ranks of People his Sentiments and Deſigns, and even to ſtyle himſelf in Naigpore Amaud-ul-Dowlah; to exert himſelf as far as his Life and Power carry him in effecting what the Honour of the Engliſh and your Wiſhes require; to keep ſecret and concealed from you no Point, but to write and ſpeak plainly his Opinion and Advice; and on my Part it is now incumbent on me to give Proofs in all Events of the Sincerity of my Obedience and Attachment. Although many Matters have ariſen which ſeem difficult and hard, and which no one but

thoſe who are entruſted with the Secret can underſtand, yet when you ſhew ſo much Favour and Affection to Rajah Chumnajee Baboo, the Son of my Maſter, and conſider him as much as your own Life, it becomes immediately my Duty to lay before you every Thought and Idea which my Attachment and Friendſhip to you may have given Birth to. Theſe it is adviſable that you keep concealed in your Breaſt, which is the ſafe Receptacle of Secrets, and that you ſuffer no one to be acquainted with them, but thoſe who are entruſted with your other Secrets, otherwiſe it will bring great Difficulties on us. It is the abſolute Duty of all true and ſincere Well-wiſhers, in any difficult Situations to keep no Views or Opinions in any Matter concealed from their Maſter, although they plainly ſee that by diſcovering them they will bring inevitable Dangers on themſelves. This is in fact ſporting with their own Lives; but it is at the ſame Time incumbent on his Protector to exert himſelf in every Thing which may prevent the other's ſecret Offices from being diſcovered, and from his Attachment and Services being the Cauſe of his Deſtruction; to keep the Secrets made known to him as carefully as he would his own Life, to do whatever is proper to be done, or elſe to remain perfectly ſilent, and not to ſay that ſuch a one has written me this, I am accordingly employed in this Matter, and have got authentic Particulars of it, at the ſame Time ſhewing what his Friend had written him. You are ſuperiorly ſkilled in the Knowledge of all political Concerns, and from this you will, without Doubt, keep all you learn with the moſt careful Circumſpection.

APPENDIX, N° 304.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 4th September 1780.

THE Commander in Chief delivers in the following Minute:

4th September, 1780.

Sir Eyre Coote—It has never ſince my firſt entering upon Public Life fallen to my Share to deliberate on a Buſineſs of ſuch Extent and Importance as the preſent Criſis of the Company's Affairs in India. And unequal as I find myſelf to the Taſk of deviſing Means in my own Mind ſo well approved as to leave me without a Doubt of their extricating them from the more than common Difficulties in which they are at preſent involved; nevertheleſs do I find myſelf called upon equally by a Regard for the Intereſts of my Nation and my Employers to ſuggeſt ſuch Meaſures as in my Judgment appear beſt calculated to repel thoſe Evils which have already fallen upon the Company's Poſſeſſions in the Carnatic, as well as to avert, if poſſible, the further Calamities with which their Intereſts in general are threatened.

I am well aware of the very great Diſadvantages under which I ſhall here give my Opinions; I mean the Expectations entertained from this Quarter, both by the Company and the Nation, of Reſources to ratify thoſe Conditions, unavoidable on a Renewal of the Charter: But whilſt not in Poſſeſſion of theſe Reſources, and whilſt the very Spring from whence they are ſuppoſed to flow, and I truſt they may ſtill at a future Period be derived, is itſelf in Danger; I flatter myſelf I ſhall ſtand exculpated in the Eyes of my King, my Country, and my Employers, in recommending the Adoption of Meaſures, for the Security of ſo important an Object to all, however oppoſite they may be to the immediate Hopes of the Public.

In the preſent Exigency of our Affairs, with no Money in our Treaſury, excepting the War Depoſit in our new Fort, and which I have been taught to underſtand the Demands againſt us, both from the Civil and Military Eſtabliſhments, have nearly if not entirely mortgaged, added to the Knowledge we have, that our Receipts of Revenue are barely adequate to defray our preſent Diſburſements, it behoves us to conſider in what Manner the Extraordinaries attendant upon the extenſive Wars we are now engaged in are to be ſupplied.

I know of no other Mode than to endeavour to borrow Money on Bond, and at the ſmalleſt Intereſt procurable. This is a Step which indiſpenſable as it appears to be in the preſent State of our Finances, I would not heſitate to adviſe in a like critical Conjuncture of the Company's Intereſts, even allowing that there were no Calls for its immediate Diſburſement.

In all well-regulated Governments, it is a leading Maxim to act in ſuch Manner as may tend to intereſt as many of the Community as poſſible in its Welfare and Succeſs. A natural Love of the Laws and Religion by which they are governed, binds the Subject to the Intereſts of his Country; but in this, where every Action of a Native's Life is influenced by ſelfiſh Motives, and the more powerfully in Proportion to the Magnitude of the pecuniary Object, and totally devoid as they muſt be of any further Attachment to us than what ariſes from the Neceſſity of our Protection, it would appear to me, there is no more certain Method of enſuring their good Wiſhes and Support to the Cauſe of the Public, than by inducing them to place as much of their Property as poſſible under the Security of our Government. In doing this we alſo diveſt them of thoſe Means, which in Caſe of

Invaſion

Invaſion of a Foreigh Enemy, might either through Accident, or by their Free Will Contributions, be inſtrumental to our Deſtruction. The Reputation too of having a large Treaſury, would operate in the moſt favourable Manner upon the Minds of our Adherents, by the Confidence it would give them of our Superiority, at the ſame Time that it would damp the Minds of our Enemies, by the very great Diſtance at which it would place all their Hopes of Succeſs.

For the preceding Reaſons, ſo thoroughly am I convinced of its being an eligible Policy, I ſhall, juſt for the Sake of drawing a Compariſon between the Two Points, as they mutually affect the Company's Intereſts, make the following Suppoſition:

We have already got a conſiderable Sum of Money in our Treaſury, ſay Two Crores; our Situation in every other reſpect the ſame as at preſent, which every impartial Obſerver muſt allow is far from being a ſafe one; but by drawing into our Treaſury a further Sum of Two Crores of Rupees, I not only provide againſt the Evils which threaten us, but give to our Government, by attaching to its Intereſts a Number of the moſt opulent of its Subjects, a Form of Stability which nothing but the moſt unforeſeen and unexpected Accident ſhall be able to ſhake. Our Affairs render it neceſſary to ſupport this Policy for Two Years; it has not however happened in the Courſe thereof, that we have had Occaſion to ſpend even a Rupee of the borrowed Sum, which we ſhall admit was taken up at Five per Cent: Our Buſineſs is finiſhed, the Tranquillity of the Country reſtored, and we pay it back with a Premium of Twenty Lacks; a Sum which ſurely when brought againſt the great Points we had ſecured by it, will hardly be thought deſerving our Conſideration; and in the Event of our ſpending any Part of the Principal, the Argument in Favour of the Meaſure is ſtill ſtrengthened, as the Neceſſity for it more plainly appears.

The hoſtile Operations of Hyder Ally, the very great Strength of his Army, the Want of Money at Madras, are Subjects that demand our moſt ſerious Conſideration, whilſt they leave us no Alternative, but that of all others the leaſt deſirable—a War; to proſecute which, the moſt ſpeedy and vigorous Meaſures ought to be adopted.

In the Firſt Place, a Sum of Money adequate to the Emergency of the Occaſion ſhould be ſent to Madras, provided they are not able to furniſh themſelves by the Method they are now purſuing, of raiſing Money upon the Company's Bonds; and that there may be as little Delay as poſſible in furniſhing this Supply, if neceſſary, I would recommend its being taken from the War Depoſit in the new Fort, as being a Fund apparently provided for ſuch Exigencies.

The particular Manner in which our Troops on the Coaſt are diſtributed in Garriſons ſituated at a Diſtance from each other, and the Communication between them partly cut off by Hyder's Cavalry, may render it a Service of no leſs Difficulty than Danger to aſſemble an Army ſufficiently ſtrong to riſk an Engagement with the very formidable Force he is reported to have now in the Field. I feel this Circumſtance with the more ſenſible Regret and Concern, as the Diſtance from hence puts it beyond a Poſſibility to give any Aſſiſtance that could afford immediate Relief: However, in order to lighten the Burthen, and to give Spirit and Confidence to ſuch Operations as the Madras Adminiſtration from their own Diſcernment and local Obſervation may find it expedient to purſue againſt Hyder (for to their own Conduct it muſt in a great Meaſure now be left) as well as to awe the Nizam from attempting any Thing againſt the Circars, to deter Hyder from turning his Views towards theſe Northern Dominions, and to be in Readineſs to act in concert with what Force may now be in the Circars againſt the French, who, as they are at this Time expected, may attempt a Landing on that Coaſt; I ſay, for theſe moſt important Purpoſes, I would recommend a ſufficient Army being formed to the Southward; but to the good Effects of this ſalutary Meaſure I cannot help obſerving that I perceive a very powerful Obſtacle, and which I ſhould be happy to ſee removed, I mean a Maratta Army on the Confines of Cuttack, and now laying in conſiderable Force on our Borders. As they have had no Enemy to oppoſe, and as we have as yet neither made or threatened to make any Encroachments upon their Territories in that Quarter, I ſhould be glad to be informed of the Cauſe and Purpoſe of their being there, the more eſpecially, as I have been told that for upwards of Eleven Years paſt, they have never once ſhewn themſelves in thoſe Parts.

To this Query it may be anſwered, that as they have been there for ſome Months and have offered us no Harm, they are our Friends. As a Military Man, I muſt declare that the Circumſtance itſelf in the Effects it produces diſproves the Allegation. Were they invited into their preſent Situation by us, or did they come to ſuppreſs any Diſturbances that had ariſen there? If neither of theſe has been the Caſe, they muſt be an Army of Obſervation, leagued with thoſe who wiſh no Good to our Affairs, and have proved more injurious to our political Intereſts, than if they had abſolutely entered our Territories, in which Caſe we could immediately have applied the Remedy, but as they have conducted themſelves, they have by forming a Barrier on our Frontier, in the High Road of Communication with our Poſſeſſions on the Coaſt, encouraged, covered, and given Spirit and Confidence to Hyder Ally's Tranſactions in the Carnatic, whilſt they have on the other Hand ſerved as a Check, and deſtroy every favourable Effect that might have reſulted from our Operations, and ſo alarmed and intimidated our Inhabitants, that there is not a Man amongſt them of any Rank or Denomination with whom I have converſed, and I have had full Opportunity in coming down the Country to learn their Sentiments, who has not expreſſed his Fears of their coming into this Country; and in ſuch Caſe pointed out his own defenceleſs State, and the Dependance he had upon us, as holding the only Power to afford him Protection; under the Influence of theſe Apprehenſions many are preparing, and ſome I am informed are actually removing their Property and Families to Places which appear to them more ſecure: With ſuch incontrovertible Evidence of the Prejudice done to the Eaſe and Happineſs

Happineſs of our Subjects by the Continuance of this Force at Cuttack is it poſſible that I ſhould ſo totally overlook my Duty to the Public, both in my Civil and Military Capacity, as not to be anxious to diſburthen our Affairs of a Weight which may impede every Operation we wiſh to carry on, either offenſive or otherwiſe?

It is therefore my Opinion, That under whatever Authority they may be, an immediate Application ſhould be made for them to retire, as their remaining where they are diſturbs the Peace of our Provinces: This Requiſition will ſoon diſcover the Reality of their Intentions towards us: And in order that we may not ſuffer ourſelves to be further injured by Delays, a Time ſhould be ſtipulated for receiving an Anſwer; ſhould this be denied us, our own Safety and Intereſts will dictate to us how to act.

I muſt further point out the Neceſſity of covering the Province of Bahar, which now lies open and expoſed to the Incurſions even of ſmall Parties of the Enemy; for this Purpoſe I recommend the giving immediate Orders for completing our Two Regiments of Cavalry, and calling them down as ſoon as the Seaſon will admit, for its Protection.

I do not apprehend at this Time any Danger to the Vizier's Provinces, as the Troops ſtationed in thoſe Parts, when properly arranged, will, excluſive of our Cavalry, be more than ſufficient to prevent the Marattas from entering them.

It ſhould however be ſtrongly recommended to the Vizier to be attentive to the keeping up a reſpectable Body of Horſe, and the Reſident directed to urge the Neceſſity of their being regularly and punctually paid.

As theſe are the Outlines neceſſary to be firſt conſidered, I ſhall not take up the Attention of the Board further at preſent, but reſerve what I have ſtill to propoſe until the Detail of the Buſineſs ſhall be entered upon.

(Signed) Eyre Coote.

Governor General—I could not ſuffer a greater Mortification than that which I have undergone, from the Neceſſity impoſed on me of propoſing the Queſtion now before the Board, and I did intend to have contented myſelf with entering ſimply my Aſſent to it. But the Commander in Chief has ſupported it by an Argument drawn from the Wants of the People of theſe Provinces, and eſpecially their more wealthy Inhabitants, which I think deſerving a more particular Attention, as it proves not only the Propriety of opening our Treaſury for the mutual Relief of this Government and the Country itſelf, but of extending this Meaſure without any Limitation. I think it proper both to add my Concurrence in this Opinion, and to extend the Reaſoning on which it is founded to the other Conſequences which are deducible from it.

The ſlighteſt Cauſes will be ſufficient to excite a general Alarm among the People, who having no Criterion to judge of the Truth or Probability of public Rumours, and being by Nature timid, will therefore be ready to believe ſuch as portend public Danger.

The immediate Effect of ſuch Apprehenſions will be a Solicitude in every Perſon poſſeſſing Property to ſecure it by ſuch ſimple and rude Means of Concealment as Cuſtom alone has taught them, by conveying it to the Woods or Hills, or by ſhifting it from Place to Place, as their Fancies may ſuggeſt to them the Hopes of greater Safety in one than another; by depoſiting it with a heavy Tax in the foreign European Settlements; by tranſporting it altogether beyond the Bounds of the Provinces; or laſtly, by the more frequent and eaſy Expedient of burying it in the Earth. Each of theſe Means will create an irretrievable Loſs of the Current Specie, and a Stagnation of the Remainder. Both theſe Conſequences will fall heavily on the Revenue, and add to the Diſtreſſes of Government at a Time when it can leaſt bear a Failure in its Collections. To open the Public Treaſury as a Repoſitory for the Wealth of the Country, if they have a Confidence in the Government itſelf, of which my own there is Room for Doubt, may prevent the Application of ſuch dangerous Reſources, and thus not only ſecure the Attachment of the People by affording them the moſt ſubſtantial Protection: I give my Aſſent to the Queſtion.

The other Subjects of the General's Minute being of a different Nature and wholly unconnected with the Queſtion immediately before the Board, I ſhall conſider as diſtinct Queſtions.

The Firſt is, "That a Sum of Money adequate to the Emergency of the Occaſion be ſent to 'Madras, provided they are not able to furniſh themſelves by the Method they are now purſuing of 'raiſing Money upon the Company's Bonds; and that there may be as little Delay as poſſible in 'furniſhing this Supply, if neceſſary, that it be taken from the War Depoſit in the New Fort, as being 'a Fund apparently provided for ſuch Exigencies." As the Terms of the Queſtion do not require or admit of an immediate Conſideration of it, and we have already provided Two Modes of Remittance, which though not ample, will prove a ſufficient Relief to the immediate Wants of the Preſidency of Fort Saint George, I hope the General will conſent to ſuſpend the final Determination upon it until the Approach of the Period in which his Propoſal, if approved, muſt be carried into Execution. In the mean Time we may hope to be informed of the State of that Preſidency with relation to its Wants, its Reſources, its Diſpoſitions for repelling the pretended or actual Invaſion whichever it may prove, and the other diſtinct Services to which they may propoſe to apply the Sums afforded them by this Government.

Theſe Provinces, already very much exhauſted, will not bear greater Drains, nor can any Thing ſhort of extreme Neceſſity juſtify it in repeating them. It is therefore at leaſt reaſonable to expect

pect that they will furniſh us with previous Information upon the Points which I have enumerated; nay, it may ſo happen, that by the Neglect of this Precaution, we may furniſh them with the Means of employing the Company's Arms in an unnatural and deſperate Oppoſition, even to the Authority of this Government, which was appointed for their Controul, and to whoſe Protection they muſt finally owe their Exiſtence.

On this Occaſion I muſt remind the Board of the Demand which was made to them ſo long as the 12th of June laſt, for the Reſtitution of the Circar of Guntoor or Martezanagur to the Nabob Nizam Ally Cawn, and of the Repetition of that Demand in our Letter of the 24th ultimo. Their Silence will juſtify us in crediting the Reports, which though not of official Authority, have doubtleſs reached every Member of this Board, That the Forces of that Preſidency, which were ſent to take Poſſeſſion of the Circar of Mortezanagur, ſtill continue there in Defiance of our Orders, and that the Management of it had been aſſigned in Form to the Nabob of the Carnatic. Hence I draw a ſtrong Suſpicion, that they will not eaſily be induced to reſign it, and this is an additional and very powerful Inducement with me to defer the Conſideration of the preſent Queſtion until we know whether the Preſidency of Madras will yield to our Authority, or compel us to uſe the Means with which we are conſtitutionally armed for that Purpoſe to ſupport and enforce it; if ſuch ſhall be, as I truſt it will, the Reſolution of this Board.

The Second Propoſal introduced in the Minute of the Commander in Chief is, "That in order to lighten the Burthen, and to give Spirit and Confidence to ſuch Operations as the Madras Adminiſtration from their own Diſcernment and local Obſervation may find it convenient to purſue againſt Hyder, as well as to awe the Nizam from attempting any Thing againſt the Circars;" to deter Hyder from turning his Views towards theſe Northern Dominions, and to be in Readineſs to act in concert with what Force may now be in the Circars againſt the French, who, as they are at this Time expected, may attempt a Landing upon that Coaſt, a ſufficient Army be formed to the Southward." To the Proſecution of this Meaſure the Commander in Chief juſtly obſerves, there is One powerful Obſtacle in the Situation of the Forces of the Rajah of Berar; their Poſition at Cuttack being directly in the Road which our Troops muſt paſs to effect the propoſed Junction with thoſe of the Preſidency of Fort Saint George, and their Vicinity to our Borders having intimidated the People of the Country, and impreſſed them with the Dread of an Invaſion, the General is led to propoſe, that immediate Application ſhould be made for them to retire; and he ſupports his Opinion on this Point, by obſerving that ſuch a Requiſition will ſoon diſcover the Reality of their Intentions towards us. Though the Fact itſelf, ſtated without the antecedent Circumſtances which have produced it, will juſtify the Reaſonings of the Commander in Chief, I yet perſuade myſelf that when he is acquainted with all the Particulars and Gradations of it, he will not only change his Sentiments, but agree with me in Opinion that it will be better Policy in this Government to wait a ſhort Time for the Knowledge of the Intentions of the Government of Berar, than by any premature Act impel it to a decided Choice, which may prove hoſtile to us, whether its preſent Inclinations are yet fluctuating, or, as I believe them to be, determined in our Favour.

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I am pleaſed that the General has furniſhed me with this Occaſion to lay before the Board the true State of the Subject; and I requeſt I may be indulged with a patient Attention while I deliver it, which I ſhall endeavour to do in as ſuccinct a Manner as poſſible.

The Board will well remember (nor ought it to be forgotten) the ready and effectual Aſſiſtance which General Goddard's Detachment repeatedly received from the Government of Berar.

On the firſt Formation of that Corps, an Application was made to Moodajee Booſla, to permit it to paſs through a Part of his Dominions; he inſtantly and cheerfully complied, and unſolicited wrote to Colonel Leſlie, who then commanded the Detachment, inviting him to proceed, and offering him both a free Paſſage and the Means of Subſiſtence; at the ſame Time he cauſed a large Store of Grain to be provided on his Borders, where it lay Six Months waiting for his Arrival. General Goddard's Letters contain Acknowledgments of the Hoſpitality with which he was received, and treated during his long Continuance at Hoſungabad, and the liberal Manner in which Moodajee Booſla advanced the Money due on his Bills when General Goddard formed the Reſolution of marching to the Relief of Bombay, though againſt his repeated and urgent Remonſtrances. Theſe were ſpontaneous Acts and ſubſtantial Proofs of his Friendſhip; and whatever Policy may have dictated them, their Obligation on this Government is the ſame, and has acquired an increaſed Force by the Knowledge which we now poſſeſs of the Effects ſince produced by it on that Government. It has expoſed it to the Reſentment of the Poona Government, for having been inſtrumental to all the Conſequences occaſioned by the March of our Troops to the other Side of India.

May I be permitted to add, as a Proof of the Notoriety of the Diſpoſition of the Government of Berar to ours, the Facility with which Mr. Elliott obtained the Surrender of Mr. Chevalier at Cuttac, ſince nothing but a certain Knowledge of that Attachment could have induced the Naib to have conſented to an Act which on a different Suppoſition would have proved of ſo much Danger to himſelf.

What has ſince paſſed, notwithſtanding external Appearances, will fully juſtify the Belief that its Diſpoſition is ſtill the ſame.

Whatever Movements of whatever Tendency have been made, have been previouſly and confidentially communicated to this Government.

The Dewan was early diſpatched to Poona to negociate a Peace with General Goddard: In this Attempt he failed; but he communicated to me, and ſtill more largely to Beneram Pundit, his Miniſter at this Place, every Circumſtance that happened during his Stay there. It was from him

as I recollect, that I firſt heard of the Confederacy planned by the Nabob Nizam Ally Cawn, and formed in Conjunction with him, the Miniſter at Poona, Madajee Scindia, Hyder Ally, and Moodajee Booſla, againſt the Company.

He was called upon by the Miniſter, with the Command of the Pieſhwa, to furniſh his Quota of Troops for the common Cauſe, and was threatened by Nizam Ally Cawn and Madajee Scindia, that they would invade and lay waſte his Country if he refuſed. He was totally unprepared to reſiſt Two ſo formidable Enemies, having diſbanded his Troops, and reſerving only a Peace Eſtabliſhment. He was obliged therefore to temporize, conſenting to enter into the general Confederacy, but ſtill claiming the Privilege of Mediation. The Part aſſigned him was to ſend an Army during the Courſe of the laſt Seaſon to lay waſte the Provinces of Bengal. With this Requiſition he complied, but at the ſame Time informed me, that he ſhould continue ſuch Means to delay as ſhould prevent the Army from approaching our Borders till the Cloſe of the Fair Seaſon, which would be a Plea for not entering upon immediate Action; that in the mean Time he ſhould be able by the next Seaſon to raiſe ſuch an Army as would effectually eſtabliſh his own Independency, and qualify him to act according to the Dictates of his own Judgment. Theſe Declarations have been literally verified, for we have ſeen this Body of Troops ſpin out a March to Four Months, which might with Eaſe have been accompliſhed in Two, and arrive at the Place of their Deſtination at the Commencement of the Rains. Theſe though Marattas, and Part of them Pindaries or Plunderers by Profeſſion, have remained as quiet as if cantoned at their own Capital. Every Letter received from the Court of Berar is filled with the moſt ſolemn Aſſurances of actual Friendſhip, and its Reſolution to maintain it under every Circumſtance.

I now lay before the Board the Two laſt Papers of Advice which have been received from Naigpoor. The Firſt of theſe, which is a Letter from Dewagur Pundit to Beneram Pundit, mentions that Sedaſhew Pundit, the Reſident of the Peſhwa at Naigpore, a Man of high Rank and Truſt, had been diſpatched to Poona with a Repetition of the Propoſal expreſſed in the moſt peremptory Terms, that Credentials ſhould be immediately ſent to Dewagur Pundit to treat with this Government for Peace, and that the Dewan was making every Preparation to ſet out for Bengal on the Inſtant of the Arrival of an Anſwer from Poona. This being the actual State of that Government in its Relation to ours, and no Occaſion calling us to an immediate Deciſion, I hope the Board will agree with me to ſuſpend it to the Period within which we may reaſonably expect to be informed of theirs. I for my own Part am morally certain that it is the earneſt Wiſh and Ambition of the Government of Berar to become the Mediator and Guarantee of a Peace between this and the Government of Poona; and it is my firm Belief, that if it ſhall fail of this Purpoſe, and be compelled at length to take a decided Part in the War, it will rather unite with us than ſubmit to act with its natural Enemies, the Nabob Nizam Ally Cawn, Mhadajee Scindia, and the Poona State, its conſtitutional Superior.

With reſpect to any Requiſition made to the Commander of the Forces at Cuttack for their Removal, it can be of no Effect, becauſe he acts under poſitive Orders, and is perhaps as little acquainted with the real Deſtination of his Troops as are the Members of this Government. Such an Application might indeed be made to Moodajee himſelf; but this is now unneceſſary, as the next Advices muſt amount virtually to the ſame Effect as any that could be expected from it.

Letter from Dewagur Pundit to Beneram Pundit.

On the 24th Rejeb I received your Letter dated the 29th Jemadiaſſanie, together with an Arzie for the Preſence, and a Letter to the Dewan Sahib, and became acquainted with all Particulars, and made known fully every Point which you mention to my Maſter and the Dewan. What you ſaid to the Nabob Amaud ul Dowlah, reſpecting the Arrival of our victorious Army at Cuttack, was very proper and adviſable. The Dewan Sahib greatly praiſed your Conduct, and ſaid, that if the Sirkar had any People of equal Wiſdom and Attachment to what you have ſhewn in your good and prudent Management of this Matter, every Thing would be well and properly ſettled, and his Highneſs, upon hearing all theſe Particulars, expreſſed Ten Times more Regard and Favour for your Wiſdom than he had done before. All theſe you will learn from Beneram Pundit, who ſet off the Day before your Letter arrived, and who will deliver you the Khellaat and Serpaitch for the Duſſara, and receive your Thanks for it, and will be able to inform you about the Bill of Exchange for 1000 Rupees which was before ſent to Ram Bhedar Pundit at Surat. In all the Views and Intentions of this Quarter you are truſted with entire Confidence; continue therefore to exert yourſelf to the utmoſt of your Life and Strength to execute the Wiſhes and Orders of our Maſter to his Satisfaction, and be convinced that the Dewan Sahib is in every Inſtance favourable and well inclined to you. I who am your firm Friend, will write to every Thing which I ſee with my own Eyes, or which may be communicated to me either in public or private. The Army which is arrived at Cuttack was ſent there in purſuance of a Plan of the Nabob Nizam Ally Cawn, and of the Advice of the Miniſters of Pundit Purdhaun. This has been fully explained in the Karetahs written to that Quarter, and not the ſmalleſt Occurrence or particular Requiſite in the Duties of Friendſhip has been omitted. I cannot therefore conceive what could be his Intentions of telling you, that ſo large an Army was not neceſſary for the Settlement of Cuttack. Where all Diſtinction has been taken away, every Thing ſhould be the ſame to both Parties. Every Circumſtance which has happened in this Quarter, has been written to that Side, without Reſerve. The Army, after its Departure from hence, arrived at Cuttack at the Beginning of the rainy Seaſon, in Six Months. Conſider this likewiſe, that all theſe Delays were ſolely owing to the ſincere Friendſhip

ſhip entertained for the Engliſh. If the Friendſhip for the Engliſh Gentlemen, and the long Intercourſe of Letters with them, the Arrival of General Goddard at Hoſhungabad, the ſtationing of a Vackeel with them, for the providing of Proviſions, &c. the coming of Mr. Watherſtone to Naigpore, the paying from the Sirkar the Bills of Exchange of the Mahajuns, had not been known to them, it would not have been neceſſary for the Army to be levied and ſent to that Quarter, and ſuch Difficulties and Expences incurred for the Payment of the Soldiers. In an Intercourſe of Friendſhip, all theſe Difficulties and Expences are eaſily borne by firm Friends. The explaining all this to the other Quarter, is incumbent on you: Of this, you will learn all Particulars from the Hindoſtanny Letter of the Dewan Sahib, who before has written and ſtill writes with the greateſt Affection and Attachment for the Engliſh Gentlemen. On the Arrival of Bejy Ram Doboy at that Quarter, not the ſmalleſt Article of all the Views, Intentions and Dangers of this Quarter will be unknown to you, and you will then repreſent and explain to the Nabob every Thing which ſhall appear to you of Uſe and adviſable. The Proverb which you mention, by the Nabob's Orders, that whoever by the Strength of his Arms attempts to ſwim in a River, when a large Wave comes he loſes his Power of moving, and is carried away at the Pleaſure of the Waters without it being poſſible to affirm what will become of him: The Maha Raja upon hearing this Proverb ſmiled, and immediately without any previous Thinking ſaid, what the Nabob mentioned was very proper and applicable; but that, by the Bleſſing of God, the River was unable, notwithſtanding its Violence and the Fury of its Waves, to go beyond its Banks, but is always fixed in its determined Boundaries. That the Authority, Greatneſs, Power and Strength of the Gentlemen were like a River that has large Waves; but that from their great and ſtriking Virtues and their Piety and *Love of God*, they never go beyond the Boundaries fixed by their Treaties and Engagements: That if at any Time in their Intercourſe of Friendſhip, Events and Circumſtances, and the Common Revolution of Affairs, which are never fixed, any Difficulties ſhould come upon their Friends, they, like a River which ſupports upon its Water the great Weight of large Ships, take upon themſelves the Weight of them, and depoſit them ſafely on the Shore: That the Nabob has now approved of what he had ſo often written in all his Letters to that Quarter, and has in ſome of his Karetahs written Orders to that Purport, and will continue in the ſame Intention. Secondly, the Nabob has mentioned another Proverb, which you have wrote as follows, That the Governor of Bombay had undertaken a Matter without his Advice, which had rendered neceſſary every Thing which has ſince been done; but that as this Quarter is deſirous of ſeeing Peace brought, and as he is reſolved to follow the Advice of this Quarter, he will therefore make over to the Rajah the Power of Solomon's Seal. In Anſwer to this his Highneſs ſaid, That when the Nabob, from his Friendſhip and Confidence in him, entruſts him with the Power of Solomon, he himſelf muſt be like the Seal and Inſcription, as the Power of Solomon was entirely derived from the Inſcription; that when he is made Mediator and Guarantee by both Parties in the intended Peace and Reconciliation between the Engliſh Gentlemen and Pundit Purdhaun, and when he gets into his Hands written Powers from the Nabob, his Authority will then be complete; and that this Authority, from the diſtinguiſhed Character of his illuſtrious Family, will be productive of great Advantages: That he will keep Poſſeſſion of this Seal of Solomon in the Manner that is requiſite; and will, agreeable to the Repreſentations, after the Arrival of Bejy Ram Dooby, give an explicit and final Anſwer: In a Word, I have written every Thing which his Highneſs ſaid, in Anſwer to the Two Proverbs; for the reſt, I refer you to the Dewan's Letters, and you will act agreeable to them, and will write every Thing, either public or ſecret, which occurs in that Quarter. You will alſo conſider the effecting a true and perfect Reconciliation of the Maha Raja to be the moſt neceſſary of all Meaſures, and that after the Terms of the Treaty of Peace ſhall be ſettled, it will be adviſable for the Dewan to be admitted to an Interview. You will keep up a Correſpondence with Raja Chinna Baboo and Bowanny Pundit Buckſhy; and will write the State of Affairs, and your Advice and Opinion on all Matters.

Tranſlation of a Letter from Dewan Dewagur Pundit to Beneram Pundit, dated 26 of Shabaun.

On the 25th Rajib I received your Letter, dated the 27th Jemmadieaſſanie, and underſtand the Contents. I perfectly comprehend what the Nabob Amaud O'Dowlah ſaid to you, which you mention in your Letter. To this Time, Three Letters have been ſent from this Quarter, and a Fourth is now diſpatched; from them you will have learnt Particulars. What you ſaid to the Nabob Amaud O'Dowlah, reſpecting the furniſhing Proviſions, and what he told you in Anſwer, namely, that there could be no Exception againſt furniſhing Proviſions, &c. but that he could conceive what were the Views of ſo large an Army at Cuttack; that God forbid any other Intentions except friendly ones ſhould be entertained, and that of this you muſt be Security, and what you, keeping in View the Directions and Orders of our Maſter, repreſented in Anſwer; the Particulars of all theſe Matters, both what was written in your Hand for my private Information, and what was in the Letter of the Moonſhy of Bowanny Pundit, are fully underſtood by me. The Nabob Amaud O'Dowlah is ſuperiorly wiſe and foreſeeing, and knows the proper Meaſures and Advice in all Matters. You muſt explain to him that this Army has been ready ever ſince the Duſſara, and that if any hoſtile Thoughts had exiſted they would have been ſent by the Road of Mundella to Chutta Naigpore, from whence they would have paſſed into Azeemabad. But as it is now Six Years that Friendſhip has been ſtrongly cemented with the Nabob through your Mediation, God is Witneſs that I have watched and guarded it

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as I would my Honour and Poſſeſſions; of this you muſt be fully convinced. How can a powerful Friend that has been acquired be loſt? Had not our whole Deſires been fixed on Friendſhip, how could Mr. Anderſon have come to Naigpore, and Colonel Goddard to Hoſhungabad, and have remained there Three Months? Or would Mr. Watherſtone have been invited to Naigpore? Or ſhould we have ſent Jadoo Row and Sewo Sing, and have perſuaded Colonel Goddard to ſtay Three Months at Hoſhungabad? At that Time you were at Naigpore, and were an Eye Witneſs to every Thing I mention. Although it is abſurd to repeat theſe Points ſo often, yet as you have written on this Subject, I have therefore mentioned them. The Nabob ought to reflect with an Eye of Juſtice, on the Largeneſs of the Army at Cuttack, the Difficulties, Expences, and Loſſes with which it has loaded the Sirkar; let him conſider that the coming of Mr. Anderſon and Mr. Watherſtone to Naigpore, the remaining of Colonel Goddard at Hoſſungabad, the Attack and Hoſtilities begun by the Bombayers againſt Pundit Purdhaun, and raiſing Battalions here by Mr. Watherſtone, and the Negociations reſpecting theſe Battalions, and the purchaſing of all Articles which he had Occaſion for, in Naigpore; all theſe Cirumſtances, the Vackeels of the Nabob Nizam Ally Khan and Pundit wrote to their Conſtituents; you yourſelf were here at the Time, and know all this to be true, as you were an Eye Witneſs. Theſe Events were the original Cauſe of our preſent Difficulties, the Nabob Nizam Ally Khan, having fixed upon a Plan, brought into this Dilemma, promiſing to march in Perſon towards Checkacool and Rajebundery, and obliging us to go towards Bengal, while Scindia and Holcar were to have proceeded to Surat. When Nana Furneſſe and Hurry Pundit Umteah and Scindiah came from their own Habitations to Poona, to examine into this Plan, and conſult on the beſt Meaſures, from the Proof of Mr. Watherſtone's having been at Naigpore, they accuſed me of every Point, which as I above ſaid, all the Vackeels had written to their Conſtituents, and pointed at me with their Fingers; to all this I ſingly ſubmitted. In an Intercourſe of Friendſhip, ſhould ſuch Difficulties, Diſtreſſes, and Abuſe fall on a Perſon? it is of no Conſequence, the Shame of it is on the Friends. No Neglect was ever committed by this Quarter, the Diſpoſition of the Maha Raja my Maſter, and of all this Family, is fixed in obſerving their Word, and in preſerving Friendſhip, nor is he ever wanting in fulfilling any thing which he promiſes, either verbally, or by Writing, nor backward in performing his Engagements. Never was any Anceſtor of this Family accuſed of Neglect or Breach in his Promiſes; with whomever they had entered into Oaths and Engagements of Friendſhip, or had a Proſpect of effecting an Alliance, they never admitted any Thoughts different from that, as it would bring a Stain upon the lateſt Poſterity. Of this you are well informed; and although by ſending this Army we have brought a great Weight upon us, yet, by the Bleſſing of God, I am firm in my Attachment, and hope for its Increaſe. This you muſt explain in a proper and convincing Manner to the Nabob Amaud O'Dowlah, that the Maha Raja is a firm Friend, and that I conſider them both as one: Of this God is Witneſs!

The Nabob in Greatneſs and Diſtinction admits of no Second, and in Foreſight, Prudence and Wiſdom, is ſo far above all Praiſe, that in this Age no one can be found to approach him. This is my preſent moſt earneſt Wiſh, that at all Events I may once be able to ſee the Nabob with my own Eyes, and may either in Benares, Balaſore, or in Calcutta, it matters not which, be made happy by one Month's Reſidence near the Nabob, and may in Perſon effect a ſincere Reconciliation between the Nabob and Row Pundit Purdhaun, that no Interruption may ever in future happen in it; but that they may be united in their mutual Intereſts, and that having next made a Treaty on the Part of the Maha Raja, I may return. This is my earneſt Deſire. It is abſurd to repeat this ſo often; but in this there are Three conſiderable Opponents: Firſt the Nabob Nizam Ally Khan, who upon learning this will take hoſtile Reſolutions; Secondly, Scindeah, who is the moſt confidential Miniſter of Pundit Purdhaun, and in whoſe Hands at preſent all the political Affairs are lodged; ſo that the Poona Miniſters were obliged to give him Intelligence of what I informed them reſpecting my Wiſh to go to Calcutta; and Thirdly, the Weight of Expences and Difficulties from this Army. But my whole Deſire and View is, to ſecure the Peace of the People; and if between the Two Chiefs a firm Reconciliation and Alliance ſhould take place, and the People of the Two Countries acquire Eaſe and Security, how can my Diſtreſſes remain, as the Peace and Happineſs of the whole World is fixed in my Mind? The Inhabitants of it cannot remain in Difficulties, nor can Friends deſire it. After the Receipt of your Letter to Nana Furneſſe and Hurry Pundit Tupteah, for their private Information, to the following Effect; that they muſt try to perſuade the Nabob Nizam Ally Khan and Scindeah, of the Neceſſity of my going to Calcutta. I before this gave you Notice of what the Letters from Poona contained, which you will have learnt; and I have now diſpatched Bejey Ram, from whom nothing is kept ſecret; after his Departure, as ſoon as Taram Reek arrived and delivered me your Letters, knowing it to be unadviſable to delay anſwering them, I immediately wrote all Particulars, and the Moonſhy of Bowanny Pundit has wrote every Matter in Anſwer to the Letters, which you will ſoon learn.

Poſtſcript.—During Three Months, continual Hoſtilities were kept up between General Goddard and Scindia and Holkar; at laſt, when the Rainy Seaſon commenced, the General retired to Surat, and Scindia and Holkar went towards Oogein and Indore. The Gentlemen of Bombay making an Invaſion in the Diſtrict of Cokan, ſeized upon Three or Four Magazines, and took Poſſeſſion of their whole Contents, and committed divers other Devaſtations; and the Army with Sérement Pundit Purdhaun ſent into the ſame Diſtrict is employed in oppoſing them with various Succeſs. At preſent that I have written to Poona for their Approbation of my going to Calcutta,

and am myſelf deſirous of going thither, what can be thought of theſe violent Hoſtilities ſtill ſubſiſting in Cokan? The Nabob, at the Beginning, ſaid, That he did not approve of the Engagements of the Bombayers, and could not aſſent to them; What therefore can I effect? It is therefore neceſſary, that before you receive Letters from hence, adviſing you of the Poona Miniſters having aſſented to my Journey to that Quarter, you do ſo; that General Goddard and the Bombayers receive Directions to remain inactive, at that Time it will be proper for me to begin my Journey.

In the Dewan's own Hand Writing.

I have written to Poona, to Nana Furneſſe and Hurry Punt Tanteah, and for greater Security propoſe ſending to Poona Sadage's Pundit, who is equally truſted as myſelf, and reſides here as Vakeel from Pundit Purdhaun to the Maha Raja, who is truly and firmly attached to this Sirkar, and is a ſincere Friend of mine. After his Arrival I do not doubt but that I ſhall receive ſuch Letters from Poona as I could wiſh, reſpecting my Journey; as ſoon as I receive them I will, after celebrating the Duſſora, take Sadajee Pundit Dadda and my Moonſhy with me, and go by the Road of Cuttack. I expect to receive there Letters before the End of Sawan, or Middle of Bhagdom, and immediately I will prepare all the Neceſſaries for my Journey, and before I ſet off I will write to you by the Way of Benares. In that Letter I will mention that you muſt procure Orders from the Nabob Amaud O Dowlah to General Goddard and the Gentlemen of Bombay, to put a Stop to all Hoſtilities; in this you muſt exert yourſelf and bring it about. It is now Eight Months that the Army has ſuffered much from the Scarcity and Dearneſs of Proviſions, nor do the Boephanils bring enough. It is neceſſary, abſolutely neceſſary, that you repreſent this to the Nabob. If the Boephanils can be ſent to the Army of Baboo Sahib Secna Bahadar, it is a Duty of Friendſhip, and ought to be done. I am Friend to the Nabob; the *Friend*, the *Friend*; of this convince him, and give entire Satisfaction on this Point: You muſt gain me One Interview with him, as it is my moſt ſanguine Wiſh. The Nabob himſelf laſt Year expreſſed a great Deſire for an Interview; may God grant that it be happy! I am anxious for the Receipt of Letters from Poona.

Reſolved, That the Treaſury be immediately opened for Loans of Money at the eſtabliſhed Rate of Intereſt, being 5 per Cent, and that public Notice thereof be given accordingly.

Ordered, That the Sub Treaſurer do ſubjoin to his Weekly Abſtract of Treaſury, the Sum received into the Treaſury during the Courſe of the preceding Week, and the Diminution of the Depoſits during the ſame Period.

Agreed, That the other Subjects of the Commander in Chief's Minute lie for Conſideration.

Warren Haſtings,
Edw[d] Wheler.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 18th September 1780.

The Commander in Chief delivers in the following Minute in conſequence of that from the Governor General recorded on the 4th Inſtant.

Sir Eyre Coote—I agree with the Governor General in the Propriety of deferring to ſend further Supplies for the Relief of the Preſidency of Madras until the Adminiſtration there ſhall have adviſed us on thoſe Points which the Governor General has ſtated, and which are ſo very neceſſary for our Information, in order to guide us as to the Nature of the Aſſiſtance to be given them.

From the Effect which the Governor General apprehends might be produced in the Conduct of the Berar Court towards this Government by the Formation of an Army to the Southward, and in Conſideration of the further Arguments he has ſtated in Proof of Moodajee Booſla's friendly Diſpoſition towards us; and becauſe the Seaſon when our Troops can move with Facility is not yet arrived, I agree with him to ſuſpend the immediate Execution of that Meaſure, and to wait further Intelligence as to the Intentions of the Government of Berar. At the ſame Time I muſt beg Leave to recommend that every neceſſary Preparation be made for the Adoption of ſuch a Step the Moment it may be found expedient; and in ſhort, that every Precaution be taken to ſecure the Company's Poſſeſſions from any ſudden Surprize in thoſe Quarters where it is moſt to be apprehended, and which may operate to the Prejudice of the Collections. In this Particular, the Province of Bahar appears firſt to demand our Attention, as well becauſe of its being more expoſed to the Danger of an Incurſion by the Marattas, as that it is leſs protected than any of the others.

(Signed) Eyre Coote.

The Board agree with the Commander in Chief in the Sentiments expreſſed in the above Minute, and refer it to him to take ſuch Precautions, and to paſs ſuch Orders, as may be immediately neceſſary to guard againſt the Event of an Invaſion.

APPENDIX, N° 304.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 10th Auguſt 1780.

PRESENT;

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Edward Wheler, Eſquire.
Mr. Francis indiſpoſed.
Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote abſent.

The Secretary having with the Aſſiſtance of Brigadier General Stibbert, commanding Officer of the Firſt Brigade, prepared Orders and Inſtructions to the commanding Officer of the Battalion lately ordered on Duty towards the Banks of the Subenreka River, now lays them before the Board for their Approval.

Inſtructions to Captain M'Pherſon.

Sir,

Being in Command of the 3d Battalion of Sepoys and Artillery, lately ordered upon Service, you are directed to march with them from Midnapore (after the Arrival of the Troops at that Place, whereto they have been directed to proceed in Boats by Water) to Jellaſore; you are then, or at ſuch other Place adjacent as you may ſee moſt convenient, to take Poſt with your Detachment, and be ready to repel any Invaſion or Incurſions that may be attempted by the Maratta Army aſſembled at Cuttack, into the Company's Provinces at the Gaut acroſs the River Subenreka, called Rajegaut, on the great Road leading from Ballaſore to Jellaſore, &c. or at any other Gaut or Fords in the Neighbourhood or contiguous to it.

You will uſe ſuch Means as may be in your Power to obtain the moſt early and beſt Intelligence from Time to Time of the Motions and Deſigns of the Enemy; and as their Forces are ſaid to be numerous, it is ſtrongly recommended to you to be ſtrictly upon your Guard againſt any Surprize, and to take the neceſſary Precautions for the Security and Defence of your Detachment, in caſe of your being attacked by a ſuperior Body of Troops, till you can be reinforced from Midnapore, or the Preſidency. Theſe Precautions your own Experience will beſt point out to you, as well as the Meaſures moſt proper to be purſued for effecting the Service in general on which you are employed.

You are immediately upon receiving Advice of the Enemy's making any Movements from Cuttack towards Ballaſore, with their Army or any Part thereof, to ſend out Parties and ſeize upon all the Boats on the Subenreka above or below Jellaſore, as far as Pipley, and the Sea Shore, which might be uſed by them in croſſing that River: As it is broad, and as the Tide ſets in ſtrong at Pipley, and it is ſaid there are no Fords for ſome Coſs above that Town; by ſecuring the Boats, and ſtationing a Guard of a Company of Sepoys there, you will it is conceived effectually prevent any Troops from croſſing, and Inroads being made by them at that Part; the Road leading thereto, and that to the Gaut near Jellaſore being, as it is reported, the principal by which they can effect an Entrance on that Side of the Country. But this you will be the beſt able to examine into and determine after your Arrival. All that is further recommended to you is, that you do not divide your Force for the Protection and Defence of any Ports unleſs it be abſolutely neceſſary, or on any Account whatever, as far as it can be poſſibly avoided.

You are to report to the Commander in Chief all Intelligence of Conſequence, which you may receive reſpecting the Enemy, as well as all Occurrences of your Detachment: You are to make ſimilar Reports to Lieutenant Colonel Blair, commanding the Troops at Midnapore, with whom you are alſo to co-operate; and you are to obey any Orders that he may give you, which are neceſſary for the Good of the Service, and the general Defence of the Provinces and Diſtricts which you are ſtationed to protect.

Fort William,
the 10th Auguſt 1780.

Approved the above Inſtructions, and ordered that they be copied fair, and ſent by the Secretary to Brigadier General Stibbert, to be by him iſſued to Captain Macpherſon.

Warren Haſtings,

Edw[d] Wheler.

APPENDIX, N° 305.

Extract of Bengal Secret Consultations, the 22d June 1780.

THE Governor General informs the Board that he has received Advice of the Arrival of Chimnajee Booſla, the Commander of the Army of Berar, in the Province of Oriſſa, at Cuttack. By Intelligence communicated ſome Time ſince to the Members of the Board, they have been informed of the Diſtreſs which this Army had actually ſuſtained, and of the greater Difficulties which it was likely to incur from the Want of Proviſions, and of the Order which Beneram Pundit, the Vackeel or Miniſter of the Berar Government, had received, to apply to this Government for Aid in procuring their future Supply: That Application has accordingly been made by the Vackeel; and as it appears to be the general Senſe of the Board, that we ſhall conſider the Government of Berar as friendly to this; and as it is entitled to ſome Return for the Hoſpitality which it afforded to our Army under the Command of General Goddard, for many Months before its Arrival within the Frontier of Berar, and during its Reſidence in it, the Governor General recommends, that Orders be iſſued to the Provincial Chiefs and Councils of Burdwan and Calcutta, and the Collector of Midnapore, to permit Supplies of Grain, Proviſions, and other Neceſſaries, to paſs to the Maratta Army at Cuttack, and to aſſiſt their Agents in procuring them; and that he himſelf may be authorized to inform the Berar Vackeel, that the Board have thought proper to iſſue ſuch Orders.

Mr. Wheler—Placing a much greater Confidence in the Opinion which the Governor General has formed of the friendly Intentions of the Raja of Berar, and which I conclude he has collected from his long Intercourſe with the Vackeel of that Chief, than from any Evidence of them which I can gather from the Proceedings, or from the Correſpondence with him, I accede to the preſent Motion.

Mr. Francis—I think that we ought to continue to treat the Berar Government as Friends, without neglecting to have a ſtrict Eye upon their Motions: If their Intentions be hoſtile to us, they will ſoon be diſcovered; in the mean Time I think it may be proper to give them this Proof of our friendly Diſpoſition towards them: The Supplies may be ſtopped at any Time. I therefore agree to the Motion.

The Governor General—My Opinion of the Diſpoſition of the Berar Government towards this, has been fully expreſſed and explained in my Minute of the 12th June. I repeat, that I believe it to be perfectly friendly; but I muſt add, that it will depend upon the Conduct of this Government towards it, whether it is to prove in the End our Friend or our Enemy.

Agreed to the Governor General's Propoſition.

The following Letter is accordingly written to the Provincial Councils of Calcutta and Burdwan, and to the Collector of Midnapore.

Mr. David Anderſon, Chief, &c. Calcutta Committee.

To the Calcutta Committee of Revenue.

Gentlemen,

A large Body of Troops belonging to the Berar Raja, and commanded by Chimnajee Booſla, being arrived in the Neighbourhood of Cuttack, we authorize and direct you to permit Supplies of Grain, Proviſions, and other Neceſſaries, to paſs to Cuttack for their Uſe, and to aſſiſt their Agents in procuring them.

We are, &c.

Fort William,
the 22d June, 1780.

The ſame to Burdwan, and to the Collector of Midnapore.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, 17th July 1780.

Calcutta Committee.

Read the following Letter from the Calcutta Committee of Revenue:

We have been honoured with the Receipt of your Orders of the 22d of June, and have iſſued Perwannahs to the Naibs and Zemindars of Hidgelee and Tumlook, directing them to permit Supplies of Grain, Proviſions, and other Neceſſaries, to paſs to Cuttack, for the Uſe of the Troops of the Berar Rajah at that Place, commanded by Chimnajee Booſla, and to aſſiſt his Agents in procuring them.

We ſhall take Care that proper Attention is paid to our Perwannahs.

We are, &c.

(Signed) D. Anderſon,
and Committee.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX, N° 306.

Bengal Perſian Correſpondence.

Tranſlation of a Letter from Dewagur Pundit to Beneram Pundit: Received 21ſt September, 1780.

CONFIRMING what has paſſed in all former Letters without the Deviation of an Iota, I write with my Attention limited by them alone, and without Reſtraint by the Fear of any one.

The Governor wrote the Maha Raja that he looked upon the Army under Chumnajee as his own. There is now nothing wanting to the Completion and Extent of their Friendſhip; therefore every Thing, good and evil, muſt meet with the moſt unreſerved Communication: When you have well underſtood the Contents of my Letter, you will lay it entirely before him.

The Times require that a Peace be made with the Maratta Adminiſtration, and that, in whatever Mode it may be, a Treaty and Agreement take place between them. If this is not now effected, Confuſion and Warfare muſt be carried to the greateſt Lengths and Extremities. I write, appealing to God and the Friendſhip now eſtabliſhed. This Diſpute muſt be ended.

Although many Impediments are attempted to be thrown into my Way, to prevent my hoped-for Meeting with the Governor, and have ſent Sadaſeo Pundit to Nanna Purnaveeſe and Hurry Punt Purkia, well aſſured that the Anſwers from Poona will prove agreeable to my Wiſhes, and enable me to accompliſh them. I have therefore ſent incloſed, the Heads of the Treaty concluded with Colonel Upton, and Memorandums of the Claims regarding Guzerat, Ahmudabad, Cokun, Surat, and the Guicawars, &c. You muſt lay them without Diminution before the Governor, aſk his definitive and ſolemn Anſwer, and ſend it to me. This is the Advice, and moſt neceſſary to be followed.

The Maha Raja will never drop the Pornagor. They promiſed Gurrah and Mundela, and have not performed it, but this remains upon them. Notwithſtanding this, it is proper and right that Peace ſhould be brought about between them and the Engliſh, by me, that I may on this Side of the Marattas, have a Claim upon their Gratitude, for the after Performance of many unfiniſhed Claims between them and the Maha Raja. And on the Side of the Engliſh, I ſhall enhance our Friendſhip with them. An Agreement ſubſiſted between the Predeceſſors of the preſent Maratta Government and thoſe of the Maha Raja, and ratified when Ragojee Bhoſila went to Poona, by my placing him in their Arms, and they promiſing never to deſert him. Upon this Score therefore, our Fidelity is due to them in every Form. When at ſundry Times we have been diſtreſſed, they have helped us. I therefore hope now in Return to aſſiſt them. A Meeting between me and the Governor is abſolutely neceſſary to conclude this Buſineſs.

In Repetition.

The Maha Raja, like all others of the Bhoſila Family, is not ſelf-intereſted. Wherever they place their Friendſhip, they do not heſitate to ſtake their Lives, much leſs their Fortunes, provided either can ſerve to cement and anſwer the Ends of Friendſhip. You have ſeen all this yourſelf, and know it from your own Knowledge.

Inform the Governor the Nabob Zuffer ul Dowla Donſah*, is at Nuzmull, and is Soul and Body united with the Maha Raja. You ſaw the Letters which came from him, at the Time General Goddard was at Hoſhungabad, and Mr. Watherſtone came to Naigpore; eſtabliſh the Truth therefore with the Governor. Zuffer ul Dowla has 12,000 Gardies, 2000 Coſſrees, 6000 Horſe, and 40 Guns, with and under him, and is devoted to us: The Governor probably knows this: It is no Secret to the Marattas, and Nizam Ally. A friendly Letter from the Governor to him, would be of great Uſe. God enlighten you in this Path, that every Thing may be underſtood by the Governor, for if the Whole of this is not only not underſtood, but does not meet with his warmeſt Concurrence, a World will be loſt.

I look up to the Governor as my own Maſter, and ſpeak only for his Welfare. This is true to the leaſt Tittle

If an oſtenſible Letter from the Governor to Sindia be written, referring to me as an Agent, I can then come to your Quarter.

Again in Repetition.

Every thing has been moſt fully explained to you in former Letters, but for Certainty I repeat the Heads. I was at Poona when the Army under Chumnajee was propoſed and recommended by Nizam Ally Khan, to the Government of Poona, to be ſent into Bengal. Letters were then paſſing between Sindia and Goddard, about Peace, but being interrupted and broken off by the Means of Nizam Ally, he then carried the ſending of our Army to Bengal. I took my Leave of Poona, and came to Naigpore. On the Day of the Duſſara, Chumnajee took the Field (now one Year) and arrived at Cuttack, not till the laſt of Jeyt, as before explained, and unneceſſary to repeat. On the Day of the Departure of the Army, 35 Lacks in Money, 3 Lacks in Cloths, and

* A diſaffected and powerful Jaquirdar of Nizam Ally's.

and 14 Elephants, were given to the Chief of it. Diſtreſs of Proviſions much injured them upon the Road. Upon their Arrival at Cuttack, they experienced the ſame. Yet ſo ſtrong is our Friendſhip with the Engliſh, particularly with the Governor, that we never treſpaſſed their Bounds, *and never will*; God is my Witneſs to this. The Governor has permitted Grain to be ſent to them, it muſt have taken place of courſe; the Merchants muſt certainly have carried it, but there is no Money with the Army. According to the loweſt Calculation, 4 Lacks per Month is the leaſt that can defray their Exigencies. It is adviſable between us *as Friends* that this Army return in Poos and Maug. Sixteen Lacks ſhould be ſent for their Aſſiſtance, Twelve of it *ſecretly*, to Bowanny Pundit, that he may be able to repreſs the Army, and keep them under Controul. This is ſpeedily neceſſary. Let not the Governor apprehend that this Money will thereby be thrown away, for the Bhoſila and Engliſh Intereſt will then be but One, and much Benefit muſt flow from this. To bring this about is neceſſary, extremely neceſſary. I do not write for myſelf. This is the Advice to be followed, moſt certainly, or the Army will be no longer governable. Save us from this Diſgrace. All my Hopes are upon you. If the Army remains till Poos and Maug, the Fear of the Engliſh will be upon all, and therefore this ought to be effected.

APPENDIX, N° 307.

Bengal Perſian Correſpondence.

To Chumnajee Baboo. 13th October 1780.

HAVING received repeated Letters from Moodajee Booſla, reſpecting the State of the Army under your Command; and regarding it, on account of the long Intimacy which has ſubſiſted between our Two Governments, as my own; I have for this Reaſon diſpatched Biſſembeer Pundit, the Brother of Beneram Pundit, to you, and have furniſhed him with ſuch Aids as were in my Power, which he will deliver to you. As he is fully acquainted with all the Circumſtances of my Affairs, and of my long fixed Attachment to the Maha Raja, and to the Houſe of Booſla, he will ſerve in the Place of a longer Letter, and to him I refer you for all the Particulars.

APPENDIX, N° 308.

Letter from the Governor General, 29th November 1780.

To the Honourable the Court of Directors for Affairs of the Honourable United Company of Merchants of England trading to the Eaſt Indies.

Honourable Sirs,

YOU will be informed by our Conſultations of the 26th June, of a very unuſual Tender which was made by me to the Board on that Day, for the Purpoſe of indemnifying the Company for the extraordinary Expence which might be incurred by employing the Detachment under the Command of Major Camac in the Invaſion of the Maratta Dominions, which lie beyond the Diſtrict of Gohed, and drawing the Attention of Mahdajee Scindia, to whom that Country immediately appertained, from General Goddard, while that of the General was employed on the Reduction of Baſſein, and in ſecuring the Conqueſts made by your Arms in Gujerat.

I was deſirous to remove the only Objection which had been, or could be oſtenſibly made to that Meaſure, which I had very much at Heart, as may eaſily be conceived from the Means which I took to effect it., For the Reaſons at large which induced me to propoſe this Diverſion, it will be ſufficient to refer to my Minute recommending it, and to the Letters received from General Goddard near the ſame Period of Time. The Subject is now become obſolete, and all the fair Hopes which I had built upon the Proſecution of the Maratta War to its Termination, in a ſpeedy, honourable, and advantageous Peace, have been blaſted by the dreadful Calamities which have befallen your Arms in the Dependancies

dancies of your Preſidency of Fort Saint George, and have changed the Object of our Purſuit from the Aggrandizement of your Power to its Preſervation. My preſent Reaſon for reverting to my own Conduct on the above-mentioned Occaſion, is to obviate the falſe Concluſions, or purpoſed Miſrepreſentations which may be made of it, either as an Artifice of Oſtentation, or as the Effect of corrupt Influence by aſſuring you, that the Money, by whatever Means it came into your Poſſeſſion, was not my own; that I had myſelf no Right to it, nor would, nor could have received it, but for the accidental Means which were at that Inſtant afforded me of accepting and converting it to the Property and Uſe of the Company; and with this brief Apology I ſhall diſmiſs the Subject.

Something of Affinity to this Anecdote may appear in the firſt Aſpect of another Tranſaction which I ſhall proceed to relate, and of which it is more immediately my Duty to inform you.

You will have been adviſed by the repeated Addreſſes of this Government of the Arrival of an Army at Cuttac, under the Command of Chimnajee Booſla, the ſecond Son of Moodajee Booſla, the Rajah of Berar. The Origin and Deſtination of this Force have been largely explained and detailed in the Correſpondence of the Government of Berar, and in various Parts of our Conſultations: The minute Relation of theſe would exceed the Bounds of a Letter; I ſhall therefore confine myſelf to the principal Facts. About the Middle of the laſt Year a Plan of Confederacy was formed by the Nabob Nizam Ally Cawn, by which it was propoſed, that while the Army of the Marattas, under the Command of Mahdajee Scindia and Tuckoojee Holkar, was employed to check the Operations of General Goddard in the Weſt of India, Hyder Ally Cawn ſhould invade the Carnatic, Moodajee Booſla the Provinces of Bengal, and he himſelf the Sirkars of Rajahmundry and Chicacole.

The Government of Berar was required to accept the Part aſſigned it in this Combination, and to march a large Body of Troops immediately into Bengal. To enforce the Requiſition on the Part of the ruling Members of the Maratta State, Menaces of inſtant Hoſtility by the combined Forces were added by Mahdajee Scindia, Tuckoojee Holcar, and Nizam Ally Cawn, in Letters written by them to Moodajee Booſla on this Occaſion. He was not in a Situation to ſuſtain the Brunt of ſo formidable a League, and oſtenſibly yielded. Such at leaſt was the Turn which he gave to his Acquieſcence in his Letters to me, and his ſubſequent Conduct has juſtified his Profeſſions. I was early and progreſſively acquainted by him with the Requiſition, and with the Meaſures which were intended to be taken, and which were taken by him upon it. The Army profeſſedly deſtined for Bengal marched on the Duſſerra of the laſt Year correſponding with the 12th of October; inſtead of taking the direct Courſe to Bahar, which had been preſcribed, it proceeded by varied Deviations and ſtudied Delays to Cuttac, where it arrived late in May laſt, having performed a practicable Journey of Three Months in Seven, and concluded it at the inſtant Commencement of the Rains, which of courſe would preclude its Operations, and afford the Government of Berar a further Interval of Five Months to provide for the Part which it would then be compelled to chuſe. In the mean Time Letters were continually written by the Rajah and his Miniſters to this Government, explanatory of their Situation and Motives; propoſing their Mediation and Guarantee for a Peace and Alliance with the Peſhwa; and profeſſing, without any Solicitation on our Part, the moſt friendly Diſpoſition towards us, and the moſt determined Reſolution to maintain it. Conformably to theſe Aſſurances, and the Acceptance of a Propoſal made by Moodajee Booſla to depute his Miniſter to Bengal, for the Purpoſe of negociating and concluding the intended Treaty of Peace, Application had been made to the Peſhwa for Credentials to the ſame Effect: At this Inſtant the fatal News arrived of the Defeat of your Army at Conjeveram. It now became neceſſary that every other Object ſhould give place, or be made ſubſervient to the Preſervation of the Carnatic; nor would the Means requiſite for that End admit of Delay. Peace with the Marattas was the Firſt Object. To conciliate their Alliance and that of every other Power in natural Enmity with Hyder Ally, the next Meaſures were immediately taken (as our general Advices will inform you) to ſecure both theſe Points, and to employ the Government of Berar as the Channel and Inſtrument of accompliſhing them. Its Army ſtill lay on our Borders, and in Diſtreſs for long Arrears of Pay, not leſs occaſioned by a Want of pecuniary Funds than a Stoppage of Communication. An Application had been made to us for a Supply of Money, and the Sum ſpecified for the complete Relief of their Army was Sixteen Lacks. We had neither Money to ſpare, nor in the apparent State of that Government, in its Relation to ours, would it have been either prudent or conſiſtent with our public Credit, to have afforded it; it was nevertheleſs my decided Opinion, that ſome Aid ſhould be given, as well to contribute the neceſſary Relief, as to indicate a Confidence upon our Part, and a Return for the many Inſtances of ſubſtantial Kindneſs which we had within the Courſe of the laſt Two Years experienced from the Government of Berar. I had an Aſſurance that ſuch a Propoſal would receive the Acquieſcence of the Board; but I knew that it would not paſs without Oppoſition, and it would have become public, which muſt have defeated its Purpoſe. Convinced however of the Neceſſity of the Expedient, and aſſured of the Sincerity of the Government of Berar from Evidences of ſtronger Proof to me than I could make them appear to the other Members of the Board, I reſolved to adopt it, and take the entire Reſponſibility of it upon myſelf. In this Mode a leſs conſiderable Sum would ſuffice: I accordingly cauſed three Lacks of Rupees to be delivered to the Miniſter of the Rajah of Berar reſident in Calcutta, which he has tranſmitted: Two Thirds of this Sum I have raiſed by my own Credit, and ſhall charge it in my official Accounts; the other Third I have ſupplied from the Caſh in my Hands belonging to the Honourable Company. I have given due Notice to Moodajee Booſla of this Tranſaction, and explained it to have been a private Act of my own, unknown to the other Members of the Council. I have given him Expectations of the Remainder of the Amount required for the Arrears of his Army, proportioned to the

Extent

Extent to which he may put it in my Power to propoſe it as a public Gratuity, by his effectual Orders for the Recall of the Troops, or for their Junction with ours.

I hope I ſhall receive your Approbation of what I have done for your Service, and your Indulgence for the Length of this Narrative, which I could not comprize within a ſmaller Compaſs.

I have the Honour to be,
Honourable Sirs,
Your moſt faithful, obedient
and humble Servant,
Warren Haſtings.

Fort William,
Nov' 29th, 1780.

APPENDIX, N° 309.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, 17th July 1780.

READ another Letter as follows, from Mr. Holland, incloſing one from Hyder Ally Cawn, which is entered after it:

Honourable Sir,

I herewith encloſe Hyder Ally Khan's Anſwer to the Letter which I forwarded to him on the 11th March. The Hircarrahs inform me that they were detained Twelve Days by Meer Sahib, Governor of Cudapah, who at laſt ſent them forward with Two of his own Hircarrahs and a Duſtuck; that upon your Letter being delivered to Hyder he expreſſed himſelf, as they heard from Hyder's Hircarrahs, in Terms and Looks of Anger and Reſentment; that there was a Report at Syringapatam where Hyder then was, of his Intention of ſetting out ſoon to invade the Carnatic; that his Troops under Meer Sahib, Governor of Cudapah, had plundered ſome Parts of Venentagharry, the Country of Bungan Yachem Naick, Tributary to the Nabob Walaw Jau, and had carried off from thence 1500 Women.

I am, &c.
(Signed) John Hollond.

Hydrabad,
June 16th, 1780.

P. S. The latter Part of the News I had heard here previous to the Arrival of the Hircarrahs, who returned this Morning.

From Hyder Ally Khan, received 14th July 1780.

I have received your agreeable Letter, and underſtand the Contents, which gave me inexpreſſible Pleaſure: I was before well convinced, that the Treaties and Engagements of the Engliſh are inviolable; but whenever a new Governor arrives, he will not conform to the Agreements of the Council, but acts as he pleaſes, making many Innovations in the eſtabliſhed Friendſhips. Firſt, the Engagements which Wallah Jah Bahadre, and the Chiefs of the Company entered into at the Time of the Siege of Chunapilly, were never fulfilled; and Secondly, it was agreed between us, under the ſtrongeſt Engagements, that whenever I ſhould require Aſſiſtance in a neceſſary War, it ſhould be immediately furniſhed from that Quarter, and that as often as they could demand Succours, they ſhould be ſent from hence. Accordingly before this, when I was engaged in Hoſtilities againſt ſeveral Enemies, notwithſtanding that I had not the ſmalleſt Occaſion for it, yet to try the Strength of their Friendſhip and Alliance, I deſired Aſſiſtance from them: but they pleaded various Excuſes, and in many other Inſtances, acted in direct Breach of the Engagements. What Dependance etherefore can be placed on the Engagements and Treaties of the Chiefs of the Company? Do yo however act as ſhall ſeem beſt to you.

A true Copy.
(Signed) Edw. Colebrook,
Perſian Tranſlator.

APPENDIX, N° 310.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, dated 25th September 1780.

THE Governor General delivers in the following Minute.

Governor General—This is not a Time either for long Deliberation at Home, or the formal and tedious Proceſs of Negociation Abroad. The Calamity which has befallen us upon the Coaſt, and the alarming Superiority which Hyder Ally Cawn has acquired in the Carnatic; the Deſpondency of the Government of Fort Saint George; the Conſternation and Diſtruſt which ſeem to have ſpread themſelves among all thoſe who are ſubject to its Authority; its utter Want of preſent Means and Reſources; the Diminution of their Military Strength, and its declared Inſufficiency for the War which it is to ſuſtain; and above all, the authentic Information which we have received, of a great Naval and Military Armament prepared by the Court of France, and deſtined beyond all Doubt to co-operate with Hyder Ally, demand the moſt inſtant, powerful, and even hazardous Exertions of this Government, to avert the Event portended by ſo many concurrent Difficulties. To this Point every other Conſideration muſt now give place. Without further Preface, I propoſe the following Reſolutions. Governor General.

1ſt. That the Sum of Fifteen Lacks of Rupees be immediately ſent to Fort Saint George in Specie, and laden for that Purpoſe on the Honourable Company's Ship the Duke of Kingſton, and the other Veſſels which are now on the Point of ſailing for Madras.

2d. That the Treaſure depoſited in the New Fort, including the Moiety lately taken from it, be all replaced in the General Treaſury, to be applied to the preceding Purpoſe, and other Exigencies of this Government.

3d. That a large Detachment of European Infantry and Artillery, be immediately ſent to Fort Saint George by the Duke of Kingſton, and the other Veſſels which are now on the Point of ſailing for Madras. To this Propoſition, as a neceſſary and eſſential Part of it I muſt add the following, viz. That the Commander in Chief be requeſted, and I do for my own Part, make it my moſt earneſt and particular Requeſt, that he will proceed himſelf immediately to the Coaſt, and take the Command of the Army on that Eſtabliſhment.

(The Commander in Chief will pardon this formal and official Solicitation. I know the Ardour of his Zeal for the Public Service, and that this Principle will of itſelf impel him to be whereever it ſhall moſt require his Preſence; but I think this a Caſe in which it would mark too great an Indifference to the Public Welfare, and too cold a Senſe of the Utility of his Services, to leave the Offer of them to his unſolicited Opinion. I make no Scruple to avow, that although I am convinced that the Danger impending on our Intereſts in the Carnatic, might be eaſily repelled, even with the Force which it already poſſeſſes for its Defence; yet I cannot place any Reliance upon it, unleſs it ſhall be properly applied and conducted; that I do not think it has been properly applied, nor expect that it will be properly conducted, unleſs Sir Eyre Coote will at this Criſis ſtand forth, and vindicate in his own Perſon the Rights and Honour of the Britiſh Arms.—I mean not to compliment his Military Experience; and above all the high Eſtimation in which his Name is held by the World, and eſpecially by that Part of it where it was principally acquired, mark him as the only poſſible Inſtrument to retrieve our paſt Diſgrace, or to preſerve the Britiſh Intereſts and Poſſeſſions in the Carnatic from utter Ruin.

Our Armies which have been ſo long formed to the Habits of Conqueſt, will not eaſily recover from the Impreſſion of the dreadful Reverſe which has lately befallen them, nor be brought to act with the former Confidence under unſucceſsful Commanders. The Addition of Numbers will not relieve their Apprehenſions, and will but contribute to oppreſs the Hands which have been already proved too weak to ſuſtain the Weight of an imperior Charge.)

4th. That an immediate Offer of Peace be made to the Maratta State, in the Mode and on the Conditions following; viz. That as the Miniſters of that State have profeſſed a Deſire for Peace, which has been equally the Wiſh of this Government, even from the Commencement of the War; and as the Attainment of it ſeems to have been hitherto impeded by the Difficulty of managing a Negociation between the Principals ſituated at ſo great a Diſtance from each other; to preclude all further Delays, we do at the ſame Time offer Peace, and bind ourſelves to the Obſervance of it on their Acceptance and Ratification of the following Conditions; viz.

1ſt. That all Acquiſitions made by our Forces in the Courſe of the War, and retained in our Poſſeſſion as the Property of the Company, ſhall be delivered up and reſtored to the ſame Footing as that on which it ſtood before the Commencement of the War; but that ſuch as have been conquered and ceded in virtue of formal Treaties ſhall remain, and be confirmed to the Perſons to whom they were ſo ceded; and the Treaties concluded with them remain firm and inviolate.

2d. That a Proviſion be made for the Maintenance of Ragonaut Row during his Life; and that he ſhall be permitted to reſide where he pleaſes, excepting Bombay or any Place nearer to Bombay than Surat, but ſhall receive no Aſſiſtance from the Governor General and Council of Bengal, nor from any other Preſidency of the Company; nor, if he ſhall chuſe any of the Company's Preſidencies or Settlements for the Place of his Reſidence, ſhall he be permitted to re-aſſert his Pretenſions to the Adminiſtration of the Maratta State, without the entire and univerſal Conſent and Requiſition of all the Members of the State, who are included as Parties in this Treaty.

3d. That the Peſhwa and Rulers of the Maratta State ſhall agree to an Alliance, offenſive and defenſive, with the Company, againſt the French and Hyder Ally Cawn, and ſhall immediately employ their Forces in Conjunction with ours in the Invaſion of his Dominions, and in the Proſecution of ſuch Operations againſt him, as the Circumſtances of the War, and the Judgment of thoſe who have the Conduct of it on both Sides, ſhall determine; and if in the Courſe of it any Acquiſitions of Territory ſhall be made, they ſhall be equally ſhared between the Parties to this Engagement, in ſuch Manner as ſhall be moſt ſuitable to the Situation and Contiguity of the Places or Dominions at this Time reſpectively held by them.

4th. That if the Peſhwa will not agree to the propoſed Alliance, Peace be nevertheleſs concluded, each Party retaining what it hath acquired, or that a Suſpenſion of Hoſtilities ſhall take place on both Sides during One Year from the Date of the Treaty, for the Purpoſe of negociating the Terms of a future and perpetual Adjuſtment.

5th. That the Treaty ſhall be concluded with the Mediation and Guarantee of Rajah Moodajee Booſla, who ſhall be a ſubſcribing Party to it, and ſhall bind himſelf and his Succeſſors to the faithful Obſervance and Support of it.

6th. That the Treaty ſhall be ſealed, ſigned, and ſanctified by the reſpective Parties to it, with the moſt ſolemn Oaths preſcribed by their reſpective Religion.

7th. That One Copy of the Treaty executed in Manner above preſcribed by the Governor General and Council of Bengal, being received by the Peſhwa or his Miniſters, Two Copies or Counterparts thereof ſhall be in like Manner executed by the Peſhwa and principal Rulers of the Maratta State and Moodajee Booſla as the Guarantee to it in the Manner abovementioned, and ſhall be tranſmitted, one to the Government of Bombay and the other to General Goddard, or to the Officer commanding the Detachment ſent from Bengal, that all Hoſtilities may immediately ceaſe on both Sides, and each provide for the due Execution of the Treaty: But until the Treaty ſhall be thus ratified on the Part of the Peſhwa, it ſhall not be binding on the Governor General and Council, neither ſhall it be binding, unleſs it ſhall be ſo ratified within Two Months after the Receipt of it.

5th. That a Letter be written to the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, and a ſimilar Order to General Goddard and Major Camac, requiring and commanding them immediately to ſuſpend all Hoſtilities and Military Operations on the Receipt of a Requiſition in Writing to that Effect, and a Notification from the Peſhwa, that the like Order has been given on his Part to the Officers commanding his Armies; and that the Peſhwa be adviſed of theſe Orders, that if deſirous of Peace, he may make the ſaid Requiſition and Notification accordingly.

6th. That the Treaty being executed by the Governor General and Council, in the Manner ſpecified by the 6th and 7th Articles of the 4th Reſolution, it be forwarded to Moodajee Booſla with Two blank Copies of it; that if he ſhould approve of it, it may be previouſly ratified on his Part as Guarantee, and tranſmitted with the Treaty executed by this Government to the Peſhwa for his Ratification, in the Manner preſcribed by the 6th and 7th Articles of the 4th Reſolution.

This is all that I propoſe as immediately neceſſary. The Commander in Chief will offer ſuch a Plan for the Diſtribution of our Troops and other Military Arrangements, as appertain to his ſeparate Province.

Other ſubſidiary Meaſures may be the Subject of future Deliberation.

Agreed, That the Conſideration of the foregoing Propoſitions be deferred until the next Meeting.

The Board adjourn till To-morrow Morning, at 10 o'Clock.

Warren Haſtings,
P. Francis,
Edwd Wheler.

APPENDIX, N° 310.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 26th September.

At a Council; PRESENT,
The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General,
Philip Francis, } Eſquires.
Edward Wheler, }
Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote, K. B.

The Board met agreeable to Adjournment.
The Secretary lays before the Board the following Letter from the Military Paymaſter General.

To Mr. Edward Hay, acting Secretary to the Supreme Council. Military Paymaſter General.

Sir,

In Anſwer to your Letter of this Date, I have to inform you, that all the Europeans at the Preſidency are paid to the laſt Day of this Month; the Engineers to the 31ſt of laſt Month; and all the Artillery Laſcars, Sepoys, and Artificers, to the 30th of June; Captain Allen M'Pherſon's Battalion ſent on Command, to the 31ſt of July. N° 24, Mr. Francis's Packet.

It is impoſſible for me to ſay to what Period the Troops at Surat, and Majors Camac and Popham's Detachment are paid, and by the lateſt Advices there were no Arrears due to the Troops at Cawnpore, Futty Ghur and Berhampore.

There is now due to me from the Treaſury, a Balance of Auguſt Eſtimate,

Cur' Rup'	—	6,13,264 11	2
The whole of September	—	11,46,292 2	1
Total Curr' R'	—	17,59,556 13	3

I am, &c.
(Signed) Claud Alexander,
Mil' P' M' General.

Mr. Francis delivers in the following Minute on the Propoſitions recorded by the Governor General on Yeſterday's Proceedings. N° 23, Mr. Francis's Packet.

Mr. Francis—I am earneſtly deſirous of giving every Aſſiſtance and Relief to the Preſidency of Fort Saint George, that Prudence and a due Regard to our own Safety will admit of; our Endeavours to provide for the Security of the Company's other Poſſeſſions in India, ſhould always be guided and limited by the fundamental Principle laid down for us by the Court of Directors in our general Inſtructions, *to make the Safety and Proſperity of Bengal the principal Objects of all our Deliberations and Reſolutions:* And I truſt that the Board will not loſe Sight of this Principle in the preſent Debate.

1ſt. I ſee many Objections to the Governor General's firſt Propoſition. The Sum of 15 Lacks in Specie is much too great for this Government to ſpare from its own preſſing Occaſions, nor do I think that ſo great a Sum ought to be truſted at once to the Gentlemen of Madras, if our Treaſury were full. If we ſupply them gradually and with Moderation, it is probable they may apply our Money with Œconomy to the Service for which we intended it; if not, I very much fear it will not only be miſapplied but waſted. Before we part with any Thing, we ought to look into the State of our own Treaſury, and ſee what Supplies can be afforded from it, conſiſtently with the immediate Demands, and other indiſpenſable Services of this Government.

We had Yeſterday an apparant Balance of 44 Lacks of Current Rupees, including 4,65,196 Bills receivable; 1,26,990 unſtated Treaſure, and Depoſits of private Property to the Amount of C. R'. 16,51,653: This is our actually exiſting Fund. The Paymaſter General's immediate Demand on this Fund is for 17 Lack 59,556; other Orders unpaid amount to C. R'. 15,91,441. The Civil Service I believe is univerſally in Arrears. The Artillery Laſcars, the Artificers, and all the Sepoy Battalions, except One, are Three Months in Arrears. On the Firſt Day of next Month, the Paymaſter General will call upon us for C. R'. 5,47,000, excluſive of any Bills that may be drawn by General Goddard and Major Camac; put theſe Demands together, and ſee in what State we ſhall be left when they are ſatisfied, as ſome of them at leaſt muſt be without Delay: In Effect we have no Fund to meet our moſt preſſing Expences; nor do I ſee by what Means it will be poſſible to create ſuch a Fund as our Situation requires. Before we have a conſiderable Sum in Hand, I would not undertake to ſend large Supplies to the other Preſidencies. For theſe Reaſons, I think that the preſent Supply to Fort Saint George ſhould not exceed Half the Sum propoſed, nor could any thing but their preſſing Neceſſities extort even this Sum from me in the preſent State of our Treaſury.

2d. If it depended on me, I would rather take Meaſures to encreaſe the Depoſit in the new Fort, than proclaim our Diſtreſs to all India, by taking away the Reſidue now left there. It is a dreadful Conſideration

Conſideration, that a Government ſuch as this ſhould not at all Times have a Reſerve of 20, or 30 Lacks in Specie at its Command.

3d. On the firſt Part of the 3d Propoſition I muſt ſubmit to the Judgment of the Commander in Chief, Whether a *large Detachment of European Infantry and Artillery can be ſpared* with Safety from the Defence of Fort William, and of theſe Provinces? It is not aſcertained by what Conveyance they are to be ſent. The Kingſton, it is ſaid, may be ready in Ten Days; but this is the only Ship now under Orders for ſailing; and it is to be feared that even ſhe will arrive on the Coaſt at a Time when it may be very difficult, if not impoſſible, to land the Stores or Men. I deem this to be a Point of very great Conſequence, and hope the Board will attend to it, as the Governor General declares, that he is convinced, that the Danger impending on our Intereſt in the Carnatic might be eaſily repelled, even with the Force which it already poſſeſſes for its Defence, if properly conducted.

I concur in the Requeſt propoſed to Sir Eyre Coote; but I do not ſee the ſame Neceſſity for ſending a Reinforcement of Troops.

4th. I agree to the Fourth Paragraph, with the following Reſervations, viz. That all Acquiſitions whatever, on the Malabar Coaſt, made by us ſince the laſt Rupture with the Poona Government, ſhall be reſtored: I would not continue the War for the Sake of keeping Futty Sing in Poſſeſſion of any Part of Guzerat. With reſpect to the Rana of Gohud, I would ſecure him, if poſſible, in the Poſſeſſion of whatever is properly his own Dominions; but I would keep Guilior, which is a Royal Fortreſs, and not his, to be made uſe of in our Accommodation with the Marattas; that is, I would exchange it for Baſſein, and garriſon it until that Point can be accompliſhed. I agree to the Article reſpecting Ragonaut Row; except, that he ſhould not be permitted to reſide at Bombay: And, if he could be removed entirely from that Coaſt to ſome other Reſidence, I think that one principal Cauſe and Inſtrument of future Quarrel with the Marattas would be thereby removed.

On the 3d and 4th Articles of the 4th Propoſitions, I am of Opinion, that we ought to make Peace with the Marattas at all Events; becauſe I deem it a Caſe of indiſpenſable Neceſſity, which ſuperſedes all other Conſiderations: It is, undoubtedly, much to be deſired that they ſhould join with us againſt Hyder Ally; but, in our preſent Circumſtances, it is of itſelf a Point of ſo much Conſequence, and will give us ſo great a Relief to put an End to the War with the Marattas, that I think it ought not to be embarraſſed with any Conditions which they can reaſonably refuſe. All they deſire as I underſtand is, that we ſhould reſtore them their Property: They are content to ſit down with the heavy Loſſes and Diſtreſſes they have ſuffered in the Courſe of our different Invaſions of their Country. I ſhall not object to the Mode propoſed for obtaining a ſpeedy Determination of the Queſtion, Whether the Marattas will accede to our Propoſal or not? The Governor General knows better than I do, what Dependance is to be placed in the Zeal and Friendſhip of Moodajee Booſla. For my own Part, I fear Delays, and am inclined to think, that if Major Popham, or ſome other Officer from that Quarter, were ſent to Poona with the Treaty in his Hand, it would be the ſhorteſt Courſe, and the moſt likely to ſucceed.

I ſubmit to the Board, Whether, in caſe the Marattas ſhould not join in an offenſive Alliance with us, it would not be proper to inſert an Article in the Treaty, to provide for the free Paſſage of General Goddard's Army through their Country, and its Return Home, ſuppoſing we ſhould at any Time think fit to demand it? I have not mentioned the Recall of Major Camac's Detachment, nor any thing that relates to the Arrangement of the Troops for the Defence of theſe Provinces, eſpecially to the Southward towards Cuttack; as I underſtand theſe Points have been duly attended to by the Commander in Chief, in whoſe Care and Judgment I confide, I think it would be proper to recommend it to Sir Eyre Coote, to inſiſt on the Reſtoration of Mr. Hollond to his Rank in the Company's Service, from which he was diſmiſſed by a moſt arbitrary and unjuſt Reſolution of a Majority of the Select Committee formed by the caſting Voice of the Preſident. It was an Indignity to this Government which we ought to riſe at, as well as an Injury to Mr. Hollond which we are particularly bound to repair, ſince it was drawn upon him by his Compliance with our Inſtructions: I need hardly add, that, in the preſent Juncture, his Services at the Nizam's Court may be turned to the moſt advantageous Account. An offenſive Alliance with this Prince ſeems to me one of the firſt Objects to be aimed at; and with ſome Conceſſions, which in Effect would coſt us nothing, I ſhould think it might eaſily be accompliſhed.

But there ſtill is another Point which I deem eſſential to the Succeſs of every Meaſure we take for the Defence of the Carnatic, and which I muſt again beg Leave to bring into View. I mentioned it Yeſterday in Diſcourſe; and if we are unanimous I ſhould have no Scruple to record my Opinion of it. If we are not unanimous, the Subject had better not be mentioned.

Theſe Ideas are thrown together, I confeſs, with much leſs Care and Deliberation than the Importance of the Subject of them demanded: The Shortneſs of the Interval ſince the Cloſe of Yeſterday's Council obliges me to defer entering into many other important Conſiderations which are ſuggeſted to me by a general View of our Situation.

I beg Leave to annex an abſtract State of our Treaſury, with the preſent and immediate Demands upon it.

State

APPENDIX, N° 310.

State of the Treaſury, 25th September 1780.

Whole Ballance C. R^{s} — — — — —	44,12,895	10	6
Deduct Depoſits of private Property — — —	16,51,653	15	1
Orders to the Mr Paymaſter General, unpaid — — —	17,59,556	0	0
Deduct the Civil Eſtabliſhments, unpaid — — —	15,91,441	0	0
Demand of the Mr Paymaſter General for the 5th of next Month —	5,47,000	0	0
Public Offices for October, eſtimated — — —	2,60,000	0	0
	58,09,650	15	1
26th September. Ordered this Day to Madras — —	15,00,000	0	0
Curr^{t} Rupees —	73,09,650	15	1

(Signed)
P. Francis.

The Governor General—As the principal Part of the Reſolutions which I had propoſed for the preſent Deliberation of the Board, depends on the Reliance which I had placed on the Diſpoſition of the Government of Berar, I requeſt that the Board will permit Beneram Pundit, the Miniſter of that Government, to attend them, and anſwer ſuch Queſtions as may be put to him, for the Purpoſe of ſatisfying all Doubts which may remain, reſpecting the Credit which is to be given to the Propoſitions of that Government. He is now waiting, if the Board ſhould think proper to order his Attendance.

Ordered, That Beneram Pundit be deſired to attend the Board.

The Miniſter, Beneram Pundit, attends the Board accordingly. Mr. Nathaniel Middleton, being in waiting, is called in to interpret between the Board and Beneram Pundit.

The Governor General—With the Permiſſion of the Board, I will propoſe the firſt general Queſtion to be put to Beneram Pundit.

Queſtion. The Board deſire to be informed, generally, of the Diſpoſition and Intentions of your Maſter, the Rajah of Berar, reſpecting this Government, and that of the Paiſhwa, in ſuch Points as have a common Relation to both.

Anſwer. To the Paiſhwa, my Maſter is bound by his Faith and his Religion; to this Government, by a ſtrict Friendſhip. The Rajah's Deſire is to become the Inſtrument of effecting a Reconciliation between the Paiſhwa and this Government.

Queſtion. If we ſhall employ him as the Inſtrument of Peace and the Mediator between us and the Paiſhwa, and the Terms that we may offer ſhall be ſuch as his Maſter ſhall approve, will he in ſuch Caſe be the Pledge to us for the Concurrence of the Paiſhwa? or, in caſe he cannot anſwer for that Event, and our Offers ſhould be rejected, the Treaty be broken off, and the War continued, what Part will your Maſter take in ſuch a Caſe? Will he preſerve his Neutrality between us? or, will he take a Part actively as our Friend, or as our Enemy?

Anſwer. The Rajah is willing to pledge himſelf, that in caſe he ſhould be employed as the Inſtrument of Peace and the Mediator between the Two Governments, and the Terms propoſed by the Company ſhall be approved by him, that they will be accepted by the Paiſhwa; if they are not, the Rajah himſelf will become the Company's Ally, and aſſiſt the Company to the utmoſt of his Abilities.

Queſtion. You have ſaid, that the Rajah of Berar is bound to the Paiſhwa by his Faith and Religion; and you now ſay, that if the Paiſhwa will not ratify his Approbation of our Propoſals, he will be our Ally: How can he be in any Caſe our Ally, if he is bound to the Paiſhwa by his Faith and Religion?

Anſwer. If the Terms propoſed by the Company be reaſonable, and rejected by the Paiſhwa, a Breach of Faith is on the Paiſhwa's Side, and my Maſter will be juſtified in becoming the Company's Ally. The Rajah has written to me, that in caſe the Paiſhwa rejects, he will quit his, the Paiſhwa's Cauſe, and become the Company's Ally.

Queſtion. In the Anſwers which you have given, have you ſpoken from Authority, or from your own Belief only?

Anſwer. I have ſpoken from the Authority of my Maſter's Letters. I am an Ambaſſador.

Queſtion. If your Maſter is ſo deſirous of Friendſhip with the Engliſh, what Occaſion is there for keeping up a large Army at Cuttack, which he muſt do at a great Expence?

Anſwer. My Maſter is obliged to keep up Appearances, in conformity to a Plan by Nizam Ally Khan.

Queſtion. With whom is that Plan concerted?

Anſwer. With the Paiſhwa, with Nana Furneſſe.

Queſtion. Is the Rajah Party to that Agreement between the Nizam and the Paiſhwa?

Anſwer. He is not. When Dewagur Pundit, the Dewan of Rajah Moodajee Booſla, was at Poona, Letters were received from Nizam Ally Khan, by him and Nana Furneſſe, declaring, that as the Rajah his Maſter was the Means of introducing the Engliſh Army into Decan, Nizam

Ally and Nana Furneſſe had forwarded a Plan, in which he muſt take a Part, and that he muſt march an Army to invade Bengal.

Queſtion. When did Chimnajee Baboo, Commander of the Army at Cuttack, receive his Diſpatches?

Anſwer. The Army marched in the Day of the Duſſorah, and arrived at Cuttack at the End of Byſac. *

Queſtion. In the Poſtſcript of the laſt Letter written to the Governor-General by the Rajah, he refers the Governor General to you, concerning Aids to be given to Chimnajee Booſla: What were the Orders which you received upon this Subject?

Anſwer. The Rajah writes to me, that a Supply of 16 Lack of Rupees will be needful; but that 12 Lack at all Events will be indiſpenſably neceſſary. This Money will not be loſt; it will be made good from the Acquiſitions that will be made by the united Operations of the Company's and Rajah's Troops.

Queſtion. Were this Government to comply with ſuch a Requiſition, what Security or Pledge has it, or can it have, that the Army for whoſe Benefit it is intended will unite with us, or that it will not act againſt us?

Anſwer. The Reputation of the Family of Booſla is of long ſtanding. It is not poſſible that the Rajah could ſacrifice or riſque it, or violate his Faith for a Conſideration of 12 or 16 Lacks of Rupees.

Queſtion. Would you yourſelf take upon you to be anſwerable for the Fidelity of your Maſter in ſuch a Caſe?

Anſwer. My Maſter writes, that he is the firm Friend of the Engliſh; to the Truth of which God is Witneſs. On the Faith of this Declaration I can venture to pledge myſelf for my Maſter's Fidelity.

Queſtion. Do you think this Aſſurance a ſufficient Voucher for this Government acting in Truſt for the Intereſts of the Company, and of the King of England?

Anſwer. Yes, I think it is. The Rajah himſelf has written to the Governor General, and pledged his Faith. I pledged my Faith.

Queſtion. Will you be perſonally anſwerable to this Government, that the Force now at Cuttack will in no Caſe enter our Provinces, if not provoked by Hoſtilities on our Part?

Anſwer. My Maſter's Faith is in my Hands, and pledged to me. On the Strength of that I can venture to be anſwerable, that the Force now at Cuttack will in no Caſe enter the Company's Provinces, if not provoked by Hoſtilities on their Part.

Queſtion. If that be the Caſe, can your Maſter have any Objection to the Removal of the Force from Cuttack, if this Government ſhould think it neceſſary? The Poſition of it at Cuttack gives Alarm to the People of theſe Provinces.

Anſwer. He will have no Objection, if this Government deſire they ſhould be removed.

Queſtion. Will you be anſwerable, that if we deſire to ſend a Reinforcement to our Settlement on the Coaſt, their Paſſage ſhall not be oppoſed or interrupted by the Army now at Cuttack, or otherwiſe by the Rajah?

Anſwer. I will be anſwerable that they ſhall not be oppoſed or interrupted by the Army now at Cuttack, or otherwiſe by the Rajah.

Queſtion. Is the Rajah at this Time ſtronger in Force, or richer in Revenue, than he was a Year and a Half ago, when General Goddard was at Hoſhuagabad?

Anſwer. He is not richer in Revenue, but has more Troops.

Queſtion. What Force had the Rajah on actual Eſtabliſhment at the Time when General Goddard was at Hoſhunnabad?

Anſwer. He had 5,000 Horſe belonging to his own Houſe, and 10,000 the Property of the Ridey, and 7,000 Patna Jaghierdars.

Queſtion. What is his preſent Strength?

Anſwer. I do not know my Maſter's preſent Force at Naigpore; but I know that 30,000 Horſe are at preſent at Cuttack.

Queſtion. Are the Whole of the 30,000 Horſe at Cuttack paid by your Maſter, or is any Number of theſe paid by the Miniſters at Poona?

Anſwer. They are entirely under my Maſter's Orders, and have no Connection with the Miniſters at Poona.

Queſtion. Are there not 5, or 6,000 Horſe in the Army at Cuttack, called Poona Wallahs, or denominated from Poona?

Anſwer. There are Men who have come from Poona, who may be called Wallahs; but they are all the Rajah's Servants.

Queſtion. If Hyder Ally Cawn ſhould have entered into an Alliance with the French King, and have received from him ſuch an Aſſiſtance of Ships of War and Soldiers as would give him a Superiority in the War in which he is engaged with the Engliſh in the Carnatic; how do you underſtand that ſuch an Event would intereſt the Paiſhwa, and the other Rulers of the Maratta State?

* The Day of the Duſſorah, laſt Year was in the 5th of Cautic, which anſwers to the 19th October 1779. The laſt Day of Byſac 1187, anſwers to the 11th May 1780.

Anſwer. The Paiſhwa, and the other Rulers of the Maratta State, could not be pleaſed with ſuch an Event, as they would have every bad Conſequence to expect from ſuch an Acquiſition of Power and Strength to Hyder Ally, who is their natural Enemy, and has already conquered their Country as far as the Kiſtna, and with ſuch an Acceſſion of Strength would not ſtop there.

Queſtion. In the Third of the Requiſitions ſtated by Dawagur Pundit, on the Behalf of the Paiſhwa, it expreſſed, that no Demand for the Reimburſement of Expences ſhall be made on either Side; Pundit Purdhaun and the Engliſh Gentlemen ſhall recover their heavy Expences by uniting themſelves and jointly attacking their Enemies: Who do you underſtand to be meant by the Term Enemies?

Anſwer. Hyder Naig; there is no other Enemy.

The Board proceed to conſider the Governor General's Propoſitions, delivered in his Minute recorded Yeſterday.

Firſt, "That the Sum of Fifteen Lacks of Rupees be immediately ſent to Fort Saint George, in "Specie, and laden for that Purpoſe on the Honourable Company's Ship the Duke of Kingſton, "and the other Veſſels which are now on the Point of ſailing for Madras."

Sir Eyre Coote—I agree to the Propoſition.

Mr. Wheler—I am of Opinion that we cannot furniſh from our preſent Funds ſo large a Supply as 15 Lacks of Rupees; neither am I fully convinced that the Preſidency of Madras is in immediate Want of it. I am therefore for dividing the Sum propoſed to be ſent into equal Shares, remitting the Half of it by the Ships now deſtined to carry the Company's Troops, and the Remainder after the Change of the Monſoon.

Mr. Francis—My Opinion on the Governor General's ſeveral Propoſitions is contained in my Minute which I have already recorded.

The Governor General—I agree to the Queſtion. I ſhould be glad to join with the other Members of the Board in forming any Means for reſtricting the Preſidency of Fort Saint George to the Application of this Money ſolely to their military Charges.

Reſolved, That the Sum of 15 Lacks of Rupees in Gold, be immediately ſent to Fort Saint George, in Specie, and laden for that Purpoſe on the Honourable Company's Ship the Duke of Kingſton, and the other Veſſels which are now on the Point of ſailing for Madras.

Read the Governor General's 2d Propoſition, viz.

2d, "That the Treaſure depoſited in the New Fort, including the Moiety lately taken from "it, be all replaced in the general Treaſury, to be applied to the preceding Purpoſe, and other Exi-"gencies of this Government."

Sir Eyre Coote—I agree to the Propoſition.

Mr. Wheler—I conſider the Depoſit of Treaſure now in the New Fort, to have been made for the Purpoſe of defraying ſuch extraordinary Demands as this Government from Time to Time might become ſubjected to, either from the Effects of War, or other public Calamities. I underſtand that a Moiety of the original Depoſit hath already been replaced in the general Treaſury, with a View of applying the ſame to our preſent Exigencies; and I do not believe we ſhall be enabled to defray the preſent unſatisfied and growing Demands upon our Treaſury, without the Application of the Remainder, or without every other poſſible Meaſure of Exertion; I am, therefore for applying it agreeable to the Terms of the Queſtion.

Reſolved, That the Treaſure depoſited in the New Fort, including the Moiety lately taken from it, be all replaced in the General Treaſury, to be applied to the Purpoſe mentioned in the foregoing Reſolutions, and to the other Exigencies of this Government.

Read the Governor General's 3d Propoſition; viz. N° 3 Mr. Fra Minute.

"That a large Detachment of European Infantry and Artillery be immediately ſent to Fort St. "George by the Duke of Kingſton and the other Veſſels, which are now on the Point of ſailing "for Madras; and that the Commander in Chief be requeſted to proceed himſelf immediately to "the Coaſt, and take the Command of the Army on that Eſtabliſhment."

The Commander in Chief delivers in the following Minute:

Sir Eyre Coote—I cannot help feeling in the higheſt Senſe the diſtinguiſhed Terms in which the Governor General has ſolicited me to undertake the immediate Command of the Forces on the Coaſt of Coromandel; nor am I leſs ſenſible of the Honour done me by the other Members of this Board, by their having joined in a Requiſition ſo much to my Credit.

I ſhould do Injuſtice to thoſe Motives which actuated my Return to India, and to the Expectations which both my King and my Country formed from it, did I not on this Occaſion expreſs the Readineſs with which I now conſent to undertake a Service, on the Succeſs of which the Honour and Intereſts of the Britiſh Nation are ſo materially concerned. And I flatter myſelf I enter upon the arduous Taſk with a Degree of Zeal and Fortitude equal to what I did many Years ago in a ſimilar Conjuncture of the Affairs of both the Company and the Nation in that Part of India, and that my Efforts will be crowned with Succeſs. At the ſame Time I ſcruple not to confeſs that I feel myſelf embracing the Road to Honour and Glory under a Diſadvantage which I did not then experience, a Diminution of perſonal Activity, which the Addition of Years has involuntarily entailed upon me.

The other Difficulties which I have to encounter in taking upon me the Command of an Army, diſheartened and diſpirited by the late unfortunate Defeat by Hyder Ally Cawn, the Governor General has ſufficiently elucidated; it only therefore is left for me to add the further Conſideration of

of my having to overcome an Enemy, who can bring treble the Number of our Forces into the Field, and who, from their late Conduct, appear to be in higher Diſcipline than any we have yet encountered among the native Powers of Hindoſtan.

Whilſt the Steps which are neceſſary to be taken for the Security of our Poſſeſſions here, and for the Relief of our Diſtreſſes at Madras, from their Nature oblige us to relinquiſh the Proſecution of the offenſive War which we had commenced againſt the Marattas from this Side of India; I agree entirely in Opinion with the Governor General, that Orders ſhould be ſent, in the Manner and on the Principle he has pointed out, for a Ceſſation of Hoſtilities in the reſpective Quarters on the other Side of India, and that Propoſals for Peace, and an offenſive and defenſive Alliance, on the Terms he has ſtated, ſhould be immediately offered to them. I cannot help looking upon the preſent Seaſon as one favourable for that Purpoſe, as I conceive the late Victory Hyder Ally has obtained over us, added to his Conduct in latter Years, whereby he has evinced a Diſpoſition to encroach upon the Maratta Dominions, will render them extremely jealous of his Power, and induce them rather to wiſh for a Connection with us, than to act in concert with him againſt us.

The very accurate and juſt Deſcription which the Governor General has given, of the Danger that at preſent impends the Intereſts of the Britiſh Nation in India, I am perſuaded will have the ſame Influence upon the Mind of every other Member of this Board as it has had upon mine, and tend to produce that Freedom of Deliberation, Concord, and Unanimity in our Councils, ſo neceſſary for the Public Good. In full Confidence that no other View can exiſt amongſt us, I with the greater Chearfulneſs undertake that Part of the Service which falls to the Lot of the Station I fill; and relying on the Support of this Board therein, moſt readily repoſe my Military Character and Credit in their Hands.

Reference App. 312. In Conformity to the Requeſt made at the Cloſe of the Governor General's Minute, I now deliver in a State of our Force in this Eſtabliſhment, and of the Diſpoſition propoſed to be made of it, for the Protection of theſe Provinces, and for the Relief of Madras.

Commander in Chief.

The preſent Strength in Troops at the upper Stations at and above Chunagur is as follows:

2 Regiments of Cavalry,
3 Companies of Artillery,
Captain Mayaffer's Detachment of D°,
1 Regiment of Europeans, ½ Batt^n,
Company of Rangers,
21 Battalions of Sepoys.

Propoſed Diſpoſition of ſaid Corps:

Gwelior to be garriſoned with 3 Battalions of Sepoys,
Captain Mayaffer's Detachment of Artillery and the Company of Rangers,
The Four remaining Battalions at preſent with Major Camac to return, and the Detachment of Cavalry with him to join the 2^d and 3^d Regiments.

Daranaghur, One Battalion of Company's Sepoys, 1000 of the Vizier's Infantry, and ſent ſuch a Number of Fyzulat Cawn's Troops as may be thought neceſſary.

An Army to be formed at Allahabad, or in any centrical Poſition thought moſt eligible, of the following Troops:

2 Companies of Artillery,
2^d Regiment of Europeans,
10 Battalions of Sepoys,
1000 of the Vizier's Candahar or beſt Horſe. If 1000 cannot be obtained, as many as can poſſibly join.

N. B. From the above Two Companies of Artillery, the ſmall Detachments at Dananagur and Channar Gur to be ſupplied.

Chunar Ghur, One Battalion of Sepoys as uſual.

Bahar Province, the Two Regiments of Cavalry to be ordered down there, to be joined by Four Battalions of Sepoys, the Third Company of Artillery from the Field, and 1000 Horſe, if they can be procured from the Rajah of Benares. Boggah Battalion to make One of the 4 Battalions for this Service.

Thus the Troops at the upper Stations to be diſpoſed of for the preſent; and there will then remain 3 Battalions of Sepoys from the before-named Number of 21 Battalions, for other Services; our Force with ſaid 3 Battalions included at and below Berhampore will then be,

Artillery 6 Companies, and the Remainder of Captain Mayaffer's Company. Firſt and Third Regiment of Europeans, and 18 Battalions of Sepoys,

To be employed as follows:

At Berhampore, covering the City, or ready for any Service that might occur, — } One Company of Artillery, One Battalion of Europeans, and Four Battalions of Sepoys,

Madras Detachment.

The Proceeding of the Troops by Land or Sea for this Service, ought to be determined by the Part the Maratta Force at Cuttack mean to take. If they are Friends, our Armament for the Coaſt might proceed by Land; but if they are hoſtile to our Cauſe, as one of the firſt Objects is to aſſiſt the Preſidency of Madras as ſoon as poſſible, the Detachment for that Service ſhould proceed by Sea; but whether the Sepoys can be brought voluntarily to embark, is by no Means a certain Point. If the Embarkation could be adopted, the Detachment ſhould conſiſt of

2 Companies of Artillery,
1 Battalion of 3d Regiment completed to 300 Rank and File, and
4 Battalions of Sepoys.

This is on a Suppoſition that the Cuttack Forces are in Oppoſition to us, in which Caſe 4 Battalions at leaſt will be wanted on the Midnapore Side, with the preſent Detachment of Artillery there, and the Chain of Troops as above ſtationed will be able to oppoſe the Enemy whenever they attempt entering the Provinces: There will alſo then remain for the immediate Protection of Fort William and this Quarter,

3 Companies of Artillery,
1 Regiment of Europeans,
6 Battalions of Sepoys;

But if it can be proved that we have no Oppoſition to apprehend from the Force at Cuttack, I then recommend that the Army for the Aſſiſtance of Madras ſhould proceed by Land; viz.

2 Companies of Artillery,
1 Battalion of Europeans, 300 Rank and File,
8 Battalions of Sepoys, with a light Field Train.

They would arrive by Land in the Carnatic, at this Seaſon of the Year, as ſoon as by Embarkation, even if the Sepoys would without Heſitation embark: For ſuch a Force as mentioned could not with Safety proceed by Sea from hence till late in November or December, when the Height of the N. E. Monſoon will be abated on the Coaſt.

From the Movement by Land the different Country Powers will alſo be awed, the Nizam particularly kept in Check, and Hyder's Troops oppoſed if they ſhould again make the Circars their Object. If this Mode is adopted, as it is on the Suppoſition that the Marattas at Cuttack are not inimical, the upper Stations will not then want ſuch a powerful Chain of Troops for their Defence; and from the connected Poſition of the different Bodies of Troops, ſtationed as before mentioned, any Part of them, when wanted on Exigency, can be drawn down for the Protection of Bengal in general, or of the Preſidency in particular. If the 8 Battalions were to proceed to Madras by Land, there would be no Occaſion for Four Battalions at Midnapore, Two would be ſufficient for the Service required there, and theſe might be drawn from Berrampore, that the Force at the Preſidency might not be weakened.

The Independent Corps at Chittagong, and Ramgur Light Infantry, are not included in the above Diſpoſition of the Troops; they are ſuppoſed occupying their preſent Poſts; as well as the Corps of Militia, at their different Stations.

Calcutta,
September 27, 1780.

The Governor General—The Seaſon of the Year, and the marſhy State of the Roads through which an Army muſt paſs from hence to the Carnatic, eſpecially through the Diſtricts of Midnapore, Jellaſore, and the whole Province of Oriſſa, will render it impoſſible to march an Army by Land, until late in the Month of November. We have not Shipping to tranſport the requiſite Number of Sepoys by Sea; neither if we had would it avail us. The Remembrance and Tradition of the paſt Sufferings of thoſe who have been tranſported by that Mode of Conveyance, would be an inſuperable Objection on the Part of the Sepoys themſelves, eſpecially at this Seaſon. I muſt beg Leave, therefore, to change the Terms of the Queſtion, and ſubſtitute for, "what we would wiſh to do," "what we can do." I ſhould agree with the General, and do agree with him, in the Propoſition of ſending a conſiderable Reinforcement of Sepoys, as well as Europeans, to Madras; but this muſt reſt for a future Reſolution; and I mean to add on another Day, a freſh Motion to that Effect. For the preſent Queſtion, I propoſe, from the Terms of the General's Minute, that Two Companies of Artillery with their Complement of Laſcars, and One Battalion of one of the Regiments of Infantry, completed to 300 Rank and File, be immediately embarked, as many as can be on board the Duke of Kingſton, the reſt on any of the Ships offered for that Purpoſe by Mr. Ferguſſon.

Agreed, That the Commander in Chief be requeſted to proceed himſelf immediately to the Coaſt, and to take the Command of the Army upon that Eſtabliſhment

Reſolved, That Two Companies of Artillery with their Complement of Laſcars, and One Battalion of one of the Regiments of Infantry, completed to 300 Rank and File, be immediately embarked for the Preſidency of Fort Saint George, as many as can be on board the Duke of Kingſton, and the reſt on any of the Ships offered for that Service by Mr. Ferguſſon.

Ordered, That Returns be made to the Commander in Chief, of the Number of Ships offered by Mr. Ferguſſon, and of the Number of Men that each Ship can carry.

Agreed to the Diſpoſition of the Troops propoſed by the Commander in Chief; and ordered, that a Copy of it be ſent to Brigadier General Stibbert, after the Departure of Sir Eyre Coote, that he may iſſue the neceſſary Orders for carrying the ſame into Execution when the Seaſon will permit.

Adjourned till To-morrow Morning at 10 o'Clock.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 27th September 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Eſquire, Governor General, Preſident,
Philip Francis, Edward Wheler, } Eſquires.
Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote.

The Board having met agreeable to Adjournment, reſumed the Conſideration of the Governor General's Propoſitions, contained in his Minute of the 25th Inſtant.

Read the Governor General's 4th Propoſition, and the 1ſt Article of the propoſed Treaty included in it; viz.

" That an immediate Offer of Peace be made to the Maratta State, in the Mode, and on the " Conditions following; viz.

That as the Miniſters of that State have profeſſed a Deſire for Peace, which has been equally the Wiſh of this Government, even from the Commencement of the War, and as the Attainment of it ſeems to have been hitherto impeded by the Difficulty of managing a Negociation between the Principals ſituated at ſo great a Diſtance from each other, to preclude all further Delays, we do at the ſame Time offer Peace, and bind ourſelves to the Obſervance of it, on their Acceptance and Ratification of the following Conditions, viz.

Firſt, " That all Acquiſitions made by our Forces in the Courſe of the War, and retained in " our Poſſeſſion as the Property of the Company, ſhall be delivered up and reſtored to the ſame " Footing as that on which it ſtood before the Commencement of the War; but that ſuch as have " been conquered and ceded to others in virtue of formal Treaties, ſhall remain and be confirmed to " the Perſons to whom they were ſo ceded, and the Treaties concluded with them remain firm and " inviolate."

Governor General—In the firſt Article of the Treaty which I have recommended to be offered to the Paiſhwa, it is propoſed that all Acquiſitions made from the Maratta State, and appropriated to the Company in the Courſe of the preſent War, ſhall be reſtored, and nothing reſerved to the Company but what it poſſeſſed and was intitled to by the Treaty of Poorunder: But as there are ſtrong Grounds to expect that Baſſein may by this Time, or before the Notification of our Intentions to the Peſhwa can be made, be in our Poſſeſſion; and as the Poſſeſſion of that Place has long been an Object of the Company, and may be rendered of much more Importance to them, and eaſier of Defence than any other Territory which we poſſeſs on the Continent, at a Diſtance from the Seat of our Government, on that Side of India, although greatly inferior in Point of Revenue, and as Baſſein is a Part of the Patrimony of the Peſhwa himſelf, and upon that Account the more likely to prove an Impediment to the Concluſion of the Treaty, unleſs an Option be left to the Maratta Government to be reinſtated in the Poſſeſſion of this Place, if its Conſent cannot be obtained to the Ceſſion of it on ſuch Terms as we may offer as an Alternative; I would recommend, that a further Clauſe be added to this Article, that if the Fort of Baſſein ſhall have been conquered by our Forces, and ſhall have been in our Poſſeſſion before the final Ratification of the Treaty, an Option ſhall be given to the Peſhwa, either to receive back the Fort of Baſſein in the Manner ſtipulated by the preceding Part of this Article, and that the Fort with its Dependencies ſhall be ceded to the Company for ever; and all the Poſſeſſions and Rights which were ceded to the Company by the 5th Article of the Treaty of Poorunder, ſhall be reſtored to the Paiſhwa in lieu thereof; that is to ſay, that the Poſſeſſions of the Company dependent on Bombay, ſhall be limited to the Iſland of Bombay, the Iſland of Salſette, and the other ſmaller Iſlands, which were obtained by Treaty with Ragonaut Row, the Fort of Baſſein and its Dependencies, the City of Surat and its Dependencies, ſubject as before to the Chout, and the entire Property of the City and Purgunnah of Broach, together with the trading Factories which were eſtabliſhed before the Commencement of the War. It is neceſſary that I ſhould remind the Board, that the Diſtrict of Baſſein was eſtimated by Mr. Tayler in his Letter of the 29th October 1775, at 4 Lacks annual Revenue; and that the Ceſſions which by the foregoing Clauſe I have propoſed to yield up in lieu thereof, do amount by the ſame Eſtimate to 14,59,000 annual Revenue:

That

That is to ſay, the Purguinnahs of

Orpad — — —	3,50,000
Jambooſeer — — —	4,00,000
Occlaſeer, in Part — — —	75,000
Corial — — —	50,000
Chicky — — —	1,00,000
Veriow — — —	28,000
Amrood — — —	1,50,000
	11,53,000

to which muſt be added the Right acquired by the Company, by the 5th Article of the Treaty of Poorunder, to a further Territory of 3 Lacks, hitherto unadjuſted, but reduced by our Inſtructions to General Goddard, to the Sum of Rupees 2,09,000. I will add, that I regard the Diſtrict of Baſſein eſtimated but at 4 Lacks, as of much greater Value to the Company than the remote and ſcattered Purgunnahs of Guzerat, were their real Value equal to it, or even much greater. It will reduce our Dominions, on that Side of India, to a compact and defenſible Compaſs; free from expenſive Eſtabliſhments of Collectors of Revenue; from Diſputes of Boundaries and other Competitions, which private Intereſt will be too apt to excite with the Collectors of the adjacent Lands, and other ſimilar Occaſions for future Diſturbances; from new Military Eſtabliſhments, more proportioned to the Diſtance of Relief than the Worth of the Territory which they are to protect; and multiplied Accumulations of Expence on every Approach or Suggeſtion of future Invaſion.

Sir Eyre Coote—I agree to the firſt Condition propoſed by the Governor General, in his Minute of the 25th Inſtant, with the additional Clauſe to it now propoſed.

Mr. Wheler—I agree alſo to both.

Mr. Francis—I entirely agree in the general Principles laid down in the Governor's laſt Minute; they are the ſame which I have invariably profeſſed, and of courſe I ſhall be at all Times ready to ſupport any Plan that is founded upon them.

Reſolved in the Terms of the Governor General's 4th Propoſition before recited, with the Amendment ſince propoſed.

Conſidered the 2d Article of the propoſed Treaty included in the Governor General's 4th Propoſition, viz.

" That a Proviſion be made for the Maintenance of Ragonaut Row during his Life; and that he " ſhall be permitted to reſide where he pleaſes, excepting at Bombay, or any Place nearer to " Bombay than Surat; but ſhall receive no Aſſiſtance from the Governor General and Council of " Bengal, nor from any other Preſidency of the Company; nor, if he ſhall chuſe any of the Com- " pany's Preſidencies or Settlements for the Place of his Reſidence, ſhall he be permitted to " re-aſſert his Pretenſions to the Adminiſtration of the Maratta State, without the entire and uni- " verſal Conſent and Requiſition of all the Members of the State who are included as Parties in " the Treaty;"

Agreed to.

Conſidered the 3d and 4th Articles of the propoſed Treaty included in the Governor General's 4th Propoſition; viz.

3d. " That the Paiſhwa and Rulers of the Maratta State ſhall agree to an Alliance, offenſive and " defenſive, with the Company, againſt the French and Hyder Ally Cawn; and ſhall immediately " employ their Forces in conjunction with ours, in the Invaſion of his Dominions, and in the " Proſecution of ſuch Operations againſt him as the Circumſtances of the War, and the Judgment " of thoſe who have the Conduct of it on both Sides, ſhall determine: And if in the Courſe of it " any Acquiſition of Territory ſhall be made, theſe ſhall be equally ſhared between the Parties to " this Engagement, in ſuch Manner as ſhall be moſt ſuitable to the Situation and Contiguity of the " Places or Dominions at this Time reſpectively held by them:"

4th. " That if the Paiſhwa will not agree to the propoſed Alliance, Peace be nevertheleſs con- " cluded, each Party retaining what it hath acquired; or, that a Suſpenſion of Hoſtilities ſhall " take place on both Sides, during One Year from the Date of the Treaty, for the Purpoſe of nego- " tiating the Terms of a future and perpetual Adjuſtment:"

Sir Eyre Coote—I agree.

Mr. Wheler—I agree.

Mr. Francis—My Opinion is already given in my Minute.

Agreed to the 3d and 4th Articles.

Conſidered the 5th Article; viz.

" That the Treaty ſhall be concluded with the Mediation and Guarantee of Rajah Moodajee " Booſla, who ſhall be a ſubſcribing Party to it, and ſhall bind himſelf and his Succeſſor to the " faithful Obſervance and Support of it;"

Agreed to.

Conſidered the 6th Article; viz.

" That

" That the Treaty ſhall be ſealed, ſigned, and ſanctified by the reſpective Parties to it, with " the moſt ſolemn Oaths preſcribed by their reſpective Religions ;"

Agreed to.

Conſidered the 7th Article.

" That One Copy of the Treaty, executed in the Manner preſcribed by the Governor General " and Council of Bengal, being received by the Paiſhwa or his Miniſters, Two Copies or " Counterparts thereof ſhall be in like Manner executed by the Paiſhwa and principal Rulers of " the Maratta State, and Raja Moodajee Booſla as the Guarantee to it, in the Manner above- " mentioned, and ſhall be tranſmitted, one to the Government of Bombay and the other to Ge- " neral Goddard, or to the Officer commanding the Detachment ſent from Bengal, that all Hoſ- " tilities may immediately ceaſe on both Sides, and each provide for the due Execution of the " Treaty. But until the Treaty ſhall be thus notified on the Part of the Paiſhwa, it ſhall not " be binding on the Governor General and Council, neither ſhall it be binding, unleſs it ſhall be " ſo ratified within Two Months after the Receipt of it ;"

Agreed to.

Read the Governor General's 5th Propoſition.

" That a Letter be written to the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, and a ſimilar " Order to General Goddard and Major Camac, requiring and commanding them immediately to " ſuſpend all Hoſtilities and Military Operations, on the Receipt of a Requiſition in Writing to " that Effect, and a Notification from the Paiſhwa that the like Order has been given on his " Part to the Officers commanding his Armies ; and that the Paiſhwa be adviſed of theſe Orders, " that, if deſirous of Peace, he may make the ſaid Requiſition and Notification accordingly ;"

Reſolved in the Terms of the Propoſition.

Read the Governor General's 6th Propoſition.

" That the Treaty being executed by the Governor General and Council in the Manner ſpeci- " fied by the 6th and 7th Articles of the Fourth Reſolution, it be forwarded to Moodajee Booſla " with Two blank Copies of it ; that if he ſhould approve of it, it may be previouſly ratified on " his Part as Guarantee, and tranſmitted with the Treaty executed by this Government to the " Paiſhwa for his Ratification, in the Manner preſcribed by the 6th and 7th Articles of the Re- " ſolution;"

Reſolved accordingly in the Terms of the Propoſition.

Warren Haſtings,
P. Francis,
Ed Wheler.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 2d October 1780.

PRESENT,

Depart- Monday.

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Eſquire, Governor General, Preſident,
Philip Francis, Edward Wheler, } Eſquires,
Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote, K. B.

The Proceedings of the 25th, 26th, and 27th ultimo, read and approved.

The Governor General lays before the Board the following Draft of a Treaty with the Paiſhwa, formed on the Reſolutions of the 27th ultimo. He thinks it incumbent upon him to add, that he had finiſhed it before he received the Information of Mr. Francis's Intention of bringing on the Queſtion, which has taken up the Time of this Meeting in their Public Department, becauſe under ſuch a Diſcouragement he doubts whether he could have undertaken it, and becauſe he now entertains Doubts of its proving effectual.

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We the Governor General and Council appointed for the Management of all Affairs of the Engliſh Nation and Company in the Province of Bengal and its Dependencies, do, in the Name of the ſaid Company and for ourſelves, and for all the Governments, Servants, and Miniſters of the ſaid Company, and of the Engliſh Nation, in the Empire of Hindoſtan, offer Peace and Friendſhip to the Peſhwa and Rulers of the Maratta State, on the following Conditions of a Treaty, to which we have previouſly affixed our Signatures and the Seal of the ſaid Company, declaring it to be binding on our Part from this Day and for ever, provided the Peſhwa ſhall ratify it on his Part in the Manner hereinafter ſtipulated, but in every other Caſe to be from this Time and for ever void.

1ſt, All Forts, Cities, and Territories, which have been or ſhall have been acquired at the Time of the final Execution of this Treaty, by the Engliſh Arms ſince the Commencement of the preſent War, that is to ſay, ſince the Month of January 1779, and which did formerly belong to the Maratta State (excepting the City of Ahmedabad, and the Diviſion of the Province of Guzerat, which have been confirmed and guarantied to Rajah Futty Sing Row Guicawar, by a Treaty concluded between him and the Honourable Engliſh Company, and the Fortreſs of Gwalior, which has been in the like Manner granted and guarantied by Treaty to the Rana of Gohud) ſhall be immediately reſtored to the Peſhwa and delivered into the Charge of ſuch Perſons as ſhall be appointed by him to receive them, without any

Plea

Plea of Delay or Reſervation of Right whatever; and it is hereby underſtood and declared, That the City of Ahmedabad and Diviſion of Guzerat aforeſaid, ſhall be allowed to remain in the Poſſeſſion of Futty Sing Row Guicawar, and that the Fortreſs of Gwalior ſhall remain in like Manner the Property of the Rana of Gohud conformably to the Faith of the Treaties concluded with each; the Obligations of which are, in all Events, and under all Circumſtances, perpetual and unalterable.

2d. If the Fort of Baſſein ſhall have been taken by the Engliſh Forces, and ſhall be in their Poſſeſſion at the Time of the final Ratification of this Treaty, we offer and agree to give in Exchange for the perpetual Ceſſion and Grant of the ſaid Fort and its Dependencies, all the Lands and Rights which we have acquired by virtue of the 3d and 7th Articles of the Treaty of Poorunder, and of the Treaty formerly concluded by the Preſident and Council of Bombay with Rajah Futty Sing Row Guicawar, and to confine all the Poſſeſſions of the Company which are adjacent to thoſe of the Maratta State, to the Iſlands of Bombay and Salſette, and the other ſmaller Iſlands adjacent, the Fort and Dependencies of Baſſein, the City of Surat and its Dependencies in the Manner in which it was before held by the Company, and the entire Poſſeſſion and Property of the City and Pergunnah of Broach, together with the Factories of Commerce which were eſtabliſhed before the Commencement of the War; but if this Offer, which is ſolely made from the Deſire of Peace, and for the Prevention of future Diſputes and Competitions, ſhall not be approved on the Part of the Peſhwa, then the Fort of Baſſein ſhall be reſtored conformably to the general Tenor and Obligation of the preceding Article, and the Ceſſions made by the Treaty of Poorunder ſhall remain as before.

3d. A Proviſion ſhall be made for the Maintenance of Ragonaut Row during his Life, equal to that ſtipulated in the 11th Article of the Treaty of Poorunder, with the Exception of that Part of it which reſpects the Place of his Reſidence. This ſhall be left to his Option, except that he ſhall not be permitted to reſide in Bombay, nor in any of the Places dependent on the Company nearer to Bombay than the City of Surat; he ſhall receive no Aſſiſtance from the Governor General and Council of Bengal, nor from any other Preſidency of the Company, nor if he ſhall chuſe to reſide in any Settlement of the Company under the Limitation aforeſaid, ſhall he be permitted to re-aſſert his Pretenſions to the Adminiſtration of the Maratta State, without the entire and univerſal Conſent and Requiſition of all the Members of that State, who are included as Parties in this Treaty.

4th. The Peſhwa and Rulers of the Maratta State ſhall agree to an Alliance offenſive and defenſive with the Company againſt Hyder Ally Cawn, and ſhall immediately employ their Forces in Conjunction with ours, in the Invaſion of his Dominions, and in the Proſecution of ſuch Operations againſt him as the Circumſtances of the War, and the Judgment of thoſe who have the Conduct of it on both Sides, ſhall determine; and if in the Courſe of it any Acquiſition of Territory ſhall be made, theſe ſhall be equally ſhared between the Parties to this Engagement, in ſuch Manner as ſhall be moſt ſuitable to the Situation and Contiguity of the Places or Dominions at this Time reſpectively held by both.

5th. If the Peſhwa will not agree to the propoſed Alliance, Peace ſhall be nevertheleſs concluded, each Party retaining what it hath acquired; or a Suſpenſion of Hoſtilities ſhall take place on both Sides during One Year from the Date of the Treaty, for the Purpoſe of negociating the Terms of a future and perpetual Adjuſtment.

6th. Whereas Rajah Moodajee Booſla has offered his Mediation and Guarantee for the Furtherance and future Maintenance of a Reconciliation between the Peſhwa and this Government, and we have been induced principally by his earneſt and repeated Perſuaſions and Solicitations, to make theſe liberal Advances on our Parts to effect it: We do therefore conſent and agree to accept of his Guarantee, and have for that Purpoſe, and for the further Prevention of Delays, cauſed this Treaty to be tranſmitted firſt to him, and we deſire that he will be pleaſed to ſubſcribe thereto a Declaration, witneſſed by the principal Miniſter of his State, and ſanctified by the moſt binding Oath of his Religion, that he doth conſent and engage to become a Party to this Treaty, and the Guarantee for the faithful Obſervance of it; that he will be the common Friend of the other Two Parties ſo long as it ſhall continue inviolate, and the Enemy of that which ſhall firſt commit any Infringement upon it, until a ſufficient Atonement ſhall be made by the Party ſo aggreſſing.

7th. This Treaty being received by the Peſhwa, it is expected that his Seal and Signature, and the Seal and Signatures of Ballajee Row, Nanna Furneeſe, and of ſuch other Perſons as conſtitute the efficient Adminiſtration of the Maratta State, ſhall, within the Space of Five Months from this Date be affixed in due Form to Two Counterparts of the ſame, and that they ſhall bind themſelves, or be otherwiſe bound, in ſuch Manner as the Rites and Inſtitutes of their Religion will allow, to the faithful Obſervance thereof; after which the Treaty executed by us ſhall remain with the Peſhwa, and the other Two ſhall be forwarded, one to the Governor of Bombay and the other to General Goddard, or the Officer who ſhall be in Command of the Army of the Company which has been ſent by us into that Quarter, that all Hoſtilities may immediately ceaſe on both Sides, and each provide for the due Execution of the reſpective Parts of the Treaty. Unleſs the Treaty ſhall be ratified in the Manner and within the Time preſcribed by this Article, it ſhall not be binding on our Part, but be from this Time and for ever void.

We the Governor General and Council of Bengal, for and on Behalf of the Honourable Engliſh Company, in Teſtimony of our Sincerity, and as a ſolemn Pledge for the due Obſervance of this

Treaty in all and every of the Conditions and Reſervations therein ſpecified, have hereunto, ſeparately as well as collectively, ſet our Hands, and cauſed the Seal of the ſaid Company to be affixed, hereby binding the Company, ourſelves and Succeſſors, in the Name of God, and by the Faith of our holy Religion, to the true and ſtrict Obſervance thereof.

Sir Eyre Coote—I approve of the Draft of the Treaty with the Peſhwa, as laid before the Board by the Governor General.

Mr. Wheler—I approve.

Mr. Francis—I agree.

Agreed to the Draft of the Treaty laid before the Board by the Governor General.

Ordered, That the ſame be copied fair, that a Counterpart of it be made in the Perſian Language, that it be ſealed with the Seal of the Company, and ſigned by the Members of this Government.

APPENDIX, N° 311.

To Moodajee Booſla: Written 12th October 1780.

I Have received your Letter, &c. &c. all of which I fully underſtand, and have imprinted it on my Mind. You inform me, that you have aſſumed my Name as your own; nothing could be more gratifying to my Wiſhes, to my Credit, or my Friendſhip. Remember this, I ſhall ſet a Value upon it, as upon the higheſt Title of Honour, and ſhall conſider not only our Union as complete, but that of our Two States, as connected by Principles of everlaſting Durance. There are Inſtants in which the Minds of Men are irradiated by the Divine Influence, and when the Secrets of Futurity are imperfectly diſplayed to your Perception: God knows whether it is from ſuch our Inſpiration, that I exult in the Hopes that the Chronicles of theſe Nations will tranſmit to the remoteſt Poſterity our Names together, recorded in the ſame Page, and connected with Events not leſs illuſtrious in your Atchievements than important to the Intereſts of Mankind. If ſuch ſhould prove the Conſequence of our Connection, remember with how conſtant and unremitted a Perſeverance I have laboured to improve and perfect it during the Courſe of Seven Years ſince it firſt began: Nor have your Inclinations or Actions been wanting to promote the ſame End.

At your repeated Inſtance I conſented to enter into an early Accommodation of Peace with the Peiſhwa, and rejoiced at the Offer of your Guarantee for the faithful and effectual Maintenance of it; and I have been long waiting in anxious Expectation of a Meeting with your Dewan Dewagur Pundit, whom you had intimated your Deſign of deputing to me with Credentials and full Powers, both from yourſelf and the Peiſhwa, to negociate and conclude it. But in the Correſpondence which has paſſed between us, ſo much Time has elapſed that the Seaſon for Action has already commenced, and the Operations of War may be drawn into indefinite Lengths, and produce ſuch Variations in the State of each Party as may defeat the Purpoſes of Negociation; and beſides this, a new Scene has opened, which requires a new Train of Meaſures and a different Principle of Action.

You will doubtleſs have heard of the ſudden Irruption which the Nabob Hyder Ally Cawn has made in the Carnatic, and of the Conſequence with which it has been immediately attended, through the Want of Exertion and Failure of Preparation to oppoſe it. At the ſame Time we learn from undoubted Authority, that in conſequence of an Alliance long ſince concluded between him and the King of France, a large Armament of Ships of War and Land Forces has been diſpatched from the Ports of France to join him, and are at this Time either arrived, or are daily expected. The Objects of this Alliance are to proſecute his Deſigns, in the Execution of which he has been ſo long engaged, on the Maratta State, and thoſe of the French on the Carnatic.

It is equally the Intereſt of this Government, of the Peſhwa, of his Friends and Adherents, and of all Hindoſtan and Decan, to oppoſe Attempts of ſo dangerous a Tendency. The Differences between the Peiſhwa and the Company have prevailed againſt my Inclination from the Beginning; of that you are a Witneſs, and of the early Deſire which I manifeſted to accommodate them: Their Continuance can produce no poſſible Good to either Party, and muſt be attended with much Evil to both. The Laws of Nature, and the Principles of true Policy, require that they ſhould be upon Terms of mutual Friendſhip, ſince they want nothing from each other but Peace; and united, may dictate Peace to all Nations in India.

On theſe Grounds, and to prevent further Delays, I have precluded the formal and tedious Proceſs of Negociation, and in Conjunction with the Counſellors of this Government, have at once formed and executed a Treaty, which require only your Guarantee and the final Ratification of the Peiſhwa to conclude it. The Terms are nearly the ſame you yourſelf have propoſed, and they are ſuch as it is the Intereſt of the Peiſhwa to accept, if Peace and the Safety of his State be the real

Objects

Objects of his Miniſters. I ſend it to you incloſed with this, and with it Two Counterparts, intended for the Ratification of the Peſhwa: To each of theſe Papers I hope you will add your Sanction in the Forms and Manner propoſed, and forward them all with the Letters accompanying them to the Peiſhwa Nanna Furneeſe, to whom they are directed.

This is enough for the preſent. The Plan of Operations I intend ſhortly to write you in another Letter; and if you continue in the Intention of deputing your Dewan Dewagur Pundit to this Quarter, than which nothing can be more agreeable to my Wiſh, every Thing which will not admit of a Diſcuſſion by Letter may be adjuſted to our mutual and complete Satisfaction.

P. S. Regarding the Expences of the Cuttack Army, Beneram will write you the Particulars. It is neceſſary you ſhould ſend immediate Orders to Chumna Baboo to act in Conjunction with our Troops, whenever, and in any Manner, we may find it expedient to call upon him. If this cannot be done, he muſt be ordered to withdraw his Troops to Naugpoor, as their Situation ſo cloſe to our Borders cannot but have an unfavourable Appearance in the Eyes of People who are not acquainted with the real Motives for their being ſtationed there; or with the Friendſhip which ſubſiſts between this and the Berar Government. In my next I will inform you of the Plan of Operations it is intended to purſue, and the Part it is expected you will take in it.

To Dewagur Pundit: Writen 12th October, 1780.

Your friendly Letter reached me the 13th September, and I clearly underſtand the Contents. Beneram Pundit has alſo communicated to me the Subſtance of Two Letters which he has received from you, the latter whereof, being written in the Perſian Language, he ſubmitted in the Original to my Peruſal. Theſe are too long, and the Subjects too important, to be abſtracted; but I have conſidered and reconſidered them, and every Syllable of their Contents is imprinted on my Mind. Beneram Pundit knows how little Time I have to ſpare; but he alſo knows that I have employed many Hours, even Days, in conſidering upon all theſe Points, and upon the Means of facilitating and expediting our mutual Intentions. I have alſo explained to the Council all theſe Matters, and in Conjunction with them have reſolved on ſeveral Points and Meaſures of which it is neceſſary you ſhould be informed.

The Seaſon being now arrived for acting, will not admit of Time for Negociation. This Government has no Object in the War with the Peiſhwa; nor can it, any more than the Peiſhwa, gain any Thing by it. I was forced into it, and from the Beginning have ſought Peace, as you well know, you being at Poona and acquainted with the Inſtructions given to General Goddard for that Purpoſe. Our Reputation had ſuffered the greateſt Diſgrace, and the Company's Settlements brought into Danger, by the Failure of an ill-adviſed Expedition, ſet on foot by the Governor and Council of Bombay. It became neceſſary for this Government to exert its Power and Reſources in endeavouring to repair the Diſgrace which had thus been brought on our Reputation, and to preſerve the Company's Settlements.

The Credit of the Engliſh Name has happily been reſtored; the Danger which threatened the Preſidency of Bombay removed; all therefore that I wiſhed for has been accompliſhed, except Peace. And why ſhould I deſire to ſee the Company involved in a War with the Maratta State, whoſe Territories lie every way upon our Borders, and are as it were a Screen between us and others, who are our profeſſed and irreconcileable Enemies?

Hyder Ally Cawn has invaded the Carnatic, and by the ſame Improvidence which had nearly ruined the Company's Affairs at Bombay, he has been ſuffered to ravage that Country, while by the Diſſipation of our Army he has prevented its Junction and cut off a Part of it. The ſame Obligation which claimed our Interference at Bombay, now demands our utmoſt Exertion in Defence of the Carnatic. Thus, from no Impulſe or Act of my own, from no Intereſts of this Government, you ſee me again drawn forcibly into a Participation of Troubles, only the Lot of others, but which falling on the Intereſts of the Engliſh Nation, which are generally under my Charge, I am compelled to take the ſame Part in them as if they had been excited by me.

Hyder Ally Cawn, from former Connections with the French, our everlaſting Enemies, and from the War which has ſubſiſted ſo many Years between him and the Peiſhwa, is alike the common and natural Enemy of both. He has been incited in the Invaſion of the Carnatic by a League concluded by him with the King of France, in conſequence of which a large Maritime and Military Force is now on its Way, and perhaps at this Time actually arrived at ſome of the Parts of his Dominions. I have no Doubt that by the Bleſſing of God, which has always ſupported the Engliſh Nation, the Spirit of its Rulers and People which has ever riſen in Proportion to the Danger ſurrounding it, will bear them ſingly through their preſent Difficulties with Conqueſt and Glory; and their Reſources are very great; yet it is the Part of Wiſdom and Foreſight to make every poſſible Proviſion againſt impending Difficulties, and to leave as little as poſſible to the Power of Fortune, to which Providence in its Diſpenſations is often pleaſed to leave human Affairs. Should it happen, (which God forbid) that this combined Force ſhould prevail over our Forces in the Carnatic, let it be conſidered what an Accumulation of Power this will give to Hyder Ally Cawn; and, whether the Peiſhwa in the preſent diſtracted State of his Government would be able to withſtand it, ſhould he, as he certainly will, reſume his former Hoſtilities againſt the Peiſhwa's Government. His Arms have been employed for theſe Six or Seven Years againſt the

Peiſhwa, and with ſuch Succeſs, though unaſſiſted with any other Alliance, that he has poſſeſſed himſelf of the Maratta Dominions to the Banks of the Kiſhena; and the ſtrong Fortreſs of Merrick has been the ſole Obſtacle to his further Progreſs. But the Capture of fortified Places is to Europeans the Work of Art, and reducible to Certainty. In the Event which I have ſuppoſed, every Thing is to be dreaded in the Dominions of Decan, whether appertaining to the Peiſhwa or to Nizam Ally Cawn; and neither the known Bravery of the Chief of Berar, nor the Wiſdom which is known to have ever regulated his Councils, can exempt him from a Share in the common Lot. For all theſe powerful and united Reaſons, it is neceſſary that the Peiſhwa, the Raja of Berar, and the Engliſh, ſhould enter into a ſtrict Friendſhip and Combination, and exert all their Strength to repel this ambitious Invader. This Government is ſafe: Armed by its Reſources and the unconquerable Defences which Nature has provided for it, its Seas, Rivers, Woods, and Mountains, the Imbecillity of the Nations which ſurround it on its North and Eaſt Borders, and its Contiguity to your Country, which covers it with the Shield of Friendſhip, it can have nothing to apprehend; but it cannot be an unconcerned Spectator of the Dangers which threaten its remote Dependencies, or its Connections; therefore it is that I have repreſented to you all theſe Things in ſo ſtrong a Light.

You have frequently offered your Mediation and Guarantee between the Engliſh and the Peiſhwa and have preſſed me in the moſt urgent Terms to conclude a Peace. I have not only conſented to it, but have alſo offered it on ſuch Terms as I conceive will be moſt agreeable to you, to him, and to his Miniſters. Theſe I intended to have reſerved for a Negociation and perſonal Diſcuſſion with you, and had repeatedly ſignified my Wiſhes to you on this Subject in former Letters, but the preſent Occaſion will not admit of this Delay; I have therefore taken my decided Reſolution, and have formed a Treaty on the Ground of your Advice and Solicitations, in which, giving up all the Advantages we have obtained by the War, I have placed every thing nearly on the ſame Footing it was at the Commencement of the War. This Treaty executed by this Government in all the neceſſary Forms I now ſend you, with a Letter requeſting you will add your Ratification and Guarantee to it. I alſo ſend you Two blank Treaties to be executed by the Peiſhwa and his Miniſters, to which I requeſt you will previouſly add your Ratification and Guarantee. The Letter I have written to the Peiſhwa I encloſe with this, and as it is neceſſary you ſhould be informed of the Contents, I ſend a Copy of it for your Peruſal: You will ſend this Letter with the Treaty. I rely on your Friendſhip and Influence to render this Meaſure effectual, and to obtain the immediate Ratification of the Treaty in its preſent Form without any Deductions or Additions on the Part of the Peiſhwa and his Miniſters, becauſe that would be productive of Delays and defeat my Purpoſe in ſending them in their complete Conſtruction; and I have for this Reaſon made Conceſſions, to which I ſhould never have ſubmitted in the Progreſs of a deliberate Negociation: And remember, it is by your Deſire and at your repeated Inſtances, and from the Impulſe of my Friendſhip to you, which exceeds every Conſideration but that of my public Duty, that I have conſented to a Peace on theſe Terms, and have made theſe Advances to obtain it. If Peace on theſe Terms ſhall be accepted, it is well; if, added to Peace, the propoſed Alliance ſhould take place, it will be better, and every Party will find its Account in it: If neither of theſe can be obtained, which my firm Reliance on your Friendſhip and Sincerity will not allow me to doubt, I have done my Duty, nor ſhall have ought to reproach myſelf with for the Conſequences, which I ſhall chearfully wait, not doubting but by the Bleſſing of God all will turn out well.

When theſe Matters ſhall have been diſcuſſed and ſettled with the Peiſhwa and his Miniſters, I ſhall be very happy to receive the Viſit you have ſo long intended me, and I doubt not but the Interview will be ſatisfactory to us both, and tend to our mutual Advantage: For other Particulars I refer you to the Letters of Beneram Pundit.

P. S. The ſame as that to Moodajee Booſla in the foregoing Letter.

To the Peiſhwa: Written, 12th October 1780.

Two Years have now elapſed ſince the preſent War, which has brought conſiderable Loſſes on both Nations, firſt took place. God is Witneſs that this was never of my ſeeking, but that on the contrary, although from a Concurrence of Circumſtances I have been reluctantly drawn into it, my ſole Thoughts have been ever employed on the Means of preventing its Continuance, and I have Reaſon to believe that your Wiſhes have equally tended to this View, the ſole Bar to which has been the Difficulty of managing a Negociation between the Principals ſituated at ſo great a Diſtance from each other. With a View to remove theſe Obſtacles, Maha Raja Moodajee Booſila has offered his Mediation and Guarantee to any Treaty we may reſolve upon, and has propoſed to ſend his Miniſter Dewagur Pundit for the final reconciling of all Differences: But as this laſt Step would require a Proceſs of Deliberation, during which the preſent Hoſtilities, far from ſubſiding, might by ſome unforeſeen Accident and Occurrences be drawn into an indefinite Length, I have taken the Reſolution of making the firſt Advances myſelf, and have drawn up a Treaty, executed under the Seal of the Company, and the Signatures of the Council, and confirmed by the moſt ſolemn Oaths, which I have forwarded to Moodajee Booſila, that it may be by him ratified as Guarantee, and tranſmitted to you for your final Ratification. In this Treaty I have reſtored and ſurrendered

rendered every Thing, except what is ſecured by former Treaties, to Futty Sing, the Ranna of Gohud, and have left nothing for future Diſcuſſion; and I deliver up every thing in my Power, reſerving to myſelf only my Honour and my Faith to prior Engagements. Should the Terms of this Treaty meet with your Acquieſcence, you will ratify it in the Manner therein provided, and the one executed by us will then remain with you, that the preſent Hoſtilities may immediately ceaſe, and the Subjects of both Nations regain their former Eaſe and Security. Be aſſured that my continual Endeavours have been exerted to promote the Attainment of this deſirable End, and to root out all Differences and Miſunderſtandings.

To Ballajee Pundit: Written 12th October 1780.

Having taken into Conſideration the Deſire of Peace which the Miniſters of the Maratta State have profeſſed, and which it has been equally the Wiſh of this Government to promote, provided the Attainments of it could be procured on Terms by which neither the Company's Credit and Honour ſhall be affected, nor former Treaties actually exiſting infringed; I have been induced from theſe Circumſtances, added to others which it will be unneceſſary to mention, to propoſe a Treaty of Peace to be concluded between the Governor General and Council of Bengal, and the Peiſhwa and Rulers of the Maratta State, on certain Conditions, mutually binding upon both Parties. With reſpect to the War itſelf, I muſt obſerve in the firſt Place, that it was not originally of my ſeeking, and even from the Commencement of it to this Period, my Endeavours have been exerted to prevent its Continuance; but the Difficulty of managing a Negociation between the Principals, ſituated at ſo great a Diſtance from each other, has hitherto been a Bar to the Accompliſhment of this End. With a View however to remove every Obſtacle that has been in the Way, Maha Raja Moodajee Booſila, in ſeveral Letters which I have received from him, has been very ſolicitous and preſſing for Peace, offering his Mediation and Guarantee to the Execution of any Treaty we might reſolve upon, and propoſing at the ſame Time to depute an Ambaſſador on his Part for the final Settlement and reconciling of Differences. But this laſt Step would require a Proceſs of Deliberation too formal and tedious, eſpecially in the preſent Moment, which ought to be that of Deciſion and Action. I have therefore connected the whole of this Subject into one Point of View, weighing the good Conſequences that might be derived from the Mediation and Guarantee of Maha Raja Moodajee Booſila; the immediate Neceſſity of putting an effectual Stop to the Depredations and Ambition of Hyder Ally Cawn; and the obvious Utility not only in regard of preſent Intereſt, but future Permanence and Proſperity to the Maratta State, by making common Cauſe with the Engliſh, and cementing a cloſe and compact Alliance with them, offenſive and defenſive, againſt the French and Hyder Ally Cawn, at this Time united in Alliance, drawn up a Treaty with the ſeveral Articles to be obſerved, and the particular Reſervations to be excepted, and have inſerted the Name of Maha Raja Moodajee Booſila as a ſubſcribing Party, to the End that when it ſhall be properly executed by the Governor General and Council, it may for the greater Diſpatch be forwarded to Moodajee Booſila, with Two blank Copies of it, that it may be previouſly ratified on his Part as Guarantee, and tranſmitted to the Peiſhwa for his Ratification in the Manner eſpecially ſet forth and preſcribed.

I ſhall now refer you to the Treaty itſelf, perſuaded that you will find the Terms of it liberal, equitable, and fair, preſerving the Faith of Treaties inviolate, and conſulting as much as may be the Safety, Honour, and Advantage, of every Party ſubſcribing to the Engagement. Under theſe Circumſtances I doubt not of your chearful and ready Acquieſcence, together with a Determination upon no Pretence whatever to break or evade the Treaty, or to deviate, in the ſmalleſt Inſtance, from the Stipulations therein named and provided for.

To Madajee Scindia: Written 12th October 1780.

From a Concurrence of Circumſtances not in my Power, I have been driven into a War with the Maratta State infinitely againſt my Inclination; as I think it our mutual Intereſts to unite conſtantly againſt all other Enemies, inſtead of quarrelling ourſelves, I have been from the firſt perpetually aiming at a Peace, and finding all Attempts to negociate to have been conſtantly baffled and vain, I have now determined to put an End to the Conteſt, at leaſt on my Part, and have to that End ſent a Treaty to the Peiſhwa, ready executed, and only wanting his Ratification. The Treaty is to give up every Thing I have gained by the War, excepting what has been ceded by Agreement to Futty Sing Guicawar, and the Ranna of Gohud, ſo that I ſhall remain without the leaſt Benefit from the War; while I have in neceſſary Form addreſſed myſelf upon this Occaſion to the Peiſhwa and the Miniſters, I cannot overlook, in a Matter of ſuch Moment, one, whoſe Perſon forms ſo material a Support to the Maratta State; and truſt you will think my Terms too reaſonable to withhold your Concurrence.

While as an Enemy I may regret the Maratta Arms being conducted by ſuch Courage and Ability as have always been conſpicuous in your Conduct, yet I cannot as a Man withhold my Eſteem for the Virtues and Wiſdom you have diſplayed; as a Tribute to thoſe, receive this Letter; and as I have experienced you a powerful Opponent, ſo let me know you are an able Abetter.

To Moodajee Bhoosla — 15th October.

On Thursday the 12th Instant I dispatched, by the Way of Benares, a Letter to you, with a Treaty executed conformably to your Desire, on the Part of this Government with the Peshwa, proposed for your Signature as Guarantee, and to be afterwards forwarded with Two Copies for his Ratification of the latter, with other Papers. Of all these a Duplicate Packet is preparing to be sent to you by the same Road. I early apprized Beneram Pundit of my Intentions respecting these Particulars, and promised to enclose his Letters in my Packet; but as much Time has been consumed in preparing it, and I was impatient with the Delay, I forgot to give him Notice in Time, which is the Cause that his Letters did not accompany mine: At his Request therefore I write this for Explanation. I have given him a Copy of the Treaty which he will send you; although I hope you will before have received the Original. I see him daily, and as I keep nothing secret from him, his Letters and mine will afford you a complete State of the Affairs of this Government.

The Day before Yesterday General Sir Eyre Coote embarked with a large Detachment of European Infantry and Artillery for Madras, destined for the War against Hyder Ally Cawn, of which he will take the Conduct. You cannot be a Stranger to his Name and Reputation. It was to his Bravery and Military Skill that we owe the Preservation of the Company's Interests in the Carnatic, and the Extirpation of the French from that Country in the last War between that Nation and ours; and, by the Blessing of God, I trust he will be the Instrument of retrieving the Losses which we have recently experienced in that Quarter. He is a Counsellor of this Government, and the Commander in Chief of all the English Military Forces in India. I will add, that he is in his Heart my Friend, and therefore your's. Inclosed is a Letter from him to you. I request that you will favour him with your Letters, and send him express Notice of what you shall have resolved and done respecting the Guarantee of the Treaty, and of the Part which you propose to act in the Proposals which I have submitted to you, with your Advice for the Assistance of his Conduct in the great Affairs of which he has charge. In this you will confer a Kindness on me.

To Dewagur Pundit — 15th October.

Of the same Tenor as the foregoing, and assigning as a Reason for the General's not having written to him, that his Letter to Maha Raja was from the Ship, and that in the Hurry of Departure he probably forgot to accompany it with one for him.

To the Peshwa — 17th October 1780.

On Thursday the 13th Instant, (Month of Shawal) I dispatched a Letter to you with a Treaty completely executed on the Part of this Government, and Two Copies of it proposed for your Ratification of them through the Channel of Maha Raja Moodajee Boosla, which I hope you will have received. Lest any Accident should have befallen this Packet in the Way, I have thought it proper for the greater Certainty to send you a Duplicate of it through the same Channel.

General Sir Eyre Coote, who is Commander in Chief of all the English Forces, and a Counsellor of this Government, embarked on Friday last for Madras, taking with him a large Force of European Soldiers and Artillery for the War of the Carnatic against Hyder Ally Khan. By the Blessing of God all the Troubles there will soon be removed by his known Military Skill and the Bravery of our Troops, who want only the Presence of an able Commander to lead them to Conquest.

Having proposed to you an Alliance with the Company against our common Enemy Hyder Ally Khân, and persuaded that the Wisdom of your Ministers will dictate to you the Policy of an immediate Combination of your Forces with ours, for the early Prevention of his Designs, which are solely founded on an Enmity to you, as those of the French, his Allies, are to us; I request that so soon as you shall have ratified the Treaty which I and the Counsellors of this Government have offered for your Acceptance, if you shall have approved it, you will immediately cause Letters to be written to Sir Eyre Coote to advise him thereof, and of whatever else may be necessary in consequence thereof.

May God advance the Progress of our Friendship and of your Prosperity.

To Ballajee Pundit — 17th October.

On Thursday the 13th of this Month Shawal I dispatched a Letter to you with a Treaty compleatly executed on the Part of this Government, and Two Copies proposed for the Ratification of it on your Part, through the Channel of Mahe Raje Moodajee Boosla, which I hope you will have received. Lest any Accident should have befallen this Packet in the Way, I have therefore for the greater Certainty, thought it proper to send you a Duplicate of it through the same Channel.

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Let not the Novelty of this Propoſal either ſurprize you or render you averſe to the Ratification of the Treaty; I have acted on this Occaſion both as the Neceſſity of yours and of our Affairs has required, as I have found them too urgent for Delay; I rely on your Wiſdom to review this Action in its proper Light.

Hyder Ally Cawn, who is more your Enemy than ours, has with a large Army invaded the Carnatic, and from the Neglects and Miſmanagement of that Government has gained ſome ſignal Succeſs. The French, our natural Enemies, are daily expected with a conſiderable Armament, Naval and Military, deſtined to act in Conjunction and in Alliance with him. Their Object is the Conqueſt of the Carnatic; his, as you muſt know, the Reſumption and Proſecution of his Deſigns againſt the Dominions of the Peiſhwa: It is therefore your Intereſt equally at leaſt with mine, to provide againſt the Effects of ſo formidable a Combination. Therefore, relying on the concurrent Policy of our reſpective States and on your Wiſdom, to which it will be obvious, I have reſolved on this uncommon Meaſure; I have performed my Part, the reſt depends on you.

General Sir Eyre Coote, who is Commander in Chief and a Counſellor of this Government, embarked laſt Friday for Madras, taking with him a large Force of European Soldiers and Artillery for the War of the Carnatic againſt Hyder Ally Khân. By the Bleſſing of God all the Troubles there will be ſoon diſſipated by his known Military Skill and the Bravery of our Troops, who wanted only the Preſence of an able Commander to lead them to Conqueſt.

Having propoſed to you an Alliance with the Company againſt our common Enemy Hyder Ally Khân, and perſuaded you will approve the Policy of an immediate Combination of our Forces for the early Prevention of his Deſigns, I requeſt, that as ſoon as the Treaty ſhall have been ratified on your Part, which the Counſellors of this Government have offered for your Acceptance if you ſhall have approved it, you will cauſe Letters to be written immediately to Sir Eyre Coote to adviſe him thereof, and of whatever elſe may be neceſſary in conſequence thereof.

May God advance the Progreſs of our Friendſhip and of your Proſperity.

To Maha Raja Moodajee Booſla — 17th October.

On Thurſday the 13th Inſtant of this Month Shawal, I diſpatched to you a large Packet with ſundry Letters and Papers, of which I now ſend you Duplicates, leſt by any Accident the Originals ſhould have miſcarried by the Way. Having peruſed them, I requeſt you will be pleaſed to forward thoſe intended for the Peſhwa and Ballajee Pundit without Loſs of Time.

I alſo ſend a Duplicate of my laſt Letter to you.

APPENDIX, N° 313.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 2d November 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Philip Francis, } Eſquires.
Edward Wheler, }
Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote abſent.

AGREED, That the Governor General be requeſted to write to the Nabob Vizier, recommending to him to require from Fyzoola Cawn the Quota of Troops ſtipulated by Treaty to be furniſhed by the latter for his Service, being 5,000 Horſe, to be put under the immediate Command of Lieutenant Colonel Muir, commanding at Futtigur. Fyzoola Cawn to furniſh his Quota of Troops.

Agreed alſo, That the Governor General be requeſted to write to the Raja of Benares, requiring him to furniſh ſuch Part of his Cavalry entertained in his Service, as he can ſpare for the Service of this Government; and to inform what Number he can ſupply. That a Letter be written to Mr. Francis Fowke, directing him to make the ſame Requiſition of the Raja; and at the ſame Time, to obviate any Jealouſy which the Raja may conceive that this may be converted to a permanent Impoſition upon him, by aſſuring him, that the Board will require the Services of theſe Forces no longer than while the preſent War laſts; after which they will be returned. Rajah of Benares to ſupply a Part of his Cavalry for the Service of the Company.

Agreed, That the following Letter be written to the Reſident at Benares:

Sir,

On Receipt of the Intimation conveyed to us in your laſt Letter of the 18th ultimo, Orders were iſſued To Mr. Francis Fowke, Reſident at Benares.

iſſued to countermand the March of the Troops which were appointed to proceed to Benares, in conſequence of the Delays uſed by the Rajah in the Payment of his Subſidy.

Deeming it juſt and proper that the Rajah ſhould be deſired to afford every Aſſiſtance in his Power to this Government, to whoſe Protection and Support he owes all that he poſſeſſes, the Governor General has been requeſted to write to him to furniſh ſuch Part of the Cavalry entertained in his Employ as he can ſpare for the Service of the Company; but as ſome Jealouſy and Apprehenſion may ariſe in the Rajah's Mind, that his Aid may be converted to a permanent Impoſition on him, we think it neceſſary that ſuch Fears ſhould be obviated, and direct you therefore to aſſure him that we ſhall require the Services of this Force no longer than during the Continuance of the preſent War, after which it will certainly be returned.

We are, &c.

Fort William,
2d November 1780.

APPENDIX, N° 314.

Secret Department, Monday.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 30th October 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Philip Francis, } Eſquires.
Edward Wheler, }
Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote abſent.

THE Proceedings of the 26th Inſtant read, and approved.

Read the following Letter from Brigadier General Stibbert, encloſing an Addreſs to Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote from Major Briſco.

Brigadier General Stibbert, 28th October.

Gentlemen,

The encloſed Letter from Major Briſco, who commands the Detachment poſted at Damagur, being addreſſed officially to Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote, I opened it Yeſterday on its being preſented to me. As it contains ſome Information by no Means unintereſting at this Juncture, I have judged it proper to lay it before you.

The Seaſon approaching when the upper Rohilcund will be conſiderably expoſed to the Inroads of the Seicks, or other Adventurers from the Weſtern Side of the Ganges, owing to the great Number of Fords which lead acroſs that River in the dry Months, I purpoſe reinforcing Major Briſco by a Battalion from Futty Ghurr (Three Battalions having till lately been always ſtationed there) unleſs the Board ſhould offer any Objection to the Meaſure. However, when the Extent of Country, and numerous Ghauts to be defended by the Daranagur Detachment, is conſidered, I flatter myſelf, Gentlemen, that you will agree to this Expediency. I preſume that on a Peruſal of the Major's Letter, the Neceſſity of preſſing both the Vizier and Fyzoola Khan to contribute effectually to the Protection of the Rohilcund will not fail to appear to the Board.

I have the Honour, &c.
(Signed) G. Stibbert.

Fort William,
28th October 1780.

Encloſure in General Stibbert's Letter from Major Briſco to Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote.

Sir,

I had the Honour of addreſſing you Twice on your Way down to the Preſidency, reſpecting this Station, and I now beg Leave to give you every Intelligence of my Tranſactions in the Protection of Rohilcund.

The River Ganges is already fallen ſo very low, I am under the Neceſſity of ſending large Detachments to guard the Ghauts and Paſſes of the River, as the Seicks and Goodiers (Enemies of this Country, the Nabob Vizier's Dominions) are beginning to croſs the Ganges, and committing Depredations in Rohilcund. The Troops I have detached in conſequence will prevent them.

The Goodiers are an Enemy in Poſſeſſion of the Country on the oppoſite Side the Ganges to Rohilcund, and are conſtantly very troubleſome. The Seicks are a People who inhabit a Country a great way to the Northward of this, bordering on *Timur Shaw*'s Territories; and as they are a Set of Freebooters, they are generally at War with ſome of the neighbouring Powers, and frequently make

make Viſits, and want to invade Rohilcund; and if it were not for the Detachment at Daranagur, they would in a very ſhort Time lay waſte the whole Country, and only wait an Opportunity.

The Seicks and Goodries are moſtly Horſemen, and are a good deal like the Marrattas, in that they commence Hoſtilities wherever they go, and have made ſeveral Attempts on Rohilcund at different Times, Three or Four Years back; however, at preſent there are no very large Body of them aſſembled on theſe Frontiers; there are only Parties of them ſcattered about. But the Seicks at Times can collect a very large Army together, Thirty or Forty thouſand Men.

I have Information that Neizop Cawn is tampering with the Seicks, and uſing Endeavours to form a Treaty with them. I do not know what Deſigns Neizop Cawn may have, but he is making great Preparations for War, &c.

On my being appointed and taking the Command at Daranagur, I was not honoured with any Inſtructions from you regarding the Nabob at Rampore, Fyzoola Cawn's Troops. I have only Five hundred of his Horſe, and the Nabob in his Agreement with Government is obliged to keep up Five thouſand Troops for aſſiſting in the Defence of Rohilcund. A few Months ago Three Battaſions were ſtationed here with Colonel Muir, beſides a Body of the Nabob Fyzoola Cawn's Cavalry; and they were well employed, and had enough to do in protecting the Country from Invaſion. The Command is greatly reduced. One Battalion taken away, and Fyzoola Cawn has not afforded more than Five hundred Men ſince I have been here, which is a great deal too ſmall a Force from him, as I acquainted you in my former Letters Two Battalions were too ſmall to command Rohilcund from Invaſion. I want a larger Detachment from the Nabob.

I underſtand you intended ordering the Nabob to furniſh Fifteen hundred Men when you recalled the Battalion; and it is abſolutely neceſſary that he ſhould, as they are very much wanted on the Frontier Station where I have my Detachments.

I hope to be honoured with your Directions relative to Fyzoola Cawn's Troops, as ſoon as convenient. I wait the Honour of your Inſtructions.

I have the Honour to be, &c.
(Signed) H. Briſco.

Ordered, That the above Letters lie for Conſideration until our next Meeting.

P. Francis.
Edw[d] Wheler.

APPENDIX, N° 318.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, 9th October 1780.

THE Governor General lays before the Board the following Draft of a Letter to Brigadier General Goddard, in Reply to thoſe which have been received from him, under Date the 27th May, 20th June, and 15th July, and which are yet unanſwered.

To Gener Goddard.

Sir,

We are to acknowledge the Receipt of the ſeveral Letters which you have written to us under Date the 27th May, 20th June, and 15th July.

The candid Manner in which you have juſtified your Conduct in your Obſervations on the Paper of Madras Intelligence, tranſmitted to you with our Letter of the 24th January, is to us convincing alſo of the Falſehood of it; and we deſire you to be aſſured that in ſending this Paper to you, and requiring your Anſwer to it, we were actuated by no Motive but that of affording you an Opportunity of exculpating yourſelf from Charges which might have ſome Weight with the Public, though the Senſe which we have always entertained of your good Conduct would not permit of their having any Weight with us.

The ſucceſsful Enterprizes of which you have adviſed us of Detachments under the Command of Major Forbes and Lieutenant Welch, and particularly of thoſe under the latter, did not come to our Knowledge without heightening the favourable Opinion which we before entertained of the Merits of theſe Gentlemen, and have not paſſed without leaving the Impreſſion which they deſerve with us. We deſire that you will preſent our Thanks to Major Forbes and Lieutenant Welch, for their Gallantry and good Conduct on the Occaſions recited in your Letter of the 27th May and 20th June, as well as to the Officers and Men under their Command. The Services performed by the Regiment of Cavalry and by the Officers in Command of it, call for our particular Acknowledgments; and it is our Order that you make the ſame known to them on the Receipt of this Letter.

Our Orders to you of the 20th April, for the Reduction of the Regiment of Cavalry, were founded on our Belief that it was not of that Uſe to your Operations which was intended by our Appointment of it, to make Part of your Detachment. You had not to that Time made any Mention to us of Services performed by it, though you had particularly obſerved on thoſe of the Candah's Horſe,

Horſe, and we ſaw not ſufficient Reaſon to maintain an uſeleſs Corps, which could not be ſupported but at the heavieſt Expence. It has given us the greateſt Satisfaction to find ſuch ample Reaſon for entertaining an oppoſite Opinion of the Uſe to be derived to the public Service from this Regiment, and we chearfully abandon our former Sentiments concerning it for others more favourable, which we take up in lieu of them and under the Impreſſion of its Utility, as a Reward to a Body of our Troops, which inſtead of Diſmiſſion merit Encouragement; and on your Recommendation we revoke our Orders of the 20th April for diſbanding the Regiment of Cavalry with your Detachment, and conſent to its Continuance in the Service.

We adhere to the Orders which we ſent to you reſpecting your Demand on Futty Sing, for Payment of the Expence of the Troops ſtationed in Ahmedabad, and we not only now confirm them, but direct that before Ahmedabad be delivered up to Futty Sing, you claim and receive from him, in Behalf of the Company, full Payment of the Expence of the Troops employed for its Defence, from the Time that they were left there, as well as any Extra Expence incurred by the Company in the Capture of it.

Our Commands for the entire Reduction of the Allowance granted to Ragoba, were ſo ſtrict and poſitive, that we cannot but be in ſome Degree aſtoniſhed at the Liberty you have taken, under any Circumſtances, to grant him a Stipend from your Treaſury; but we at the ſame Time confeſs that the Reaſons which you have adduced to the Juſtification of your Conduct are very powerful; and if they do not entirely acquit you for Inattention to our repeated Orders on this Subject, they yet go far to ſupport you under it; they are ſuch too as, including Conſiderations which were not before us when our Orders were ſent to you, now induce us to approve of the reduced Allowance which you have granted to Ragonaut Row: You will be pleaſed to aſſure him that the Orders which we gave for the Reduction of his Stipend, did not ariſe from any Diſregard to his Rights or to his Claims to our Support; that he may depend on our Protection during the War in which we are involved with the Peſhwa, and on our Regard for his perſonal Safety and Intereſt, ſo far as it may be in our Power to provide for him after it; but we are certain that he cannot be ſurprized at our Inability to ſupply him ſo largely from our Treaſury, as the uſeleſs and idle Expence of an Indian Prince might demand from it; that the War in which we are engaged is burthenſome to the Company, and highly ſo; and that during the Continuance of it, it is incumbent on this Government to be as frugal in their Diſburſements as the Occaſion renders poſſible; but that we willingly allow the Sum of Ten thouſand Rupees for his Monthly Support, and have given you Directions to iſſue it to him, hoping that it will anſwer every neceſſary Expence.

With reſpect to the Plan of Operations for the Campaign, which we muſt now ſuppoſe to have been ſome Time commenced, we muſt leave it to your Judgment, guided and aſſiſted by the Opinion and Advice of the Gentlemen at Bombay. We have only One poſitive Order to tranſmit to you; viz. that if the French land an Army on the Coaſt of Malabar, you employ the Troops under your Command for the Defence of Bombay, and render every Aid in your Power to that Preſidency. You know our general Intentions, and we approve of the Sentiments delivered in your late Letters; but at this Diſtance we cannot venture to give Orders for any Plan of Operations for the Forces under your Command, ſince on your Receipt of it a new and unforeſeen Cauſe may prevent you from adopting it: You muſt not therefore wait for our Inſtructions; we leave you to act for the general Benefit of the Company under the Advice of the Preſident and Select Committee at Bombay; and to be guided by Circumſtances as they may preſent themſelves.

We are, &c.

Fort William,
9th October 1780.

Mr. Francis—There are ſome Parts of this Letter in which I cannot concur. I have not altered my Opinion with reſpect to the Regiment of Cavalry; and in regard to Ragoba, I am of Opinion not only that our repeated Orders ought to have been attended with inſtant and literal Obedience; but that, excluſive of the Expence, it is not prudent in us to furniſh Ragoba with a Subſiſtance. We ſhall aſſuredly be burdened with him as long as he receives it; and while he is with us, he will always be a Difficulty and an Obſtacle in the Way of Peace.

Having already in Diſcourſe ſubmitted my Opinion to the Board, of the Object to which General Goddard's Army ſhould be directed as ſoon as an Alliance or Peace with the Marattas ſhall leave him at Liberty to act, and finding that it concurs with the Views and Opinions of the Governor General, I ſhall omit to ſay what I was prepared to ſay on that Subject; I think that no Time ſhould be loſt in ſuggeſting it to General Goddard, and inſtructing him to prepare himſelf eventually for the Execution of ſuch a Service the Moment it can be undertaken.

APPENDIX, N° 320.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 5th June 1780.

PRESENT,
The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler, } Eſquires.

THE Governor General informs the Board, That having himſelf examined the Copy of the Treaty concluded with Futty Sing Guicawar, and compared the Engliſh Counterpart with the Perſian Original, and it appearing to him that they differ conſiderably both in Form and Subſtance, he thought it proper to cauſe an accurate and literal Tranſlation of the latter to be made for the Information of the Board, and employed Mr. D. Anderſon (with whoſe Knowledge of the Perſian Tongue the Board are well acquainted) in this Service. He now lays before the Board the Office Copy of the Treaty, with Mr. Anderſon's Tranſlation, and deſires that they may be entered in oppoſite Columns in the Conſultations, by which their Agreement or Diſagreement will be moſt apparent. Beſides the general Diſagreement between the Engliſh and Perſian Tranſcripts of the Treaty in the Copy received from General Goddard, the Governor General begs Leave to call the Attention of the Board to the 5th, 6th, and 10th Articles in particular, as he apprehends that in their preſent Form, they are liable to many Subjects of Contention. The 6th and 10th Articles making the Exchange of ſpecific Diſtricts expreſs Conditions of the Treaty, may admit of a Conſtruction which would deprive the Company of the Benefit intended by the 5th, which ſpecifies, that in any new Partition, the original Amount of the whole of each reſpective Share ſhall be preſerved; by which the Board have underſtood, that whatever Partition had taken place, or ſhould hereafter take place, between the Company and Futty Sing, the final Diſtribution ſhould be ſo ordered as to place each Party preciſely in the ſame Situation with reſpect to the Value of the Poſſeſſions allotted to each. That for Example, if the Poſſeſſions lately held by Futty Sing in Guzerat did amount in their yearly Revenue to 57,71,200 Rupees, and the Paiſhwa's Share of the ſame Province to 40,98,800 Rupees, the Lands ultimately appropriated to each ſhould yield thoſe Sums to each reſpectively; but, as this Partition is ſtated as a future and eventual Conſequence of a Requiſition on the Part of the Company, and the profeſſed Object of it to prevent Diſputes by the Intermixture of the Lands appertaining to each for want of proper Boundaries, it may be doubted or diſputed that the Lands which originally appertained to the Paiſhwa on the North of the River Myhie, and eſtimated by the Preſidency of Bombay to yield a yearly Revenue of 27,00,000 Rupees, and which were given up to Futty Sing in Exchange for the Poſſeſſions expreſſed in the 6th and 10th Articles, amounting by the ſame Eſtimate to 10,62,900 Rupees, are included in the Proviſion made by the 5th Article. The Board will therefore probably think it both prudent and equitable to put this Point beyond a Diſpute, and to inſure to the Company the Right which they undoubtedly poſſeſs, by the general Tenor of the Treaty, to that Share, or an Equivalent which was originally poſſeſſed by the Paiſhwa, and to which they are entitled as ſtanding in his Place.

The 5th Article contains a technical Expreſſion of a ſimilar Ambiguity with that of Jumma Khamil, which has occaſioned ſo much Diſpute in the Treaty of Poorunder, and an Inaccuracy in the Conſtruction which might likewiſe ſerve as a Pretext for future Cavil. On both theſe Points the Governor General has thought proper to conſult Mr. Ducarel, Superintendant of the Khalſa Records, with the Aid of the Naib Canongoes, the proper Official Judges of the firſt, and of the latter only as being neceſſarily conſulted upon the firſt, and competent to decide upon it by their general Knowledge of the Perſian Language. Mr. Ducarel's Report is as follows:

Mr. Ducarel to the Governor General.

Honourable Sir, Calcutta, 5th June 1780.

Agreeable to your Commands, I have examined the 5th Article of the Treaty between Futty Sing Guicawar and the Honourable Company, as expreſſed in the Perſian Language, and ſubmitted it to the Canongoes Gunga Govind Sing and Seuce Narain Muſtofy, for their Opinion of the exact Meaning conveyed by the Words *az* Company—*Keſil Mokurrurry*, and *Amdanni muaffuch Mamool*.

They agree with me in Opinion, that the Word *az*, which ſignifies from or by, is a Miſtake, put in place of the Word *beh*, to, which alters the whole Meaning of the above 5th Article, requiring the Company to give what it is intended they ſhould receive.

The Canangoes are farther of Opinion, that the Words *Keſil Mokurrurry*, and *Amdanni muaffuch Mamool* (the literal Meaning of which is, fixed Collections and Receipts agreeable to eſtabliſhed Uſage) reſpecting the actual Collections, and not a Jumma or Demand which, though eſtabliſhed by Law or Uſage, may not be realized: But they think that the Addition of the Words *Receipts agreeable to eſtabliſhed Uſage* (which they apprehend were not neceſſary) may leave room for throwing the Charges of Collection into the Ceſſion, or including them as a Part of the Produce of the Lands to be ceded.

I have the Honour to be,
(Signed) G. G. Ducarel.

By

By this Letter it will appear, that it is at leaſt neceſſary to give a Reviſion and Correction to the Treaty before it can be ratified.

Treaty between the Honourable Engliſh Eaſt India Company and Futty Sing Row Guicawar, Shemſeer Bahadar, concluded at the Village of Candeela, in the Purgunnah of Dubhoy, January the 26th 1780.

The Chiefs of the Engliſh Company and Futty Sing Row Sena Khaſs Kheel, Shumſhere Bahadar, at the Village of Candeela, in the Diſtrict of Dubhoy, on the 19th of the Month of Mohirrim, 1193 Hegyra, correſponding to the Year 1180 of the Æra of Adel Shaw, or 1836 of the Sumbut, have, with mutual Conſent and Inclination, ſettled and entered into this Treaty.

The Miniſters of the Maratta State having refuſed to accept of the reaſonable Terms of Accommodation offered them by Brigadier General Thomas Goddard, in the Name of the Honourable Governor General and Council of Fort William, and by their obſtinate Perſeverance in hoſtile Intentions againſt the Engliſh, compelled them to take up Arms in Defence of their own Rights and Poſſeſſions; the Honourable the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, with the Sanction and Approbation of the Honourable Governor General and Council of Fort William, have appointed and authorized Brigadier General Goddard to ſettle and conclude a Treaty of laſting Peace and Alliance betwixt the Honourable the Engliſh Eaſt India Company on one Part, and Futty Sing Row Guicawar, Shemſeer Bahadar, for and in the Name of all the Guicawar Family, on the other; and the following are the Articles of Convention mutually entered into:

Article 1ſt.

The Engliſh and Futty Sing Row agree to a League of defenſive Alliance, and to protect each other againſt all foreign Enemies whatever.

Article 2d.

The Miniſters of the Maratta State, by repeated Violations of Treaty, as well as their late Conduct, having drawn upon themſelves the juſt Reſentment of the Engliſh; having alſo, by undue Acts of Oppreſſion, proved themſelves the Enemies of Futty Sing; for theſe Reaſons, and becauſe the moſt firm and ſincere Friendſhip has long ſubſiſted betwixt the Honourable Company and Futty Sing, the contracting Parties mutually agree to enter immediately into an offenſive League, excluding the Government of Poona from all Share of Country in the Province of Guzerat whatever.

Article 3d.

The Engliſh agree to ſupport and defend Futty Sing

Whereas the Miniſters of Poona not having liſtened to Propoſals which were reaſonable and ſuitable to the Times, the Supreme Council of Calcutta ſent General Goddard with full Powers into this Country: And General Goddard having alſo ſent every Propoſal to the Miniſters of Poona that could tend to terminate the Diſpute and promote the Welfare of both Parties; but they not agreeing thereto, bound their Loins with Enmity, and intriguing with the Enemies of the Engliſh, entertained treacherous Deſigns in their Minds; wherefore it became neceſſary for the Chiefs of the Engliſh Company to ſettle Affairs with them: And the Gentlemen of Bombay having approved of the Propoſitions and Meaſures of the Supreme Council of Calcutta are impowered to form a Treaty of Alliance with Futty Sing Row Guicawar, Sena Khaſs Kheel, Shumſhere Bahadar, and all the Guicawars; and accordingly the ſaid Row and General Goddard have agreed together on the following Articles:

1ſt. A Treaty between the Chiefs of the Engliſh Company and Futty Sing Row Guicawar, Shumſere Bahadar, is concluded under ſolemn Engagements, that the Friends of the one ſhall be the Friends of the other, and the Enemies of the one the Enemies of the other: If any one ſhall invade the Territories of the Engliſh, it ſhall be incumbent on Row Shumſhere to puniſh him; and if any one ſhall paſs into the Country of the ſaid Row, the Chiefs of the Engliſh Company ſhall uſe their Endeavours to repel him. In this let no Deviation happen.

2d. Whereas the Miniſters of Poona have repeatedly violated the Treaty, which under the ſtrongeſt Engagements they entered into with the Chiefs of the Engliſh Company; and whereas they have committed various Acts of Hoſtility towards the Engliſh, and having alſo bound their Loins with Enmity againſt Futty Sing Row Guicawar, Shumſhere Bahadar, have greatly oppreſſed him, wherefore it has become neceſſary for their Honour to check and reſent the Injuries which have been committed by the Miniſters of Poona: It is therefore at preſent agreed, that having removed the Government of the Miniſters of Poona from the Country of Guzerat, we will conquer and poſſeſs ourſelves of the whole Country of Guzerat, and the Soubah of Ahmedabad, and make ſuch an Arrangement that the Miniſter ſhall not be able to receive or collect a ſingle Daum from that Country.

3d. The Share of the Country of Guzerat belonging

Sing in Poſſeſſion of his Share of the Guzerat Province, and Futty Sing is to aſſiſt and ſupport the Engliſh in poſſeſſing themſelves of and maintaining the Share now held by the Government of Poona.

belonging to the Guicawar ſhall be continued and kept entire, and the Share of the Miniſters of Poona ſhall be enjoyed by the Chiefs of the Engliſh Company, and Row Shumſhere Bahadur ſhall ſupport and aſſiſt the Chief of the Engliſh Company in taking it, in ſtationing Tannahs or Garriſons, and in keeping Poſſeſſion of it. And the Chiefs of the Engliſh Company ſhall not fail to ſupport and aſſiſt Row Shumſhere Bahadur.

Article 4th.

In order to accompliſh this Service, a firm Friendſhip is now eſtabliſhed betwixt the Engliſh and Futty Sing; the latter agrees to join the Engliſh with 3,000 Horſe, according to Cuſtom, and as many more as he can poſſibly raiſe, to act in Conjunction with them during the preſent War, whenever they ſhall call on him to do ſo.

4th. As it is of particular Importance to ſettle the Country, and as a Treaty of Union is eſtabliſhed betwixt Row Futty Sing Shumſhere Behadur, and the Engliſh; Row Shumſhere Behadur engages that he will ſupply for the preſent War Three thouſand Horſe as uſual; and further, as many more as he can, at the Requiſition of the Chiefs of the Engliſh Company, and will perform all that is incumbent on a Conjunction of Intereſts.

Article 5th.

As the preſent Mode of Partition betwixt the Poona Government and Futty Sing is attended with great Loſs and Inconvenience from the Diſputes that muſt ariſe from the Interference of each in collecting the Revenues of the ſame Places and that lay interſperſed with one another, it is agreed upon that a new Settlement of the Province of Guzerat ſhall take place for the mutual Benefit and Convenience of both Parties; the expreſs Object of which will be, an abſolute and ſpecific Partition of the whole Territory betwixt the Honourable Eaſt India Company and Futty Sing, according to the Proportion of the Revenues now reſpectively held by him and the Marattas.

5th. Whereas in the Diviſions held by the Guicawar and the Miniſters of Poona reſpectively, by reaſon of the double Government which exiſt in the ſame Town, and the Vicinity of their Villages to one another, Diſputes and Quarrels daily take place, the Collection of the Revenues of the Country is impeded and prejudiced, and the Ryots are diſtreſſed; the Engliſh Chiefs are for theſe Reaſons deſirous of ſettling a new Partition, ſo that a Treaty having mutually taken place, no Difference may ariſe: And with a View to the Intereſt and Welfare of both, a Portion of Country, equal to the Share held at preſent by the Miniſters of Poona, according to the eſtabliſhed Collections and cuſtomary Receipts of Revenue, ſhall, after the Conqueſt of theſe Diſtricts, be given in Exchange to the Company, it is intended that there ſhall not be a Daum Difference.

Article 6th.

Ahmedabad and its Dependencies, that is to ſay, the Country to the North of the River Myhi, now poſſeſſed by the Poona Government, to be allotted to Futty Sing, in lieu of which the Engliſh are to be put in Poſſeſſion of the Guicawar Diviſion of the Country South of the Tappey, known by the Name of Attaveiſſie, and their Share of the Revenues of Surat.

6th. The City of Ahmadabad, together with the Purgunnah, that is to ſay, the whole of the Country laying on the other Side of the River Myhi which is now poſſeſſed by the Poona Government, ſhall be conquered and given to Row Shumſhere Bahadur; and in exchange for it the Purgunnahs of Surat, Attaveiſſee, and the Chout of the City of Surat, ſhall be allotted to the Share of the Chiefs of the Company.

Article 7th.

The Engliſh will give ſuch Aſſiſtance of Force as Futty Sing may require, to conquer and put him in Poſſeſſion of the Poona Share of the Country to the North of the Myhi.

7th. Whenever Row Shumſhere Behadur ſhall require Troops to conquer the Country comprehended under the Share of the Miniſters of Poona, and laying on the other Side of the River Myhi, they ſhall be ſupplied by the Engliſh Company.

Article 8th.

The final Partition and Settlement of the Guzerat Province being made, each Party is to have the diſtinct and ſole Government and Poſſeſſion of the Diviſion allotted him, and to hold his Share independent of and unconnected with the other, except when united for their common Defence againſt a foreign Enemy, which they mutually and in the moſt ſolemn Manner agree to do. And this Partition, and this Settlement mutually

8th. After the Partition of the Country of Guzerat is effected, each Party ſhall have the ſole Government in the Diſtricts allotted to their reſpective Shares, and ſhall have no Dependance on one another, except when any Perſon ſhall paſs into the Country of Row Shumſhere Bahadur, in which caſe Aſſiſtance ſhall be brought by the Engliſh Company: And if any one ſhall invade the Share of Country allotted to the Engliſh

agreed to, is to be binding upon them and their Poſterity for ever.

Company, Row Shumſhere Behadur ſhall afford Support and Aſſiſtance. And this Partition of the Country of Guzerat, which hath with mutual Approbation been ſettled betwixt Row Shumſhere Behadur and the Chiefs of the Company, ſhall perpetually remain and be continued to their reſpective Deſcendants and Succeſſors: In no reſpect ſhall it be broken through by either.

Article 9th.

Futty Sing having requeſted that the Engliſh ſupport him in witholding the annual Tribute hitherto paid by him to the Poona Government, it is ſtipulated that the Honourable Company will do ſo till a final Peace ſhall be concluded betwixt them and the Poona Government, in which the Intereſts of Futty Sing ſhall be carefully and equally attended to with their own.

9th. Agreeable to the Repreſentation of Row Futty Sing Behadur, the Money which he annually ſends to Poona muſt not be ſent; he muſt keep it with himſelf. Whenever any Negociation for Peace ſhall take place with the Miniſters of Poona, the Intereſt and Welfare of Row Shumſhere Behadur ſhall firſt be diſcuſſed. The Intereſt of Row Shumſhere Behadur, and the Intereſt of the Company, are one and the ſame.

Article 10th.

In Conſideration of the Advantage that will ariſe to Futty Sing from the above Article, and as a Proof of his ſincere Regard and Friendſhip for the Engliſh, he agrees to cede to them the Diſtrict of Zinnore, and the Villages ſituated in the Broach Purgunnah, now belonging to him, both which are to remain for ever in the Poſſeſſion of the Company.

10th. As the above Article is for the Advantage of Row Futty Sing Shumſhere Behadur, he, from the Friendſhip and Regard which he bears towards the Chiefs of the Engliſh Company, ſhall make over to the Company the Diſtrict of Zinnore, together with the Villages of Broach, which are at preſent in his Poſſeſſion.

Article 11th.

All the Countries and Places made over to the Engliſh in this Treaty by Futty Sing are to be delivered into their Hands, and the Collections accounted for to them from the Day that Futty Sing is put in Poſſeſſion of the City of Ahmedabad; and no Demand of Collection for any paſt Time is to be made in them by Futty Sing.

11th. All the Purgunnahs and Villages above mentioned ſhall be delivered over to the Chiefs of the Company from the Day on which the City of Ahmedabad is delivered over to Row Shumſhere Behadur. From the Day on which Poſſeſſion is taken of the City of Ahmedabad, the Revenues of the above Purgunnahs ſhall be enjoyed by the Chiefs of the Engliſh Company; and after the Chiefs of the Engliſh Company ſhall have obtained Poſſeſſion, no Claims of Collection ſhall be made on account of the Time paſt in theſe Purgunnahs.

Article 12th.

It is agreed that Two Copies of this Treaty be immediately ſent to the Honourable Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay for their Approbation, and to be by them tranſmitted to the Honourable Governor General and Council of Fort William, under whoſe Sanction it is concluded, in order to receive their final Confirmation and Ratification; after which One Copy ſo authenticated is to remain with the Honourable Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, and another with Futty Sing.

12th. It is agreed that Two Copies of this Treaty, written fair, ſhall be ſent from hence firſt to the Gentlemen of Bombay, and by them Gentlemen from Bombay to Calcutta. As the Gentlemen of both Places have written regarding Row Shumſhere Behadur in the ſame Terms, having peruſed this Treaty they will return it under their Seals, ſo that one ſhall remain in the Poſſeſſion of Row Shumſhere Behadur, and the other will be depoſited amongſt the Records of the Company with the Gentlemen of Bombay.

A true Copy.

(Signed) Thomas Goddard.

A true Tranſlation.

The Seal of the Company.

(Signed)

Dalhouſie Watherſtone,
Perſian Tranſlator.

This Treaty was ſigned, ſealed, and delivered to the contracting Parties by each other, in the preſence of us who have hereunto ſigned our Names.

(Signed) John Cockerell,
Quarter Maſter General.
Edward Heard,
Adjutant General.

This Treaty under the Seal and Signature of the contracting Parties, is delivered to each other in the Preſence of the under written Sirdars.

(Signed) Thomas Goddard.



Futty Sing's Signature.

Signed { Govind Gopal, the Rajah's Duwan, and Rolajee Scindia, married to the Daughter of Scajee, Futty Sing's Brother.

Ordered, That the Governor General's Minute, and the different Tranſlations of the Treaty, be ſent in Circulation for the Peruſal and Conſideration of the Members of the Board.

The above Papers having been ſent in Circulation, they were returned with the following Minutes:

Mr. Francis—I think that for the Reaſons aſſigned by the Governor General, the formal Ratification of the Treaty ſhould be delayed.

Mr. Wheler Agrees.

Reſolved, That the Ratification of the Treaty be delayed.

The Governor General propoſes that the following Alterations be made in the Treaty; and that the Secretary, with the Aſſiſtance of the Perſian Tranſlator, do prepare a new Draft conformable to theſe Alterations, and lay it before the Board for Approval.

Governor General's propoſed Corrections of the Treaty with Futty Sing.

Preamble. To be rendered conformable to the original Engliſh.

Article 1ſt. Right in the Perſian; but inſtead of "paſs into," write "invade."

2d. Right in the Perſian; inſtead of "for their Honour," write "for our mutual Honour."

3d. To be enjoyed by the "Company," inſtead of, "Chiefs of the Engliſh Company."
Omit, "in ſtationing Tannahs or Garriſons," add at the End, "in the Defence and "Maintenance of his Share."

4th. Right in the Perſian.

5th. Right; but the Language of the Perſian to be corrected according to Mr. Ducarel's Report.

6th. Inſtead of "allotted to the Share of the Chiefs of the Company," write "allotted "to the Share of the Engliſh Company."
To be added, "Whatever Difference may ariſe in the Revenue of the reſpective Shares "by this Exchange, ſhall be adjuſted according to the preceding Article."

7th. Right,

8th. For "any Perſon ſhall paſs," ſay "when any Enemy ſhall invade;" and inſtead of "if any one ſhall invade," ſay "if any Enemy ſhall invade." Inſtead of "the Chiefs "of the Company ſhall perpetually remain," ſay "the Engliſh Company ſhall per-"petually remain." The reſt right.

9th. Right.

10th. With the ſame Addition as to the 6th Article.

11th. Inſtead of "ſhall be enjoyed by the Chiefs of the Engliſh Comapny," ſay "ſhall be "enjoyed by the Engliſh Company."
Inſtead of "after the Chiefs of the Engliſh Company ſhall have obtained Poſ-"ſeſſion," ſay "and from that Day."

12th. To be conformable to the original Engliſh.

The Board approve of the propoſed Alterations, and order that a new Treaty be prepared accordingly.

As the Board in their late Inſtructions to General Goddard have empowered him to annul the Interchange which has been made by the 6th and 10th Articles of the Treaty with Futty Sing Guicawar; and as theſe and every other Deviation from the Original Partition is provided for by the 5th Article;

Agreed, That Two Drafts be formed, each duly ratified by the Seal of the Company and Signature of the Governor General and Council, one ſtanding in the original Form with the preſcribed Corrections, the other the ſame, but with the Omiſſion of the 6th and 10th Articles, that they may be

be ſent to Brigadier General Goddard; and that it be left to his Diſcretion to obtain the Signature of Futty Sing and the Preſident and Council of Bombay, adding his own to either, and delivering the other to the Preſident and Council of Bombay to be cancelled and returned to this Board.

Warren Haſtings.
P. Francis.
Edw[d]. Wheler.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 26th June 1780.

PRESENT,
The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Philip Francis, } Eſquires.
Edward Wheler, }
Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote abſent.

The Secretary informs the Board, That in Obedience to their Orders of the 5th Inſtant, he has prepared Two Drafts of the Treaty with Futty Sing Guicawar, in the Manner preſcribed by thoſe Orders; and now lays before them that of the Two Drafts, in which the Treaty ſtands in its original Form, agreeable to the Tranſlation made by Mr. Anderſon, with the Corrections reſolved on by the Board, but with the Omiſſion of thoſe Numbers in the Original which formed the 6th and 10th Articles.

Treaty between the Honourable Engliſh Eaſt India Company and Futty Sing Row Guicawar Shemſeer Bahader, concluded at the Village of Candula, in the Pergunnah of Dubhoy, January the Twenty-ſixth, One thouſand Seven hundred and Eighty.

The Miniſters of the Maratta State having refuſed to accept of the reaſonable Terms of Accommodation offered them by Brigadier General Thomas Goddard, in the Name of the Honourable Governor General and Council of Fort William, and by their obſtinate Perſeverance in hoſtile Intentions againſt the Engliſh, compelled them to take up Arms in Defence of their own Rights and Poſſeſſions; the Honourable the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, with the Sanction and Approbation of the Honourable Governor General and Council of Fort William, have appointed and authorized Brigadier General Goddard to ſettle and conclude a Treaty of laſting Peace and Alliance betwixt the Honourable the Eaſt India Company on one Part, and Futty Sing Row Guicawar Shemſeer Bahader, for and in the Name of all the Guicawar Family, on the other; and the following are the Articles of Convention mutually entered into:

Article Firſt.

A Treaty between the Chiefs of the Engliſh Company and Futty Sing Row Guicawar Shemſeer Bahader, is concluded, under ſolemn Engagements that the Friends of the one ſhall be the Friends of the other, and the Enemies of the one the Enemies of the other: If any one ſhall invade the Territories of the Engliſh it ſhall be incumbent on Row Shemſeer to puniſh him; and if any one ſhall invade the Country of the ſaid Row, the Chiefs of the Engliſh Company ſhall uſe their Endeavours to repel him. In this let no Deviation happen.

Article Second.

Whereas the Miniſters of Poona have repeatedly violated the Treaty, which under the ſtrongeſt Engagements they entered into with the Chiefs of the Engliſh Company; and whereas they have committed various Acts of Hoſtility towards the Engliſh, and having alſo bound their Loins with Enmity againſt Futty Sing Row Guicawar, Shemſeer Bahader, have greatly oppreſſed them; wherefore it has become neceſſary for our mutual Honour to check and reſent the Injuries which have been committed by the Miniſters of Poona: It is therefore at preſent agreed, that having removed the Government of the Miniſters of Poona from the Country of Guzerat, we will conquer and poſſeſs ourſelves of the whole Country of Guzerat, and the Soubah of Ahmedabad, and make ſuch an Arrangement that the Miniſters ſhall not be able to receive or collect a ſingle Daum from that Country.

Article Third.

The Share of the Country of Guzerat belonging to the Guicawar ſhall be continued and kept entire; and the Share of the Miniſters of Poona ſhall be enjoyed by the Engliſh Company; and Row Shemſeer Bahader ſhall ſupport and aſſiſt the Chiefs of the Engliſh Company in taking it, and in keeping Poſſeſſion of it; and the Chiefs of the Engliſh Company ſhall not fail to ſupport and aſſiſt Row Shemſeer Bahader in the Defence and Maintenance of his Share.

Article Fourth.

As it is of particular Importance to ſettle the Country, and as a Treaty of Union is eſtabliſhed betwixt Row Futty Sing Shemſeer Bahader and the Engliſh, Row Shemſeer Bahader engages that he will ſupply for the preſent War Three thouſand Horſe as uſual, and farther, as many more as he can, at the Requiſition of the Chiefs of the Engliſh Company, and will perform all that is incumbent on a Conjunction of Intereſts.

Article

Article Fifth.

Whereas in the Diviſions held by the Guicawar, and the Miniſters of Poona reſpectively on reaſon of the double Government which exiſts in the ſame Town, and the Vicinity of their Villages to one another, Diſputes and Quarrels daily take place; the Collection of the Revenues of the Country is impeded and prejudiced; and the Ryots are diſtreſſed; the Engliſh Chiefs are for theſe Reaſons deſirous of ſettling a new Partition, ſo that a Treaty having mutually taken place, no Difference may ariſe; and with a View to the Intereſt and Welfare of both, a Portion of Country equal to the Share held at preſent by the Miniſters of Poona, according to the eſtabliſhed Collections and cuſtomary Receipts of Revenue, ſhall after the Conqueſt of theſe Diſtricts be given in Exchange to the Company. It is intended that there ſhall not be a Dauin Difference.

Article Sixth.

The City of Ahmedabad, together with the Purgunnahs, that is to ſay, the Whole of the Country laying on the other Side of the River Mahé, which is now poſſeſſed by the Poona Government, ſhall be conquered and given to Row Shemſeer Bahadar; and in Exchange for it the Purgunnahs of Surat Attaveeſſee, and the Chout of the City of Surat, ſhall be allotted to the Share of the Engliſh Company: Whatever Difference may ariſe in the Revenue of the reſpective Shares by this Exchange ſhall be adjuſted according to the preceding Article.

Article Seventh.

Whenever Row Shemſeer Bahadar ſhall require Troops to conquer the Country comprehended under the Share of the Miniſters of Poona, and laying on the other Side of the River Mahé, they ſhall be ſupplied by the Engliſh Company.

Article Eighth.

After the Partition of the Country of Guzerat is effected, each Party ſhall have the ſole Government in the Diſtricts allotted to their reſpective Shares, and ſhall have no Dependance on one another; except when any Enemy ſhall invade the Country of Row Shemſeer Bahadar, in which Caſe Aſſiſtance ſhall be brought by the Engliſh Company; and if any Enemy ſhall invade the Share of Country allotted to the Engliſh Company, Row Shemſeer Bahadar ſhall afford Support and Aſſiſtance. And this Partition of the Country of Guzerat, which hath with mutual Approbation been ſettled betwixt Row Shemſeer Bahadar and the Engliſh Company, ſhall perpetually remain and be continued to their reſpective Deſcendants and Succeſſors: In no Reſpect ſhall it be broken through by either.

Article Ninth.

Agreeable to the Repreſentation of Row Futty Sing Bahadar, the Money which he annually ſends to Poona muſt not be ſent, he muſt keep it with himſelf: Whenever any Negociation for Peace ſhall take place with the Miniſters of Poona, the Intereſt and Welfare of Row Shemſeer Bahadar ſhall firſt be diſcuſſed. The Intereſts of Row Shemſeer Bahadar and the Intereſts of the Company are one and the ſame.

Article Tenth.

As the above Article is for the Advantage of Row Futty Sing Shemſeer Bahadar, he, from the Friendſhip and Regard which he bears towards the Chiefs of the Engliſh Company, ſhall make over to the Company the Diſtrict of Zinnore, together with the Villages of Broach, which are at preſent in his Poſſeſſion: Whatever Difference may ariſe in the Revenue of the reſpective Shares by this Exchange, ſhall be adjuſted according to the Fifth Article.

Article Eleventh.

All the Purgunnahs and Villages abovementioned ſhall be delivered over to the Chiefs of the Company from the Day on which the City of Ahmedabad is delivered over to Row Shemſeer Bahadar. From the Day on which Poſſeſſion is taken of the City of Ahmedabad, the Revenues of the above Purgunnahs ſhall be enjoyed by the Engliſh Company, and from that Day no Claim of Collection ſhall be made on Account of the Time paſt in theſe Purgunnahs.

Article Twelfth.

It is agreed, That Two Copies of this Treaty be immediately ſent to the Honourable Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, for their Approbation, and to be by them tranſmitted to the Honourable Governor General and Council of Fort William, under whoſe Sanction it is concluded, in order to receive their final Confirmation and Ratification; after which one Copy ſo authenticated is to remain with the Honourable Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, and another with Futty Sing.

Approved the Drafts; and ordered that a fair Copy of them be made in Duplicate to receive the Signature of the Members of the Board, and to be ſealed with the Seal of the Company.

Agreed, That when the Treaties ſhall have been ſigned, and the Seal of the Company been affixed to them, they be tranſmitted to Brigadier General Goddard, with the following Letter:

Sir,

We have for ſome Time paſt had under Conſideration a Copy of the Treaty concluded by you on the 26th of January laſt with Futty Sing Guicawar, and tranſmitted to us by the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay in the Engliſh and Perſian Languages for our Ratification.

On a Compariſon of the Engliſh Counterpart of this Treaty with the Perſian, they appeared to us to differ ſo conſiderably both in Form and Subſtance, that we determined to remove the Doubts which we had on this Point, by employing ſome Perſon in whoſe Knowledge of the Perſian Lan-

Accommodation with the Maratta State. The Proviſion ſtipulated for him in the Treaty of Proondur, is in our Opinion adequate to his Rank and Wants, and places him in a State of Safety and Independence; and we expect and ſhall require his Conſent to ſuch a Proviſion as was then made for him: Upon this Principle we ſhould have approved of the Offers made to you by Madjee Scindia for the Reſidence of Ragoba at Jaunſee, with ſuch a Proviſion for his Subſiſtence, if that Fortreſs and its Dependency, or ſuch Portion of it as was equal to the clear Revenue intended to be appropriated to his Uſe, were aſſigned to him abruptly, and independantly of any other Controul. We think proper to give you this Explanation of our Sentiments, that you may conform to them in future, on any Occaſion that may preſent itſelf to bring the War to an honourable Concluſion.

We have in all our late Letters informed you of the Difficulty we had found in making the large Remittances of Caſh which we had ſent to Bombay for the Support of that Preſidency, and to Surat for the Supply of your Army: We are alone unequal to ſo great a Charge upon our Income, and have therefore in our Letter to the Select Committee of Bombay of this Date, deſired them to appropriate the Acceſſion of Revenue which may immediately ariſe to the Company from the Operations and Succeſſes of your Army, excluſively to that Expence. We truſt that you will be able to ſecure from the Ravages and Incurſions of the Enemy the Diſtricts which you may have obtained; and that the Collections will equal the Eſtimate made of them, at leaſt during the rainy Seaſon, in which they will be leſs liable to Interruption; and for ſuch further Sums as you may indiſpenſably want, we authorize you to draw Bills upon us at Par; but we poſitively prohibit them on any other Terms.

We are, &c.

Fort William,
15th May 1780.

APPENDIX, N° 321 and 322.

N° 321.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, 2d October 1780.

READ the following Letter from Brigadier General Goddard:

Gentlemen,

I have the Honour to acknowledge your Letter of the 15th May.

In Anſwer to what related to the Partition of the Territory made with Futty Sing, I ſhall endeavour to explain the Circumſtance you have alluded to as clearly as I poſſibly can; and do not doubt being able to effect that Point to your entire Satisfaction.

After the expreſs Declaration contained in the Fifth Article of the Treaty with Futty Sing, where it is provided that a new and equitable Settlement of the Province of Guzerat ſhall take place, it would have been in me a Proof of an unpardonable Inattention to the Intereſts of my Country and the Honourable Company, could I have ſuffered them to be ſo materially injured as the ſuppoſed Difference of the Value of the Lands mutually ceded, admitting that Settlement to be juſt, would prove it to be the Caſe: Nothing but the ſtrongeſt Conſiderations of political Expediency could have juſtified ſuch a Step; and had ſuch exiſted, I ſhould have deemed myſelf highly culpable in withholding from you in the Firſt Inſtance every minute Information upon a Point of ſo much Importance. I acknowledge however that the Neceſſity for making ſuch a Sacrifice never did exiſt; and I alſo affirm that the preſent Partition of Country, as far as my Knowledge of the reſpective Value of each Share, drawn from the beſt Authority and Information I could procure, enabled me to judge, it was not only made in an equal and juſt Proportion, but from many Conſiderations greatly to the Benefit and particular Advantage of the Company, excluſive of the general Conveniences, and, when it was formed, deſirable Object of the Alliance itſelf.

I could have wiſhed the Honourable Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay had deferred tranſmitting you their Letter to me of the 24th February till they received my Anſwer; that both might have been ſent at the ſame Time, in order to prevent any partial Impreſſion, and by having the Matter more fully ſtated, enable you to decide with more Certainty and Preciſion upon the ſeveral Circumſtances of it. They will no Doubt have corrected this, by ſubmitting it to your Conſideration as ſoon as it reached them, but leſt they may have neglected to do ſo, I beg Leave to tranſcribe for your Peruſal, ſuch Part of my Letter to the Honourable Select Committee of Bombay, of the 7th of March, as relates to the Subject in queſtion, and to which I further beg Leave to obſerve, they have never thought it neceſſary to ſend any Reply.

It

It was as follows:

"Reſpecting the Statement you have been pleaſed to ſend me of the Revenues of Guzerat, as "ſhared by the Peſhwa and Guicawar, but which you had, you do not anſwer for being altogether "accurate; I beg to aſſure you, that from the moſt exact Information I received, it is exceedingly "erroneous and incorrect. I ſhall take an Opportunity of laying before you an Extract and ſatis- "factory Statement of the Collections of this Province, for your more particular Information, very "ſoon; at preſent only permit me to obſerve, that the Eſtimate made of the Peſhwah's Share "of the Diſtricts to the North of the Myhie, exceeded the proper Value by at leaſt Fifteen Lacks "of Rupees. I ſhall mention Three Inſtances in which they are greatly exaggerated; Firſt, re- "ſpecting Pirlad, the whole Revenue of which may be reckoned at Six Lacks, Three only of "which are accounted for to the Peſhwah: Second, the City of Ahmedabad, whoſe Collections "amounted to about Three Lacks, and little more than Half belonged to the Poona Circar. "The Revenue mentioned under the Name of Muluckgeery, the real Value of which depended "upon the Force employed, and was never valued to the Peſhwa at more than Three Lacks; if "to theſe Deductions be added the Expences neceſſary to collect the Revenues from the Ze- "mindars, as well as to protect the Country from the Inroads and Depredations of the Cottywars, "and other Freebooters; it will be found that the real Value of the Pergunnahs ceded to the "Engliſh by Futty Sing, excluſive of the Conveniencies and Advantage of their Situation, is "equal if not ſuperior to that guaranteed to him by the Company in lieu of it."

The Facts being as above ſtated, and the Honourable Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay not having yet thought proper to controvert or weaken their Force by any Objection to the Argument I had uſed, I cannot help remaining fixed in my former Opinion, that the Exchange of Territory made by Futty Sing was equitable, and proportioned to the Claims of each Party, and calculated to promote the true Intereſts of the Company.

I ſhall however, in Obedience to your Commands, further conſult with that Government on the ſeveral Points you have mentioned relative to this Treaty: And as the expreſs and declared Intention of its Formation was, excluſive of its general and political Object of uniting with Futty Sing againſt the common Enemy, to poſſeſs ourſelves of the full and undiminiſhed Share of the Province formerly belonging to the Peiſhwa, ſhould any Thing yet be wanting to the complete Attainment of that End, I ſhall moſt earneſtly and zealouſly aſſiſt in contributing to its Accompliſhment.

I cannot quit the Subject entirely without venturing a few Words upon what you are pleaſed to obſerve reſpecting the local Advantage ariſing to the Company from the Exchange of Territory made with Futty Sing. This Meaſure was ſtrictly conformable to the Plan propoſed and recommended to me by the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay; and I muſt confeſs, from many Reaſons, it then did and ſtill does appear to me the moſt advantageous Mode of Participation that could be followed.

If the Lands to the North of the Myhie are further removed from the main Power of the Marattas than thoſe we gain, and rendered difficult of Acceſs by the Interpoſition of Three capital Rivers; they are alſo ſeparated, and in a Manner unconnected with the Company's former Poſſeſſions; and in caſe of an Attack, the ſame Obſtructions of Rivers, together with the Diſtance, would unite to prevent our being able to furniſh the neceſſary Aſſiſtance for their Defence, except at an increaſed Expence, and at extreme Hazard and Inconvenience, as all the Country we do hold to the Southward would in ſuch Caſe be left entirely expoſed to the Inſults and Inroads of the Enemy; beſides, the Entrance into the Northern Diſtricts is, at the Seaſon for Military Operations, always open to the Marattas by the Province of Malva; and whenever they have meant ſeriouſly to make an Attack on Guzerat, it has always been by beginning their Efforts to the Northward.

I ſhall on this Point alſo, in Conformity to your Directions, avail myſelf of any Advice the Government of Bombay may give reſpecting it, and at preſent take Leave of the Subject of Futty Sing, by expreſſing my ſincere Wiſh, that as the Treaty with that Chief was entered upon by me after the matureſt Deliberation and Attention to every collateral Circumſtance, poſſible Benefit or Diſadvantage to the Company; and as I promoted it with Ardour, from a Conviction of its great Utility, which has ſince been proved, on the Eve of an important and dangerous War, no Deficiency in the Means of attaining theſe Objects, or Cauſe of Alteration may be adduced, by which the Public Faith, or my private Character, may ſuffer the moſt diſtant Shadow of Reflection.

The Letters which I have from Time to Time addreſſed you ſince that of the 28th of March, will have fully confirmed the Accounts then given of Scindia's Inſincerity and Duplicity of Conduct, and the Impoſſibility of deriving any ſolid Advantages from a Connection with that Chief, or even of forming one, but upon Terms the moſt diſgraceful and unprofitable. That his principal Object is to get the Perſon of Ragoba into his own Hands, is obvious; but notwithſtanding the fair Openings given him in the Courſe of his Negociation with me, he never availed himſelf of them to offer Conceſſions to the Engliſh adequate to ſuch a Sacrifice on our Part, or even in the ſmalleſt Degree calculated to inſpire us with an Inclination to make it.

N° 322.

The Idea conveyed in your Injunctions relative to Ragoba, has been the Ground of my Treatment of that Chief hitherto, of the Plan laid down for the Profecution of the War laſt Seaſon, and of my ſubſequent Conduct towards Scindia; I ſhall continue to make it my invariable Rule, and I truſt, that the Honour and Dignity of the Nation may ſtill be preſerved unblemiſhed; and it will never be neceſſary to relax in it towards him.

It is always with the moſt real Concern and the ſtrongeſt Repugnance imaginable, that I am compelled to deviate in the ſmalleſt Tittle from the ſtrict Letter of your Inſtructions. With theſe Sentiments, if I at any Time do depart from it, nothing but the Expediency of the Caſe, and a Regard for the Public Good, which I know to be paramount in your Breaſt to all other Conſiderations, could juſtify me to myſelf, or furniſh any Shadow of Excuſe to you. Should my Judgment unfortunately err, I have ſo often experienced your Candour and Indulgence, that I know you would pardon the Error of the Action itſelf from the Goodneſs of the Intention which led to it.

When I wrote to you laſt, I informed you that I had entirely withdrawn the Allowance granted to Ragoba; this was my Determination; and in communicating to him the Neceſſity of ſuch a Step, I endeavoured to reconcile it to him in Terms the beſt calculated to remove every Idea of it originating from any Alterations in the friendly Sentiments of your Government towards him; and at the ſame Time to convince him of the political Juſtice and Propriety which dictated it. He pleaded his Poverty, and entire Dependance on us, with the ſtrongeſt Force of Language; but as he had no other Argument to make uſe of than his Neceſſities, he was compelled to acknowledge the Reaſonableneſs of your Decree, and only ſolicited me to lay before you the diſtreſsful State to which he was reduced. A few Days after that, I learned that ſome Jewels belonging to Ragoba had been offered for Sale in the City, and that he had diſpoſed of ſome Golden Female Ornaments. He ſhortly after renewed his Solicitations; he deſcribed to me his extreme Diſtreſs in the moſt moving Manner, informing me of his Attempt to ſell the few remaining Jewels left of his Family; but that, availing themſelves of his Neceſſities, the Merchants refuſed to buy them but at a Third of their Value; declared that he was unable to furniſh the neceſſary Subſiſtence for himſelf and Family; and concluded, after expreſſing his grateful Senſe of the many Favours he had received from the Engliſh, and his Regret at the inadequate Return it had been, and was then in his Power to make them, by frankly declaring, that as by his Continuance at Surat he muſt inevitably experience the Want of even the common Neceſſaries of Life, it would be expedient for him, in order to ſave his Family from periſhing, to direct his Courſe to ſome other Quarter; and requeſted me to adviſe him in what Manner he ſhould conduct himſelf in theſe trying and difficult Circumſtances. This was the Subſtance of his Converſation.

As I was ſenſible of the Truth of his Repreſentations, I felt myſelf greatly embarraſſed how to act. To the Feelings of Humanity, I found united in his Favour, many Conſiderations of political Convenience and Neceſſity, all which I have taken the Liberty of laying before you on former Occaſions; but at this Time they received an additional Weight, as I know from good Authority, that both the Miniſter and Scindia had their Engines at work, and were endeavouring by the moſt fair and ſplendid Offers to bribe him into a Confidence of their good Diſpoſition towards him, and avail themſelves of the Diſſatisfaction they knew he muſt feel from finding that we conſidered ourſelves as Principals in the War, without admitting him into any Participation of the Territories acquired by its Succeſs. From all theſe Conſiderations, I thought it an expedient and adviſable Meaſure, which from its good Policy, and I may add Neceſſity, would meet with your Approbation, to relax from the entire reducing of Ragoba's Allowance before reſolved upon; and as he had, from the firſt Intimation given him, diſmiſſed almoſt all his Dependants, preſerving ſuch only as could not decently be diſpenſed with, to allow him monthly, for their bare Support and the Subſiſtence of himſelf and Family, the Sum of Ten thouſand Rupees, till I might receive your final and deciſive Sentiments for my further Guidance; for be aſſured I ſhall not in the ſmalleſt Degree depart therefrom.

I have troubled you with this minute Detail, that you may be clearly informed of every Circumſtance, and by that be enabled fully to diſcover the Reaſons which operated with me on this Occaſion; the force of which I truſt you will admit; and in this Confidence I chearfully ſubmit myſelf to your Judgments.

Permit me to acknowledge, with the deepeſt Senſe of Gratitude, the honourable Marks of Diſtinction conferred on me by the Approbation you have been pleaſed to convey of my Conduct, in your Letter of the 19th of May, which came to Hand at the ſame Time with that of the 15th. I can only repeat what you have ſo often indulged me with an Opportunity of ſaying, that it ſhall be my conſtant and unwearied Study to make the ſole Return in my Power for ſuch unlimited Goodneſs and Confidence, by exerting myſelf on all Occaſions to promote the Intereſts of the Company, and the Honour and Succeſs of your Government; and that my future Actions will, I truſt, prove to you the Exiſtence of thoſe Sentiments in my Breaſt, which Language would in vain attempt to deſcribe.

My Letter of the 20th ultimo fully explained the Situation of Affairs in the Maratta State, reſpecting which I have received no new material Information; nor has, I believe, any Change whatever taken place. I look with anxious Expectation for your Reply to that Letter, and your Sentiments on the Plan of Operations for the enſuing Campaign, therein recommended and propoſed. The Deſcription I then gave of our new Acquiſitions, of which the Company now remain in full and peaceable Poſſeſſion, and muſt, until the Concluſion of the rainy Seaſon, will, I hope, make good your Expectations of Revenue from that Reſource; but it is unneceſſary to remark to you, how uncertain and precarious any Dependance on their Produce muſt prove during the War. When the Period of Military Operations in the Field arrives, and from the entire Want of Reſources in this Government, I muſt rely ſolely upon your Wiſdom and Vigour for the future Support of the Army.

Head Quarters,
Camp near Surat,
15th July 1780.

I have the Honour to be, &c.
(Signed) Thomas Goddard.

Warren Haſtings,
P. Francis,
Edwd Wheler.

APPENDIX, N° 324.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 4th September 1780.

Minute of the Governor General, 28th Auguſt 1780.

WHEN I took Charge of this Government, under the former Syſtem of it, I found it loaded with a bonded Debt of One Crore and One Lack of Rupees, which Amount, in a very ſhort Time after, grew to One Crore and Twenty-five Lacks; it was my good Fortune and Happineſs to ſee this enormous Debt wholly reduced, and a Sum accumulated in our Treaſuries, which, as I recollect, amounted at one Time to Two Crore and Twenty-one Lacks of Rupees. Since that Time our Expences have been increaſing, our Means declining (I will not in this Place enumerate the Cauſes of both) and it is now my hard Lot, and a painful Duty impoſed on me by the Neceſſity of the Times, to propoſe that we ſhould again have Recourſe to the Means of ſupplying our growing Wants, and provide againſt the multiplying Exigencies not of this State only, but of the other Preſidencies, whoſe Exiſtence muſt depend upon our Care of them, by taking up Money at Intereſt. The Sum I do not propoſe, becauſe I think it ſhould not be limited. The Subject is itſelf of too much Importance for a precipitate Deciſion. I deſire only to ſubmit it at this Time to the Conſideration of the Board; and requeſt, that the other Members of it will be pleaſed to contribute their Opinions upon it, hoping that it may be reſumed, and a final Concluſion drawn upon it, at our next Meeting in this Department.

W. H.

APPENDIX, N° 325.

Conſiderations upon the preſent Political State of the Company in India; written at Madras in January 1780.

THE Meaſures lately purſued at Bengal and Bombay in Support of Ragonaut Row, having drawn on the Company the Reſentment of the Maratta State, given Offence to Nizam Ally Cawn, who is in Friendſhip with that State, and a declared Enemy to Ragonaut Row, and opened the Way to a Rupture with Hyder Ally, by promoting Peace between him and the Marattas, and leaving him at Liberty to execute the Threats which he has denounced againſt the Carnatic; it is become a Matter of ſerious Importance with the Company, to conſider how they may beſt avert the Evils that ſurround them, and what Line of Conduct it may be proper to adopt, for eſtabliſhing their Affairs in future upon a ſolid and permanent Footing.

It

It was hardly poſſible to have imagined a more difficult, dangerous, and unjuſt Enterprize, than that of ſupporting Ragonaut Row's Pretenſions to the Regency at Poona; and if the Meaſure itſelf be examined without the leaſt Regard to the unfortunate Conſequences that have happened, it will be found diametrically oppoſite to the wiſe Maxims laid down by the Company for the Conduct of their Servants, and in its Nature liable to all the Difficulties we now experience from it *.

Ragonaut Row at the Time he was firſt taken under our Protection, was a Fugitive without Friends or Party. His ambitious Views upon the Maratta Government had been accompliſhed by the treacherous Murder of his own Nephew Narrain Row, then Peſhwa; after this Action, he ſeized the Chief Power into his own Hands; but ſuch was the Horror which his Crimes had excited, that a general Confederacy ſoon appeared againſt him in Favour of the Infant Son of Narrain Row, and he was driven from the Maratta Dominions, and forced to fly for Safety to the Territories of the Company.

In this Situation, and under theſe Circumſtances, the Government of Bombay eſpouſed his Cauſe, and waged War againſt the prevailing Powers at Poona to replace Ragonaut Row in his uſurped Authority. The Company's Arms were not ſucceſsful, but by the timely Interpoſition of the Governor General and Council of Bengal, a Treaty of Peace was made with the Minor Peſhwah and Miniſters at Poona †; in which it was agreed that Ragonaut Row ſhould have an annual Stipend for his Maintenance from the Maratta Government, in Conſideration of the Company's withdrawing their Protection from him, and taking no further Part in his Concerns.

By this firſt Step in favour of Ragonaut Row, there ſeems to have been a manifeſt Deviation from what the Company had preſcribed as a fundamental Rule of Policy to be obſerved by all their Preſidencies, viz. "to engage in no offenſive Wars or Alliances with any of the Country "Powers, nor interfere in any Diviſions which might lead to the Interruption of the public Tran-"quillity." But, excluſive of theſe wiſe Precautions, there were other Circumſtances that ſhould have weighed ſtrongly againſt this particular Meaſure; and firſt, the Injuſtice of taking Part in the domeſtic Troubles of a State, without being called upon by the ruling Power, or having received the leaſt Injury to provoke our Reſentment, cannot but be admitted in this Caſe with peculiar Force, as the Party in whoſe Favour we acted was marked by a Crime of ſuch a Nature, as ſhould, *with us*, have effectually deſtroyed his Right, if he had ever poſſeſſed any. Secondly, This Meaſure, as might have been foreſeen, was likely to be treated by the Nizam as a Breach of the Company's Engagements with him of 1768, by which it was ſtipulated, that the Enemies of the one ſhould be conſidered as the Enemies of the other; and the Nizam had declared Ragonaut Row to be his inveterate Enemy; and expreſſed his Intention of aſſiſting the Powers at Poona againſt him. Thirdly, The Support of this Chief had a direct Tendency to diſengage the Marattas from their Wars with Hyder Ally, to which the Company had for ſeveral Years owed the Tranquillity of their Poſſeſſions on the Coaſt of Coromandel.

Such were the obvious Inconveniences attending the Proceedings of the Government at Bombay. As to the Advantages expected from the Alliance with Ragonaut Row, it may be ſafely affirmed, that nothing was or could be propoſed of ſufficient Importance to juſtify it under the Circumſtances above deſcribed.

No ſooner was the Treaty of Poona concluded by the Means of the Governor General and Council of Bengal, than Ragonaut Row, from an Apprehenſion that the Place appointed by that Treaty for his future Reſidence was not ſafe, fled to Bombay, and again claimed the Protection of that Government; which was openly granted to him: "Ragonaut Row," ſay the Gentlemen at Bombay ‡, "has refuſed to accept the Terms ſtipulated for him by Colonel Upton, thinking his "Life would be endangered by putting himſelf ſo entirely in the Power of his Enemies, and has "claimed our Protection, which we eſteemed ourſelves bound by every Tie of *Honour and Humanity* "to grant him; and this the Miniſters pretend to term an Infringement of the Treaty;" and well they might; What, becauſe Ragonaut Row had thought proper to reject the Conditions made in his Behalf, and to fancy the Miniſters at Poona would not afford him the Security they had promiſed, was it the Part of a Company's Government to protect him againſt the ſuperior Obligations of a ſolemn Treaty? Where was the *Honour* of ſuch a Conduct? *Humanity*, indeed, if it were at all concerned in this Caſe, might have been employed in attempting by fair and perſuaſive Means to ſtrengthen his Security; but upon what Principle could we pretend to remedy a Defect or Omiſſion in the Treaty, by breaking a poſitive Stipulation of it?

The Governor General and Council of Bengal, who were the Makers and Guardians of this Treaty, appear not to have diſavowed the Protection given to Ragonaut Row, for it was continued in the moſt open Manner from April 1776 to the Month of November or December 1777, when, in Conſequence of ſome Diviſions in the Adminiſtration at Poona, ſaid to have been favourable to Ragonaut Row, a new Plan was eagerly formed at Bombay for ſupporting his Pretenſions. This Meaſure had the expreſs Sanction of the Governor General and Council, who approved it ſo much

* This Judgment may ſeem harſh, ſince the Meaſure has been countenanced by the Court of Directors; but I perſuade myſelf that all the Circumſtances relative to it have not been ſtated, or at leaſt not fairly ſtated, to them by their Servants, otherwiſe they would have conceived inſurmountable Objections to every Part of the Deſign.

† The 1ſt March 1776.

‡ Letter from Bombay to the Preſident and Council of Madras, 15th April 1776.

that

that they propoſed to join a Body of their own Troops to favour the Operations from Bombay; Six Battalions of Sepoys, One Company of Native Artillery, and about a Thouſand or Fifteen hundred Horſe, were ordered about the End of February 1778, to march acroſs the Peninſula for that Purpoſe. In the mean while the Gentlemen at Bombay were not ſo active as might have been expected. The Ardour with which they had begun, appeared ſuddenly to have abated. Some Difficulties aroſe that had not been foreſeen or provided for; they wrote a Letter to ſtop the March of the Bengal Troops which were on their Way to join them; afterwards they deſired the Troops might ſtill advance, without propoſing any Object or Plan of Operations for them; and at length, to cloſe theſe Inconſiſtencies, while the Troops were advancing they undertook the Cauſe of Ragonaut Row with their own Force only. The Event of this Expedition is too diſgraceful to be touched upon; ſuffice it to ſay, that with the Experience we had already purchaſed in the former Attempt, with all the probable Conſequences to be apprehended from this freſh Provocation of the Maratta State, and of the Nizam, to renew the Enterprize in favour of ſuch a Man as Ragonaut Row, and with the Force of a ſingle Preſidency, ſeems to have been a Strain of Imprudence that could only be exceeded by the Choice of the Time for ſuch an Expedition, which was after the Commencement of a national War, when the Strength of every Preſidency was likely to be called forth againſt the common Enemy, and when Bombay itſelf was ſuppoſed to be in Danger of an inſtant and powerful Attack from them.

Let it be remembered too in this Place, that the whole of the Proceedings concerning Ragonaut Row, from the firſt Alliance with him in 1775 to the late unfortunate Cataſtrophe, were carried on without ever conſulting with the Preſidency of Fort Saint George upon the Propriety of any one Meaſure, although from the Situation of the Company's Poſſeſſions on the Coaſt of Coromandel, it be certain that their Intereſts were more involved in that Quarter than in any other; and had the Governments of Bengal and Bombay only waited to hear the Objections which could have been urged againſt their Proceedings from Fort Saint George, it is not impoſſible but that Things might have taken a more favourable Turn.

The ill Succeſs of the laſt Expedition in ſupport of Ragonaut Row has thrown the Company upon the very Brink of thoſe Dangers which were reaſonably to be apprehended from it. The Government at Bengal having refuſed to ratify the Treaty by which the Bombay Army was ſuffered to eſcape from the Hands of the Marattas, freſh Terms were propoſed. Theſe have now been in Diſcuſſion Four or Five Months without producing the deſired Effect; though by every Information I can learn, the Marattas are well diſpoſed to an Accommodation upon the Footing of the Treaty of 1776, which is even more than can be expected from them, conſidering their Succeſs: But it is ſaid, that General Goddard, who is negociating with them, inſiſts upon a very large Sum of Money to defray the Expences of our Meaſures in behalf of Ragonaut Row; and this, as they obſerve (with Juſtice) is a Demand of ſo extraordinary a Nature, that they can by no Means come into it. In the mean Time, to ſtrengthen themſelves as much as poſſible in caſe of a Rupture, they have, even during our Negociation, actually concluded a Treaty of Peace and Alliance with Hyder Ally, in order to engage his Aſſiſtance againſt us; and the Nizam is heartily diſpoſed to enter into the Combination.

Whatever be the Event of theſe Appearances, allowing, as I hope will be the Caſe from the great Moderation ſhewn by the Marattas, that the Cloud which hangs over us ſhall be diſperſed, ſtill it muſt be confeſſed, that our Situation will be unpleaſing enough; for, beſides the Expence, the Danger, and the Diſgrace into which we have ſucceſſively fallen, it is certain that the Country Powers have but a very indifferent Opinion of our public Faith; and ſo inconſiſtent has been our Conduct with reſpect to Ragonaut Row, that the Marattas themſelves, who bear the Character of *moſt faithleſs*, declare they can place no Confidence in any of our Engagements, and call us a moſt deceitful People. If ſuch then have been the Effects produced by our political Tranſactions, it is high Time ſurely to correct our Syſtem, to ſcrutinize rigidly into paſt Meaſures, and to mark ſtrongly thoſe Parts wherein we have acted imprudently or with Inattention to our Treaties, that ſo we may avoid the Shame of ſuch Imputations in future, and recover that ſacred Regard to public Faith which ſhould accompany us in every Part of the World, and if poſſible be the more attended to where it will do us moſt Honour, among the Powers of India.

In order to aſſiſt in this neceſſary Retroſpect, as far as my Judgment and Materials will permit, I ſhall endeavour to ſhew from our principal Treaties and Engagements, what Objects have been propoſed or attained by our political Conduct; whether thoſe Objects have been conſiſtent with the true Intereſts of the Company, or the Plans laid down for the Government of their Affairs; and laſtly, in what Points our preſent Treaties appear defective, that we may by Degrees, if it be thought neceſſary, rectify ſuch Errors as ſhall be found ſtill to exiſt in them.

With reſpect to our Treaties in general with the Country Powers, ſuppoſing we act upon the ſtrict Principles of public Faith, it is evident that we lie under a great Diſadvantage, ariſing from a contrary Diſpoſition in the Natives, who are ſwayed only by the Views of Intereſt or Ambition, and who, notwithſtanding they are conſtantly reminding us of our Engagements to them, certainly do not ſuffer the leaſt Scruple of Faith to come in Competition with their Deſigns, when it ſuits their Convenience to execute them. I mean not to infer from this that we ought to be leſs mindful of the Treaties we make with them; but that we ſhould be extremely cautious of concluding any Treaties at all; and that when we do make them, we ought to confine ourſelves ſimply to Engagements of *Peace and Friendſhip*, and not enter into Articles which we cannot perform without

Embarraſſment, nor evade without a Breach of Faith. To illuſtrate my Opinions of ſuch Treaties, I ſhall recite a remarkable Fact, which, as it is deſcriptive of the Principles of every one of the native Powers, will ſerve better perhaps than a whole Volume of Reaſoning upon the Subject.

In the Year 1766, the Preſident and Council of Madras concluded a Treaty of Friendſhip and Alliance with Nizam Ally Cawn; by one Article whereof it was agreed, That the Company ſhould furniſh that Prince with a Body of Troops whenever he ſhould require it, to ſettle the Affairs of his Government. The Nizam at that Time meditated a powerful Attack on the Dominions of Hyder Ally, in Conjunction with the Marattas; and it appears by the Negociation of the Treaty, that our Aid of Troops was to be firſt appropriated to this Service. The Engliſh Army accordingly marched and joined the Nizam's Forces in the Beginning of 1767. He carried it along with him into the Heart of Hyder's Country; and then, without even giving the Government of Madras, or the commanding Officer of the Troops acting with him, the leaſt Intimation of his Deſign, he ſold a Peace to Hyder for a Sum of Money; ſaid, he had no further Occaſion for our Troops, and left them to return Home in the beſt Manner they were able, through an Enemy's Country: But as if this Act of Treachery were yet incomplete, he ſoon after found a Pretence to quarrel with us; and having firſt involved us upon his own Account in a War with Hyder, he joined his Troops to thoſe of our Enemy, and attacked us with as much Inveteracy as Hyder himſelf. This extraordinary Proceeding raiſed a Flame which was not extinguiſhed in leſs than Two Years, and its Progreſs was marked with nothing but Deva[illegible]tation, Expence, and Ruin, both to the Company and the Nabob of the Carnatic. The Reflection of the Court of Directors upon the Conduct of their Servants on this Occaſion, was juſt enough: "The general Alliance," ſay they, "with the Soubah and the Marattas, produced the Effect we ſhall always expect from Alliances "among Powers uncontrolled by the Law of Nations, or any Principle to eſtabliſh good Faith "among them." *

In examining our principal Treaties with Nizam Ally Cawn, Hyder Ally, and the Marattas, it will appear that they all originated in Propoſals and Schemes of our own, tending to the further Aggrandizement of ourſelves or our Neighbours, and comprizing Meaſures of ſuch a Nature as were calculated only to involve us in the Wars that followed them. But this was not the only Inconvenience ariſing from our ill-judged Treaties: The Wars we were involved in could not be cloſed without new Treaties and Engagements, which contained the Seeds of future Wars; ſo that for the laſt Fourteen Years the Company have been proceeding in a perpetual Round of Treaties, Wars, and Negociations; and are now plunged into ſuch a Multiplicity of Engagements, that there is no Safety but in returning, if it be practicable, to the Point from whence they ſet out, and there endeavouring to fix themſelves. Theſe Obſervations, however ſtrange they may ſeem, will be verified in the following ſhort Hiſtory of our Treaties.

Our firſt Treaty with the Nizam was concluded at Hyderabad the 12th November 1766, and deſerves particular Conſideration. We had in the Year 1765 obtained the Mogul's Phirmaunds, or Grants, for the Five Northern Circars; Ellore, Rajahmundry, Muſtaphanagur, Cicacole and Guntoor, as a free Gift, without Tribute or Tax of any Kind. As theſe extenſive Diſtricts were then in the Poſſeſſion of the Nizam, who certainly could not be pleaſed to have them thus abſcinded from his Government, it was thought adviſable to obtain his Conſent to our Enjoyment of them; not from any Apprehenſion of his Power, which was too weak to have reſiſted any Attempt to poſſeſs ourſelves of theſe Countries by force; but from a Deſire of accommodating our Rights as much as poſſible to his Inclinations, that ſo we might be ſecure from the Diſturbance which he was capable of giving to us in the Collection of the Revenues. This was an Advantage that merited ſome Sacrifice; and if it had been purchaſed by the Payment of a Sum of Money, in the Way of Friendſhip, or by any other Means conſiſtent with the Company's Honour, and the Tranquillity of their Poſſeſſions, the Meaſure muſt undoubtedly have been approved. But in the Treaty that was made on this Occaſion, ſuch Conceſſions were granted, as will appear aſtoniſhing for ſo ſmall an Object. In the firſt Place, the Company's Right to the Circars under the Mogul's Phirmaund was given up, and the Nizam's Grant taken in lieu of it. 2dly. The Company were made to pay Five Lacks of Rupees annually to the Nizam for the Circars of Rajahmundry, Ellore and Muſtaphanagur, and for thoſe of Cicacole and Guntoor, as ſoon as they ſhould be put into their Hands, Two Lacks each; in all Nine Lacks of Rupees per Annum, which was ſuppoſed to be as much, if not more, than the Nizam ever received from them before they were granted to us. 3dly. The Circar of Guntoor, which was included in the Mogul's Phirmaund, was allowed to remain as a Jaguеer with the Nizam's Brother, and to revert to the Company only at the Deceaſe of that Prince. 4thly. The Nabob Mahomed Ally Cawn was in this Treaty releaſed by the Nizam from all Demands, paſt, preſent, and to come, on Account of the Carnatic, for Five Lacks of Rupees, † while the Company were taxed with a Tribute of Nine Lacks of Rupees per Annum for the

* Letter from England, 25th March 1768.

† When the Mogul granted the Circars to the Company, he gave the Nabob a Phirmaund to hold the Carnatic independant of the Soubah of the Decan, and this being a Meaſure which muſt have diſpleaſed the Soubah, at leaſt as much as the Grant of the Circars to the Company, I cannot help thinking it ſtrange, that the Nabob ſhould have obtained his Conſent and a Releaſe from all Demands on the Carnatic, for 5 Lacks of Rupees, at the Time the Company were ſacrificing ſo largely for the quiet Poſſeſſions of a few Diſtricts. It would ſeem as if we had been made to pay for the Nabob and ourſelves too.

Five Circars only. 5thly. To crown all, the Company were obliged to aſſiſt the Nizam with a Body of Troops to ſettle the Affairs of his Government whenever he ſhould require it; an Article of itſelf worth all the Circars put together, not only from its probable, but its actual Conſequences; ſince we became inſtantly embroiled by it in a War with Hyder Ally, the moſt ruinous we had ever engaged in, and productive of Treaties which have ſince created nothing but Riſk, Embarraſſment, and Loſs of Reputation. *

In this War, as I have already mentioned, our new Friend and Ally, to whom we had made ſuch ample Conceſſions, was guilty of that conſummate Piece of Treachery which I have before noticed, and which ended in his joining Hyder againſt us. But our Arms proving ſucceſsful in the Beginning of the War, he detached himſelf from Hyder with the ſame Facility that he had ſeparated from us, and having made Overtures of Peace, a new Treaty of Friendſhip and Alliance was concluded with him in February 1768.

The Conteſt ſtill continued between the Company and Hyder Ally, until the Month of April 1769, when the Government of Madras entered into a Treaty with that Power, which though it reſtored Peace to the Carnatic, proved the Source of much future Embarraſſment and Loſs of Reputation to the Company; ſo that after a War that laid waſte the Carnatic, and coſt £. 600,000 Sterling, with the Lives of a conſiderable Number of Men, for all which no ſort of Equivalent was obtained, either in Territory or Money, our political Situation became more intricate and perplexing than ever.

Having made ſo unfortunate an End of our firſt Step in offenſive Treaties, the Dictates of Prudence certainly forbad us to engage in any further Schemes of the like Nature; and yet, ſcarcely had the Company been allowed Time to recover from the ruinous Effects of the War with Hyder Ally, when their Government at Bombay brought them into freſh Troubles; firſt, by ſeizing on the Iſlands of Salſette and Caranja, belonging to the Marattas (without any Provocation that I could ever learn) and, then, by engaging in the Support of Ragonaut Row, and entering into an open War with the Marattas in Favour of that Chief's Pretenſions. The Motives which induced the Government at Bombay to embrace this laſt Meaſure, will be beſt explained by the following Extract of their Letter to Madras on the Occaſion; and by reciting the 4th Article of their Treaty with Ragonaut Row.

Extract of a Letter from the Governor and Council of Bombay, to the Governor and Council of Fort St. George, dated 10th April 1775.

"Your Honour, &c. we make no Doubt are perfectly well acquainted with the Diviſions at "preſent ſubſiſting in the Maratta Empire. *We have deemed it for the Intereſt* of our Honourable "Employers, to embrace the Cauſe of Ragonaut Row againſt his Enemies, the miniſterial Party; "and our Army, to the Number of 2,500 Men, have in conſequence proceeded to Cambay to "his Aſſiſtance. And though his Affairs, owing to his Miſcarriages a ſhort Time before our Forces "ſet out, do not wear *the moſt favourable Aſpect*, yet we hope when our Forces ſhall join the Re"mainder of his Army, they will be quickly retrieved," &c.

Extract of the 4th Article of the Treaty with Ragonaut Row, dated 6th March 1775.

"The Honourable the Preſident and Council of Bombay, in Behalf of the Honourable Company, "and *in Conſideration of the undermentioned Grants and Ceſſions* made by Ragonaut Row to the Com"pany, do hereby engage and agree, ſo ſoon as theſe Articles of Agreement and Treaty are fully "ratified on the Part of Ragonaut Row, to aſſiſt him with a ſtrong Body of Forces, with proper "Guns and Warlike Stores, and a Field Train of Artillery, which are to join his Army and act in "Conjunction with his Forces againſt his Enemies, the miniſterial Party, &c."

Such were the Grounds of our firſt Alliance with Ragonaut Row; which having immediately led to all the Conſequences ſtated in the former Part of theſe Reflections, it becomes unneceſſary in this Place to examine more particularly than I have already done, the Reaſons aſſigned for abrogating the Treaty of Poona, and concluding a Second offenſive Alliance for reſtoring Ragonaut Row to the Government; the Riſe, Progreſs, and Reſult, of theſe Tranſactions, are ſufficiently known and felt.

But as if the Meaſure of our Experience were not yet full, while Matters at Bombay were in ſuch a State, that it was yet doubtful whether the laſt Treaty with Ragonaut Row would take place, the Governor General and Council of Bengal formed the Scheme of an offenſive and defenſive Alliance with the Rajah of Berar, Chief of a Maratta Province, bordering on the Territories of Bengal. When we ſee thoſe Gentlemen whom the Legiſlature hath appointed to ſuperintend over our Wars and Treaties, moving by themſelves in a Sphere of Action which requires ſo much

* The Court of Directors ſeverely, but with great Juſtice, condemned the whole of this Treaty, in their Letters to Fort Saint George on the 25th March, 5th April, and 13th May, 1768. Theſe Letters deſerve much Praiſe, as containing the moſt ſenſible Reflections on the paſt Conduct of their Servants, and the wiſeſt Maxims in my Opinion that could poſſibly be laid down for the future Government of their Affairs.

Ability,

Ability, as well as Dignity and Propriety of Conduct; we ſhould be naturally inclined to expect ſome Inſtances of peculiar Skill in Negociation; of great Diſcernment in tracing and conſulting the true Intereſts of the Company; and of the moſt ſtudied Attention to the Faith of former exiſting Treaties. Let us ſee how far their Conduct may have anſwered ſuch Expectations.

We muſt remember here, that after the Governor General and Council of Bengal had given the Preſidency at Bombay a Power of concluding the Second Treaty with Ragonaut Row, which was to place him in the Adminiſtration at Poona, there ſuddenly appeared an unaccountable Slackness in the Meaſures of that Preſidency, ſufficient at leaſt to alarm the Governor General and Council, who had ſent a conſiderable Body of Troops acroſs the Country to ſupport thoſe Meaſures. Finding themſelves deceived in their Hopes of a more vigorous Conduct on the Side of Bombay, and their Troops being now advanced into the Maratta Countries, as far I believe as the Borders of the Berar Province, it became requiſite to ſeek ſome Expedient for ſaving their Credit in the Part they had taken. This apparently gave Riſe to the Negociation which it was propoſed to open with the Rajah of Berar; and the Meaſure was quickened by a Circumſtance that ſhould in Reaſon have delayed it—the Advice received at that Time of our Rupture with France.

Moodajee Booſla, Rajah of Berar, is in Fact no more than a Vaſſal of the Maratta Government, and owes the ſame Allegiance with all the other Chiefs ſcattered through that wide Empire. Such a Man at firſt Sight would not appear a fit Subject to raiſe to the Dignity of an Ally; and therefore to remedy this Defect, it was diſcovered that he had ſome diſtant Pretenſions to the Sovereignty of the Maratta State; diſtant indeed, or extremely unavailing, ſince they were never advanced or ſupported (at leaſt ſo I learn) until the Governor General and Council of Bengal took that Office upon themſelves.

With this Man then, it was propoſed to enter into an Alliance of a more extenſive and important Kind than any which appears in the Annals of the Company. The Agent employed on this Occaſion, was firſt inſtructed to make it defenſive, then conditionally to extend it to offenſive Objects of ſuch a Nature as would have involved the whole Peninſula in a Flame.

"If," ſay the Gentlemen at Bengal in their Inſtructions to their Miniſter, "from Mr. Moſtyn's* "Advices, or the Information you can obtain on the Spot, you are aſſured that the Preſidency "of Bombay have not entered into any new Engagement either with Ragonaut Row, or any other "Party among the Marattas, which may claſh with the Tenor of the following Inſtructions: If "you ſhall at the ſame Time underſtand, either that a French Force is actually arrived at Poona, "*or is expected*; *or that the Chevalier St. Lubin* † *is ſtill there*; or, if you are convinced from other "Circumſtances, of the Exiſtence of the Engagements which we ſuppoſe to have been formed be"tween him and the Miniſters; *or even if no Circumſtance ſhall have come to your Knowledge that may* "*afford you Cauſe to doubt it*; in theſe Caſes we authorize you to make an Offer to Moodajee Booſla, "to unite with him in a *direct and open War* with the miniſterial Party of Poona." Such a Latitude *to cloſe* in a Meaſure of the firſt Importance, without waiting even for the Sanction of his Superiors, and upon Information wherein the Negociator might be very much deceived, with all his Diligence, was never before, I believe, given to any public Miniſter; at leaſt, when the Stake was ſo great as that which was to be hazarded by this Treaty.

But after all, What was the Object of theſe bold and offenſive Meaſures? There had for ſome Time been at the Court of Poona, a French Agent, whoſe Commiſſion was not certainly known, but it was ſuppoſed, from ſome doubtful Intelligence, that he had made an Agreement on the Part of the French Nation, to ſupply the Marattas with Troops and Stores. Allowing the Fact, was this a ſufficient Reaſon for plunging us into a diſtant War, againſt a powerful Nation, before we knew the Extent of thoſe Supplies, to what Objects they were directed, or what Calls we might have for our Armies in Defence of our own Settlements? Beſides, were it not unreaſonable to the laſt Degree, to imagine that the French had either the Means or the Will to extend their Influence at Poona to any alarming Length, while their own Eſtabliſhments in every Part of India were abſolutely ſtarving for Want of Supplies of all Kinds, and in Danger of ſinking under the firſt Attempts that might be made upon them?

The Imprudence of the propoſed Alliance and Union with the Rajah of Berar, appears in a much ſtronger Light ſtill, if we conſider the Motives intended to be offered as an Encouragement to engage him in our Meaſures. The Bengal Agent was inſtructed at his Diſcretion to enter into an expreſs Treaty for ſupporting Moodajee Booſla's Pretenſions to the Sovereignty of the Maratta State: And he was authorized likewiſe, if Moodajee ſhould preſs it, to engage our Aſſiſtance for the Recovery of ſome Conqueſts made from him a few Years ago by Nizam Ally Cawn; adding thereby a new Enemy to the Number already upon our Hands.

But what contributes more than any Thing I have yet mentioned, to give this whole Proceeding a peculiar Air of Wildneſs, is, that at the very Time it was in Agitation, the Government at Bombay had Authority from Bengal to conclude an Engagement for aſſiſting Ragonaut Row in his Pretenſions to the Government at Poona. There was alſo at that Time an exiſting Treaty of Friendſhip with the actual Power in the Maratta State (which that People in general conſidered as the legal one) conſiſting of the minor Peſhwah and his Miniſters. And we had likewiſe a Treaty

* The Company's Reſident at Poona.

† A ſuppoſed Agent with Powers from the Court of France.

of ſtrict Friendſhip and Alliance with the Nizam, made in 1768, which was directly ſtruck at by the propoſed Meaſure of aſſiſting the Rajah of Berar in an offenſive War againſt him. Here then appears to our View the ſtrangeſt Scene of Politics that can well be conceived. Various and contending Claims. Intereſts and Pretenſions raiſed by our abſurd and contradictory Engagements; and all of them ſupported occaſionally by our ſhifting from one to another, as our ſuppoſed Intereſt leads, without regard to Treaties, and in direct Oppoſition to the fundamental Orders and Maxims of the Company *.

Having now given my Opinion of Treaties in general with the Country Powers, and attempted to ſhew, by a Deduction from our principal Treaties, that the only Misfortunes ſuſtained by the Company in India, have been occaſioned by a Train of very imprudent and offenſive Meaſures, I ſhall proceed with great Confidence to lay down the following Poſitions; firſt, That all Sorts of Engagements, offenſive and defenſive, with the native Powers of India, are dangerous, and inconſiſtent with the Views of a trading Company, as leading them frequently into Meaſures much beyond their real Strength; and diverting thoſe Reſources to the Purpoſes of War, which are intended for the Purpoſes of Commerce. Secondly, That the Company have already, or might have with very little more Expence, a Force ſufficient in itſelf to protect all their Poſſeſſions from Inſult, without any foreign Alliance whatever; and that if they cannot depend upon their own Force for this Security, it were better to give up what they cannot themſelves defend, than call upon a Country Power to aſſiſt them.

In theſe Sentiments I think all reaſonable Men will agree, who reflect how little we have gained, and how ſeverely we have ſuffered, by our paſt Alliances. It has been too much the Fault of the Company's Servants in India to conſider the Company as a great Power, whoſe extenſive Poſſeſſions made it expedient for them to take an active Part in the Politics of the Country; and to aim at preſerving a Balance among the neighbouring States; an Idea which led them at once, as we have ſeen, from the ſolid and immediate Intereſts of the Company, in Purſuit of diſtant Objects which preſented nothing but Inſecurity and Danger.

The Company themſelves very juſtly obſerved to their Servants, upon the Treaty with the Nizam in 1766 †, "If it had not been for the imprudent Meaſures you have taken, the Country Powers "would have formed a Balance of Power among themſelves, and their Diviſions would have left "us in Peace:" And again ‡, "Conſcious of our own Superiority in India, it ſeems to be our proper "Line of Conduct to obſerve a ſteady Neutrality till ſuch Time as our own Dignity and Intereſt "call upon us to interfere, and then a favourable Moment ſhould be ſeized, &c. The Diſſenſions "among the Indian Powers can only ſerve to augment our Conſequence: And while we ſhew our "Strength, and keep it up, we ſhall be courted equally by all Parties: The Moment we take a "Side we make Enemies of all but One."

To correct the Imperfections which pervade the preſent Syſtem, and to extricate the Company from the Difficulties in which their Wars and Treaties have involved them, will certainly be a Work of Time; but it ſhould be an Object continually preſent with them, and accompliſhed by Degrees, as Opportunities may offer: For I do maintain, that the only Way to a permanent Safety is, to retreat back to their former Limits, to entrench themſelves within their own Power, and confine their Views ſolely to the *Preſervation and Defence* of what they have already acquired, without ſuffering any Temptation, however great, to lead them farther §. *I would even propoſe that a ſevere Penalty ſhould be inflicted upon any of their Servants who ſhall tranſgreſs theſe Bounds.* The Company, in their Letter to Madras of the 13th May 1768, ſay, "The Dewanny of Bengal, Bahar and "Orixa, with the Poſſeſſions we hold in thoſe Provinces, are the utmoſt Limits of our Views on "that Side of India; on the Coaſt, the Protection of the Carnatic, and the Poſſeſſion of the Circars, free from all Engagements to ſupport the Soubah of the Decan, or even without the Circars, preſerving only Influence enough over any Country Power who may hold them, to keep "the French from ſettling in them; and on the Bombay Side the Dependencies thereof, the "Poſſeſſions of Salſette, Baſſein, and the Caſtle of Surat; the Protection of theſe is eaſily within "the Reach of our Power, and may mutually ſupport each other without any Country Alliance "whatever. If we paſs theſe Bounds we ſhall be led on from one Acquiſition to another, till we

* When I ſpeak of the Meaſures of the Governor General and Council of Bengal, I believe I ought to except Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler, Two of that Council, who as far as I can learn, have been uniform and conſiſtent in oppoſing the Conduct of the Majority. This Majority till very lately conſiſted only of the Governor General and another Member; ſo that all, or moſt of the important Tranſactions I have mentioned muſt have been determined by the caſting Voice of the Governor General: Nothing can afford a more convincing Proof of the Faultineſs of our Syſtem, than that the Fate of the Company's extenſive Empire ſhould in any Circumſtances depend upon the Judgment of Two, and Deciſion of One ſingle Individual.

† Letter from the Company, 25th March 1768.

‡ Letter from the Company to the Select Committee at Madras, 10th April 1771.

§ The Charters granted to the Company have no Tendency to enable the Company to enter into offenſive Wars; and great Circumſpection is neceſſary in the Alliances they enter into with the Indian Powers, leſt the Aſſiſtance they afford under ſuch Treaties ſhould give juſt Cauſe of Umbrage and Reſentment to European Powers, and kindle the Sparks of a new War in Europe. We never thought that an offenſive or defenſive Alliance with an Indian Prince againſt all the World, was warranted by the Company's Charter or the Laws of Nations. In caſe of Attacks, the India Company have a Right not only to repel Invaders, but to obtain Satisfaction for Injuries they may have ſuſtained. Letter from the Court of Directors to Madras, 25th March 1768.

" ſhall find no Security but in the Subjection of the Whole; which, by dividing your Force, would " loſe us the Whole, and end in our Extirpation from Indoſtan."

" You will obſerve by the whole Tenor of theſe Diſpatches, that our Views are not to enter into " offenſive Wars in India, or to make any further Acquiſitions beyond our preſent Poſſeſſions. " We do not wiſh to enter into any Engagements which may be productive of enormous Ex- " pences, and which are ſeldom calculated to promote the Company's eſſential Intereſts; on the " contrary, we wiſh to ſee the preſent Indian Powers remain as a Check one upon another, with- " out our interfering: Therefore we recommend to you ſo ſoon as poſſible to bring about a Peace " upon Terms of the moſt perfect Moderation on the Part of the Company; and when made, to " adhere to it upon all future Occaſions, except when the Company's Poſſeſſions *are actually* " *attacked*; and not to be provoked by freſh Diſturbances of the Country Powers to enter into new " Wars."

I propoſe now to point out the Defects ſubſiſting in the preſent Treaties of Alliance with the Country Powers; and which I wiſh to be remedied as Occaſion may offer, without expoſing the Company to any Imputation of Breach of Faith. And firſt I ſhall name as Defects, all Articles in general which may be conſtrued into *offenſive or defenſive Engagements*: For I am ſatisfied, excluſive of the Dangers and Inconveniences I have before recited, that the Company may, in another Reſpect, be ſaid to make very bad Bargains whenever they conclude ſuch Treaties: For what Advantage can they expect in either offenſive or defenſive Operations that regard themſelves by a Junction of the Troops, or rather Rabble of a Country Ally, with their own regular and diſciplined Forces? And, on the contrary, What Advantages may not ſuch an Ally expect from their Aſſiſtance in any Undertaking whatſoever? In another View likewiſe the Difference is equally ſtriking; the Loſs of European Officers and Soldiers to the Company is an Hundred-fold greater than the Loſs of Natives can be to any Ally; and this is a Circumſtance of no ſmall Moment in the Eſtimate of ſuch Bargains.

Our Treaty with Hyder Ally, made at Madras in April 1769, contains an Article of defenſive Alliance, which has ſince been productive of infinite Embarraſſment to the Company's Servants.— It is the Second Article, which runs in theſe Words, " In caſe either of the contracting Parties ſhall " be attacked, they ſhall, from their reſpective Countries, mutually aſſiſt each other to drive the " Enemy out, &c." At that Time Hyder had Reaſon to apprehend a powerful Attack on his Country from the Marattas, and propoſed the above Article with a View of engaging our Support. The Company's Servants were aware of the Deſign, and endeavoured all in their Power to evade it; but as Hyder would come to no Accommodation on any other Terms, it was thought expedient to yield in the then Situation of Affairs; and the Article was inſerted accordingly. Every Thing that was foreſeen ſoon after happened: The Marattas invaded Hyder's Country upon all Sides: Hyder claimed Aſſiſtance from us in Terms of the Treaty: Excuſes were made, under the Pretence that it was neceſſary to wait for Orders from the Company: The Nabob too ſeemed extremely averſe to our joining Hyder; and went ſo far as to propoſe that we ſhould even aſſiſt the Marattas againſt him. The King's Miniſter Plenipotentiary, who was then at the Nabob's Court, ſupported theſe Opinions, and ſtrongly preſſed the Government to adopt them; which was a little remarkable, conſidering that this Officer of the Crown was ſent out, as he himſelf declared, to ſupport *the Honour of the Company and the Nation*; and to enforce it particularly in the Obſervance of Treaties. However, notwithſtanding the Pains taken by this Gentleman, and by his Succeſſor in Office, to inſtigate the Company's Servants into a War againſt the Man whom they were bound by Treaty to aſſiſt, they were too firm to be moved, and this Firmneſs deſervedly gained them the Applauſe of their Maſters; though it would have been ſtill more commendable, if Circumſtances had permitted them, to carry it a little further, by ſending Succours to Hyder agreeably to their Engagements: But the Nabob's Averſion to the Meaſure was certainly a great Obſtacle; and indeed, without his hearty Support and Concurrence, nothing of this Kind could well have been attempted.

The Company in their Letter to the Select Committee at Madras, dated the 10th April 1771, ſpeak of this defenſive Alliance in the following Terms:

" We cannot but conſider the defenſive Alliance (with Hyder) as a Source of infinite Evils; and " we hope that no temporary Conſideration will in any future Time induce our Servants to em- " barraſs us with Claims, the fulfilling of which may tend to wound our commercial Intereſts, and " endanger the public Tranquillity; and the Refuſal whereof may in any Degree be conſtrued as an " Impeachment of our Honour."

With reſpect to the Treaty with the Nizam, concluded in February 1768, there are ſome Defects for which it ſeems difficult to account; ſince the Government at Madras could not plead the ſame political Neceſſity for embarraſſing the Company with Claims that operated in the Caſe of their Treaty with Hyder. They had juſt obtained a deciſive Advantage in the War, and by marching a Detachment of Troops towards the Nizam's Capital, had in a Manner compelled him to ſue for Peace. This was the Time therefore to get rid entirely of thoſe inconvenient Articles in their former Treaty of 1766, which had brought them into ſo many Difficulties; and this ſeems indeed to have been their profeſſed Intention at the Beginning of their new Agreement: But before they reach the End of it, they loſe Sight of the Object and ſtipulate freſh Articles of the ſame Tendency, tho' not quite ſo impolitic as thoſe of 1766. Thus in the 5th Article they ſaddle the Company with an annual Peiſcuſh, or Tribute, for the Northern Circars, which now by

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that Treaty is riſen to the enormous Sum of Five Lacks of Rupees per Annum: And in the 6th Article it is ſaid, that, "The Company, and the Nabob Waw Law Jaw, willing however to ſhew "their voluntary Attachment to the Soubah, will always be ready to ſend Two Battalions of Se-"poys, and Six Field Pieces, manned by Europeans, whenever the Soubah ſhall require them, and "the Situation of their Affairs will allow, &c."

The Nizam has not yet indeed made any Demand of the Aſſiſtance above ſtipulated; but when he does require it, the Company may probably be as much embarraſſed as they were by the Claims of Hyder; and if they comply with ſuch a Requiſition, they may again ſee the ſame Troubles that followed their Compliance with the like Article in the Treaty of 1766.

As to the Peiſcuſh, there is at this Time nearly the Amount of Three Years, or 15 Lacks of Rupees, due to the Nizam; and the Non-payment of it for ſo long a Term has excited Apprehenſions in his Mind, that we mean to withhold it all together; tho' in Fact the Deficiency has been occaſioned by an unexpected Failure in our Receipts from the Circars, and by the great Expences of the War, which has diſabled us from making the neceſſary Payments. The Stipulation however is in itſelf not only burthenſome, but diſgraceful; and by being inſerted in a public Treaty, without any Reſervation whatever, the Non-payment of it ſubjects us to the Charge of a Breach of Faith.

The propoſed Treaty with the Rajah of Berar, ſhould it have taken place, or be ſtill intended, either in whole or in part (of which I am not able to learn) will inevitably create Embarraſſment without End. A defenſive Alliance, even with ſuch a Man, under all the Circumſtances I have mentioned, would be full of Danger, without producing one ſingle Advantage to the Company. The Country Powers are not capable of diſtinguiſhing between a *defenſive* and an *offenſive* Treaty: and were we to *defend* the Rajah of Berar with our Troops againſt the Attack of any other Power, we ſhould unavoidably make an Enemy of that Power, juſt as effectually as if we had entered into an *offenſive* War, to deſpoil him of his Poſſeſſions, or overturn his Government. As to any Advantage that might be expected on our Side by introducing Ten or Twenty thouſand Maratta Horſe into the Provinces of Bengal to defend them in caſe of an Invaſion, I am humbly of Opinion, that any Stipulation of this Kind were better let alone; for excluſive of the Pay of ſo large a Body of Cavalry, which muſt be provided for, it is to be feared that ſuch Defenders would do more Miſchief than any Invaders we could poſſibly be troubled with *.

Having thus pointed out what I conceive to be great Imperfections in the ſubſiſting Treaties with Hyder Ally and the Nizam, and in the propoſed Alliance with the Rajah of Berar, I ſhould proceed alſo to examine our Engagements with Ragonaut Row and with the Maratta State; but as theſe will probably undergo conſiderable Alterations in the Event of a new Treaty upon the Settlement of the preſent Differences, it may be proper only to obſerve in general, that the Marattas have always been conſidered as the worſt Allies that are to be found among the Indian States. Altho' they have appeared to ſome Advantage in their late Tranſactions with us, they certainly have themſelves no Idea of abiding by any public Engagement longer than it may be for their Intereſt ſo to do. In Wars, their ſole Object is Devaſtation and Plunder; and in this Reſpect they make ſo little Diſtinction between Friends and Enemies, that it is almoſt as dangerous to act with them as againſt them.

Should the Syſtem, which I have ventured to recommend, of *a perfect Neutrality*, be diſapproved, and the Company think it neceſſary to proſecute the Idea adopted by their Servants, of taking Part in the Diſputes of the Country Powers; the ambitious Deſigns of the Marattas point out Hyder Ally as the Perſon to be ſupported againſt them, becauſe he is the ſole Power of any Conſequence remaining, who has not ſubmitted to their Yoke, and becauſe his Country is ſituated between their Poſſeſſions and the Carnatic; and ſhould it ever fall into the Hands of the Marattas they would probably become very troubleſome Neighbours, both to the Nabob and the Company. This Support, however, *if it be given at all*, ought not I think to be expreſſed in the common Form of a defenſive Alliance, which may leave it in his Option to call for our Aſſiſtance whenever he is attacked, but rather promiſed in theſe general Terms: "That while he remained in Peace and "Friendſhip with the Company he might be aſſured we ſhould never join his Enemies againſt "him, and that if he be at any Time in Danger of being overpowered by them, we ſhall then "give him Aſſiſtance as far as our Circumſtances and Situation may permit;" or if this be going

* It may perhaps appear extraordinary that the moſt important Negociations that were ever yet ſet on Foot in India, ſhould have been all entruſted in the Hands of Military Officers: The Negociation and Treaty of 1766 with the Nizam, were conducted by General Caillaud; the Negociation and Treaty concluded at Poona in 1777, were entruſted to Colonel Upton; the Negociation of the propoſed Treaty with the Rajah of Berar, upon the Death of Mr. Elliott, the Gentleman firſt employed, was transferred to General (then Colonel) Goddard; and the Negociation of Peace, now or lately on Foot with the Marattas, was entruſted to the ſame Officer. That Military Officers are poſſeſſed of as much Zeal for the Public Service as any other Men, cannot be queſtioned; but they have no Opportunities of acquiring the leaſt Knowledge of the Commercial or Political Intereſts of the Company, and the Habits of their Profeſſion give them too ſtrong a Bias to the Side of War. The Company upon the Occaſion of General Caillaud's being employed to conclude the Treaty with the Nizam in 1766, writes as follows, "We muſt obſerve to you, that we think it very extraordinary, "that the whole Negociation with the Soubah ſhould have been conducted by a Military Officer, unaccompanied by a "Civil Servant: When Mr. Pybus's Illneſs was known, another ſhould have been immediately appointed, for it is highly "diſpleaſing to us, and contrary to our Orders, that a Military Officer ſhould be alone employed in Negociations of "our Commercial or Political Intereſt."

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too far, let it be a general Inſtruction to the Company's Servants, without pledging themſelves at all, to give him Aſſiſtance in caſe they ſee him at any Time in Danger of being totally ſubdued by the Marattas, leaving the Quantum and Nature of it to their Diſcretion.

I have now gone through all that I have to ſay on the Subject of Foreign Treaties and Alliances. Our *Home* Politics, in which I include the Engagements ſubſiſting between the Company, and ſuch Princes as are cloſely united with them in Friendſhip and Intereſts, form a diſtinct Branch, which is conducted upon Principles very different from thoſe of our Foreign Alliances, though as yet without any regular Syſtem whereby the preciſe Nature and Extent of theſe Engagements can be aſcertained, or any Line drawn for the Government of thoſe in whoſe Hands the Preſervation of them is intruſted.

The Firſt and moſt diſtinguiſhed of our Connections, is that which has been long formed with the preſent Nabob of the Carnatic. The Cauſe and Progreſs of this Alliance have been often traced, and are now ſo generally known, that it were ſuperfluous to dwell upon them. It began upon a Principle of mutual Advantage, and has been cementing during a Series of more than 30 Years, by the Exchange of all Sorts of good Offices; ſo that at this Time or at leaſt very lately, it might be ſaid to have ripened into a ſincere and equal Attachment. Much indeed were it to be wiſhed that all our Alliances had been formed on the ſame Principles, and that we had never taken Advantage of our Strength to eſtabliſh a Superiority which might perhaps have been as well or as permanently acquired by more juſtifiable Means. Our Influence in the Carnatic is founded on the free Will and Conſent of the Nabob; from his Confidence in our Attachment and our Power, he requeſted of his own Accord that the Company might garriſon his Forts and maintain Troops at his Expence, for the Protection of the Carnatic. Such a Confidence ought never to be abuſed: To have deſerved it, reflects Honour upon our Moderation; to abuſe it, would be to throw an indelible Stain upon our Character and Memory.

I have often wondered that a Connection of more than 30 Years ſtanding ſhould have ſubſiſted, without any ſpecific Treaty or Agreement; for I do not remember that any was ever yet formed between the Company and the Nabob; poſſibly it may be owing to this Circumſtance that their Friendſhip has continued ſo long. Where expreſs Stipulations are eſtabliſhed as the Ground of an Alliance, the Parties are ſo much upon their Guard, and ſo watchful of the Conduct of each other, that Jealouſy and Diſtruſt too often aſſume the Place of Confidence and good Will. Theſe Inconveniencies are more likely to be felt where the Intercourſe is frequent and even conſtant, as that which has always exiſted between the Nabob and the Company. By maintaining a Connection upon the mutual Exchange of good Offices, without expreſsly defining the Views and Wiſhes of either Party, ſuch a Latitude is given, as cannot fail of producing Confidence and Friendſhip. In theſe Caſes Miſunderſtandings when they happen, are removed by liberal Explanations and Arguments drawn from general Queſtions, and not by the Conſtruction of Words and Phraſes which may admit of various Opinions, and be ſtrained occaſionally to the Views and Purpoſes of either Party.

But although it be allowed that ſuch Advantages have ariſen from the Nature of our Connection with the Nabob; yet in another View, it muſt be confeſſed, that the want of ſome preciſe Line for the Guidance of the Company's Servants in their Intercourſe with him hath been and muſt continue to be productive of much Embarraſſment: For Example, The Nabob has always been conſidered and treated by the Company as an independant Prince; an Union of Intereſts and of Meaſures has generally taken place between them, and at his Requeſt, a certain Force is continually kept up under the Company's Authority for the Defence of the Carnatic: It has not however yet been ſettled how far the Nabob in virtue of his Independency, or the Company in the Character of his Friends and Protectors, ſhould direct and ſuperintend the Intereſts of the Carnatic. If this Privilege belong ſolely to the Nabob, and he (as is natural to ſuppoſe) ſhould wiſh to exerciſe it, then the Company may without, and even againſt their Conſent, be drawn into Meaſures directly affecting their own Intereſts and Poſſeſſions; for it is not poſſible in any Caſe to ſeparate their Cauſe from that of the Nabob without totally giving up all Concern in his Affairs. On the other Hand; if the Company in virtue of their Character, as Protectors of the Nabob's Government, claim the Right of directing the Intereſts of the Carnatic, then they infringe the acknowledged Independency of the Nabob, and become in Fact the Rulers inſtead of the Defenders of his Country. It ſeems reaſonable indeed that the Company, who have taken upon themſelves the Office of Protector, ſhould be allowed the Lead in all political Tranſactions that affect the Carnatic, and this the Nabob has hitherto generally admitted; but there are Inſtances on Record, where he has claimed the Privilege of acting for himſelf, even in Oppoſition to the Advice and Remonſtrances of the Company's Government, and it is upon theſe Occaſions that the Company's Servants will always find themſelves perplexed, until it be abſolutely determined how far they or the Nabob are to yield upon any Differences in Opinion.

There are other Embarraſſments of a different Nature attending the cloſe Connection we have with the Nabob, which do not come ſo properly within my preſent Purpoſe to mention; but it is certain, that all the Inconveniences we ſuffer are amply conpenſated by the Advantages derived from an excluſive Influence in the Nabob's Country, ſufficient to eſtabliſh a decided Superiority, and to prevent all Competitors, European or Native, from hurting the Commerce or diſturbing the Poſſeſſions of the Company. It is unqueſtionably to this Influence that we are indebted for a great Part of our Proſperity, for our Succeſs againſt the French in India the laſt War, and for the

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deciſive Stroke made againſt them ſo early in the preſent War, to which, as Affairs have ſince turned out, we owe perhaps our preſent Exiſtence in the Eaſt.

Under theſe Circumſtances, if our Gratitude alone be too weak a Tie to bind us to the Nabob, a Senſe of Intereſt ſhould teach us the Importance of ſo uſeful an Attachment; and by ſhewing how much we have profited and may ſtill profit by it, inſtruct us on the other Hand how different our Situation would have been, and may ſtill be, if that Attachment ſhould ever be diſſolved, or tranſferred to our Rivals.

But it has been often urged, that the Benefits reſulting from this Connection are reciprocal, and that the Nabob having received the ſame Advantage from our Alliance and Support that we have derived from his Friendſhip, is equally bound upon Principles of Gratitude and of Intereſt to remain ſtedfaſt in his Attachment to the Company. There can be no Doubt that the Nabob owes the Poſſeſſion and Security of his Government to the Company; and he has never been wanting in Acknowledgments for their Favour and Protection; tho' it be certain that the Support of the Company was originally given to him, *not upon his Account, but their own:* And that having effectually anſwered their own Purpoſes by eſtabliſhing him in his Government, the numerous Gifts and Favours he has ſince beſtowed on them ought to be conſidered rather as Earneſts of his Attachment than Returns for Benefits received.

Such being the State of our Connection with the Nabob, it were extremely to be wiſhed, that nothing had been ever done by us which might tend to impreſs on his Mind any unfavourable Ideas of our Juſtice, or the Sincerity of our Attachment. There is Reaſon however to believe, that the late Tranſactions relative to Tanjore, have produced this Effect in a remarkable Degree; and as I conceive it to be properly connected with my preſent Subject to touch upon thoſe Meaſures, I ſhall do it with all due Deference to the reſpectable Opinions that have been already advanced, and more with a View to the Juſtice and Policy of our Conduct, than to any perſonal Regards whatſoever.

While the Province of Tanjore was ſubject only to the Claims of the Mogul, and to ſuch Demands and Pretenſions as were uſually advanced by the Nabobs of the Carnatic, the Company had properly no other Concern in that Government than to maintain a friendly Correſpondence with the Perſon who might happen to be the Rajah; nor did they ever pretend the ſmalleſt Right to interfere in its Affairs until the Year 1762, when their Servants made a Treaty between the Nabob and the Rajah, which gave Riſe to all the ſubſequent Meaſures relative to Tanjore.

This Treaty, to which the Company became Guarantees, was framed by their Servants in the Character of Arbitrators: But the Claims of theſe Princes upon each other were not voluntarily ſubmitted to their Deciſion; and it would be difficult to conceive any other equitable Ground upon which they could act as Arbitrators *. A proper Attention to this Circumſtance is abſolutely neceſſary to form a right Judgment of the Treaty of 1762. It is indiſputable from the Records of the Company, and avowed indeed by thoſe who made and have defended this Treaty, that the Company's Servants in adjuſting the Pretenſions of the Nabob and the Rajah, decided entirely by *their own* Ideas of Juſtice, and obliged both Parties to conform to their Deciſions. An Authority of this Kind is without Doubt neceſſary to an Arbitrator; but it can be founded only on his being voluntarily choſen by both Parties to adjuſt their Differences; and their being mutually bound to each other, and to him, to abide by his Award, whatever it may be. If this Formality were obſerved in ſettling the Treaty of 1762, the Conduct of the Company's Servants muſt be deemed unexceptionable in every Part; but if it were wanting altogether, or there were any material Defect in it, then their Proceedings, under the Maſk only of Juſtice, became highly injurious to both Parties, and might have been diſputed with as much Propriety as an Individual might diſpute any Attempt to wreſt from him his undoubted Property.

That the Nabob gave no ſuch previous Conſent, as I have mentioned, to the Appointment of the Company's Servants as Arbitrators of his Differences with the Rajah, or any Promiſe to be bound by their Deciſions, is evident from his Correſpondence with the Governor at that Period. By this it appears, that the Company's Servants were deſirous of interpoſing their Mediation to adjuſt the Claims of the Nabob and the Rajah. That both Parties in conſequence ſtated their reſpective Demands; that the Nabob's went much further than the Company's Servants ſeemed inclined to allow; and that the Company's Servants thereupon framed their Objections, which were anſwered by the Nabob, in a Manner that ſufficiently ſhewed his Diſlike to their Proceedings. Upon the Whole, there appears not the leaſt Room to doubt, that nothing but the decided Influence and Superiority which the Company's Servants had then lately acquired by the Expulſion of the French from the Country, and his Fears of giving Offence to them, could have prevailed with

* An indifferent Perſon reading the Accounts of this Treaty, and particularly that publiſhed in a Book called *Lord Pigot's Defence*, would ſuppoſe that Lord (then Mr.) Pigot, who was the prime Mover in the Treaty, was ſome great Monarch, and that the Nabob and the Raja of Tanjore were his Vaſſals, whoſe Differences he condeſcended to adjuſt in his own Way; for in the Book abovementioned, after ſpeaking with much Encomium on Lord Pigot's Deciſion upon the Merits and Claims of the reſpective Parties, the Writer goes on to obſerve: "*To reward the Fidelity of the one, and check the Ambition of the other, Lord Pigot adopted the only effectual Meaſure.* He guarantied the Kingdom of Tanjore to Pertaub Sing and his Deſcendents;" which is repeated alſo a Second Time with peculiar Emphaſis, Page 40, and 41.

the Nabob to ſet his Name to a Treaty which he conſidered as depriving him of his moſt eſſential Rights *.

With reſpect to the Rajah of Tanjore, ſo far were the Company's Servants from conſulting his Inclinations before Hand, that when they had brought the Nabob's Demands down to what *they* thought reaſonable, they drew out the Treaty between him and the Rajah; got the Nabob firſt to ſign it, and then ſent it in this State to Tanjore by their Agent, with Inſtructions to him, "*to* "*endeavour to prevail on the Rajah to accept the Terms propoſed* †." But what appears ſtill more extraordinary in this Tranſaction is, that the Company's Guarantee was affixed to the Treaty *before* it was ſent to the Rajah for his Acceptance, with this Expreſſion, "*We do hereby promiſe to guaran-*"*tee the Performance of the ſaid Treaty, being thereunto invited by both Parties:*" From whence it ſeems reaſonable to conclude, that the ſame Guarantee was likewiſe tendered to the Nabob for his Acceptance, with the Articles of the Treaty; and that both of the Parties, inſtead of *inviting* the Company's Servants, were *invited*, or rather obliged by them, to accept of their proffered Guarantee: Yet it is upon this Guarantee ſo obtained, that the Company have built their Right to interfere in all the ſubſequent Meaſures that have been purſued with reſpect to Tanjore; and finally, upon the Conqueſt of that Country made by the Nabob, with the Aſſiſtance of their own Servants, to take it into their Hands and reſtore it to the Rajah.

The Advocates for the Treaty of 1762, have urged chiefly in its Defence, that it was expedient in Point of Policy to keep Arcot and Tanjore in the Hands of ſeparate Princes. Suppoſing it to be ſo, if the Princes of Arcot and Tanjore had Claims upon each other, was it the Part of Juſtice for the Company's Servants, becauſe they were ſtronger than either, to ſettle them in their own way, and with a View to the Advantage of their Maſters? Allowing the Nabob's Claims upon the Rajah of Tanjore to have been in ſome Points extravagant, and according to our Notions of Equity, unjuſt; upon what Ground could the Company's Servants pretend to regulate them by their own Ideas of Propriety? Admitting the Nabob to have been the Dependant of a Dependant of the King of Dehli; ſtill with reſpect to the Company, he was ſovereign and independant, and their Servants had no more right to adjuſt his Pretenſions, than they had to adjuſt thoſe of the King of Dehli himſelf ‡. Does it ſeem probable that the Nabob, by his own free Will, would have concluded ſuch a Treaty as that of 1762, with the Rajah of Tanjore? If not, ſo far as the Company's Servants acted on that Occaſion againſt his voluntary Conſent, ſo far they acted without Authority; and by whatſoever Name they may term the Part they took in this Treaty, whether it were that of Friends, Mediators, or Guarantees, their Conduct will always be liable to the Imputation of an unjuſt Interference.

The Occurrences which intervened between the Concluſion of the Treaty of 1762, and the firſt Expedition againſt Tanjore in 1771, are ſufficiently known. Much Argument has been employed, both to prove and to arraign the Juſtice of aiding the Nabob in that Expedition; but as the Meaſure itſelf proved nothing deciſive againſt the Rajah, and was cloſed by a new Treaty between him and the Nabob, in which the Company's Servants had no Part, I ſhall only obſerve upon the Subject, that from an attentive Peruſal of this whole Proceeding, and of the Orders and Opinions of the Company as they may be gathered from their Correſpondence, it appears to me, that the War againſt the Rajah was fully juſtified by repeated Provocations, and that the Court of Directors themſelves conſidered the Treaty of 1762, as violated by his offenſive Conduct, and their Guarantee of courſe aboliſhed, ſometime before the Expedition and Treaty of 1771 took place. How elſe ſhall we account for their Orders of 1769 and 1770, wherein they complain of the Rajah's withholding his Aſſiſtance from the Company and the Nabob when they were acting in Defence of the Carnatic againſt Hyder Ally, and after ſpeaking of former Contributions made by the Rajahs of Tanjore in like Caſes, enjoin their Servants "to give the Nabob ſuch Support in "his Pretenſions as may be effectual; and if the Rajah refuſed to contribute a juſt Proportion "to the Expences of the War, then to purſue ſuch Meaſures as the Nabob may think conſiſtent "with the Juſtice and Dignity of his Government?" In another Letter they ſay, "the plain Fact "is, that the King of Tanjore, who *is tributary to the Nabob, ought to have furniſhed his Quota to-*"*wards carrying on the War, which he has not done.*"

With regard to the Second Expedition againſt Tanjore in 1773, which terminated by the Capture of the Place, it were to be wiſhed, that the Company's Servants had been fully inſtructed by their Conſtituents, before they were called upon to execute that Meaſure; as it was, being left to their

* The Idea of the Nabob's being forced to ſign the Treaty has been ridiculed; but if ſuch an Influence were employed as he could not reſiſt without hazarding the Affections or perhaps feeling the Reſentment of thoſe who had the Power to hurt him, it carries to my Mind as much the Idea of *Force* as if he had been compelled by a ſtronger Arm than his own to affix his Name to the Treaty.

† Vide Inſtructions to Mr. Du Pré, dated 20th September 1762.

‡ There are ſeveral Rajahs or Zemindars in the Carnatic, over whom the Nabob exerciſes the ſame Rights that he formerly claimed, and ſtill claims over the Rajah of Tanjore; yet the Company never pretended to examine or queſtion thoſe Rights, and would now probably think it a great Injuſtice, however they may have been acquired, to interfere with them in ſupport of thoſe whom the Nabob holds in Dependance. This Pretence aſſumed by the Servants of the Company to adjuſt the Claims of the Nabob, tempts me to put the following Caſe: Suppoſing the Nabob or any other Indian Prince were ſufficiently *powerful*, to enquire into and *adjuſt* the Rights of the Company, either by their own fluctuating Notions of Equity, or even by the fixed and juſt Standard in Uſe with more enlightened People, how many Complaints ſhould we not make, and how many Wars wage, in Defence of our Claims?—and is there the ſmalleſt Difference between this Caſe and that of which I am now ſpeaking?

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own Diſcretion, and having the Power of the Company in their Hands, whether they uſed that Diſcretion with Wiſdom or not, their Actions were to all Intents and Purpoſes as binding on the Company as if they had been performed by the expreſs Authority of the Court of Directors. They were required by the Nabob to aid him as Auxiliaries againſt the Rajah of Tanjore: In that Character they made public Engagements with the Nabob, and ſent their Troops to aſſiſt him in reducing the Fort of Tanjore, and placing that Conqueſt in his Hands. As the Whole of their Meaſures on this Occaſion had the Force of a public Treaty, upon what Claim of Right do the Company by their own Authority abrogate theſe Proceedings in Oppoſition to the Will of the Nabob? Engaged by their Servants as Auxiliaries, how could they aſſume the Character of Principals? But as Principals and Equals even in this Tranſaction, they could juſtly abrogate nothing without the Nabob's Conſent. They go then ſtill higher: They act as the Nabob's Superiors, and not only take from him the Country which their Servants had conquered, and put into his Hands, but even place the Nabob in a worſe Situation, and the Rajah, at leaſt with reſpect to him, in a better than before the Conqueſt was made.

As to the Ground on which the Company built their Claim of Interference in this Caſe, viz. The Treaty of 1762, to which their Servants had made them Guarantees, I have already ſhewn upon what Idea that Treaty was concluded, and what ſtrong Reaſons there were to believe, that one of the Parties had been as it were compelled to enter into it; I have alſo, and I think, upon good Reaſons, urged that the Treaty of 1762 was conſidered by the Company themſelves as violated by the Conduct of the Rajah of Tanjore, even before the Commencement of the Firſt Expedition againſt him in 1771; but if the Company, after they had in Effect declared thoſe Engagements at an End; after their Servants had made one Expedition to Tanjore, which ended in a new Treaty between the Nabob and the Rajah, wherein that of 1762 is not even mentioned; after a Second Expedition had been undertaken, which ended in the Capture of the Place: I ſay, if the Company, after all theſe Tranſactions, think proper to revive the Guarantee of 1762, which was a diſcretional Act of their Servants, what Reaſon can be given why the Engagements with the Nabob of 1771, and thoſe of 1773, which were alſo diſcretional Acts of their Servants, ſhould be diſregarded and ſet aſide? And why are thoſe Stipulations which were made by their Servants in favour of the Rajah of Tanjore, who had no particular Claim upon the Company's Friendſhip, to be approved and revived in a Manner the moſt diſtinguiſhing to *him*, and thoſe reiterated Engagements which were made with the Nabob, who had ſo many Claims upon their Friendſhip, to be diſavowed and abrogated in a Manner the moſt diſgraceful to *him*?

But the Guarantee of 1762, even allowing it to have been in Force, could only entruſt to the Company the Care of the Stipulations included in the Treaty ſo guaranteed. The Operation of this Guarantee therefore in its fulleſt Extent, could not place the Rajah of Tanjore in any other Situation than that in which it found him in 1762. In that Situation, he was wholly independant of the Company, and the Nabob had ſtill ſome Claims upon him, which were not given up by the Treaty: How different becomes his Situation now he is reſtored to his Government by the Company. The Conditions of his Reſtoration were, "that he ſhould admit a Company's Garriſon "in his Fort; that he ſhould aſſign Revenues ſufficient to maintain this Garriſon; that no Troops "except thoſe of the Company ſhould be permited to reſide within the City of Tanjore, and "except alſo a few native Guards, which were not to be exceeded or augmented by the Rajah "on any Account or Pretence whatſoever; and that he ſhould make no Treaty with foreign "Powers without their Concurrence."—This is in Fact a Situation of Dependance, though diſtinguiſhed by the Company under the flattering Names of Friendſhip and Alliance; and when we add, that the Company have ſince requeſted and obtained profitable Grants of Land in the Tanjore Country, the whole Tranſaction carries with it an Appearance extremely unfavourable, and gives to the Nabob too much Reaſon to complain that Juſtice and Friendſhip have been ſacrificed to the mere Views of Intereſt and Policy.

With reſpect however to the Policy of this Meaſure, I ſhall never be induced to think it eligible in that View, to maintain ſo cloſe an Alliance with Two Princes whoſe Diſagreements never can be reconciled, and whoſe reſpective Situations are ſuch as cannot fail of producing further Diſputes in which we muſt neceſſarily take Part. The Nabob ſuperior in Power, and the moſt naturally our Ally, poſſeſſes by much the greateſt Portion of the Carnatic, and the Rajah of Tanjore is alſo by our Alliance ſupported as a Power within that of the Nabob, his Province being in the Heart of the Nabob's Poſſeſſions. In this Situation, though dependant on the Company, he conſiders himſelf wholly independant of the Nabob: And from the Tranſactions that have paſſed, the Intereſts of the Two Princes are become totally oppoſite and incompatible with each other. If any Diſpute happen between the Nabob and the Rajah, and the Nabob in Revenge of a juſt Offence ſhould think proper to attack the Rajah, which he may do with his own Troops independant of us, and without breaking any one Engagement, then by our Stipulations with the Rajah, we are bound to act in his Defence, and to conſider the Nabob as his Enemy. If we aid the Nabob, as we ought in a juſt Cauſe, then that Part of our Troops which is maintained for his Support, may be employed againſt that Part which is entertained for the Defence of the Rajah. On the other Hand, ſhould the Rajah have any juſt Cauſe of Offence againſt the Nabob, it will be expected of us, as his Friends and Allies, to obtain Redreſs: Here again we may be involved, either with him or the Nabob. With reſpect to foreign Powers, our Engagements to the Rajah become

ſtill more hazardous. The French had lately, and the Dutch and Danes now have, Settlements within his Territories; to thoſe Settlements the Rajah's Servants or Renters are perpetually flying for Protection againſt his Government: And as our Troops only are employed in the Tanjore Country, the Rajah on theſe Occaſions calls upon us to ſupport his Authority. Once already have we been on the Point of embroiling ourſelves with the Dutch: And very lately an Inſult was offered upon the Daniſh Settlement at Tranquebar, by ſome of our Sepoys employed in the Collections under the Authority of the Rajah's Managers. With regard to the Indian States we are likewiſe in the ſame Predicament from this Alliance. If the Rajah's Country be attacked by Hyder Ally or the Marattas, we muſt defend it, not only with the Troops appointed for its Protection, but *totis viribus*, otherwiſe it will inevitably be conquered. How then are we to act in this Caſe? Our Strength chiefly conſiſts in the Military Eſtabliſhment kept up for the Defence of the Nabob, and paid by him; but the Nabob has now no Intereſt in the Rajah's Country, nor can we imagine he will eaſily be induced to ſpend his Money and expoſe his own Poſſeſſions in fighting the Rajah's Battles; and indeed this is one of thoſe Caſes in which it would be an Inſult, after what has paſſed, to deſire his Aſſiſtance; much more to uſe Influence or Compulſion for obtaining it. In a Word, ſo far from thinking it politic to ſupport an independant Intereſt within the Carnatic, oppoſite, and even inimical to that of the Nabob, it appears to me to be a Syſtem productive of nothing but Confuſion and Danger; nor can we poſſibly maintain it long without making Enemies of both the Princes we are bound to defend; without involving ourſelves in infinite Troubles; and hazarding ſtill further than we have already done, the Honour of our public Engagements.

Either the Rajah ſhould have been left in the Situation in which we found him before the Treaty of 1762, that is, before we had any public Engagements in his Behalf, or all the Acts which the Servants of the Company have deemed it neceſſary in various Conjunctures to purſue, relative to Tanjore, ſhould have been confirmed. In this laſt Event the Nabob would now have been in Poſſeſſion of Tanjore, and the Company, beſides preſerving the Faith of their Engagements, would have had only One inſtead of Two Intereſts to ſupport. It has been ſaid, that ſuch an Increaſe of Territory might have made the Nabob too powerful, and placed him beyond the Controul of the Company; but the Idea in this Caſe is fallacious. To have added any Territory out of the Carnatic (that is in the Belaghaut or above the Paſſes) to the Dominions of the Nabob, would have no Doubt been impolitic: But it is unqueſtionably more ſafe, as well as more advantageous, for the Company to have only One Intereſt on this Side the Paſſes, let that Intereſt be ever ſo powerful, than to have Two diſtinct Intereſts, both perpetually claſhing, and both upheld by our Support. If the Nabob had continued to poſſeſs Tanjore, would not the Company have maintained the ſame Checks over him in that Province that they now hold throughout the whole Carnatic, by having Garriſons in all his Forts? By having his Perſon and Family in their Power? and laſtly, by having the little Army which he keeps in his immediate Pay commanded by their own Officers? But what ſtill more effectually deſtroys the Idea of the Nabob's becoming too powerful by the Acceſſion of Tanjore, is, that when he actually poſſeſſed that Country, and even had a large Garriſon of his own Troops in the Fort, he allowed himſelf to be deprived of it, and ſaw it given to his avowed Enemy, in a Manner the moſt humiliating and diſgraceful to himſelf, without even a Semblance of Oppoſition.

I have dwelt the longer upon the Affairs of the Nabob ſeparately, and as they are connected with thoſe of Tanjore, becauſe as he is the oldeſt, and properly ſpeaking, the only natural Ally of the Company, it is fit that his Situation, his Grievances, his Embarraſſments, ſhould be perfectly known and underſtood. If it ſhall appear from a cool and candid Examination of paſt Meaſures, that he has been treated with a Severity ill ſuited to the long and faithful Attachment he had confeſſedly born to the Company: If it ſhall appear that we have in any Inſtances uſed our Power unjuſtly to exact Compliances from him, which he might have otherwiſe thought it diſhonourable to grant: If it ſhall appear, that we have raiſed into our Favour and Alliance, a Man whom he, and whom the Company have conſidered as a Dependant on him, who was obnoxious to him, who had deſervedly in more Occaſions than one drawn on himſelf the Company's Diſpleaſure, and who never made any Effort to deſerve their Friendſhip *: If it ſhall appear that we have done this in a Manner the moſt diſtinguiſhing to that Man, the moſt humiliating and diſgraceful to the Nabob: And laſtly, if it ſhall appear that theſe Acts have been committed at the Expence of our public Faith, pledged to the Nabob in repeated and poſitive Engagements: I am at a Loſs to conceive how we ſhall be able to atone for ſuch accumulated Injuſtice. Certain it is, we ought to loſe no Time in making every Reparation in our Power; and though we have as yet been ſlow in our Attempts towards it, I hope we ſhall not confirm and add to the Injuries we have committed, by neglecting any longer to redreſs them.

* When I obſerve the Raja never made any Effort to deſerve the Company's Friendſhip, I ſpeak of the Period of his Independance; for ſince he was reſtored to his Government, I cannot conſider any Conceſſions he may have made in that Light: However even lately, when he was applied to for a Grant of the Diſtrict of Nagore, a ſhort Time only after his Reſtoration, he complied with a very ill Grace, ſaying, that although he had done ſo much for the Company, and his Country was ſo much impoveriſhed, ſtill he was *forced* to grant them large Jagueers (vide Letter from him to the Governor, received 16th May 1778.) This Jaguеer which he was *forced* to grant amounted to about £. 20,000 per Annum, whereas the Nabob granted to the Company at one Time as a Proof of his Friendſhip, a Jagueer of near £. 150,000 per Annum.

I propoſe

I propoſe now to return to the general Subject of theſe Sheets, and to bring it to a Concluſion, after making a few Remarks upon the Syſtem at preſent eſtabliſhed for the Government of the Company's political Affairs in India.

It has been obſerved in the Courſe of my Reflections, that ſome Inconveniencies have ariſen from the Want of a free and equal Communication of Meaſures and Sentiments among the Three principal Preſidencies of the Company, Bengal, Madras, and Bombay. This Communication is ſo neceſſary in all Tranſactions that relate to Wars or Engagements with the Country Powers, that there is no Poſſibility of preſerving any Degree of Union and Conſiſtency of Action without it. The Clauſe in the late regulating Act of Parliament, which gave a controlling Power to the Governor General and Council of Fort William in certain Caſes, has been the chief Foundation of this Evil, not from any Defect in the Clauſe itſelf, but from its being ſtrained to Purpoſes which the Legiſlature never could have intended it. The Power therein conveyed was meant, as I have always underſtood, ſolely to eſtabliſh among the ſeveral Preſidencies an uniform Plan of Action with reſpect to their Wars and Treaties; for when the Preſidencies were in theſe Reſpects independant of each other, it had ſometimes happened, that the Company's Servants at one Settlement were making War againſt a Power with whom their Servants at another were under Engagements of Peace and Friendſhip. In order to remedy the Abſurdity of this Syſtem, the Wiſdom of the Legiſlature judged it expedient to fix a controlling Power in One of the Company's Governments, ſufficient to reſtrain the reſt from making Wars or Treaties without its Concurrence, and conſequently to eſtabliſh that general Uniformity of Action ſo requiſite in Affairs of this Nature.

Such appear to have been the Ground, Extent, and Meaning of the controlling Power, but the Governor General and Council of Fort William, have given it a much greater Latitude. Inſtead of confining themſelves to a reſtraining Power in Two Points, they have aſſumed and exerciſed upon different Occaſions an active compelling Power, extending to all the political Tranſactions of the Company at the other Preſidencies. They have formerly promulgated among the Indian States, that the Servants at the other Preſidencies are appointed to manage the Company's political Affairs under "*their general Controul and Directions*;" and they have in virtue of this aſſumed Power, interfered with the Governments of Madras and Bombay, in a Manner the moſt hurtful to their Conſequence that can be imagined, and as it were with the ſole View of degrading them in the Eyes of the ſeveral Powers around them*.

The Effects of this Uſurpation are, I conceive, extremely injurious to the Intereſts of the Company. The Governor General and Council of Fort William have annexed to it ſuch a Degree of Superiority over the other Preſidencies, that they iſſue Orders to them in the ſame Style as the Court of Directors; nor will they condeſcend to aſk or to be guided by the Opinions of the Company's Servants at Madras or Bombay, in Points even that relate ſolely to the Intereſts of theſe Preſidencies, though they themſelves are not in a Situation, even if they had Experience and Time ſufficient to acquire a Knowledge of them: The Conſequence is, that with partial Views only they form Plans, and adopt Meaſures that comprize the general Intereſts of the Company; and when they come to be put in Execution, it is found that they claſh with ſome Intereſt or ſome Engagement at another Preſidency, which had been overlooked. Thus the Scheme of ſupporting Ragonaut Row in his Pretenſions had a direct Tendency to involve the Carnatic in a War, and interfered with an expreſs Treaty made by the Government at Madras with Nizam Ally Cawn, yet the Governor General and Council of Bengal never aſked the Advice or Opinion of thoſe who were immediately charged with theſe Intereſts and Engagements; probably they knew not or had forgot that any ſuch exiſted. Again the Governor General and Council of Bengal formed in like Manner a Scheme of an offenſive and defenſive Alliance with the Rajah of Berar, and authorized their Agent to put it in Execution; though One Article of the propoſed Alliance could not have been made without a direct Breach of the ſame Treaty with the Nizam, to which I have above alluded, nor of courſe without involving the Preſidency who executed the Treaty, in a War againſt that Power.

I cannot help remarking on this Occaſion, but with the greateſt Deference and Submiſſion to that moſt reſpectable Body which determined otherwiſe, that the Situation appointed for the Reſidence of the controlling Power, has not been happily choſen; nor can I perceive a ſingle Advantage that naturally intitles it to ſuch a Pre-eminence, except it be one to poſſeſs more Wealth and a larger Territory than any other Eſtabliſhment in India; this might be a Conſideration ſufficient to determine a Preference where the Advantages were in more eſſential Points equal to thoſe of any other Place; but I am humbly of Opinion, that the proper Seat for a controlling Power is that Preſidency which is moſt central with reſpect to the other Preſidencies, and moſt central in reſpect to the Country Powers, with whom we have our chief Intercourſe. Fort Saint George indiſ

* A ſtriking Inſtance of this happened very lately: The Government at Madras endeavoured to obtain from Nizam Ally Cawn a Relief from the great Burthen of Peiſcuſh, annually paid for the northern Circars. The Nizam at firſt ſhewed a ſtrong Diſinclination to comply with the Demand, and even expreſſed himſelf on the Occaſion in Terms of much Reſentment; but the Agent whom the Government of Madras employed at his Court, gave Hopes that by perſiſting in the Demand, the Nizam might be brought to a Compliance. In the mean Time, the Governor General and Council of Bengal upon ſome imperfect Information they had received of the Proceeding, thought proper to interpoſe their Authority; and without even waiting for any Explanations from Madras, they addreſſed a Letter directly to the Nizam, acquainting him in Effect that the Government at Madras had acted improperly, and that he was not to regard any Thing that had been done.

putably claims theſe Advantages over the other Settlements. It is nearly equidiſtant from Bengal, Bombay and Bencoolen. It has a more frequent, ſafe, and ſpeedy Communication with England, and with the other Preſidencies, than any other Settlement can have. It is the Place to which the greateſt Part of the India Ships, outward-bound, with Military Stores, Recruits, &c. are ordered to touch before they proceed to the other Parts of India and China; and it is the Place to which all Naval or Land Armaments ſent out by the King for the Service of India are directed, and from whence all their Operations are planned and executed; forming by theſe Means a much more reſpectable Appearance in the Eyes of the Natives than Bengal itſelf. With regard to the Country Powers, its Situation is no leſs advantageous. The Company and the Nabob's Poſſeſſions at Fort Saint George join to the Territories of the Nizam, and of Hyder Ally Cawn: And the Capitals of theſe two Powers are ſo near, that Letters paſs to them from Madras in Eight or Ten Days; to Poona, the Capital of the Marattas, Letters can paſs directly by Land in Twenty Days, or by the Way of Bombay in almoſt the ſame Time. I muſt not omit likewiſe, that Military Operations againſt either European or Indian Powers, can no where be carried on with ſo much Eaſe and Expedition as at Fort Saint George, on account of its Vicinity to the European Settlements, and to the Territories of the principal Indian States *.

Bengal certainly does not poſſeſs any of the Advantages I have mentioned in any Degree equal to Fort Saint George. Calcutta is inconveniently ſituated for Communication either with the other Settlements or with Europe; and as to the Country Powers I have mentioned, it is in a Manner quite removed from the Scene of their Politics or Military Operations, and ſo diſtant from them, that I believe, until the Government of Fort William was inveſted with a controlling Authority, and began in conſequence to aſſume a leading Part in the general political Intereſts of the Company, the Indian States paid very little Regard to it; becauſe though it maintained a formidable Force, that Force was too remote to be of any immediate Conſequence, either in promoting or checking their Views.

The Kingdom of Bengal is of ſuch wide Extent, that the Government of it in all its Branches, Civil, Military, Political, and Revenue, will be found a ſufficient Taſk for any Five, or even any Ten Men of the Firſt Abilities. To engage them in the Concerns of other Preſidencies is to take off a Portion of their Time and Attention from the Objects committed to their chief Care, and to employ it in directing Intereſts at a Diſtance, which are, and muſt be certainly more ſafe in the Hands of thoſe who are immediately appointed to the Charge of them, and whoſe ſole Duty it is to ſtudy them. But the controlling Power lodged in the Governor General and Council of Bengal, though it were confined in its Exerciſe (which it is not) *to Wars and Treaties only*, would engage them in a Scene much too extenſive for Men who are entruſted with the Government of ſo great a Kingdom, becauſe they cannot uſe this Power to Advantage, without attending to the political Concerns of the Company in every Part of India, and watching the gradual Changes which they undergo from a Variety of Occurrences too trivial perhaps to be noticed, but by thoſe who are Eye Witneſſes of them, or thoſe who have ſufficient Leiſure to mark them in a Series of voluminous Correſpondence.

I ſhall now conclude the Subject of theſe Sheets, by obſerving, that as I have been induced by public Conſiderations only, to preſent a faithful View of our political State in India; and to recommend ſuch Meaſures as are in my Judgment beſt calculated to remedy the Errors and Defects of our late Proceedings, ſo I ſhall think myſelf amply rewarded for the Pains I have taken, if it be my good Fortune to have propoſed any thing which may meet the Approbation of thoſe whoſe Opinions I reſpect, or contribute in any Degree to reſtore Peace and Proſperity to the Affairs of the Company.

* When the Governor General and Council of Bengal determined in February 1778, to ſend Troops to aſſiſt the Military Operations on the Bombay Side, they ordered them to march acroſs the Peninſula; I ſuppoſe chiefly, if not ſolely on account of the Averſion which the Bengal Sepoys have to go on Ship-board. This Body of Troops did not reach Surat till May 1779, that is Fourteen Months after they were put in Orders to march. Beſides the Riſk of paſſing through ſuch an immenſe Tract of the Maratta Dominions, the extra Expence of ſending theſe Troops by Land, muſt have been at leaſt 20 or 25 Lacks of Rupees; whereas the whole Armament might have been tranſported from Fort Saint George (where our Sepoys have not the ſame Averſion to go on Ship-board) in leſs than a Month, and at the Expence of about One Lack, or One Lack and a Half of Rupees.

APPENDIX, N° 326.

Extract of the General Letter from Fort Saint George to the Court of Directors; dated 3d April 1783

Par. 10. WHEN we reflect upon all that has paſſed from the firſt Treaty made with Ragonaut Row by the Preſidency of Bombay in 1774, to the preſent Time, we are clearly of Opinion, that no Means ſhould have been left untried to bring about a Peace upon Terms of the moſt perfect Moderation. If it ever were in General Goddard's Power to promote an Accommodation upon the Footing of the Treaty of Poorunder, we think he ſhould have gladly embraced the Opportunity; becauſe after the Diſaſter which the Bombay Troops met with, and the diſgraceful Capitulation made in conſequence by Meſſrs. Carnac and Egerton, nothing could in our Idea be more deſirable for the Company, both in Point of Honour and Safety, than to obtain a Releaſe from the ſevere Terms of that Capitulation, and a Renewal of the Treaty of Poorunder. We think too that ſuch Conceſſions, or even leſs favourable ones, acquired in this Manner, are infinitely preferable to any that can be obtained by Force of Arms. If the Object of a War with the Marattas be the Conqueſt of Territory, we do not apprehend that the Company in the End will be any Gainers, even by the moſt ſucceſsful Expeditions that can be made; for beſides the vaſt Expence of Blood and Treaſure which always attends diſtant Military Projects, there is too much Reaſon to fear that ſuch remote Acquiſitions can only be retained by the ſame Mode in which they are won; and that the Company may in their Defence be ſubject to a State of perpetual Warfare.

11. The only Situation, we humbly conceive, in which the Company can carry on their Affairs in Security, is that of Peace and Friendſhip with all the Country Powers, which never ſhould be diſturbed but when they are compelled to draw the Sword for the Defence of their preſent Poſſeſſions: To this their Power is very equal; but the Moment they paſs theſe Bounds, and engage in the Diſputes between the Indian States, or in any diſtant Plans of Conqueſt, their Force, by being divided, is much too weak either for offenſive or defenſive Meaſures; and in ſuch Caſe their Settlements and Territories muſt inevitably become expoſed to the Mercy of the firſt powerful Invader. We do not conceive that your Armies were ever meant for any other Purpoſe than the Defence and Protection of your Poſſeſſions; or that your Reſources could ever be thought adequate to the Support of remote and offenſive Wars: If any ſuch Ideas prevail, they will be inſtantly removed by comparing the preſent State of the Reſources in Bengal with their Condition Two Years ago; and then reflecting, that excluſive of about 20 Lacks of Rupees, which were ſent to this Preſidency, and expended in the Reduction of Pondicherry and Mahé, the Remainder of the Treaſure there accumulated, or a very conſiderable Part of it, has gone to the Support of General Goddard's Detachment, conſiſting only of Six Battalions of Sepoys, One Company of Native Artillery, and about a Thouſand Horſe.

12. We have thought it our Duty to deliver our Sentiments freely upon the Subject of your Affairs on the other Side of India; becauſe, being no further concerned in them than as acting in Support of the Meaſures which have been adopted by the Preſidencies of Fort William and Bombay, the Opinions we give are likely to be free from that Partiality which Men naturally feel in favour of their own Meaſures; and we advance them with the more Confidence on this Occaſion, becauſe we find them perfectly conſonant to the general Maxims which you have laid down for the Government of your Affairs.

13. We have adviſed your Honours from Time to Time of the Diſpoſition and Movements of Hyder Ally Cawn: This Chief, by Means of our Wars with the Marattas, is now grown to a formidable Height of Power; and his Genius is ſo aſpiring, his Reſources ſo various, and his Authority throughout every Part of his Dominions ſo completely eſtabliſhed, that he is become an Object of the firſt Importance in the political Syſtem of India. Before we were engaged in Diſputes with the Marattas, that Nation turned all its Views to the Reduction of Hyder's Power, and waged inceſſant War for that Purpoſe during many Years. Hyder, by his ſuperior and active Genius, was able to withſtand their Attacks, which though very powerful, were of no long Continuance; and whenever the Marattas quitted his Country he always found Means to recover himſelf ſo far as to be prepared for their next Invaſion. In this perpetual Scene of Warfare between the Two firſt Powers of India, your Affairs were every where carried on in perfect Peace and Security, your Forces extremely reſpected, and your Friendſhip courted by the Parties at War, and by every other State in India. This then was preciſely the Situation in which we think you ſhould and might eaſily have continued: Nothing could poſſibly have altered it but the Engagements entered into by the Preſidency of Bombay with Ragonaut Row, and the different Attempts formed in conſequence to overturn the reigning Government at Poona. The Views of the Maratta State became by thoſe Means inſtantly turned from Hyder to the Company. They withdrew all their Forces from his Country to defend themſelves againſt the Attacks of Ragonaut Row and his Allies. Hyder availed himſelf of this Opportunity to recover the Conqueſts that had been made from him by the Marattas, and to recompence himſelf by Conqueſts upon them; and the Marattas at length ſeeing no Proſpect of Relief from their Wars with the Engliſh, were forced to

1779. 68. conclude a Treaty with Hyder, which they made offenſive, that they might have the Benefit of his Aſſiſtance againſt us.

14. Such have been the Effects produced by our Diſputes with the Marattas; and if the Country Powers were capable of taking all the Advantages which a Combination might give them againſt us, we ſhould ſeverely feel the Weight of their united Operations; but fortunately for the Company, their Jealouſy of each other is too ſtrong to admit of any ſincere or permanent Agreement; and we think even now, notwithſtanding the Provocations which the Marattas have received by our Meaſures in Support of Ragonaut Row, were we to grant them any reaſonable Terms of Accommodation, they would inſtantly turn their Arms againſt Hyder, and leave us once more to the Enjoyment of that Tranquillity which we experienced from their former Conteſts with this Chief.

APPENDIX, N° 328.

Letter from the Governor General at Fort William to the Secret Committee of the Honourable Court of Directors of the Honourable United Eaſt India Company, 2d December 1780.

Honourable Sirs,

IN the preſent alarming Situation of your Affairs which their Diſtance, the long and momentous Interval which will have paſſed before you can receive the Knowledge of them, and the Diſſenſions which are ever attendant on public Calamities, will be too apt to exaggerate, you will probably expect that I ſhould inform you of my particular Sentiments concerning them; and I am the more deſirous of conforming to this Suppoſition, from a Belief too ſtrongly founded, that the Meaſures neceſſary to the Preſervation of your Poſſeſſions and Intereſts in India, will be inevitably productive of one Conſequence of which you ought to be early apprized, that you may be enabled to obviate it in the Proviſions which I underſtand will fall regularly under your Conſideration ſoon after the probable Receipt of theſe Diſpatches. I bear too high a Reſpect for the Characters to which I addreſs myſelf, to treat them with the Managements of a preparatory and gradual Introduction of an unpleaſing Report; and as it is the only point of ſubſtantial Information which I ſhall have to convey to you in this Letter, I ſhall therefore make it the firſt Subject of it.

The Conſequence to which I allude is the Neceſſity to which I foreſee that we ſhall be compelled of making a large Reduction, and poſſibly a total Suſpenſion, of your Inveſtment for the enſuing Year. I cannot pronounce what our Ability may be beyond that Period; this will depend on Contingencies too variable and remote for preſent Conjectures. In Juſtification of the Meaſure itſelf which I have predicted, I muſt remark that it will be leſs an Act of the Board than, as I have before intimated, the Reſult of an unavoidable Neceſſity, in which no Option will be left us, but either to ſacrifice the temporary Profits of the Company, or to hazard for ever the Exiſtence of all that they poſſeſs, for the Sake of retaining them. It will be impoſſible at the ſame Time to provide for the vaſt Expence which will be required for the Subſiſtence and Defence of both your other Preſidencies, and for an Inveſtment, in Addition to the increaſing Exigencies of this Government, and all from its own unaſſiſted Reſources.

We have been already reduced to the mortifying Extremity of borrowing Money at Intereſt, by which we have raiſed the Sum of 64,44,601. 1. 6. This Reſource cannot laſt: It muſt ceaſe at a certain Period, and that perhaps not diſtant; but the Exigency which called it forth will ſtill remain the ſame, and muſt be anſwered. We have no other Fund from which we can defray it, with the preſent Appropriation of our Means; for excluſively of the foreign Calls, our own internal Expences have accumulated, and will yet increaſe, notwithſtanding all the Care and Œconomy that we may uſe to check them, as we muſt replace all the Native Troops which we have detached to the Relief of the Carnatic, and as it is to be apprehended that our Revenue may ſuffer by the large Drafts which we ſhall be obliged to make of our current Specie.

I will confeſs that I am myſelf more alarmed at the Novelty of the Meaſure, than convinced of any real Detriment of which it will prove to your Intereſts, when I conſider, that your Ships are detained in their Outſet for Months by the Want of Hands to navigate them, and liable without any Exemption or Diſtinction to the ſame Hardſhips as the Neceſſity of the public Service impoſes on common Veſſels of Trade; that they arrive too late to be diſpatched in the ſame Seaſon; that equal Delays often attend them in their Return, which is accompliſhed with Hazards ſo great, that at leaſt a Part of their Cargoes cannot fail, without great Negligence of our national Enemies, to fall into their Hands; and in that Senſe ſo much of your Inveſtment may be affirmed to be provided for their Benefit, equally with your Loſs: I can venture to aſſure you that every Precaution will be taken by this Adminiſtration, with the Advice of the Board of Trade, to prevent the Inconveniences to which the Buſineſs of your Inveſtment may be liable in its Renewal, from

from its having been diſcontinued. Reſpecting the Expedients which may be recommended for ſupplying the Deficiency of your Inveſtment in the Caſe of its Stoppage beyond the next Year, upon theſe I do not preſume to offer my Opinion; they will not eſcape your Penetration, and I know that they will be ſuggeſted by a Judgment and Experience in theſe Points, ſuperior to my own.

I do not know whether your Supracargoes at Canton will ſtand in any need of our Aſſiſtance, I ſhould think not; but it is unneceſſary to add, after what I have herein premiſed, that it will be equally out of our Power to afford it.

I wait in anxious Expectation of an Anſwer from the Government of Berar to my Diſpatches which conveyed the Treaty propoſed for its Guarantee, and the Ratification of the Adminiſtration of Poona. This may arrive in the Courſe of another Week: I have every Reaſon to believe it will be entirely conſonant to my own Wiſhes. With the Aid, or even Neutrality of this Power, I have no Doubt of being able to make the Reſources of this Government equal to every Service which may be exacted from them, both for Maintenance of the actual Peace of theſe Provinces, and the Reſtoration of your Affairs in the Carnatic, however deſperate they may now appear, if they continue under the Conduct of your preſent Commander in Chief.

I cannot venture to pronounce what may be the Determination of the Adminiſtration of Poona: Conſidered as a State, it has certainly every Cauſe to dread the Aggrandizement of Hyder Ally Cawn, its natural Enemy: As a Faction, though not wholly unintereſted in the Event of his Succeſs, it may be influenced by other Cauſes; by the Ties of Confederacy; by its own Weakneſs; by the Jealouſy of Ragonaut Row; by the Aſcendant of Mahdajee Sindia, and his ſeparate Views, which are incompatible with Peace; and perhaps by national Reſentiment—Yet I think it probable that the Example of the Government of Berar may contribute to turn the Scale in our Favour. But I have no Grounds for ſuch an Expectation in any recent Act or Appearance.

Permit me to offer a brief Reflection on the preſent State of your preſent political Affairs: I have been told that the Maratta War has been, I know not on what Ground or Suggeſtion, attributed to me: Your Honourable Court is poſſeſſed of the fulleſt Evidence of the contrary. The Occaſion of the War was planned and executed without the Knowledge or previous Concurrence of this Government, which has had no other Participation in it than in providing, by an extraordinary Exertion, for the Support of the Meaſures undertaken by the Preſidency of Bombay, if theſe ſucceeded; and for its Preſervation if they failed: Our Detachment arrived ſeaſonably for the laſt of theſe Objects, and for the Redemption of the National Honour, which had been without it irretrievably loſt.—I had indeed flattered myſelf that the War would have ſoon terminated in ſuch Advantages as would have amply atoned for the paſt Calamities which had attended it. Whatever Conviction I may entertain of ſuch a Concluſion, it is now reduced to an Argument of unavailing Speculation, in which every Perſon is at Liberty to form his own Opinion. Maratta

Another and more intereſting Occaſion has now called for the Exertion of this Government in the Preſervation of that of Fort Saint George: This at leaſt will not be imputed to the Government of Bengal. If the extorted and palliated Confeſſion of the Nabob Nizam Ally Cawn may be credited (and we have the Evidence of the moſt public Notoriety to confirm it) it was the ſole Effect of a Confederacy formed at his Inſtigation, and dictated by his Reſentment of the Infringements made by the Select Committee of Fort Saint George on his Rights, obtained by the Treaty ſubſiſting between him and the Company, and his natural Apprehenſion of Hoſtilities intended by that Government againſt him. Whatever be the Cauſe, ſuch have been the Effects; and it is our Duty to do all that may be in our Power to avert them. This we have already done to a Degree as great as the Time and our Means would admit: We exhauſted our Treaſury: We have deprived ourſelves of the Flower of our Army for their Relief: We have abandoned our own Meaſures in the Criſis of their Succeſs: We have formed a powerful Detachment which will be in a Condition to march in a few Days from this Date; and have uſed Means, which though new and untried were the moſt likely to prove of ſpeedy and of certain Effect, to win Allies to their Cauſe, even of our preſent Enemies. I hope it will not appear the Aſſumption of an undue Merit, to obſerve that, extenſive as the Aids are which we have already afforded them, and at a Seaſon in which the Rules of your Service have hitherto interdicted the Navigation of theſe Seas in conſideration of the Dangers attending it, they arrived in Safety at Fort Saint George in leſs Time than Two Months from the Date of the Calamity which furniſhed the Occaſion for them, computed from the Return of the Army under Sir Hector Munro to the Mount, on the 14th September, to the Arrival of the laſt Ship of the Fleet, the Duke of Kingſton, at Fort Saint George on the 5th of November.

We ſhall continue to employ the ſame vigilant Attention to your Intereſts: And I have no Fears for the Event while I have the Happineſs to poſſeſs my preſent Means, with the ſame able and willing Aſſiſtance which Fortune has given me in my preſent Aſſociate of this Government.

I moſt humbly beg Leave to conclude this Letter with a Recommendation of Major Popham to your Favour: The Services which he has rendered in the Expulſion of the Marattas from the Dominions of your Ally the Rana of Gohud, and eſpecially in the Capture of the important Fortreſs of Gwallier, have given him a Claim to my Solicitation in his Behalf; and you will permit me to obſerve, that in whatever Mode you may be pleaſed to ſtamp your Approbation of his Services, you cannot have a more deſerving Subject for it, nor a Seaſon in which the Zeal of your Servants will Captain Popham.

will better intitle them, on every Principle of Policy, as well as Juſtice, to ſuch Rewards and Encouragements.

I am, with the greateſt Reſpect,
Honourable Sirs,
Your moſt obedient and faithful Servant,
Warren Haſtings.

Fort William,
2d December 1780.

Bengal Conſultations, the 25th September 1780.

At a Council; PRESENT,
The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident.
Philip Francis, Edward Wheler, } Eſquires,
Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote, K. B.

Read the following Letter from Bombay:

Gentlemen,

Having this Day received a Packet to your Addreſs from the Honourable Company, by the Way of Buſſora, we take the Opportunity of tranſmitting it by a Country Ship fortunately on the Point of ſailing.

We have alſo forwarded to Admiral Hughes the Intelligence therein contained, and earneſtly recommend to him to bring round His Majeſty's Squadron to this Coaſt as expeditiouſly as poſſible; as it might be attended with the utmoſt Danger to the Company's Poſſeſſions, ſhould ſuch a formidable French Armament make its Appearance, now that we are engaged in a War with the Marattas.

We have taken a Copy of the Diſpatches from the Honourable Company, which we ſhall tranſmit by another Opportunity. The Letter referred to by the Committee of Correſpondence in the firſt Part of their Letter has never come to our Hands.

We are with Reſpect, &c.

Bombay Caſtle,
14th Auguſt 1780.

APPENDIX, N° 329.

Extract of General Letter to Bombay, dated 12th April 1780.

21. HAVING taken into our particular and moſt ſerious Conſideration the State of the Company's Military Force at your Settlement, we have reſolved to appoint an able Officer to the Command of the Troops at Bombay.

22. And having the higheſt Opinion of the Zeal, Experience, and Military Abilities of Colonel Thomas Goddard, we have thought fit to appoint Colonel Goddard Commander in Chief of the Company's Forces at Bombay, and granted him a Commiſſion of Brigadier General in our Service.

23. We have alſo requeſted His Majeſty to grant a Commiſſion of Brigadier General, with local Rank, to Colonel Thomas Goddard, which we doubt not will be granted accordingly.

27. It is our Order, that Brigadier General Goddard have a conſtant Seat as Third in our ſaid Council and Select Committee. We likewiſe direct, that Mr. Henry More be the Fourth Member of our Select Committee at Bombay.

28. As a further Mark of our Approbation of the Conduct of Brigadier General Goddard, we have directed that the Pay and Allowances received by him from Bengal, as Commander in Chief of the Detachment ſent from that Settlement, be continued to him and paid by our Governor General and Council, ſo long as thoſe Troops ſhall remain under General Goddard's Command on the Weſtern Side of India; he muſt alſo receive the Pay and Allowances of Third of our Council and Select Committee at Bombay. But if our Governor General and Council ſhall recall the Bengal Detachment, the Pay and Allowances received by General Goddard on that Account muſt be diſcontinued, and ceaſe immediately upon the Return of the ſaid Detachment, as it will then be no longer under his Authority or Command; and after that Period General Goddard muſt receive the Pay and Allowances of our Commander in Chief of our Troops at Bombay.

APPENDIX, N° 330.

At a Council; PRESENT,

Secret Department, Tuesday.

The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Philip Francis, } Eſquires.
Edward Wheler, }
Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote, K. B.

READ the following Letter from the Preſident and Select Committee at Bombay.

Gentlemen,

Bombay, 17th Auguſt.

Incloſed is Duplicate of our Letter, dated the 30th ultimo.

The Preſident ſoon after laid before us a Plan for the Operations of the enſuing Campaign, which we take this firſt Opportunity of tranſmitting to you, together with a Copy of the Letter we ſent to General Goddard, conveying our Sentiments of the Plan, and the Meaſures we propoſe purſuing on our Part in Conſequence.

The Preſident's Minute and our Letter containing a full Statement of the preſent Situation of Affairs, as relative to the Maratta War, as well as of the propoſed Meaſures; it would be uſeleſs Repetition to give them in Detail here, and we therefore beg you will be referred to the Papers in the Packet.

We ſhall however explain ourſelves more fully to you on the Subject of the excluſive Approbation you have deſired us to make of the Receipts from the late Acquiſitions, for the Payment of the Army under General Goddard.

If with our former Reſources, we were under a Neceſſity of requiring in Addition a conſtant and ſtated Subſidy from you, to ſupport the Charges of this Preſidency, that Neceſſity will not in any Shape be leſſened, but very conſiderably augmented, by the late Increaſe of our Poſſeſſions; if the Revenues are to be diverted to another Channel, and ſo long as our Receipts continue to fall ſhort of our Expences, we ſhall not only ſtand in Need of this ordinary Supply from Bengal, but alſo of further Aid, in Proportion to any extraordinary and unprovided for Demand which we may have to anſwer; or, to bring the Matter exactly to a Point, ſuppoſing an Aggregate made of the Expences of this Preſidency, and of the Army under General Goddard, oppoſed to our Receipts and Revenues, the Deficiency can be ſupplied from no other Reſource but your Treaſury.

If it ſhould appear theſe Receipts are unequal to the ſingle Demands of this Preſidency, it can be no Relief to your Government to leſſen General Goddard's Demand upon you by increaſing ours, which is equally preſſing, but only varying the Proportion of the reſpective Supply to each. If you find both Expences too heavy to ſupport, we have foreſeen that Contingency, and pointed out a Remedy, which will not be found in the Meaſure you have propoſed to us; which, excluſive of the Diſtreſs it will occaſion, is humiliating to this Government in the higheſt Degree, when neither the Army we are to pay, or the Application of the Money we are to furniſh, are under our Controul.

We have already upon different Emergencies, afforded to General Goddard conſiderable Aids of Money, not without involving ourſelves in great Difficulties; and if our Means are increaſed by the late Acquiſitions, we ſhall moſt readily contribute more liberal Aſſiſtance: But too much Confidence muſt not be placed in the immediate Receipts from that Source, conſidering that the Diſtricts from whence this Revenue is expected were not taken into the Company's Poſſeſſion till nearly the End of May laſt; and we have yet no Knowledge but from Country Accounts, of what Sums they may afford, nor Dependance upon making the Collections, but from the Protection that is given to the Country. We requeſt theſe Circumſtances may be attended to, when the Eſtimate now ſent by the Board in conſequence of your Letter of the 1ſt May, comes under Conſideration.

To prevent the Diſtreſs that would reſult from a Deficiency in the Supplies from you occaſioned by an over-rated Computation of the Sums to be produced by that Reſource, we ſubjoin Extracts of Letters from the Chief of Surat, containing the laſt Information on that Subject.

" The Honourable Company's Tannahs are fixed in the ſeveral Purgunnahs belonging to the " Peſhwa Government, as alſo in the different Ceſſions to the Honourable Company from Futty " Sing Guicawar; and every Encouragement given to the Inhabitants to return to their Villages, " and reaſſume the Cultivation; and from preſent Appearances, I flatter myſelf the Honourable " Company will be able to recover a handſome Revenue therefrom the next Seaſon." 16th June.

" Your Honour, &c. may reſt aſſured, that every Attention ſhall be uſed on my Part, for procuring as large a Revenue from the late Acquiſitions as may lay in my Power, but the Whole " will depend on the Enemy's being prevented *from* entering the Purgunnahs." Auguſt 2d.

The

The Importance and abſolute Neceſſity of the Expedition into the Conkan is very fully explained in the Governor's Minute: It is, in ſhort, eſſential to the Succeſs of the War; and the Conqueſt of Baſſein would only be an Addition to our Burthens, unleſs the Country is firſt ſecured, nor could the Army be ſubſiſted otherwiſe. The preſent Poſition of the Army under General Goddard puts it out of his Power to effect this in Time, and we have therefore underſtood the Execution of this Service, which we will venture to pronounce, is more calculated to produce a favourable Criſis to the War, than any other which could at preſent be adopted. Our Endeavours muſt be entirely defeated were we to throw our Reſources out of our own Hands; and we ſhall truſt, that when you are informed of the general Tendency of our late Meaſures to relieve you from your preſent intolerable Burthens, and the vigorous Exertion for which we are now preparing, you will at leaſt provide for the Payment of the Bengal Troops, even if the Lowneſs of your Treaſury ſhould diſable you from aſſiſting us further; and we ſhall in the mean Time appropriate the Receipts from the new Purgunnahs to the general Purpoſes of the War, and admit General Goddard to ſuch a Participation as we can poſſibly afford.

If you ſhould judge it an expedient Meaſure, upon the Grounds of the Governor's Minute, we requeſt you will negociate a Loan in Calcutta to the Amount of Ten Lacks of Rupees, on the Bonds of this Government, and ſend the Amount in Specie to Bombay, for the Purpoſes therein explained.

We hope that the Line of Conduct we have recommended to General Goddard, to be obſerved for the preſent towards Futty Sing, will meet with your Approbation.

We acquainted you, in our Letter of the 30th ultimo, with the Conduct of the Nabob Hyder Ally to the Reſident at Onore; and it is proper we ſhould mention, that as the Nabob did not return any Anſwer to the Preſident's Propoſals of ſending a Gentleman to him, we countermanded Mr. Horſley's intended Journey.

In our Diſpatches of the 2d January, we tranſmitted the Information we had received from General Goddard of the Correſpondence carried on by the Dutch Chief at Surat with the Poona Miniſters. The General has, in a ſubſequent Letter which you will find in the Papers now ſent, ſtrongly preſſed us to take public Notice of the Conduct of Mr. Vande Graaf, which we have deferred doing, till we receive your Inſtructions, for which there will be ſufficient Time before an Opportunity will offer for Batavia, if you ſhould think it proper for us to make a Repreſentation to the Dutch Governor General. Tranſlation to the intercepted Letters are now encloſed, and the Original of that from Mr. Vande Graaf is in our Poſſeſſion, and ſealed with his official Seal, as a Director at Surat.

We have directed Mr. Henſhaw to obtain the moſt authentic Teſtimonials he can at Goa, of the ſeveral Facts relative to the Seizure of the Engliſh Veſſel at Mangulore; which when received ſhall be tranſmitted to you.

Encloſed is a Duplicate of our Letter of the 14th inſtant; and the original Packet from the Honourable Company therein mentioned, is now forwarded by the Duke of Grafton.

Bombay Caſtle,
17th Auguſt 1780.

We are with Reſpect, &c.
(Signed) William Hornby, &c.
Select Committee.

Ordered, That the Encloſures in the above Letter be entered after the Conſultation, and that the Letter itſelf do lie for Conſideration.

Preſident's Statement of the preſent Poſture of Affairs, and Propoſal of a Plan for the Operations of the enſuing Campaign.

1. The preſent Seaſon which obliges both our Troops and thoſe of the Enemy to remain inactive, affords us an Opportunity, uninterrupted by caſual intervening Circumſtances, of reviewing the general Poſture of our Affairs as relative to the Maratta War, the Advantage or Difficulties of our preſent Situation; and of conſidering how far the one may be improved, or the other relieved.

2. The War the Nation is at preſent engaged in with France and Spain; the uncertain Diſpoſition of the principal Powers in India who yet remain neuter in the Conteſt between us and the Marattas; and the reduced State of the Company's Finances in India, while Government at Home is calling on them for extraordinary Supplies, in Aid of the Public Neceſſities, ſufficiently evince the Expediency of bringing this Maratta War to as early a Concluſion as poſſible.

3. At preſent however there ſeems no Likelihood of effecting this deſirable Purpoſe by Treaty, all Attempts that have been made of this Kind having hitherto failed. We need not be at a Loſs for the Reaſon why the very moderate Terms demanded by the Governor General and Council laſt Year, could not be accepted by Nana and by Scindia; and that Reaſon ſtill ſubſiſts in its full Force. The public Faith engaged to Ragoba for his Security, and the Views of both Nana and Scindia in deſiring to obtain Poſſeſſion of his Perſon, form an Obſtacle which in a ſeparate Treaty with Nana ſeems inſurmountable, and with Scindia, is certainly of no ſmall Difficulty. I do but touch on theſe Subjects, for ſince the Commencement of Hoſtilities between General Goddard and Mhadjee

Mhadjee Scindia, all preſent Expectations of a Peace by Treaty with Nana and Scindia, jointly or ſeparately with either, has been at an End. The Governor General and Council have not even been pleaſed to inform us, whether they have empowered General Goddard to enter into further Negociation ſince the Termination of that which they authorized him in June laſt to commence with the Government at Poona, and with Futty Sing, after the Re-commencement of Hoſtilities, nor with their Views in any future Negociation for Peace.

4. In the mean Time their Sentiments with regard to the Operations of War, and the Direction of them to its final Termination, we muſt conclude correſpond with ours; not indeed from any direct Communication of theirs to us on this momentous Subject, but from their Approbation of my Plan for the Conduct of the War, delivered in this Committee laſt Year *; according to which, the Partition of Guzerat with Futty Sing, and the Reduction of Baſſein, which with its Diſtricts would connect our Poſſeſſions in one continued Line from hence to the Myhie, were to be the Objects of the War, and the Boundaries of our Views in regard to the Acquiſition of Territory for this Preſidency.

* 30th March 1779.

5. All Treaty for the preſent being at an End, and whenever re-commenced, there being ſuch Difficulties as to render the Concluſion of a Peace by this Means very doubtful, I confeſs I have but little Hope of it, unleſs by Succeſs in vigorous Meaſures directed to certain Objects, and ſtrictly confined to them. What they are, as far as we are informed, and what they ought to be, according to our repeated Reſolutions and Opinions, is above expreſſed in a few Words, and already in part accompliſhed. The Reduction of Baſſein, and its dependent Diſtricts, alone remains to compleat our Views; and when effected will bring us to that Period, when, if the Enemy refuſe to accept of a Peace, they muſt continue the War with us on our own Terms, as we ſhall then be in Poſſeſſion of a Revenue equal to all our Expences, on a Plan of mere Defence, which the Nature of the Country will make eaſy to us; while our Situation will render our Force in the higheſt Degree formidable to them during the War, and at all Times reſpectable.

6. It is true however, that neither the Revenue of all this Territory, nor much more, will ſuffice both for the Support of General Goddard's Army, and of our own Eſtabliſhment, which beſides we may fear will be growing more and more burthenſome, on account of the Expectation our Troops naturally entertain of being ſupported on the ſame Footing with the Bengal Army, which tho' given way to at firſt, only as a temporary Indulgence, will ſoon be grounded on the Plea of Precedents; and when our Officers have once formed their Expences upon this (extravagant) Plan, the Inefficacy of oppoſing Regulation to eſtabliſhing Habit and Cuſtom, will be felt here as it has been already experienced in other Governments.

7. By the Advices laſt received from the Governor General and Council, we learn, "that their "Diſtreſs for Money is ſuch, that they ſhall be unable to make adequate Remittances for the "Support of this Preſidency, and the Pay of the Army under General Goddard." This Diſtreſs may continue ſo long, or encreaſe ſo far, as to overbalance by many Degrees all the Advantages derived from the Aſſiſtance of the Bengal Detachment. And the only Security we can have againſt the Evil, is in the Diſpatch we uſe in putting our Affairs into ſuch a Poſture as to diſpenſe with this dangerous Aid.

8. This we could never have done but by making ſuch an Augmentation of our Military Force, as we have with this very View reſolved on, and which, if the Events of the next Campaign do not much diſappoint us, we may hope will enable us to ſend back the Bengal and Madras Battalions as early as we can receive the neceſſary Communications in Reply to the Letters already written to Bengal on this Subject, and the Seaſon will well permit; that is to ſay, by February or March next.

9. In a Word then, Peace, either formally or ſubſtantially, ſhould be the firſt Object of our Wiſhes. The Second, (and hardly of leſs Importance to this Government than the Firſt) to ſend back the Troops of the other Preſidencies, which we have no preſent Means nor future Hope of being able to maintain, unleſs by Supplies from Bengal, which we are plainly told are no longer to be depended on.

10. We have ourſelves ſcarce ever felt greater Diſtreſs for Money than at this Time, and muſt ſtill expect to feel for ſome Months; and I am well aware of the Impediment we may meet from this Cauſe, in the Execution of any Plan that can be propoſed: yet this is no Reaſon with me againſt our entering on Action, but indeed the contrary; for if we can by any Means advance, we may ſtill as we proceed hope to find ſome Relief to our Neceſſities, which, while we remain inactive, muſt be ſtill encreaſing on us till we are unable even to attempt a Remedy. The Expence of our preſent Eſtabliſhment muſt be borne, whether our Troops are kept in Action or in Idleneſs; and this Expence alone is ſufficient to ſink us: The only Difference therefore is, that by the former we have a Proſpect of relieving our Neceſſities; by the latter, none; for no Reſource remains for us, but ſuch as we may find in our own Efforts. Theſe I flatter myſelf will prove ſucceſsful; but if they do not, we ſhall have the Conſolation of having made them, and ſhall be ſubject to no Reproach for want of Foreſight, or for Inactivity or Delay; and ſhall at leaſt put off the Moment in which we are to give up all our Hope to the laſt. We muſt therefore, in ſpite of all Difficulties, reſolve to ſtruggle on towards the Accompliſhment of the End we have in View, and determine to be ſtopped by nothing but [illegible] Impoſſibilities. I am not without Hopes too, that the Governor General and Council [illegible], finding the Lowneſs of their Treaſury, fall on ſome Expedient for aſſiſting us, when [illegible] convinced of the Tendency of our Meaſures to render all Supplies from them for

the future unneceſſary, and to relieve our Employers from the intolerable Burden the Bengal Army on this Side of India has proved to them.

11. Before I proceed to propoſe the Sentiments I mean to ſubmit to the Committee, relative to the Operations of the enſuing Campaign, it is neceſſary to take Notice of ſome Circumſtances of our Connection with Futty Sing, to which the laſt Letter from Bengal refers, as well as of all other Particulars of our preſent Situation which are to be taken into Conſideration in order to form a juſt Judgment with regard to our future Meaſures.

12. The Governor General and Council have been pleaſed to inform us, that they ſhall conform to the Caution given them by us, relative to the apparent Diſproportion between our Share of the Partition of Guzerat and Futty Sing's, in their final Ratification of the Treaty with him. They likewiſe ſeem inclined to think that excluſive of the above-mentioned Diſproportion, the Exchange of Territory agreed on with him muſt rather prove diſadvantageous to the Company, becauſe, as they ſay, "We gain for Lands lying remote and rendered in a Degree inacceſſible to the Marattas by the Interpoſition of Two Capital Rivers, a Diſtrict immediately on their Borders and open to their "Incurſions."

13. They have accordingly recommended Three ſeveral Ways of finally adjuſting the Partition of the Province; viz.

1ſt. Either to annul the Exchange altogether, and both Parties to poſſeſs their Share according to the former Diviſion between the Peſhwa and Futty Sing; for this I apprehend to be the Meaning of the Governor General and Council, who ſeem to have miſunderſtood the Situation of Zinnore and Dubhoy, and to have conſidered them as having both formerly belonged to Futty Sing, and to have ſuppoſed likewiſe that he had poſſeſſed no Part of the Province to the Southward of theſe Places.

Or, 2dly. Futty Sing to make up the Diſproportion by further Ceſſion of Land to the Company.

Or, 3dly. By paying an equivalent Subſidy in Ready Money.

14. The Committee will recollect, that General Goddard in his Reply to their Letter of the 24th February, expreſſes his Opinion poſitively, that the Diviſion in point of Revenue is already in our Favour; and till we have an Opportunity of informing ourſelves with Certainty on this Point, it will be highly impolitic to alarm Futty Sing with the Appearance of inſtituting freſh Claims: And as the Governor General and Council have kept this Matter open for future Adjuſtment, I conceive that for the preſent this is ſufficient; and it will be adviſable to wait a more convenient Seaſon than the preſent for the Diſcuſſion.

15. With regard to the Objection which the Governor General and Council have ſtated to the Situation of our Diviſion of the Province, it ſeems to me totally without Foundation. General Goddard has in the Principal of the Exchanges with Futty Sing, conformed ſtrictly to the Plan which was originally concerted with him, and approved by the Governor General and Council. The Southern Part of Guzerat will, after the Reduction of Baſſein and its Diſtricts, connect in one continued Line with the reſt of our Territory. The Mountains which ſtretch Northward from thence are a Security to it from the Southward and Eaſtward; and the Myhie, which forms our Boundary to the Northward, and the Nerbuddah and Tappy which interſect our Portion of Guzerat, and are navigable higher than any other Rivers of the Province, give a clear Advantage to this Part of the Country over that North of the Myhie, from which, if we were poſſeſſed of it, we ſhould be cut off by Futty Sing's Diviſion to the Southward, and during great Part of the Fair Seaſon ſhould have but a tedious Communication with it by Sea, on account of the North Weſt Winds which then prevail, and the Difficulties of the Navigation in the Gulph of Cambay; while on the Side of Malwa and Candeiſh, it lies equally expoſed with the other, as well as to the Depredations of the numerous Bands of Freebooters who are in Poſſeſſion of the Country to the N. W. By which and by the various Oppreſſions it has ſuffered from its many Maſters, within theſe laſt Thirty Years, it is totally changed from what it formerly has been; a melancholy Inſtance of which may be ſeen in the preſent State of the once-flouriſhing City of Ahmedabad.

16. The Governor General and Council therefore having deſired that we would afford General Goddard the Aid of our Advice on this Subject, and in a Manner that ſeems to refer the Deciſion on it to us, I would propoſe that we ſhould recommend to General Goddard to adhere by all Means to the firſt Intention of reſerving the Southern Part of the Province to ourſelves, and likewiſe for the preſent, wave entering on the more exact Adjuſtment of the reſpective Proportions of the Company, and of Futty Sing in the Diviſion of it. The Revenue we ſhall be in immediate Receipt of, as we are now ſituated in that Quarter, and the further Views we have to proſecute on this Side rendering it moſt prudent in my Opinion to avoid a Subject that may give Cauſe of Diſſatisfaction to Futty Sing, to whom (if neceſſary) I think it might even be expedient to confirm any Advantage he may have, according to the preſent Partition, rather than to hazard a Breach or even Coolneſs with him, that would oblige us in any Degree to withdraw our Attention from the Proſecution of the Objects which ſo preſſingly demand it to the Southward.

17. I have the Pleaſure to obſerve that General Goddard's Sentiments with regard to the Reduction of Baſſein, as the firſt Operation of the enſuing Campaign, entirely concur with ours, and he has deſired "to receive from us the earlieſt Communication of the Plan we would recommend "for carrying it into Execution, the Manner, Time, and every Thing elſe that may be conducive "to its early Succeſs." He is even ſo anxious for undertaking this important Enterprize, that he ſeems to wiſh to come down by Sea, as ſoon as ever the Seaſon will permit of his embarking his

Troops from Surat, where he informs us he is providing every Material neceſſary for conſtructing the Works and carrying on the Siege which can eaſily be conveyed by Water; but depending entirely on us for Aſſiſtance of ſuch Artillery, Stores, and Ammunition, as may be requiſite, and alſo for the neceſſary Supplies of Proviſions.

18. The General informs us likewiſe that Scindia and Holkar are certainly ſeparated, the former being gone to Eugene, and the latter to Indour; and that he has recommended to the Governor General and Council to aſſiſt in a Plan of detaining them in the Northern Provinces, while we purſue our Views here, by cauſing a powerful Diverſion of their Forces on the Side of Malwa: and we muſt ſuppoſe, that it is to this Purpoſe that the Operations of the Detachment under Captain Popham, in Conjunction with the Rana of Ghode, are now directed, though we have heard nothing from the Governor General and Council on this Subject, and know nothing of the Proceedings of that Detachment but by the Intelligence of private Correſpondents.

19. By the Succeſs which has attended the Detachment ordered by General Goddard againſt Gunneſe Punt, in driving him entirely out of Guzerat, and in taking Poſſeſſion of the Forts to the Southward of it, the General's Quarters are now extended to the Borders of the Diſtricts dependant on Baſſein, and the Revenue from our Diviſion of Guzerat is ſecured for the next Seaſon. Scindia and Holkar are the only Enemies who can moleſt us from the Northward; and even if their Attention ſhould not be engaged on the Side of Bengal, yet there is no Reaſon to ſuppoſe that they will be able to aſſemble their Troops and ſettle the Terms on which they are to afford their Aſſiſtance to Nana, ſo as to attempt any Thing againſt us next Seaſon earlier than they did the laſt; that is to ſay, before the End of February: And indeed Scindia's Operations during the laſt Campaign ſeemed rather directed to cover his own Country than to attack ours; and if that be ſtill his View, we ſhall have nothing to apprehend from him on the Side of Guzerat while our Troops are employed on this.

20. General Goddard, however, I dare ſay will be able to provide ſufficiently for the Protection of that Province when he comes this Way, as in caſe of Neceſſity a ſtrong Reinforcement from the Garriſon of Surat and Broach may take the Field to join ſuch Troops as the General may think proper to leave behind him to the Northward.

21. In the mean Time I conſider the Poſition of General Goddard's Army, till the Seaſon for Action commences, as very advantageous, by ſecuring the Pergunnahs from which we are to expect ſo large a Part of our Reſources for the next Year againſt the Incurſions of the Enemy from the Southward: This Advantage will ſtill be maintained, and even extended, by his bringing down his Army to the Attack of Baſſein by Land, as he will in fact by this Means take in the whole Country as he advances; he will too be in Readineſs for undertaking the Siege of Baſſein immediately on his Arrival there; whereas if he comes down by Sea to Bombay, ſome Time will be neceſſary to furniſh him with the neceſſary Apparatus for the Siege. And after the Reduction of the Place, his Army will require to be fitted out afreſh for the Field, in which we are under great Diſadvantages from the Nature of our preſent Limits; and in the mean Time the Country between the Hills and the Sea lying open to the Enemy, they may do conſiderable Damage to our Northern Pergunnahs by Incurſions from the Concan.

22. At the Time General Goddard propoſed coming down by Sea to the Attack of Baſſein, he was unacquainted with the Footing we had gained on the Continent, nor can he yet be informed of the Purpoſes to which we may be able to apply this Advantage in favour of his Operations againſt Baſſein, and his March to the Southward; theſe I flatter myſelf are of the moſt deciſive Kind, and will I think appear ſuch with ſo great a Degree of Evidence, as I proceed to explain the Part I propoſe our Troops ſhould take in the next Campaign, that I do not doubt of the Concurrence of the Committee.

23. By poſſeſſing ourſelves of Callian we have ſecured one of the moſt favourable Openings into the Concan, ſituated at eaſy and nearly equal Diſtances from the principal Paſſes leading to and from the Decan; it muſt be by poſſeſſing theſe, and by a reſpectable Body of Troops to cover the Country, that we muſt endeavour to exclude the Enemy from it, and render it uſeful to ourſelves. I would accordingly propoſe that Five Battalions ſhould be aſſembled at Callian, and all neceſſary Preparation made for them to take the Field as early as the Seaſon will permit, it being a Point of the laſt Importance to have this Body of Troops in Readineſs to protect the Harveſt before the Enemy can begin their Operations: I do not pretend now to fix the preciſe Time for their entering on Action, which muſt depend on the Seaſon and on many Particulars of local Knowledge, which can only be judged of on the Spot, I therefore ſhould think it ſufficient for the preſent to appoint the Officer we pitch on for this Command, together with the commanding Officer of Artillery and the Commiſſary, who ſhould now be made acquainted with our Views in forming this Army, and be employed as may ſeem neceſſary in making the requiſite Preparation in their ſeveral Departments. Theſe Views, according to my Idea, are to ſecure to ourſelves the Poſſeſſion of the Country, and by that Means a plentiful Subſiſtence for our Troops during the Campaign, to guard the Paſſes from the Decan into the Concan, and otherwiſe cover the Country till General Goddard's Arrival, and then to cover the Siege of Baſſein.

24. By the Appointment of the above-mentioned Officers, and communicating our Plan of Operations thus early, I make no Doubt of having every thing put in the neceſſary Degree of Forwardneſs in the ſeveral Departments, without any unneceſſary Encreaſe of Expence. The Officers we entruſt with this Command will acquire, before the Seaſon for Action opens, a thorough Know-

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ledge of the Country, in which the Enemy have a vaſt Advantage over us at preſent, and may prepare by many ſmall Enterprizes and Movements for the main Service on which he knows he is to be employed, and thus greatly facilitate its future Succeſs.

25. The Advantage we ſhall derive from the Poſition of our Troops and of General Goddard's Army, ſeems to me to be of the greateſt Conſequence, it will ſecure to us the Produce of an extenſive and plentiful Tract of Country, at a Time when our Diſtreſs for Money will render ſuch a Reſource doubly valuable; the Enemy will be obliged to fight for an Entrance into the Conkan if they preſume to attempt it, which I think they hardly will, as they will then be ſhut up between the Two Armies; we may conſider the Country therefore as ours from the Moment our Troops take the Field, if we are beforehand in this reſpect with the Enemy.

26. With an Army from hence in the Field to prevent the Enemy from entering the Country on this Side, it will not be very material whether General Goddard is a little ſooner or later in undertaking the Siege of Baſſein. Our Army in the Conkan will ſecure his unmoleſted March to the Southward, he will find a plentiful Country to ſupply his Army as he comes along, and we hope to meet with little Oppoſition in the complete Reduction of it with ſo reſpectable Force both in Numbers and Situation.

27. The Troops will better bear running in Arrears while they are kept employed on actual Service and ſubſiſted from the Country, than they will while they are idle in Garriſon, and have no other Dependance than their Pay; in this Reſpect therefore Money will be leſs neceſſary to us, though we may feel the Want of it in others; but the Reputation of Succeſs, and the near Proſpect of bettering our Finance, will of themſelves keep up a Credit that may prove a Reſource which we ſhall hardly obtain by any other Means.

28. A further Conſideration worthy of Attention is this, that the Difference of a Month earlier in the Field may make the Difference of a whole Year or more in point of Revenue, or in the Aids of Subſiſtence to be expected from the Country, for if the Enemy are able to conſume and deſtroy the Produce, it is certain that nothing can be had from it till a new Crop comes in; and we may likewiſe reckon as our Loſs, the Detriment the future Revenues muſt ſuffer by the Depopulation of the Villages.

29. The Fall of Baſſein, our indiſputed Poſſeſſion of the Country and Paſſes, and the actual Strength of the Two Armies, will certainly ſpread an Alarm at Poona, that may not improbably be expected to form a Criſis, that may be improved to the great Work of Peace, but will certainly at leaſt ſerve to ſecure the Tranquillity of our more diſtant Poſſeſſions, as the Enemy will hardly venture to ſend their Forces from Decan, while they ſee ours aſſembled ſo near the Capital.

30. In order to heighten to the utmoſt the Impreſſion this Situation may make on the Enemy, and at the ſame Time to keep alive the Reliance Ragoba has ſtill had on us for Aſſiſtance; it might perhaps be worth while to let him try his Fortune in the Southern Parts of the Conkan, between this and Goa, with ſuch Forces as he could collect, and backed by a ſmall Detachment of ours. He has yet ſome Partizans in Arms in the Country. Monackjee Funera has ſent to me, offering Aſſiſtance, and I know that there are now Overtures making to Ragoba on this Subject by the Rajah of Callapore, whoſe Country gives an Opening into the Decan, on the Banks of the Kiſtna, not far from Meritz; Ragoba might then be able to form ſome Eſtabliſhment for himſelf, in which, while the War continued, he would be eaſily ſupported by us, engage much of the Enemy's Attention, and render the Work of Peace more eaſy than it is at preſent. This, however, is rather thrown out as a Hint, that may be purſued at its proper Seaſon, than as a Part of the preſent Plan.

31. If inſtead of ſtepping forward in the War, we confine ourſelves merely to maintaining our Garriſons in Callian and Bellpore, and waiting there General Goddard's Arrival from Surat, we muſt be ſatisfied to ſee the Enemy poſſeſſed of the Country, as ſoon as ever the Seaſon will allow them to take the Field, and our Garriſons inſulted with Impunity, and ſtraitened for every Neceſſary of Life. The Enemy will ſupport themſelves by Means of the Reſources we have failed to avail ourſelves of, and may prepare for General Goddard's March to the Southward, by laying waſte the whole Country ſo compleatly, as not to leave a Blade of Graſs between him and Callian. By like Means, in a much leſs Diſtance, only 13 Miles, Mhadjee Sindia effectually ſtopped General Goddard's Progreſs laſt Seaſon; and in the preſent Inſtance we have the more to apprehend from this Mode of Defence on the Enemy's Part, as it may go near to ſtarve us on our Iſlands; and thus, beſides our own Diſtreſs, diſappoint General Goddard in the Dependance, he expreſsly has he has on us for Proviſions, which it will be impoſſible for us to furniſh, unleſs by ſecuring the Country, from whence it is produced.

32. If when the Enemy is once come down into Conkan, theſe Dangers appear ſo preſſing, as to induce us to ſend over our Troops to act againſt them, we ſhall find, that for want of ſome little neceſſary Preparation they will be landed in ſo crippled a State that they will be unable to act, or but to little Effect; much of the Miſchief will be already done; and the Enemy, who might eaſily have been kept out of the Country, being once in it, will render it ſo difficult a Matter to ſupply ourſelves, either with the neceſſary Cattle for Carriage and Draft, or with Proviſions, as will perhaps put it out of our Power, but certainly render it very difficult to expel them; General Goddard indeed may ſtill come down by Sea, and though under manifeſt Diſadvantages, he may reduce Baſſein, the Acquiſition of which would burden us with another chargeable Garriſon, without enlarging our Means of maintaining it; for General Goddard, if he come

down

down by Sea, will have to fit out his Army anew for taking the Field; and if the Enemy are in Poſſeſſion of the Country, will be as little able to effect it as we ſhall, for an Encreaſe of our Numbers will only prove an Encreaſe of Difficulty. Theſe Conſiderations, I think, make it evident that the Reduction of Baſſein will be performed with infinitely greater Advantage if General Goddard come by Land, than in the other Mode of bringing down his Army by Sea.

33. After ſtating thus at large the Reaſons on which I found my Recommendation of the abovementioned Meaſures, I ſhall not diſſemble the Objections to which they ſeem moſt liable.

34. It may perhaps be thought that at a Seaſon when we may probably expect to be attacked by an Armament from France, we ought not to carry our Views beyond our own Defence till that Danger is paſt. My Anſwer to this Objection is, that in the firſt Place it is probable that our Troops cannot take the Field in the Conkan before the Seaſon for an Attack on this Iſland by the French is paſt; and ſecondly, that this Scene of Action is propoſed to be confined ſo much to our own Neighbourhood, that they will always be at Hand to return to our Aſſiſtance at a few Hours Warning. From the Advices laſt received, we have no Reaſon to think the Probability of ſuch an Attack at all encreaſed; but even if it were far greater than any one I ſuppoſe can at preſent think it, I confeſs, no more Probability ſeems ſufficient to juſtify us in remaining inactive. Under ſuch Circumſtances as we are now in, we have it not in our Choice to make Peace either with the French or the Marattas, and therefore muſt remain ſubject to the Riſk of a joint Attack from them; for which very Reaſon it ſeems neceſſary that we ſhould exert ourſelves with greater Vigour, in order to eſtabliſh our Superiority over one, before the Arrival of the other. I am by no Means inſenſible to the Danger we might be expoſed to from an Attack by the French while we are engaged with the Marattas. But I think this Danger better guarded againſt by puſhing hardily through the Difficulties that preſs the moſt nearly on us, than by timid Precautions, which provide againſt only one of our Fears, and that the moſt remote.

35. An Objection of far greater Weight than that abovementioned, in my Opinion, is founded on our preſent Want of Money to carry on a Plan of active Service into Execution. The Balance of Caſh on the Firſt of this Month was only about 40,000 Rupees; and from that Time to the End of October, I ſee no Probability of our receiving more than Three, or at moſt Three Lacks and a Half. Our ordinary Expences for the ſame Time cannot be eſtimated at leſs than One Lack and a Half per Month, which, with One Lack to be ſent from Tellicherry, One Lack for the neceſſary Preparation for our Troops to take the Field according to the above Plan, and One more for their unavoidable Expences, will bring our Charges within the ſame Time to Nine Lacks of Rupees. We may flatter ourſelves with the Hope of Supplies from Bengal; but we cannot depend on them, and therefore muſt look for ſuch Reſources as are to be had within ourſelves; and in my Opinion there never was an Occaſion which demanded our moſt ſtrenuous Exertion than the preſent, for we are now ſo critically ſituated, that in the State of our Affairs for the enſuing Year, and even the Fortune of the War, will depend on the Forwardneſs in which we may be for Action at the very firſt Opening of the Seaſon. Whatever Reſources therefore may preſent themſelves after October next, if in the mean Time we are unable to find Caſh for our neceſſary preparatory Expences, they will come too late for our Purpoſes; the Enemy will be in Poſſeſſion of the Country before us; we ſhall be obliged to act againſt them under all the Diſadvantages of an unfurniſhed Army, and experience all the Difficulties which their great Superiority in Cavalry enables them to oppoſe to us; and if at laſt we drive them paſt the Mountains, we ſhall have poſſeſſed ourſelves only of a depopulated and exhauſted Country that will yield us neither Revenue nor Subſiſtence.

36. In Circumſtances of ſuch preſſing Neceſſity, and with Objects of ſo great Magnitude in View, I ſhould not doubt of the Propriety of our reſolving on the moſt deſperate Remedies, if none others were left. I flatter myſelf however that we have yet one Reſource within our Power, which will furniſh us with an immediate Supply of ready Money within the Time abovementioned. There is now in our Warehouſe Copper to the Value of about Seven or Eight Lacks, which I would propoſe ſhould be peremptorily ſold, to be paid for in ready Money within Three Months, under a Penalty of Fifteen per Cent. in Default of Payment at the ſtipulated Terms. It would be neceſſary likewiſe, that it ſhould be ſold in large Lots, not leſs than 1000 Maunds each, in order that the Whole might be purchaſed by reſponſible Men, who might be depended on for making good their Engagements. I think too we ought to make this Sale without Delay, as the Arrival of Ships that may now be expected, may reduce the Price of our Copper much below the Price it may now fetch.

37. Notwithſtanding the preſent Scarcity of Money, it is generally believed that there are lodged in this Place large Sums of Gold and Silver, which, ſince the Troubles in the Maratta Empire, ſome of the richeſt Bramins have depoſited here as a Place of greater Security than any other they could pitch on, on Account of the Nature of our Government, and the eſtabliſhed Rights of private Property among us. Theſe People are not indeed Merchants, but Copper being conſidered here as a Sort of precious Metal, they would I believe exchange the Money for it, if they ſaw Proſpect of ſufficient Advantage in it; we muſt expect therefore that it would ſell low, comparatively to the Price we have lately ſold at, on the long Credit uſually allowed at our Sales; yet I think we ſhall ſtill get at leaſt a ſaving Price for the Company. And I am perſuaded every one who conſiders the State of our Affairs with any Degree of Knowledge or Attention, muſt be ſatisfied that a preſent Command of Money for the Purpoſes of the War, is of greater Moment than any Difference of Price in the Sale of our Copper, which can never be put in Competition with any

one of the Objects now in Contemplation; excluding the Enemy from the Conkan; securing the immediate Poſſeſſion of it to the Company, together with the Subſiſtence of our Armies and Garriſons; compleating our Line of Territory; bringing the War as near as poſſible to a Termination, and relieving our Eſtabliſhment from the Expence of the Bengal Army.

38. I intirely concur with the Governor General and Council, that as much as poſſible of our Revenue, and the whole of that ariſing from the new acquired Purgunnahs, ſhould be ſet apart for the Purpoſes of the War. Our Aid however from this Service till after October, will be nothing. From that Time till the End of December, I hope we may be able to procure about Six Lacks from Surat and Broach, which will juſt ſerve to ſupport our own indiſpenſable Expences. After the Commencement of the next Year, I flatter myſelf our Supplies from the Northward will be conſiderable enough to render our Situation ſomewhat eaſy. And ſuppoſing our Buſineſs in the Conkan effected, and that we are relieved from the Burden of the Bengal and Madras Battalions, I think we ſhall ſee the Affairs of the Company on this Side of India in a fair and proſperous Train.

39. As ready Money will be abſolutely neceſſary for the Payment of the Troops of the other Preſidencies before they are ſent Home, and the Neceſſities of the Governor General and Council ſeem ſo preſſing as to oblige them to turn their Views even to us for Aſſiſtance, which I cannot think we ſhall be able to furniſh from any Funds which we ſhall be in Receipt of ſo ſoon as the Month; and the whole Property of this Place being already in a Manner inveſted in the Company's Bonds, ſo that we cannot expect to be able to procure any further Sums at Intereſt here; I think it would be expedient to requeſt of the Governor General and Council to negociate a Loan in Calcutta to the Amount of Ten Lacks of Rupees on the Bonds of this Government, and to ſend us round the Amount in Specie; with which we ſhould, I think, find ourſelves ſufficiently in Caſh to aſſiſt in diſcharging the Arrears of the Bengal and Madras Troops previous to their Departure.

40. The Extent and Importance of this Subject has led me into great Length. I wiſh therefore, before I quit, to bring my Opinion, together with the principal Facts and Arguments on which they are founded, within one general and comprehenſive View.

41. I think it abſolutely neceſſary to bring this Maratta War to as ſpeedy a Concluſion as poſſible; at the ſame Time I ſee little preſent Hope of Peace by Means of Treaty or Negociation: I would wiſh therefore to ſee the War confined ſtrictly to what I conceive ought to be the Objects of it, the Attainment of which we may either compel the Enemy to Peace, or reduce the War on our Part to a mere Plan of Defence, for which the Revenue we ſhall be in Poſſeſſion of after the Reduction of Baſſein and its dependant Diſtricts, will amply ſuffice (if we are once relieved from the Burden of the Bengal and Madras Troops, to the Expence of which, added to that of our own Eſtabliſhments, much more than the Revenue of all the Territory we hope to acquire, would prove adequate). The Reduction of Baſſein and its dependant Diſtricts then I think ſhould be proceeded on, without ſuffering our Attention to be diverted from this by any other Object. But as the Poſſeſſion of Baſſein alone without the Country, will only be increaſing our Charge at a Time when we need every Reſource to enable us to ſupport our Exertions, I would have our Operations ſo planned as to provide at once for the Reduction of Baſſein and of the Country which we muſt depend on for Subſiſtence, and thus diſappoint the Enemy in the only Plan of Defence in which they can hope for Succeſs; for theſe Purpoſes it ſeems indiſpenſably neceſſary that we ſhould take our Meaſures ſo that our Troops may be in the Field ſome Time before the Enemy; and I accordingly propoſe to make ſuch Appointments of Officers, and ſuch a Communication to them of our Plan as ſeems neceſſary, in order to prepare for its Execution. Senſible of the Difficulties we have to ſtruggle with from the low State of our Finances, I think it neceſſary to take our Meaſures in ſuch a Manner as may moſt effectually tend to the Relief of our Neceſſities; but I do not think thoſe Neceſſities, nor the Difficulties ariſing from them, any ſufficient Reaſon for Inaction. If our Want of Money is now great, it is likely to become much greater, unleſs relieved by our own Efforts. If theſe are now difficult to us, they will ſoon be impoſſible, and if they are ſo already, we are then already undone; yet even in this Caſe we owe to ourſelves and to our Conſtituents to bring this Point to the Proof, that nothing may remain unattempted that hereafter may be thought likely to have afforded a Remedy. I am far however from thinking our Affairs ſo deſperate, and have propoſed ſuch Meaſures as to me ſeem likelieſt to put our Affairs in a proſperous Train, together with my Reaſon for what I propoſe the Committee will judge both of one and the other, and likewiſe conſider whether there is any other Plan more ſuitable to all the Circumſtances of our preſent Situation. If the Committee concur with me, I think we cannot be too early in communicating our Meaſure to General Goddard and to the Governor General and Council, who though "unable to make adequate Remittances both for the Support of this Preſidency and the Pay of the "Army under the Command of General Goddard," we may be confident will not neglect to provide for their own Troops at leaſt, at a Time when we are ſtraining every Nerve to bring the War to ſuch a Period as will relieve them not only from their preſent heavy Charges on this Side of India, but from all other in Time to come.

1ſt Auguſt 1780. (Signed) William Hornby.

A true Copy.

(Signed) Edw[d] Ravenſcroft,
Secr[y].

Copy

Copy of a Letter from General Goddard; dated at Surat the 6th Auguſt 1780, and received the 14th following.

Gentlemen,

I have the Pleaſure to acknowledge your Letter of the 3d Inſtant. I am ſorry at the Neceſſity which you have informed me has induced you to appropriate the Two Lacks of Rupees ſent round from Bengal on the Belborough, to the Payment of the Arrears due to the Detachment furniſhed by your Preſidency, becauſe it is a Proof that your own Wants are exceedingly preſſing, and diſappoint every Expectation I might have formed of Relief and Aſſiſtance from you in diſcharging a Part of the Expences of the late Campaign. I could not indeed build any thing on this Hope, from the frequent Deſcriptions you had given me of the low State of your Finances, nor did I think it the leſs incumbent on me to provide an adequate Fund to the Payment of the Arrears due whenever it might be in my Power, and for that Purpoſe I meant to have taken the firſt Opportunity of remitting a Sum of Money to Bombay, which can always be done without any Loſs, and generally with ſome Advantage of Exchange.

Reſpecting what you mention of Colonel Hartley and the Paymaſter, being unable to inform you of any Proviſion having been made for the Payment of your Troops by me, it is not at all ſurprizing, as I was myſelf at that Time unacquainted with the Extent of the Reſources it might afterwards be in my Power to command, and of courſe could not ſpeak with any Certainty either to the Amount of the Sum itſelf, or to the Time when it might be allowed me to furniſh it. Upon the March of your Detachment, low as my Finances were, I thought it neceſſary to make every poſſible Exertion, and advanced what could be then ill afforded from the general Stock, R' 1,10,000. I at the ſame Time told Colonel Hartley I ſhould take the firſt Opportunity of remitting whatever Sum might be requiſite to clear off the Arrears; which I meant to do when an Application might be made ſtating their Amount, and the improved State of the Treaſury put it in my Power.

The Paymaſter, in his Eſtimate given you, has generally ſaid it will require upwards of Three Lacks to pay off the Arrears; of this Sum he has already received from you Two Lacks, and the Paymaſter of the Bengal Detachment has by my Orders diſcharged Bills on his Account to the Amount of near R' 1,40,000. This Sum exceeds Mr. Lewis's Statement; but as he has never delivered in any Accounts of his Office from the firſt Formation of Colonel Hartley's Detachment, I am at a Loſs to know whether he confines his Eſtimate to the Arrears of the Troops actually returned to the Preſidency, or extends to every Expence of thoſe Troops while in the Field. I am therefore induced to beg you will be pleaſed to call upon Mr. Lewis for an Account of the Expenditure of ſuch Sums as he has already received, and direct him to tranſmit me the regular Accounts of his Diſburſements to the lateſt Period poſſible, by which the Balance due, if any, may be exactly aſcertained previous to my Compliance with the Application you ſay you have left him to make to me for what further Sum may be wanting.

Although the Honourable Governor General and Council will moſt probably have themſelves tranſmitted you their Sentiments upon the Exchange of Territory in the late Treaty with Futty Sing, as it may not have reached you I beg to tranſcribe Extract of their Letter to me on that Subject.

" We have received from the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, a Copy of your Cor-
" reſpondence with them to the 24th February.

" It appears by their laſt Letter in this Correſpondence, that in the late Treaty with Futty Sing, you
" have ceded to him Diſtricts which they eſtimate at the Annual Revenue of 27 Lacks of Rupees,
" but that in Return there was only yielded the Company the Poſſeſſion of a Country eſtimated at
" 10,62,000 Rupees, by which a Difference of 16,37,100 R' ariſes, which appears to be an entire
" Loſs to the Company: We are only able to account for this Exchange, which has occaſioned
" ſuch a Diminution of the original Value of our Portion of the Province of Guzerat, by ſup-
" poſing that your Knowledge of the Character of Futty Sing might ſuggeſt to you the Expedi-
" ency of having ſome Check over him, that the Fort and Diſtrict of Dubhoy from its Conti-
" guity to Brodera, might appear to you a deſirable Poſſeſſion for the Company on this Account;
" but uninformed as we are of the other Circumſtances on which the comparative Advantage of
" the Diſtricts may depend, it ſeems to us that, excluſively of the Difference, the Exchange
" made muſt rather prove diſadvantageous to the Company; as we gain for Lands lying at a
" Diſtance, and rendered in a Degree inacceſſible to the Marattas, by the Interpoſition of ca-
" pital Rivers, a Diſtrict immediately bordering upon theirs, and at all Times open to their
" Incurſions.

" This Conſideration, we believe, did not occur to you; but as it appears to us deſerving of your
" Attention, we deſire that you will reconſider the Part of the Treaty with Futty Sing to which
" it belongs, and avail yourſelf of any Advice reſpecting it, which you may receive from the
" Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, whom we have requeſted to aſſiſt you with it.

" Such being our Opinion of the Exchange of the Land ſtipulated in the Treaty, we think
" proper to direct,

" 1ſt. That you either require the Conſent of Futty Sing to annul this Exchange, and to give
" the Poſſeſſion of the Diſtricts which formerly appertained to the Peſhwa on the North
" of the River Myhie, and which were ceded to him by you, and to receive back the Diſtricts

" of

" of Zimmore and Dubhoy, originally the Guicawar Share on the South of the Tappey, which " were ceded to him by you in like Manner:

" Or, Secondly, allowing the Exchange to continue, to aſſign and to deliver over to the Com- " pany Poſſeſſion of an additional Portion of Land, yielding a Revenue equal to the Difference " produced by that Exchange, in the Manner preſcribed to you by the Preſident and Select Com- " mittee of Bombay, in their Letter to you of the 24th February:

" Or, Thirdly, to enter into a ſpecial Engagement for a Subſidy payable in ready Money " equal to that Amount.

" The Treaty has been tranſmitted to us by the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay " for our Ratification, and we ſhall return it to them in a few Days, properly confirmed; but " guarding it with a Reſervation, providing a new and equitable Settlement of the Province of " Guzerat, according to the 5th Article."

You will perceive by it the Information on which they ground their Objections to the preſent Partition and Alteration they have propoſed, contained in your Letter of the 24th February, to which Period only they had received a Copy of our Correſpondence from you. I have therefore thought it neceſſary to ſend them an Extract of my Anſwer to you of the 7th March upon the ſame Subject.

Since writing this Letter, I have made every minute Enquiry into the Amount of the Peſhwa or Revenue North of the Myhie, and have Reaſon to be convinced, from the particular Information I have received, and a Compariſon of the ſeveral Accounts I have been able to obtain, that the Statement you tranſmitted was greatly exaggerated, as indeed you acknowledged yourſelves you could not depend on its Accuracy; that the Corrections I offered in my former Letter relative to the Valuation of Amedabad Pitlad, and the Article of Muluchgary, was juſt and well founded upon real and indiſputable Facts, and that upon the whole, the Exchange of Lands was not only fair and equitable, but attended from concurring Circumſtances with particular Advantages to the Company. The ſuppoſed Revenue of Muluckgurry, is tôo variable and precarious to be a deſirable Object of any Government, except one like that of the Marattas, which is founded upon violent Meaſures and Rapine. Even the ſmall Sum collected from that Source, which I will venture to ſay has not for the laſt Ten Years exceeded Two Lacks Annually, requires a conſiderable Force to collect it, and beyond that, as no Means but Compulſion, and the full Exertion of that Claim which the Strong may be ſaid to poſſeſs over the Weak, could be uſed with any Proſpect of Advantage (the Rajahs and independant Zemindars not acknowledging any Subjection) every Encreaſe of Revenue from that Quarter muſt depend upon, and will be in Proportion to the Numbers and Succeſs of the Troops employed to inforce it. A juſt and equitable Diviſion of Country between the Engliſh and Futty Sing, proportioned to the Value of the Diſtricts before poſſeſſed by the latter and the Poona Government, being the avowed Intention and expreſs Object of the Treaty, I have aſſured the Honourable Governor General and Council, that I ſhall cheerfully and zealouſly co-operate with you in every Meaſure that may be found requiſite after a minute and cloſe Inveſtigation to effect that End, towards which I have myſelf thought it improper and impolitic to take any immediate Step, and ſhall therefore be happy to receive your further Sentiments upon a Subject of ſo great Importance.

Reſpecting the Opinion paſſed by the Honourable Governor General and Council, of the local Advantages, excluſive of the Conſiderations ſuſtained by the Company in the Exchange of Territory, I beg Leave to tranſcribe for your Peruſal the Sentiments I have expreſſed to them on that Subject, and do not doubt, from the Opportunity you poſſeſs of obſerving the State of the Country, and your Knowledge of the juſt Grounds upon which I have founded my Remarks, but that the Opinion I have given will meet with your Concurrence.

" This Meaſure was conformable to the Plan propoſed and recommended to me by the Preſident " and Select Committee of Bombay. And I muſt confeſs, for many Reaſons it then did and ſtill " does appear to me the moſt advantageous Mode of Partition that could be adopted.

" If the Lands to the Northward of the Myhie are further removed from the main Power of " the Marattas than thoſe we gain, and rendered difficult of Acceſs by the Interpoſition of Three " Capital Rivers, they are alſo ſeparated, and in a Manner unconnected with the Company's " former Poſſeſſions, and in caſe of an Attack the ſame Obſtructions of River, together with the " Diſtance, would unite to prevent our being able to furniſh the neceſſary Aſſiſtance to their " Defence, except at an encreaſed Expence, and at an extreme Hazard and Inconvenience, as all " the Country we do hold to the Southward would in ſuch caſe be left entirely expoſed to the " Inſults and Inroads of the Enemy; beſides, the Entrance into the Northern Diſtricts is, at the Sea- " ſon for Military Operations, always open to the Marattas by the Province of Malva; and whenever they have Means to make an Attack upon Guzerat, it has always been by beginning their Efforts " to the Northward."

The Governor General and Council having further informed me that they have ſignified to you their Deſire of appropriating every Exceſs of Revenue which may immediately ariſe to the Company from the Operations and Succeſs of the Army under my Command, and excluſively to the Support of that Expence, I take the Liberty of requeſting that you will be pleaſed to give the neceſſary Orders to your Chiefs at Surat and Broach for that Effect. The low State of my Treaſury, and no other Source of recruiting it now offering, but by drawing Bills upon the Government of Bengal at a conſiderable Loſs, and even that but temporary and precarious, I hope you will approve

prove of the Propoſals I beg Leave to make, that Inſtructions may be given to the Gentlemen at both theſe Stations, whenever the Sum collected may amount to One Lack, to pay it into my Hands.

Head Quarters,
Camp near Surat,
6th Auguſt 1780.

I have the Honour to be, &c. &c.
(Signed) Thomas Goddard.

A true Copy.
(Signed) Edwd. Ravenſcroft, Sec^ry.

Copy of a Letter from the Select Committee to General Goddard.

Sir,

The Seaſon for Action now approaching, the Preſident has laid before us a Statement of the preſent Situation of Affairs, as relative to the Maratta War, and his Sentiments in reſpect to the Operations of the enſuing Campaign, with a general Plan of Meaſures moſt ſuitable to the Circumſtances in which we now are.

We loſe no Time in tranſmitting to you an Abſtract of the Preſident's Minute on thoſe Points which are requiſite for your immediate Information, and in adviſing you of the Meaſures which appear to us moſt expedient to be purſued at this Juncture.

The Preſident's Statement of our preſent Difficulties is juſt in every Particular, and we entirely concur with him in the Neceſſity of the moſt vigorous Exertions on our Part for averting the further Diſtreſs we ſhould be expoſed to by Inactivity, and for bringing the Maratta War to as ſpeedy a Concluſion as poſſible; nor can we indulge any Hopes of effecting either of thoſe, or of improving our Situation, but by the timely Execution of the Meaſures he has propoſed, and ſtrictly confining our Attention and Efforts to the Objects already defined and explained to you as the Boundaries of our Views in regard to the Acquiſition of Territory for the Preſidency.

The Plan of Operations propoſed for the enſuing Campaign appears calculated with every Probability of Succeſs to anſwer theſe important Ends, and to be concerted with all poſſible Attention to our preſent Circumſtances and Means of Execution; and we have accordingly determined to ſend an Army into the Conkan as early as the Seaſon will poſſibly permit, under the Command of Lieutenant Colonel Hartley, to anticipate the Enemy in ſecuring Poſſeſſion of the Country and Paſſes into the Decan, whilſt the Army under your Command moves down to the Siege of Baſſein, when our Forces may be employed in covering the Siege, or as Occaſion may require. The Advantages of this Plan are ſo obvious, and ſo clearly explained in the Preſident's Minute, that we ſhall not repeat them here; and ſhall only obſerve, that we ſee no other poſſible Method of ſecuring Subſiſtence for the Army, for which you have acquainted us you ſhall entirely depend on us.

It will be eſſential to the complete Execution of the Plan for ſecuring the Country before it is ravaged and deſtroyed by the Enemy, that the Bengal Army ſhould move down by Land to the Siege of Baſſein, and we think more eligible in every other Reſpect than tranſporting it by Sea; not only by the Saving of much Time and Expence; but as it will tend to diſtract and impreſs the Enemy with an Opinion of our Strength, excluſive of the Argument that may be drawn in ſupport of our Opinion from the Averſion the Bengal Sepoys entertain for the Sea, the Chance of Accidents, and the Diſguſt they may conceive to the Service, if embarked contrary to their Intentions. What is urged on this Head we doubt not will fully convince you that the Reduction of Baſſein will be performed with infinitely greater Advantage, as well as other very important Points provided for more effectually, if the Army is moved down by Land, rather than in the other Mode of tranſporting it by Sea: And we truſt, that when you have attentively conſidered the Reaſons on which our Opinion is grounded, any further Recommendation will be needleſs to induce you to adopt the Meaſure of marching the Army by Land to the Siege of Baſſein.

We cannot point out the exact Time for your commencing the Siege, as that will depend on the Weather, but according to the uſual Courſe of the Seaſons, we imagine you will be able to put the Army in Motion the 1ſt of October. We however recommend to you to commence your March as ſoon as you ſhall judge it practicable, and the Rains ſufficiently abated to permit the Paſſage of the Rivers; whilſt, as already mentioned, we ſhall exert our utmoſt Endeavour to preſerve the Country in a Condition to afford the neceſſary Supplies to the Army during the March and the Continuance of the Campaign in this Quarter.

We ſhall furniſh the Artillery Stores and Ammunition requiſite for the Siege agreeable to your Deſire, and lodge them at Danavie, where they will be in Readineſs for Service immediately on your Arrival, and we ſhall provide Veſſels for tranſporting them to the Place where they are to be landed; and for keeping your Communication open to Sea.

We underſtand there is now a large Force in Baſſein, ſaid to conſiſt of 8 or 10,000 Men; and as the Enemy muſt for ſome Time have expected our Attack, we conclude they are not unprepared for the Event. You will no Doubt ſee the Importance of making an effectual Diſpoſition for the Protection of Guzerat during your Abſence to the Southward. So principal a Part of your Reſources depending on the Receipt from the late Acquiſitions, to enable you more ſufficiently to provide for their Defence, we now ſend Directions to the Chiefs of Surat and Broach to afford you ſuch Reinforcements from the Garriſon as can be ſpared, if you ſhould judge ſuch Aſſiſtance neceſſary, and make a Requiſition to them on that Head.

The Governor General and Council have in a late Letter given their Sentiments on the Exchange of Territory made with Futty Sing according to the late Treaty, and recommended other Modes of Partition which are particularized in the Governor's Minute, as well as the Objections that lay againſt thoſe Modes; but circumſtanced as Matters now are, we are perſuaded you will agree with us in Opinion, that it will be more expedient for the preſent to avoid a Subject that may give Diſſatisfaction and raiſe Doubt in Futty Sing, and to wave any further Diſcuſſion of the Matter till a more convenient Seaſon.

Our Diſtreſs for Money is ſo very great, that we ſhall find the utmoſt Difficulty in furniſhing the neceſſary Sum, even for the ſlender Equipments of the Body of Forces to be ſent into the Conkan, a Service on which ſo much depends; and at a Time when our own Neceſſities preſs ſo hard upon us, our Embarraſſment is doubly encreaſed by the Intimation we have received from the Governor General and Council, that their own Diſtreſs will put it out of their Power to make adequate Remittances for the Support of this Preſidency, and the Pay of the large Army under your Command; on which Account they deſire that every Acceſſion of Revenue which may ariſe to the Company from the Succeſs of that Army, may be ſet aſide, and appropriated excluſively to that Expence: We ſhall not, however, renounce our Reliance on more effectual Support from Bengal, when the Governor General and Council have received our late Repreſentations, and are informed of the Levies made with your Advice for the Defence of our new Poſſeſſions, for which it was neceſſary we ſhould make Proviſion, as their Defence muſt in the End devolve on us; but when they ſee the vigorous Exertion we are making to bring the War to an advantageous Criſis, we confidently hope they will ſtrain their extenſive Reſources to ſecond our Endeavours, or at leaſt that they will provide for the Payment of the Bengal Army, and make this excluſive Appropriation unneceſſary as it is impoſſible. In the mean Time, the Revenue ariſing from the new Acquiſitions ſhall be ſet apart for the general Purpoſes of the War; and we ſhall be very ready to afford you, out of this or any other Reſource, ſuch Sums as we can poſſibly ſpare from our own Occaſions, to aſſiſt in defraying the Charges of the Forces under your Command.

We have received your Letter of the 8th ultimo.

The Information you before gave us on the Subject of Mr. Vaande Graaſs' Correſpondence with the Poona Miniſter, has been already tranſmitted to the Governor General and Council, and will be followed by your Letter above mentioned; when, if they ſhould judge it proper to take public Notice of his Conduct, we ſhall have ſufficient Time to make a Repreſentation to the Dutch Governor General before any Opportunity will offer for Batavia.

We are, &c.

(Signed) Wm Hornby, &c.
Select Committee.

Bombay Caſtle,
6th Auguſt 1780.

A true Copy.
(Signed) Edwd Ravenſcroft, Secry.

Secret Department, Thurſday.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 23d November 1780.

PRESENT,
The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Edward Wheler, Eſquire,
Philip Francis, Eſquire, indiſpoſed.
Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote abſent on Service at the Preſidency of Fort Saint George.

The following Letter having been received from Bombay ſince the laſt Meeting of the Board, it and its Enclоſures were circulated on the 20th Inſtant, for the Peruſal of the Members of the Board.

Bombay, 10th September.

Gentlemen,

We encloſe Duplicate of our Letters of the 14th and 17th ultimo, and of the ſeveral Papers forwarded with thoſe Letters.

General Goddard arrived here ſoon after to conſult with us on ſome Points previous to the Commencement of Operations, which being adjuſted, he only waits for more favourable Weather to embark again for Surat, in order to ſettle the neceſſary Arrangements for the Defence of the Northern Provinces during his Abſence, and to march down the Troops to be employed in the Siege of Baſſein.

We tranſmit with the other Papers, a Copy of the Letter he delivered after his Arrival, and of our Reply, which contain every Thing material that has been determined; and by the latter you will obſerve the Meaſures we have taken for aſſiſting General Goddard to defray the Expences of the Army.

We ſend by the Nancy Ketch a Box of Army Accounts, recommended to our Care by General Goddard, and for which a Receipt is encloſed.

Having lately received an extraordinary Letter from the Governor General at Goa, we think it proper to tranſmit a Copy thereof for your Notice, as we ſhall hereafter of our Reply.

We

We beg Leave to Notice to you that whatever Advices you may have occaſion to forward to this Preſidency before the End of February, will be conveyed to us with more Expedition and Safety by the Way of Anjengo than by any other Route.

Bombay Caſtle, 11th September 1780.

We are with Reſpect, &c.

Ordered, That the Box of Army Accounts accompanying the above Diſpatch be ſent to the Accountant General.

Ordered, That the Encloſures in the above Letter from Bombay be entered after the Conſultation.

ENCLOSURES.

Copy Tranſlation of a Letter from the Captain General at Goa to the Governor and Council at Bombay.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

It being true and inconteſtable that the Crown of Portugal for many lawful Cauſes, ſince allowed as Rights, made the Conqueſt of the Eaſt Indies:

That the Fortreſs of Baſſein and Tannah, with all the other Forts, Countries, and Juriſdictions, from Choul up to Dumaun, and in Poſſeſſion of the ſame Crown and its State of India for the Space of Two hundred Years:

That notwithſtanding, that the Marattas Forty Years paſt, without juſt Cauſe, invaded and by Violence ſeized ſome Forts and Lands of the State, which they held in the Northern Province, detaining them by Force of Arms:

It is nevertheleſs indubitable that the Crown of Portugal loſt not the Sovereignty and Rights which it had and has in all the ſaid Forts, Lands, and Countries relating thereto, notwithſtanding it is deprived of the Poſſeſſion thereof agreeable to the true and inconteſtable Law of Rights. The Sovereignty is always preſerved whilſt the Crown reſerves to itſelf the Right of Reverſion, and never diveſts itſelf of Intentions of re-annexing them, nor has it omitted to uſe every Means poſſible to incorporate them again with its Dominions. It waited only for a fortunate Conjuncture, ſuch as now offered, when the interior Diviſions and Civil Wars of the Marattas had divided the Supreme Authority into Two Parties, and the Subaltern Powers into as many Heads and Chiefs as there are Officers and Governors of Forts, and from this Situation, the Crown thought to have got Poſſeſſion thereof through the Channel of Negociation.

The State has for Years kept an Emiſſary at Poona, charged with the public Buſineſs, and more eſpecially with the Claim of Reſtitution of the Forts, Villages, and other Lands of its ancient Juriſdiction; it was in Part concluded on, and Orders given for paſſing the Sunnuds for the Delivery of ſundry Lands.

In the Reſtoration of the above Forts and Countries, the Crown of Portugal has Claim in a Preference to all Sovereigns, eſpecially to that of the Crown of England, founded on ſpecial Right, for by the Articles of Peace and Treaty of Marriage of her Serene Highneſs Donna Catharina, Infanta of Portugal, with Charles the Second King of England, and from the Declarations wherewith the Delivery of the Iſland of Bombay adjacent to the Province of the North was made, having been given in Dowry with ſaid Donna Catharina; it is expreſsly declared, that the Crown of Britain at no Time whatever ſhall impede the Juriſdiction of the other Iſlands of Baſſein and other Countries, nor deprive the State of India of the Commerce and Liberty which they have in them, and that the Engliſh never ſhall claim in the Portugueze Juriſdiction more than what was ceded to them by the ſaid Marriage Treaty, as fully appears from the Conditions under which was delivered to them the ſaid Iſland, inſerted in the Act of Poſſeſſion received from them under Date the 18th February 1665.

By this ſame ſolemn Convention entered into by the Two Crowns, that of Portugal has a clear Right to be aſſiſted by the Engliſh at any ſuch Time as they deſigned to regain the Province of the North; for in the ſaid Treaty of Peace the King of England obliges himſelf to ſuccour that of Portugal on all Occaſions which require it, as is declared in the Royal Orders of the 9th April 1662, whereby we are ordered to deliver the Iſland of Bombay, as follows:

"By the other Articles of this Treaty you (Vice Roy of India) will be informed of the Union we celebrate, and of the Obligations that the King of England is under to aſſiſt us in all urgent Occaſions that may ariſe and require it; if the Situation you are in makes it neceſſary to avail of the Engliſh Aſſiſtance, you will do it."

From whence may with evident Certainty be inferred, that the Engliſh ought to ſuccour the State in the difficult Enterprize of regaining the North, and that by no one Title can they pretend to aſſume to themſelves the Sovereignty of theſe Countries without Breach of the Laws of Nature and of Nations of the Treaty of Peace, and of the Faith and ancient Friendſhip which always ſubſiſted between the Two Crowns.

But the contrary has taken place, from the public and conſtant Information received, that your Excellency and your Noble Council have planned and undertaken an Expedition, and have taken the

the Field with a moſt numerous Army, under the ſpecious Pretext of aſſiſting Ragoba, and with him at the Head, have blockaded and poſſeſſed themſelves of the Fortreſs of Parnel, and propoſe extending their Conqueſts to the Forts of Baſſein, Choul, and other Places of the ancient Juriſdiction of Damaun, garriſoning the Forts conquered with Troops, and recovering the Revenue and Cuſtoms dependent thereon.

This Intelligence is very afflicting to me, and I am convinced that your Excellency and the other Gentlemen of your Noble Council, when you met to reſolve thereon, were guided more by the Aſiatic Intereſts of the Britiſh Nation, than by regard to that public Faith that ought to be obſerved in Promiſes authorized by ſolemn Treaties: And for the Conſervation of the Royal Dominion, the Crown of her moſt Faithful Majeſty has in thoſe Forts, Lands, and Diſtricts, of the Province of the North, I require of your Excellency, Honourable Governor, and the other Gentlemen of your Noble Council of Bombay, that you deſiſt from an Undertaking ſo foreign to the Intentions of his Britannic Majeſty, and ſo injurious to the good Faith of the Engliſh Nation, Friend and Ally of the Crown of Portugal.

In caſe your Excellency and the other Gentlemen of your Noble Council do not comply with my Demand, I hereby make a moſt formal Proteſt, not only to preſerve to the Crown of Portugal its Sovereignty in all the Forts, Diſtricts, and Lands, of the Province of the North, which it has no Intent to give up, nor to depart from its Royal Right in all the Countries of the ſaid Province, but to have and repoſſeſs them on a fit Opportunity with all Loſſes and Damages ſuſtained.

I proteſt likewiſe againſt your Excellency, Honourable Governor, and the other Gentlemen of your Noble Council, as Violaters of the Public Peace of the Two Nations, in a Manner ſo inconſiſtent with, and ſo oppoſite to the defenſive Alliance ſubſiſting between Her Moſt Faithful Majeſty my Miſtreſs and His Britannic Majeſty.

I likewiſe alſo proteſt for all the Prejudice ſuſtained by the State of Portugueze India; and I beg you to reflect on the Loſſes your Excellency, and the other Gentlemen of your Noble Council are cauſing to ſaid State, and of which I ſhall quickly adviſe and inform Her Moſt Faithful Majeſty, to the End that ſhe may indemnify herſelf for the ſame, as to her ſeems beſt, out of the great and important Pledges that the Crown and Nation of Great Britain has in her Kingdoms; far more conſiderable than the Prejudices that your Excellency, and the other Gentlemen of your Noble Council, have created and intend to create, without reflecting on the Danger to which you expoſe all thoſe Intereſts which you derive from your Alliance with Portugal.

Your Excellency, and the other Gentlemen of your Noble Council, ſhould reflect, that on this Conduct you are ſubjecting your Bank in Europe to the Riſk of loſing the many Millions which it draws from Portugal for the Support of its Public Credit—That you are likewiſe ſubjecting your Nation to the Loſs of its Trade in Portugal and Algarve, ſhould Her Moſt Faithful Majeſty once determine to retaliate upon the Engliſh in Europe, the Loſſes which reſult to her in Aſia from the preſent projected Conqueſts.

Laſtly, I cannot diſpenſe with acquainting Her Moſt Faithful Majeſty of what I have above obſerved from the full Belief that the King and the whole Britiſh Nation will deem your Excellency, and the other Gentlemen of your Noble Council, reſponſible for every Conſequence reſulting on this Account.

God preſerve, &c. &c.

(Signed) Dom Federico Guilherme de Souza.

Goa,
17th July 1780.

A true Copy.
Edw[d] Ravenſcroft.

Copy of a Letter from Brigadier General Goddard to the Select Committee at Bombay, dated 10th Auguſt 1780.

Gentlemen,

I had the Pleaſure of addreſſing you the 4th Inſtant, which has been diſpatched by the Hart and Boat, and will I truſt reach you ſafe.

I have nothing new or material to communicate to you relative to the Deſigns or Situation of the Maratta Leaders, further than the Report of the great Preparations making at Poona by the Miniſter, and the Repetition of the Story of laſt Year, that he is to be aided with powerful foreign Allies in the Operation of next Seaſon againſt us.

This Expectation will, it is probable, prove as fallacious and ill-founded as the former, but there is Reaſon to believe, from the Silence he has obſerved, having hitherto made no Overture or Attempt towards an Accommodation whatever, that he is meditating ſome Effort of Importance; and that he is buoyed up with Hopes from ſome Quarter not yet fully diſcovered by us, of retrieving the Loſſes of the laſt by the Superiority he expects to obtain in the enſuing Campaign.

I am from theſe Conſiderations induced to be moſt earneſt in my Wiſh, of ſeizing the firſt poſſible Opportunity to commence the Operations of the War by attacking Baſſein. The rainy Seaſon is now approaching to a Concluſion, at leaſt the violent and ſtormy Months, which from obſtructing the Navigations would have proved the greateſt Obſtacle to that Enterprize, are now paſt.

I cannot

I cannot help being of Opinion, that by a vigorous and unexpected Effort we may anticipate the hoſtile Preparations of our Enemies, and have accompliſhed that Service before they are in a Condition to act in any effectual Manner againſt us in that or any other Quarter. Your ſuperior Information and Knowledge of the Situation of Baſſein will enable you to judge how ſoon any Operations againſt the Place will be practicable; but in this Point of ſo great and real Importance to the Succeſs of the preſent Conteſt, I muſt venture to offer it as my Opinion, that Conſiderations of the Difficulties we may expect to encounter in the Attempt ought to give way whenever Circumſtances are ſuch as to preſent any reaſonable Proſpect of Succeſs.

Upon this Principle I beg Leave to conſult, and to requeſt you will communicate to me your Sentiments and Inſtructions upon the following Points:

As I am exceedingly deſirous, and think it eſſential to the Conduct of the enſuing Service, to have an Opportunity of perſonally concerting with you the Plan of its Operations, previous to their Commencement, I ſhall, whenever the Seaſon permits, ſet out for Bombay, and this I hope will be during the preſent Month, as the Veſſels for the Surat Station are expected ſhortly to arrive.

The Troops which can be ſupplied from this Place without expoſing in any Shape your Poſſeſſions in this Quarter, and which I would recommend as neceſſary to be employed againſt Baſſein, are the Madras European Artillery and Infantry, and Battalion of Sepoys. The Difficulty of the Roads from the deep and rapid Rivers, and the Country being ſo much overflowed, will not for ſome Time admit of marching any of the Bengal Troops along the Coaſt, but I propoſe tranſporting a ſtrong Detachment of them by Water, conſiſting of a Force at leaſt equal to Two Battalions.

Theſe Circumſtances I think it neceſſary thus early to ſubmit to your Conſideration, that the requiſite Veſſels may be ſent up for their Tranſportation as ſoon as poſſible.

The Force you can furniſh from Bombay, with the Madras Detachment, and a numerous Artillery, would I conceive amply ſuffice for the Reduction of Baſſein; but I have reſolved upon the further Reinforcement of the Bengal Sepoys, from an Idea it is probable the principal Scene of the War will be transferred to your Neighbourhood, and that a reſpectable Force will become requiſite in that Quarter to ſecure the Gauts, and to carry on ſuch further Operations againſt the Enemy as Circumſtances ſhall render practicable and eligible.

With reſpect to the neceſſary Train of Artillery and Ordnance Stores, I ſuppoſe it will be in your Power to make every proper and ample Proviſion of them at Bombay: I would however propoſe, if it meets with your Approbation, to carry with me the Four Eighteen Pounders employed at the Siege of Ahmedabad, as I have had an Opportunity of trying and proving their Utility and Excellence, and think they may be employed to great good Purpoſe on the approaching Service. In order that nothing may be wanting for carrying into immediate and effectual Execution the propoſed Attack, I have alſo ordered to be prepared under my own Inſpection many Materials for the Uſe of the Engineer's Department at the Siege, ſo that no Obſtruction can ariſe to the inſtant Commencement of Operations, from any Delay in putting them in Readineſs. For the Tranſportation of theſe and ſuch other Stores as you may think requiſite to be conveyed from this Place, the Chief of Surat will eaſily ſupply the neceſſary Boats whenever you ſhall be pleaſed to give him your Inſtructions for that Purpoſe.

The next and moſt material Point to be adjuſted, is the Place for the Troops from the Northward to land, and as your Knowledge of the Situation of Baſſein and the Country round it, puts it in your Power to judge of the moſt eligible and convenient Spot for that Purpoſe, I ſhall be entirely guided in that Particular by your Advice and Determination; it will ſave a good deal of Time and prevent Delays, which muſt neceſſarily ariſe by diſembarking at Salſette, and afterwards croſſing over to the Continent, if the Troops and Stores from your Preſidency could effect a Junction with me off Terrapore, in which Caſe the Whole might be landed immediately to the Northward of Baſſein on the Southern Shore of a River, which I underſtand empties itſelf into the Sea about Ten or Twelve Miles from Baſſein. But of the Propriety of this Plan, the ſuperior Information you have of the Situation of the Country will enable you to form the beſt Judgment; and I beg to repeat that I ſhall act conformable to ſuch Mode as you may chuſe to recommend.

I diſpatch this Letter expreſs by Hircarrahs, whom I have promiſed to reward if they uſe Expedition, and I hope to receive your Anſwer in order that I may make the neceſſary Arrangements previous to my Departure.

Should I find it expedient to ſet out before your Anſwer arrives, I ſhall take ſuch Meaſures with Mr. Boddam, your Chief at Surat, and leave ſuch Inſtructions with the Officer in command of the Troops, as may effectually prevent any Impediment or Delay to the immediate Execution of your Orders and Intentions relative to this Service.

I have the Honour to be, &c.

(Signed) Thomas Goddard.

Surat,
Auguſt 10th 1780.

Copy of a Letter from General Goddard, dated at Bombay the 24th Auguſt 1780.

Gentlemen,

I have the Honour to reply to your Letter of the 6th Auguſt, incloſing Abſtract of the Honourable Preſident's Statement of the preſent Poſture of Affairs, and cannot find Words expreſſive of the Satisfaction I have received from the clear and ample Information it gives of their Situation and Proſpect, as well as the general Propriety of the Plan he has recommended for the Operations of the enſuing Campaign, which appears to me formed with a due Regard to preſent Circumſtance and to provide for every future probable Occurrence as far as the Extent of human Foreſight and Wiſdom can poſſibly reach. I ſhall however venture to trouble you with a few Remarks on this important Subject, in which the very ample and minute Detail entered into by the Preſident will greatly relieve me from the Neceſſity I might otherwiſe be under of commenting more at large on the Meaſures proper to be adopted at this ſo critical a Period, and on which the future good or bad Fortune of our preſent Conteſt with the Maratta State ſeems entirely to depend.

I beg Leave to call your Attention to the Sentiments contained in an Addreſs I had the Honour to deliver in to this Committee laſt November, which the Event has ſince proved to have been juſtly founded, and of which the Honourable Preſident in his Minute ſeems now ſo fully ſenſible.

The Diſappointment I met with in my Endeavours to negociate a Peace, and the unreaſonable, I may add, inſolent Demands made by the Poona Miniſter, preſented Obſtacles to its Attainment, which I was convinced at that Time were inſurmountable; and furniſhed me with Arguments for urging the immediate Proſecution of active and vigorous Meaſures, as the only Means by which we could ever hope to recover the Company's Affairs on this Side of India from the Embarraſſment they were then under, or obtain Terms of Advantage or Honour in any future Accommodation.

To the Objection of Expence which the low State of our Finances would ill enable us to ſupport, and towards which you declared your Inability of affording an adequate, or indeed any Supply, I ventured to make uſe of the ſame Reaſoning which the Preſident now urges in ſo clear and pointed a Manner, and ſuggeſted the Neceſſity of an immediate Commencement of Hoſtilities, to enable us to provide a Fund for the future Maintenance of our Armies, which while they remained inactive, exceeded our Abilities to ſupport; and being ſubſiſted at an Expence little inferior to what they would require on active Service, could only tend to exhauſt the Reſources we were poſſeſſed of, and deprive us even of the Power of Defence when the Period ſhould arrive in which we might be called upon to ſtrain every Nerve and Sinew of War againſt an elated and preſumptuous Enemy.

You, Gentlemen, were convinced by the Propriety and Force of the Arguments; and I am happy that it is in my Power at this Day to congratulate you on the Succeſs which I have been enabled, by your vigorous Exertions and timely Aſſiſtance, to obtain hitherto in the Proſecution of the Meaſures formerly reſolved upon in concert with you.

The Honourable Preſident has founded his Plan for the Operations of the enſuing Campaign upon the Baſis of that mutually agreed laſt Year, and which the Honourable Governor General and Council have been pleaſed to ſignify their Approbation of, as beſt calculated to promote the Intereſts of the Company, and produce that great and deſirable Object to which their Inclinations have been always ſo ſtrongly and manifeſtly directed, an advantageous and honourable Peace.

The Poſſeſſion of Baſſein, which only remains to complete your Views of territorial Acquiſition, and the Command of the Paſſes leading to and from the Decan, which will be requiſite to give Value and Security to thoſe Poſſeſſions, are from Conſiderations of immediate Benefit, as well as the future deciſive and favourable Conſequences to be expected from them, the principal Objects of our preſent Purſuit and Attainment.

In a Letter which I had the Honour of addreſſing you from Surat, previous to the Receipt of your's, encloſing the Preſident's Minute, I propoſed the immediate Embarkation of the Troops from thence, in order to undertake the Siege of Baſſein. My Reaſon for this I gave you at the ſame Time, which was founded upon the ſtriking Advantage we ſhould derive by poſſeſſing ourſelves of that Fortreſs previous to the Poſſibility of any Army's being aſſembled to oppoſe us, and the Command of that ſtrong Hold would inevitably give us of the whole Country below the Ghauts. Nothing would then remain to be done but to ſecure the Paſſes leading into the Decan, which Service, after leaving a ſufficient Garriſon in Baſſein, we might have effected with our whole united Force, or at leaſt ſuch conſiderable Body as might have given us an aſſured Superiority over the numerous Troops which the Miniſter will certainly collect to oppoſe us whenever our Forces ſhall begin to be in Motion.

The Idea of Anticipation, by the Plan you have adopted of ſending Lieutenant Colonel Hartley with the Forces of your Preſidency to ſecure the Ghauts, is now ſufficiently deſtroyed, becauſe a Commencement of Hoſtilities on our Part will be a Signal to the Maratta Government to aſſemble their Forces from all Quarters; and as they have, during the preſent inactive Seaſon, diſcovered no Inclination for Peace, I muſt conceive, that ſenſible of our hoſtile Deſigns, they are in a ready and prepared State to reſiſt them; and it is not even improbable that if the Alarm is given by any early Movement of our Troops, they will march ſo large an Army into the Conkan, and with ſuch Expedition as to demand the Attention of our whole Force; and retard at leaſt, if not entirely

entirely fruſtrate, the preſent Accompliſhment of our Views againſt Baſſein. The Honourable Preſident however has not fixed the preciſe Time for entering upon Action, which he ſays muſt depend on the Seaſon: And I would alſo propoſe, that your further Determination on this Point ſhould be made with a particular Attention to the Period when it will be practicable to move the Troops from Surat, which you obſerve, according to the uſual Courſe of the Seaſon, cannot be before the 1ſt of October.

Upon the Plan of Operations you have adopted, I entirely concur with you in the Expediency of marching the Troops down by Land; and as they are in a State of complete Preparation, I ſhall readily embrace the inſtant Occaſion of the Roads being in any Degree paſſable to put them in Motion.

In my laſt Letter to you from Surat, I took Occaſion to declare my Opinion, that whenever we ſhould begin our Operations againſt Baſſein, the principal Efforts of the Enemy would be directed to that Quarter, which would become the Seat of War during the Campaign. The Vicinity of that Place to the Maratta Capital, and the imminent Danger to which Poona muſt be expoſed whenever we open ourſelves a Paſſage to the Decan, by ſecuring the ſeveral commanding Paſſes that lead towards it, confirms ſuch Belief almoſt to a Certainty.

I therefore muſt aſſure myſelf, altho' the Terms in which you have deſcribed the Service intended for your Troops do not expreſsly declare ſo, that you propoſe to leave me the entire Direction of their Military Operations, in ſuch Manner as I may find expedient to advance the general Plan previouſly concerted with your Government.

The Diviſion of Force, with a powerful Enemy in the Field, which we have every Reaſon to expect, is at all Times attended with Inconvenience, and ſeldom produces any adequate good Conſequences to the manifeſt Danger it threatens. Such Diviſion may however be ſometimes proper, and even requiſite; but the Officer who commands upon the Spot, and has informed himſelf of the Strength, Situation, and Deſigns of the Enemy, can be the only competent Judge when it is to be attempted with Succeſs. The Idea of Two Armies acting ſeparately and independantly of each other, while employed againſt One common Enemy, in Proſecution of the ſame general Plan, and in the ſame Tract of Country, is too abſurd, and combats too much againſt every Principle on which the Syſtem of War is founded, to make it neceſſary I ſhould trouble you with further Remarks on the Subject.

The few Obſervations I have made on this Head are derived merely from Conſiderations of Military Expediency, and theſe I deem at this Time ſufficient, becauſe I cannot help being firmly perſuaded it is your Intentions that the Troops from your Preſidency, ſerving on the Continent, ſhould act under my immediate Orders and Direction whenever the Army under me ſhall arrive in the Neighbourhood of Baſſein, or at ſuch Place as the Operations of the one may be materially affected by thoſe of the other.

I would not be thought, from what I have before advanced againſt the too early Movement of your Troops, to ſuggeſt the ſmalleſt Objection againſt that Part of the Plan propoſed by Mr. Hornby, or the Service which it is intended they ſhould perform; on the contrary, I am convinced it will tend to facilitate and render more expeditious and unmoleſted the Progreſs of the Troops from the Northward.

It will effectually diſtract the Attention of the Enemy: It offers the moſt reaſonable, the only poſſible Means of preſerving the Country from Deſolation; and will, I truſt, help to ſecure that effectual Supply of Proviſions of which we ſhall ſtand ſo much in need.

The Seaſon of the Year would however obviate the Danger of our feeling the ſame Effects from the devaſtating Hands of the Marattas, which we ſo ſeverely experienced in a Diſtance only of 18 Miles, laſt April, when the ſcorching Winds and Sun ſo powerfully aſſiſted the Efforts of Madjee Scindia, and burnt up every Blade of Graſs upon the Ground; but even there, I beg Leave to obſerve, that other Conſiderations than the Difficulties this occaſioned, operated effectually to ſtop my Progreſs; and that had not political Reaſons, which my Letters written at that Time to the Committee fully explained, detained me on the Confines of the Guzerat, I ſhould have found it a much eaſier Taſk to advance than to have continued ſo long as I did on the ſame barren deſolated Spot.

I obſerve with real Concern and Diſappointment the Diſtreſs for Money which you ſo ſtrongly repreſent, becauſe my own cannot be inferior, and the Honourable Governor General and Council have depended upon the Reſource of the new-required Revenue for the greateſt Part of my Supply.

I have been compelled for ſome Time paſt to draw Bills upon them at a conſiderable Loſs, which nothing but the moſt urgent and extreme Neceſſity could juſtify, to provide for the mere Subſiſtence of the Troops; but even this Reſource has proved inadequate, and the Army is greatly in Arrears: It is now no longer to be depended upon. I am firmly perſuaded of your Readineſs to afford me every Aſſiſtance in your Power, and in that Confidence, urged by the preſſing and immediate Neceſſities of the Service, hope you will find it practicable to comply with my Requeſt of appropriating the firſt Payment of the Revenues of the Country dependent on Surat, which is paid in advance, to the ſole Uſe of the Army now under my Command.

In a Letter tranſmitted you from Surat ſome Time ago, on the Subject of the Treaty made with Futty Sing, I delivered you my Opinion fully, regarding the Sentiments expreſſed by the Governor General and Council on the Exchange of Territory made with him, and am happy to find it correſponds

reſponds with thoſe contained in the Preſident's Minute, and recommended by you. It is therefore unneceſſary to take up your Time with future Obſervations on that Point at preſent.

You may rely upon my taking every effectual Meaſure in my Power, for protecting the Province of Guzerat from the Inſults and Depredations of the Enemy, during the Abſence of any Part of the Troops to the Southward, which with the Aid of Reinforcements from your Garriſons of Surat and Broach, will eaſily be accompliſhed, except Scindia ſhould himſelf return with a Large Army, in which Caſe the Force that can be ſpared for the Defence of the Province might be unequal to keep the Field; but all Apprehenſions from that Quarter of Scindia (and from no other can there be any Cauſe to fear) will, I truſt, be removed by the Plan which the Government of Bengal may find it expedient to adopt to detain him in the Province of Malva. It remains now, that I ſay a few Words reſpecting Ragoba. The Preſident in his Minute has ſuggeſted a Mode of employing him to the Southward, but which he adds, is rather thrown out as a Hint that may be purſued at a proper Seaſon, than as compoſing Part of his preſent Plan.

It may not however be improper juſt to take Notice of it, in treating of the Subject of Ragoba, as it tends to recommend the Line of Conduct it may be moſt expedient for us to follow regarding him. The Two Chiefs mentioned by the Preſident, have been long Partizans of Ragoba, and have been lately in Arms againſt the Miniſter: It is true they defeated ſome Troops that were ſent againſt them, but they obtained no deciſive or material Advantages: If Ragoba was to join them, which however I am perſuaded he will not venture to do, their Force would receive no Augmentation, and the Miniſter would detach a more reſpectable Army againſt them, the Conſequence of which muſt end in their Defeat, and irrecoverable Ruin of Ragoba, who would either fall into the Hands of the Miniſter, or, which is more probable, fly to Hyder for Protection: The Diſappointment Ragoba has met with from us, in not being decreed any Participation of the Revenues of the conquered Country, has affected him a good deal; and if he was once to execute the Deſign of leaving us, he would not be induced to return to his former Aſylum. It ſeems now no longer a Conteſt for Empire with him; he has ſeen all the Hopes he might once have entertained of being ſupported by powerful Partizans in the Empire, diſappointed, and all he can now have any Wiſh for, muſt I ſhould think in a great Meaſure be confined to Subſiſtence, and Safety to himſelf and Family; while he confines his Views to theſe Preſents, even thoſe who were jealous of his Pretenſions to Power, may relent, and Deſpair might alſo have the Effect of making him rely upon their Promiſes and Profeſſions.

I am therefore induced to give it as my Opinion, that Ragoba ſhould remain immediately under our own Eyes, and that no partial or inferior Attempts ſhould be made in his Favour, which might end in Diſappointment, and perhaps fix upon us the Imputation of having relieved ourſelves from the Weight of a Tax we did not chuſe to pay, by reſigning him to Deſtruction. The final Opinion I have been led to form reſpecting Ragoba's Connection with us, is this, That though he can bring no material Aid, or render any eſſential Service to us in the Proſecution of the War, from the extreme Contempt and Hatred he is held in by all the principal Leaders, that his Preſence will be of infinite Uſe in improving our Succeſſes, when any future Plan of Negociation is entered upon, and the great Work of Peace through his Means be more ſpeedily and effectually finiſhed, than if the Miniſter was entirely relieved from any Apprehenſion on his Account.

I ſhall conclude my Remarks upon the preſent Poſture of Affairs, the clear and full Inveſtigation of which Subject in the Preſident's Minute, leaves me ſo little Room to enlarge, by venturing a few Words on the Obſervation he has made, concerning the Want of Information from the Honourable Governor General and Council, relative to their Views in any future Negociation for Peace with the Poona Government; and on this Point I ſhall take upon me to ſpeak only from the Circumſtances he has himſelf premiſed, and the Concluſion which muſt indiſputably be deduced from them.

The Honourable Governor General and Council have all along conſidered the Attainment of a permanent and honourable Peace as the grand and primary Object: Their Inſtructions to me in June laſt, which were imparted fully to this Government, pointed only to this End: Since the Failure of that Negociation, they have repeatedly declared their ſtrong Deſire of effecting a reaſonable Accommodation; they have approved and authorized the Plan concerted laſt Year for proſecuting the War, which had then become neceſſary; and have concurred with you in the Object to which its Operations ſhould be directed.

Their Views once accompliſhed, I conſider myſelf authorized, from the Nature of their former Inſtructions, which have never been revoked, and their repeated Wiſh expreſſed for Peace, to conclude ſuch Terms of Amity with the Maratta State, by the Advice and Concurrence of this Government, as the Succeſſes of the War may entitle us to expect; as may be beſt ſuited to every concurrent Circumſtance at the Time when ſuch Opportunity of Accommodation offers itſelf, and calculated to promote the true Intereſts of the Company in general, and the Proſperity and Succeſs of this Preſidency in particular.

I have the Honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant.
(Signed) William Goddard.

A true Copy,
(Signed) Edward J. Croft.
Secr.

Copy

APPENDIX, N° 336.

Copy of a Letter to General Goddard; dated the 5th September, 1780.

To Brigadier General Goddard.

Sir,

We were very highly pleaſed to find by the Letter you laid before us at our Meeting on the 28th ultimo, that the general Plan of Operations propoſed for the enſuing Campaign coincided ſo entirely with your Sentiments, and having already fully deſcribed the Service intended for the Bombay Detachment under Lieutenant Colonel Hartley, it only now remains to explain the Powers we have judged it expedient to give you over this Detachment, for the Proſecution of the general Plan.

We are inclined to the Opinion, that if it can ſtill continue to protect the Country, at the ſame Time that it covers the Siege of Baſſien, it will be making the moſt advantageous Uſe of it; but as the Siege will be the grand Object, and when once undertaken, our Succeſs muſt be provided for to the utmoſt, we ſhall commit to you the entire Direction from the Time that you may arrive in the Neighbourhood of Baſſein with the Army under your Command, and we ſhall accordingly direct Lieutenant Colonel Hartley to pay ſtrict Obedience to all ſuch Orders as you may think proper to give him from that Time.

We ſhall likewiſe continue your Command over this Detachment during the Remainder of the Campaign in the Conkan for the Proſecution of the concerted Plan, though we wiſh that ſo long as you may judge it adviſable to have a covering Army, the Bombay Detachment may be employed in that Manner; and if you ſhould at any Time think it neceſſary for them to join, we would ſtill wiſh to have our Troops kept up in the ſame Manner as when they were acting ſeparate, in order that they may be maintained in a Condition to act ſeparately again, if it ſhall be hereafter found neceſſary. For the ſame Reaſon, we ſhall be glad they may be as little as poſſible ſubdivided or ſcattered into ſmall Detachments; and we muſt remark that the ſecuring the Crop of Grain in the Country for which this Detachment was principally formed, will depend on their being kept in a Condition and Station to protect it.

We ſhall give Orders to Lieutenant Colonel Hartley to correſpond punctually with you as ſoon as you approach Baſſein, and we ſhall alſo direct him to continue to correſpond with us; we ſhall wiſh to receive the readieſt and moſt direct Communication from all Quarters of the State of Affairs. We cannot foreſee any Circumſtance at preſent which can render it neceſſary for us to give any ſpecial Directions to Lieutenant Colonel Hartley, while he may be acting ſeparately from you under your Orders; but ſhould any ſuch Occaſion occur, we ſhall give you the earlieſt Notice.

The Time for our Troops taking the Field will depend chiefly on the Weather; but imagine it may be early in next Month, about which Time we ſuppoſe you will be able to put the Forces in Motion from the Northward.

The battering Cannon and heavy Stores for the Siege will be embarked in proper Boats, and kept in Readineſs in Salſette River, to join you as ſoon as you can poſſibly have Occaſion for them.

As you propoſe bringing down the Europeans by Sea, and it will be a prudent Meaſure to have them near the Preſidency at the Opening of the Seaſon, we now ſend up the Revenge and Bombay Grab for the Accommodation of yourſelf and Suite to Surat, and to bring down the Europeans, with the neceſſary Convenience and Expedition, and they may be cantoned on Salſette till there may be Occaſion for their Services.

Our Situation in Point of Money has been fully explained to you; but in order to afford you every Aſſiſtance in our Power, we now ſend Directions to the Chief and Council at Surat to make good to you the Firſt Collections from our Purgunnahs under their Management, for the ſole Uſe of the Army under your Command; and to leſſen your Expence of ready Money we ſhall give you a Credit on the Bombay Treaſury for ſuch Sums, as you can diſcharge by Aſſignment.

We hope ſoon to congratulate you on your Arrival again in our Neighbourhood; and are,

Sir,

Your moſt obedient humble Servants,

(Signed) Willm Hornby, &c. Committee.

Bombay Caſtle, 5th September 1780.

A true Copy.

(Signed) Edward J. Croft, Sec^y.

The following Letter from Brigadier General Goddard having been alſo received ſince the laſt Meeting of the Board, it was circulated on the 20th Inſtant for the Peruſal of the Members of the Board.

Brigadier Genl Goddard 6th Septem

Gentlemen,

My laſt Addreſs to you was dated ſo long ago as the 15th July; from which Period to the Time of my Departure for Bombay in the Middle of laſt Month, nothing of any Importance occurred to communicate to you.

That

That you may be fully informed of every material Tranſaction that has ſince happened, and clearly comprehend the preſent Situation of Affairs, together with the Plan of Operations propoſed for the enſuing Campaign, I beg Leave to tranſmit for your Peruſal, Copy of a Letter, N° 1. I received from the Select Committee previous to my Departure from Surat; and of the Preſident's Minute, N° 2. which they ſent me incloſed; I alſo ſubmit to you my Reply thereto, N° 3. delivered in to the Committee upon my Arrival at Bombay. The Contents of theſe Papers, as they touch upon every Point that appears of Moment on the preſent Occaſion, almoſt renders unneceſſary my further Remarks, ſince you will from a Peruſal of them be at once able to judge of the propoſed Plan of Operations, which is founded upon the Principles of what I have already ventured to lay before you, both with reſpect to the Object of the War itſelf, and the Means by which it may be moſt eaſily and certainly attained.

To attempt to point out to you the Advantages we muſt derive from proſecuting the War upon the Syſtem now laid down, would be only a Repetition of Sentiments frequently delivered to you; and indeed would be further ſuperfluous, as you have already ſignified your Senſe of it in your Concurrence with Mr. Hornby's Plan originally, and your Approbation of the Meaſures reſolved upon at the Opening of the laſt Campaign, of which thoſe at preſent entered into are intended as a Completion; and cannot fail, with the effectual Aid and Support of your Council and Endeavours, to produce the End ſo much deſired, "a Termination of our preſent "Conteſt by an honourable and advantageous Treaty."

You will underſtand both from the Expreſſions uſed in Mr. Hornby's Minute and the Letter I have myſelf written you on the Subject, that the Plan adopted by the Committee is conformable to the Sentiments I had avowed to them relative to the general Objects of the War, and is partial only with reſpect to the Part they have aſſigned their own Troops in the Conkan previous to my Arrival before Baſſein, which Meaſure was determined upon and in ſome Degree entered into before I received any Communication of their Intentions.

Senſible of what ſerious Importance it is to the public Cauſe to preſerve a Confidence and good Underſtanding with this Government, I ſhall make that Object my moſt earneſt and principal Study, and I truſt the Readineſs with which I have concurred in Proſecution of their Views for the public Service at this Time, as well as the Warmth and Zeal with which I ſhall co-operate with them for the ſame good Purpoſe hereafter, will obtain its Reward in your future Favour and Approbation.

I ſhall, in purſuance of the Plan fixed upon, take the earlieſt Opportunity of putting the Troops from Surat in Motion, which I apprehend on account of the uncommon Quantity of Rains that have fallen this Year and ſtill continue to fall, cannot poſſibly be before the 1ſt October. I hope, however, there will be no Neceſſity of Delay after that Period, and as I propoſe returning to Surat in a few Days, and the Army is already prepared to take the Field, no other Impediment but the Inclemency of the Seaſon, and the conſequent Difficulty of the March along the Coaſt from the ſwelling of the numerous Rivers that empty themſelves into the Sea from the Hills that are adjacent, can poſſibly occur to protract my Operations: I ſhall not fail to give you immediate Notice of my Movements, and of the Diſpoſition of Force I may find it neceſſary to make for the Protection of the Company's Territories in Guzerat.

The Sentiments of the Committee relative to the Partition of Territory made with Futty Sing, preciſely correſpond with thoſe I have already ventured to give you upon the ſame Subject; and I flatter myſelf you will admit of their preſent Juſtice and Propriety.

I need not, I am convinced, call your Attention to that Part of the Committee's Letter which relates to the Supplies of Money, ſetting forth their Diſtreſs, and the Impoſſibility of an excluſive Appropriation of the Revenues ariſing from the new-acquired Purgunnahs to the Payment of the Army under my Command, as its own Importance will give it a Claim to your immediate and particular Notice. Their Reſolution of ſetting them apart for the general Purpoſes of the War, involves ſuch a Variety of Charges and ſo extenſive a Field of Expence, that excluſive of the Precarioufneſs and at preſent inadequate Extent of the Revenue itſelf, leaves, I muſt confeſs, but little Hopes of Benefit or effectual Aſſiſtance from it. Let me therefore repeat my earneſt Solicitations that you will exert every Endeavour to remedy the Evils already felt, and prevent thoſe ſtill more ſevere which we muſt inevitably experience, unleſs you ſtrain every Reſource at this Time to adminiſter Relief. I have ſo often troubled you with Repreſentations on this Subject, and you are yourſelves ſo well informed of the circumſcribed Means poſſeſſed by this Government towards extricating themſelves and me from our preſent Diſtreſs, that I feel at once the Impropriety of enlarging further on it I cannot help however anticipating the Accompliſhment of that Event predicted in the Concluſion of Mr. Hornby's Minute, "when you ſhall be relieved from all future Expence in ſupport of this Government," which I think the favourable Train of their Affairs at this Juncture, ſeconded by vigorous and united Efforts, cannot fail of producing before the Termination of the enſuing Campaign.

I come to that Point which of all others appears to me the moſt intereſting, and demanding your particular Attention and Conſideration; I mean when the ſucceſsful Operations of the War ſhall have brought us to that happy Criſis ſo much to be deſired, and which we have beſides every Reaſon to expect capable of being improved to the great Work of Peace.

Although the Inſtructions I have received from you, and the Sentiments you have been pleaſed to communicate from Time to Time on this Subject, leave me at no Loſs regarding the Objects you

would look to in a Treaty, or the Meaſures I ought to purſue for their Attainment; yet it does not appear that the Gentlemen of this Government deem themſelves ſufficiently informed of your Views to afford that full and unreſerved Participation of Sentiments I could wiſh to receive from them whenever a Negociation ſhall be ſet on Foot. I have in a few Words explained my Idea of your Intentions in reply to Mr. Hornby's Remarks, "of this Committee having received no Communication of your Views, in any future Negociations for Peace, ſince June 1779;" and I flatter myſelf that you will approve of what I have ſuggeſted on that Occaſion. I repeat it, that I feel myſelf poſſeſſed of ſufficient Grounds, from the Inſtructions and Information already received, to proſecute your Views in a Treaty with the Maratta State, ſhould an Opportunity offer of doing ſo previous to the Arrival of any further Directions from you for that Purpoſe. But as a ſufficient Time will certainly intervene, betwixt your Receipt of the preſent Diſpatches and the Period of Negociation to which I have alluded, to obtain a full Communication of your Sentiments, I beg Leave to expreſs my Wiſh, that in order to prevent every Poſſibility of Inconvenience or Delay from any Miſconception of your Inſtructions or Intentions, you will pleaſe to tranſmit a clear and definite Explanation of them for our mutual Direction and Guidance, as early as poſſible, that you may be informed of every particular Circumſtance, and of the Steps now taken or propoſed to be taken. I alſo encloſe you Copy of a Letter, wrote me by the Select Committee, N° 4, previous to my ſetting out for Surat; from which Place I ſhall again addreſs you, and have the Honour to be, with the greateſt Reſpect, &c.

(Signed) Thomas Goddard.

Bombay,
September 6th 1780.

The Accompanyments of the above Letter being only Copies of the Papers received from the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, and entered on the Proceedings of the 3d ultimo and this Day, there is no Occaſion to record them in this Place.

Read another Letter, as follows, from Brigadier General Goddard:

Gentlemen,

Brigadier General Goddard, 24th Septemb

I had the Honour to addreſs you from Bombay, the 6th inſtant, encloſing Copy of my Correſpondence with the Select Committee; the Opinion we had mutually formed of the preſent Poſture of Affairs; and the Plan of Operations propoſed to be followed for their Improvement and Succeſs the enſuing Campaign. As this Diſpatch was ſent round by the Nancy, Bengal armed Veſſel, I make no Doubt but it will reach you ſafe; and as it contained every particular and poſſible Information, both with reſpect to the preſent State of the War, and our Intentions for its future Proſecution, I find it unneceſſary, nothing material having ſince intervened, to trouble you farther at this Time on the Subject.

In purſuance of the Plan determined upon at Bombay, the Detachment of Madras Europeans, Infantry, and Artillery, embark this Day; and as nothing prevents me but the Severity of the Weather, and the conſequent Height of the Rivers and Nullahs on the Road, I flatter myſelf this Obſtacle will now ſoon be removed, and that I ſhall have the Happineſs ſhortly to acquaint you with the whole Army's being in Motion.

Permit me to congratulate you upon the ſignal Succeſs of your Arms under Captain Popham, and the Honour they have acquired in the Capture of the ſtrong Fortreſs of Gwalior, which opens ſo favourable and promiſing a Proſpect to the Operations of the War in the Northward.

I have within theſe few Days been favoured with your Letter, in Triplicate, of the 15th May, on the Subject of Mr. Farmer's Repreſentation, which has been attended to, and his Claim admitted by the Government. I beg Leave to acquaint you, that I have received no Letter from your Government of a later Date than the 17th May.

I have the Honour to be,
With the greateſt Reſpect, &c.
(Signed) Thomas Goddard.

Camp near Surat,
September 24th 1780.

APPENDIX, N° 331.

Extract of a Letter from the President and Select Committee of Bombay to the Honourable the Governor General and Council; dated 23d September 1780.

HAVING ſince then received ſome very intereſting Intelligence from Mr. Henſhaw at Goa, we now encloſe Copy of his Letter, which we immediately communicated to General Goddard and preſſed him to uſe all poſſible Expedition in bringing down the Army for the Siege of Baſſein. And we ſhall likewiſe take every Meaſure in our Power to anticipate the Portugueze in their View of getting Poſſeſſion of that important Place.

Copy of a Letter from Mr. Robert Henſhaw to the Honourable William Hornby, Eſquire President and Governor, &c. &c. dated Goa, 9th September 1780.

Honourable Sir,

I ſend away this Boat, expreſs, to acquaint you of ſome Meaſures of this Government, in regard to their Poſſeſſions (as they Term them) North of Bombay. I Yeſterday learnt of their having actually received Orders from Poona, to the Governor of Baſſein, for receiving a Portugueze Garriſon therein, and hoiſting Portugueze Colours. In conſequence, Two of their Frigates are getting ready, working Night and Day for this Purpoſe, and upwards of Five Companies of Europeans and near One Thouſand Sepoys (Irregulars) are now here at this Village, ready to embark the Moment the Veſſels get over the Bar. It is given out they are going to Demaun. Their Hope is to be before Hand with us; but I anxiouſly wiſh them diſappointed. I beg your Honour will return a Patamar Boat to me, having none to forward any Intelligence or Packets from Madras. It is very long ſince I heard from Stewart.

I am with the higheſt Eſteem and Gratitude,
Honourable Sir,
Your moſt obliged,
And grateful humble Servant,
(Signed) Robert Henſhaw.

Goa,
9th September 1780.

A true Copy.
(Signed) James Hartley,
Dep^y Secr^y.

A true Copy.
E. Hay,
Act^g Sec^y.

APPENDIX, N° 332.

Copy of a Letter from Brigadier General Goddard to the Honourable the Governor General and Council; dated the 15th October 1780.

Gentlemen,

I HAVE the Honour to encloſe you Copy of an Extract from the Honourable Company's Commands, dated the 12th April laſt, which has been tranſmitted me by the Honourable Select Committee of Bombay.

The Marks of Diſtinction they have been pleaſed to confer upon me are in no Reſpect more honourable and grateful than in the Opportunity they give of continuing to merit your Favour and Approbation, by an implicit Obedience to your Commands, and the Hope of conducting to a ſucceſsful Termination, under your Auſpices, the Service you have entruſted to my Care and Direction.

It is with Pleaſure I can inform you, that every thing at preſent promiſes the moſt favourable Iſſue to our firſt Attempt upon Baſſein: The Madras Europeans are ſafe arrived at Durwa Point upon the Iſland of Salſette, where the Stores requiſite for the Siege are all collected, with Boats,

Boats, &c. ready to tranſport them to the oppoſite Shore, whenever the Army under my Command ſhall arrive; and as from the Accounts brought me by my Hircarrahs, of the Condition of the Roads, which from the unuſual heavy Rains that have fallen this Seaſon, have continued impaſſable longer than was expected, I have Reaſon to hope it will now be in my Power to overcome every remaining Difficulty. I propoſe putting the Army in Motion the 16th inſtant, and ſhall march with all the Expedition in my Power to Baſſein: I ſhall write you immediately upon my Arrival at that Place; and ſhall not fail to addreſs you, ſhould any thing material happen on the Road.

No Change has taken place in the Situation of Affairs ſince I laſt had the Honour of writing you; and from the Reports that prevail here, of a large Body of Troops from Bengal having croſſed the Jumna, on their Way to Gohud, I am encouraged confidently to hope that Scindia and Holkar will find themſelves too much employed in the Defence of their Northern Poſſeſſions to have any Leiſure to attend to what is tranſacting to the Southward.

I have provided as far as I could, conſiſtently with the Plan of Operations, and the grand Objects to be purſued this Campaign for the Protection and Security of the Company's Territories in Guzerat, which from the preſent Appearance of a favourable Crop, and the Extent and Value of their Collections, promiſe ſo large an Acceſſion of Revenue this Seaſon, as to render the Security of them a Point of the moſt ſerious Importance to our future Succeſs; and unleſs Scindia and Holkar ſhould themſelves invade the Country with a very large Army, I am under no Apprehenſion that it will be in the Power of the Enemy to make any Impreſſion upon it.

To the Detachment already ſtationed at Ahmedabad, and the Two Battalions left at Zinnore, which provide for the Safety of the Country North of the Nerbuddah, a Body of Troops, conſiſting of Two Bombay Battalions of Sepoys, will alſo be formed in the Neighbourhood of Surat, to be in Readineſs to move to repel any Attack of the Enemy from the Southward; and theſe it is intended ſhall be all directed to unite, ſhould the Approach of any large Army of the Marattas render it neceſſary.

The common Object to which the Service of theſe ſeveral Detachments is thus directed, requiring that their Operations ſhould be under one general Controul, in order that they may be ordered to act conjunctively, or ſeparately with each other as Circumſtances ſhall render moſt expedient, I have thought it neceſſary to leave Major Forbes, an Officer of Experience and long Service, and of whoſe Courage and Military Talents I have had repeated and recent Proofs, in the Command of the Whole; and I flatter myſelf his Conduct in it will be ſuch as to merit your Approbation, and anſwer the good Opinion I have been led to form of him.

I ſhall addreſs you when any thing material occurs; and have the Honour to be,

With the greateſt Reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient,
and moſt humble Servant,
(Signed) Tho' Goddard.

Head Quarters,
Camp near Surat,
15th October 1780.

A true Copy.
E. Hay,
Act' Sec'.

APPENDIX, N° 333.

Extract of a Letter from Governor and Council of Bengal, in their Secret Department, to the Court of Directors of the Eaſt India Company, dated the 7th January 1781.

Par. 8. WE think it proper to ſend for your Information an Extract of a Letter which we have received from the Preſident and Select Committee at Bombay, under Date the 23d September, accompanied by a Letter to them from Mr. Henſhaw, their Reſident at Goa; it goes therefore a Number in this Diſpatch; but we deem the Report therein conveyed to us unworthy of our ſerious Attention. We are generally inclined to believe, that although a Connection may ſubſiſt between the Portugueze and the Marattas, its Effect cannot be important: They have no Rank among the Powers in India; they have no Means of ſubſiſting their Army in the Field; and no ſuch Advantages are likely to be yielded to them as can weigh againſt the ſtrong Conſideration of the Alliance which has long ſubſiſted between our Nation and theirs. The Claims which they prefer are Claims of Form, and perhaps would be preferred by any other Nation having them, whether they were or were not juſtly founded.

9. With reſpect to the ſuppoſed Intention of aſſerting and maintaining the Claim on Baſſein by Force,

Force, it ſeems to us nugatory; and it cannot be effectual, ſince we have received certain Advice that Brigadier General Goddard with his Army was before Baſſein on the 18th November laſt; and we are informed, that there was no Force, excepting that in Garriſon, to oppoſe his early Captur of the Place.

APPENDIX, N° 334.

Letter from Bombay, 11th January 1781, to the Honourable the Secret Committee of the Honourable the Court of Directors for Affairs of the Honourable United Company of Merchants of England trading to the Eaſt Indies.

Honourable Gentlemen,

Par. 1. OUR laſt Advices, dated the 25th July, were forwarded by the Way of Buſſora, and we have the Honour to addreſs you, in Duplicate, by the ſame Route, accompanied by Tranſcript of our ſaid Advices.

2. Since the above Date, the following Letters have come ſafely to Hand.

Received the 24th Auguſt. Company's Letter, and Letter from the Committee of Correſpondence, both dated the 24th March 1780.

Received the 18 October. Letter from Chairman and Deputy Chairman, dated 9th July 1779.
Company's Letter, and Letter from the Committee of Correſpondence, dated 12th April 1780.
Letter from the Committee of Correſpondence, dated 29th April 1780.

3. The neceſſary Communications were immediately made to the other Preſidencies, and to the Admiral, in conſequence of the Advices contained in theſe ſeveral Letters; and the Diſmiſſions ordered in the Honourable Company's Commands of the 12th April took place on Receipt thereof.

4. Mr. Draper begs Leave to return his humble and hearty Acknowledgments for the very favourable Orders reſpecting him; and to aſſure his Honourable Maſters, he will uſe his beſt Endeavours, that his future Conduct in the Service may prove equally acceptable to them, as that they have been pleaſed to notice.

5. In conſequence of Mr. Carnac's Diſmiſſion, and the Death of Mr. Moore, Mr. Stackhouſe has become a Member of this Committee, agreeable to the Honourable Company's Orders, dated 10th April 1778.

6. We immediately ſignified to General Goddard, then with the Army at Surat, your Appointment of him to the Chief Command of the Forces under this Preſidency, who has expreſſed himſelf exceedingly ſenſible of the honourable Marks of Diſtinction you have been pleaſed to confer upon him; and hopes to diſcharge the Duties of that important Station with Honour to himſelf and Satisfaction to you. He has ſent Advice of this Appointment to the Governor General and Council, in order to receive their particular Sentiments regarding it; but has not as yet aſſumed the Exerciſe of his Command.

7. Our laſt Advices left both our Troops and thoſe of the Enemy inactive: The Seaſon of the Year neceſſarily occaſioning an Intermiſſion of Hoſtilities, the Preſident made uſe of this Opportunity to lay before us a Review of the general Poſture of Affairs, as they related to the Maratta War. The Advantages as well as Difficulties of our Situation, and a Plan of Meaſures for immediate Proſecution, evincing, by the moſt accurate Statement of our Situation, the Neceſſity of bringing the Maratta War to as early a Concluſion as poſſible.

8. By a well-founded Concluſion from paſt Events, and an attentive Conſideration of Views and Intereſts of the ſeveral leading Men in the Poona Government, we gave up all preſent Expectation of effecting this deſirable Purpoſe by Treaty; nor were we empowered, or informed that General Goddard was empowered, to enter into any further Negociation. We could not therefore entertain any Hopes of Peace, unleſs from Succeſs in the moſt vigorous Meaſures; which, preſſing as the Difficulties were under which we laboured, ariſing eſpecially from the very low State of our Finances, we reſolved to adopt, and to purſue ſteadily the Execution of the Plan formed upon the Grounds of your Orders, and entered upon our Diary under the 30th March 1779, according to which the Reduction of Baſſein and its Dependencies alone remained unaccompliſhed to complete our Views in regard to the Acquiſition of Territory.

9. The Principle of Conduct recommended to us by the Preſident, and upon which we reſolved to proceed, was, in ſhort, by a vigorous Purſuit of the War, ſtrictly confined to the Objects already defined, either to compel the Enemy to Peace, or reduce the War on our Part to a mere Plan of Defence, and thereby to put ourſelves in a Condition as early as poſſible, to ſend back the Troops of the other Preſidencies, for the Expence of which no Reſources within our moſt ſanguine Hopes could prove in any Degree adequate.

No. As the poſſeſſing Baſſein without the Country would only be burthening ourſelves with an expenſive Garriſon, and increaſing our Charges without enlarging our Reſources. The Meaſures propoſed were ſo planned as to provide at once for the Reduction of Baſſein, and the Protection of the Country, ſo far as our Means would permit; as it was of the utmoſt Importance to prevent, if poſſible, the Enemy from conſuming or deſtroying the Produce, which would not only diſappoint us of the Revenue for a whole Seaſon, but of all Aids of Subſiſtence expected from the Country. By the Poſſeſſion of Callian, we had already ſecured Footing, and a very favourable Opening into the Country, affording alſo a convenient Station for aſſembling our Troops, and making early Preparations for taking the Field.

11. This Service could only be effected by Troops from Bombay, the Poſition of the Bengal Army rendering it impoſſible to General Goddard. We therefore, after due Communication with him, ſent a ſtrong Detachment into the Field under the Command of Lieutenant Colonel Hartley, as early as the Seaſon would permit, whilſt the General undertook his March from Surat, which the Severity of the Weather did not permit him to commence until the 16th of October; and even then, the Army met with ſuch Difficulties and Obſtructions, from the extreme Badneſs of the Roads, and the numerous Rivers, that they did not reach their Ground before Baſſein until the 13th of November, where he was joined by Reinforcements and Stores from Bombay; and Colonel Hartley, according to his Inſtructions, was from that Time to act under the General's Orders, and be employed in covering the Siege, or otherwiſe, as might be found neceſſary.

12. The General repreſented, that finding the Place very ſtrong, and defended by a numerous Garriſon, under the Command of Viſſagee Punt, he determined to carry on his Operations with Regularity and Precaution. On the 28th in the Morning he had completed a Battery of Six Guns, and Six Mortars, within 900 Yards of the Place, and under Cover of the Fire, carried on his Approaches to the Spot where he erected the grand Battery of Nine 24 Pounders, which was opened the 9th ultimo in the Morning, within 500 Yards of the Wall; beſides which a Battery of 20 Mortars, of different Sizes was opened upon one of the Flanks of the Parapet: Theſe were ſerved with ſuch Effect, that on the 10th in the Morning, a practicable Breach being nearly completed, a Meſſage was ſent from the Fort, offering to ſurrender; and we have the Pleaſure to acquaint you, that after ſome Demur on the Part of the Enemy, which obliged the General to renew the Fire from the Batteries, the Place ſurrendered the next Day at Diſcretion; the Garriſon marched out and laid down their Arms in Front of the Fort, being only allowed to carry away their own private Effects. We beg Leave to congratulate you moſt cordially on this important Acquiſition, which has been ſo long the Object of our Wiſhes. And what adds greatly to the Satisfaction we feel on the Occaſion is, the very ſmall Loſs ſuſtained in the Siege; One Officer only, Lieutenant Sir John James Gordon, having been wounded, who is ſince dead, and about 12 Men killed and wounded, of whom Four only were Europeans.

13. A conſiderable Quantity of Ammunition was found in the Fort, and 220 Pieces of Cannon, and 10 Braſs Mortars; of which 19 Pieces of Braſs Cannon, ſeveral of a very large Calibre, 128 Pieces of Iron Ordnance, and all the Mortars, have been reported ſerviceable.

14. It is not material to give a Detail by this Conveyance of the Operations of the Detachment under Lieutenant Colonel Hartley; which, upon the Whole, we doubt not facilitated the Succeſs of the Siege, which was carried on without Interruption whilſt Colonel Hartley took up the Attention of a large Body of the Enemy, ſent, we apprehend, to attempt the Relief, with which he was ſucceſſively engaged for the Three Days preceding the Fall of the Place; immediately after which General Goddard moved to his Support; but Two Days before he joined, the Enemy had retired to a conſiderable Diſtance.

15. We ſignified to Lieutenant Colonel Hartley the Mark of Favour you intend him; and he aſſures us he ſhall ever conſider your Approbation as the higheſt Honour, and that whenever an Opportunity offers, he ſhall not fail of ſhewing to the utmoſt his Zeal for your Service.

16. After the Reduction of Baſſein, the General repaired to Bombay, to conſult with us reſpecting his further Operations; but by that Time a very material Change had taken place in our political Situation.

17. The Select Committee at Fort Saint George had adviſed us, in a Letter dated 28th July, received the 13th September, that Hyder Ally had invaded the Carnatic with a large Army, and that they could only act upon the Defenſive. They gave their Opinion, that the War ſhould be carried into Hyder's Poſſeſſions on the Coaſt of Malabar; and expreſſed Hopes that we ſhould be in a Situation to act with Vigour againſt him, at leaſt when the Maratta War was at an End. We did not fail to give them a faithful Account of our Condition and Inability to co-operate with them in any Degree, until the Maratta War was brought to a Concluſion, and had no further Account of their Proceedings until the Arrival of the Fleet on the 19th ultimo, when the Admiral delivered us a Letter from the Select Committee, confirming Reports we had before heard of a moſt dreadful Diſaſter having befel a conſiderable Part of their Army under the Command of Colonel Baillie. The Account we now give of this unfortunate Affair is in their own Words.

18. With theſe alarming Accounts we received a Letter from the Governor General and Council, dated the 9th of October, adviſing that they had come to a Determination to offer Peace to the Marattas; and encloſing Copy of a Treaty of which they had agreed for that Purpoſe, to which they refer us in ſo many Words for the Knowledge of every Particular; having therefore no further Information to afford, we think it eſpecially neceſſary to tranſmit a Copy of this Paper, with

with which we received a peremptory Order to ſuſpend all Hoſtilities and Military Operations againſt the Marattas, immediately on Receipt of a Requiſition in Writing to that Effect, and a Notification from the Peſhwah, that the like Order had been given on his Part to the Officers commanding his Armies: But in the mean Time, and until the Receipt of ſuch Requiſition and Notification, they earneſtly recommended to us a vigorous Proſecution of the War, and ſending the like Order to General Goddard. The Copy of the propoſed Treaty ſent to us has no Date but the Letter accompanying it as above mentioned, is dated the 9th of October, and what we have now communicated contains the whole Subſtance of the Information given us by the Governor General and Council reſpecting this Meaſure.

19. When Hyder Ally, by his Invaſion of the Carnatic, had commenced open Hoſtilities againſt the Company, a Body of his Troops alſo joined the Malabar Powers in the Attack of Tellicherry: Finding the Defence of this Settlement an inſupportable Burthen, and the Maratta War requiring that every Reſource of this Preſidency ſhould be confined to that Object alone, we ſaw the Expediency of abandoning Tellicherry altogether; but after the Opinion given by the Select Committee at Fort Saint George, of the Neceſſity of carrying the War into Hyder's Poſſeſſions on this Coaſt, we did not think it proper without firſt conſulting them to give up a Place which might be of much Conſequence towards the Succeſs of ſuch a Meaſure whenever Circumſtances may permit of its being carried into Execution, and which might alſo have a material Effect upon their preſent Operations. We at the ſame Time ſtated our Inability to furniſh the neceſſary Supplies of Men, Money and Stores, to ſuſtain a Siege which promiſed to continue ſo long, as the Army in the Carnatic continued to act on the Defenſive; and ſubmitted to them, whether the Fort of Tellicherry was of ſuch Importance to the Succeſs of the War as to be equal to the Expence of maintaining it; in which Caſe we deſired to know, whether they would take that Charge upon their Government; for as we then acquainted them, we were not able to ſupport it, further than by ſending a temporary Relief until their Anſwer could be obtained.

20. The Select Committee, in their Anſwer ſubſequent to the Diſaſter of the 10th of September, recommended the evacuating of the Place; and we had lodged previous Orders at Tellicherry for the Garriſon to act in this Point according to the Anſwer from Fort Saint George, which for that Reaſon we deſired might be immediately communicated to the Reſident, that Meaſures might be taken for withdrawing from the Place under the Countenance and Protection of His Majeſty's Squadron, which we expected would arrive there nearly at the ſame Time with the Anſwer from Fort Saint George.

21. The Admiral, when he arrived at Tellicherry, was poſſeſſed of the Governor General and Council's Intentions of offering Peace to the Marattas; and on being conſulted by the Reſident and Factors reſpecting the Meaſures for withdrawing the Settlement, he gave it deciſively as his Opinion, from the great Difference which had ariſen in the State of the Company's Affairs, both as to War and Policy, ſince the Date of our Inſtructions, the Place ought not to be abandoned until further Orders from Bombay; and to enable them to hold out until then, he offered Supplies of Ammunition, Military Stores, Proviſions, Men and Money; and immediately diſpatched a Letter to us, ſtrongly urging the Neceſſity of maintaining the Place at this Time, and under the preſent Circumſtances of the Company's Affairs; and requeſting and deſiring we would take this Matter under our moſt ſerious Conſideration, and ſpeedily diſpatch ſuch a Reinforcement of Troops and other Requiſites as might be fully ſufficient to drive the Enemy from before the Place; when, if we ſhould not think the Settlement worth keeping, it might be evacuated, the Company's Effects ſaved, and the Honour of the National Arms preſerved.

22. The Admiral accordingly landed a Detachment of 100 Marines, and ſuch Stores as were judged adequate by the Commandant to the Defence of the Place, until a Reinforcement could be ſent from Bombay; and alſo left the Ships Ponſborne and Contractor, to aſſiſt with the Company's Cruizers ſtationed there in keeping the Port open. We cannot omit mentioning the further Proof the Admiral gave of his Zeal for your Service, by offering to land a Body of Men from the Fleet, to aſſiſt in ſtorming the Enemy's Works, but which Major Cotgrave thought proper to decline.

23. The Admiral, in his Paſſage up the Malabar Coaſt, has conſiderably weakened Hyder Ally's Marine Force, by cutting out One Ship from Callicut Road; and at Mangalore, with the Boats of the Fleet, he deſtroyed two Grab Ships, a large Ketch, and took another Ketch of Ten Guns. He then proceeded to Bombay with the whole Fleet, which now conſiſts of only Five Ships of the Line, and One Frigate; Three Ships being returned to England, One Frigate ſent to China, and the Nymph Sloop to the Cape. The Sartine Frigate was loſt at Callicut.—The Ships at Bombay are proceeding in their Refitment with all poſſible Expedition.

24. Such was the State of Affairs when after the Reduction of Baſſein it became neceſſary to determine what further Meaſures were to be purſued, and we requeſted the Admiral and the General to meet us in Committee for that Purpoſe.

25. The Admiral declared it to be his Opinion, that the Safety and Preſervation of the Company's Settlements on the Coaſt of Coromandel, and of the Army under Sir Eyre Coote, depended on this Preſidency being able to make ſome vigorous Effort againſt the Poſſeſſions of Hyder Ally on this Coaſt; and urged in ſtrong Terms the Neceſſity of a ſpeedy Peace with the Marattas, to enable us to act with our whole Force againſt Hyder Ally, who now threatens Deſtruction to the Carnatic, and even to Fort Saint George itſelf, if aided by a Body of French, which there appeared a great Probability might be introduced into the Country.

26. We

26. We allowed much Weight to the Sentiments delivered by the Admiral, and that in the unhappy Situation to which Affairs at Fort St. George are reduced, a Peace with the Marattas was moſt ardently to be wiſhed for, and which we ſhall labour moſt zealouſly and ſtrenuouſly to obtain; but until that Event takes place it muſt be admitted as an abſolute Impoſſibility, that we can make any effectual Attack againſt the Poſſeſſions of Hyder Ally on the Malabar Coaſt, for were we to relax in our Operations againſt the Marattas, or to weaken the Army ſo far as to diſable it from acting with Vigour againſt them, this Preſidency might ſoon be reduced to as bad a Situation at Fort St. George; or the Marattas relieved from all Apprehenſions on this Quarter, might unite with Hyder Ally in the Invaſion of the Carnatic, and complete the Ruin of that Preſidency.

27. A Purſuit of the Maratta War with all poſſible Vigour as recommended by the Governor General and Council, promiſed with the moſt rational Expectation to promote a ſpeedy Accommodation, ſooner than any other Plan of Conduct; and indeed our own Safety, as well as the general Safety of the Company's Poſſeſſions, made it neceſſary that we ſhould either find Employment for the Marattas or bring them to Terms. In theſe Circumſtances therefore it would be in the higheſt Degree imprudent and impolitic, by a Diviſion of our Forces to diſable ourſelves from purſuing the Line of Conduct ſo neceſſary for the public Safety.

28. At the ſame Time we were very earneſt in our Wiſhes to preſerve Tellicherry, until at leaſt we can form a better Judgment what Probability there may be of the Marattas accepting the proffered Terms, or of the War being otherwiſe brought to a Concluſion; and on conſulting the General reſpecting the State of the Army, we found we could furniſh a very defenſive Garriſon for Tellicherry without diſabling him from an active Proſecution of the War againſt the Marattas; and we have therefore determined for the preſent to maintain it.

29. Immediately on the Reduction of Baſſein and before the Receipt of the Letter from Bengal of the 9th of October, we had on the Preſident's Propoſal recommended to the General, to acquaint the Poona Miniſtry that if they were deſirous of Peace on equitable and moderate Terms he was ſtill ready to enter into Treaty with them; at the ſame Time ſupporting the Offer with ſuch Motions of the Army as might ſeem moſt likely to enforce the Acceptance of it; keeping ſtill in Mind the main Object of the Campaign, the complete Reduction of the Conkan or Country below the Gauts, in which were ſeveral Forts of difficult Acceſs, the Poſſeſſion of which would be of great Importance to preſerve it in Tranquillity: The General did not altogether coincide in the Idea, but ſeemed to think that greater Advantages might be derived from the Fall of Baſſein, and although he did not abſolutely propoſe to penetrate into the Decan, he gave it as his Opinion, that with all the Force we could collect, the firſt military Effort would be to ſecure the Paſſes of the Gauts, there to take Poſt, and either advance or continue to act on the Defenſive, as may be found moſt expedient, carrying the Terror of our Arms as near to the Enemy's Capital as poſſible, without riſking too far the Safety of the Troops or endangering their Return. This Step he thought moſt likely to produce a Peace, and ſupported his Propoſal by remarking the unprepared State of the Poona Government to reſiſt our Arms, ariſing from the Abſence of their Two principal Officers, Scindia and Holkar, who we do not find *have yet* moved to this Side, as well as the Improbability of their receiving Aſſiſtance from any other Power hoſtile to the Company.

30. As we were equally ſolicitous to reduce the Maratta Government to Terms, and the Governor General and Council left the Conduct of the War to General Goddard, we have only in general Terms recommended to him to purſue his Operations with all poſſible Vigour, and to the utmoſt Extent he may find practicable with the Force under his Command.

31. While the neceſſary Preparations are forwarding for the moſt vigorous Operations, a Detachment of the Army is employed in the Attack of Arnaul, a Fort on the Sea Coaſt to the Northward of Baſſein; and the Admiral at our Requeſt has ſent Two of the King's Ships to aſſiſt in this Service.

32. We have the Pleaſure to acquaint you, that your Poſſeſſions to the Northward have remained in perfect Tranquillity, and we expect to receive a conſiderable Revenue therefrom this Seaſon, which however will be far from equal to our Neceſſities, now preſſing to a Degree never before experienced, as we are obliged to appropriate a Part for the Expences of the Bengal Army.

33. By a Letter communicated to us by General Goddard, we learned with great Satisfaction that the Detachment under Captain Popham ſurprized and took the important Fortreſs of Guilier on the 4th of Auguſt laſt, but we are not able to give any farther Advice of the Operations of that Detachment, or to what Object they are directed.

Bombay Caſtle,
11th Jan. 1781.

William Hornby,
D. Draper,
N. Stackhouſe.

APPENDIX, N° 335.

Enclosures in Sir Edward Hughes's Packet to Lord Hillsborough, Secretary of State.

N° 9.

To Sir Edward Hughes, K. B. Rear Admiral of the Red, and Commander in Chief of His Majesty's Ships in India.

Sir,

WE have the Pleasure to acquaint you with the safe Arrival of Sir Eyre Coote, with a Detachment of Europeans from Bengal. And we learn by private Advice, that Eight Battalions of Sepoys are marching from thence to the Presidency.

We inclose you Copy of a Letter from our Resident at Ganjam, which will inform you of the Intelligence we have received respecting French Cruizers.

We are likewise to inform you, that the Governor General and Council having thought proper by the Power vested in them, to suspend John Whitehill, Esquire, Charles Smith, Esquire, have succeeded to the Government of the Company's Affairs on this Coast.

We have the Honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient humble Servants,
Cha' Smith,
Eyre Coote,
Sam' Johnson,
Hector Munro,
Alex' Davidson.

Fort Saint George,
15th November 1780.

Edwd Hughes.
(Copy.)

N° 10.

Fort Saint George, 12th November 1780.

Dear Sir,

I must take a future Opportunity of replying to such Parts of your Letters of the 2d July, and 14th September, as may not be answered by what follows in this.

Before I left Bengal, your Letters to the Governor General and Council, containing Copies of the Advices which you had received from England, of an Armament being in Readiness to sail from France to act against us in India, and informing them of your Resolution to leave this and proceed to the Malabar Coast to counteract the Enemy, as you expected they would first make an Attempt in that Quarter, either to distress our Settlements there, or form a Junction with Hyder Ally Cawn, had arrived. By the Answers which were written to them, and which I hope have reached you in Safety, you will be informed of the Call that was made upon me to proceed hither in order to take upon me the Command of the Army at this Presidency; a Call, which you may suppose as the Interests of the Public were so essentially concerned, I embraced with that Alacrity which my Heart has ever dictated to me on such Occasions. By the same Dispatches you are also informed of the Resolutions which the Supreme Council had come to, of making Peace with the Marattas, a Measure which in the present Situation of our Affairs was equally necessary and to be wished for. I trust therefore that the Proposals we have made towards bringing about an Accommodation will be attended with Success. If you can be serviceable in this Business I am confident you will.

I took my Departure from Bengal on the 13th ultimo, and arrived here on the 5th Instant. I have brought with me Fifteen Lacks of Rupees for the Services of the War, Two Companies of European Artillery with their Complement of Lascars, a Battalion of Europeans consisting of 370, and about 40 Gentlemen Volunteers. I did flatter myself, that with this Addition to the Strength of our Army here, I should have been in Force sufficient to have taken the Field against Hyder; but so very short have I found it of my Expectations, and in so distracted and unprepared a State, Affairs in general, that however willing I feel myself to check him in his Career of Success, it is now impossible: First, because of the Monsoon which has set in with very heavy Rains, and obliged me for the present to order the Troops into Cantonments; and next, because the Fall of Arcot, the Capital of the Carnatic, into the Hands of Hyder, which happened Two Days before my Arrival, has put him in Possession of not only a most formidable Asylum for his whole Army, but a considerable Quantity of very useful Military Stores, either for maintaining the Footing he has already obtained, or for prosecuting his further Views of Conquest. By the best Information I can obtain, his Army does not consist of less than a Hundred thousand Black Infantry; between Two and Three hundred of European Infantry, under the Command of a Mr. Lally; Thirty thousand Horse, a large Train of Artillery; not less than a hundred Pieces of Cannon of different Calibres, and so well served, as in the late Siege of Arcot, to have frequently dismounted the Guns on our Batteries. This is not a Circumstance collected from mere Report, but communicated to me by the Officers and others who are arrived from the Garrison of Arcot, under Articles of Capitulation. All these Circumstances considered, and added to the Difficulties which we should, after leaving this

this Place, unavoidably experience on the Score of Proviſions, I ſee no Probability of having it ſpeedily in my Power to act offenſively againſt Hyder, unleſs I ſhould have the Happineſs to hear ſoon that Peace is concluded with the Marattas, and that they have united their Forces with General Goddard, and invaded his Poſſeſſions on the other Side of India.

I incloſe you a Copy of my Letter to Brigadier General Goddard: You will perceive from it that he is under my Orders; but you will obſerve alſo, that as I write without any certain Intelligence, either of his Situation, of the Proceſs of his late Expedition againſt Baſſein, or of the State of our Negociations with the Marattas, I am obliged to leave him in a great Meaſure to his own Diſcretion: I only point out to him that I now conſider the Maratta War as a very ſecondary Buſineſs, and that he will direct his whole Views towards diſtreſſing the Poſſeſſions of Hyder on the Malabar Side, as, until the Detachment of Eight Battalions of Sepoys, which I have been adviſed from Bengal, are under Orders of March for this Place, under Command of Colonel Pearſe, arrive, it is the only Hope I have, by obliging Hyder to divide his Force, of enabling me to act offenſively againſt him, and to drive him from the Carnatic.

After theſe Obſervations, and convinced of the Zeal with which Sir Edward Hughes is inſpired for the Service of his King, and for the Honour and Intereſts of the Britiſh Nation, I know it is unneceſſary for me to expreſs even a Wiſh of his concerting ſuch Meaſures as his Line of Service may enable him, and he may deem eligible, towards diſtreſſing Hyder on the Sea Coaſt of Malabar, and of his co-operating with General Goddard in every Inſtance that may be in his Power, and whereby the grand Object of their mutual Exertion may be promoted.

I have, purpoſely to convey this Diſpatch to you, ſent round the Indus Schooner, Captain Jones, belonging to Bengal; and which, as I ſhall be extremely anxious to receive early Intelligence of both your own and General Goddard's Plans, I hope you will return as ſpeedily as poſſible, as well as ſend me the earlieſt Information to the ſame Effect, in Duplicate and Triplicate, by the ſafeſt and moſt expeditious Land Conveyance.

I truſt that by our joint Endeavours we may yet reſtore the Intereſts of the Nation in this Quarter of the Globe to their wonted flouriſhing State, and that with Honour and Credit to ourſelves. With moſt ſincere Wiſhes for all poſſible Succeſs to crown your Operations, I have the Honour to be, with much Eſteem and Regard,

Dear Sir,
Your moſt obedient and
moſt humble Servant,
Eyre Coote.

P. S. It had almoſt eſcaped me, that the Supreme Council having thought proper to ſuſpend Mr. Whitehill, the Government in conſequence devolved upon Mr. Charles Smith.

(Copy) Edwd Hughes.

His Excellency Sir Edwd Hughes, K. B.
&c. &c. &c.

N° 11.

To Brigadier General Goddard, or the Officer commanding the Bengal Detachment.

Sir,

I incloſe you a Letter from the Governor General and Council, of which they communicated to me the Contents, but ſent me no Copy; I therefore opened it, that I might be enabled to ſend you an exact Duplicate by Land from hence, and which I ſhall ſend To morrow.

I have alſo, to give theſe Diſpatches every Chance of reaching you with Safety and Expedition, ſent a Duplicate by the Veſſel which carries this, and which ſhe is to put on Shore at Nagore, from whence I have written to the Reſident there, Mr. Huddleſton, to forward it to Mr. Torleſſe at Anjengo, and to whom I have likewiſe written to expedite it with all poſſible Care to you.

The Terms of the Governor General and Council's Letter, placing your Detachment under my Orders, are in themſelves ſufficiently clear and deciſive to render all Definition by me unneceſſary. I ſhall therefore, without further Preamble, proceed to communicate to you in as conciſe a Manner as poſſible, the State in which Things are in here, and what Share I could wiſh you to take, in order to aſſiſt in extricating them from the Difficulties with which they are loaded.

I ſhall in the firſt Place inform you, that I left Calcutta on the 13th of laſt Month, and arrived ſafe here on board the Kingſton Indiaman, the 5th inſtant, having brought along with me a Detachment from the Bengal Army, conſiſting of Two European Companies of Artillery with their Complement of Laſcars, One Battalion of European Infantry amounting to 370, and 40 Gentlemen Volunteers. With ſuch an Addition to the Strength of the Army which I expected to find here, I had little Doubt of being in Force ſufficient to cope with Hyder in the Field; but to my great Concern the pleaſing View I had formed of entering immediately upon Action, has, from a Combination of untoward Circumſtances, become altogether viſionary. Inſtead of Eight or Ten complete Sepoy Battalions which I laid my Account with meeting, I can hardly muſter from their Remains enough of effective Men to complete Three. The Cavalry, both Nabob's and Company's, when collected

collected together, will not be a Thouſand ſtrong. The Complement of Europeans, which after leaving a very ſmall Garriſon in this Fort, I could carry into the Field, would not exceed 1400. No Proviſions to be had any where in the Country Five Miles beyond Madras, which has been ravaged, and is now infeſted by Hyder's Horſe in large Bodies; and at this preſent Time the Inhabitants are living on the Supplies which have lately come from Bengal.

Under theſe Circumſtances you may imagine that it would be no eaſy Matter to equip an Army for either a long or active Campaign, which could command no other Reſources for Subſiſtence than what it had immediately within itſelf. With ſuch powerful Obſtacles as theſe to encounter; I confeſs my Mind has received ſome ſmall Relief from its Diſappointments, by the Neceſſity which the ſetting-in of the Monſoon has furniſhed me with, of throwing my little Army into Cantonments, which however I have formed contiguous to where it was encamped, that I might not give an unfavourable Impreſſion, by appearing to quit the Field. When the Detachment of Eight Battalions of Sepoys under Orders of March from Bengal, under the Command of Colonel Pearce joins, (which however it will not do in leſs than Four Months) I ſhall be competent to any Thing: But ere that Time, I conceive Matters will be brought to a Criſis one Way or another, for Hyder has advanced with ſuch rapid Succeſs, that I muſt not remain ſo long inactive.

Having made you acquainted with what immediately concerns myſelf, I ſhall now inform you of what belongs to Hyder.

He is in Poſſeſſion of Arcot the Capital of the Carnatic, which he took Two Days before my Arrival. The Pettah he took by Storm, and the Citadel capitulated. His Infantry are computed at a Hundred thouſand, of which there are Twenty thouſand in regular Battalions, and well diſciplined; between Two and Three hundred Europeans under the Command of a Mr. Lally, and 30,000 Cavalry, together with a very formidable Train of Artillery, not leſs than 100 Pieces of Cannon, and which at the Siege of Arcot were ſo well ſerved, as repeatedly to have diſmounted our Guns on the Batteries. By the Capture of this Town and Garriſon he has got Poſſeſſion of an Aſylum for his whole Army, and of a very large Quantity of Military Stores, which will prove very uſeful, not only in maintaining what he has already acquired, but in aſſiſting his further Views of Conqueſt. Theſe are Circumſtances which threaten us with the moſt ſerious Conſequences.

I hope that ere this reaches you, you will have been informed of the Reſolutions which the Governor General and Council had come to, of offering Peace to the Marattas, and that the Terms have been received and proved acceptable to the Court of Poona; that Matters are in a fair Train of being amicably accommodated; and that I ſhall ſoon receive the agreeable Tidings of their having united their Forces with you to act againſt Hyder. However this may be, and as in the preſent Situation of our Affairs, I conſider it as a very ſecondary Buſineſs; I muſt earneſtly deſire that you will of yourſelf endeavour by every poſſible Means to diſtreſs Hyder's Poſſeſſions on your Side India; and if there is any Expedition which you are of Opinion might, in concert with the Admiral, be ſucceſsfully undertaken againſt any of Hyder's principal Places, and would produce the Effect of obliging him to ſend Part of the large Force he has here to the Security of his own Country, I depend on your Military Experience and Activity for ſpeedily executing it. I ſhould then I think be able, even with the Force I now have, to drive him from the Carnatic. I write to Sir Edward Hughes on this Subject, who I am perſuaded will chearfully co-operate with you in any Meaſure that may promiſe Succeſs to the general Operations of the War. As I have no late Accounts where you now are, nor any Advices concerning either your own or the Tranſactions of the Marattas in your Expedition againſt Baſſein, I have it not in my Power to point out to you any direct Line for your Plan of Operations. I muſt therefore rely on your local Knowledge of Circumſtances and Diſcernment, for purſuing ſuch a Conduct as may ſerve to promote the great Object I have above ſuggeſted.

As nothing can be more material to the mutual Succeſs of our Operations in the War than particular and frequent Intelligence, I muſt beg you will be conſtant in your Communications upon every Occurrence which may be in any Shape uſeful for me to know; and you may depend on my being punctual in my Correſpondence from hence.

As the firſt Step which has occurred to me might be of Service to your Operations, I have ſent Orders to Major Cotgrave, in Command of a Detachment from the Troops of this Preſidency formerly ſtationed at Tellicherry, and lately ordered to march from thence to Anjengo to obey any Orders you may ſend him to join you if neceſſary; if not, his Detachment would be of great Service here: I would therefore, if ſafe, adviſe his coming to Pallamcotah where he will receive further Orders. I have the Honour to be, with much Eſteem and Regard,

Sir,

Your moſt obedient
humble Servant,
(Signed) Eyre Coote.

Fort St. George,
12th Nov. 1780.

(Copy.) Edward Hughes.

APPENDIX, N° 336.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 9th October 1780.

THE Secretary lays before the Board Drafts of Letters to the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay and to Brigadier General Goddard, grounded on the Reſolutions of the Board of the 27th ultimo.

To Bombay.

Gentlemen,

We have received the ſeveral Letters which you have written to us under Date the 29th May, 6th June, 30th July, and 14th Auguſt, with the Accompanyments to each. We are alſo to acknowledge the Receipt of your Letter of the 17th Auguſt, which has reached us within theſe few Days, and to which we propoſe to ſend a ſeparate Reply in a very ſhort Time.

At ſo great a Diſtance as this is at which we are placed, from the Scene of General Goddard's Operations, it is impoſſible for us to preſcribe any fixed Plan of Action for the Army under his Command: We have therefore left it to his Judgment, guided and aſſiſted by your Opinion and Advice, to employ our Troops after the Reduction of Baſſein, which we ſuppoſe by this Time accompliſhed, or nearly ſo, for your Defence againſt the French, if neceſſary for the general Benefit of the Company's Intereſts and Annoyance of the Enemy. The Line of Conduct marked out by the Company's Inſtructions, and to which you ſeem to adhere in your late Letters, is the Rule by which we deſire you to be guided; but we are happy to leave the Plan of Operations to your Determination and to that of the Commander of our Troops, not doubting but that your Judgment and Information will determine on the beſt that can be purſued.

We are now, Gentlemen, to inform you of a Reſolution which we have paſſed, but which we deſire may be kept inviolably ſecret while it be in the Power of our Enemies to oppoſe and defeat the Succeſs of its Object. Without further Preface then, we make known to you the Determination which we have paſſed, to offer Peace and Friendſhip to the Marattas. The encloſed Copy of the Treaty on which we have agreed for this Purpoſe, will convey to you the Knowledge of every Particular; and we hereby require and command you immediately to ſuſpend all Hoſtilities and military Operations againſt the Marattas on the Receipt of a Requiſition in Writing to that Effect, and Notification from the Peſhwa that the like Order has been given on his Part to the Officers commanding his Armies; but in the mean Time and until your Receipt of ſuch Requiſition and Notification, we earneſtly recommend to you a vigorous Proſecution of the War as far as your Troops may be engaged in it.

A ſimilar Order has been ſent to Brigadier General Goddard.

We are, &c.

Fort William,
the 9th October 1780.

To General Goddard.

Sir,

In our Letter to you of this Date already written, we have replied to ſuch Parts of your Letters hitherto unacknowledged as appeared to us to require an Anſwer. The Purpoſe of this Letter is diſtinct and particular; it is meant only to convey to your Knowledge a Reſolution which we have formed, and Orders for your Guidance grounded on it; and we direct that for ſome Time to come the Whole be kept inviolably ſecret, and not permitted to paſs beyond your own Information.

We have reſolved to offer Terms of Peace and Friendſhip to the Maratta State, and for your Knowledge of ſuch Part of the Treaty as may affect the Motions of your Army we herewith ſend you an atteſted Copy of the Treaty which we have determined to propoſe.

And we hereby poſitively require and command you immediately to ſuſpend all Hoſtilities and Military Operations againſt the Marattas, whenever you may receive a Requiſition in Writing to that Effect, and a Notification from the Peſhwa that the like Order has been given on his Part to the Officers commanding his Armies; but in the mean Time and until ſuch Requiſition and Notification be received by you, we direct that you proſecute the War with the utmoſt Vigour, and act in all Circumſtances as if the foregoing Information had not been ſent.

We are, &c.

Fort William,
9th October 1780.

APPENDIX, N° 338.

Extract of a Letter from Sir Edward Hughes, K. B. to the Earl of Hillſborough; dated Bombay, the 2d January 1781.

BY the Ponſborne I received Letters from the Select Committee of Fort Saint George, incloſing alſo a Letter directed to me, dated the 2d October laſt, from the Governor General and Council of Bengal, in Anſwer to mine to them of the 14th September laſt; a Copy of which Letter, N° 2. is herewith incloſed for your Lordſhip's Information, as containing Matter of much Importance to the Affairs of the Company in particular, and of the Nation at large.

On the 24th November in the Evening, in Sight of Callicut Road, a Port of Hyder Ally's, I ſaw at an Anchor there His Majeſty's Ships Exeter, Burford, Eagle, and Sartine, the Two laſt engaging Two Ships lying cloſe to the Shore with Hyder's Colours flying on board them, but being ſtill anxious to proceed to the Relief of Tellicherry, one of the Company's Settlements on this Coaſt, that had been beſieged Nine Months by the combined Forces of the Nairs aſſiſted by a Detachment of Hyder Ally's Troops; and its Garriſon, by the Information I had received at Anjengo, reduced to great Want of every Article eſſential to its longer Defence, I continued my Courſe to that Place with the Burford in Company which joined off Callicut, and arrived in Tellichery Road on the 27th, where I found Two of the Company's armed Snows, and a Tranſport Ship which had brought ſome Stores and Ammunition to the Garriſon; in the mean Time the armed Boats of the Ships in Callicut Road cut out and brought from thence One of Hyder Ally's Ships, and forced the other on Shore; but in the Courſe of their Operations the Sartine being warped into ſhoal Water to cannonade the Ships, ſtruck on the Rocks at low Water, and filled ſo that ſhe was totally loſt, Part of her Sails, Topmaſts, Booms, and ſome other Stores, being all that could be ſaved out of her.

On the 28th I went on Shore to Tellicherry at the Requeſt of the Chief and Council at that Place, to deliberate with them on what was beſt to be done in the then Situation of that Place; and prior to our Meeting I received from them the Letter of which N° 3 is a Copy, and N° 4 a Copy of my Anſwer, by which your Lordſhip will obſerve that I ſtrongly urged the Propriety of maintaining the Place, and tendered them every Aſſiſtance in my Power for that Purpoſe.

On the 28th and 29th the ſeveral Ships of the Squadron with the Company's Ships Ponſborne and Contractor, and Merchant Ships, joined me in Tellicherry Road, and on the 1ſt of December His Majeſty's Ship Coventry joined me, laſt from Bombay; this Ship I had ſent from Madras in February laſt with my public Diſpatches, and a Packet from that Preſidency to the Court of Directors, to be landed at Suez under the Care of Mr. Wooley, who was charged with the Conveyance of them over Land; the Coventry did not get up the Red Sea quite as far as Suez, on account of contrary Winds, but landed Mr. Wooley at Coſſier, a Port not far diſtant from Suez, who proſecuted his Journey to Cairo; and I hope the Packets arrived ſafe in England.

By the Coventry I received a Letter from the Select Committee of Bombay, dated the 13th November, of which N° 5 herewith incloſed is a Copy; by which your Lordſhip will obſerve that the Maratta War was ſtill uppermoſt in the Minds of that Preſidency, notwithſtanding the known Diſtreſs of the Company's Affairs on the Coaſt of Coromandel, and of their own Settlement of Tellicherry.

After much Correſpondence with the Gentlemen of Tellicherry, of which N° 6 is a Copy of the Reſolutions of a Council of War held there; N° 7 a Copy of a Letter from me to them; and N° 8. their Anſwer thereto; will enable your Lordſhip to form a Judgment; they came to an unanimous Reſolution, to maintain the Place until further Orders from Bombay, provided a Reinforcement of an hundred Marines with their Officers, and a thouſand Barrels of Powder, were landed from the Squadron, and the Company's Ships Ponſborne and Contractor left in the Road to keep the Poſt open for Supplies of Proviſions; and having landed the Marines and Powder accordingly, I ſailed from Tellicherry Road towards Bombay on the 5th of December, with all the Squadron, except the Coventry left as a Convoy to the Trade up the Coaſt, taking with me the Company's Two armed Snows.

On the 8th of December being off Mangalore, the principal Sea Port of Hyder Ally on the Malabar Coaſt, I ſaw Two Ships, a large Snow, Three Ketches, and many ſmaller Veſſels, at an Anchor in the Road, with Hyder's Colours flying on board; and ſtanding cloſe into the Road found them Veſſels of Force and all armed for War; on which I anchored as cloſe to the Enemy's Ships as poſſible with Safety, ordered the armed Boats of the Squadron to attack and deſtroy them, under the Cover of the Company's Two armed Snows and the Prize Ship taken in Callicut Road, which were anchored in Four Fathoms Water, and cloſe to the Enemy's Ships; this Service was conducted on the Part of our Boats with a Spirit and Activity that do much Honour to the Officers and Men employed in them, and in Two Hours they took and burnt the Two Ships, One of 28 the other of 26 Guns full of Men for their Defence; One Ketch of 12 Guns was blown up by the Enemy at the Inſtant our Boats were boarding her; another Ketch of 10 Guns which cut her Cables

Cables and endeavoured to get to Sea was taken; the Third Ketch with the ſmaller Veſſels were driven on Shore; and the Snow only eſcaped into the Harbour, having thrown every Thing overboard.

On this Service the Squadron loſt Lieutenant Goin of the Burford and 10 Men killed, Lieutenant Sutton of the Superb, Lieutenant Maclellan of the Eagle, and 51 Men wounded: There were ſeveral of the Enemy's Ships and Veſſels within the Harbour, but ſo little Depth of Water on the Bar at the Entrance, that even the Company's Snows could not go in without being lightened; and under the Muzzles of the Enemy's Guns, with a Garriſon of 4000 Men, who could wade to our Boats when within the Harbour, I did not think it practicable to deſtroy them by our Boats alone without a very great Loſs of Men, and therefore early on the 9th I proceeded with the Squadron for Bombay; and the ſame Day was joined by the Coventry from Tellicherry Road, which brought me Letters from the Select Committee of Fort St. George and General Sir Eyre Coote, under Dates the 12th and 15th November, of much Importance to our Affairs in this Country, eſpecially the Copy of Sir Eyre's Letter to Brigadier General Goddard; Copies of which, N° 9, 10, and 11, I now have the Honour to encloſe with this for your Lordſhip's Information, by which, amongſt other Misfortunes, your Lordſhip will obſerve the Loſs of the Capital of the Province of Arcot, and the almoſt ruined State of the Army on the Madras Eſtabliſhment.

On the 20th December I arrived here with the Squadron in this Harbour, and the ſame Day iſſued Orders for preparing the Ships for docking and refitting with all poſſible Expedition, on the 23d I met the Select Committee at their Deſire, and entered with them into Deliberation on the preſent State of the Company's Affairs both on the Coromandel Coaſt and on this Side of India; the Reſult of which your Lordſhip will ſee in N° 12, of this Packet, being a Copy of the Minutes of our Conſultation, at the ſame Time I received from the Preſident, a Copy of the Letter from the Governor General and Council of Bengal to this Preſidency, with the Copy of the Treaty propoſed by the Governor General and Council of Bengal to the Peſhwa and the Maratta Adminiſtration; of which Letter and Treaty I have the Honour to encloſe Copies, N° 13 and 14, for your Lordſhip's Information.

On the 24th I received a Letter deſiring the Aſſiſtance of His Majeſty's Ships Worceſter and Coventry, on an Expedition againſt the Maratta Town and Fort of Arnaul, ſituated on a ſmall Iſland at the Entrance of a River of that Name, which forms the Northern Boundary of Baſſein; a Copy of which Letter, N° 15, I have the Honour to encloſe with this; and I ordered the Worceſter and Coventry on that Service accordingly, on which they are now employed, co-operating with the Company's armed Veſſels, and a Part of General Goddard's Army, under Colonel Parker.

I have taken the Liberty to trouble your Lordſhip with this minute Detail of my Tranſactions with His Majeſty's Squadron under my Command, as well as the moſt eſſential Parts of my Correſpondence with the ſeveral Preſidencies ſince my laſt Addreſs to your Lordſhip, becauſe I think it neceſſary in the preſent Situation of our Affairs all over India, that your Lordſhip ſhould be furniſhed with every poſſible Information.

The Marattas have as yet made no Requiſition on their Part to the Preſidency of Bombay, notwithſtanding the propoſed Treaty has been received Fourteen Days ago at Poona, their Capital, diſtant only Four Days Journey from Bombay; and until ſuch Requiſition is made, this Preſidency is authorized by the Governor General and Council of Bengal, to proſecute the War againſt the Marattas; which they appear to me more diſpoſed to do, than to march the Army under General Goddard into the Dominions of Hyder Ally, to make the Diverſion General Sir Eyre Coote thinks ſo neceſſary for the Preſervation of the Carnatic againſt him, and which indeed they cannot do till a Reconciliation with the Marattas takes place.

I beg Leave to aſſure your Lordſhip that I will loſe no Time in repairing and refitting His Majeſty's Squadron under my Command for Service and that the Force entruſted under my Direction ſhall be employed in the beſt Manner I can for the Defence of the Company's Trade and Settlements in this Country; and I have the Honour to incloſe for your Lordſhip's farther Information, N° 16 and 17 Copies of the lateſt Intelligence I have been able to procure from the Mauritius, by which your Lordſhip will judge of the Naval and Military Force already accumulated at that Place, and the Expectations our Enemies there have of ſtill greater Additions to both.

N° 3.

To Sir Edward Hughes, Knight of the moſt honourable Order of the Bath, Rear Admiral of the Red, and Commander in Chief of His Majeſty's Ships in the Eaſt Indies.

Sir,

1ſt. We were honoured with your Letter of the 26th inſtant; and you may depend on our exerting ourſelves in giving the Squadron under your Command every Supply and Aſſiſtance that our preſent Situation will afford.

2d. The Honourable the Select Committee of Bombay were pleaſed to write us under the 23d September, that the War in which they are engaged with the Marattas requiring the utmoſt Exertion of that Preſidency, and not permitting them to divert their Reſources to any other Object, they were not able to ſend us any further Aſſiſtance after the Diſpatch of the Royal Charlotte; and

therefore

therefore unleſs the Enemy ſhould withdraw from the Attack, or the Government of Madras undertake to furniſh the neceſſary Supplies of Men and Stores for our Defence, they ſhould be under an abſolute Neceſſity of abandoning this Place.

3d. They further informed us, that they had then wrote fully to the Select Committee at Madras on the Subject, and encloſed us a Copy of their Letter. Alſo, that the Select Committee at Madras had recommended to them that the Malabar Powers ſhould be excited to raiſe Commotions, and revolt againſt Hyder's Government; that it would be a good Meaſure ſhould we find the Settlement was to be maintained; otherwiſe it would be only needleſsly expoſing the Nairs to his Reſentment; and that therefore we were to act in this Point according to the Anſwer from the Select Committee at Madras.

4th. In conſequence of the above Orders from the Select Committee of Bombay, we addreſſed a Letter to the Select Committee at Madras, under the 9th ultimo, giving them an Account of the State of the Malabar Country from the Time Hyder Ally conquered it till the preſent Period, with our Sentiments of the Practicability of exciting a Revolt among the Nairs, and their Inclinations to co-operate, ſhould ſuch a Meaſure be adopted. A Copy of our Letters accompanies this for your Obſervation.

We have yet received no Anſwer to the above Letter from the Select Committee at Madras; but by your Squadron have received one under the 13th ultimo, to which we beg Leave to refer you.

In Compliance therefore with the Orders of the Select Committee of Bombay to communicate to you the Situation of our Affairs, on your Arrival we ſhall proceed to lay the ſame before you.

We are, Sir, to inform you, that although we are confined within the Limits of the Diſtricts of this Settlement, and have been from the firſt Commencement of Hoſtilities on the Part of the Nairs, ſubject to Hyder; and ſince, by Hyder's Troops under the Command of an Officer named Sader Cawn; that they have never yet been able to make any material Impreſſion on our Lines; and could the Preſidency of Bombay have afforded us, or could at this preſent Period afford us, the Support of a Battalion or Two of Sepoys, with a Proportion of Europeans, that we ſhould have been enabled to have acted offenſively againſt the Enemy, and to have obliged them to retire. We have little Doubt alſo, that had the State of Affairs on this Coaſt admitted of ſuch Support, that it would have been productive of thoſe Events ſo much wiſhed for by the Preſidency of Madras, as ſeveral of the Malabar Powers are at this Period ripe for a Revolt againſt Hyder's Government, and only wait for the Moment when they ſhall find us in a Situation to ſupport them, or rather indeed to ſupport ourſelves, in the Maintenance of this Settlement.

You, Sir, from the Papers now before you, will perceive that the Two Preſidencies, however much they wiſh to maintain and ſupport this Settlement, doubt the Practicability of it, engaged as they both are in a War with the Marattas and Hyder Ally; and therefore direct, that if driven to the lamentable Neceſſity (for ſuch indeed we muſt term it, all Circumſtances conſidered) to abandon the Place to the Enemy.

Your known Zeal, Sir, for the Intereſt of the Company, from which the National is in no ways diſtinct, has led our Superiors to direct we ſhould conſult and adviſe with you in our preſent Situation: And as your Knowledge of the preſent Deſigns and Intentions, both of the Supreme Council at Bengal and the Preſidency of Madras, as to their Operations and Views in the Proſecution of the preſent War with Hyder Ally and the Marattas, renders you a far better Judge than we can be in what Degree the Intereſt and Honour of the Company may be affected by abandoning this Settlement at this Period; we hope to be favoured with your Advice and Opinion on this important Subject.

We think it incumbent on us to make known to you, that the Eaſt India Company have been in Poſſeſſion of this Settlement ſince the Year 1708, and have now to the Number of 30,000 Inhabitants living under their Protection; all of whom, as well as thoſe Malabar Powers who have afforded us Support in our preſent Troubles, and who have proved themſelves ſtaunch in the Intereſt of the Company, and have even rejected all Overtures made them by Hyder, look up to the Company for Protection, and whoſe Ruin muſt be complete if ever this Settlement falls under Hyder's Government. Although it is our moſt earneſt Deſire to put in Execution the Wiſhes of the Preſidency of Bombay in reſpect to this Settlement, as far as we can judge of them, yet we ſhould feel the moſt ſenſible Concern, if by any Change in the preſent political Syſtem of Affairs, of which we are unacquainted, the Defence and Protection of this Settlement might be conſidered of Importance; which conſequently makes us ſo deſirous of obtaining your Advice and Opinion on the Subject.

After this Statement of our Situation, it is neceſſary to ſay ſomething as to the preſent Strength of the Enemy now acting againſt us; that you, Sir, may be able to form a better Judgment what Meaſures are neceſſary to be taken, ſhould you adviſe and recommend the Settlement being maintained until the further Pleaſure of the different Preſidencies can be known, or until your Squadrons return to Madras, ſhould it then be judged neceſſary to give it up. The Troops under Sader Cawn, Hyder Ally's Officer, from the beſt Information we can obtain, conſiſt now only of about 3,000 Sepoys, and about 30 Pieces of Cannon; the Nairs, Moplas, and Tivas with him, are ſuppoſed to be about 6,000 Men; but we have Occaſion to believe, that ſince your Attack upon Callicut, and Appearance here, that he has drawn off about 2,000 Men. Major Cotgrave, who is in Command of our Troops, and who has had a long Experience of the Enemy's Condition and Strength,

Strength, is well convinced, that they muſt fly before us the Moment we can act on the Offenſive; and would conſider himſelf in an ample Situation ſo to do, had he an Addition to his preſent Force of 1,000 Sepoys, or Half the Number of European Troops. If therefore, Sir, you ſhould be of Opinion that it is political and adviſable, engaged as the Company at preſent are in a War with Hyder, to oblige his Troops to retire from before this Place, you will now be able to judge what Aſſiſtance it would be neceſſary to afford from His Majeſty's Squadron now under your Command. Major Cotgrave is of Opinion the Service would be very ſoon effected, and attended with every favourable Conſequence we could wiſh or expect from it. As to the Supplies of Stores, we ſhall be able to hold out for ſome Months to come, after the receiving the Powder you have on board the Squadron; and in reſpect to the Article of Rice, as we hope to collect from the Ships under your Convoy between Two and Three thouſand Bags, we ſhall in this Particular alſo be able to ſupply our Garriſon until ſome of the Bengal Ships may appear.

We have the Honour to be,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient,
and moſt humble Servants,

Tellicherry,
28th November 1780.

R[t] Church,
Sam[l] Stedman,
M. Firth.

(Copy) Edward Hughes.

N° 4.

Gentlemen,

I have received your Letter of the 28th of this Month, in which after your promiſed Aſſiſtance of a Supply of every Thing you can afford to His Majeſty's Squadron under my Command, you are pleaſed to inform me, that the Select Committee of Bombay, to which you are ſubordinate, had been pleaſed to write you under Date the 23d September laſt, "that the War in which they were "engaged with the Marattas requiring the utmoſt Exertion of that Preſidency, and not per-"mitting them to divert their Reſources to any other Object, they were not able to ſend any "farther Aſſiſtance after the Diſpatch of the Ship Royal Charlotte, and therefore, unleſs the Ene-"my ſhould withdraw from the Attack, or the Government of Madras undertake to furniſh the "neceſſary Supplies of Men and Stores for your Defence, they ſhould be under the abſolute Ne-"ceſſity of abandoning the Place:" And in the Third Paragraph of your ſaid Letter, you are pleaſed to inform me of your further Inſtructions from the Preſidency of Bombay, under the ſame Date, ſignifying that the Preſidency of Madras had recommended it as an eligible Meaſure to excite the Malabar Powers to raiſe Commotions and revolt againſt Hyder's Government, if you found the Settlement in a Condition to be defended, otherwiſe it would be only unneceſſarily expoſing the Nairs to his Reſentment; and that therefore you were to act in that Point according to the Anſwer from the Select Committee of Madras. In your Fourth Paragraph, you are pleaſed to inform me, that you had written to the Preſidency of Madras, giving them a State of the Malabar Country, from the Time Hyder Ally conquered it to the preſent Period, with your Sentiments of the Practicability of exciting a Revolt amongſt the Nairs, and their Inclinations to co-operate with you; to which you have as yet received no Anſwer: And you then proceed, in Compliance as you ſay with the Orders of the Select Committee of Bombay, to communicate to me the State of your Affairs on my Arrival here, and to conſult and adviſe with me under that Situation, as my Knowledge of the Deſigns and Intentions of the Supreme Council of Bengal and the Preſidency of Madras, as to their Operations and Views in the Proſecution of the preſent War with Hyder Ally and the Marattas, renders me a far better Judge than you can be, in what Degree the Intereſt and Honour of the Company may be affected by abandoning your Settlement at this Period, and that you hope to be favoured with my Advice and Opinion on the important Occaſion. In the ſubſequent Paragraphs, you have ſtated, with a due Senſe of Honour and Humanity, the Situation of 30,000 Inhabitants living under the Company's Protection in your Settlement, all of whom, as well as thoſe Malabar Powers who have afforded you Support in your preſent Troubles, and who have proved themſelves ſtaunch in the Company's Intereſt, and have even rejected all Overtures made to them by Hyder Ally, look up to the Company for Protection, and whoſe Ruin muſt be complete if ever your Settlement falls into Hyder's Hands.

You then proceed to give me a Statement of the Force of the Enemy employed againſt you, and of the Means which you think would be ſufficient to enable you to act, not only defenſively but offenſively againſt Hyder Ally and the Nairs.

Having deliberately conſidered every Matter contained in your Letter, as well as the Inſtructions you have received from the Preſidency of Bombay, as the Letter of the 13th of laſt Month from the Preſidency of Fort Saint George, and alſo the State and Condition of the Settlement and its Inhabitants as you have repreſented it; and having alſo maturely weighed the great Difference which has ariſen in the State of the Company's Affairs, both as to War and Politics, ſince the Date of your laſt Inſtructions from Bombay, and the Letter from Fort Saint George; I am clearly of Opinion that you ought not to evacuate the Settlement until you have farther Orders from

from Bombay; and to enable you to hold out againſt the Enemy until ſuch farther Orders arrive, I will order you a Supply of ſuch a Proportion of Ammunition, Military Stores, and Proviſions, as can be ſpared from the Squadron under my Command, and immediately diſpatch Letters to the Preſidencies of Bombay and Fort Saint George; to urge them to furniſh you with ample Succours; and if you ſtand in Need of Money for the immediate Service, I will direct a Supply to be furniſhed you for your Bills on the Preſidency of Bombay.

I am,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
(Copy) Edw[d] Hughes.

Superb, in Tellicherry Road,
the 29th November, 1780.

Richard Church, Eſquire,
Chief and Council of Tellicherry.

N° 6.

At a Council of War held in Tellichery, 28th November 1780.

PRESENT,

Major John Cotgrave,
Captain David Muirhead,
Captain William Seward,
Acting Captain, Thomas Smith,
Lieutenant Peter Campbell.

Major John Cotgrave, commanding Officer of the Forces, lays before the Council a Letter which he this Day received from the Select Committee of Madras; wherein he is ordered to return to the Coaſt of Coromandel with the Madras Troops. He alſo acquaints the Council of an Offer made this Day by Sir Edw[d] Hughes, K. B. and Commander in Chief of His Majeſty's Ships in the Eaſt Indies, viz. That for the Preſervation of the Honourable Company's Settlement of Tellicherry he will exert his utmoſt, and offers to land from Eight hundred to One thouſand Men from the Squadron under his Command, for the Space of Two or Three Days, if Major Cotgrave thought, with their Aſſiſtance, he could diſpoſſeſs the Enemy of their Poſts and drive them away.

The Opinion of the Council is, that this Service could not be effected in ſo ſhort a Time: And even was it poſſible to do it, the Poſts could not be maintained, having ſo few Troops in this Garriſon, nor could the Works be deſtroyed without a vaſt deal of Labour and Time.

The Admiral further ſaid, for the Honour of the Britiſh Nation, he thought it of the utmoſt Importance to defend this Settlement to the laſt Extremity; and if the Major thought he could do it in One Month, with the Aſſiſtance of One hundred Men from the Squadron, he would land them, and immediately on his Arrival at Bombay repreſent to the Board, and inſiſt on their ſending ſo ſtrong a Reinforcement to put its Safety beyond Doubt. And the Admiral ſtill further added, from the Alteration in the Company's Affairs ſince the Date of the Letter from the Select Committee to Major Cotgrave, he was certain it would be more to the Advantage of our Honourable Maſters, that Major Cotgrave, with the Madras Troops under his Command, ſhould remain and defend Tellicherry in Preference to returning to the Coaſt of Coromandel, agreeable to Orders received.

The Opinion of the Council is, that with the Aſſiſtance of Two hundred Men (Europeans) Seven hundred Barrels of Gunpowder, Four hundred Coolies (able bodied Men) to work daily, a Plenty of Proviſion, and Eight or Ten Twelve Pounder Guns, the Settlement may be defended againſt the preſent Enemy.

John Cotgrave,
D. Muirhead, Capt[n]
W[m] Seward, Capt[n]
T. Smith, Act[g] Capt[n]
P. Campbell, L[t].

(Copy)
Edw[d] Hughes.

N° 7.

Gentlemen,

I have received the Pleaſure of your Letter of Yeſterday, and applaud your Reſolution of maintaining your Settlement, and am happy that it has been in my Power to contribute ſuch Aſſiſtance as you and Major Cotgrave judge will be adequate to your Defence until a Reinforcement from Bombay can arrive.

The Detachment of Marines conſiſting of One Captain, Four Lieutenants, and One hundred and Eight

Eight Rank and File, will be landed this Afternoon about 4 o'Clock; and I beg Leave to recommend both the Officers and Men to your particular Attention and Kindneſs.

There are 37,000 Star Pagodas on Board the Superb, the Whole or any Part of which you may have for the Public Service for your Bills drawn on your Preſidency; and you will be pleaſed to ſend a proper Perſon on board the Superb to receive it.

With my Letter of this Date to Major Cotgrave, I have ſent a Copy of my Order to Captain O'Farrel, who commands the Detachment of Marines, with a Requeſt that he would communicate it to you for your Information.

So ſoon as my Diſpatches for Anjengo and Bombay are ready, I will ſend them to you that you may diſpatch the Pattamar Boat with them.

I am,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient,
humble Servant,
Edw[d] Hughes.

Superb, in
Tellicherry Road,
the 4th December 1780.

(Copy) Edw[d] Hughes.

Rich[d] Church, Eſq;
Chief, and Factors of Tellicherry.

N° 8.

To Sir Edward Hughes, Knight of the moſt Honourable Order of the Bath, Rear Admiral of the Red, and Commander in Chief of His Majeſty's Ships in the Eaſt Indies.

Sir,

We have been honoured with your Letter of Yeſterday's Date, and One of this Morning, incloſing Copy of the Orders you have given to the Ponſborne and Contractor.

It is with particular Satisfaction we have received your Approbation of our maintaining this Settlement till further Orders; and we hope with the Aſſiſtance you have been pleaſed to afford us, to be able to preſerve it.

We are much obliged to you, Sir, for your Offer of Money, and in conſequence have received of Arthur Cuthbert, Eſq; the Sum of 22,000 Star Pagodas, for which we have given him Bills on the Preſidency.

Major Cotgrave has communicated to us Copy of your Order to Captain O'Farrell, and you may be aſſured that every Attention and Kindneſs in our Power ſhall be ſhewn to the Officers and Men.

We have directed Captains Will[m] Robinſon and Joſeph Alderſon, of the Drake and Eagle Cruizers, to obey your Orders.

We wiſh you a ſpeedy Paſſage to Bombay, and Succeſs in your Operations.

We have the Honor to be,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient, and moſt
humble Servants,
R[d] Church,
Sam[l] Stedman,
M. Firth.

Tellicherry,
5th December 1780.

(Copy) Edw[d] Hughes.

N° 5.

Select Committee.

To Sir Edward Hughes, Knight of the moſt Honourable Order of the Bath, Rear Admiral of the Red, and Commander in Chief of His Majeſty's Ships in the Eaſt Indies.

Sir.

The Coventry now proceeding to join the Squadron, and Captain Mitchell having made an Offer of his Services on the Paſſage, we have requeſted him to do his utmoſt to take or deſtroy any Veſſels he may meet with belonging to Hyder Ally or the Marattas, with both which Powers the Company are now at War, and to diſtreſs the common Enemy by every Means in his Power; which we flattter ourſelves will meet with your Approbation.

We have alſo recommended to him to touch at Tellicherry, and give the Garriſon every Support and Countenance in his Power during his Continuance there. We are quite ignorant of the State of Affairs there, and in a State of Anxiety, not having any Accounts from thence later than the 19th of Auguſt, in conſequence of which we have already addreſſed you in Duplicate, under the 23d September.

General Goddard is juſt arrived before Baſſein, and Operations will ſoon be commenced againſt that Place. We have a ſtrong Body of Forces near the Foot of the Ghauts which we hope will

will prevent the Enemy from venturing into the low Country, or interrupting the Siege of Baſſein.

We hope this will meet you on the Coaſt of Malabar, and that we ſhall ſhortly have the Pleaſure of ſeeing you at Bombay. In the mean Time we remain, with the higheſt Eſteem and Reſpect,

Sir,

Your moſt obedient humble Servants,

Bombay Caſtle,
13th November, 1780.

(Copy) Edw[d] Hughes.

Will[m] Hornby,
D. Draper,
N. Stackhouſe.

APPENDIX, N° 339.

Extract of Bombay Select Conſultations, the 12th December 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable William Hornby, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor,
Daniel Draper,
Nathaniel Stackhouſe, } Eſquires.

Preſident's Plan of Operations propoſed by him and before the Committee.

THE Preſident lays before us the following Plan of Meaſures he would propoſe to be now purſued in conſequence of the Reduction of Baſſein; and the ſame being deliberately conſidered is entirely approved, and muſt be immediately tranſmitted to the General, with a ſtrong Recommendation from us immediately to purſue the Meaſures therein propoſed, which we flatter ourſelves will coincide with his Sentiments.

The Surrender of Baſſein makes it unneceſſary to ſend the large Supply of Gunpowder requeſted by General Goddard in his Letter of the 10th, and which we could but ill afford to ſpare.

The Preſident's Plan of Operations he propoſes to be purſued in conſequence of the Reduction of Baſſein.

The Reduction of Baſſein being now happily accompliſhed, I think it will be proper that the General ſhould be recommended immediately to acquaint the Poona Miniſtry, that if they are convinced of the Superiority of our Arms, and are deſirous of peace on equitable and moderate Terms, he is ſtill ready to enter into Treaty with them on this Subject; at the ſame Time ſupporting the Offer with ſuch Motions of his Army as may ſeem moſt likely to enforce the Acceptance of it, keeping ſtill in Mind the main Object of the Campaign, the complete Reduction of the Concan. It is not improbable that Nana may accept the Offer of a Treaty with a View to gain Time; this can only be known by the Event, and need give him no Advantage. We ought, I think, to be perſuaded of his Sincerity, and without delaying the Buſineſs we have to accompliſh, encourage as much as poſſible the Idea of the certain and inevitable Concluſion of Peace; for a Perſuaſion of this Sort would prove one of the moſt powerful Motives with all the Killedars in this Country to make their Terms, and would be an Encouragement to the Inhabitants to return, and would thus contribute to ſettle the Country more ſpeedily and advantageouſly under our Government than it can otherways be done; ſo that whether Nana meant Peace, or only Procraſtination, we ſhould draw our Advantage from his accepting the Offer of a Treaty The General ought, I think, to move his Army immediately to the South Eaſt, without remaining at Baſſein now it is taken, becauſe great Promptitude in his Motions would tend to confound the Enemy and improve the Impreſſion made by the Fall of Baſſein; he need not however be in too great a Hurry, but ſhould, I think, ſhew himſelf before Mowlee, Byramgur, Shetgur, and all the Way along the Foot of the Ghauts to the Southward, where there are a Line of Forts juſt below the Ghauts, and of very great Importance to the Tranquillity of the Country, ſummoning them to ſurrender, but not ſuffering himſelf to be detained by ſuch as are abſolutely inacceſſible, and ſeem determined on Reſiſtance; but of the Firſt that could be taken after ſlighting the Summons, a ſevere Example ſhould be made; as after the Reduction of Baſſein, which may be conſidered as the Capital, Reſiſtance in the other Places of leſs Note ought not to be held juſtifiable, and if theſe little Places are encouraged by an ill-timed Lenity to hold out, we may probably find our Conqueſt of Baſſein very unprofitable to us for a conſiderable Time to come. While the General is advancing he will be ſuppoſed ſtill to have an Expedition in view to Poona, and ſo long as this Idea laſts we ſhall have Leiſure for effecting our real Purpoſe of compleating the Reduction of this Country, as the Enemy will hardly deſcend the Ghauts with their

main Army, but will probably reſerve it for what they will think a Purpoſe of infinitely greater Conſequence, the Defence of the Capital, and expect to meet us with Advantages in the Decan far ſuperior to any they can hope for below the Ghauts.

Bombay,
12th December 1780.

William Hornby.

Enclosure in Sir Edward Hughes's Packet to Lord Hillsborough, Secretary of State.

N° 12.

Bombay Caſtle, 23d December 1780.

At a Select Committee; PRESENT,
The Honourable William Hornby, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor,
Rear Admiral Sir Edward Hughes, K. B.
Daniel Draper, Eſquire,
Brigadier General Thomas Goddard,
Nathaniel Stackhouſe, Eſquire.

The Admiral now meeting the Committee in conſequence of our Deſire ſignified to him Yeſterday by the Secretary, the State of the Company's Affairs, ſo far as they can be affected by our Reſolutions, is taken under our moſt attentive Conſideration, the ſeveral neceſſary Papers having been previouſly read.

The Admiral declares it to be his Opinion, that the Safety and Preſervation of the Company's Settlements on the Coaſt of Coromandel, and the Army under Sir Eyre Coote, depend on this Preſidency being able to make ſome vigorous Effort againſt the Poſſeſſions of Hyder Ally on this Coaſt; and urges in ſtrong Terms the Neceſſity of a ſpeedy Peace with the Marattas, to enable us to act with our whole Force againſt Hyder, who now threatens Deſtruction to the Carnatic and even Fort Saint George itſelf, if aided by a Body of French which there now appears a great Probability may be introduced into the Country.

The Select Committee then proceeded, aſſiſted by the Admiral and the General, to conſider the ſeveral important Matters before them, and the Sentiments delivered by the Admiral, in which they allow there is great Weight; and having duly weighed every Circumſtance, the following is the Reſult of their Deliberation, in which the Admiral and General concur.

That in the unhappy Situation to which Affairs at Madras are now reduced, a Peace with the Marattas is moſt ardently to be wiſhed for, that we may have it in our Power to make a vigorous Attack againſt the Poſſeſſions of Hyder Ally on this Coaſt; but at the ſame Time it muſt be admitted as an abſolute Impoſſibility that we can make any effectual Diverſion in their Favour until the Maratta War is brought to ſome Concluſion, as this Preſidency might ſoon be reduced to as bad a Situation as Madras; or the Marattas united with Hyder might complete the Ruin of that Preſidency were we ſo far to weaken our Army as to diſable it from acting with Vigour againſt them, or to relieve them from further Apprehenſions of the Effects they have experienced of our Force.

A Purſuit of the Maratta War with all poſſible Vigour, as recommended by the Honourable the Governor General and Council, promiſes to promote a ſpeedy Accommodation ſooner than any other Plan of Conduct, till when it will not be in our Power to act with Vigour or Effect againſt Hyder; and indeed our own Safety as well as the general Safety of the Company's Poſſeſſions abſolutely requires that we ſhould either find Employment in this Quarter for the Marattas, or bring them to Terms of Accommodation.

In theſe Circumſtances therefore it would be in the higheſt Degree imprudent and impolitic, were we by any Diviſion of our Troops to diſable ourſelves from purſuing the Line of Conduct ſo neceſſary for the general Safety.

Whilſt the Neceſſity of our co operating with the Preſidency of Madras againſt Hyder is ſo obvious and apparent, we can eaſily conceive how much it will add to their Diſtreſs and Diſappointment, if inſtead of giving our Aſſiſtance, we abandoned the only Place of Strength we poſſeſs in his Dominions, the Attack whereof at this Time occupies a Part of his Force, which in that Caſe might be added to the Numbers of the Enemy now in the Field againſt them: We are therefore very earneſt in our Wiſhes to maintain Tellicherry, at leaſt until we can form a better Judgment what Probability there is of the Marattas accepting the proffered Terms, or of the War being otherwiſe brought to a Concluſion. We are ſtrengthened in this Diſpoſition not only by the Reaſons which militate againſt withdrawing the Settlement at this particular Time, but alſo by the Difficulties we can foreſee would ariſe even in the Execution of an Attempt to evacuate the Place, which no Doubt would be oppoſed by the auxiliary Nairs, as well as the numerous Inhabitants, whoſe Safety is involved with our Continuance there; ſo that we think the Garriſon could not be withdrawn with Safety until rendered ſufficiently ſtrong firſt to diſlodge the Enemy: This Meaſure may be taken under Conſideration on the Return of the Fleet, when we ſhall be better able to judge what Probability there is of our Wiſhes for Peace being accompliſhed.

On conſulting with the General reſpecting the State of the Forces, we are of Opinion we can furniſh a defenſive Garriſon for Tellicherry, without diſabling him from an active Proſecution of the War againſt the Marattas; and Two Battalions of Sepoys being judged fully ſufficient for that Purpoſe, and to relieve the Madras Sepoys now there, which is abſolutely neceſſary, and likewiſe Captain Seward's, as recommended by the Reſident and Factors; Reſolved accordingly, That Two complete Battalions be ſent down by an early Opportunity, which we ſhall take care to provide; and that Major Cotgrave with the Madras Sepoys be returned to Anjengo; on the Arrival of the Troops from Bombay, Captain Seward's Battalion may be detained for a further Time if judged neceſſary: We are inclined to think it may not be impracticable before the Madras Detachment is returned to make an Effort with Succeſs, to diſlodge the Enemy from their Works.

If it ſhould be found neceſſary, in order to furniſh the Force for Tellicherry, a Part of the Sepoys may be drafted from the Northward, the Importance of defending our Poſſeſſions there being leſſened by the Probability of their being reſtored to the Marattas, and the moſt conſiderable Part of the Revenues for this Seaſon will ſoon be collected.

We can only in general recommend to General Goddard to purſue his Operations againſt the Marattas with all poſſible Vigour, and to the utmoſt Extent he may find practicable with the Force under his Command, and we think nothing would tend more to the ſpeedy Accompliſhment of a Peace, than ſome deciſive Advantage gained over the Enemy in the Field.

The firſt immediate Object of his Operations being the Reduction of Arnaul, and the General repreſenting that His Majeſty's Ships and Seamen might be of great Uſe in the Undertaking, the Committee at his Inſtance now make a Requeſt to the Admiral to ſpare Two Ships for this Service. The Admiral on their Requiſition readily agrees to ſpare the Worceſter and Coventry, upon its being repreſented to him, that the Service will not in all Probability detain them more than Seven or Eight Days, and that the Diſtance is ſo ſmall they may be recalled in 24 Hours, ſhould it be found neceſſary.

The neceſſary Orders muſt be given to the Commander of the Company's Ships now on the Arnaul Station.

(Copy) Edw[d] Hughes.

APPENDIX, N° 340.

Encloſure in Sir Edward Hughes's Packet to Lord Hillſborough, Secretary of State.

N° 15.

Select Committee.

To Sir Edward Hughes, Knight of the Bath, Rear Admiral of the Red, and Commander in Chief of His Majeſty's Ships in the Eaſt Indies.

Sir,

IT being judged abſolutely neceſſary to proſecute the War againſt the Marattas with all poſſible Vigour, in order to bring them to Terms of Accommodation; and the Reduction of the Fort of Arnaul being a material Object in which the Commander in Chief has repreſented, that the Aſſiſtance of His Majeſty's Ships might be of eſſential Service; we were induced by this Conſideration, and our Experience of your Zeal for the Company's Intereſt, to requeſt, when we had the Honour to meet you this Morning, that you would ſpare Two of His Majeſty's Ships to cooperate with the Company's Forces and Veſſels in this Undertaking, which in all Probability will not detain them more than Seven or Eight Days, and the Diſtance is ſo ſmall, that they may be recalled within 24 Hours ſhould you find it neceſſary.

Arnaul is a Fort ſituated upon a ſmall Iſland at the Entrance of a River of that Name, which forms the Northern Boundary of the Iſland of Baſſein, from which Place it is only diſtant about Twelve Miles. The Poſſeſſion of that Place is therefore highly neceſſary to ſecure Baſſein from Interruption, whilſt the Company's Troops may be employed in a more diſtant Quarter; nor will it in that Caſe be prudent to leave in the Hands of the Enemy a Place of Strength immediately adjoining the Company's Poſſeſſions, and without which the Conqueſt of Baſſein is not complete.

We thank you for the Readineſs with which you conſented to ſpare the Worceſter and Coventry for this Service, which we flatter ourſelves will with their Aſſiſtance be effected without any material Difficulty. We ſhall give Inſtructions to Commodore Neſbitt, now commanding the Company's Ships on that Station, to communicate to the commanding Officer of His Majeſty's Ships every Information in his Power that may be uſeful in the Execution of this Service, and to obey all

all ſuch Orders as may be given him. We alſo beg Leave to requeſt, that you will give Inſtructions to the Naval Officers to co-operate with General Goddard, who on his Part will exert every Effort in his Power in concert with them, to enſure Succeſs to this Enterprize. We have the Honour to be, with the greateſt Reſpect and Eſteem,

Bombay Caſtle,
23d December 1780.

Sir,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servants,
Wm Hornby,
D. Draper,
N. Stackhouſe.

(Copy) Edward Hughes.

APPENDIX, N° 341.

Extract of Bombay Select Conſultations, the 11th February 1781.

PRESENT,

The Honourable William Hornby, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor,
Daniel Draper, Eſquire, and Nathaniel Stackhouſe, Eſquire.

THE Preſident now lays before us an Extract of a Letter he wrote to the General under the 8th Inſtant; and as we intirely concur with him in the Propriety of what he has therein ſuggeſted; Ordered, That it be entered after this Conſultation, and another Copy immediately tranſmitted to the General, leſt any Accident ſhould have happened to the Original.

Preſident, the Honourable William Hornby, Eſquire, Letter from him to General Goddard approved.

Extract of a Letter from the Preſident to General Goddard.

With reſpect to your going to Poona, I do not know what Effect it may have in bringing the Marattas to Terms, or of accepting the Propoſals made to them by the Governor General and Council of Calcutta, through Moodajee Bouncello; but I think and recommend that you ſhould take Raja Matchee, as it may be very uſeful in many Reſpects, both for lodging your Proviſions, &c. and as a Place to which you may return, ſhould it be found neceſſary; indeed I think it would be riſking too much the going with your Army too far into the Decan in the preſent Poſture of Affairs with Enemies on all Sides; for ſhould the French appear at this Place, we have no Force here to oppoſe them, ſhould any unforeſeen Accident happen to your Army, and the Squadron have left this Place; all which are Matters of ſuch Conſequence, that ſhould not be forgot by you, nor do I think the appearing at or before Poona will be of any Conſequence; as it is an open Town, they will certainly abandon it, and fly to ſome of their ſtrong Holds or Forts; and I underſtand that all the Merchants and People of Conſequence with their Property have been for ſome Time removed.

8th February 1781.

To the Honourable the Secret Committee of the Honourable the Court of Directors of the United Company of Merchants of England trading to the Eaſt Indies.

Honourable Gentlemen,

1. We addreſſed you laſt in Duplicate, under the 11th of January, via Buſſorah; and Mr. Latouch has acquainted us, that he tranſmitted you another Copy: We now ſend a further Tranſcript.

2. We have now to adviſe, that the Period limited by the Governor General and Council for the Acceptance of the Terms offered to the Poona Durbar, expired the 9th of this Month, without their having declared their Acceptance of them; and conſequently they remain no longer in force. General Goddard, after the Reduction of Baſſein and Arnaul, marched to the Gauts, forced the Enemy's Poſt, and gained Poſſeſſion of the Paſs of Bhore Gaut: Soon after a Maratta Agent came into Camp, but without any Powers or Credentials from the Miniſter himſelf, and expreſſed in general Terms the Deſire of the Marattas for Peace; and aſked what Conditions we expected. In the firſt and every Stage of this Intercourſe (for it did not amount to a Negociation) the Maratta profeſſed entire Ignorance of the Terms offered by the Governor General and Council, through the Medium of

of the Rajah of Berar; on which Account, and to convince them of our pacific Diſpoſition, we deſired the General to ſend a Copy of the Articles directly to the Miniſters; having no Doubt at the ſame Time, but that he was perfectly acquainted with the Particulars. The General did accordingly tranſmit them, with a Letter of the moſt friendly Profeſſions, and received a Reply containing a poſitive Refuſal to accede to the offered Terms; which, he ſays, were not approved by the Rajah of Berar, who had for that Reaſon ſent them back to the Governor General and Council: And the Miniſter alſo ſays, that Conditions for another Power muſt be included in whatever Treaty may be made with the Marattas; by which we underſtood he meant Hyder Ally. It is to be obſerved, the Miniſter ſent to the General the firſt Advice we received of the Arrival of the French Fleet on the Coaſt of Coromandel, which muſt have reached the Maratta Camp after the firſt Overture had been made, and probably influenced him in his ſubſequent Determination. As we have thus loſt all immediate Proſpect of a Peace with the Marattas; and every Object we had propoſed to acquire in the Courſe of the War being accompliſhed, we have taken Meaſures, in concert with General Goddard, to confine our future Operations to a mere Plan of Defence, and the Security and Preſervation of our preſent Acquiſitions; to reduce as much as poſſible the enormous Charges attending the Army, and to yield what Aſſiſtance we can to the Preſidency of Fort Saint George: The General will accordingly make a ſuitable Diſpoſition to protect and cover our Poſſeſſions, and for the Defence of Bombay in caſe of Neceſſity; and we are preparing to ſend back all the Fort Saint George Troops ſerving on this Coaſt, by which our Military Charges will be greatly reduced, and the Army under General Coote ſtrengthened with a very conſiderable Reinforcement. The Meaſure, which we have taken for the general Safety of our Poſſeſſions, makes it doubly neceſſary that you ſhould comply with our repeated Requeſts for a Supply of European Recruits. We are concerned to be at the ſame Time under a Neceſſity of putting our former Reſolution into Execution, of withdrawing from Tellicherry, as fully explained in our laſt Letter, which will be done as ſoon as Shipping can be prepared for tranſporting the Fort Saint George Troops, in which we have requeſted the Aſſiſtance of the Admiral.

We have received Advice from the Select Committee at Fort Saint George, and have ſeen other authentic Accounts, of a French Squadron which appeared off that Place on the 25th, 26th, and 27th of January, conſiſting of

L'Orient,	74	Guns,	800 Men.
Brilliant,	64	—	700
Severé,	64	—	700
Bizarre,	64	—	700
Ajax,	64	—	700
Flamand,	50	—	700
Conſolante,	50	—	400
Subtile,	20	—	200
Expedition.	12	—	80

and commanded by Chevalier D'Orves. The Commander of a Country Veſſel which was taken and ranſomed, and who was on board the French Admiral, gives an Account, that there did not appear to be any conſiderable Number of Military on board, and they have no Tranſports. By a private Letter from Fort Saint George, dated 1ſt of February, we find they proceeded to the South, without making any Attempt on the Five Indiamen then in the Road, with a Number of Veſſels laden with Grain and Proviſions; the deſtroying of which might have been eaſily accompliſhed, and would have been ſeverely felt. They arrived at Pondicherry the 29th of January; but it is ſuppoſed they have neither a Stock of Proviſions, nor can procure Supply ſufficient to enable them to continue long upon the Coaſt of Coromandel. It is ſaid the Arrival of the French Fleet has not prevented General Coote from purſuing his Operations: The General has retaken Carangoly, and the Enemy withdrawn the Troops, with which for many Weeks they have been beſieging Vellore, Permacoil, and Wandewaſh. Hyder Ally was alſo employed in moving his heavy Cannon and Stores from Arcot; but it ſeemed to be the general Opinion, he will not withdraw his Army before he has hazarded a Battle.

The Fleet under Admiral Hughes will ſail for the Coaſt of Coromandel about the 20th of next Month.

We are with great Reſpect,
Honourable Gentlemen,
Your moſt faithful Servants,
Wm Hornby,
D. Draper,
N. Stackhouſe.

Bombay Caſtle,
31ſt March 1781.

APPENDIX, N° 342.

Extract of Bombay Secret Conſultations, the 15th February 1781.

RECEIVED the following Letter from General Goddard.

Gentlemen,

I beg Leave to make you acquainted with a Circumſtance that has occurred, which though of the moſt important Nature, and on a Subject at preſent the moſt intereſting to us of all others, I find it impoſſible to form any certain Judgment of what may be the probable Reſult, or how far it may be conſidered as favourable to our Views. I ſhall however proceed without further Preface to make you acquainted with the Particulars. Goddard General, Letter from

Yeſterday, the 12th Inſtant, a Man arrived from the Enemy's Camp, ſent, as he previouſly intimated to me, from the Maratta Miniſter. His Name is Runſoor Senoy; and I underſtand that he was many Years ago employed by the Poona Government to tranſact their Affairs with the Preſidency of Bombay, where he reſided a long Time in the Character of their Vackeel. Upon admitting him to a Conference, I found that the Letter he had brought was not from Nana Furneſſe himſelf, but from Byroo Pundit, a Perſon who Runſoor informed me, and indeed I had heard myſelf from other Authorities, was a good deal in the Miniſter's Confidence. I expreſſed my Surprize that he ſhould have neglected to provide himſelf with the Credentials of his being really employed by Nana, and without which I told him it was improper for me to enter into any Converſation with him. He made many Apologies for the Neglect, principally founded upon the Doubts the Miniſter pretended to entertain of the friendly Diſpoſition of the Engliſh towards him; and added ſuch ſtrong verbal Aſſurances of the ſincere Intentions of the latter, that though not convinced by his Arguments, I thought it moſt expedient for the Public Good to acquieſce in his Propoſal of being heard at this Time, and give this Proof of my Readineſs to concur in any proper Meaſures for terminating the Difference now ſubſiſting, rather than by too nice a Regard to ceremonious Forms, throw any Obſtacle in the Way of a Reconciliation that was ſo much the Object of our Deſire and Intereſt.

The Letter from Byroo Punt was in general Terms acquainting me with the earneſt Deſire of the Miniſter to conclude a Peace; and his having diſpatched Runſoor Senoy to converſe with me upon certain Points, to which if my Anſwer proved favourable, he would immediately ſend an Ambaſſador to me with full Powers from the Sircar to conclude a Treaty.

Runſoor began by declaring on the Part of Nana his ſincere and friendly Intentions towards the Engliſh, and his Deſire of immediately entering into an Alliance with them. He did not condeſcend upon any particular or ſpecific Conditions for effecting this Alliance, but affected to conſider it as a Point that might be attained without any Difficulty, if both Parties were but ſincere in their Deſire of accompliſhing it. On this Head I thought it ſufficient on my Part to make the ſame general Aſſurances which the Miniſter had communicated to me through him, and he ſeemed to be perfectly ſatisfied with them.

The other Point, and that on which he laid the greateſt Streſs, related to Hyder Ally; here he ſaid the Miniſter found himſelf a good deal embarraſſed; he had lately received Letters from Sir Eyre Coote, propoſing to him to conclude a Peace with the Engliſh, and unite his Forces with theirs againſt Hyder. He affirmed on this Head, that however willing he was to conſider Hyder Ally an Enemy to the Maratta State, which he had always proved himſelf, and at this Time was in Poſſeſſion of a Country belonging to the Sircar, and yielding a Revenue of Sixty Lacks of Rupees, it was impoſſible for the Miniſter to commence Hoſtilities againſt him immediately, on Account of Engagements they had lately formed together; that he therefore propoſed to write to Hyder, acquainting him with the Arrival of the Engliſh Army at the Top of the Gauts; that he had thought it expedient to enter into an Alliance of Friendſhip with them, in which he intended that Hyder alſo ſhould be included; and the Reſult of this Plan, he added, would be, that as Hyder's Anſwer would furniſh him with a ſufficient Pretext for breaking with him, the united Arms of the Engliſh and Marattas ſhould take the Field immediately after the Rains, and march into his Country. The Reaſon he gave for delaying the Operations till that Period was, that before an Anſwer could be received to the Letter he now propoſed writing, the Seaſon of Action would be nearly over, and the Rains at Hand, which muſt render it impoſſible for an Army to keep the Field. He further added, that even admitting it was in every other Reſpect convenient for him to break with Hyder and enter upon Action immediately, the Seaſon is already too far ſpent to enable us to make any conſiderable Progreſs. Runſoor concluded this Subject with declaring, that it was not the Intention of Nana to defer the Concluſion of the Treaty betwixt the Engliſh and the Maratta State, which he wiſhed ſhould be executed immediately, and that what related to Hyder ſhould remain ſecret in a ſeparate private Treaty; beſides which, if any Doubts were entertained of the Sircar's Sincerity, he offered to deliver up to the Engliſh a Man of the firſt Conſequence as a Hoſtage, in which Caſe he alſo would expect the ſame.

Having maturely conſidered the important Objects to which this Propoſal relative to Hyder muſt lead, and the neceſſary Attention it deſerved in the preſent State of our Affairs, I expreſſed

in general Terms my Satisfaction with the Sentiments thus communicated to me by the Miniſter, and the mutual Advantages which muſt accrue from the Proſecution of the Plan he had laid down. At the ſame Time I thought it prudent to avoid entering more particularly into the Subject, by pointing out any Mode of Attack, either with reſpect to Time or Place, or indeed by propoſing any Conditions of mutual Benefit as the Baſis of our Compact againſt Hyder. Theſe Points I conceived could only be diſcuſſed with any Propriety when a public Vackeel ſhould arrive; when it appeared that any reaſonable Dependance could be placed upon the Sincerity of the Maratta Government, and when your Sentiments ſhould be tranſmitted to me on the important Subjects now communicated, and your Inſtructions founded on them be received for my future Guidance. The Man returned to the Enemy's Camp early this Morning; and as the Miniſter is encamped beyond Tilliagong, the Time neceſſary for going there and returning, together with that requiſite for the Diſcuſſion and Preparation of the important Points to be afterwards adjuſted, will occaſion a Delay of Eight Days, at the Expiration of which he declared a public Vackeel would arrive in my Camp.

The Time thus limited will cauſe no Inconvenience, or even Delay in my Operations, as I hope that Interval will be uſefully employed in receiving the neceſſary Supplies of Proviſions from Bellapore, and give you Leiſure to weigh fully the Subjects on which I have ſolicited your Sentiments, and which I ſhall wait for with the greateſt Impatience.

In the Courſe of Converſation with Runſoor, he gave me to underſtand, though it is a Circumſtance by no Means probable, that the Propoſals from Bengal had never been received by Nana, but that Moodajee Booſla, through whom they were ſent, finding no ſatisfactory Offer made relative to Ragoba, had returned them. Suppoſing this to have been actually the Caſe, the Copy of theſe Propoſals will no doubt have been ſent them by Moodajee, and as it appears they do not mean to produce the Original, there is Reaſon to ſuſpect that either Moodajee muſt have been averſe to, and deſignedly prevented the Succeſs of the propoſed Compact againſt Hyder, or that the Marattas themſelves have ſuppreſſed theſe Propoſals, with a View of obtaining more favourable Conditions in a preſent Treaty with us; though this laſt Suggeſtion is, I muſt confeſs, very unlikely and improbable.

Upon the Whole, and indeed their own Declarations confirm this Opinion, the Variety of Channels through which Application have been made to them, while it tends to perplex and confound, fills their Minds with Diſtruſt and Diffidence of the Powers veſted in any Individual with whom they may treat, and an Apprehenſion of the Invalidity of the Terms which may be concluded upon under ſuch Circumſtances.

This Subject leads me to mention another Fact which Runſoor communicated to me, and affirmed to have been one very principal Reaſon why the Miniſter had deferred for ſome Days ſending him to me. I know the various Artifices practiſed by theſe People, and therefore do not put much Confidence in his Aſſertion; but as Admiral Sir Edward Hughes is on the Spot, who can ſatisfy you with reſpect to the Truth of it, or otherwiſe, I ſhall only mention the Circumſtance, and refer you to him for further Information. Runſoor told me that a Muſſulman, named Bapoo Copt, arrived in the Maratta Camp, ſent, as he ſaid, from Admiral Sir Edward Hughes, with a verbal Meſſage to the following Effect: "That the Governments of Bengal and Bombay had violated "Peace, and waged an unjuſt War againſt the Maratta State; that he (the Admiral) was veſted "with full Powers, and deſirous of putting an End to Hoſtilities, by reſtoring to them what "had been taken, and therefore wiſhed to be acquainted with their Complaints." No Anſwer was given by the Miniſter, but the Man ordered to depart immediately.

I have fully weighed this Circumſtance in my own Mind, and if Runſoor's Information is true, am convinced that this Man muſt have acted without Authority; ſince Admiral Sir Edward Hughes would never have ſent a Meſſage of any particular Nature, to a Power with whom we were actually engaged in War, and propoſing to conclude a Treaty upon the Inſtructions received from the Governor General and Council, without firſt communicating his Intentions to your Committee and to myſelf, who are intruſted with the Management of this Alliance, as an oppoſite Conduct from the Appearance it carries of Diſunion and differing Intereſts, cannot but be productive of the greateſt Inconvenience and Detriment to the Public Service.

I have wrote you ſeveral Letrers on the Subject of Supplies of Proviſions for the Army, to which I know it is unneceſſary further to call your Attention. In a Letter of this Date, I have encloſed for your Peruſal an Addreſs from the Commiſſary General, and now beg Leave to ſubmit to your Conſideration another from Mr. Horſely, the Commiſſary of your Detachment. The Propriety of his Requeſt, and the Juſtneſs of the Arguments which he uſed to enforce it, both with regard to what relates to himſelf, and the future Proſecution of the Service, ſtrikes me in ſo forcible and particular a Manner, that I find it unneceſſary to add any Thing to what he has repreſented, further than to recommend it moſt earneſtly to your ſerious Attention and Conſideration.

I have the Honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
Thomas Goddard.

Camp at Bhore Gaut,
February 13th, 1781.

Extract

APPENDIX, N° 342.

Extract of Bombay Select Conſultation, the 22d February 1781.

We can only expreſs our Approbation of the Manner in which the General appears to have treated the Maratta Agent, but do not think it material to enter into any further Diſcuſſion on the Subject of the General's Letter, till an Agent arrives with proper Credentials from the Miniſter himſelf, and there appears a greater Certainty of a Negociation taking place.

Goddard, Brigadier General, the Manner which he treated the Maratta Agent, approved

An Extract of thoſe Paſſages relative to the Admiral has been delivered to him, which we ſuppoſe he will of courſe explain.

Extract of Bombay Diary, the 7th March 1781.

Received the following Letter from General Goddard, with the encloſed Paper.

Wedneſday

Gentlemen,

Goddard, General, Letter from

Having received early this Morning the Miniſter's expected Reply to my Letter ſent him the 1ſt Inſtant, I loſe no Time in communicating it to you; and that you may be enabled to judge more fully of the real Diſpoſition and Intention of the Maratta Government, I have encloſed an exact Tranſlation of his Letter to me, together with a Copy of mine, to which his is an Anſwer.

This Letter I can but conſider as an abſolute Refuſal of the Offers of the Government of Bengal, and proves beyond a Doubt what I have all along had Reaſon to ſuſpect, the Exiſtence of an Alliance and Connection with Hyder Ally, which has for its principal Object a mutual League againſt the Engliſh Nation; and that Hyder is expreſsly alluded to in that Part of the Miniſters Letter, when he ſays that if I am fervent in my Deſire of Friendſhip, it is requiſite that I make a Treaty, which ſhall include the Propoſals of ſuch Perſons who are allied to and connected with the Sircar.

Having therefore no Grounds to expect that the Miniſter will in the moſt diſtant Degree be inclined to enter into our preſent Views againſt Hyder by any further Attempt to negociate on my Part, and indeed thoroughly perſuaded that no Terms could now in Policy be propoſed to the Maratta Government, that had not the mutual Proſecution of the War againſt Hyder for its expreſs and ſole Object, the preſent Expediency and Neceſſity of which could alone juſtify any further Sacrifice on our Side, I have determined to conſider the Miniſter's Anſwer, as it is certainly intended by him, deciſive with reſpect to the preſent Negociation, and to make no new Propoſals or Advances, which could only encreaſe his confident Preſumption, ſubject us to the Mortification of a Second Refuſal, and beſides promiſe no reaſonable Proſpect of Succeſs; ſince, if Nana Furneſſe was really deſirous of Peace, he would have availed himſelf of the Opening now given, and at leaſt have communicated in Writing, or ſent a Perſon to declare what the Terms are on which he is ready to conclude a Treaty, and in ſome Reſpects have explained the Nature of the Propoſals he wiſhes ſhould be included for the Benefit of the Perſons who he ſays are allied to, and connected with the Councils of the Sircar.

I requeſt to be favoured with your particular Sentiments on this Occaſion, and your Opinion of the Propriety or good Policy of proſecuting any further Plan of Negociation under the diſcouraging Circumſtances that now preſent themſelves; which unleſs ſome unforeſeen Event occurs, I ſhall not myſelf think of attempting till I receive your Anſwer to this Letter.

I have under my Conſideration your Letter of the 12th ultimo, relative to the future Operations of the War, in the Conduct of which I ſhall be generally guided by the Opinion you have therein expreſſed, and which concurs with the Sentiments formerly delivered to you by myſelf.

I ſhall however be glad to receive any further Communication of your particular Ideas on this important Point; and have the Honour to be,

Head Quarters, Condolah,
5th March 1781.

Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient,
and moſt humble Servant,
Thomas Goddard.

Draft of a Letter from General Goddard to Nana Furneſſe, March 1ſt 1781.

Letter from General Goddard to Nana Furneſſe.

Notwithſtanding you are already fully acquainted with the friendly Sentiments of the Engliſh, and their earneſt Deſire for Peace with the Maratta State, which have been particularly communicated to you through the Means of Runſoor; yet, in order to convince you ſtill more of the Sincerity of my Intentions, and that you may not poſſibly urge in Excuſe for neglecting the Intereſts of the Sircar at this important and dangerous Time, your Ignorance of the favourable and very friendly Diſpoſition of the Engliſh towards you, I now encloſe the Propoſals of the Honourable Governor General and Council of Bengal, for concluding a Treaty of perpetual Alliance with the Maratta State, Original of which has been tranſmitted by them to you, through the Mediation of Modajee Booſla, the Rajah of Berar.

Should

Should the original Propoſals not have been received by you through Moodajee, I think it proper to declare to you in the Name of the Honourable Governor General and Council of Bengal, that I am inveſted with full Powers in their Name, and in Behalf of the Honourable Company, to agree to the Conditions propoſed in the Paper I now ſend you, provided they are accepted of by you in the Manner and within the Time preſcribed by the Honourable Governor General and Council of Bengal.

You will perceive from the Date of the Propoſals, that the Five Months limited will expire in Nine Days from the Date of this Letter, that is on the 9th of March, correſponding to the 13th of Rubba ul Divil in the 1195 Year of the Hegira.

I therefore think it neceſſary to declare to you, that if before that Time you do not agree to the Propoſals, I am not authorized to grant or to treat on thoſe Terms afterwards, and they will therefore become then and for ever after void and of no Effect.

If the Propoſals now made meet with your Concurrence, it is neceſſary that a Perſon be ſent from you, fully authorized by the Sircar to negociate, as with no other can I in future hold Correſpondence. What more?

A true Tranſlation.

Dal[illegible] Watherſton,
Perſian Tranſlator.

Tranſlation of a Letter from Nana Furneſſe to General Goddard. Received 5th March 1781.

er from
a Furneſſe
eneral God-

Your agreeable Letter having been received, I am made acquainted with the Contents.

You have wrote, "That Mr. Haſtings and the Government of Calcutta ſent a Treaty to the Miniſter of the Peiſhwa, through the Mediation of Moodajee Booſla, which perhaps may not have arrived, and on that Account you have ſent a Copy; from a Peruſal of which every Particular will be made known." You alſo add, "That Mr. Haſtings and the Government of Calcutta have inveſted you with full Powers to conclude and ſettle the Buſineſs of theſe Parts."

Before this, Moodajee wrote the Sircar, that Imad ul Dowlah and the Chiefs of Calcutta had ſent him a Treaty, but as it did not meet with his Approbation, it would anſwer no End to ſend it to the Sircar; and that therefore he had returned it to Mr. Haſtings.

At preſent the Copy of that very Treaty which you have ſent me, has been read from the Beginning to the End by your Friend, and it is certain that the Contents therein written are not proper or fit for the Approbation of the Sircar. If you are ſincere and fervent in your Deſire of Friendſhip, it is therefore incumbent upon you to make a Treaty that ſhall include the Propoſals of thoſe Perſons who are allied to, and connected with the Councils of the Sircar.

It is not my Deſire that the Violence of War ſhould continue to rage on both Sides, and the Inhabitants be ruined. But betwixt the Government of the Peiſhwa Pundit Purdhaun and the Engliſh Company, a firm and conſtant Intercourſe of Friendſhip and Alliance long ſubſiſted: On whoſe Part this has been interrupted and deſtroyed, that Friend well knows; there is no Neceſſity for me to point it out. What more ſhall I write?

A true Tranſlation.

D. Watherſton,
Perſian Tranſlator.

Extract of Bombay Select Conſultations, the 24th March 1781.

By Pattamars received the Two following Letters from Brigadier General Goddard. The Original of that of the 12th Inſtant has never been received.

ird, Gene-
tter from.

Gentlemen,

I had the Honour of addreſſing you the 5th Inſtant, informing you of the Reſult of the Overtures I had made to the Miniſter; ſince which nothing new or material has happened. Every Doubt and Uncertainty with reſpect to the Miniſters real Determination, being now removed by his poſitive Refuſal to accede to the Terms offered by the Honourable Governor General and Council of Bengal, and an abſolute Bar put to our Hopes of effecting a Peace with the Maratta State at this Time, upon any Conditions ſince thoſe already rejected have actually become void with the Expiration of the Period limited for their remaining in Force, and were we even diſpoſed to make ſtill more liberal Advances and Conceſſions, there does not appear any reaſonable Hope of Succeſs to our Endeavours; it becomes incumbent upon us in this Situation to determine upon ſome Plan of future Operations that may remedy, by every poſſible Means, the Diſappointment given to the Views of the Bengal Government, and provide as far as Circumſtances will admit for the general Intereſts of the Company's Affairs, and the Preſervation of their valuable Settlements and Acquiſitions in India. I ſhall therefore preſume to lay my Sentiments before you on theſe momentous Points, that you may take them into your ſerious and full Conſideration, and ſuch Syſtem of Conduct be immediately adopted, as ſhall appear beſt calculated to promote thoſe deſirable Purpoſes.

Before

APPENDIX, N° 342.

Before the Commencement of the preſent Campaign, the expreſs Objects of our military Operations were declared to be the Conqueſt of Baſſein and its Dependencies, the Expulſion of the Enemy from the Concan, and beſides, providing for the Defence of our new Acquiſitions in Guzerat, the ultimate, and as it then appeared, every probable Hopes of Terms of Honour and Advantage to the Company. Upon this Plan Hoſtilities have been proſecuted, and every Part of it has been hitherto attended with the wiſhed-for Succeſs, except our Expectations of attaining a Peace, the Cauſe of which Diſappointment we unfortunately find to be ſo remote from any Powers of Remedy we may poſſeſs, as to have defied all our paſt, and to throw an invincible Obſtacle in the Way of any preſent, Efforts to remove it. If under ſuch Circumſtances it may be permitted to indulge any particular Cauſe of Satisfaction, I muſt confeſs I cannot on this Occaſion avoid deriving a ſecret Pleaſure from the conſcious Reflection that no Means have been left unattempted by us, either to produce the pacific Diſpoſition in the Miniſter we ſo much wiſhed for, or, failing in that, to obtain a thorough Knowledge of his real Views and Deſigns.

In this latter Aim I think we have perfectly ſucceeded, and however much Reaſon and good Policy may condemn the Idea, I cannot help being now confirmed in the Belief that, encouraged by the Succeſs of Hyder, or ſeduced by his Promiſes, the Maratta Miniſter has determined to adhere to the Engagements mutually formed, and ſteadily perſevere in the Alliance, I am not perhaps far wrong, when I ſay, general Confederacy of the Powers South of the Nerbeddah, againſt the Engliſh; it is only therefore by a ſeaſonable and effectual Check to the Progreſs of Hyder that we can hope to bind the Maratta Miniſtry to Peace. It may not be improper here to make ſome Remarks upon the Effects which an immediate Proſecution of further vigorous Meaſures might be expected to produce in their Councils; eſpecially as from the Poſſeſſion of the Gauts, and the Vicinity of their Capital, it is evident that we could march and poſſeſs ourſelves of it in 6 or 7 Days at ſurtheſt, but it is alſo well known that ſhould we determine upon this Step, they have reſolved to ſet Fire to it themſelves, ſo that neither would the Acquiſition of it be of any Value to us, nor would it advance us One Step towards an Accommodation with the Peſhwa, which alone, in the preſent Situation of Affairs, would in any Degree juſtify ourſelves penetrating into the Decan: And indeed were there not other weighty Conſiderations at this Time to demand our moſt ſerious Attention, and did no other Wars employ our Arms in India, I am far from thinking that a Plan of Conqueſt on this Side, beyond what has been already purſued, is for the Intereſts of the Company; and conceive that the Preſervation and Security of the Poſſeſſions we have acquired, would be an Object far more beneficial in its Conſequences than the Glare of additional Conqueſts, which, from their Diſtance and relative Situation, beſides involving an enormous and ruinous Expence, would be too hazardous and difficult to maintain.

The Syſtem of Defence, which under ſuch Circumſtances would be an Object of Choice, is now a Meaſure of Neceſſity; and if while proſecuting it, we can at the ſame Time be ready to guard againſt any Attempts of the French on this Side, and be aſſiſting to the Operations of Sir Eyre Coote againſt Hyder on the other Coaſt, we ſhall accompliſh Three Objects the moſt beneficial to the Company's Intereſts at this Period, and provide, as far as lies in our Power, for the general Safety of their valuable Poſſeſſions in India.

I ſhall firſt ſpeak to the latter Point, viz. Our affording Relief to Sir Eyre Coote: And ſince the Obſtinacy and Enmity of the Maratta Miniſter will not admit of our doing it in the Extent we could have wiſhed, we muſt make every Effort to do it to the Extent we poſſibly can, conſiſtent with the Safety and Exiſtence of this Settlement: I therefore beg to propoſe, as the only Step left in our Power, that the Madras Detachment, ſerving in the Army under my Command, be ſent back to the Service of the Coaſt of Coromandel; that it ſtop at Tellicherry, and, reinforced by the Troops under Major Cotgrave, proceed to Anjengo, from whence Colonel Brown, the Officer commanding the Whole, will direct his March through the Travencore Country, and in Conjunction with the Rajah, make a powerful Diverſion towards Dindigal, conformable to the Plan already propoſed for the Operations of Major Cotgrave's Detachment, by Sir Eyre Coote; or be ready to follow ſuch further Inſtructions as the latter ſhall find it neceſſary to ſend to meet him at Anjengo.

This, Gentlemen, is all that, in the preſent critical and dangerous State of Affairs, I am of Opinion can be attempted in favour of Sir Eyre Coote, conſiſtent with your own immediate Safety: For, in order to effect this, it will be requiſite to ſpare at leaſt One Battalion; or, if Captain Seward is withdrawn, Two Battalions from the Troops of your Preſidency to relieve Major Cotgrave, and the Remainder, in Conjunction with the Bengal Battalions, will not be more than ſufficient for the Defence and Protection of your own Acquiſitions, the relinquiſhing of which at this Time, unleſs for the eſſential and ſolid Objects of Advantage propoſed by the Honourable Governor General and Council, which we have eſſayed and found to be unattainable, would be moſt impolitic, and probably involve the Ruin of all the Company's Settlements on this Coaſt.

I ſhall now make a few Remarks reſpecting the future Diſpoſition of the Troops for the Purpoſes of a Plan of Defence. It is very evident, that while we keep Poſſeſſion of this Gaut, the Miniſter will not venture to detach any conſiderable Body diſtant from the Capital: There is therefore no Reaſon to be apprehenſive of our valuable Acquiſitions in Guzerat being materially diſturbed; and I conſider the Force already there under Major Forbes, joined by a Body of Furty Sing's Troops in caſe of an Attack, as fully adequate to their Defence and Preſervation. While we are in Poſſeſſion of this Gaut, it is alſo plain Nana Furneeſe will not ſend any conſiderable Force into the

the Concan; at any rate he will not venture to detach any Guns, and the Bodies of Cavalry that may moleſt the open Country, will in all Probability retire before the ſetting in of the Rains.

I would therefore propoſe, as a Plan the moſt expedient and adviſable, that Two or more Battalions of Sepoys, with a Proportion of Artillery, be ſtationed upon this Gaut in a ſtrong fortified Poſt; and the Remainder of the Army encamped during the Rains in ſome Part of the Concan, the moſt convenient for the Purpoſe of moving with Expedition to the Support of this Gaut, or to aſſiſt in the Defence of Bombay, as Circumſtances may render expedient.

As it will be of the utmoſt Importance to keep up a ſafe and regular Communication from Bombay with this Poſt; and its Security will become an Object of the firſt Conſequence, in order effectually to check and overawe the Maratta Power, I would recommend that ſome Place for encamping the Army be fixed upon, as near to Bhore Gaut as poſſible; and therefore, provided no Objections exiſt in Point of Situation or Conveniency of Supplies, which are at preſent to me unknown, I am of Opinion that Panwell, or even Chouk, which is Half Way between Panwell and this Place.

On this particular Point it is not however ſo neceſſary to come to any immediate Determination; and I have at preſent introduced it principally to give you a clear and preciſe Idea of the general Plan I beg Leave to recommend to your Conſideration, in order that you may come to ſome ſpeedy Deciſion, and avail yourſelves of the Preſence and Aſſiſtance of Sir Edward Hughes, in deliberating upon a Plan of ſo great Importance to the Intereſts of the Nation in India, and particularly in executing that Part of it which relates to the immediate Tranſportation of the Troops.

I beg Leave to expreſs my earneſt Wiſh to be favoured with an immediate Anſwer to this Letter, as indeed I have been conſiderably diſappointed in not receiving a Reply to mine of the 5th Inſtant, Duplicate of which I have diſpatched by this Opportunity, leſt ſome Accident ſhould have befallen the Original.

I have the Honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient,
humble Servant,
Thomas Goddard.

Head Quarters,
Condelah,
March 12th, 1781.

Gentlemen,

d, Gene- tter from.

I was Yeſterday favoured with your Two Letters of the 8th and 9th Inſtant, the former encloſing a Letter from the Secretary to the Honourable Governor General and Council to my Addreſs; and thank you for the Steps you have taken relative to the Bills of Exchange which came encloſed.

I moſt ſincerely felicitate you upon the favourable Intelligence which you have communicated to me, of the State of Affairs on the Coaſt, and have not any Doubt but the moſt fortunate and deciſive Succeſs will ſoon follow ſo auſpicious a Beginning.

In Reply to what you are pleaſed to obſerve in your Letter of the 9th Inſtant, relative to Colonel Hartley's Detachment, I did ſuppoſe the Events that immediately followed the Reduction of Baſſein, both reſpecting the Situation of that Detachment in particular, and the Operations of the Army in general, were ſo well known to you, that any particular Explanation of them would never have been wanted from me. It is true, the Bombay Detachment, at the Period you mention, was placed, and has ever ſince continued, under my Command; but the ſmalleſt Reference to the peculiar Circumſtances that firſt occaſioned my March to join it at Viſrabhoy, to the Service on which the Troops were employed immediately after, to the Object propoſed, of driving the Marattas out of the Concan, and to the Expediency, nay even Neceſſity of making no Diviſion of Force where the Enemy had already ſhewn themſelves ſo dangerouſly powerful, will be ſufficient to convince you that no partial Purpoſes of Collection could poſſibly have been attended to by me, without the greateſt Inconvenience and Hazard to the Public Service.

This Explanation on my Part will probably account fully for the neceſſary Failure that may have happened to your Expectations of Supplies ſince the Reduction of Baſſein; but as the Seaſon for Collection had commenced at leaſt Two Months before that Period, the greateſt Part of which no Enemy whatever moleſted the Country, I ſhould conceive the Hopes you were led to form, during that Time, of being relieved by the Produce of the Concan, cannot poſſibly have met with the ſame Diſappointment.

On the Subject of further Negociation with the Maratta Miniſter, and what relates to Tellicherry, as well as the general Plan of Meaſures to be purſued. I have already troubled you with my particular Sentiments, and wait to receive your Opinion and Determination on them.

In the mean Time, as it will be abſolutely neceſſary in the Event of maintaining a ſtrong Poſt upon the Top of the Gaut, (a Meaſure, the Expediency of which cannot I think admit of a Doubt) to leave for its more perfect Security, ſome Guns of a heavier Metal than any at preſent with the Army, I muſt requeſt of you to give immediate Orders to be ſent to Bellapore, to be ready to accompany the firſt Eſcort coming from thence, Two 18 and alſo Four 12 Pounder Pieces of Ordnance, with their Tumbrels, and a large Proportion of Ammunition, &c.

The Danger of the Road rendering my Diſpatches to you very precarious, and liable to be intercepted, I have not encloſed you a formal Return of the State of the Army, but tranſcribe you the following Abſtract of its preſent actual Strength, excluſive of European Officers.

Bombay

Bombay Artillery	—	57
Madras Ditto	—	67
Bombay European Infantry		170
Madras Ditto	— —	346
Bengal Native Artillery		97
Bengal Sepoys	—	2542
Bombay Ditto	— —	1446
Madras Ditto	— —	527
Cavalry, about	—	700
		5952
Sick at Baſſein, Callican and Camp, about		754
Laſcars, Bildars, &c. Ditto		2000

ſhall conclude this Letter with informing you of an Action that happened at Chouke the 16th ant, with a Body of Marattas under the Command of Purriſs Ram Boa, and the Eſcort com- from Panwell, conſiſting of the 5th Battalion of Bengal and the 1ſt of Bombay Sepoys, and Candahar Horſe.

The former to the Amount of between 12 and 15 Thouſand Horſe and Foot, made a moſt bold daring Aſſault upon the Eſcort, a very ſhort Time after coming to their Ground early in the rning; but after repeated Efforts, from which however they did not altogether deſiſt till about on, were obliged to relinquiſh the Attempt without making any Impreſſion upon the Detach- nt, though not without conſiderable Loſs to themſelves both of Men and Horſes. The good Con- t and Military Skill of Captain Mackay, who commanded, in the Diſpoſition he made of his ce, was equalled by the Spirit and Intrepidity of the Officers under him, who exerted themſelves moſt extraordinary and gallant Manner. I beg Leave to expreſs my warmeſt Senſe of their rits and Services on this Occaſion, which I flatter myſelf will appear deſerving of your Ap- bation.

One Company of Sepoys belonging to the Bengal Battalion, who had routed a Party of Horſe, purſued them too eagerly and incautiouſly, were ſuddenly turned upon and attacked by them, ſuſtained ſome Loſs; I have not yet aſcertained the exact Number of Killed and Wounded. In Night of the 16th Captain Mackay advanced a few Miles, and having been joined by a Rein- cement I ſent from Campoly the Morning of the 17th, arrived ſafe in Camp that Evening with Whole of his Convoy, which I have the Pleaſure to tell you was a very large and conſiderable . I have the Honour to be with Reſpect,

Gentlemen,

Your moſt obedient
humble Servant,
Thomas Goddard.

Head Quarters,
Camp at Condelah,
21ſt March 1781.

P. S. The above Abſtract of the State of the Army under my Command, includes only the oops preſent with me in the Field, beſides which there are Two Bengal Battalions with Major bes in Guzerat, their Four Grenadier Companies excepted, which accompanied the Army. Six gal with Two Bombay Companies of Sepoys compoſe the Garriſon at Ahmadavad, the whole ount of whoſe Strength may be computed at Twelve hundred Men. The State of the Two mbay Battalions which have joined Major Forbes, and of the reſt of your Troops in Guzerat and the Preſidency, as well as thoſe compoſing the Garriſons of Baſſein, Callian, and Bellapore, you ſufficiently acquainted with, to form a certain Eſtimate of their Strength; and it is not in my wer to give you a more particular Return of them at preſent than you are already poſſeſſed of.

T. G.

APPENDIX, N° 343.

Extract of Bombay Select Consultations, the 27th March 1781.

PRESENT,
The Honourable William Hornby, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor,
Daniel Draper and Nathaniel Stackhouſe, Eſquires.

. Genl the Political
geſted by him, the
ɔeatedly recommend-

GENERAL Goddard's Definition of the Objects of the War, and of our Political Views on th Side of India, is exactly the ſame as have been repeatedly expreſſed by us in all our Proceed-n and Plans of Conduct, and by which we have been invariably guided in all our Operations.

en^l, his Plan for
g a Poſt at the Head
its, not approved of.

We entirely concur with the General, and indeed the Propoſition came firſt from us, as appears b our Minutes of the 9th, that a Syſtem of Defence is now a Meaſure of Neceſſity, and our own Difficult is in the Choice of Meaſures for purſuing that Syſtem. Various Objections occur againſt keeping large a Force at the Head of the Gauts during the Monſoon; the Danger and Difficulty of affordin them Supplies, the vaſt Expence of Stores and Ammunition, and the Danger of leaving ſo large Part of our Force in a Situation where perhaps we could not command their Services, if there ſhou be a Neceſſity for them at Bombay, or be able to give them Aſſiſtance, if they ſhould be hard preſſe After all, it does not appear that maintaining a Poſt at the Head of the Gauts will anſwer the Purpo of keeping the Enemy out of the Conkan, for it is evident by the General's Letters on the Table, tha notwithſtanding the preſent Situation of the Army, a very large Body of the Enemy is now in th Country, by which a large Convoy was expoſed to imminent Danger. If the General could hav adopted our Propoſal of, making himſelf Maſter of Razematchy, the Poſſeſſion might have bee maintained with a ſmall Body of Men, and it would have afforded ſecure Lodgement for the Troop and Stores, without the Expence attending the propoſed Scheme of raiſing Works and fortifying Poſt, building Magazines, Caſemates, &c.

tle Uſe it will be of
; the Enemy out of
n.

ing poſſeſſed him-
ematchy lamented.

Upon the Whole, we think that if at any Time hereafter it may be judged expedient to poſſeſ ourſelves of the Gauts, they may be again ſecured or taken Poſſeſſion of with much leſs Loſs, Dif ficulty, and Danger, than would attend maintaining a Poſt there during the rainy Seaſon: And it i therefore reſolved to recommend to the General to drop this Idea, and to employ the Army the Re mainder of the Seaſon in protecting the Conkan, and if poſſible, to reduce Paib, or ſome other of th ſtrong Holds, which might afford convenient and ſecure Stations for Part of the Troops during th Rains; and the Security of which in our Hands will protect and encourage the Inhabitants in thei Cultivation the enſuing Seaſon.

ɔmended to him to
Idea of maintain-
ɔn the Gauts during
on;
ɔy the Army in re-
ɛ of the ſtrong

As it will be impoſſible for the Maratta Horſe to act in the Conkan during the Rains, we apprehen there can be no Danger; and it muſt be accordingly ſuggeſted to the General to canton the Army i Two or more Diviſions, at the moſt convenient Stations for covering the Country, which we judg may be about Panwell, Calian, or Viſrabhoy, from which Places the Troops may with Eaſe be tranſ ported to Bombay in caſe of Neceſſity; or form a Junction againſt the Opening of the Seaſon, with out Danger from the Enemy.

ɔn^l, Recommenda-
reſpect to the Diſ-
the Army in the

We ſhall, agreeable to the General's Propoſal, take immediate Meaſures for returning the Madra Detachment; and are glad to have it in our Power to aſſiſt that Preſidency, though in the preſent re duced State of our Eſtabliſhment we wiſh Circumſtances would permit of our detaining the Eu ropeans. The General muſt in conſequence be deſired to give immediate Orders for returning th Madras Detachment to Bombay, in Readineſs to embark.

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thence ſerving on
o be returned.

Troops ſerving
rmy to be ordered
ɔn previous to the
f the Monſoon.

We alſo propoſe, previous to the ſetting in of the Monſoon, to withdraw the Bombay Troops int Garriſon, which will cauſe a further conſiderable Reduction in the Expences of the Army; and w conceive the Bengal Detachment will be fully ſufficient to ſecure the Country, and ſtrong enough t reſiſt any Attempts that can poſſibly be made by the Enemy at that Seaſon of the Year.

the Reſolution for
this Settlement
mined on.

We muſt now, with whatever Reluctance, put in Execution our former Reſolution of abandon ing Tellicherry, which, as already full explained in our Proceedings, it is abſolutely out of our Pow to maintain any longer, ſince we have no longer any Hopes of bringing the Maratta War to a Conclu ſion. When the Madras Detachment arrives from the Army, which, as the Seaſon is late, the Gener muſt be deſired to expedite, we ſhall conſult with Colonel Brown about the Plan to be obſerved withdrawing the Garriſon, and the Expediency of landing his Force, in order to make an Effort diſlodge the Enemy, which we apprehend will be neceſſary before the Place can be evacuated; an will alſo enable us to do it with leſs Loſs of Credit and Riſque to the Inhabitants.

ɛ purſued for car-
ɛſolution into Exe-

be made to diſlodge
previous to our
the Place.

Ordered that the Commander of the Royal Admiral be directed to get his Ship in immediate Read neſs for Sea, to aſſiſt in tranſporting the Madras Detachment to Tellicherry and Anjengo.

l to be got ready
ediately.

Read the Letter from Admiral Hughes, entered under the 19th Inſtant.

np's Ships,
Hughes, Reſolu-
mmunicated to him;
d to aſſiſt us with
y our Reſolutions
on.

Reſolved, that our Reſolutions of this Day reſpecting the Madras Detachment and the withdrawi of Tellicherry be communicated to the Admiral, and a Requeſt made to him to order One or more His Majeſty's Ships to aſſiſt on theſe Services. Whatever Ships he may think proper to order, ma take on board the Marines he left for the Defence of Tellicherry.

Th

The Seamen will be returned on the Arrival of the Revenge, now daily expected, or if the Bombay Grab ſhould not have ſent up her Proportion, the Ships the Admiral may ſend to Tellicherry may receive them there; and an Apology muſt be made to the Admiral for their Detention, which was neither foreſeen or ordered by us.

Apology made for Seamen borrowed from the Fleet not being yet returned.

Adjourned.

Edw[d] Ravenſcroft, Secr[y].

W[m] Hornby,
D. Draper,
N. Stackhouſe.

Extract of Bombay Select Conſultations, the 28th March 1781:

Signed the following Letter to General Goddard, agreeable to the above Minutes:

To Brigadier General Goddard.

Sir,

We have received a Duplicate of your Letter of the 12th Inſtant, the Original of which never came to Hand, and the Duplicate did not reach us till the 24th, at the ſame Time with your Letter of the 21ſt. We are ſorry to find our Letters of the 8th and 9th met with equal Delay in the Paſſage.

Your Definition of the Objects of the War, and the Extent of our Views in Point of Acquiſition, entirely coincide with our Opinion and the Plan of Meaſures originally formed for the Proſecution of the War, and by which we have been invariably guided in all our Proceedings and Deliberations; nor have we a Wiſh or View beyond the Security and Preſervation of our Poſſeſſions in Guzerat and the Conkan.

Upon this Principle, and conſidering every other Circumſtance neceſſary to be attended to, we are entirely of the Opinion before expreſſed to you in our Letter of the 9th Inſtant, that our Meaſures ſhould now be confined to a defenſive Plan; and we have accordingly directed our Deliberations ſolely to the Choice of Meaſures for purſuing a Syſtem of Defence.

Various and ſtrong Objections occur againſt keeping ſo large a Part of our Force at the Head of the Gauts during the Monſoon: The Danger and Difficulty of affording them Supplies, the vaſt Expence of Stores and Ammunition, and the Imprudence of hazarding a Body of Troops in a Situation where perhaps we might not be able to command their Services in caſe of Neceſſity, or to give them Aſſiſtance if they ſhould be hard preſſed; nor by a fair Concluſion from paſt Events can it be urged, that maintaining a Poſt at the Gauts will anſwer the Purpoſe which alone could juſtify ſuch a Meaſure, namely, preventing the Enemy from ſending a Force into the Conkan; for it is evident, that notwithſtanding the preſent Poſition of the Army under your Command, the Enemy have by the other Paſſes detached a very conſiderable Body of Horſe into the Conkan, and, as we underſtand, with Guns, by which a large Convoy was expoſed to imminent Danger. The Poſſeſſion of the Fort of Razemachy would have removed ſome Part of theſe Objections, as it would not only have given us a firm Footing on the Gauts, but might have been maintained with a ſmall Body of Men, and would have afforded ſecure Lodgment for the Troops and Stores without the heavy Expences incident to the propoſed Scheme of making a fortified Poſt, with Storehouſes, Magazines and Lodgments, for a large Garriſon, conſtructed with a ſufficient Degree of Strength and Solidity to reſiſt the Attacks of the Enemy, and the Impreſſion of the Weather during the Monſoon.

Upon the Whole, we are of Opinion, that if at any Time hereafter it may be judged expedient to gain Poſſeſſion of the Gauts, they may be ſecured or forced with much leſs Difficulty and Danger than would attend maintaining a Poſt there during the rainy Seaſon; and we muſt therefore recommend to you to drop that Idea, and to employ the Army during the Remainder of the Seaſon, in compleating the Reduction of the Conkan, and getting Poſſeſſion of Paeb, or ſome other ſtrong Holds, which would afford convenient and ſecure Stations for Part of the Troops during the Rains, and in our Hands would protect and encourage the Inhabitants in their Cultivation for the enſuing Seaſon.

As it will be impoſſible for the Maratta Horſe to act in the Conkan during the Rains, or for ſome Time after, we apprehend there can be no Danger in cantoning the Army in Two or more Diviſions, at the moſt convenient Stations for covering the Country, which we judge may be about Panwell, Callian, or Vizrabtroy, from which Places the Troops may with Eaſe be tranſported to Bombay in caſe of Neceſſity, or form a Junction at the Opening of the Seaſon, without Danger from the Enemy.

We acquieſce in your Propoſal of ſending back the Madras Detachment under the Command of Colonel Brown, to be joined at Tellicherry by the Party under Major Cotgrave, and are glad to have it in our Power ſo far to aſſiſt that Preſidency; though in the preſent reduced State of our Eſtabliſhment, we wiſh Circumſtances would permit of our detaining the Europeans.

We ſhall take immediate Meaſures in concert with the Admiral to provide Embarkation; and as the Seaſon grows late we recommend to you to loſe no Time in ordering the Madras Detachment to Bombay, to be in Readineſs for embarking: We alſo propoſe, previous to the ſetting-in of the Monſoon, to withdraw the Bombay Troops into Garriſon, in order to relieve ourſelves from the heavy Expence of keeping them in the Field, as we conceive the Bengal Detachment will be ſufficiently ſtrong to reſiſt any Attempts that can poſſibly be made by the Enemy at that Seaſon of the Year.

Since we have no longer any Hopes of coming to an Accommodation with the Marattas, it is utterly beyond the Reach of our Resources to maintain the Settlement of Tellicherry, which we have accordingly resolved to abandon; it will not therefore be necessary to make any Arrangement for its Defence, but we doubt not you will see the Necessity; and we request, that for the present this Intention may be kept inviolably secret.

Mr. Boddam has acquainted us of his having received the Bills in your Favour for Five Lacks of Rupees, and has lately remitted the Sum of R°. 1,80,000 for the Service of the Army, which is deposited in our Treasury till your Directions can be received regarding it.

We are,
Sir,
Your most obedient,
humble Servants,
William Hornby,
&c. Committee.

Bombay Castle,
28th March 1781.

Extract of Bombay Select Consultations, the 23d April 1781.

PRESENT,
The Honourable William Hornby, Esquire, President and Governor,
Daniel Draper, Esquire, and Nathaniel Stackhouse, Esquire.

Received the following Letter from Brigadier General Goddard:

Gentlemen,

I did myself the Pleasure of addressing you the 15th Instant, and acquainted you with the safe Arrival and Junction of the Escort under Colonel Brown.

Having previously sent down to the Gauts as many of the Guns, Tumbrils of Ammunition, and Baggage of every Kind as I possibly could, consistent with the Security of the Post, and the Prevention of too full a Discovery of our Intentions; on the 17th in the Afternoon I ordered the remaining Bazars and Baggage, together with such Artillery as I had found it necessary to detain, to proceed to Campoley, and I followed myself at Day-break, with the Rear Division of the Army, which reached the Encampment at the Bottom of the Gaut about Nine o'Clock, without having been annoyed by the Enemy in the smallest Degree, or suffering any Loss or Inconvenience whatever.

This fortunate Circumstance I attribute to the Success of the Precaution I had used to conceal as much as possible from the Enemy our Intentions to relinquish the Post at Condolah, of which I am convinced, from the subsequent Intelligence brought me by my Hircarrahs, as well as from the certain Proof their Conduct furnished, they had not the smallest Knowledge, till Day-light discovered to them that we were gone. About Eight o'Clock a Party of Horse made their Appearance at the Top of the Gaut; a few Foot only shewed themselves; but none of them thought it prudent to advance or attempt to molest the March of our Troops, who were at that Time near the Foot of the Pass.

I have been obliged to halt this Day to refresh the Cattle after the excessive Fatigue which they have lately undergone, and in particular during the Day and Night of the 17th; but I propose to march To-morrow, and hope to arrive at Panwell the 23d Instant, as I fear, on account of the necessary Attention to Water sufficient for the Supply of the Army, I shall be detained a Day longer on the Road than would otherwise be requisite.

I shall however use every Endeavour to reach Panwell the 22d, and therefore request you will order the necessary Boats to be ready at Bellapore for transporting the Troops arrived from your Presidency, as well as the Madras Detachment, to Bombay with every possible Expedition.

The Enemy have not yet ascended the Gauts Holkar with his Force, unincumbered by any Baggage, is at the Bottom of the Cessere Pass; and Purris Ram Bow has sent off all his Bazars and Baggage to the Columby Pass, about Three Cos's farther to the Northward, and Eight from this Ground, where I learn he intends also following himself during this Day.

I have the Honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your most obedient,
humble Servant,
Thomas Goddard.

Head Quarters,
Campoley,
19th April 1781.

Extract of Bombay Select Consultations, the 25th April 1781.

lard, Gene- letter from.

Gentlemen,

I had the Pleasure of addressing you the 22d Instant from Chouke, and acquainted you with my Intention of marching towards Panwell the following Day. As I knew the Road from Chouke to Burwah, more than Half-way to this Place, lay through a Country full of thick Jungles, broken Ground, and narrow Defiles, where the Enemy would possess every Advantage they could wish,

of

of concealing themſelves and annoying our Troops, I thought it expedient to ſend off all the heavy Stores, Baggage, and every Incumbrance, at 2 o'Clock in the Morning, under the Care of a ſtrong Eſcort, and remained myſelf with the main Body till Day-break. The Succeſs fully anſwered my Expectations: The Baggage, &c. moved off undiſcovered by the Enemy, who had not an Opportunity during the March of attacking or giving them any Diſturbance whatever.

A little after Sun-riſe the Enemy made their Appearance, at firſt in ſmall Parties, throwing Rockets and diſcharging their Muſquetry upon our Rear, from the numerous Thickets and Hollows that favoured their Approach. Their Numbers continued to encreaſe; and ſoon after their whole Force, which I am confident from the full View I had of them at different Times Yeſterday, the Names of their Leaders, and the repeated Intelligence of my Hircarrahs, could not be leſs than 50,000, of which there may be 6000 Infantry, ſhewed themſelves, lining the Tops of the Hills on Right and Left, and behind every Bank or Buſh where there was a Poſſibility of concealing themſelves. Their Horſe kept behind their Guns, and generally at too great a Diſtance for our Artillery to reach them; though ſometimes conſiderable Bodies came near enough to receive the Fire of our Guns, which were exceedingly well ſerved, and muſt have done very great Execution.

Their moſt ſerious and determined Attack was made when we came near Burwach, with their whole Force, Horſe and Foot; at which Time the Rear being very hardly preſſed, I took Poſſeſſion of an Eminence with the 6th Battalion of Bengal and 13th of Bombay Infantry, which effectually commanded the Spot where the Enemy had poſted themſelves, and drove them off, after they had ſuſtained very conſiderable Loſs from the Guns of theſe Battalions.

The Whole of the Army reached Burwach about One o'Clock; when finding the Enemy ſhewed no Inclination to advance, but on the contrary were retreating, ſeemingly tired of the warm Reception they had met with, and deſpairing of Succeſs in their Attempts to make any Impreſſion upon our Line, I thought it moſt expedient, notwithſtanding the Fatigue the Troops had ſuſtained, as the Whole of the Baggage, &c. was ſecure in our Front, to puſh on to Panwell; and accordingly having halted ſome Time to refreſh the People, proſecuted my March, and arrived at Panwell about an Hour before Sun-ſet.

It is with the greateſt Concern I have to acquaint you with the Loſs of Colonel Parker, who commanded in the Rear, where, exerting himſelf with that Courage and military Ardour that always diſtinguiſhed him on every Occaſion of active Service, he received a mortal Wound in the Belly, of which he expired on the March a few Hours after. Incloſed is a Return of Killed and Wounded in the Action of Yeſterday; and I alſo take this Opportunity of ſending you a particular Liſt of our Loſs upon the 9th Inſtant.

The Reinforcements upon your Preſidency will embark this Day at Noon; at which Time alſo the Reliefs for the Garriſon of Bellapore and Parſeek will proceed. I ſhall alſo ſend off with all poſſible Expedition the Five Companies belonging to Captain Carpenter's Battalion, to ſtrengthen the Garriſon at Callian, with One Company of the Fourth Battalion of Bombay Sepoys.

I expect to receive particular Accounts by my Hircarrahs of the Situation of the Enemy, and of their Deſigns. By Intelligence brought in early this Morning, I learn that their main Body is encamped at Chouke, and that they have a Body of about 5000 Horſe poſted at Burwach. I ſhall do myſelf the Pleaſure of communicating any further Information as ſoon as it arrives; and have the Honour to be,

Gentlemen,

Your moſt obedient

humble Servant,

Thomas Goddard.

Head Q^r, Panwell,
April 24th, 1781.

To the Honourable the Secret Committee of the Honourable the Court of Directors for Affairs of the United Company of Merchants of England trading to the Eaſt Indies.

Honourable Gentlemen,

1. You receive herewith an Addreſs, dated the 31ſt ultimo, containing a ſhort Abſtract of the Syſtem we had adopted for our Conduct in the preſent Situation of Affairs.

2. We had made every neceſſary Arrangement for putting in Execution our Reſolution of withdrawing from Tellicherry, and the Time fixed for the Departure of the Fleet was arrived within Two Days; when on the 18th Inſtant we received a Letter from the Governor General and Council, dated the 7th of January, (which might and ought to have reached us Seven or Eight Weeks ſooner) wherein they acquainted us of their having ſent round Five Lacks of Rupees for the Service of this Preſidency, on the Duke of Portland; and gave us Authority to paſs Drafts upon them for ſuch further Sum as we might ſtand in need of. We had alſo private Intimation of their having provided a large Quantity of Rice for the Service of this Preſidency, of which we actually received a Part by the Veſſel that brought their Letter.

3. Theſe Reſources in View, we immediately determined, late as the Seaſon was, to uſe our utmoſt Exertion to preſerve Tellicherry; and made a Requeſt to the Admiral, to poſtpone his Departure for a few Days, in order to give us Time to collect Troops, and the neceſſary Supplies for the Garriſon, to be ſent down in Company with the Fleet, without whoſe Aſſiſtance we could not have

have executed our Meaſures. The Admiral expreſſing great Satisfaction in our Reſolution, cheer-fully complied with our Requeſt, and by a vigorous Diſpatch the Royal Charlotte and Royal Admiral were equipped for Sea. Troops brought from the Foot of the Gauts, and with Stores and Proviſions, embarked within Seven Days upon different Veſſels, which with the Fleet ſailed from this Place the 27th of the Month.

4. The Royal Charlotte has been detained a few Days, to wait for Rice, to complete a Stock for the Rains; that Ship, as well as the Royal Admiral, will proceed from Tellicherry to Fort St. George, to aſſiſt in tranſporting Major Cotgrave's Detachment to the Coaſt of Coromandel, and will then purſue her Voyage to China, whilſt the latter will return to Bombay, whence ſhe will be diſpatched to England early in the enſuing Seaſon.

5. The Prime will ſhortly ſail for England, and carry our Advices and Proceedings at full Length. We ſhall not now enter into a Detail of the Operations of the Army, but ſhall only mention, that General Goddard has in purſuance of our Advice, relinquiſhed Poſſeſſion of the Paſs of Bhore Gaut, where he had propoſed forming a fortified Poſt; marched the Army to Panwell, in order to lodge his Stores and heavy Baggage, and proceed in his future Operations according to the Syſtem of Defence we had concerted with him in March: This being a Country favourable for the Mode of Attack obſerved by the Enemy, the Army was extremely harraſſed by numerous Bodies of Horſe and Foot, which had poured into the Concan Country, and preſſed upon our Troops with a Degree of Boldneſs, which can only be imputed to their Exultation at the Appearance of a Retreat; our Troops in this Situation behaved with their accuſtomed Firmneſs and Reſolution, and baffled every Attack of the Enemy to make an Impreſſion either on the Line or Baggage, though our Loſs from ſuch continual Attack could not fail being conſiderable; and we find from our Returns that during the Two Days taken up in the March, Three Officers and Fifty-Five Men were killed, and Fifteen Officers and Three Hundred and Ninety Men wounded, though we derive ſome Satisfaction that amongſt the Privates killed and wounded, few or none were Europeans. We are very ſorry to add, that in the laſt Day's March Colonel Parker, who commanded the Rear Guard, was mortally wounded, and died in a few Hours.

6. Arrived at Panwell the 23d Inſtant, when the General, immediately upon our Requiſition, ſent over the Troops we had appointed for the Garriſon of Tellicherry, and will next proceed upon a Plan for ſecuring the Country from the Ravages of the Enemy in the beſt Manner poſſible, until the lateneſs of the Seaſon ſhall compel them to retire. For this Purpoſe the Army will immediately change its Poſition, and move near Callian, a more centrical Situation, and where it is propoſed to canton them during the Rains; the Europeans and Bombay Troops will be brought into this Garriſon.

7. We very much wiſh we had any late authentic Account to give you of the Situation of Affairs on the Coaſt of Coromandel, the Hopes of which were the principal Cauſe of our detaining the Mercury ſo long: We can only now acquaint you, that it is certain the French left the Coaſt of Coromandel in February, without landing any Aſſiſtance for Hyder, or doing any other material Damage; and that they ſeemed much diſtreſſed for Proviſions; the Poſition of General Coote's Army, and his burning all the Boats at Pondicherry, preventing them getting any Supplies from the Shore. Country Intelligence, collected by Mr. Stewart at Goa, mentions that Hyder had quitted the Carnatic.

8. We have the Pleaſure to adviſe you of Colonel Carnac's having gained a very complete Victory over Mhadajee Scindhia; which is the more agreeable, as the Colonel had been obliged to retreat, and was harraſſed Four Days together by a very powerful Army; after the Fourth Day's Retreat he Colonel countermanded a Detachment from his Army in the Night, with which he got in the Rear of the Enemy, and attacked their Camp, which was forced and plundered, and Two Guns, Four Elephants, and a large Booty, fell into our Hands. Several Accounts concur that the Enemies Loſs amounted to Eight thouſand Men; and Scindia himſelf eſcaped with Difficulty to Serenga, attended by only Horſemen.

We have the Honor to be with Reſpect,
Honourable Gentlemen,
Your faithful and obedient humble Servants,
Willm Hornby,
D. Draper,
N. Stackhouſe.

Bombay Caſtle,
30th April 1781.

Extract of the Select Letter from Bombay, dated 27th May 1781.

We mentioned in our Addreſs of the 11th of January, the Attack of the Fort of Arnaul, which was not reduced till the 18th of that Month; General Goddard then moved with the Remainder of the Army, and joining the Diviſion of Bengal Troops and the Bombay Detachment, late under the Command of Colonel Hartley, which had remained in the ſame Poſition at Vizzaboy ever ſince the 4th of December, put the Whole in Motion on the 27th of January. It had, as already adviſed, been ſettled, that in the Interval which remained of the Term limited by the Governor General and Council for the Acceptance of their Propoſals, the General ſhould purſue his Operations with all poſſible Vigour, and to the utmoſt Extent he might find practicable, with the Force under his Command,

hand, in the Hopes by this Plan of Conduct, or ſome deciſive Advantage, to diſpoſe the Miniſter o an Accommodation. The Enemy, who, during the Siege of Arnaul, and while the Detachment ept their Poſition at Vizzaboy, had committed great Ravages in the Country, immediately retired s the General advanced, and after ſlight Oppoſition re-aſcended the Ghauts. Diary, 2d and 7th February.

On the 8th February the Preſident took Occaſion to lay before us an Extract of a Letter he had ritten to the General on the Subject of the Operations of the Army, and as we entirely concurred h Opinion with the Preſident, we alſo recommended the ſame to his Conſideration. The Subſtance f this Letter was to recommend his poſſeſſing himſelf of Razemachy, a ſtrong Fort at the Head of he Ghauts, and offering Objections againſt his carrying the Army to Poona, or too far into the Decan.

Our Army advancing as the Enemy retired, arrived at the Foot of the Ghauts on the 8th February, nd the General finding the Enemy had poſted a Body of about 4000 Infantry, with ſeveral Guns, to efend the Paſs, and were conſtructing Works for its Defence, determined upon making the Attack at very Night before they could have Time to collect a more numerous Force, or to improve their Works. The Paſs of Bhore Ghaut was accordingly ſtormed that Night by a ſtrong Party, under Diary, 12th February. ie Command of Colonel Parker, who, after forcing the different Poſts, gained complete Poſſeſſion f the Paſs, and encamped on the Summit of the Ghauts on the Ground formerly occupied by ie late Captain Stuart.

From this Poſt the General gave us his Sentiments with reſpect to the Meaſures to be purſued ie Remainder of the Campaign, in order, if poſſible, to bring the War to a Concluſion: The oona Government had not then made any Overture or Propoſal for Peace, and the Miniſter being Poſſeſſion of the Terms on which he might, if he thought proper, put an immediate End to e War, the General thought any further Advances on our Part would rather encourage the nemy to perſiſt in Hoſtility, and to encreaſe in their Demands and Expectations of Advantage: heſe being his Sentiments with reſpect to any Advances to a Negociation, he next explained s Opinion of the moſt eligible Plan for proſecuting the War; the firſt Object he propoſed was to abliſh a ſtrong Poſt upon the Ghauts, which he thought might be defended by One Battalion of poys againſt any Force whatever, and that our Poſſeſſion of this Paſs which opened us a Paſſage o the Maratta Capital, might perhaps incline the Enemy to think ſeriouſly of Peace. The next Point was to collect a Magazine of Stores and Proviſions at the Ghauts ſufficient for Six Weeks, hould it be deemed expedient to march forward to Poona; with reſpect, however, to that Meaſure, the General obſerved he did not then ſee any ſufficient or adequate Reaſon to authorize it, but hat at any rate he was under the Neceſſity of remaining at the Ghauts till he received a Supply of Proviſions.

We entirely coincided in the General's Ideas, reſpecting the Impolicy and Inefficacy of making ny further Overtures towards an Accommodation, as the Miniſter was in Poſſeſſion of our Terms, nd little more than Three Weeks then remained of the Period limited for their Determination. We then hoped, the ſhort Time they had for Deliberation, the advantageous Poſition of the Army, nd vigorous Preparations for further Meaſures might produce the wiſhed-for Criſis, which we did ot think could be accelerated by any further Advances on our Part.

We accordingly gave every Aſſiſtance in our Power for furniſhing the Army with Proviſions, that he General might have it in his Power to proſecute his future Operations in the Manner that might Diary, 14th and 15th, 23d and 24th February. be judged moſt expedient, upon further Knowledge of the Conduct the Miniſter might obſerve in conſequence of the Poſition of the Army and our Preparations.

Then followed the General's Intercourſe with a Maratta Agent, mentioned in our Addreſs of he 31ſt March, when, though every Readineſs was ſhewn on our Part to liſten to any reaſonable Propoſals, we are ſorry to ſay, never advanced to any direct Negociation: The General's Account of the Arrival, and of his Reception of the Agent, appears on the Diary under the 15th of February, nd in the ſame Letter is mentioned a Circumſtance related to him by the Agent, of the Admiral's Interference, by ſending an Agent to the Miniſters with a Meſſage on the Subject of the preſent War and the projected Treaty.

Thoſe Paſſages of the General's Letter, relative to this Affair, were communicated to the Admiral, who never explained himſelf to us in Writing on this Subject.

Under the 25th is entered another Letter from the General, containing an Account of his further Proceedings with the Maratta Agent; in which, as we obſerved, the Miniſter affected Ignorance of the Conditions propoſed by the Governor General and Council, though we were ſatisfied he was fully acquainted at leaſt with the Subſtance of them: We thought it could have no bad Effect, and would teſtify our earneſt Deſire to promote a Peace, were a Copy of the Bengal Propoſals to be ſent directly from the General to the Miniſter; we therefore ſuggeſted this Meaſure to the General, which we thought would equally put to the Teſt the Sincerity of the Miniſter's Diſpoſition for Peace.

We underſtood that the Four Months limited by the Governor General and Council for the Acceptance of their Propoſals, was to expire the 9th of March, and therefore, to prevent the Miniſter taking any Advantage to protract the Concluſion of the Treaty, we adviſed the General to accompany the Copy of the Propoſals with a Declaration, that we ſhould conſider the Four Months to expire from that Day, and not to commence from the Delivery of the Propoſals by him.

The General accordingly ſent a Copy of the Propoſals directly to the Miniſter, with a Letter from himſelf, to which he received an Anſwer, containing an abſolute Refuſal of the Offers made by the Bengal Government, as already noticed in our Addreſs, dated the 31ſt of March.

The General's Letter, and an exact Tranſlation of the Miniſter's Anſwer, are entered in our Diary under the 7th of March.

Diary, 7th March. Having no Grounds to expect the Miniſter would be induced to enter into our Views againſt Hyder, by any further Attempt to negociate, the General determined to conſider the Miniſter's Anſwer as deciſive with reſpect to the Negociation, and to make no more Propoſals or Overtures, which would only expoſe us to the Mortification of a Second Refuſal, without promiſing any reaſonable Proſpect of Succeſs, ſince, if the Miniſter had been really deſirous of Peace, he certainly would have availed himſelf of the Opening given him, and take ſome Method to explain the Propoſals, which, as he ſays in his Anſwer, it is neceſſary ſhould be included for the Benefit of the Perſons allied to and connected with the Councils of the Maratta Government.

The General however requeſted our Opinion of the Propriety or good Policy of proſecuting any further Plan of Negociation, which we concurred with him, after the liberal Advances made to the Miniſter, would be highly impolitic, and could not poſſibly anſwer any good End; and as the Expiration of the limited Period was then actually arrived, we propoſed waiting to hear the Refuſal thereof from the General, when if the Miniſter did not declare his Acceptance of the offered Terms, we ſhould finally determine what Meaſure to purſue, which, as we then acquainted the General, we were of Opinion muſt be confined to a defenſive Plan.

Diary, 9th March.

Owing to a Stoppage in the Communication, we did not again hear from the General till the 24th of March, when an abſolute Bar being put to Hopes of Peace, as the Propoſals, beſides being rejected, had become void with the Expiration of the Term limited for their remaining in Force, the General ſubmitted to us a Plan of Meaſures to be purſued in our then Situation, which have already been briefly mentioned to you, and are explained at Length in his Letter entered under that Date.

Letter 31ſt March.

General Goddard's Definition of the Objects of the War, and of our political Views on this Side of India, is exactly the ſame as repeatedly expreſſed by us in all our Proceedings and Plans of Conduct, and by which we have been invariably guided in all our Operations.

We entirely concurred with him, and indeed the Propoſition was our own, that a Syſtem of Defence was now become an Act of Neceſſity, and our only Difficulty lay in the Choice of Meaſures for purſuing that Syſtem. Various Objections lay againſt keeping the large Force now propoſed by the General at the Head of the Ghauts during the Monſoon, ſuch as the Danger and Difficulty of affording them Supplies, as had already been experienced in a high Degree, the vaſt Expence of Stores and Ammunition, and the Imprudence of leaving ſo large a Part of our Force in a Situation, when we could not command their Services if there ſhould be Occaſion for them at Bombay, or be able to give them Aſſiſtance if they ſhould be hard preſſed; and after all it did not appear, that maintaining a Poſt at the Head of the Ghauts would anſwer the Purpoſe, which alone could juſtify the Meaſure, namely, preventing the Enemy from entering the Conkan; for it was evident by the General's Letters, that notwithſtanding the Poſition of the Army, a very conſiderable Body of the Enemy had entered the Country by other Paſſes, of which there were ſeveral, by which a large Convoy of Proviſions had been expoſed to imminent Danger, and conſiderable Loſs actually ſuſtained. If the General could have adopted our Propoſal of making himſelf Maſter of Razemachy, the Poſſeſſion of that Fort might have been maintained with a ſmall Body of Men, and it would have afforded ſecure Lodgement for the Troops and Stores, without the Expence attending the propoſed Scheme of raiſing Works, fortifying a Poſt, building Magazines, Caſemates, &c conſtructed with a ſufficient Degree of Strength and Solidity, to reſiſt the Attacks of the Enemy, and the Impreſſion of the Weather during the Monſoon.

Diary, 24th March.

Upon the whole, we were of Opinion, that if at any Time hereafter it might be judged expedient to poſſeſs ourſelves of the Gauts, they might again be forced or taken Poſſeſſion of with much leſs Loſs, Difficulty, and Danger, than would attend maintaining a Poſt there during the rainy Seaſon; and we therefore recommended to the General to drop the Idea, and to employ the Army the Remainder of the Seaſon in protecting the Conkan, and reducing the ſtrong Holds which ſtill remained in the Hands of the Enemy.

Diary, 7th April. The General in Reply acquainted us, that although he entirely concurred with us in the ſuperior Expediency of the Meaſures we had recommended, he was unable at that Time, owing to a particular Train of Circumſtances, to carry them into Execution; for having under the 28th of March detached a very ſtrong Eſcort to Panwell, under the Command of Colonel Brown, to bring a Supply of Proviſions to the Army, Holkar had deſcended the Gauts with the whole of his Force, and by this Addition of Strength to the Enemy then in the Conkan, had rendered the Return of the Eſcort, if not impracticable, at leaſt too dangerous to be attempted without a Reinforcement. Colonel Brown in the March to Panwell had been harraſſed by the Enemy's Troops, and loſt a conſiderable Number of Bullocks; and in this Emergency the General found himſelf obliged to requeſt we would immediately order a Detachment from the Garriſon of Bombay to join Colonel Brown and proceed with him to Camp, after which the General propoſed immediately to relinquiſh the Poſt on the Gauts. He ſtrongly urged to us to comply with his Requiſition, as he found it impracticable to march a Detachment from Camp to join the Eſcort, or to relinquiſh the Poſt until the Return of Colonel

Colonel Brown with the Draft Bullocks; and further mentioned that his Stock of Proviſions would not laſt more than Twelve Days.

In this critical Situation we immediately exerted every poſſible Effort to extricate the Army, and accordingly inſtantly formed the ſtrongeſt Detachment our Garriſon would afford, to reinforce Colonel Brown; with which we had the Pleaſure to learn he conducted the Convoy of Proviſions to the Army without any Loſs, notwithſtanding the repeated and powerful Efforts of the Enemy, who attacked him every Day, and in particular on the March of the Second Day, when he was attacked by the Enemy's whole Force, conſiſting of at leaſt 20,000 Men. The Troops however ſuffered, Eighteen being killed and Eighty-eight wounded. Diary 10th April

The General beſtowed great Commendations on the Conduct and Military Skill of Colonel Brown, in preſerving and protecting his Convoy during ſo long and inceſſant an Attack, and we likewiſe thought it juſt to expreſs our Approbation thereof.

At this Period the Letter arrived from Bengal, mentioned in our Addreſs of the 30th ultimo; in conſequence of which we took the Reſolution then communicated to you, for maintaining Tellicherry, which you will find more fully explained in our Proceedings under the 19th, where our Letter to the Admiral on the Subject is alſo entered, and his Anſwer under the following Day. In this Place we muſt mention, that the Admiral on every Occaſion where his Aſſiſtance could be of Uſe, has manifeſted the utmoſt Zeal and Attention for the Company's Service.

Upon the Junction of Colonel Brown the General moved from the Gauts with the Stores and Proviſions collected there, and after ſuſtaining ſevere and continual Attacks on the March, as already adviſed in our above-mentioned Addreſs, arrived at Panwell on the 23d ultimo. The General's Letters, containing particular Accounts of theſe Actions, are entered on the Diary under the 23d and 25th, with the Returns of the Killed and Wounded, amongſt which we were ſorry to find Colonel Parker, who commanded the Rear Guard, and was killed on the laſt Day's March.

The Army remained at Panwell till the 20th Inſtant, employed in embarking the Sick and Wounded, Stores and Baggage, for Bombay and Callian, when they marched to the latter Place under the Conduct of Colonel Brown, the General having come over to Bombay. The Army is to be cantoned at Callian during the Rains, except the Madras Europeans and the Troops of this Eſtabliſhment, which are to remain in Garriſon at Bombay. Diary 29th April

We had intended to return the Madras Detachment to the Coaſt, as already mentioned, immediately on Cloſe of the Campaign; but the General has given his Opinion in ſtrong Terms, the Neceſſity of their remaining on this Side of India, in which we alſo entirely concur, until Circumſtances more favourable than the preſent ſhall admit of their Return. As the Service of the Madras Europeans appears indiſpenſable in the ſhattered State of our Battalions, and the Expence upon their preſent Footing of a Detachment on Foreign Service is very heavy, we have it in Contemplation to return the Officers and incorporate the Men on this Eſtabliſhment, at leaſt till we are in a Condition to return them, by which we ſhall receive a very material Addition of effective Strength, and the Company be relieved from a very burthenſome Expence which the Funds for the Army are totally unequal to ſuſtain. Diary 18th April

In our laſt Letter from the Governor General and Council they expreſs high Approbation of the Sentiments delivered in the Preſident's Minute of the 1ſt of Auguſt, on the Plan of Operations for the Campaign then enſuing; but Events having taken place ſince that Period which could not be foreſeen or provided for, the Intereſts of the Company required that the Operations of their Troops ſhould be directed againſt another Enemy, and that their Syſtem of Policy ſhould of courſe be changed. That it was now become neceſſary that the whole Force which could be collected and ſpared from the immediate Defence of the ſeveral Preſidencies, ſhould be employed in curbing, and, if poſſible, overſetting the increaſed Power of their ambitious Enemy in the Carnatic, and they hoped that the Order which General Goddard had received from Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote would have been followed by the immediate Direction of his Arms towards the Territories of Hyder Ally Cawn.

Letters from General Coote on this Subject, both to General Goddard and to us, are entered on our Diary, under the 15th of April, and our Anſwer under the 26th; but we think it totally needleſs to uſe any Arguments to you to demonſtrate ſo obvious an Impoſſibility, as that we could divert the Army from our own Defence againſt the Poſſeſſions of Hyder Ally, before the Maratta War is brought to a Concluſion; ſhould our Wiſhes for Peace be happily accompliſhed, we ſhall moſt zealouſly co-operate to the utmoſt of our Ability againſt the common Enemy, in which Caſe likewiſe the Aid of the Madras Europeans will be indiſpenſable; but, as we obſerved to General Coote, it is not becauſe we are deſirous of Peace, or that Peace is neceſſary to our Affairs, that will prove Arguments with the Marattas to conſent to an Accommodation. Let the ſame Arguments be applied to Hyder Ally, with whom a Peace is equally neceſſary, and we believe the Effect will be equal. We confeſs we know not what further can be undertaken on the Plan of Negociation. The Miniſter has declared in very intelligible Terms, that Hyder muſt be included in whatever Treaty may be made with the Poona Government, and we have tranſmitted this Declaration to the Governor General and Council, who alone are competent to treat upon that Ground. Diary 23d Dec.

In the Preſident's Minute of the 1ſt, and our Letter to Bengal of the 17th of Auguſt, our Diſtreſs for Money is deſcribed with the utmoſt Strength and Juſtice The Governor General and Council have in Reply acquainted us, that they wiſhed to leave in Suſpence their ultimate Reſolution on that Part of our Letter, wherein we communicated our Obſervations on the Deſire they had expreſſed

that

that the Receipts from the Acquiſitions in Guzerat ſhould be appropriated excluſively to the Payment of the Army under General Goddard. They further obſerve, that their Ability to continue Supplies is not encreaſed, but on the contrary leſſened, as they had been obliged to augment their own Military Strength to ſupply the Place of Detachments; and that the Proſecution of the War in the Carnatic depended ſolely on Remittances from their Treaſury.

Diary 28th Auguſt. Beſides the Aſſiſtance we have afforded to General Goddard from the Collections made from the Surat Purgunnahs, we alſo gave him as a further Relief, a Credit on our Treaſury for the Diſcharge of ſuch of the Army Bills as did not require Ready Money, by which means our Bond Debt has been very conſiderably increaſed.

It is an inexpreſſible Diſappointment to us, that out of the Five Lacks conſigned to us by the Governor General and Council on the Duke of Portland, Three have been landed and detained at Madras, without even the ſmalleſt Notice given to us on the Part of that Government. We ſhall however endeavour to avail ourſelves of the Permiſſion we have received to paſs Drafts on Bengal, by which, and our other Reſources, applied with the moſt frugal Management, we muſt hope to keep Affairs in a Currency: But our Difficulties are and will be very great.

We mentioned in our Addreſs, by the Hawke, the Conduct of the Governor at Goa reſpecting the Capture of an Engliſh Merchant Veſſel at Mangulore, and the Governor General and Council have tranſmitted our Repreſentation of the Affair to the Admiral; his Opinion on the Subject is entered on the Diary, under the 25th of September. The Sentiments of the Governor General and Council will appear in their Letter entered the 9th of July; but we do not find the Admiral has taken any further Steps in the Affair; and the Governor General and Council have lately deputed Mr. Auriol, their Secretary, to Goa, to make Overtures to the Portugueſe for a Coalition againſt Hyder Ally, though we underſtand Mr. Auriol has been unable, through bad Health, to proceed further than Madras.

We have, as you will obſerve by our laſt Conſultations, judged it expedient to detain the Ponſborne till we ſhall come to ſome final Determination reſpecting the Madras Detachment.

We have no late Intelligence of the State of Affairs on the Coaſt of Coromandel.

APPENDIX, N° 344.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 31ſt December 1779.

RECEIVED the following Letter from Surat.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We had the Honour to addreſs you the 18th Inſtant by an armed Boat, and have ſince received your Commands of the ſame Date by the Revenge.

The Chief has acquainted us that he is in Hopes of being able to procure about Five Lacks of Rupees, in conſequence of a former Order from your Honour, &c. and that One Lack is already paid into the Treaſury.

We therefore now ſend you by the Revenge, Two Lacks and a Half of Rupees in Specie, and your Honour, &c. may depend upon our attentive Obſervance of your Directions, relative to our continuing to ſend you down in Specie ſuch Sums as we can ſpare, or that the Chief may have taken up.

We are, with Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servants.
R. H. Boddam,
Thomas Day.

Daniel Crokatt,
Daniel Seton.

Surat,
28th December 1779.

At a Select Committee, Tueſday 11th January 1780;

PRESENT,
The Honourable William Hornby, Preſident and Governor,
John Carnac Eſquire. Daniel Draper Eſquire.

Read Letters received this Morning from Brigadier General Godddard and the Chief of Surat.

The

The preſent low State of our Finances, and the indiſpenſable Occaſions we have for our own unavoidable Expences, make it utterly impoſſible for us to engage to accept General Goddard's Drafts, or to give the Chiefs of Surat and Broach Authority for that Purpoſe. It muſt be obſerved, that ſince the Date of General Goddard's Letter, we have directed the Chief of Surat to advance him Two Lacks out of the expected Loans at that Place, which the Chief in his Letter before us acquaints us he ſhould accordingly pay; and we truſt this Sum will prove a conſiderable Relief to the Exigencies of the Army: But ſtill, to provide as far as we poſſibly can for their further Demands, it is now alſo reſolved to empower the Chiefs of Surat and Broach to make good to General Goddard, for the Service of the Army, the Amount they may recover from the new-acquired Purgunnahs, and this is the utmoſt we can poſſibly do to aſſiſt him.

General Goddard muſt be again reminded of the Inability of our Garriſons at Surat and Broach to protect and ſecure the Purgunnahs, which he has deſired them to take Poſſeſſion of, and that we cannot ſpare a Man from this Garriſon. It appears to us he might add much to his Reſources by enabling our Settlements to ſecure the Collections of ſuch extenſive Diſtricts, and it will reſt with him to determine whether this can be effected without Injury to the Service, by any Diſpoſition of the Forces under his Command.

Wm Hornby,
D. Draper.

Adjourned.

Edwd Ravenſcroft, Secry.

Extract of a Letter from General Goddard.

Gentlemen,

I beg to acknowledge your Letter of the 18th Inſtant, mentioning the Arrival of the Ship Elizabeth with Stores from Madras, upon the Subject of which I have already wrote you.

I beg now to addreſs you in the moſt particular Manner, on the Subject of the Money for the Pay and Subſiſtence of the Troops. I ventured to aſſure you, when at Bombay, that with the Ten Lacks coming round from Bengal, and the Money I ſhould myſelf be able to procure at this Place for Bills on the Honourable Governor General and Supreme Council, I hoped to prevent the Inconvenience of a Want of Caſh, till the effectual Supply which I was certain would be ſent by the Government of Bengal, when they received Intelligence of the War in which they were involved, might arrive. Of the Ten Lacks above mentioned, Five only are come to hand; the Remainder, in Specie, is ſhipped on the Britannia, and on the Way; ſo that my Expectations on that Account have met with a temporary Delay in their Gratification: And with reſpect to the Reſource I aſſured myſelf of finding in my Credit with the Merchants of Surat, I have been entirely diſappointed by the Inſtructions tranſmitted by your Committee to the Chief, to borrow Money upon Account of the Company, which has put a Total Stop to my Drafts. It was my Belief for ſome Time, that the Expedient thus adopted by your Government was intended for the Support of the common Cauſe; but I find you propoſe reſerving whatever Money may be thus borrowed to be ſent to your Treaſury at Bombay. I know, Gentlemen, your own Scarcity of Caſh, but I beg Leave alſo to repreſent the Expediency and ſound Policy of aſſiſting and relieving my Wants all in your Power: For theſe Reaſons, let me propoſe that you will authorize your Chiefs of Surat and Broach to advance me any Sums which the Neceſſity of the Service only ſhall compel me to draw for; that you will be pleaſed to direct the Amount of the Revenues collected from the new Purgunnahs to be appropriated to the Expences of the preſent War, for which they will be a very timely Supply, and paid to me; and that you will adopt ſuch other Expedient for the Convenience and Benefit of the Service, and to relieve my preſent Diſtreſs, as you may judge moſt eligible, either by permitting me to make Drafts on your Treaſury, which may be accepted by you as Loans and Depoſits, or otherwiſe as your own Wiſdom and Experience in theſe Matters may ſuggeſt, &c.

I have the Honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient,
humble Servant,
Thomas Goddard.

Camp near Surat,
30th December 1779.

Extract of a Letter from Surat.

The Sum of Two Lacks ſhall be paid to General Goddard agreeable to your Directions, and as faſt as the different Perſons that have engaged for Loans pay the ſame into the Treaſury, it ſhall be tranſmitted to the Preſidency; but it will be the Middle of next Month before the Whole is collected, as ſeveral of the Merchants, on aſſenting to their Loans, particularly ſpecified Two Periods for making good the ſame.

I am, with great Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient, humble Servant,
Rawſon Hart Boddam.

Surat,
7th January 1780.

APPENDIX, N° 344, 346.

To Brigadier General Goddard.

Sir,

Our Letter of the 27th ultimo, acquainting you of the Effort we have made to aſſiſt you by directing the Chief of Surat to advance you Two Lacks of Rupees for the Service of the Army, which you were not apprized of at the Date of your laſt Letter; but with the moſt zealous and cordial Inclination to relieve your Wants, the low State of our Finances, and the indiſpenſable Occaſions we have for every Rupee we can raiſe from our ſtated Reſources, for our own unavoidable Expences, make it utterly impoſſible for us to engage to accept your Drafts, or to give the Chiefs of Surat and Broach unlimited Authority for that Purpoſe—The Supply juſt mentioned, will, we truſt, prove a conſiderable Relief to your Exigencies; and in order to provide to the utmoſt Extent of our Power for your further Demands, we ſhall now direct the Chiefs of Surat and Broach to pay to your Order the Amount of ſuch Collections as they may make from the new Purgunnahs, if the Neceſſity of the Service ſhould compel you to require ſuch Supply, which we ſhould be very glad may not be the Caſe; but this is the utmoſt we can do to aſſiſt you.

Our Sentiments reſpecting the Expediency of protecting the Purgunnahs adjoining to Surat and Broach were made known to you in our laſt Letter, with the Inability of thoſe Garriſons to ſuch an extenſive Service; and the Chief of Surat has ſince acquainted us, that the Motion of the whole Army to the Northward has put it entirely out of his Power to make Detachments for ſecuring the Purgunnahs that were to fall under his Charge, which made the firſt of the Plan recommended to you. It appears to us you might add much to your Reſources by enabling our Settlements to ſecure the Collections of ſuch extenſive Diſtricts, and it will reſt with you to determine whether this can be effected without Injury to the Service by any Diſpoſition of the Forces under your Command.

We are,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient,
humble Servants,
William Hornby,
&c. Committee.

Bombay Caſtle,
11th January 1780.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 28th January 1780.

To General Goddard.

Sir,

We have received your Letters of the 6th and 10th Inſtant.

We have the Pleaſure to acquaint you that the Britannia is arrived at Bengal, and now proceeds to Surat with a Conſignment of Eight Lacks of Rupees in Specie for the Service of the Army under your Command. This ample Supply will, we doubt not, render it unneceſſary for you to paſs any Drafts upon the Settlements of Surat and Broach, in conſequence of the Latitude lately given you, and which we therefore deſire you will not make, as our own Exigencies for Money are very preſſing.

The Governor General and Council alſo acquaint us, that they ſhall ſoon ſend you a further Supply of Two Lacks by the Beſborough.

We are,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servants,
William Hornby,
&c. Committee.

Bombay Caſtle,
28th January 1780.

APPENDIX, N° 346.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 15th May 1780.

Extract of a Letter from Brigadier General Goddard:

Gentlemen,

3. THE Settlement of Guzerat being effectually accompliſhed by the Conqueſt of Ahmedabad, and the Expulſion of all the Garriſons belonging to the Maratta Miniſter, before ſtationed in the different Purgunnahs to collect the Revenues of the Province, I had full Leiſure to attend to the Buſineſs which next appeared of the greateſt Importance; and accordingly, having left Major Fullerton with Eight Companies of Sepoys drafted from the ſeveral Battalions, and Two Field Pieces, in a ſtrong Poſt within the City of Ahmedabad, formerly the Reſidence of the Guicawar Collector of Futty Sing's Share of the Revenues, in order to aſſiſt in the Defence and Settlement of the Place; and further, to ſecure a uſeful and decided Influence to the Engliſh in the Northern Part of the Province,

vince, I marched myſelf with the Remainder of the Army to the River Myhie, which I croſſed on the 6th Inſtant, having previouſly ſent off all my heavy Stores, Artillery, and unneceſſary baggage, to Cambait, to be ſent from thence to Broach.

10. I muſt here beg Leave to obſerve, that of the Reinforcements ordered to join me from Madras, Five hundred Europeans only, under the Command of Colonel Browne who commands the Whole of the Detachment, have arrived at Surat.

11. No Part of the Troops from Tellicherry are joined, owing to Cauſes that appear to me moſt unaccountable, but which have been alledged, very unfortunately for the preſent Juncture, to render the Service of ſo large a Force totally uſeleſs to this Campaign; for by the laſt Advices they were detained merely to oppoſe the Irruptions of the Nairs; a Race of Banditti who poſſeſs the Hills adjoining to Tellicherry. Although Colonel Braithwaite, in the Letters he formerly wrote me, aſcribed the Detention of the Mahie Detachment to his Fears of Hyder's hoſtile Deſigns, which have ſince proved without Foundation; but admitting that the Tellicherry Troops were now permitted to ſet out, the Seaſon is ſo far advanced that they could not poſſibly arrive in Time to be employed upon any Service before the ſetting in of the Rains.

12. I muſt beg Leave here to repreſent the conſiderable Increaſe of Expence that will be requiſite to maintain all theſe additional Troops who will look to be ſupported by me as their Commander and immediate Repreſentative of your Supreme Government. I ſhould expect and think it muſt be deemed ſtrictly conſiſtent with Juſtice and Propriety, that every Acceſſion of Revenue which may immediately ariſe to the Company from Operations of this War, ſhould be ſet aſide and ſolely appropriated to aſſiſt in defraying the Expences of it, and hope you will ſignify your Sentiments to the Select Committee of Bombay accordingly; but as the Collection of theſe newly acquired, and ſo likely to be the Scene of future Hoſtilities, muſt at preſent be very precarious and uncertain, let me entreat you will continue to ſend me ſuch Supplies of Money as will be abſolutely neceſſary to ſupport the large Army I ſhall have with me, and prevent my having Recourſe to the Expedient of drawing Bills on your Honourable Board, which I might perhaps be compelled to do at a very conſiderable Loſs.

I have the Honour to be, &c.
(Signed) Thomas Goddard.

APPENDIX, N° 347.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 1ſt May 1780.

AGREED that the following Letter be written to Bombay:

Gentlemen,

We have received your Letter of the 31ſt January.

In order to enable us to make an early Proviſion for any future Supplies which you may require from us, we deſire that you will tranſmit to us as ſoon as poſſible an Eſtimate of your probable Receipts and Diſburſements for the enſuing Year, included between the 30th of April 1780 and the 1ſt of May 1781; with an Account of the actual Receipts and Diſburſements of your Government for the preceding Year, ending the 30th April 1780.

We further deſire to be furniſhed with a ſeparate Eſtimate of the groſs Revenue and Charges of Collection of the Purgunnahs or Diſtricts ceded to the Honourable Company by the Treaties of Poorunder, and that lately concluded with Futty Sing Guicawar, alſo an Account of your bonded Debt, with the Amount of Intereſt due thereon up to the lateſt Period.

We are, &c.
Warren Haſtings,
P. Francis,
Edw[d] Wheler.

Fort William,
the 1ſt May 1780.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 11th September 1780.

PRESENT,
The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Philip Francis, } Eſquires.
Edward Wheler, }
Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote, K. B.

Read the following Letter from the Preſident and Select Committee at Bombay: Gentlemen,

Gentlemen,

We have the Honour to encloſe a Duplicate of our Letter of the 6th ultimo, and have ſince received your Letter of the 15th of May, to which we ſhall ſhortly reply more fully. In the mean Time we muſt expreſs our very earneſt Hope, that the Meaſure we have adopted for relieving you from the heavy Expence of the Bengal Army will meet with your firm Support, and that you will exert your extenſive Reſources to the utmoſt to ſend round the neceſſary Supplies this Seaſon to give full Efficacy to our Plan, and put an End to ſuch inſupportable Drains from your Treaſury in future.

We are, &c.

Bombay Caſtle,
30th July 1780.

(Signed) Wm Hornby, &c.
Select Committee.

APPENDIX, N° 348.

Bengal Public Conſultations, the 3d October 1780.

Extract of a Letter from the Preſident and Council of Bombay; dated 17th Auguſt 1780.

WE have received your Letter of the 1ſt May, and in conſequence thereof now forward the following Accounts; moſt earneſtly requeſting that you will take the moſt effectual Meaſures for ſending us ample and ſpeedy Supplies, as we are now in the utmoſt Diſtreſs for Money to defray even our ordinary Expences.

The Accounts above mentioned are,

N° 1. Eſtimate of the Honourable Company's probable Receipts and Diſburſements at this Preſidency, for the Year 1780-1.

N° 2. Account of the Receipt and Diſburſements at this Preſidency and Factories ſubordinate, for the Year ending the 30th April laſt.

N° 3. Eſtimate of the groſs Revenue ceded to the Honourable Company by the Treaty of Poorunder.

N° 4 Account Ceſſions made by the Treaty concluded with Futty Sing, and of the Conqueſts in conſequence of the War with the Marattas.

N° 5. Statement of the neat Revenues at the Preſidency and Factories ſubordinate.

N° 6. Account of the Bonded Debt at this Preſidency, made up with Intereſt to the 30th April laſt.

We have the Honour, &c.

Bombay Caſtle,
17th Auguſt 1780.

(Signed) Wm Hornby,
&c. Council.

Extract of Appendix to Fort William Consultations the 3d October 1780.

Dr. { An Estimate of the probable Receipts and Disbursements of the Honourable Company, at their Presidency of Bombay, and the Settlements subordinate thereto, for the Year 1780—1. } Cr.

RECEIPTS.

AT THE PRESIDENCY.

The Tobacco Farm Ann[l] Rent	61,400	—	—
Arrack Farm D°	41,000	—	—
Rent of Villages and Batta Grounds	10,840	—	—
Duty on Salt, eſtimated at	8,824	1	95
Quit and Ground Rent, D°	7,718	2	18
Batta Grounds gained by ſtopping the Breach, D°	2,350	2	91
The Cedery, D°	3,699	1	56
Penſion	7,705	3	43
Tax on the Landed Eſtates, D°	7,250	1	23
	1,50,708	1	73
Deduct the Collector's Charges, and the Charges ſurveying the Land	5,014	1	50
	1,55,694	—	23
Balance in the Treaſury the 18 May laſt	6,72,953	1	75
Due on Account Bills of Exchange	7,7,547	3	50
Due from the ſeveral Purchaſers at the Public Sales, the Clearance of which is yet uncertain	2,89,606	3	76
The Expected Amount of private Sales in the different Offices; viz[t].			
Cutcherry Sales	17,000	—	—
Marine Sales	10,000	—	—
Warehouſe	60,000	—	—
Marine Storekeeper	50,000	—	—
Price of the Books, &c[a]	20,000	—	—
	1,50,000	—	—
The Supply and Amount of Cargoes in the Courſe of the Year; viz[t].			
Bombay Cargoes	2,00,000	—	—
Marine D°	8,000	—	—
Bandora D°	5,000	—	—
	2,13,000	—	—
Sale of Europe Goods	6,00,000	—	—
The Amount of Cash ſent on the Court of Directors	1,00,000	—	—
	22,48,802	1	2
Carried over	22,48,802	1	2

DISBURSEMENTS.

AT THE PRESIDENCY.

Wanted to defray the Expences of the ſeveral Offices, taken from the laſt Accounts given in; viz[t].						
The Military Paymaſter's Amount laſt Year	—			11,39,976	2	53
Add for 7 new Battalions of Sepoys raiſing for the Service of this Eſtabliſhment, the Amount Expences whereof are eſtimated at a Lack of Rupees each	—			7,00,000	—	—
				18,39,976	2	53
The Land Paymaſter's Amount laſt Year	—			3,72,955	3	60
Marine Paymaſter's D°	—	3,46,329	2 19			
Add the following Veſſels on the Stocks; viz[t].						
One Ship and Two Snows	—	2,00,000	— —			
One Luggage Boat, One Water Boat	—	—	18,000 — —			
				5,64,329	2	19
The Military Storekeeper's Amount laſt Year	—			3,00,435	1	59
General Storekeeper D°	—	—		1,50,261	1	51
Paymaſter of the new Works D°	—	—		4,38,774	—	99
Powder Houſe Committees D°	—	—		30,441	3	50
Batta for 10 Battalions, ſuppoſed to be on Service this Year, at 4,500 each per Month, and for 8 Months				3,60,000	—	—
				23,561	3	72
Account Salary, as per laſt Account	—	—				
Dewanree to the Preſident and Council, the Commander in Chief, Field Officers, &c. &c.	—			1,50,312	3	24
Stable Charges	—	—	— —	8,000	—	—
						1,81,674 2 96
To compleat the Stock of a China Ship	—			—	—	2,75,000 — —
A Cargo of Cotton for one Ship to Bengal	—			—	—	40,000 — —
For an Inveſtment of Piece Goods and Arrangoes	—			—	—	2,00,000 — —
The annual Supplies to the Malabar Coaſt	—			—	—	4,00,000 — —
Contingencies	—	—	—	—	—	3,00,000 — —
						54,53,849 2 87
Carried forwards						54,53,849 2 87

(88)

RECEIPTS continued.

Brought forward —	22,48,802	1 2
AT SURAT.		
Revenues; viz[t].		
Caſtle Revenue amounted laſt Year to — — —	42,353 — 74	
Tanka D° — — — — — —	87,404 1 51	
Mowa, and Vagnagur Mandavee — — — —	985 — —	
Latty Cuſtoms — — — — — —	48,246 — 47	
The Ceded Purgunnahs — — — — —	1,07,535 3 04	
	2,86,524	1 76
AT BROACH; viz[t].		
Purgunnah Revenues, as per laſt Year's Jemmabundy — —	4,79,654 — 20	
Corul, Purgunnah — — — — —	28,087 2 80	
Ahmode, &c[a]. Rawderres — — — —	1,805 1 01	
The Mint — — — — — —	4,620 — 26	
Phorza Duties — — — — — —	54,413 — 36	
Jambooſer Revenues — — — — —	3,06,915 1 08	
Tribute — — — — — —	54,788 2 90	
	9,30,284 — 61	

Annual Revenues of the Northern Poſſeſſions, by virtue of the with Futty Sing, and the Conqueſts in conſequence of the War, which, by an Account received from the Chief of Surat, amounts to the Sum of Rupees 24,51,700.; but, from the preſent unſettled State of the Country, the Collection thereof is very uncertain. for which Reaſon no Part of it can be reckoned upon as a probable Receipt, and is not therefore included in this Eſtimate.

The Chief of Surat has adviſed the Select Committee, that the Company's Tannahs are fixed in all theſe Diſtricts, and that he hopes to make " a handſome Collection " this Year.

AT TANNAH; viz[t].

For the Nett Amount Revenues on Salſette, eſtimated as per laſt Accounts — —	2,14,640	1 20
Carried over	36,80,251 — 81	

DISBURSEMENTS continued.

Brought over —		54,53,8,9 2 87
AT SURAT.		
Diſburſements in the ſeveral Offices, eſtimated at the Expences of laſt Year; viz[t].		
Military Paymaſter's — — — —	1,74,845 3 40	
Land D° — — — — —	1,01,611 — 23	
Purſer Marine — — — —	72,580 3 66	
Storekeeper's — — — —	96,884 3 78	
	4,45,922 3 07	
Durbar Charges amounted laſt Year — —	11,554 2 —	
Account Preſents, Factory, Rent, Charges on Merchandize —	23,326 3 04	
Contingencies — — — — —	50,000 — —	
Account Salary — — — — —	3,312 — —	
		5,34,116 — 11
AT BROACH; viz[t].		
Diſburſements in the ſeveral Offices, as above; viz[t].		
Military Paymaſter's — — — —	2,52,327 3 02	
Land D° — — — — —	1,22,705 1 19	
Storekeeper's — — — —	1,12,628 — 47	
Steward's — — — —	17,271 2 10	
	5,04,932 2 78	
Account Salary — — —	3,693 2 —	
Jambooſier Diſburſements — — —	41,981 3 08	
Contingencies — — — — —	50,000 — —	
		6,00,607 3 86
AT TANNAH.		
Diſburſements in the ſeveral Offices, as above viz[t].		
General Paymaſter's — — —	3,77,321 — 09	
Storekeeper's — — — —	33,647 3 78	
Steward's — — — —	21,605 2 42	
	4,32,574 2 29	
Account Salary — — —	2,338 2 68	
Perſovah Diſburſements — — —	49 627 2 57	
Batta at the Out-Ports — — —	28,358 2 —	
	77,986 — 57	
Contingencies — — — —	50,000 — —	
		5,62,899 1 54
Carried over —	71,51,473 — 38	

RECEIPTS continued.		
Brought over —		36,80,251 — 81
AT CARANJAH.		
For the Nett Revenues collected at Caranjah, Hog, and Elephanta Iſlands — —		52,410 1 62
AT FORT VICTORIA.		
For the Revenues collected there, being the Cuſtoms, Rent of Villages, and Farm of the Paſſage Boats — — — — — — — —		8,216 2 38
AT TELLICHERRY.		
The Revenues collected there before the Troubles, amounted to about Rupees 33,000; but we fear little or nothing has been collected ſince, and therefore cannot look upon any Part thereof as a probable Receipt.		
AT ANJENGO.		
The Rent of Cotadilly Farm — — — — — —		833 2 —
AT PERSIA.		
Buſhire Reſidency Receipts laſt Year.		
Freight of Pearl and Treaſure — — — — —	700 — 36	
Account Cuſtoms — — — — —	4,385 3 44	
		5,085 3 80
To balance which, our probable Diſburſements exceed our probable Receipts the enſuing Year — — — — — — — —		38,34,492 — 85
Rupees —		75,81,289 3 46

DISBURSEMENTS; vizt.		
Brought over —		71,51,473 — 38
AT CARANJAH.		
Account Diſburſements, taken from laſt Year's Account — — —		22,050 1 65
AT FORT VICTORIA.		
Amount Diſburſements, taken as above — — — — —		45,299 — 94
AT TELLICHERRY.		
Amount Diſburſements, as above.		
Land Paymaſter's — — — —	46,073 — 92	
Military D° — — — —	1,77,405 2 99	
Storekeeper D° — — — —	12,499 3 20	
Steward's D° — — — —	9,509 3 53	
	2,45,488 2 64	
Purchaſe of Stores under the Warehouſe Keeper — —	5,070 — 50	
Account Salary — — — — —	767 3 67	
Contingencies — — — — —	50,000 — —	
AT ANJENGO.		
Charges of the Land Pay Office, about — — — —	24,000 — —	
Military D° — — — — — —	2,400 — —	
Contingencies D° — — — — — —	10,000 — —	
		36,400 — —
AT PERSIA; vizt.		
Buſſorah Preſidency, the Charges thereof eſtimated at about —	8,000 — —	
Buſhire Preſidency,		
Charges of the Settlement — — —	14,585 3 60	
Supplies under the Head of Acc^{t} Cur^{t} Bombay —	2,050 — 60	
Charges on Merchandize — — —	124 1 48	
	16,740 1 68	
		24,740 1 68
Rupees —		75,81,289 3 46

N. B. As the Revenues from the late Acquiſitions are not eſtimated in this Account, ſo neither are the Advances which may be made to General Goddard.

Bombay Caſtle, the 16th Auguſt 1780.
Errors excepted,
(Signed) Jam. Anderſon,
Sub Accountant.

Account

Dr. { Account of the Receipts and Diſburſements of the Honourable Company, at their Preſidency of Bombay, and Settlements ſubordinate thereto, for the Year ending the 30th April 1780. } Cr.

RECEIPTS.

AT THE PRESIDENCY.

On Account Goods ſold at different public Sales — —	7,32,261	1	75
Received from the Collector on Accounts, Rents, and Revenues —	1,80,062	3	95
The Bonded Debt for the Difference between the Receipts and Payments under this Head — — — —	9,24,405	2	4
Balmuccundaſs, &c[a], Minters, the Amount received of them, on account the Coinage of Copper into Pice — — —	36,823	2	59
The Amount received on Account Certificates on the Court of Directors, on Account the Privilege of the Captain and Officers belonging to the Europe Ships — — — —	1,07,600	1	74
Received from Cuſtom Maſter; viz[t].			
On Account Bombay Cuſtoms — — 2,37,202 3 99			
D° Mahim and Bandorah D° — — 17,943 2 28			
	2,55,146	2	27
Received from Bengal, for Remittances and Bill of Exchange —	7,19,669	1	50
The Eſtate of Benjamin Jarvis, received for an Advance made to him at Surat — — — — — —	1,000	—	—
Account Tonnage collected in the Year — — —	1,679	—	—
Bombay Bank, received on that Account — — —	8,125	1	18
The Military Storekeeper, received from him, on Account his Sales	26,077	3	58
General Storekeeper, D° — — — —	12,429	1	50
Marine Paymaſter, D° on Account Collections — —	25,336	1	27
Warehouſekeeper, D° his Sales — — — —	1,87,516	3	18
		32,18,134	2 55

DISBURSEMENTS.

AT THE PRESIDENCY.

The Expences in the ſeveral Offices; viz[t].			
In the Department of the Military Paymaſter — — —	11,39,976	2	53
Land D° — — —	3,72,955	3	60
Marine D° — — —	3,46,329	2	19
Military Storekeeper — —	3,00,435	1	59
General D° — — —	1,50,261	1	51
New Fortification Paymaſter — —	4,38,774	—	99
Powder Houſe Committee — —	30,441	3	50
	27,79,174	3	91
Stable Charges.			
Paid the Balance of laſt Year — — 4,000 — —			
the Amount of this Year — — 8,000 — —			
	12,000	—	—
The Poona Committee, paid the Balance of their Account —	4,408	3	60
Account Current Loudon Payments under this Head, being for Paſſage Money, &c[a]. &c[a]. — — — — —	33,330	—	—
The Amount paid for Freight of Sandal Wood, Pepper, &c[a]. —	32,066	2	17
Cloathing the Army under the Command of General Goddard —	19,292	1	75
Remittance to Onore, per Ship Reſolution, for the Purchaſe of Rice, but which could not arrive in Time to be entered on the Reſident's Diſburſements — — — — — —	62,940	3	73
Sundry Payments on Account Poona Reſidency — —	11,059	1	—

RECEIPTS continued.

Brought over			32,18,134 2 55
AT SURAT.			
On Account Remittances from Bengal	14,19,208 2 19		
D° Goods conditionally ſold	1,64,552 2 38		
D° Revenues under the Collector General	1,34,240 3 88		
D° D° D° of the Revenues	63,030 2 89		
D° D° Phoerza and Latty	36,125 — —		
D° D° the Derega Ship	661 — —		
Borrowed at Intereſt	3,68,341 — 99		
			21,86,160 — 33
AT BROACH.			
Revenues under the Collector	3,28,291 — 14		
Deduct Loans to the Villages, to promote Cultivation	1,54,680 — —		
	1,73,611 — 14		
Revenues from the Phoorza and Mint	46,848 2 30		
Receipt on Account Sale of Goods	75,876 1 84		
Borrowed at Intereſt	1,20,000 — —		
Recoverances on Account the Expedition againſt the Coolies	4,320 — —		
AT JAMBOOSEER; vizt.			
Revenues under the Collector	2,19,343 — —		
D° from the Phaerzah	30,189 1 49		
Recoverances on Account of the Expedition againſt the Coolies	2,462 2 4		
	2,51,994 3 53		6,72,650 3 81
AT TANNAH.			
Revenues under the Collector	63,648 2 —		
D° Cuſtom Maſter	24,966 2 —		
The Warehouſekeeper, on Account Sales	3,750 — —		
AT VERSOVAH; vizt.			
Collectors on Account Revenues	37,429 3 81		
Account Cuſtoms	4,776 — 8		
	42,205 — 89		1,39,570 3 89

Sundry Payments on Account Poona Expedition		91,464 1 40	
D° on Account Mr. Farmer's Hoſtage with Moodajee Scindia		25,160 — —	
D° on Account Fort Saint George Preſidency		13,996 2 16	
D° on Account Mr. Horſeley's proceeding to Bengal		6,953 3 30	
D° on Account the Office of Police		12,927 2 —	
Purchaſe of Arrack		3,750 — —	
D° Gannies		16,731 — 46	
D° Ghee		20,000 — —	
D° Houſe for the Secretary		8,026 — —	
A Payment to Dr Peters, on Account Ragonaut Row		2,000 — —	
An Advance to Bombay Country			
Account Salary at the Preſidency	23,277 2 52		
Duanny to the Preſident and Council, &c^a.	1,49,287 2 53		
		1,72,565 1 10	33,32,657 3 58
AT SURAT.			
Diſburſements in the ſeveral Offices; vizt.			
Military Paymaſter		1,74,845 3 40	
Land Paymaſter		1,01,611 — 23	
Purſer Marine		72,580 3 66	
Storekeeper		96,884 3 78	
		4,45,922 3 7	
Payments from the Treaſury; vizt.			
The Contracts for Piece Goods		79,440 2 —	
Remittances to Cambay		21,000 — —	
Sundries, under the Head of Account Preſents,			
Factory Rent Charges on Merchandize, &c^a.		23,326 3 4	
Durbar Charges		11,554 2 —	
Account Salary		3,312 — —	
Advances to General Goddard		6,00,000 — —	
Payments to the Chief, on Account Services ordered by the Select Committee		43,112 2 99	
			12,27,669 1 10

AT CARANJAH.

Received on Account Rents and Revenues in the Courſe of this Year	—	—		33,226	1 58

AT FORT VICTORIA.

The Amount received in Revenues and Cuſtoms, &c^t. &c^a. —	—	—		4,386	2 96

AT VINGORLA.

The Amount received in Revenues — — — —	11,189	3 28			
Received on Account of out-ſtanding Debts of Remittances to Onore	5,354	3 —			
				15,544	2 28

AT ONORE.

The Amount received on Account Sale of Cloth — —	8,657	— 34			
Taken by the Reſident out of our Remittances from Bengal, per Beſborough — — — — — —	41,395	1 25			
				50,052	1 59

AT TELLICHERRY.

The Amount received on Account Revenue, Cuſtoms, &c. —	8,029	2 54			
D° Sales — — — — —	7,959	1 40			
Taken by the Reſident out of our Remittances from Bengal, per Beſborough — — — — — —	2,50,554	2 54			
Borrowed at Intereſt — — — 1,90,342	2 30				
Deduct paid — — — — 12,947	1 7				
	1,77,395	1 23			
				4 43,938	3 71

AT ANJENGO.

No late Accounts from the Settlement have been received: The Rent of Cotadilly muſt have been collected — — — — — — —				833	2 —

AT BAROCHE.

Diſburſements in the ſeveral Offices; vizt.					
Military Paymaſter — — — — —	2,52,327	3 2			
Land D° — — — — — —	1,22,705	1 19			
Storekeeper — — — — —	1,12,628	— 47			
Steward — — — — — —	17,271	2 10			
	5,04,932	2 78			
Payments from the Treaſury; vizt.					
On Account Purchaſe of Cotton — — — —	36,369	— 41			
Account Salary — — — — —	3,693	2 —			
Payments to the Chief, on Account Services ordered by the Select Committee — — — — —	75.000	— —			
Advanced to General Goddard — — — —	1,30,000	— —			
Amount Diſburſements at Jambooſeer — — —	41, 8:	3 8			
				7,91,977	— 27

AT TANNAH.

Diſburſements in the ſeveral Offices; vizt.					
The General Paymaſter — — — 3,77,321	— 9				
Storekeeper — — 33,647	3 78				
Steward — — — 21,605	2 42				
	4,32,574	2 29			
Account Salary — — — — —	2,338	2 68			
Verſovan Diſburſements — — — 49,627	2 57				
Proviſions to the Out-Poſts — — — 28,358	2 —				
	77,986	— 57			
				5,12,859	1 54

AT CARANJAH.

Amount Diſburſements, as per Reſident's Account for laſt Year — — —				22,050	1 65

AT FORT VICTORIA.

Amount Diſburſements, as per Reſident's Account for laſt Year — — —				45,299	2 94

AT VINGORLA.

Amount Diſburſements, as per Reſident's Account for laſt Year — — —				53,850	— 64

AT ONORE.

Advances on Account Pepper — — — — — —				2,55,984	1 9

AT PERSIA.			
Bushire, received on Account Customs — — — —	4,385 3 44		
D° Freight of Pearl and Treasure — — — —	700 — 36		
Exchange — — — — — —	500 — —		
		5,585 3 80	
		67,70,085 — 50	
Carried forward —		67,70,085 — 50	

AT ONORE.			
Sundries under the Heads of Account Salary, Charges on Merchandize, &c^a. — — — — — —		4,496 — 17	
Advances under the Head of Account Current Bombay — —		3,027 2 95	
Amount Disbursements — — — — — —		18,782 — 99	
			2,82,290 1 20
AT TELLICHERRY.			
Disbursements in the several Offices; vizt.			
Land Paymaster — — — — —		46,073 — 92	
Military D° — — — — — —		1,77,405 2 99	
Storekeeper — — — — — —		12,499 3 20	
		2,35,978 3 11	
Payments from the Treasury; vizt.			
Charges on Account Callicut — —	6,500 — —		
For the Purchase of Rice, &c^a. — —	2,22,853 2 49		
On Account the Steward — — —	9,509 3 53		
On Account Stores under the Warehousekeeper and Land Paymaster — — —	5,070 — 50		
Account Salary — — — —	767 3 67		
Charges incurred by the Attack made by the Prince of Cherika — — —	44,236 1 32		
On Account Fort St George Presidency — — 1,48,418 3 46			
Deduct received — — 41,839 — —			
	1,90,257 3 46		
		3,95,517 2 97	
			6,31,496 2 8
AT ANJENGO.			
The Disbursements of the Land Pay Office — — —		24,000 — —	
Military D° — — —		2,400 — —	
			26,400 — —

Brought over — — — — —	67,70,085 — 50	
By Balance, arising from ſome Part of the Diſburſements for this Year, made in the ſeveral Offices, for which Payments have not yet been made from the Treaſury — —	2,03,246 — 18	
		At PERSIA.
		Buſſorah Preſidency. No late Accounts received, but the Expences therefore eſtimated at Rupees 2,500 per Month — — — 30,000 — —
		Buſhire D°, as per their Books, ending 30th April laſt, viz.
		Sundry Charges under the Head of Account Current, Bombay, for Supplies to Cruizers, &c. — — 2,030 — 60
		Charges General, for the Charges of the Settlement, under ſundry Heads — — — 14,585 3 60
		Charges on Merchandize — — — 124 1 48
		16,740 1 68
		46,740 1 68
Rupees — —	69,73,331 — 68	Rupees — — 69,73,331 — 68

Bombay, Auguſt 1780. Errors excepted.

(Signed) Jam. Anderſon,
Sub Accountant.

APPENDIX, N° 348.

Eſtimate of the groſs Revenue of the Country ceded to the Honourable Company by the Treaty of Poorundur.

A Country ceded by the 5th Article, but never put in our Poſſeſſion — — — — — — 3,00,000 — —

The Revenues on Salſette, taken from the lateſt Accounts received from the Collector General; viz.

	Mor$	P$	B$	R$			
Money Revenues — —					—	87,911 2 55	
White Batta	5,480	10	4½,	at 20 per M.	—	1,09,608 — 72	
Oarts — — —					—	3,496 — —	
Gardens — —					—	408 — —	
Coolery — —					—	4,705 0 50	
Cuſtoms — — —					—	26,231 3 11	
							2,32,360 2 88

The Revenues on Caranjah, from the laſt Accounts, &c.

Farmers of Villages — —	—	16,714 — —	
Renters of the Salt Batta Grounds —	—	13,161 — 97	
The Fiſhery — —	—	2,595 — —	
Salt Pans — — —	—	1,070 — —	
Elephanta — —	—	730 1 60	
Hog Iſland — — —	—	826 — —	
The Tobacco Farm — —	—	1,300 — —	
Fort Hill — — —	—	71 — —	
Mourah Arrack Farm — —	—	53 — —	
The Paſſage Boats — —	—	1,820 — —	
Account Cuſtoms — —	—	15,235 — 34	
			53,575 2 91
			5,85,936 1 79
		Rupees —	5,85,936 1 79

Bombay Caſtle,
16th Auguſt 1780.

E. E.

(Signed) Jam. Anderſon,
Sub Accountant.

APPENDIX, N° 348.

Ceſſions in Conſequence of the Treaty with Futty Sing Guicawar, concluded by General Goddard.

The Country South of the Tappy being his Share of the Autouezee; viz.

Chouraſſee 17 Villages, Jaghire to Siccaram Bappoo	1,69,800 — —	
Ballifier	1,04,000 — —	
Muralee	56,000 — —	
Kamuge	88,500 — —	
Timbah	46,400 — —	
Cunode	46,400 — —	
Beara	14,000 — —	
Chokey at Bera	18,000 — —	
Tillaree	1,03,000 — —	
Nowſarree Cuſbah	14,200 — —	
Guhdavee	89,000 — —	
Billamoria	8,000 — —	
Monvah	55,400 — —	
Weelu Anah	12,000 — —	
Anawil, alias Coſe Anawil	12,000 — —	
Huſſint Pore	18,900 — —	
Antapore and Rana Amba	22,500 — —	
Soongur	42,000 — —	
Mootah Cuſbah	9,800 — —	
Surat Choute	42,000 — —	
Zinnore	81,000 — —	
		10,52,900 — —

Conqueſts in Conſequence of the War.

Purgunnahs South of the Tappy taken from the Marattas, being the Remainder of the Country called the Autorozee, the Collections of which are made by the Peſhwa.

Parneya	27,000 — —	
Boodſeer	6,200 — —	
Bowarree	8,800 — —	
Bulſar	85,000 — —	
Parchole	1,07,000 — —	
Soopah	51,000 — —	
Sarbone	30,900 — —	
Ballare	30,000 — —	
Bamalee Cuſbah	7,900 — —	
Handſah, Chout on it	7,000 — —	
Durampore, D° D°	9,000 — —	
Surat, Chout on it	42,000 — —	
Chakees South of the Tappy	83,000 — —	
	4,94,800 — —	

Purgunnahs between the Tappy and Nerbuddah.

Ulpar	3,16,000 — —	
Hamſood	85,000 — —	
Occlaſeer	78,000 — —	
Nandarree, Chout on it	65,000 — —	
	5,44,000 — —	

Purgunnahs between the Nerbuddah and Myhie.

Dubhay	2,00,000 — —	
Ahmud	1,25,000 — —	
Deſborah	35,000 — —	
	3,60,000 — —	
		13,98,800 — —
Rupees		24,51,700 — —

Bombay Caſtle,
16th Auguſt 1780.

E. E.

(Signed) Jam. Anderſon, Sub Accountant.

APPENDIX, N° 348.

Statement of the Annual Revenues, as they now ſtand at the Preſidency of Bombay and Factories ſubordinate, eſtimated from laſt Year's Receipts.

Bombay Preſidency.			
Revenues under the Collector.			
The Tobacco Farm; its Annual Rent — — — —			6,14,000 — —
The Arrack Farm; D° — — — — —			41,000 — —
Malabar Hill; leaſed out at the Annual Rent of — — —			305 — —
Quit Rent.			
The Annual Rent of Grounds let out to the Inhabitants for building of Houſes — — — —		8,107 2 88	
Deduct Charges of Collection — — —		389 — 70	
			7,718 2 18
Penſion.			
This Revenue ariſes from a Sum of Money which the Inhabitants of the Iſland, who were poſſeſſed of Landed Eſtates, agreed to give to the Company on their firſt taking Poſſeſſion thereof, in conſequence of their being continued in the free Enjoyment of their Eſtates without Moleſtation, and amounts per Annum to about — —		9,224 — 62	
Deduct Charges of Collection — — —		414 — 33	
			8,810 — 29
Tax on the Landed Eſtates, being 10 per Cent. on all Orts and Grounds; its general Amount — — —		8,383 2 47	
Deduct Charges of Collection — — —		290 1 46	
			8,093 1 1
The Coolery.			
An Annual Stipend collected from the Coolees for the Liberty of Fiſhing; its general Amount appears to be — —		4,417 1 13	
Deduct Charges of Collection — — —		818 3 17	
			3,598 1 96
Batty Grounds gained by ſtopping the Breach.			
A Revenue ariſing from Grounds gained by erecting the Breach Wall — — — —		2,744 — —	
Deduct Charges of Collection — — —		289 1 50	
			2,454 3 48
Salt.			
The general Amount of the Duty on this Article appears to be — — — —		11,840 2 40	
Deduct Charges of Collection — —		3,308 3 60	
			8,531 2 80
Rent of Old Woman's Iſland — — —		853 1 76	
Deduct Charges of Collection — — —		166 3 34	
			686 2 42
		1,42,598 2 14	1,42,598 2 14
Petty Tributes; the Amount Annually is	1,643 3 48		
Deduct Charges of Collection — —	154 1 70		
		1,489 1 78	
Rent of Villages and Batta Grounds; the Annual Produce is — — —	10,555 — —		
Deduct Charges of Collection —	246 — —		
		10,309 — —	
		1,54,396 3 92	
Deduct General Charges incurred in the Collector's Office — — —	2,076 2 —		
Surveyor's Allowance for 12 Months —	2,920 — —		
		4,996 2 —	
		1,49,400 1 92	

Bombay

Bombay Cuſtoms; the neat Amount for One Year, taken from the Cuſtom Maſter's Account — — —		1,86,036	3 34
Mahim and Bandorah Cuſtoms; the neat Amount as taken from the Cuſtom Maſter's Account — —		12,213	2 14
Account Tonnage — — —		1,679	— —
Coinage Duty — — — —		534	— 20
Duty filling Water at the Pier Head, for the Amount the Collection exceeds the Charges for One Year —		314	1 60
The Rope Walk, D° — — — —		565	3 54
			3,50,744 — 74

Surat Factory; Revenues thereat, viz.

Caſtle Revenues.			
The neat Amount of Revenues collected from ſundry Villages granted the Honourable Company by the Mogul's Phirmaund, obtained from after our taking the Caſtle, Anno 1759 — — — —		42,353	— 74
Tanka Revenues.			
The neat Amount collected for the Support of the Mogul's Fleet — — — —		81,715	2 22
The Honourable Company's Share of the Mint Revenue		5,688	3 29
		1,29,757	2 25

Surat Factory.

Mawai and Vagnagur Mandavie.			
The Honourable Company's Share of Cuſtoms collected there		985	— —

Sundry Duties collected at Surat, viz.

Surat Cuſtoms — — —	35,680	2 35		
Additional Duty on Malabar Pepper —	88	— 80		
Account Tonnage — —	205	— —		
			35,973	3 15

The ceded Purgunnahs, being ſundry Diſtricts granted by Futty Sing.

Chickley Purgunnah, agreeable to the Jemmibundy — —	82,001	— —			
Collected at the Chokies —	4,439	— —			
			86,440	— —	
Deduct Charges of Collection — —			9,445	— 13	
			76,984	3 87	
Batta Ghaung, agreeable to the Jummabundy	20,700	— —			
Collection at the Choukeys —	76	2 5			
			20,776	2 5	
Deduct Charges of Collection	2,053	1 74			
			18,723	— 31	
Verion Cuſbah, agreeable to the Jemmabundy	11,417	1 33			
Collected at the Choukies —	2,353	2 —			
			13,770	3 33	
Deduct Charges of Collection — —	1,943	— 47			
			11,827	2 86	
				1,07,535	3 4
					2,74,252 —

Broach

Broach Factory, Revenues thereat, viz.

Purgunnah Revenue, 1779.			
The Amount of the Jemmabundy — —		4,84,814 — 67	
Vajeefa, 1779.			
The Amount of the Rents of the Vajeefa Lands, and the Sums annually taken by the Guicawar Pundits, as Sooery from the Seven Vajeefa Villages, when they had a Footing in the Purgunnah — — —		9,550 1 37	
Petty Branches of the Revenue, the Tax levied upon the Cotton Charcas, the Rent of a few ſmall Villages in the Lol Buza, and the Duty on Salt made at Carodra —		5,333 — 54	
Deſſey Duſtoor.			
The Sums due from Purtrabroy and Anundray Deſſoys, on Account Money borrowed from the late Nabob, and which are annually rated at — —		600 — —	
		5,00,297 2 58	
Deduct the Charges of Collections — —		20,643 2 38	
		4,79,654 — 20	
Corul Purgunnah, 1779.			
Amount of the Jemmabundy —	31,267 2 —		
Deduct Charges of Collection and Gras to the Rajah of Rajahpeeptha —	3,179 3 20		
		28,087 2 80	
Ahmoode, Corul, and Occleſeer Rawdarrys.			
The Nett Amount of the Duties and Tolls collected there, in virtue of our being Proprietors of Broach —		1,805 1 1	
The Mint.			
Neat Amount of the Coinage Duty — —		4,620 — 26	
The Phoorza.			
Duties of every Denomination — —		54,413 — 36	
The Tribute.			
Its neat Amount — — —		54,788 2 90	
		6,23,368 3 53	

Jambooſeer Revenues, viz.

Purgunnah Revenues, 1779.			
Its neat Amount —	2,80,475 3 68		
The Phoorza.			
Duties of every Denomination —	26,439 1 40		
		3,06,915 1 8	
			9,30,284 — 61

Anjengo Reſidency.

The Rent of Coladitty Farm, which was a perpetual Grant from the King of Travencore and Princeſs of Attingah, 1731 — —			833 2 —

Tellicherry Reſidency.

Revenues collected on Durmapatam Iſland	5,494 — 92		
Durmapatam Rents —	4,719 — 21		
	10,213 1 13		
Deduct Charges of Collection —	434 2 —		
	9,778 3 13		

Rents and Revenues of Randoterrah, their Nett Amount			7,181 — 79	
Tellicherry and Molan Rents D°	— —		18,854 2 35	
Cuſtoms — — —	10,255 — 74			
Deduct the Annual Stipend allowed by the Prince of Collaſtra, in lieu of Cuſtoms — —	4,200 — —			
	6,055 — 74			
Deduct Charges of Collection —	585 — —			
		5,470 — 74		
				33,284 3 1
Fort Victoria Reſidency.				
Revenues thereat, viz.				
Account Cuſtoms — — — —			1,807 1 3	
Renters of Villages.				
For the neat Amount of their Yearly Rent — —			6,029 1 35	
Farmers of Paſſage Boats.				
The Amount of their Annual Leaſe — —			380 — —	
				8,216 2 38
Caranjah Reſidency.				
For the Produce of the following Villages and Farms leaſed out for the Term of Seven Years, from 1 May 1777; viz.				
Farmers of Villages.				
For the Rent of ſundry Villages and Farms — —			16,714 — —	
Renters of Batta Grounds.				
Their Annual Rent — — —			13,161 — 97	
The Fiſhery.				
For One Year's Rent thereof — — —			2,595 — —	
Salt Pans D° — — — —			1,070 — —	
Elephanta.				
The Amount, its Annual Rent — —			730 1 60	
Hog Iſland D° — — — —			826 — —	
Caranjah Reſidency.				
The Tobacco Farm.				
The Amount, its Annual Rent — —			1,300 — —	
Font Hill D° — — — —			71 — —	
Mourah Arrack Farm D° — — —			53 — —	
		36,520 2 57		
Deduct Charges of Collection — —		1,165 1 29		
		35,355 1 28		
The Paſſage Boat.				
For One Year's Rent — — —			1,820 — —	
		37,175 1 28		
Account Cuſtoms.				
The Net Amount for One Year — —			15,235 — 34	
				52,410 1 62
Tannah Factory. Revenues on Salſette, viz.				
Money Revenues — — —			87,911 2 55	

White

	Mor.			
White Batta	5,480 10 4½, at 20 Rup[s] per Mo. —	—	1,09,608 — 72	
Arts	— — —	—	3,496 — —	
Gardens	— — —	—	408 — —	
Coolery	— — —	—	4,705 — 50	
Cuſtoms	— — —	—	26,231 3 11	
			2,32,360 2 88	
Deduct Charges diſburſed on Account Tannah, Trombray, Maſale, Gorabunder, and Daruce Diſtricts — — —		9,097 3 77		
D° on Account Mallabar and Bandorah Diſtricts — — —		3,220 — 35		
D° on Account Cuſtoms — —		5,402 1 56		
			17,720 1 68	
				2,14,640 1 20
				18,64,665 3 73
The Amount of the Ceſſions, in conſequence of the Treaty with Futty Sing Guicawar, as per ſeparate Account — — —				24,51,700 — —
Total Amount of the Honourable Company's Yearly Revenues at the Preſidency of Bombay, and Factories ſubordinate thereto, eſtimated from the laſt Year's Receipts, except the preceding Article — — — — —				43,16,365 3 73

Bombay Caſtle,
16th Auguſt 1780.

E. E.

Signed Jam. Anderſon,
Sub Accountant.

AMOUNT due on Bond to ſeveral Perſons, made up with Intereſt to the 30th April 1780.

Rupees	— — —	—	50,89,213 3 13	

APPENDIX, N° 349.

Extract of a Letter from Brigadier General Goddard to the Governor General and Council: Dated Bombay, 6th September 1780; received 20th November.

I Shall take the earlieſt Opportunity of putting the Troops from Surat in Motion, which I apprehend, on account of the uncommon Quantity of Rain that has fallen this Year, and ſtill continues to fall, cannot poſſibly be before the Firſt of October.

Let me repeat my earneſt Solicitations, that you will exert every Endeavour to remedy the Evils already felt, and prevent thoſe ſtill more ſevere, which we muſt inevitably experience unleſs you ſtrain every Reſource at this Time to adminiſter Relief. I have ſo often troubled you with Repreſentations on this Subject, and you are yourſelves ſo well informed of the circumſcribed Means poſſeſſed by this Government towards extricating themſelves and me from our preſent Diſtreſs, that I feel at once the Impropriety of enlarging further on it.

APPENDIX, N° 350.

Extract of Bombay Select Conſultations, 6th March 1780.

THE Factors at Tellicherry muſt have Permiſſion to land from the Beſborough Two Lacks and a Half of Rupees out of the Five Lacks expected from Bengal on that Ship, having no other Method of ſupplying them to the Amount they require; and leſt the Ship ſhould have paſſed their Port, 50,000 Rupees will be immediately ſent from hence on a Veſſel which will be ordered for that Purpoſe.—The Reſident at Onore muſt alſo have Permiſſion to land One Lack of Rupees from the Beſborough.

13th March 1780.

Extract of a Letter to Mr. Richard Church, Reſident, &c. Factors at Tellicherry.

Gentlemen,

We have received your Letters of the 25th and 28th of January, and 2d, 9th, 11th, and 21ſt ultimo.

The Eagle arrived here the 7th Inſtant, with Mr. Petrie.

We have, as before adviſed, given you Authority to land Two Lacks and a Half of Rupees from the Beſborough out of the promiſed Supply from Bengal; and though it muſt be attended with Loſs to the Company, we can find no other Mode of ſupplying you to ſo large an Amount. But in caſe the Beſborough ſhould have paſſed Tellicherry before the Receipt of this Order, we now ſend you by the Morning Star, a Supply of Fifty Thouſand Rupees for your immediate Expences, and ſhall furniſh you with the Remainder of the Sum required in the moſt expeditious Manner; which we ſhall be very glad to ſee appropriated to the Purchaſe of Pepper, inſtead of being expended in Military Charges.

We cannot give any Orders about the Works at Tellicherry, till we receive what Mr. Dacer has to offer further upon the Method of putting them into a more compact State of Defence.

We encloſe a Copy of our Letter of this Date to Major Cotgrave, and an Invoice of the Treaſure and Stores on board the Morning Star, for your Settlement, the Whole amounting to - - - - - - Rupees.

After landing the Conſignments of the Morning Star, you will return her to the Preſidency immediately.

Bombay,
13th March 1780.

We are
Your loving Friends,
William Hornby,
&c. Committee.

APPENDIX, N° 350, 351.

Bombay, Tueſday 4th April 1780; At a Select Committee,

PRESENT,
The Honourable William Hornby, Eſquire, Preſident, and Governor,
Daniel Draper, Eſquire,
Mr. Carnac indiſpoſed and abſent.

Read Letters received from Tellicherry ſince our laſt Meeting

Tellicherry

As it will be utterly impoſſible for us to ſend any further Supply of Caſh to that Settlement, and if the Money there is expended in Purchaſes of Pepper, no Means will remain for defraying the Expences of its Troops for the Defence, which may be attended with the moſt alarming Conſequences; Directions muſt therefore be ſent to the Reſident and Factors to pay the firſt Attention to the Means of their own Safety, and that if they ſee no immediate Proſpect of the Troubles being accommodated, they muſt reſerve the Whole of their preſent Balance of Caſh for the Payment of their Garriſon, as they muſt not expect to receive any further Supply from us.

The Reſident and Factors t apply the Mea ther to the P ment of their Troops, if th is no Appear ance of the Troubles bein ſoon accomm dated.

APPENDIX, N° 351.

Extract of Bombay Select Conſultations, the 18th April 1781.

Letter from Governor General and Council at Fort William; dated 7th January 1781.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

IN our Letter of the 9th of October, which we have the Pleaſure to forward to you in Tranſcript, we acknowledge our Receipt of the Letter which you had written to us under Date the 17th of Auguſt. We have ſince received thoſe of the 11th and 23d September.

We have read with Attention your Preſident's Minute tranſmitted to us with your Letter of the 17th of Auguſt, and highly approve of the Sentiments therein delivered on a Plan of Operations for the enſuing Campaign: It ſeems to us to be the beſt that could be adopted at the Time when it was written; but ſince that Period, Events have taken place which could not have been foreſeen or provided for; the Intereſts of the Company requires, that the Operations of their Troops ſhould be directed againſt another Enemy, and that their Syſtem of Policy ſhould of courſe be changed. It has now become neceſſary that the whole Force which we are able to collect and to ſpare from the immediate Defence of our Preſidencies, ſhould be employed in curbing, and if poſſible, overſetting the increaſed Power of our ambitious Enemy in the Carnatic; and we hope, that the Orders which General Goddard has received from Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote, with whom it was left by us to ſend him ſuch as he ſhould deem expedient, will have been followed by the immediate Direction of his Arms towards the Territories of Hyder Ally Cawn.

We wiſh at preſent to leave in Suſpenſe an ultimate Reſolution on that Part of your Letter wherein you communicate to us your Obſervations on the Deſire we had expreſſed, that the Receipts from the Acquiſitions in Guzerat ſhould be excluſively appropriated to the Payment of General Goddard's Army. Our Ability to continue Supplies to it and to your Preſidency, is not increaſed ſince we made the Requiſition; but on the contrary, conſiderably leſſened, for we have been obliged to augment our Military Strength to ſupply the Place of the Detachments made from the Force compoſing it; and the Proſecution of the War in the Carnatic depends ſolely on Remittances from our Treaſury.

We have ſent to your Preſidency on the Ship Duke of Portland, the Sum of Five Lacks of Rupees, which we hope will prove to you a ſeaſonable Supply, and we authorize you to draw on us for ſuch further Sums as you may want, at a reaſonable Rate of Exchange; but the Exchange of Bills procured here payable at your Preſidency is ſo extravagantly high, and the Riſk of Conveyance of Treaſure to the other Side of India ſo great, that we cannot promiſe you Supplies in any other Manner.

We have peruſed the Tranſlations which you have ſent us of the intercepted Papers from the Dutch Chief at Surat and the Maratta Vackeels, but we deem them as unimportant as defective in Proof; and would recommend that the Complaint be permitted to reſt to a future Day.

We are not of Opinion that the Information contained in Mr. Henſhaw's Letter incloſed in your's to us of the 23d September, is of ſufficient Importance to require our ſerious Attention; ſo far otherwiſe are we inclined to believe than that the Portugueze are diſpoſed to be hoſtile to the Company, that we have lately determined to make Overtures to them for an Union with us in diſtreſſing Hyder Ally, by ſending a Body of Forces into his Country.

The

The Inſults which have been offered to the Portugueze by this common Enemy; the Friendſhip and Alliance which has long ſubſiſted between their Nation and ours; and independantly of this laſt Conſideration, the Intereſt which they have, in common with us, in curbing an Increaſe of Power in that ambitious Chief, have prevailed with us in making them the Overtures abovementioned; and we have deputed on this Service Mr. James Peter Auriol; who has been inſtructed to adviſe you regularly of ſuch Part of his Proceedings as may be neceſſary for your Information.

We have the Honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servants,
Warren Haſtings,
Edward Wheler.

Fort William,
7th January 1781.

APPENDIX, N° 352.

Extract of a Letter from Sir Edward Hughes, K. B. to the Earl of Hillſborough, dated Tellicherry Road, 15th May 1781.

ALTHOUGH His Majeſty's Squadron under my Command was in a perfect Condition for Sea, and the Seaſon at Hand when bad Weather might be expected on this Coaſt; yet knowing the many good Conſequences that would reſult to the public Service by effectually preventing the Settlement of Tellicherry from falling into the Enemy's Hands, I readily complied with the Requeſt of the Select Committee; and on the 28th of laſt Month having embarked 40 European Artillery Men and 60 European Infantry on board the Ships of the Squadron, and 1160 Sepoys with 40 Artillery Laſcars on Four Tranſports, I proceeded with the Squadron and Tranſports (as named in the Margin) to Sea the ſame Day, and arrived at this Place the 7th of this Month, and found it cloſely inveſted on all Sides by the Enemy under the Command of Sadier Caun, an Officer of Rank in Hyder Ally's Service.

On the Day after our Arrival all the Troops from Bombay on the Squadron and Tranſports were diſembarked, and the Boats and Men from the Squadron have been conſtantly employed ſince in unlading and landing a very large Quantity of Proviſions, and all Kinds of military Stores, from the Company's Ships Royal Admiral and Royal Charlotte, which laſt arrived here from Bombay on the 10th of this Month with a farther Reinforcement of 500 Men for this Garriſon: The Service of landing the Stores and Proviſions has been attended with much Trouble and Delay, as there is a very high Surf on the Shore at this Seaſon of the Year, and very few Shore Boats at this Place.

The Ships Royal Admiral and Royal Charlotte being now cleared of all the Proviſions and Stores intended for this Place, and the Detachment of Madras Troops under Major Cotgrave, amounting to 1180 Men, Europeans, and Sepoys, embarked on the above Ships and Three Tranſports, I ſhall immediately proceed to Sea with His Majeſty's Squadron and theſe Ships, and make the beſt of my Way to the Coromandel Coaſt, together with ſuch others as have taken the Benefit of Convoy.

APPENDIX, N° 355.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 26th October 1780.

PRESENT,
The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Philip Francis, } Eſquires.
Edward Wheler, }
Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote abſent on Service.

THE following Minute from the Governor General having been circulated on the 16th inſtant, it was returned with the Minute from Mr. Francis, which is entered after it.

Governor General—Among the many important Meaſures which have been Objects of the De-

liberations of this Government, one moſt eſſentially neceſſary has eſcaped the Attention of the Commander in Chief, as well as myſelf and Members of the Board.

The numerous Detachments from this Preſidency, now in the Field, unleſs acting in concert, and connected in their Operations by one uniform Plan, may tend, inſtead of ſupporting, to counteract and even to defeat what is, and muſt continue to be for a long Time to come, our principal Object—the War againſt Hyder Ally Cawn: To this every other Meaſure muſt be ſecondary and ſubſervient; for on the Event of this may depend the Salvation of the Britiſh Dominion in India. In every Situation of the Army under General Goddard it may be employed to create a Diverſion in favour of the Operation of the Commander in Chief. It is impoſſible to lay down any determined Syſtem, or even fixed Principles, of proſecuting the Operations of the War, as they muſt be guided by Circumſtances. Peace may be concluded with the Marattas. Peace negatively, or Peace with an offenſive Alliance; or they may only agree for a Truce, or the War may be continued, and in this Event the State and Contingencies of it are liable to infinite poſſible Variations.

His Operations of courſe muſt be influenced in ſome Degree by any Reſult of theſe Suppoſitions, and ought at the ſame Time to be ſo conſtructed as to coincide with the Views of the Commander in Chief.

For this Reaſon, I recommend that the Commander in Chief be empowered to iſſue ſuch Orders to every Detachment that has or may be made from the Military Eſtabliſhment of this Preſidency, as he ſhall judge expedient for the general Service of the War; and that Orders of courſe be ſent to the reſpective Detachments, to obey all Orders which they ſhall receive from the Commander in Chief.

As there is yet Time for the Commander in Chief to receive the Authority which I have propoſed, before his final Departure, I am anxious to ſolicit the Board for their immediate Determination upon it.

(Signed) W. Haſtings.

Agreed. Edward Wheler.

Mr. Francis's Minute.

Mr. Francis—I think it very neceſſary that Brigadier General Goddard ſhould be inſtructed to act in concert with the Commander in Chief, and to obey his Orders. This was the Point to which I alluded in my Minute of the 9th Inſtant. I agree to the Whole of the Motion, though I think that in Effect it can only be applied to ſuch Detachments as are now or may hereafter be ſent to either of the Two Coaſts.

(Signed) P. Francis.

The Governor General's Propoſition having been agreed to, the following Letter was written to the Commander in Chief, and the Letters which are entered after it were written to Brigadier General Goddard, and to Major Camac.

To the Commander in Chief.

Sir,

As the Detachments now in the Field from the Forces under this Preſidency, unleſs acting in concert, and connected in their Operations by one uniform Plan, may inſtead of ſupporting, tend greatly to counteract what is, and muſt continue for ſome Time to come, to be our principal Object, viz. the War againſt Hyder Ally Khan; we think it neceſſary to empower you to iſſue ſuch Orders to every Detachment that has been made from the Military Eſtabliſhment of this Preſidency as you may judge expedient for the general Service of the War.

We are, &c.

Fort William,
16th October 1780.

To Brigadier General Goddard, &c.

Sir,

Having thought it proper to impower Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote, the Commander in Chief, now embarking for the Preſidency of Fort Saint George, to iſſue ſuch Orders to every Detachment that has or may be made from the Military Eſtabliſhment of this Preſidency, as he ſhall judge expedient for the general Service of the War in which the Company's Forces are engaged; we direct that you implicitly obey all ſuch Orders as you may receive from him after your Receipt of this Letter.

We are, &c

Fort William,
the 16th October 1780.

The ſame to Major Jacob Camac, commanding the Detachment of the Company's Troops in Ghode.

APPENDIX, N° 356.

Extract of Bombay Select Conſultations, the 29th April 1781.

Extract of Letter from the Preſident and Select Committee at Bombay to Brigadier General Goddard, dated 29th April 1781.

IN the preſent State of Affairs, we agree with you that it will be a very proper Meaſure, and of Benefit to the Public Service, to detain the Madras Detachment till more favourable Circumſtances will admit of their Return, and we ſhall therefore in our next Advices acquaint that Preſidency of the Motives which have induced us to alter our former Reſolution of ſending back theſe Troops; which we hope with you will be attended with no Inconvenience to them at this Time.

As you are well acquainted with the preſent reduced State of our European Eſtabliſhment, it is unneceſſary to point out how deficient we are in our Artillery and Infantry Corps. We wiſh therefore to be favoured with your Sentiments how far in your Opinion it might be proper and practicable to incorporate with our Troops the Non-commiſſioned Officers and private Men of the Madras Detachment, by which we ſhould have an Addition of material Strength ſo neceſſary at this Time, and not to be expected from Europe, beſides relieving the Company for ſome Time of a conſiderable additional Expence. If you coincide with us in this Step, the Officers now ſerving with theſe Men may be returned to the other Coaſt on the Veſſels which will ſhortly ſail thither.

Extract of Bombay Select Conſultations, the 26th May 1781.

PRESENT,

The W° Daniel Draper, and Nathaniel Stackhouſe, } Eſquires.

The Commander of the Ponſborne having reported to the Board that he will be ready to ſail on the 28th of this Month, Mr. Draper obſerves to the Committee, that it is material this Ship ſhould remain here until we have come to a final Determination reſpecting the Madras Detachment, in order to furniſh an Opportunity for conveying round a Proportion of the Officers, ſhould it be reſolved upon to incorporate the private Men; and that her Detention here for a ſhort Time is a Matter of no Importance to the Company, as ſhe will be diſpatched in very ſufficient Time to proceed from Madras to China. Agreed therefore, for the above Reaſons, that we propoſe to the Board, which will meet this Morning, to refer the Diſpatch of the Ponſborne to this Committee.

APPENDIX, N° 357.

Letter from the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay to the Honourable the Secret Committee of the Honourable the Court of Directors for Affairs of the Honourable United Company of Merchants of England trading to the Eaſt Indies, dated 28th July 1781.

Honourable Gentlemen,

Par. 1. WE addreſſed you by this Channel in Duplicate, under the 31ſt of March and 30th of April, and now forward Triplicates; we have ſince addreſſed you more at length under the 27th of May by the Prime.

2. The Morning Star being now diſpatched to the Gulph to convey to India any Packets or Intelligence of Importance that may arrive at Buſſorah after the Diſpatch of the Mercury, we take the Opportunity of giving you brief Advice of our Situation.

3. The Seaſon of the Year neceſſarily prevents all Military Operations, and the Troops are diſpoſed in Quarters and Cantonments at Bombay and Callian; neither has any further Negociation been attempted either by us or the Enemy ſince the Propoſals offered by the Governor General and Council, and the Advances made in conſequence by this Government and General Goddard, the Reſult of which has been already communicated to you.

4. It

4. It is as yet too early for us to fix upon any preciſe Plan, or to determine abſolutely upon further Meaſures. The late Occurrences, our Situation, and Circumſtances, have been made known to the Governor General and Council, and we may expect their Orders, founded upon full Knowledge and Information thereof. In the mean Time it is our Buſineſs in this Seaſon of Inaction to watch Events with a careful Eye, and to endeavour hereafter to make a judicious Application of them to the Company's Advantage.

5. You have been already adviſed in our Letter dated the 31ſt of March, that on the Failure of the Negociation, we judged it more expedient to reduce the War on our Part to a mere Syſtem of Defence: This Plan does not ſeem to be agreeable to the Sentiments of the Governor General and Council. They tell us in a late Diſpatch, that the Unwillingneſs of the Miniſter to accept the Offer of a Treaty, does not diſappoint, but on the contrary has rather pleaſed them, as it leaves them at Liberty to ſecure to the Company the important Poſſeſſion of Baſſein, and the other Advantages acquired at the Time the propoſed Treaty was written; and will warrant them in declaring their Reſolution not to part with that valuable Acquiſition, unleſs ſome great Reverſe of Fortune ſhould attend the Operation of our Arms. The ill Succeſs which had attended their Advances, diſcouraged them from looking to any favourable Termination of the War, but the moſt vigorous and ſucceſsful Proſecution of it; and under this Impreſſion they intimate their Wiſhes that our utmoſt Aid might be afforded to General Goddard's Operations.

6. They impute to us a ſudden Alteration of Sentiment, with reſpect to the Mode of proſecuting the War againſt the Marattas. This is not an Opportunity for entering into a particular Defence and Explanation of our Meaſures. Our Addreſs of the 11th of January, and Proceedings tranſmitted by the Prime, will ſhew the Grounds and Principles upon which we acted when we communicated to General , in future, a Purſuit of the War with all poſſible Vigour, and to the utmoſt Extent practicable with the Force under his Command; and that this Recommendation was in exact Conformity to our Inſtructions from the Governor General and Council; in Hopes by an active Exertion, or by ſome deciſive Succeſs in the Interval limited for the Acceptance of their Propoſals, to diſpoſe the Maratta Governmens to an Accommodation. Our ſubſequent Plan of Conduct was a neceſſary Conſequence of the Failure in theſe Hopes, and of our Situation and Circumſtances at the Time, which ſtand fully explained in our Proceedings above referred to.

7. The Governor General and Council adviſe us under the 7th of May, that beſides the other Cauſes which diſſuade them from making any further Overtures of Peace to the Adminiſtration of Poona; another Objection had recently occurred, in the Connection they had lately formed in the Government of Berar, which they had every reaſonable Hope would be attended with a very eſſential Change in their political Influence. The principal Points of this Engagement are ſubjoined, as communicated to us.

8. The Firſt of the . . . . . Inform . . . . . appoints Thouſand Cavalry to overtake Colonel Pearce's Detachment, and to aſſiſt in War againſt Hyder Naig.

9. The Second ſtipulates, that the Berar Army ſhall immediately leave the Province of Oriſſa, and Marine Day. An Expedition againſt Gurrahmyndalla, aided by a Body of the Company's Troops, in the Reduction of it.

10. Third and laſt Articles are preliminary to a ſtill nearer Connection of the Two Governments, and fix the Means by which this may be effected.

11. Meſſrs. Eyles Irwin, and John Richmond Smith, arrived here from Buſſorah the 29th of May, and we received at the ſame Time your Commands of the 10th of January, which had overtaken them on the Deſart. Mr. Irwin was furniſhed with One of your Cruizers to Madras, from whence ſhe was to proceed to Fort Marlborough, with Advice of the Rupture with Holland, which we had before adviſed the Preſident and Council appeared to be inevitable. Meſſrs. Benfield, Selon Stuart, and Conran, arrived here the 7th Inſtant, with Duplicates of theſe Diſpatches, and ſoon after proceeded to Madras. Mr. Woolley is not yet arrived from Muſcat.

12. We have given Orders for diſpoſſeſſing the Dutch of their Factories at Broach and Surat; we have had Advice of the latter being effected; and have Reaſon to believe a conſiderable Property will be found belonging to the Dutch Eaſt India Company, which ſhall be ſecured for the Benefit of the Engliſh Eaſt India Company.

13. General Goddard has taken upon him the chief Command of the Troops on this Eſtabliſhment, and a Share in our Adminiſtration, according to your Appointment; ſtill reſerving the ſeparate Powers he holds under the Governor General and Council. Mr. John Halſey has alſo been admitted a Member of this Committee, in the room of Mr. Stackhouſe, who proceeded to England on the Prime.

14. We are ſorry we have it not in our Power to ſend you Intelligence reſpecting the State of Affairs on the Coaſt of Coromandel.

We have the Honour to be,
with the higheſt Reſpect,
Honourable Gentlemen,
Your moſt faithful and obedient Servants,

Bombay Caſtle,
28th July 1781.

Wm Hornby,
D. Draper,
Tho' Goddard,
Jn° Halſey.

APPENDIX, N° 358.

Letter from the Governor General and Council, to the Honourable William Hornby, Eſquire, Preſident, and Seleƈt Committee at Bombay.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

SINCE writing to you on the 7th Inſtant, we have received your Letter of the 30th March.

It concerns us to obſerve ſo ſudden an Alteration in your Sentiments with reſpeƈt to the Proſecution of the War with the Maratta State. On the 15th of January laſt, you declared to us your Concurrence in the Opinion of General Goddard, that a Purſuit of the War with all poſſible Vigour, as recommended by us, promiſed with the moſt rational Expectation to promote a ſpeedy Accommodation, ſooner than any other Plan of Conduƈt. It does not appear that any Diſaſter has befallen our Arms; on the contrary, every Succeſs has attended them Our Troops were in the Neighbourhood of Poona, and in ſuch Force as well as Character, as was likely to overcome all Oppoſition, and to compel the Enemy to Terms, yet in this proſperous State of the War, we are informed of your Reſolution to reduce it on your Part to mere Defence, and to the Security of the Poſſeſſions obtained to your Government, by another Mode of conduƈting it.

We have repeatedly declared, that we wiſh ſincerely for a Peace with the Maratta State; it is our fixed Objeƈt, and we ſhall deem the Accompliſhment of it, on honourable Terms, a moſt deſirable Event. One Mode of obtaining it has been tried; Advances have been made, but theſe Advances have not been ſucceſsful; a Repetition of them would, in our Opinion, have no other Effeƈt, than to fix an Opinion of our Weakneſs in the Maratta Government, arm them with Spirits againſt us, and inſtead of ſhortening, prolong the Duration of the War. We repeat our firm Conviƈtion, that nothing but a vigorous and ſucceſsful Proſecution of it, will produce an honourable Termination of it. Under this Impreſſion, our Inſtruƈtions to General Goddard have been framed and continued, and under the ſame Influence, we expreſs to you our Wiſh, that your Aid may be afforded to General Goddard's Operations.

We, on our Receipt of your Letter, gave immediate Information to the Commander in Chief, according to your Requeſt, of the Determination which you have paſſed relative to the Madras Detachment.

We are, &c. &c. &c.

(Signed) The Honourable the Governor General and Council.

Fort William,
10th May, 1781.

A true Copy.
E. Hay, Acting Secretary.

APPENDIX, N° 360.

Letter from the Governor and Council of Bengal, in their Secret Department.

To the Honourable the Court of Directors for Affairs of the Honourable United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies; dated 7th January 1781.

Honourable Sirs,

Par. 1. THE Departure of Major John Scott to Europe, by expreſs Appointment from the Governor General, as his private Agent, affording us an Opportunity of addreſſing you, we have the Honour to avail ourſelves of it, in tranſmitting to you in Triplicate our laſt Advices from this Department by the Ships Fox and Walpole. Major Scott has taken his Paſſage on a Portugueze Ship, which being to ſtop in her Way at Fort Saint George, we have recommended it to the Preſident and Select Committee at that Place, to embrace the ſame Occaſion of tranſmitting to you a Relation of Occurrences upon the Coaſt to the lateſt Period of Major Scott's Stay. We beg Leave to recommend this Gentleman to your Favour; and that he may be reſtored to the Company's Service without Prejudice to his Rank, if he ſhould be hereafter deſirous of returning to Bengal.

2. We ſend to you Numbers in this Diſpatch, Copies of the Letters which we have received from Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote, ſince we had the Honour of addreſſing you by the Fox. We are much concerned that the Information contained in them, obliges us to ſay, that we ſtill continue in Expectation of more favourable Accounts of the State of your Affairs on the Coaſt. The Confidence which we place in the Exertions of Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote, in his Experience in Military Affairs, and in his Zeal for the Public Service, will not permit us to deſpond of a proſperous Change in it, while he continues at the Head of your Army; nor ſhall any Aſſiſtance be wanting which we can render to give Effect to his Efforts. The Military Expences are indeed large, but we have promiſed to provide for them as long as we are able; and acting upon that Promiſe, we have ordered that the Sum of CR[s] 4,23,672. 10. 3. ſhould be remitted to Fort Saint George in Specie, by the Ship Duke of Portland, now under ſailing Orders. We have taken Meaſures to continue to that Preſidency, Supplies of Grain and other Articles of which they are in need; and ſhall in no Inſtance relax in our declared Reſolution to relieve their Wants, as far as we may be able to ſupply them; but it is not in our Power to afford that Aid which the Army is ſaid greatly to require, in an Encreaſe of its Strength in Europeans. The unfortunate Diſaſter which befel the Detachment from General Munro's Army near Conjeveram, in September laſt, was attended with an important Diminution of it; and we are not able to ſpare from the Defence of our own Provinces more than have been already detached from them. Dated 16 19 20 } Nov.

3. This Conſideration, added to others which ariſe from the preſent State of your Affairs on the Coaſt, and the Neceſſity which we feel of giving every Aid to your Preſidency of Fort Saint George that can poſſibly be obtained, without too diſproportionate a Sacrifice of the Poſſeſſions of the Company, or of thoſe of the Nabob Walaw Jaw, have induced us to propoſe a Treaty of Alliance with the Dutch, whoſe Poſſeſſions at, and adjacent to, Cochin, have lately been invaded by Hyder Ally Khan. The Treaty itſelf appears on our Proceedings of the 4th Inſtant, which go a Number in the Packet, and has been formed with the Advice and Correction of Mr. Roſs, Director and Governor of the Dutch Eaſt India Company's Settlements in Bengal. Conſ. 4 Jan.

4. It appears from an Account which the Governor General informs us has been communicated to him by Mr. Roſs, that the Force actually ſtationed at or near Cochin, will eaſily enable that Government to ſupply the Proportion, both of European Infantry and Artillery, which are chiefly wanted, and of Malays ſpecified in the Treaty; and theſe may be marched at a very ſhort Notice, and by a very near Route, into the Carnatic, if the Governors of Columbo and Cochin, on which they depend, will accede to the proffered Alliance. To engage their Aſſent, which will in ſuch Caſe involve both in great perſonal Reſponſibility, as we underſtand that they have no regular Powers to bind their Company in ſuch an Act without the Sanction of the Superior Government of Batavia, we have offered to them much greater Advantages than perhaps are ſuitable to the common Intereſt which the Dutch Company have in the War, or than we ſhould be inclined to yield in an equal and formal Negociation; but for this we have no Time; the Neceſſity of the Company require an inſtant Relief, and the dependent State of thoſe whom we ſolicit to be the immediate Parties in the Treaty, claims ſome additional Conceſſions, both to indemnify them, and to win the Concurrence of their Superiors.

5. Urged by theſe Conſiderations, we have propoſed in the Treaty the Ceſſion of the Country of Tinivilly to the Dutch Eaſt India Company. Its Situation is ſuch, that it may, as we conceive, be ſeparated from the Government of the Carnatic, without either preſent Embarraſſment or Danger of future Competition; and from its Contiguity to the Dutch Poſſeſſions in Ceylon, will prove a greater Acquiſition to them than Loſs to the Nabob.

6. The Treaty has been ſuddenly prepared, without his Knowledge, and of courſe without his Conſent; and the latter is, we know, indiſpenſably neceſſary to that Article of it in which the Ceſſion of Tinnively is ſuggeſted, and which, on our Part, we can only propoſe, but it is the only Part which he is likely

likely to have in the War, although the Principal in it; and we have, in our Opinion, a Right to claim at leaſt this ſmall Return, both for the Hazards which we incur and the Exertions which we make for the Support of his Cauſe; a Return amounting only to the Sacrifice of a minute Portion of his Dominions, and that the moſt diſtant of them, for the Salvation of the Whole.

7. A Copy of the Letter written by the Governor General to the Nabob on Occaſion, as well as of thoſe addreſſed to the Governors of Colombo and Cochin, and to the Superior Government of Batavia, appear on our Proceedings of the 4th Inſtant, to which we have already referred you for a Tranſcript of the Treaty itſelf. The latter has received our Execution of it, and has been entruſted with our other Diſpatches to Fort St. George to Mr. James Deighton, whom we have recommended to the Preſident and Select Committee to be employed to proceed with the Treaty and Letters, and ſuch other Diſpatches as they may have Occaſion to add, to the Governments of Colombo and Cochin.

8. We think it proper to ſend for your Information, an Extract of a Letter which we have received from the Preſident and Select Committee at Bombay, under Date the 23d September, accompanied by a Letter to them from Mr. Henſhaw, their Reſident at Goa; it goes therefore a Number in this Diſpatch; but we deem the Report therein conveyed to us, unworthy of our ſerious Attention. We are generally inclined to believe that, although a Connection may ſubſiſt between the Portugueſe and the Marattas, its Effect cannot be important: They have no Rank among the Powers in India; they have no Means of ſubſiſting their Army in the Field, and no ſuch Advantages are likely to be yielded to them as can weigh againſt the ſtrong Conſideration of the Alliance which has long ſubſiſted between our Nation and theirs. The Claims which they prefer are Claims of Form, and perhaps would be preferred by any other Nation having them, whether they were or were not juſtly founded.

9. With reſpect to the ſuppoſed Intention of aſſerting and maintaining the Claim on Baſſein by Force, it ſeems to us nugatory, and it cannot be effectual, ſince we have received certain Advices that Brigadier General Goddard with his Army was before Baſſein on the 18th November laſt, and we are informed that there was no Force excepting that in Garriſon to oppoſe his early Capture of the Place.

10. The Inſults which have repeatedly been offered to the Portugueſe by our common Enemy Hyder Ally, the Friendſhip and Alliance which has long ſubſiſted between their Nation and ours, and, independently of this laſt Conſideration, the Intereſt which they have in common with us, in curbing an Encreaſe of Power in that ambitious Chief, have induced us to make Overtures to that Government for an Union with us in diſtreſſing Hyder Ally by ſending a Body of Forces into his Country; and we have availed ourſelves of the Services of Mr. Auriol, our Secretary, who had before received our Permiſſion to proceed to the Weſt of India for the Re-eſtabliſhment of his Health, by deputing him to Goa on this Occaſion.

11. A Copy of our Inſtructions to Mr. Auriol goes a Number in the Packet. We confeſs that our Expectations of Succeſs, from the Overtures made to the Viceroy of Goa are not very ſanguine; but there appeared to us a Poſſibility of adding to the Force engaged againſt Hyder Ally by the Union of that Government with ours, and we were not willing to neglect even the remote Chance of ſuch an Advantage.

12. The perfidious Conduct of thoſe of the French Nation at Pondicherry, as repreſented in Sir Eyre Coote's Letter of the 19th November, ſuggeſting to us the Neceſſity of taking immediate Meaſures for preventing the Example from having Effect among thoſe reſident at Chandernagore, and within the Provinces, we have given public Notice to the higher Claſs of Frenchmen, of our poſitive Requiſition, that they all quit the Provinces by Sea on or before the 31ſt Inſtant, on pain of being made Priſoners ſhould they be found in them after that Period; and we have given Orders for the immediate Seizure of thoſe of the lower Claſs. They had been all required in June laſt to leave the Provinces by the 1ſt October, and our Indulgence had permitted their remaining in them to this Time, but the flagrant and hoſtile Conduct of their Countrymen at Pondicherry would not allow us to continue the Favour ſhewn to them any longer.

13. We have the Honour to ſend to you encloſed Copies of the Letters which we have received from Brigadier General Goddard, ſince we addreſſed you by the Fox. The Information before quoted of his Arrival at Baſſein will not be found in them, but it is ſufficiently authenticated by our Receipt of a Bill of Exchange drawn by him, and dated the 18th December.

14. Excepting the Letter from Bombay beforementioned, and which is ſent a Number in the Packet, we have received no Advices from that Preſidency of a later Date than thoſe tranſmitted to you in our Proceedings ſent by the Ship Fox. We have remitted to them by the Ship Portland Treaſure to the Amount of Five Lacks of Rupees, and we have authorized them to draw Bills on us for any further Sums at a reaſonable Exchange.

15. The Provincial Commander in Chief, in the Perſuaſion that, to derive from the native Infantry of our Eſtabliſhment thoſe capital Advantages which can only reſult from exact Diſcipline, tempered with a ſtrict Adminiſtration of the Rights of the Soldiery, it was poſitively neceſſary thoroughly to reform and new model the Corps compoſing this Part of our Military Force, preſented to us on the 26th ultimo, a Series of Propoſitions beſt calculated, according to his Judgment, for compaſſing ſo important and uſeful an End. Theſe Propoſitions were accompanied with figured Statements, exhibiting as nearly as might be, the extraordinary Expence which would be incurred by the new Sepoy Eſtabliſhment, and the Annual Saving which would accrue from the general Arrangements.

16. The

16. The Letters which we have received from Brigadier General Stibbert on this Subject, and Copies of the Statements and Propoſitions accompanying them, are ſent to you Numbers in this Diſpatch. After maturely conſidering the Principles on which the Plan ſubmitted to us was obviouſly founded, after meaſuring the Extent of the Advantages it promiſed to produce, and after ſatisfying ourſelves that it united Œconomy and Utility, we delayed it, in the Conviction that the ill Military Conſtitution of our native Infantry was pregnant with Defects, which, unleſs timely corrected, threatened the moſt ſerious and alarming Conſequences, to paſs the Whole of General Stibbert's Propoſitions into Reſolutions of our Council.

17. We will here delineate, as far as may be neceſſary, the general Ground-work of this new Superſtructure, marking the leſs obvious Motives of particular Regulations, and diſtinguiſhing in a conciſe Manner the Advantages they poſſeſs over former Inſtitutions and Arrangements.

18. The apparent Strength of the Battalions of the European Regiments being at all Times very inconſiderable (rarely exceeding 300 Rank and File) and their poſitive and effective Strength being frequently below 200 Men, the large Eſtabliſhment of Officers annexed to theſe Corps, appeared to be productive of an utterly irrequiſite Expence, without yielding a ſingle Advantage in a Military Point of View. Influenced by theſe Reflections we made it our Requeſt to General Stibbert to examine the Expediency of doubling up the Battalion of the Regiments; and accordingly we have had the Satisfaction of receiving his Concurrence in a Meaſure, that while it occaſions in our Monthly Expences a Retrenchment of 37,186 Sonat Rupees, furniſhes us with a conſiderable Number of Officers towards compleating our native Infantry on the new Eſtabliſhment.

19. Although the Commander in Chief has, in the annexed Propoſitions, inſerted a Clauſe, expreſſing, that when the Strength of the European Regiments ſhall exceed 762 Rank and File, they ſhall revert to their former Conſtitution (becauſe in that Caſe the Corps would be too unwieldy for the Purpoſe of manœuvring with Celerity and Exactneſs) yet we muſt remark, that it is by no Means probable that we ſhall be reduced during the Continuance of the War in Europe, to the Neceſſity of re-adopting this burthenſome Syſtem on the military Principle ſuggeſted, and that the Period at which alone ſuch a Neceſſity is likely to occur will be the beſt ſuited to its favourable and eaſy Operation.

20. Having reſolved in conſequence of the approaching Departure of a Diviſion of our Army towards Madras, to augment our military Force, we iſſued Orders for the raiſing of Six new Battalions; but the Commander in Chief having ſuggeſted to us the Expediency of new-modelling the native Infantry, and of applying an immediate and effectual Remedy to the Abuſes which had crept into the Corps compoſing this Part of the Army, to the great Detriment of the Service, we thought proper to recall thoſe Orders, and to ſignify to him that we were prepared to receive his Sentiments at large upon this important and intereſting Subject; when he accordingly preſented to us the annexed Propoſitions, explaining them as far as was requiſite, in our Conſultations of the 26th ultimo, at which he was preſent.

21. As the Advantages of the new Sepoy Arrangements, as far as relates to the Purpoſes of manœuvring and diſciplining the Corps, as well as to the Effects which may be produced on the Minds of the Country Powers by ſuch an apparent Encreaſe of the Number of Battalions on our Eſtabliſhment, are fully ſet forth in General Stibbert's Letter to us of the 31ſt of October, we beg Leave to refer you to the ſame for his Arguments on theſe Heads; which we are to obſerve had their due Weight with us. We muſt alſo requeſt of you to ſeek in the ſame Letter, the Reaſons adduced by him for abolishing the Office of Native Commandant to the Sepoy Regiments, in the Propriety of which we entirely acquieſced, as well as in the Expediency of the Regulations, directing the Native Adjutants to be made from Jamautdars (inſtead of Subadars) with a View of preventing theſe Officers from ſucceeding to the dangerous Influence and Authority of the Commandants.

22. At the ſame Time that, in order to the correcting of the Abuſes which had crept into the Army, and which were of a Nature tending directly to the Deſtruction of the Corps compoſing it, it was become neceſſary to fix ſuch Checks, and to eſtabliſh ſuch rigid Rules, with regard to muſtering and paying the Sepoys, as ſhould put it totally out of the Power of the Commanding Officers of Regiments to derive any Emoluments from their Corps, and thereby engage their Attention wholly to the diſciplining of them; it alſo became requiſite to annex ſuch Rank and Allowances to the Command of theſe Officers as ſuited its Importance, and the Length of their Service; for to have entirely excluded them from all Perquiſites and Emoluments whatſoever, without advancing their Rank and Salary, would, ſuppoſing it poſſible to have eſtabliſhed ſuch a Regulation, have produced no other Conſequence than that of rendering them to a Man diſaffected to the Service; an Evil that muſt have neceſſarily been followed by an univerſal Relaxation of Diſcipline, for which the moſt violent Remedy would, under ſuch Circumſtances, be ineffectual.

23. This Danger however is avoided by granting, as we have done, advanced Rank and Allowances to the Officers commanding Regiments of Sepoys, who no Doubt will ere long be reconciled to the Reform, and being diſengaged from the Purſuit of other Objects, exert themſelves more than ever in training and diſciplining the Corps committed to their Charge.

24. You will be ſatisfied on examining the annexed Papers, that notwithſtanding the great Encreaſe of Field Officers and Captains, conſequent of the new Arrangements, there will ſtill be an annual Saving on the whole of near Three Lacks and an Half of Sonat Rupees, after allowing for the actual Encreaſe of Force gained to the Eſtabliſhment; but as the Commander in Chief is aware that excluſive of Pay and Batta there may be ſome other Expences incurred by his Regulations, of which

which he has not taken any Notice, he does not reſt their Propriety or Utility on the Head of Saving. He will be ſatisfied if they ſhould not encreaſe the Diſburſements on the Army Account; and though, contrary to Appearances as well as to his Hope, they ſhould add in a ſmall Meaſure to the military Burthen, he aſſerts himſelf confident that the beneficial Conſequences which will in due Time reſult from them, will be abundantly more than adequate to the extraordinary Expence they may occaſion.

25. It is unneceſſary for us to offer any Remarks on the other Parts of the annexed Regulations; we conceive that they will ſpeak for themſelves; and we are particularly hopeful that the preſcribed Forms for muſtering and paying the Native Troops will convince you, that it was our Deſign (in theſe Arrangements) to ſtrike at the Root of every Abuſe that could poſſibly affect either the good Order and Diſcipline of your Forces, or the Rights of the Native Soldiery.

26. We ſend you herewith a Return of the European Infantry and Artillery on this Eſtabliſhment: It will ſerve to place before you in a clear View, the alarming Diſproportion of our Strength in Europeans to the Number of Native Infantry; and at the ſame Time the Neceſſity of an early and ſtrong Reinforcement of the former. We have before frequently ſuggeſted to you the Neceſſity of preſerving this Eſtabliſhment entire; it was particularly ſubmitted to your Attention in one Letter of the 13th October laſt, and we muſt now repeat to you our moſt earneſt Requeſt that you will give the Subject an early and particular Conſideration. Your Firſt Eſtabliſhment of Europeans, even in Time of Peace, is not more than ſufficient to give Reſpect to your Military Forces. In Time of War it is greatly inferior to its Wants; and when the exiſting Numbers are below the Eſtabliſhment, it is our Duty to declare to you that your Poſſeſſions are in Danger of a Ruin as ſudden as it may prove irretrievable. The eſſential Strength of this Country, and the only Strength on which you can depend, is in the Number of Europeans: You are not Strangers to this Fact, and although there is no late Proof from Experience of the Truth of the Aſſertion, it cannot be inferred from this Inſtance of our good Fortune, that we may never experience the Reverſe.

27. The Sum of Forty-five Lacks of Rupees, to which the firſt Loan on Bonds bearing an Intereſt of 8 per Cent. per Annum, was reſtricted by our Reſolution of the 2d October laſt, having been completely ſubſcribed, we have determined to authorize the Receipts of ſuch further Sums into the Treaſury as might be tendered to it for like Bonds.

28. The State of our Treaſury this Day is as follows:

Ready Money	—	—	—	—	8,17,446 11 9
Bills receivable	—	—	—	—	1,85,728 2 0
Mint General Treaſury		—	—	—	4,80,732 13 0
Unſorted Treaſure	—	—	—	—	6,58,964 14 6
				Current Rupees	21,42,872 9 3

Deduct the Amount of appropriated Sums as follows:

Balance Account Depoſits —		—	11,00,900 8 5
Ditto Accomptant General of the Mayor's Court		—	1,36,358 4 0
Amount of the Old Bonded Debt in which the Intereſt has ceaſed by Public Advertiſement —	79,342 11 10		
Ditto, Ditto, on Account of the Church Wardens, bearing a running Intereſt by Order of the Court of Directors —	98,200 — —		
Ditto of the new Bonded Debt —	62,58,651 1 6		
Ditto 4 per Cent. Remittance Loan —	14,55,550 — —		
Ditto Annuities 1780	94,720 — —		
	78,08,921 1 6		
		79,86,463 13 4	
		Rupees	92,23,722 9 9

We have the Honour to be,
Honourable Sirs,
Your moſt faithful
humble Servants,
Warren Haſtings,
Edw[d] Wheler.

Fort William,
7th January 1781.

Fort

APPENDIX, N° 360.

Fort William the 4th January 1781.

At a Council; PRESENT,
The Honourable Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
and
Edward Wheler, Eſquire.
Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote abſent on Service.

Secret Dept. Thurſday.

The Misfortunes which have attended the Company's Arms in the Carnatic, in the War with Hyder Ally, and the Diſadvantages which attend the Proſecution of it, requiring that every Aid ſhould be given to the Preſidency of Fort Saint George that can poſſibly be obtained without too diſproportionate a Sacrifice of the Poſſeſſions either of the Nabob or the Company, the following Draft of a Treaty has therefore been formed, with the Advice and Correction of Mr. Roſs, the Director of Chinſura; the Expediency of it having been ſuggeſted by the late Hoſtilities which have been committed by Hyder Ally Cawn upon the Dutch Dependencies at Cochin. The Force actually ſtationed at and near Cochin, as appears from an Account communicated by Mr. Roſs to the Governor General, will very well enable that Government to ſupply the Proportion both of European Infantry and Artillery which we chiefly want, and of Malays, ſpecified in the Treaty; and theſe may be marched at a very ſhort Notice and by a very near Route into the Carnatic, if the Governors of Columbo and Cochin, on which they depend, will accede to the propoſed Treaty. To engage their Aſſent, which will in ſuch Caſe involve both in great perſonal Reſponſibility, as we underſtand that they have no regular Powers to bind their Company in ſuch an Act without the Sanction of the Superior Government of Batavia, we have proffered to them much greater Advantages than perhaps are ſuitable to the common Intereſt which the Dutch Company have in the War, or than we ſhould be inclined to yield in an equal and formal Negociation; but for this we have no Time; our Neceſſities require an inſtant Relief, and the dependent State of thoſe whom we ſolicit to be the immediate Parties in the Treaty, claims ſome additional Conceſſions, both to indemnify them and to win the Concurrence of their Superiors. It is for this Reaſon we have agreed to propoſe the Ceſſion of the Country of Tinnevelly to the Dutch. Its Situation is ſuch, that it may, as we conceive, be ſeparated from the Government of the Carnatic, without either preſent Embarraſſment, or Danger of future Competition; and from its Contiguity to the Dutch Poſſeſſions in Ceylon, will prove a greater Acquiſition to them than Loſs to the Nabob. His Conſent indeed is eſſentially and indiſpenſably neceſſary to this Article of the Treaty, which on our Part we can only propoſe; but it is the only Part which he is likely to bear in the War, although the Principal in it; and we have a Right to claim at leaſt this ſmall Return, both for the Hazards which we incur, and the Exertions which we make for the Support of his Cauſe; that is, the Sacrifice of a minute Portion, and that the moſt diſtant of his Dominions, for the Salvation of the Whole.

For all the foregoing Reaſons we have reſolved both on the Subſtance of the Treaty, as we have conſtituted it, and on its immediate Execution on our Part; and that it be tranſmitted with the Letter entered on the Proceedings of this Day to the Preſident and Select Committee at Fort Saint George. Other Remarks upon the Treaty itſelf we preſume will be unneceſſary, as we conceive their Object and Tendency will be obvious.

Propoſals for a Treaty of Alliance between the Engliſh and Dutch Eaſt India Companies and the Nabob Walla Jah Bahâdr.

Propoſed T with the I and Nabo Arcot.

Whereas the Nabob Hyder Ally Cawn has without any Cauſe invaded the Carnatic Payengaut, and the Poſſeſſions of the Engliſh Eaſt India Company which are ſituated therein, and attacked the Settlements and Forts of the Dutch Eaſt India Company dependent on the Government of Cochin on the Malabar Coaſt; wherefore it hath become the common Intereſt of the Nabob Walla Jah Bahâdr, who is the Sovereign of the Carnatic Payengaut, and of the Two Companies aforeſaid, to unite in repelling and defeating the Attempts and Deſigns of the ſaid Hyder Ally Cawn; the Governor General and Council of Bengal, with the Advice and Suggeſtion of the Director for the Management of the Affairs of the Dutch Eaſt India Company in Bengal, do propoſe and offer the following Conditions of a Treaty to the Nabob Walla Jah, and to the proper Agents and Repreſentatives of the Dutch Eaſt India Company aforeſaid, hereby declaring them to be from the Time in which the ſaid Conditions ſhall receive the Seals and Signatures of the other Parties to this Treaty, binding on the Governor General and Council, and on all the Governments and Dependencies of the Engliſh Eaſt India Company, in virtue of the Seal of the Company, and the Signatures of the Governor General and Council herein firſt prefixed; viz.

Article the Firſt.

The Governments of Columbo and Cochin ſhall engage to provide and aſſign for the Quota of the Dutch Eaſt-India Company in the War with Hyder Ally Cawn, at or near Cochin, a diſciplined Force conſiſting of not leſs than One thouſand European Infantry, Two hundred European Artillery, and One thouſand Malays, with their Complement of Officers, not exceeding the Rank of Captains,

tains, it being underſtood and agreed that all the Officers of a ſuperior Rank ſhall either be furniſhed by the Preſident and Council of Fort St. George, or appointed by Commiſſions from them. The Forces ſhall be delivered over to the Charge of ſuch Officer or Officers as ſhall be appointed by the Preſident and Council of Fort St. George to receive them, who ſhall for that Purpoſe proceed to Cochin to receive Charge and Command of the ſame; and from that Time the ſaid Forces ſhall remain ſubject to the general Authority and Command of the Commander in Chief of the English Forces, in like Manner as the Engliſh Forces in India are ſubject to his Command, until the Concluſion of the War, whether by the final Conqueſt of the Dominions of Hyder Ally Cawn, or by Peace concluded with him, and their Re-delivery in conſequence thereof to their original and proper Government: And their Pay, according to the Rates at which they are paid in the Service of the Dutch Eaſt India Company, together with all Expences of the Field or Garriſon, ſhall be at the Charge of the Engliſh Eaſt India Company, from the Day on which they are transferred to the Engliſh Command, until the Day of their Return and Re-delivery at Cochin, or ſuch other Place as ſhall be mutually appointed for that Purpoſe.

Article the Second.

In Conſideration of the Aſſiſtance granted in the Manner ſtipulated in the preceding Article, beſides their Pay and Expence, which are to be defrayed by the Governor General and Council on the Part of the Engliſh Eaſt India Company, it is propoſed and recommended by the Governor General and Council to the Nabob Walla Jah Bahâdr, that he ſhall on his Part grant and aſſign, by proper Sunnuds, to the Dutch Eaſt India Company, his Right and Property in the Province or Diſtrict of Tinnevelly, together with the excluſive Right in the Pearl Fiſhery of all the Coaſt lying to the South of Remiſerim, to the Dutch Eaſt India Company; who ſhall be permitted to take Poſſeſſion thereof from the Day on which this Treaty ſhall receive its final Ratification, without any Let or Impediment on the Part of his Aumils or Officers of whatever Denomination; and the ſaid Province or Diſtrict ſhall remain the Property of the Dutch Eaſt India Company for ever.

Article the Third.

It ſhall be allowable to the Government of the Dutch Eaſt India Company at Cochin to carry on any ſeparate Operations againſt the common Enemy with their own Forces, and to make Conqueſts of any Lands or Countries adjacent to Cochin, and to keep Poſſeſſion of the ſame, without any Claim of Participation on the Part of the Nabob Walla Jah Bahâdr, or of the Engliſh Eaſt India Company.

Article the Fourth.

If a further Aid of Troops ſhall be required from the Dutch Eaſt-India Company for the Maintenance of the War, they ſhall engage to furniſh the ſame ſo ſoon as they can be obtained from the Supreme Government at Batavia, on the ſame Terms, and in the ſame Manner, as are ſtipulated in the Firſt Article.

Article the Fifth.

This Treaty being firſt executed in the Manner abovementioned by the Governor General and Council of Bengal, for and on Behalf of the Engliſh Eaſt India Company, ſhall be next tendered to the Nabob Walla Jah Bahâdr for his Acceptance and Ratification, and having received the ſame it ſhall be forwarded to the Governments of Columbo and Cochin, that it may in like Manner receive their Aſſent and final Ratification without any additional Diminution or Alteration whatſoever, to be made either by the Nabob Walla Jah Bahâdr, or by the Government of Columbo and Cochin.

Ordered, That the Treaty above propoſed be copied fair, and that it be circulated by the Secretary to the Members of the Board for Execution.

Agreed, That Mr. James Dighton be appointed Agent on the Part of the Governor General and Council on this Occaſion, with the uſual Allowances; that he be entruſted with the Care of our Diſpatches to Fort Saint George, and recommended to the Preſident and Select Committee to be employed by them to proceed with the Treaty and Letters written to Columbo and Cochin; together with ſuch other Diſpatches as they may have Occaſion to add to thoſe Governments.

The Governor General lays before the Board the Draft of a Letter which he has prepared to his Highneſs the Nabob of the Carnatic.

Nabob

To his Highneſs the Nabob Walla Jah, &c. &c. &c.

May it pleaſe your Highneſs,

The very critical Situation in which the Affairs of your Highneſs are at preſent involved, by the Invaſion of the Carnatic by Hyder Ally Cawn, the Diſgrace which the Britiſh Arms have lately ſuſtained on the Coaſt, and the conſequent Neceſſity of every vigorous Exertion on your Part, not only to recover what has been loſt, but to preſerve what remains, are Points too cloſely connected with your Highneſs's Intereſt and Proſperity to require many Arguments to enforce them. From theſe Circumſtances which alone I conceive to be of ſufficient Weight, but which derive greater Force from the Obligations your Highneſs is under to the Company for the Benefit of their Protection and Aſſiſtance upon repeated Occaſions, I cannot but entertain Hopes that your Highneſs will readily

and chearfully co-operate with us in any Plan which may be propoſed for the common Advantage, and for the more ſucceſsfully defeating the ambitious Deſigns of Hyder Ally Cawn; eſpecially when you reflect how much has been already done by this Government, and in how ſhort a Space of Time from the firſt Intelligence of the late heavy Diſaſter which has befallen our Arms on the Coaſt, to redeem as far as it is in our Power the national Credit, and with it to retrieve the particular Loſs which your Highneſs has ſuffered, and the great Sacrifice we have made in relinquiſhing the Proſecution of the Maratta War, almoſt in the Moment when we had Reaſon to expect from the Succeſſes which have attended it, that it would have ſpeedily terminated in an honourable and advantageous Peace. Relying therefore upon the Effect which I doubt not theſe Conſiderations will produce on the Mind of your Highneſs, I proceed to acquaint you, that in conſequence of the Information which has long ſince been received of the Hoſtilities and Depredations committed by Hyder Ally Cawn on the Territories belonging to the Dutch, at or adjacent to Cochin, and his late Invaſion of the Carnatic, by which the Safety of your Poſſeſſions is endangered equally with thoſe of the Company, we have prepared the Draft of a Treaty of Alliance between the Engliſh and Dutch Eaſt India Companies and yourſelf; and having firſt tendered it for Approval to Mr. Roſs, Director and Governor of the Dutch Eaſt-India Company in Bengal, and obtained his Concurrence, we have affixed our Seals and Signatures to it, declaring it to be binding on us; and have requeſted the Preſident and Select Committee at Fort St. George to preſent it to your Highneſs for your Aſſent and Ratification, with an Apology for having introduced your Name into the Treaty without the previous Sanction of your Authority; but as this Step would have required too tedious a Proceſs, and would have opened a Channel of Negociation and Correſpondence, by which the Ends propoſed by the Treaty, which are immediate Aſſiſtance, would have been defeated, your Highneſs will perceive the Impoſſibility of an Application of this ſort, which otherwiſe that proper Reſpect and Attention which is due to your Highneſs would moſt certainly ſuggeſted. When the Treaty has been approved of and ſigned by your Highneſs, it will be tranſmitted to the Governments of Columbo and Cochin for their final Ratification. Depending that your Highneſs, from your firm Alliance with, and Friendſhip for the Eaſt India Company, and from the Confidence which you repoſe in them, will contribute chearfully your Aſſiſtance, in the Manner and on the Terms which have been ſtated in the Treaty, I will conclude with wiſhing an Encreaſe of Health and Proſperity to your Highneſs.

Agreed to the Draft of the Letter propoſed by the Governor General, and ordered that it be tranſlated.

Agreed, That the following Letters be written to the Governors of Columbo, Cochin, and to the Superior Government of Batavia.

To the Governor of Columbo.

Honourable Sir,

Having long ſince received Information of the Hoſtilities and Depredations committed by Hyder Ally Cawn on the Dutch Territories at or adjacent to Cochin, and taking into our Conſideration the Circumſtance of his being at preſent in open War againſt them, together with the Neceſſity of repelling his ambitious Deſigns upon the Carnatic, which involve your State equally with thoſe of the Nabob Wallajah and the Engliſh Company, we have prepared the Draft of a Treaty of Alliance between the Engliſh and Dutch Eaſt India Companies and the Nabob Wallajah Bahader, upon ſuch Terms as we truſt will be accepted by you and the Governor of Cochin, having firſt tendered it to the Peruſal of Mr. Roſs, Director and Governor of the Dutch Eaſt India Company at Bengal, and obtained his Approval of it; and as the evident Advantage to be derived to the Dutch Company from the Ratification of the Treaty on your Parts muſt free you from every Apprehenſion of Reſponſibility to the Superior Government at Batavia, for having acceded to it without the previous Sanction of their Authority, the Obſtacle which might otherwiſe have been allowed Weight will by this Means be removed.

The ſame Reaſon which prevented us from making an Application direct to Batavia, will be ſufficient to evince the Impoſſibility of its entering into a Correſpondence with your Government and that of Cochin on the Subject, ſince in both Caſes the Time which would be required for receiving an Anſwer reſpecting the Ratification of the Treaty, would have defeated the Ends of it, which are immediate Aſſiſtance.

We have therefore for the greater Diſpatch affixed our Seals and Signatures to the Treaty, declaring it to be binding on us, and on all the Dependencies of the Engliſh Eaſt India Company, and have tranſmitted it to the Preſident and Select Committee at Fort Saint George, requeſting them to tender it to the Nabob for his Aſſent; and as ſoon as the Nabob ſhall have made himſelf a ſubſcribing Party to it, that it may be forwarded with all poſſible Expedition to you, depending, that when the true Intereſt of your Nation is provided for ſo materially, you will not be the Cauſe of a Moment's Delay in the Execution of it.

We have the Honour to be, &c.

(The ſame to the Governor of Cochin.)

To

APPENDIX, N° 360.

To the Superior Government at Batavia.

Honourable Sirs,

In conſequence of the Information which we have long ſince received of the Hoſtilities and Depredations committed by Hyder Ally Cawn on the Dutch Territories at or adjacent to Cochin, and his late Invaſion of the Carnatic, by which the Safety of your Poſſeſſions in that Part of the World is endangered equally with our own; and in Conſideration of the Neceſſity of a mutual Co-operation to repel the Deſigns of ſo ambitious an Enemy, we have prepared the Draft of a Treaty of Alliance between the Engliſh and Dutch Eaſt India Companies, and the Nabob Wallajah Bahader, having firſt tendered it for Approval to Mr. Roſs, Director and Governor of the Dutch Eaſt India Company in Bengal, and obtained his Concurrence in Conſideration of the Terms of it being ſo favourable to your Company; and we have now, to prevent Delay, diſpatched it to the Preſident and Select Committee at Fort Saint George, with our Seals and Signatures affixed, together with a Declaration, that it ſhall be binding on our Parts; and we have further requeſted, as ſoon as the Conſent of the Nabob Wallajah ſhall have been obtained to the Treaty, that it may be forwarded with all poſſible Expedition to the Governments of Columbo and Cochin for their final Ratification and Concurrence. As the Time which would be required for receiving an Anſwer from you reſpecting the Ratification of the Treaty, would have defeated the Ends of it, which are immediate Aſſiſtance, the Impoſſibility of a previous Application for this Purpoſe will, we truſt, be ſufficiently evident, and apologize for our having Recourſe to the only Method which could be effectual in ſo critical a Conjuncture, that of forwarding it to the Governments of Columbo and Cochin, who, we doubt not, will obtain your Approbation for having ſubſcribed to a Treaty, in which the manifeſt Advantages to your State will free them from every Share of Reſponſibility.

Fort William,
the 4th January 1781.

We have the Honour to be, &c. &c. &c

Ordered, That Copies of the above Letters of the propoſed Treaty, and of the Letter from the Governor General to the Nabob, be prepared for the Peruſal of the Gentlemen at Fort Saint George, and that a Letter be written to them as follows:

To the Honourable Charles Smith, Eſquire, Preſident, &c. Select Committee, Fort Saint George.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Having long ſince received Information of the Hoſtilities and Depredations committed by Hyder Ally Cawn on the Territories belonging to the Dutch at or adjacent to Cochin, and taking into Conſideration the Circumſtance of his being at preſent engaged in open War againſt them, together with the Neceſſity of defeating his ambitious Deſigns upon the Carnatic, and preſerving, as far as in us lies, the Poſſeſſions of the Company and the Nabob, we have, with the Advice and Suggeſtion of Mr. Roſs, Director and Governor of the Dutch Eaſt India Company in Bengal, prepared the Draft of a Treaty of Alliance between the Engliſh and Dutch Eaſt India Companies and the Nabob Wallajah Bahader, upon ſuch Terms as we have every Reaſon to hope will be accepted. But as the Time which would be required for receiving an Anſwer from the Superior Government of Batavia, reſpecting its Ratification of, and final Aſſent to the Treaty, would entirely fruſtrate the Ends of it, which are immediate Aſſiſtance, we have reſolved to make our Application direct to the Governments of Columbo and Cochin, for which Purpoſe we have affixed our Seals and Signatures to the Treaty, declaring it to be binding on our Parts; and we requeſt, that on the Receipt of it you will uſe all poſſible Expedition in diſpatching it to thoſe Governments, having firſt tendered it to the Nabob and obtained his Aſſent to it. You will be pleaſed to accompany this Tender with an Apology to the Nabob from us, for having introduced his Name into the Treaty without the Sanction of his Approbation; but as this Step would have been attended with too tedious a Proceſs, and would have opened a Channel for Negociation and Correſpondence, which would have impeded the inſtant Execution of the Meaſure propoſed, upon which in this critical Moment ſo much depends, we truſt he will perceive the Impoſſibility of our previous Application to him, which otherwiſe a proper Attention and Reſpect to him would not have ſuffered us to omit.

In the Event of a Refuſal on the Part of the Nabob, we deſire you will repreſent in the ſtrongeſt Terms to him the Nature of his Situation, and the indiſpenſable Obligation he is under of making common Cauſe with the Company, leſs to ſecure their Poſſeſſions than his own from the Encroachments of the Enemy—that his very Exiſtence is now at Stake—that he is more a Principal in the War than ourſelves—that it is not by any Means which can be furniſhed by him, or by any Reſources or Treaſure of his, that the Carnatic is to be ſaved and defended, but by the Wealth of Bengal, and the Blood of Britiſh Subjects ſacrificed in its Service; that therefore we expect his Aſſent to the Treaty, and urge it as a juſt Claim which we have upon him, in return for the Protection which he has experienced at our Hands.

We ſhall wait to hear the Reſult of your Application, not doubting that from Motives of Policy and Neceſſity, as well as Juſtice, he will accede to the Terms which we have offered in his Name.

We have appointed Mr. James Dighton to be the Bearer of our Diſpatches, and have entruſted to his Care, a Copy of the Letter addreſſed by the Governor General to the Nabob ſeparately, together with Copies of the Letters to the Governors of Columbo and Cochin, for your Inſpection; and we requeſt that he may be employed to proceed with the Treaty and Letters, together with ſuch other Diſpatches as you may have Occaſion to add, to the Governments of Columbo and Cochin.

We rely upon your Zeal and Activity in this Buſineſs, and depend on receiving every neceſſary Information as early as it is in your Power.

We have the Honour to be,
&c. &c. &c.
Warren Haſtings,
Edward Wheler.

Fort William,
4th January 1781.

APPENDIX, N° 361.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 28th December 1780.

Inſtructions to James Peter Auriol, Eſq.

Sir,

HAVING given you Permiſſion to proceed in the Ship Portland to the other Side of India, we are willing to avail ourſelves of the Services which you might render to this Government during your Abſence from Bengal, and have accordingly deputed you to act as our public Miniſter at the Portugueſe Settlement of Goa on the Malabar Coaſt.

We encloſe a Letter of Credence to you for this Purpoſe, and accordingly direct that you proceed to Goa with all convenient Expedition. On your Arrival there you will deliver the Letter to the Viceroy which is herewith given to you in charge, and open the Negociation with which you are intruſted.

The Inſults which have repeatedly been offered to the Portugueſe by our common Enemy Hyder Ally; the Friendſhip and Alliance which has long ſubſiſted between their Nation and our's; and independently of this laſt Conſideration, the Intereſt which they have in common with us in curbing an Encreaſe of Power in that ambitious Chief; induce us to inſtruct you, as we do accordingly, to make Overtures to the Portugueſe Government for an Union with us in diſtreſſing Hyder Ally, by ſending a Body of Forces into his Country.

In Addition to the Motives which we have recited to you for the propoſed Negociation, and which we direct you to uſe as the general Ground of your Arguments for giving it Effect, we leave it to you to endeavour to engage the Compliance of the Portugueſe Government, by ſuch further Reaſons and Inducements as may occur to you at the Time; and we leave it to your Management and Diſcretion to obtain their Aſſiſtance in the moſt effectual Manner, independently of a Junction of their Troops with our Army.

You will not omit to adviſe us regularly of your Proceedings, and to make the ſame known to the Preſident and Select Committee of Fort Saint George, as well as that of Bombay, inaſmuch as may be neceſſary for their Information.

We are,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
(Signed) Warren Haſtings,
Governor General.

Fort William,
28th December 1780.

A true Copy.
Act^g Secr^y. E. Hay.

APPENDIX, N° 362.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 3d October 1780.

THE Commander in Chief delivers in the following Minute from Sir Eyre Coote.

Minute from Sir Eyre Coote.

The great Loſs of Troops upon the Coaſt, of which we have daily Confirmation, and the diſpirited Situation to which thoſe remaining are reduced, will render the ſmall Number now going by Sea very inadequate to the Service expected, unleſs ſupported by a Detachment of Sepoys to march by Land into the Circars; the Defence of which muſt now be extremely weakened by the Neceſſity there muſt have been of drawing the Troops ſtationed for their Defence towards the Preſidency: I therefore propoſe that 6 or 8 Battalions of Sepoys with their Guns, and One Company of Artillery, be ordered to be in Readineſs to march through the Cuttack Road towards Madras; and the Order for their March to depend upon the Hopes we have given us, that the Maratta Army now lying there will either join us or return; as without this, or a Peace concluded with the Marattas, I never can adviſe any Detachment to Troops marching from hence to the Coaſt.

(Signed) Eyre Coote.

Agreed to the Propoſition made by the Commander in Chief.

Warren Haſtings,
P. Francis,
Edw[d] Wheler.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, dated 26th October 1780.

The Governor General—In Conſultation the 3d October laſt, it was recommended by the Commander in Chief, and reſolved, That 6 or 8 Battalions of Sepoys with their Guns, and One Company of Artillery, be ordered to be in Readineſs to march through the Cuttack Road towards Madras; the Order for their March being to depend on the Hopes given us, that the Maratta Army now lying there will either join us or return. To form a Detachment of this Strength will require many preparatory Arrangements, which can hardly be compleated in leſs Time than a Month, or perhaps Six Weeks, from its firſt Formation. The fair Seaſon is now begun, and the Anſwers from the Government of Berar to our late Diſpatches muſt be expected much within the Courſe of the enſuing Month: If theſe are favourable, the Detachment ought not to loſe an Inſtant after their Arrival in commencing its March. I myſelf have every Reaſon to believe that their Anſwer will be as favourable as we can wiſh: Theſe Reaſons I ſhall now communicate to the Board. In the mean Time I move, That Orders be immediately iſſued for forming the Detachment, and that it do conſiſt of One Company of Artillery and Six Battalions of Sepoys with their Guns. I take the Liberty to recommend, that Lieutenant Colonel Pearſe be appointed to the Command of this Detachment, and Major Edmondſtone to be the Second in Command. The Firſt of theſe Recommendations I can venture to aſſure the Board will be agreeable to the Commander in Chief, and that it was his Intention to have offered it himſelf: The Second proceeds ſolely from my Opinion of the Qualifications of Major Edmondſtone, whom I know only as an Officer, neither is he acquainted with my preſent Wiſhes upon this Subject.

If the Board ſhall approve of thoſe Propoſitions, I further beg Leave to ſuggeſt the Expediency of replacing the Number which will be thus taken from our Native Infantry, by ſuch Means as ſhall be judged the moſt effectual and leaſt burthenſome in their Expence; that which has occurred to me, and which I ſubmit to the Conſideration of the Board, is to augment all the Battalions which remain, by an equal Number of Rank and File diſtributed amongſt them, to be hereafter drafted and formed into regular Battalions of the eſtabliſhed Strength, when they ſhall be required for actual Service. This Expedient, if the Board approves it, may be referred to the Provincial Commander in Chief, and his Opinion upon it deſired; or in place of it, any other which he may judge more ſuitable to the End propoſed.

The Governor General lays before the Board for their Peruſal, a Tranſlation of a Letter from Maha Raja Moodajee Booſla, received on the 20th Inſtant; and of a Letter from Dewangur Pundit, the Maha Raja's Dewan, to Beneram Pundit, referred to in it.

Mr. Wheler—I agree to the forming of the Detachment now propoſed by the Governor General, (in conſequence of the Reſolution of the 3d Inſtant) in order that it may be in Readineſs to act as we may judge proper, after receiving the Advices that are expected from the Government of Berar. I accede to the Wiſhes of the Commander in Chief in the Appointment of Lieutenant Colonel Pearſe to the Command of this Detachment, and to the Governor General's Recommendation of Major Edmonſtone to the Second in Command. I alſo agree to refer to the Provincial Commander in Chief the Expedient propoſed

roposed by the Governor General, reſpecting the Number of Sepoys which will be taken from the reſent Strength of our Military Eſtabliſhment by this Meaſure.

Mr. Francis—Mr. Wheler has ſo exactly preſſed what I meant to ſay, that I ſhall content myſelf ith ſubſcribing to the ſame Anſwer to the Governor General's Motion.

Agreed, That Orders be immediately iſſued for forming a Detachment to proceed over Land to-ards Madras: That the ſame do conſiſt of One Company of Artillery and Six Battalions of Sepoys ith their Guns; and that Brigadier General Stibbert be directed to carry this Reſolution into Exe-ution.

Agreed, That Lieutenant Colonel Pearſe be appointed to the Command of the Detachment, and Major Edmonſtone to be Second in Command of it.

The following Letter is written to Brigadier General Stibbert.

Sir,

Having thought it neceſſary to reſolve on detaching a conſiderable Force towards Madras, and having this Day determined that the ſame ſhall conſiſt of One Company of European Artillery and Six Battalions of Sepoys with their Guns, we requeſt that you will immediately iſſue Orders for carrying this Reſolution into Effect. The Command of this Detachment is given to Lieutenant Colonel Pearſe, and the Poſt of Second in Command of it to Major Edmondſtone.

Deeming it expedient that the Numbers taken from the Native Infantry by this Meaſure ſhould be replaced, and by Means the moſt effectual and leaſt burthenſome in their Expence, it has occurred to us that ſuch Purpoſe might be beſt effected in an Augmentation of the Battalions that remain, by an equal Number of Rank and File diſtributed amongſt them, to be hereafter drafted and formed into regular Battalions of the eſtabliſhed Strength whenever they ſhall be required for actual Service. On this Expedient we deſire your Opinion, or in the place of it, that you will offer any other which you may judge more ſuitable to the End propoſed.

We are, &c.

Fort William,
26th October 1780.

P. Francis.

Read the following Letters from Brigadier General Stibbert.

Gentlemen,

I was Yeſterday honoured with your Letter of the 6th Inſtant, informing me of your Reſolution to detach towards Madras One Company of European Artillery and Six Battalions of Sepoys with their Guns, &c. deſiring me to iſſue immediately the neceſſary Orders for carrying this Meaſure into Effect.

Your Inſtructions I beg you will be aſſured ſhall be obeyed with all poſſible Diſpatch; but as you have omitted acquainting me where you would chuſe to have the Detachment aſſembled, I find myſelf neceſſitated to retard my Proceedings till you ſhall be pleaſed to ſatisfy me on this Head.

In the mean Time, I hold it my Duty to ſtate to you the Strength of the Forces at preſent ſtationed at Fort William, and the other Parts of Bengal, from which the Detachment ordered muſt neceſſarily be formed.

	European Artillery Non-commiſſioned and Private.	European Infantry, Non-commiſſioned and Private.	Battalions of Sepoys.
Fort William, Barrackpore, and Chandernagore — — — —	232	341	6
Berhampore — — — —	99	688	4
Midnapore and Jellaſore —	49	—	4
Total, including the Sick	380	1029	14

After deducting this Force, One Company of Artillery and Six Battalions of Sepoys, there will only remain for the immediate Protection of Fort William and the reſt of Bengal (excluſive of Invalids and the Militia)

Artillery Europeans — — 280
Infantry D° — — 1029
Battalions of Sepoys — — 8

which, conſidering that there is juſt now a large Maratta Army aſſembled at Cuttack, and that we are at the Height of War with Two formidable European Powers, I conceive to be very inadequate to this Purpoſe.

Should

Should it be urged that the Recruits ordered to be levied will ſupply the Place of the Troops deſigned to be detached, I muſt obſerve, that it will be impoſſible, let the Care and Attention of the Officers be ever ſo unremitted, to diſcipline and train theſe Recruits, ſo as to render them fit for actual Service in leſs (to ſpeak within Bounds) than Six or Eight Months; reſpecting the Mode eligible to be purſued in raiſing and forming theſe Levies, I ſhall do myſelf the Honour of addreſſing the Board in a ſeparate Letter.

On the other Hand, there appears to me no leſs Difficulty in the Meaſure of ſtrengthening the Force below by the Recall of ſo conſiderable a Part of the Troops ſtationed in the Vizier's Provinces, and beyond the Jumna, as One Company of European Artillery, the Two Regiments of Cavalry, and Six Battalions of Sepoys, which I find to have been the Propoſition of Sir Eyre Coote: For I ſubmit it to the Board, whether it would be expedient or proper to reduce the Army in that Quarter ſo materially, at a Time when all Accounts agree in repreſenting that Nudjiff Cawn is making great Preparations for taking the Field, when the Seiks are in Motion, and when it is confidently ſaid, that Madhajee Scindia is ſetting on Foot an Expedition towards Gualior and the adjacent Country. Such being the apparent Situation of Affairs, I muſt offer it as my Opinion, that having a Regard to the Security of the upper Provinces, and to the Maintenance of our Conſequence in that Part of the Country, we cannot withdraw from thence, at this critical Period, a greater Body of Troops than will be ſufficient to aſſiſt in the Defence of Patna and the Bahar Province.

I cannot conclude this Addreſs without declaring to the Board my Apprehenſions that the Appointment of the Commandant of Artillery to the Command of the Detachment ordered to be formed for marching towards Madras, being a Thing unprecedented, will occaſion much Diſcontent among the Field Officers of Infantry, who from the Uſage of the Service will be led to conſider it as an Infringement of their Rights, if not a Reflection on their military Talents.

Fort William,
29th October 1780.

I have the Honour to be, &c.
G. Stibbert.

P. S. I have been prevented from ſending my Letter in till this Day, by being obliged to wait for a Return of the Third Regiment; and at laſt have been under the Neceſſity of making uſe of one for July laſt. If the Board approve of it, the Detachment may be aſſembled at Manurgur, near Midnapore.

G. Stibbert.

APPENDIX, N° 363.

From Moodajee Booſla; dated the 16th Zehiedja: Received the 9th January 1781.

N° 1. YOUR agreeable Letter, acquainting me that the Sincerity of my Attachment and Friendſhip, and of my Advice and Propoſals, was fully known to you, after you had underſtood, from the Repreſentations of Beneram Pundit and the Engliſh Tranſlations, the Contents of my friendly Letters; and that you had, in conſequence of your knowing the Neceſſity of the Times and Circumſtances, ſettled all Matters in the moſt prudent and adviſable Manner with Row Pundit Purdhaun on this Condition, That I ſhould become Guarantee to the Durability of the Treaty on both Sides: That you had therefore ſent Three Copies of a Treaty for my Ratification: And after recounting the Articles, you mention that I muſt firſt put my Seal on them as Guarantee, together with the Seal and Signature of my confidential Miniſter, and then, having informed you and the Council of it, muſt ſend them to Poona: That when the Rulers and Chiefs of that Place ſhall in the ſame Manner have put their Seals and Signatures to them, they are to keep One of the Copies, and to ſend the other Two to the Governor of Bombay and General Goddard, that every Matter may be amicably ſettled, and the War entirely ſtopped. You further mention the Particulars of Hyder Ally Khan, and his Friendſhip and Alliance with the French, the confirmed Enemies of the Engliſh: That your ſole Attention was taken up with preparing for repelling and puniſhing them in a proper Manner: That this Enmity to Row Pundit Purdhaun is of long and ancient Standing; and that if he increaſes his Power and Strength in this Manner, he will by Degrees deſtroy their Kingdom: That it is therefore moſt adviſable for them to ſtation a conſiderable Force under a Commander of Experience and Truſt with the Engliſh Army, by which Means the Pride and Preſumption of Hyder will

will be reduced, and whatever Treaſure or Country may be taken from him ſhall be divided equally between both Parties; that the ſuffering ſo conſiderable an Enemy to acquire Strength, without any Attempts to depreſs him, would moſt certainly give riſe to great Loſſes and Diſputes. This Letter arrived in a lucky Hour, and by removing my former Anxiety and Expectations, gave me inexpreſſible Pleaſure, and added conſiderably Friendſhip. The Advances which you have made are highly commendable among Perſons who have great and important Objects in View, and are calculated to inſure the Peace and Satisfaction of the People, and put an End to the Labours and Diſtreſſes of the Soldiers; and the taking the Reſolution of ſending the Treaty, is a compleat Proof of your Friendſhip and Sincerity. From the firſt, down to the preſent Time, the preſent Hoſtilities and Diſputes were not from your Inclination or Wiſh; but whatever was done originated from the Governor of Bombay; and in that caſe, there being no other Remedy, you were compelled to exert yourſelf for the remedying it, and for the Preſervation of your Poſſeſſions and the Defence of every thing dear. By the Bleſſing of God, your good Intentions are well known to the whole World. As before the Arrival of the Treaty I had received repeated Intelligence by the ſucceſſive Letters from that Quarter of your Intentions for Peace on the Part of the Company, and that the Treaty would be ſent afterwards, my Deſire was, that as ſoon as the Treaty ſhould arrive, I ſhould ſend my Miniſter, Dawargur Pundit, for the Purpoſe of ſettling this Matter, that every Article might be determined agreeable to my Wiſhes, and at no future Time any Diſagreement about a ſingle Letter might ariſe: But when I had peruſed the Treaty, and had reflected on the ſeveral Articles of it with the moſt attentive Conſideration, I diſcovered ſome Points which were contrary to the Treaty of Colonel Upton, in ſo conſiderable a Degree that the Poona Miniſters will never give their Aſſent to them; for if there are ſome few Things in it which I cannot approve of, how can they ever be expected to conſent? and what I myſelf do not comprehend, how ſhould I explain to another? I have therefore delayed affixing my Seal and Signature to it, but have carefully kept it with me. To the Variations of the Times and the Revolutions of the Heavens it is entirely owing, that although you were ſincere and approved of Peace and Friendſhip on every Condition, yet ſuch Delays and Obſtructions have ariſen in the Matter, that the Buſineſs of To day has been put of till To-morrow, and what was approaching to a Concluſion has been delayed to a future Time; but where there is a Steadfaſtneſs, Faith, and Sincerity, there is no room for any Prevarication, but that of the Times and Circumſtances, to raiſe ſuch Obſtructions as it is impoſſible to prevent. Thus from the Diſtance of the Road Three Months have elapſed entirely in the coming and going of the Coſſids, otherwiſe the Refuſal and Aſſent of all the Articles of the Treaty on your Part, through the Mediation of this Government, would not have met with theſe Delays, and every thing would have been ſettled in the beſt Manner. As it does not ſeem to me adviſable that the War ſhould be ſuffered to extend on every Side, and as my friendly Heart has on all Occaſions and in all Situations wiſhed to perform the Duties and Obligations of Friendſhip, I have therefore, in Anſwer to every Article of the Treaty which you have ſent, wrote fully and explicitly in ſuch a Manner as was proper, and as my Friendſhip, Faith, and Regard to Treaties required, ſo that the Intents of former Treaties might not be fruſtated, and that I might not ſeem partial to either Side; theſe Anſwers having been prepared in my Preſence, are written on a detached Paper, from which you will gain compleat Information: Nothing in that is new or innovating, but all conformable to former Agreements. In caſe of a Peace, it is neceſſary for both Parties to give up all Places agreeable to ancient Treaties, whether acquired before or in the preſent War. When you ſhall have done what is requiſite, the other Side will likewiſe perform their Part, agreeable to their Engagements. In Anſwer to what you write reſpecting Ragonaut Row, Futty Sing Guicawar, and Ranna of Gohud, it is certainly incumbent on all Perſons who have any Regard for their Word, their Honour, or Reputation, to exert themſelves in all Caſes for the Aſſiſtance of any one who takes Refuge under the Shadow of their Protection, that it may be known to the whole World, that whoever throws himſelf on the Protection of the Engliſh Gentlemen, will through their Aid attain the Completion of his Views; and that whatever diſtreſſed Perſon they will take by the Hand, they will place ſafely on the Shore from the troubled Sea of War: This is without Doubt the Uſage of the World. But where the Standard of Treaties and Engagements has been erected, and a Perſon has been pitched upon for Guarantee, and entruſted with the equal balancing of Intereſts, it then becomes incumbent on that Guarantee to do nothing that is not conſiſtent with his Faith and Word, or that may ſeem partial to either Party, but to remove all Suſpicions and Doubts, to keep firm to the Truth, by ſaying and writing nothing but the Truth, and by exerting himſelf in ſettling the Arguments of both Sides: Why therefore ſhould we make Heſitation in the delivering up Ragonaut Row to the Poona Miniſters, agreeable to former Treaties, under Pretence of his being the Maſter where he chuſes to reſide; ſince it is much more adviſable to put an End to all Diſputes, and ſince the Miniſters of Poona will never fail in the ſmalleſt Point of Reſpect, Attention, and careful Treatment to one of their illuſtrious Family. Futty Sing Guicawar is likewiſe a Branch of the Rauge, and is beſides protected by you; his Concerns will therefore certainly be attended to equally with thoſe of a Brother: And as to the Ranna of Gohud, conformable to what you write, no Spark of Enmity againſt him will remain in their Minds; why ſhould you therefore take any Trouble in their Affairs? Let it be written in the Treaty, that on this Condition it is binding, otherwiſe that it is void. Enter therefore on this Matter with the greateſt Sincerity, and do not put any more Refuſals in it, but prepare and ſend me a Treaty agreeable to the encloſed ſeparate Sheets, in which there is a full Diſcuſſion, and a Plan for a Treaty at the Foot of each Article; you will thus remove the Reſponſibility from

from yourſelf to me: And if the Poona Miniſters ſhould not then agree and aſſent to it, you will not be blamed. What is to happen will happen. The Short of it is this; that I have at all Times and in all Situations been reſolved to obſerve and attend to your Wiſhes, even above thoſe of the Council and of the Chiefs ſtationed in the other Preſidencies. God is Witneſs that I am in no Inſtance partial or inclined to the other Side. You will from the Friendſhip and Knowledge of Events and Circumſtances approve of what I have written.

The Treaty which you have ſent me, I have kept with the greateſt Care and Caution, and will ſoon return it, together with my Anſwers to all your Kareetahs. Further Particulars you will learn from the Repreſentations of Beneram Pundit.

Poſtſcript. As to what you have written from the Exceſs of your Friendſhip, that a conſiderable Army has been ſent to Madras under the Command of General Coote, and that it is neceſſary I ſhould write to Shimdojee Bhoſila, directing him to join 2 or 3000 Horſe with the General, which would be a great Addition of Strength; or ſhould it not be convenient to ſpare this Force, that in ſuch Caſe I ought to recall the Army which is arrived at Cuttack; the Fact is this: Of the State of all Matters, and of the full Particulars of this Quarter, not one Article is unknown to you; and I myſelf have ſo often written them to you that they cannot be ſecret to you. Till Peace ſhall have been ſettled, and the Treaty finally ratified, I cannot adopt either of theſe Propoſals; but when I ſhall have aſſembled there an Army of 50,000 Horſe, with all Stores and Neceſſaries, I may then ſend an Army to join General Coote, or recall it altogether from thence. This Matter will be more fully explained to you by Beneram Pundit. Be convinced, that in all Circumſtances and Situations I ſhall be your ſtedfaſt Friend.

Till Peace is finally ſettled, it is abſolutely neceſſary for me to act in the above Manner.

The Anſwer to the Firſt Article.

"All the Forts, Towns, and Places belonging to Pundit Peiſhwah, which may have been taken, or ſhall be taken by the Engliſh Army, from the Beginning of the War till the Ratification of the Treaty, ſhall be delivered over to the Peiſhwah, except the Fort of Ahmedabad, and the Share of the Country of Guzerat, which ſhall remain in the Poſſeſſion of Futty Sing Guicawar; and the Fort of Gevalior, which ſhall remain in the Poſſeſſion of the Ranna of Gohud, and no one ſhall oppoſe it."

This requires ſome Conſideration, and I requeſt you will reflect with Juſtice on what I ſay: When a Town and Fort has been from Time immemorial in the Poſſeſſion of the Family and Chiefs of Pundit Purdhaun, and Futty Sing is one of the ancient Dependants of the Family of the Rauje, what Connection can he have with the Engliſh Gentlemen? The Nature of his Connection was this; that when General Goddard arrived in the Province of Guzerat with a reſpectable Army, Futty Sing with his whole Family was in Bedodah; but having no Power or Strength to oppoſe his Enemies or defend his Property, he being remedileſs, joined himſelf with General Goddard, and at this Time has ſent ſeveral Letters to Poona; that having no Reſource at that Time, except the Protection and Aſſiſtance of the Engliſh, he had therefore united himſelf with them. Before this, reſpecting the Reconciliation of the Two Brothers who had began Diſputes and Hoſtilities about the Diviſion of their Talooks, I wrote in the Articles of the Memorandum, that as Futty Sing had taken Part with you, it would be neceſſary for both Sides to exert themſelves for the Reconciliation of the Two Brothers, when their Talooks might remain to both of them in Security. You muſt therefore write reſpecting them in the Treaty, that Futty Sing is a Chief and Dependant of the other Party, and had joined you ſolely from the Neceſſities of the Times; that as Peace and Alliance has taken Place between the Two Parties, it is incumbent on Friendſhip to forget all the paſt, and that the Two Brothers having been reconciled, muſt be made to remain peaceable and quiet as before, on their Shares of Jaghires, which will be greatly to your Satisfaction, and to the Completion of your Wiſhes. The ſame muſt be written reſpecting the Ranna of Gohud, who has always been a Dependant and Expectant on the Peſhwah, and who has now, by the Aſſiſtance of the Engliſh, got Poſſeſſion of the Fort of Gevalior, which is of ſuch Strength that the Miniſters of Poona can never permit or ſuffer to remain quietly in his Hands: Therefore, towards procuring Peace it is neceſſary that both Sides, for the maintaining of former Articles, reſtore all the Places which they may have taken of whatever Strength they may be; and let it be mentioned, that on the Subject of the Ranna no further Miſunderſtandings ſhall remain, ſince the Friends of one Side are likewiſe the Friends of the other Party.

The Second Article.

"Towards the Support and ſtrengthening the Peace and the Intereſt of both Sides, that on future Occaſion no Diſputes or Miſunderſtandings may ariſe, it is agreed, That in caſe the Fort of Baſſein ſhall have been taken by the Engliſh Army before the final Ratification of the Treaty, ſhould Pundit Purdhaun chuſe to exchange it for the Mahals which have been given up to the Company, and in their Poſſeſſion, agreeable to the 3d and 7th Articles of the Treaty of Poorunder, conformable to the former Treaty entered into by the Governor General and Council of Bombay with Futty Sing Guicawar; but ſhould Pundit Purdhaun not chuſe to exchange, we will then, agreeable to your Firſt Article of this Treaty, deliver up the Fort of Baſſein to Pundit Purdhaun; and the Country delivered up to us by the Treaty of Poorunder ſhall remain in our Poſſeſſion."

The Caſe is this; that I frequently have ſeen the Treaty of Colonel Upton, and have often wrote the Particulars of it, but never yet heard that the Treaty of Poorunder was made conformable to a former

former Treaty entered into by the Governor and Council of Bombay with Futty Sing Guicawar, that it ſhould now be mentioned. What has the Treaty of Futty Sing to do with the Treaty of the Peſhwa? or, what Connection can Dirt have with a Perſon of Diſtinction? Futty Sing is one of the Dependants and Chiefs of the Rauje; if he chuſes to deliver over by Writing to any one, the Towns and Forts belonging to the Rauje, how can it be agreed to? or what Authority and Voucher is that, that it will be aſſented to? Whatever the Owner and Poſſeſſor of the Country gives in Writing, that alone is binding.

In this Caſe, therefore, it is neceſſary that all Mahals and Places in the Province of Guzerat, Cokan, and other Parts which formerly belonged to Pundit Purdhaun, and which have been taken in the preſent War, ſhould all be delivered up; and beſides, if the Fort of Baſſein ſhould be taken, that alſo muſt be reſtored to the People of Pundit Purdhaun. But do not inſiſt upon theſe Points, which are difficult to be aſſented to; for theſe bring with them a Breach of former Treaties, and can never be agreed to. Abide entirely by the Engagements of Colonel Upton, and reſtore every Thing which has been taken in this War, or may be taken before the final Ratification of the Treaty; that the Tree of Friendſhip may bloſſom with the Flowers of Sincerity, and that the Thorn of Enmity may be removed. It is not wiſe to add a little to a large Treaſure.

Third Article.

"After ſaying that Ragonauth Row ſhall be allowed for his Expences during his Life, according to the former Agreement, you write "That what was ſettled in the former Treaty reſpecting the Place of his Reſidence ſhall be void; that he ſhall reſide wherever he may chuſe, except in Bombay and Surat; that you will never aſſiſt him in any Claim on the Maratta Government, unleſs all the Chiefs who ſign the Treaty ſhould agree to it and deſire it."

The Caſe is this: When he had been taken Priſoner in the Bombay War, at that Time no Neglect or Deficiency was found in the Reſpect, Attention, and good Treatment of him. At preſent, that he comes under the Protection of ſo great a Chief, what Refuſal can they make to ſupply his neceſſary Expences? But giving him Power to reſide wherever he likes, which would be certainly attended with Loſſes and Damage to all Quarters, can never be admitted of; and in what Light can your Letters on this Subject be conſidered? At the Time of making Peace and Treaties, the Door of Diſagreements is cloſed and not left open. How can the former Treaty be rendered void? From his having this Liberty great Damage may be expected; for ſhould he ever under the Protection of Hyder Naig join himſelf with a French Army, it would be attended with great Inconveniences to both Sides. The greateſt Circumſpection is requiſite. Nothing more need to be mentioned reſpecting Ragonauth Row, except the delivering him up to the Poona Miniſters, agreeable to the former Treaty. The Article relating to the Aſſiſtance of him, in caſe all the Chiefs who may ſign the Treaty ſhould deſire it, is likewiſe unneceſſary.

The Fourth Article.

"Pundit Purdhaun, and the other Maratta Chiefs, ſhall enter into an Alliance with the Engliſh, and ſhall in Conjunction with their Army attack Hyder Ally Khan, both for the Protection of their own Country and for the Conqueſt of his: They ſhall invade his Country with the Engliſh Army, and ſhall mutually join for his Deſtruction. Whatever Portion of Country may be conquered from him ſhall be equally ſhared, in ſuch a Manner that they ſhall take what borders on their Country, and the Engliſh ſhall poſſeſs what lies near theirs and the Nabob Wallanjaw's."

The Anſwer to this is as follows: When after the Bombay War Ragonauth Row had been taken Priſoner, and had been delivered in Charge to Madajee Row Scindia, who ſent him under Care of a confidential Servant of his to Ugeen, in the Way to which Place he found an Opportunity, and eſcaping to Surat, was a Second Time taken under the Protection and Aſſiſtance of the Engliſh. At that Time my Miniſter Dewargur Pundit, who was at Poona, was aſked by the Miniſters of the Peiſhwa his Advice, that for many Years Hyder Naig had not paid the ſmalleſt Part of the Peſhcuſh due to them, and had beſides poſſeſſed himſelf of ſome of their Mahals; that after the End of the Bombay War, there being ſome Proſpect of Tranquillity and Peace, by Ragonauth Row's being brought to them, they had reſolved to ſend an Army of great Strength againſt Hyder Naig, and to reduce his Violence; but that when General Goddard had arrived at Surat, and Ragonauth Row had returned to him, and was preparing to renew the War at that Time, how could they hope to be able to oppoſe Two ſuch powerful Enemies, and maintain themſelves againſt Two ſuch violent Attacks? The Pundit told them in Anſwer, That they ſhould enter into a friendly Correſpondence and Connection with the one who was an Engliſh Chief, Supreme over all the Poſſeſſions of the Engliſh, and who was unequalled in his Prudence, Foreſight, Faith, Sincerity, and Obſervance of Treaties, (namely, the Nabob Amaud ul Dowlah) and then engage in vigorous Meaſures againſt the other (Hyder Naig) and either entirely deſtroy him, or take from him the Money and Talooks which they want. The Miniſter agreeing to the Advice, ſent Letters and confidential Perſons to General Goddard ſucceſſively, on the Subject of Peace and Alliance; and at that Time Letters from the General were likewiſe received, full of Expreſſions and Promiſes of Friendſhip, and ſaying that they ought to aſcribe Ragonauth Row's being admitted to reſide with him, to no other Reaſon but his (the General's) Friendſhip for them, to prevent Ragonauth's applying to any other Quarter; that if they wiſhed it, he would come in Perſon to meet them, and ſettle every thing in a perſonal Conference. At that Time certainly this Matter would have been ſettled to mutual Advantage, and many Points of Conſequence would have been properly

perly adjuſted by perſonal Agreements and Conſultations. But of every thing which the General had written, not one came to paſs; for neither did he find Leiſure to come himſelf to Poona, nor did he enter into Negociations with the confidential Agents ſent to him, nor did he pay any Attention to the Letters of Dewargur Pundit: In ſhort, Affairs at laſt ended in open War and Hoſtilities, and it became neceſſary for them, having loſt ſo ſincere a Friend, to unite themſelves with their old and eſtabliſhed Enemy; and they, after mature Conſideration, agreed to this deſperate Remedy, and having entered into friendly Connections with him, ſettled every Matter agreeable to his Plan and Propoſals. As the Opportunity which is once ſuffered to eſcape can never be recovered, it is a Matter of Great Sorrow, that now when Peace might be made with the Engliſh, an Army cannot be ſent into the Poſſeſſions of Hyder, in Company with the Engliſh, without being treacherous to him, and without being guilty of ſuch a Breach of Faith and Engagements as to deter any other in future from truſting to or believing their moſt ſolemn Promiſes: This however can never be admitted by the Houſe of Pundit Purdhaun, nor will it ever be admitted. As the Diſpoſition of Hyder Naig is bent on Treachery and Diſputes, there is no Doubt but that in a ſhort Time he will be guilty of ſome Breach of Treaty, ſuch as uniting himſelf with the French, or conceiving ſome hoſtile Schemes, when immediately in conſequence of ſuch Breach they may join in the deſtroying him: but till he takes off the Maſk and diſcovers ſuch Diſpoſition, they cannot think of any contrary to their Engagements. Leave this therefore to Time, and do not mention it in the Treaty, but wait to ſee when it may happen.

The Fifth Article.

"Should Pundit Peſhwa not agree to form an Alliance againſt Hyder Naig, nevertheleſs Peace ſhall be made on this Condition, that both Sides ſhall remain in Poſſeſſion of what they have got, and a Ceſſation of Hoſtilities ſhall take place for One Year from the Date of this Treaty, during which Time Peace may be ſettled in ſuch Terms as to inſure its perpetual Stability."

In Anſwer to this; what I learn from it is, that at any rate Peace and Friendſhip is your Wiſh; this is very proper and ſatisfactory; but a Ceſſation of Hoſtilities, without a final Competition of Peace, is not the Cuſtom of this Country. The Practice of Europe is this, that Two Kings will ſet down on the ſame Carpet, and will play at Cheſs together, and their Armies will remain peaceably together, while they receive continual Accounts of each other's Intentions; and if they ſhould put an End to all Hoſtilities, they agree to a Ceſſation for a certain Number of Years, after which they renew their Attacks and Hoſtilities: But this is not the Method in Decan, for whatever Engagements are entered into there, are laſting and perpetual. You muſt therefore write this much, That if they will join their Army with that of the Engliſh it is well, and if not it makes no Difference; that you will with your ſingle Force attack the Enemy, but that at any rate you are deſirous of Peace with the Poona State.

The Sixth Article.

"As Peace is made with Pundit Purdhaun, at the Interceſſion of Moodajee Bhoſilah, it is neceſſary that he become Guarantee to it: The Treaty is therefore firſt ſent to him, that he may certify it under the moſt ſolemn Oaths of his Religion, with his own Seal, and the Signature of his confidential Miniſter; that he approves of the Treaty, and agrees to be Guarantee to it; that no Breach ſhall ever happen in it; that as long as both Sides abide by it, he will be the Friend of both; and whoever ſhall break it he will be his Enemy, till he ſhall atone for ſuch Breach."

The State is this; that I am, without Doubt, the firm Friend of your Quarter, and likewiſe am a Well-wiſher of Pundit Purdhaun, in Conformity to my Attachment due to the Family of the Rauje, and have taken upon me this Trouble and Exertion merely for the Eaſe of the People, and from my Regard to Truth and Sincerity, and my Knowledge of the Rights and Properties of every one. I likewiſe hoped, that upon the taking Place of the Peace and Alliance, I ſhould attain the Completion of my Views, and ſhould, by the Aſſiſtance of both Parties, be relieved from the Difficulties incurred by the Expences of the new-raiſed Sepoys: I therefore agreed to become Guarantee and Security to both Sides, and whichever ſhould have failed in his Part of the Obligation, I ſhould firſt attempt to make him ſenſible of his Fault, and if that failed, I ſhould then, to the utmoſt of my Abilities, puniſh him for it, and not be reconciled to him till ſuch Time as he returned to his Duty. But what you have written in the Treaty, that you have agreed to this Peace to give me Satisfaction, is by no Means neceſſary. This only need be mentioned, that I am Guarantee and Security of this Treaty to both Parties, and that whichever Side ſhall be guilty of any Breach of it, I ſhall continue his Enemy till he has made Atonement for it, and has remedied ſuch Breach of Treaty.

The Seventh Article.

"Three Copies of this Treaty are ſent; after they ſhall arrive at Poona, Ballajee Row Purnaveeſe and the other Chiefs having affixed their Seals and Signatures on them, ſhall keep One of them, and ſhall ſend the Second to the Governor of Bombay, and the Third to General Goddard, that the War and Hoſtilities may immediately ceaſe, and every Matter be finally ſettled; Should this Peace be finiſhed, and the Treaty agreed to, within Five Months from the Date of it, it is well, otherwiſe it ſhall be altogether void."

In Anſwer to this, the Diſtance from Calcutta to Poona is 900 Coſs; and beſides, the Diſcuſſion and Explanation, Aſſent and Denial of the important Articles in the Treaty, are in hand; why therefore ſhould the Dates and Times be circumſcribed? and why is this Clauſe mentioned, that if it is

concluded within ſuch particular Time it is binding, otherwiſe that it will be void. I have kept the Treaties by me with the greateſt Caution, and have ſent off theſe Letters to you. After the Receipt of your expliciť Anſwers the Treaties ſhall be ſent to that Quarter. Set your Mind at reſt. In ſhort. I have with the greateſt Attention and Care made myſelf thoroughly acquainted with all the Articles, and have underſtood all the good and bad of them, and have written whatever was conſiſtent with my Regard to the Rights and Obligations of both Sides. What might prevent the Intereſts from preponderating might perpetuate the Verdure of the Garden of Friendſhip, and keep off the Blaſt of the nipping Winds. This you muſt read and conſider with Juſtice, and not think me in the ſmalleſt Degree partial to the Intereſts of Pundit Purdhaun, for a faithful Guarantee muſt always have Regard to his Oaths and Engagements, and in all Caſes conſider the Intereſts and Advantages of both Sides: You will therefore, agreeable to theſe ſeparate Sheets, prepare and ſend a Treaty without any Addition or Diminution, that my Miniſter, Dewargur Pundit, may be ſent to Poona, and ſettle every Point agreeable to your Deſire, when, from the Opportunity of the Times and friendly Connection between us, many and great Advantages will be derived.

A true Copy of the Tranſlation.

E. Hay,
Act. Sect.

From Dewagur Pundit.

I received your Letter in a lucky Hour, in which you write, that, &c. (the ſame Recapitulation as the one in the Maha Raja's Letter.) The Inſtant that I ſaw it, my Heart felt an immediate and ſurpriſing Satisfaction from the Hopes and Proſpect of a ſecure and peaceable Future for the People; for by the ſpeedy End to all the Cruelties and Oppreſſions of the Armies, the Repoſe which the Chiefs would find from their former continual Occupations, the Attachment of many and great Advantages to both Sides by the Connection between them, the raiſing your Reputation among all the other Chiefs of the Council and the Engliſh Gentlemen, and even in the Sight of the powerful King of England; and the Hopes of a perpetual and laſting Friendſhip and Connection between Pundit Peiſhwa, the Rajah my Maſter, and the Engliſh Gentlemen, by an equal Balance of Intereſts, I immediately conceived the Deſire of departing inſtantly expreſs, that having opened the Papers on the Road, I might arrive in 10 Days at Poona, and deliver the Treaty with my own Hands, and ſettle the Baſis of it with the Miniſters of Poona in ſuch a ſolid Manner, that on no Occaſion any Alteration or Defect might ever happen: And after I ſhould have adjuſted thoſe important Points ~~conducive~~ to your Intentions, I might get my Diſmiſſion to go to Calcutta, where, being honoured with an Interview with you, I might inform you of every Thing which from a long Time has been upon my Mind reſpecting the true political Meaſures.

But afterwards reflecting that it was not adviſable for me to be in ſuch Haſte before I had fully underſtood all the Contents of the Papers, I opened them in the Preſence of the Maha Raja, when all the Karetas, Letters, Copies, and Treaties, were peruſed with the greateſt Attention and Care. Firſt, they convinced us of your great Truth and Sincerity, and that you never, from the Beginning to this Time, were inclined to the preſent Diſputes and Hoſtilities; and next, that you have not included in the Articles of the Treaty any of your Wiſhes or Inclinations; and, in ſhort, the Garden of the Treaty appeared to us in all its Parts green and flouriſhing, but though the Fruit of it was excellent, yet they appeared different from thoſe of Colonel Upton's Treaty (the Particulars of which I have frequently written to you) and upon taſting them, proved to be bitter and very different when compared to the former Articles. How can any of the old and eſtabliſhed Obligations be omitted, and new Matters agreed to, when it is plain that they will produce Loſſes and Damages? Some Points which you have mentioned under the Plea of the Faith and Obſervance of Treaties, are of ſuch a Nature that the Poona Miniſters can never aſſent to them: In all Engagements and important Tranſactions, in which the Words But, and Although, and Beſides, and Whereas, and Why, and other ſuch Words of Doubt, are introduced, it gives an Opening to Diſputes and Miſunderſtandings. A Treaty is meant for the entire Removal of all Differences, not for Encreaſe of them. My Departure to Poona has therefore been delayed; and the Rajah my Maſter likewiſe having put off the affixing his Seal, ſaid, that although he was determined to ſign the Treaty as Guarantee agreeable to your Letter, yet he could not ſuffer that after his Seal ſhould have been affixed, it ſhould be rejected by the others; that he muſt therefore conſider maturely before he ſigns the Treaty, that no one may afterwards make Objections to any Part of it; and if after having laboured to explain it to them, to ſatisfy them, and bring them over, they ſhould in any Manner not comprehend it, or join in it, we may then make uſe of that as a ſufficient Reaſon to act againſt them; but before we can be able to anſwer all their Queſtions and Doubts we muſt firſt comprehend thoroughly ourſelves. Although theſe Lines which you have written in your Kharetas with the greateſt Truth and Sincerity, that ſuch Haſte was not your Queſtion, but that from certain Circumſtances you have, agreeable to the Advice of this Quarter, diſpatched a Treaty with all Expedition, in which you have reſtored every Thing taken in this War, and placed all Matters on the ſame Footing they were before the War, are very proper and friendly, and entirely conforming to the Articles of Colonel Upton's Treaty, is conſiſtent with the preſent Intereſts and future Advantages, and will inſure the Perpetuity and Friendſhip, and render the

the Guarantee of my Maſter, the Maha Rajah, more ſecure; yet there is no Remedy for the Variations of the Times, which always produce a hundred ſucceſſive Events of the ſame Kind, and in the Settlement of all Affairs cauſes ſo many, as to endanger the Peace of the People and the Security of the Property and Poſſeſſions of both Sides. Time does every thing which he chuſes, and there is not the ſmalleſt Controul over him. But your Prudence and Wiſdom has undertaken this Matter with a thorough Knowledge of the Influence of Circumſtances. I entertain great Hopes that you will at all future Occaſions attend to every thing which your old and ſincere Friends may write to you, from the Sincerity and Friendſhip of their Hearts, and without the ſmalleſt Partiality to the other Side, and by the Bleſſing of God our Alliance and Intimacy will go on encreaſing: But the great Diſtance of 800 Coſs from Calcutta to Naigpore, and from Naigpore to Poona, which makes Two Months, and to Poona Three Months, neceſſary for the going and returning of Coſſids, cannot be remedied. What can I do? I am a Man and have neither Feathers nor Wings. The Ground is hard, and the Heavens are far off: I am unluckily far removed from the Preſence: Had I been near you, I ſhould before this have informed you of every Particular relating to this Buſineſs, and have adjuſted every thing to your Satisfaction; the Treaty would have been prepared in the beſt Manner, and great and many Advantages would have been derived from it, and I ſhould have acquired univerſal Praiſe. Even at preſent I am exerting myſelf to the utmoſt of my Power, in promiſing what is incumbent on my Attachment, and am deſirous of ſpeedily bringing to a Settlement whatever Pundit Purdhaun may propoſe conducive to a thorough Reconciliation: I have therefore kept the Treaty with the greateſt Care and Caution in my Poſſeſſion, and having taken a Copy of it, I have added to each Article another which appeared to me proper and adviſable, and without any Loſs or Diſadvantage to the Engliſh, or any thing more in favour of the Pundit Purdhaun, than what was contained in the former Treaties: This I have ſent to you, and hope that you will prepare and ſend a Treaty conformable to that, without any Beſides, or If, or Why, or But, and Whereas, that as ſoon as it arrives I may depart from Poona; and having united with me Row Madajee Scindiah, and having brought over the Nabob Nizam ul Dowlah to this Buſineſs, I may ſettle and adjuſt all Matters which are in this bad Situation. As ſoon as I have received my Diſmiſſion from thence I would ſet off for Calcutta, and repreſent to you every thing which for a long while I have had on my Mind; and by this Tranſaction erect to the View of all the World the Standard of the Greatneſs and Goodneſs of the Engliſh, and of my Maſter, and extinguiſh the Flames of War with the Waters of Friendſhip. The compaſſing all theſe Advantages and happy Proſpects depends entirely upon your Will and Conſent, and the Power of bringing them to an Iſſue is in your Hands alone. Further Particulars you will learn from my Letter to Beneram Pundit.

Poſtſcript. The ſame as the one to the Rajah's Letter.

A true Copy of the Tranſlation.
E. Hay,
Act^{g} Sec^{ty}.

Tranſlation of a Letter from Maha Rajah Moodajee Booſla to Beneram Pundit; dated the 16th Zeheidga.

I have lately received 8 Arzies from you. The firſt Two which arrived informed me that the Nabob had told you he reſolved to enter into a Treaty with Pundit Purdhaun under my Guarantee and Security, but that the Articles which you had propoſed did not meet with his Aſſent; that Dewan Dewargur Pundit need not take the Trouble of coming to Calcutta; and that you were not likely to come or go as you might chuſe. After this One or Two more Letters arrived, acquainting me that the Nabob Amaud-ul-Dowlah had held a Council, at which he told you he was determined on Peace. Three other Letters I received with the Treaty. As you had at firſt written that you was greatly affected by that Converſation, and wiſhed to retire to Benares, I wrote in conſequence of that to Hydrabad, to Poona, and to Cuttack: About 10 Days afterwards I received your Letters, informing me that Peace had been determined on, and all Doubts removed; and I learnt the Contents of the Treaty from the Perſian Copy of it. In the Firſt Place, what regards Ragonauth Row is written in an inſincere Manner. Where Friendſhip is wiſhed for, and is under Diſcuſſion, no Word admitting of Doubt or Inſincerity ought to be uſed, and every Article ought to be written without the ſmalleſt Obſcurity: I have therefore not thought it adviſable to ſend my Miniſter Dewargur Pundit to Poona with the Treaty. But if every Article of the Treaty had been plain and free from Doubts, the Dewan would certainly have been ſent to Poona to employ himſelf for the Completion of Peace. This could not however be done; and the Length of Time, which from the great Diſtance of the Way is requiſite for the arriving of Letters and the receiving the Anſwers, cannot be remedied. But God is Witneſs of the Friendſhip and Affection which from my Heart I entertain for the Nabob; yet there is now no Remedy, except the Execution of the Plan which the Nabob Nizam-ul-Dowla and Pundit Purdhaun have ſettled. For theſe laſt 14 Months I have continually written every Occurrence and Tranſaction, without omitting the ſmalleſt Circumſtance; and in the Kharetah which I have now written to the Nabob, I have mentioned every thing which was incumbent on my Friendſhip, and

have alſo included all the Particulars of the Treaty. All other Matters you will learn from the Letters of Dewan Dewagur Pundit, who has written more fully to you.

A true Copy of the Tranſlation.
E. Hay, Act^g Sec^y.

Tranſlation of a Letter from Dewan Dewargur Pundit to Beneram Pundit; dated the 16th Zeheidja; i. e. 13th December 1780.

I have received your ſucceſſive Letters, dated the 17th, 19th, 22d, 24th, and 29th of Ramſaun, and the 1ſt, 7th, 21ſt, and 23d Shaival, and the 22d of Zekaida. Firſt Two Letters arrived to the following Purport: That the Nabob Amaud-ul-Dowlah had told you that he was deſirous of concluding a Treaty of Peace and Alliance with the Chiefs of Poona, under the Guarantee of the Maha Rajah, but that he could not aſſent to the Conditions propoſed by us: That he had forbid my coming to Calcutta, and had told you that you were at Liberty either to ſtay or go; that you had accordingly for the Departure prepared. After that another Letter was received, in which you wrote, That the Nabob having held a Council, told you that he was reſolved to make a Peace; and having called you into the Council, held a Conſultation with you on all Matters; and afterwards ſaid to you in private, that as the Maha Rajah had from his great Friendſhip written to him Letters containing all his private Secrets, which were more ſacred to him than his own Life, it was therefore incumbent on him to exert himſelf for the Completion of Peace, and that he had accordingly prepared a Treaty with Pundit Purdhaun, under the Guarantee of the Maha Rajah, which he was diſpatching, together with Karetahs from himſelf. Three Karetahs and Letters accordingly arrived, and were fully underſtood; and we learnt from them that Money had been ſent to Rajah Chimnajee Bahadre, with many other Particulars. As we firſt received Letters from you, acquainting us of the Treaty and Conditions not being approved of, and expreſſive of your Deſire to go to Benares, conformably to them we wrote to the Nabob Nizam Ally Khan, to Poona, &c. Ten Days afterwards other Letters were received: In them you wrote, that the Nabob Amaud-ul-Dowlah, from his great Favour, ſhewed you much Attention, and told you he was ſettling a Peace with Pundit Purdhaun, under the Guarantee of the Maha Rajah; that he would reſtore Baſſein and the Guicawar, and Guzerat, and the Talooks of Kullian; but that they muſt unite with him for an Invaſion into the Country of Hyder Naig, and for his Reduction: All this we perfectly underſtood: And you beſides wrote, that in Two or Four Days the Treaty will be prepared and diſpatched. Accordingly Four Days after we received the Treaty, with Three Letters; this Treaty was written on one Side of the Paper in Engliſh, and on the other Side in Perſian; and on one of theſe Treaties there was a Seal; the other Two were Copies without Seals. After them arrived Three more Copies of the ſame Treaty, and Three Karetahs, addreſſed to this Quarter, to Pundit Purdhaun, and to Scindia. The Contents of the Treaty we learnt from the Perſian Side of it, and were fully comprehended by us. The Anſwers to every one of the Articles have accordingly been written to the Nabob Amaud-ul-Dowlah. When Peace is really and ſincerely wiſhed for, it is proper to write every Article without Obſcurity: Had this Treaty been plain and without Doubts in all its Parts, I ſhould then have inſtantly ſet off for Poona, where I ſhould have explained and ſatisfied them on every Point. Firſt, the Opportunity was ſuffered to eſcape, namely, when I went to Poona and wrote myſelf to General Goddard, and received his Anſwer; had at that Time an Interview taken Place between the General and Nanna Purnaveeſe, all Miſunderſtandings would have been cleared up, and by this Time Hyder Naig would have been ſo entirely ruined, that neither his Name nor any Sign of his having exiſted would have remained, and Pundit Purdhaun and the Nabob would have become One Soul in Two Bodies. That Opportunity was loſt, and as Matters were referred to the Deciſion of Arms, Pundit Purdhaun readily conſenting to his own Diſadvantage, entered into an Alliance with Hyder Naig, on this Agreement, That they ſhould carry Ruin and Deſolation into the Country of the Engliſh. And the Nabob Nizam-ul Dowlah wrote to Pundit Purdhaun, and having with him ſettled a Plan, brought us into this Diſtreſs againſt our Inclination and Wiſhes. Had I not agreed to this I ſhould have been blamed for the Misfortunes of the Ranjee; and I who am a Well-wiſher and faithful Servant of the Ranjee, ſhould have ſuffered every Reproach and Accuſation. As General Goddard had arrived at Haſhungabad, and Mr. Weatherſtone had come to Naigpore, and they had been ſupplied from this Quarter with Bullocks for their Artillery, and all other Duties of Friendſhip had been performed, this was made uſe of as an Argument for blaming and accuſing us; and Pundit Purdhaun openly affirmed to me, that we had a cloſe Alliance and Friendſhip with the Engliſh Gentlemen: And at the ſame Time Monſieur Chevalier the French Chief, having eſcaped from Calcutta had come to Cuttack in Hopes of Protection, and Mr. Elliot who was coming to this Quarter, having arrived at Cuttack, requeſted him; notwithſtanding that in Political Affairs it is very blame-worthy to forſake a Perſon who has claimed Refuge with you, yet in Conſequence of our Friendſhip we delivered him up: And although the Inhabitants of this Country were diſpleaſed and blamed me, yet I conſidered ſolely my Friendſhip, and by this I had become obnoxious and ſuſpected. Having no Remedy I found it abſolutely neceſſary for me to aſſent to the Plan, and in Conſequence of that to raiſe 30,000 new Horſemen. It is now 14 Months that we have laboured under inexpreſſible Diſtreſs, and been loaded with an Expence of Crores of Rupees for the Pay of theſe Troops, but without endangering the Friendſhip and Alliance of the Engliſh Gentlemen.

men. I was deſirous to negociate a Reconciliation at any rate between them and Pundit Purdhaun, in ſuch a Manner as to enſure the Perpetuity of the ancient Alliance of this Quarter with both Sides. During theſe 14 Months I have therefore continually informed you of all Matters, and have chearfully ſubmitted to all Difficulties and Diſtreſſes. But when the firſt Opportunity having been loſt, a Treaty is at laſt received, even in that the Concerns of Ragonaut Row are expreſſed in a doubtful and ambiguous Manner; beſides which, in the Affairs of Gwalior Futty Sing Gaicawar and the Rajah of Gohud, there is great Room for Diſputes. The Particulars of all theſe Points were hinted at large in the Perſian Letter, and are too long and tedious to be repeated here. There is a Diſtance of 600 Coſs between us, and a conſiderable Time loſt in ſending Letters and receiving the Anſwers. [illegible] unlucky Events and Circumſtances I have been compelled to ſend an Army under the Command of Rajah Chimnajee Bahadre; but how long am I to labour under the Difficulties and Diſtreſſes for the Pay of the Soldiers, which is immenſe? Though Two or Three Lacks of Rupees have been received, of what Aſſiſtance can that be, or how does that relieve us from the Weight of the Arrears? We have entered into Engagements with Pundit Purdhaun and the Nabob Nizam-ul-Dowlah; but that has not tended to the diminiſhing our Difficulties, nor can they be removed till Pundit Purdhaun and the Engliſh Gentlemen are reconciled. The Maha Rajah has accordingly exerted and employed his utmoſt Abilities for this Purpoſe, and has written to you on the Subject; but the Event has not turned out as he wiſhed and hoped for; and now that the Treaty is arrived, even in that there is great room for Alterations. We are without Reſource and Remedy. God knows and is Witneſs whether I am the Friend or the Enemy of the Engliſh; but the Earth is hard, and the Heavens are far removed. The Nabob Amaud-ul-Dowlah is prudent and foreſeeing, and all the Difficulties of every Meaſure are well known to him: At any rate he will not blame me; I am without the ſmalleſt Reſource, and can ſee no Remedy. Had the Engliſh Army under General Goddard never arrived at Hoſhangabad, what was then done would not have given Umbrage to the Decan People, and we ſhould not have been compelled to ſend an Army to Cuttack, and to ſubmit to ſuch a Weight of Expence, but we ſhould have been free and at Liberty in all Points, nor would any Difficulty have come upon us. From a Period of Twenty Years our Friendſhip has been daily encreaſing, but from the Plan determined on by the Nabob Nizam-ul-Dowlah, which has occaſioned all theſe Diſtreſſes, I am fallen into great Embarraſſment. Had a Peace been concluded between the Engliſh and Pundit Purdhaun, I was in hopes, that from the Friendſhip of the Nabob, I might have requeſted ſome ſmall Aſſiſtance, (on which Subject I accordingly wrote before, and the Nabob has kindly granted us 3 Lacks of Rupees). I alſo hoped that Pundit Purdhaun would likewiſe have given ſome Share, and that the Nabob Nizam-ul-Dowlah would certainly have contributed his Proportion, while we ourſelves would have repaid the reſt out of the Country of Hyder Naig. But on the contrary this Proſpect has not been realized, and the Negociations are extended to an unforeſeen Length: The Will of God is ſuperior to every thing. As yet, what Advantage has accrued to this Quarter from the Name which the Maha Rajah has adopted, from all the Pains and Exertions which I have taken during the laſt 14 Months, and from the many Letters I have written, in which I continually ſtyle myſelf the firm Friend, the Friend, the Friend. Fourteen Months have now elapſed ſince we raiſed 30,000 Horſemen: If there were only paid 300 Rupees, what a large Sum it would make; but the eſtabliſhed Allowances of this Country are 400 and 500 Rupees for each Horſeman, and ſome have even more than that; beſides which, there are large Allowances to the Jematdars and other Officers: conſider then well how great the Expence of the Whole muſt be. Having fully underſtood this Matter you muſt explain it to the Nabob. For 14 Months we have ſupported ourſelves, and how much longer muſt we wait in Expectation? It is incumbent on me to do any thing that may promiſe Relief from theſe Diſtreſſes, and if I am negligent and dilatory in executing it, the whole State will be brought into Danger. I have never been guilty of the ſmalleſt Neglect, and yet I am without Reaſon blamed and accuſed, and I have continually written all Particulars; but the Will of God is ſuperior to every thing. The Nabob muſt read with Attention every Syllable of the Perſian Letter which I have written to him, and muſt write back his Intentions. At this Time it is not adviſable to ſend the Army in Cantonments, and ſtill more imprudent to recall it, as nothing but Loſſes can be expected from acting contrary to the Plan which was determined on: Something muſt therefore be done. Should the Nabob think me inexcuſable for writing in one Manner, and acting in a different Manner, Diſtreſs for Money is my Excuſe, and for that I have no Remedy: But if I was eſcaped from this Whirlpool, and was able to keep myſelf alive, my ſole Attention and Endeavours would certainly be employed in cultivating the Friendſhip of the Nabob, which I hope never to loſe; or ſhould the Nabob, forgetting this, give me the Name of Enemy, it is my Misfortune, nor can I remedy it; but ſtill I will never give up my Friendſhip for him. The Expences of the Army have rendered me without Reſource. War and Hoſtilities are going on in Two or Three different Quarters; from one of theſe it is neceſſary to be free, and at the ſame Time Faith and Truth are to be obſerved. All theſe Particulars you muſt fully explain. Like the common Story of the Villager, "If I mention it, my Mother dies; if I conceal it, my Father will eat an unclean Dog;" both Cauſes are difficult. In the ſame Kind of Dilemma, which I could not foreſee, am I fallen; and this the Nabob, who is unequalled in Wiſdom and Prudence, muſt reflect upon with Juſtice. I write from the Dictates of my Friendſhip; and ſhould the Nabob conceive different Ideas of what I wrote, I am remedileſs. Had the Treaty been written without Ambiguity there would have been no Occaſion for all this: But it can never be conſented that Ragonaut Row ſhould remain in full Liberty to act as he pleaſes; for this Reaſon, that Madho Row Peiſhwa, at the Time of his Death, putting the Hand

of

of his Brother Narain Row into the Hand of Maha Raja Janojee Bhoſila, made them ſwear eternal Friendſhip, and that they would by all Means in their Power prevent the Connection from being broken; and Maha Raja Janojee Bhoſila procured the Releaſe of Ragonaut Row, who was at that Time in Confinement. The treacherous Conduct which Ragonaut afterwards obſerved towards Narrain Row, who had a Thouſand Rights veſted in himſelf, is well known. After the Murder of Narrain Row, the Maha Raja entered into new Engagements, "that though he could not act in any hoſtile Way againſt Ragonaut Row, yet he would never ſuffer him to be at Liberty to act as he ſhould pleaſe." This therefore never can nor will be agreed to; and as it was not poſſible to be ſecure for ſuch an Article, the Treaty has therefore not been ſent to Poona, but has with Letters been carefully kept here, and ſhall be diſpatched on the Receipt of your Anſwer. How can Pundit Purdhaun at this Time act inimically againſt Hyder Naig? If he ſhould, no one in the whole World would ever again confide in him, but in the Family of the Peſhwa. There is no want of Faith that they ſhould break their Engagements with a Perſon who ſolicited their Friendſhip; beſides, at this Time Hyder Naig has, in conſequence of his Connection with the Peſhwa, exerted all his Abilities; they muſt wait till Hyder is guilty of ſome Infringement of his Engagements, which at preſent he faithfully obſerves. The Opportunity of this Attack, which I informed you of in the Month of Cautick, upwards of 14 Months ago, and which perhaps you recollect, or have Letters reſpecting, was ſuffered to eſcape. If the Plan had been executed agreeable to my Information, by this Time no Mark of him would have remained; but at preſent, that to maintain their Friendſhip he has exerted himſelf in this Manner, how can they act with Enmity againſt him? All this has proceeded from the War, and no Advantage has been derived from it. The Chief of Bombay gave Riſe to theſe Hoſtilities and Enmity, and has brought Matters to this Paſs; no Fault laid in the Nabob. The Nabob was compelled to protect the Honour and Reputation of the Engliſh, and had he not attended to that, it would have given Occaſion to unlucky Events. All the preſent Circumſtances are owing ſolely to his Wiſh to maintain his Honour. If all theſe Miſunderſtandings can be removed through the Mediation of the Nabob Nizam-ul-Dowlah or Scindiah, it makes no Difference; I am certain that the Nabob Amaud-ul-Dowlah will now not write me any Letter for this Reaſon, becauſe that Rajah Chimnajee is on the Borders of Bengal, and perhaps ſome Damages have been done by him, and which has given the Nabob ſome Diſpleaſure. Let the Nabob think what he pleaſes, I am ſtill his ſincere Friend; but Misfortunes have no Remedy.

In the Hand Writing of the Dewan:

God knows what Diſtreſſes, and how great have been the Expences of 25,000 Men, which we have raiſed within theſe 14 Months. I am now without Remedy, and am in Embarraſſment from Two Quarters; on one Side there are Treaties and Engagements, and on the other a long and eſtabliſhed Connection of Friendſhip. I know not what to do; the Nabob is wiſe, and is well convinced of the Variations and Ficklenels of Times and Circumſtances.

Poſtſcript, written in Perſian.

You write in your Letters of the 22d and 30th of Ramzan, regarding "a Negociation "taking place for Peace; the Conferences of the Council; and that after much Diſpleaſure the "Governor had approved, and came into a favourable Diſpoſition to make a Treaty to abide by "the Engagements entered into by Colonel Upton, to withdraw entirely from Guzerat, the Depen-"dencies of Surat, Cokan, and the other Places which have lately been taken Poſſeſſion of, and until "a Treaty can be effected to ſtop all Operations." All this is extremely right and laudable, and tends to perpetual Advantages.

The Anſwer which you gave in the Conference with the Council and to the Governor, was extremely proper; a Hundred and a Hundred Praiſes. The Wiſhes of my Heart to eſtabliſh Truth and Sincerity, and what tends to evince my Deſire of promoting the Welfare of the Engliſh, have been ſtrongly demonſtrated, and will continue to be ſo in your Meaſures and Obſervations, which were equally prudent and wiſe. True it is, that Experience is the Touchſtone which diſcovereth the Value of a Man. All is very proper, provided that the Treaty from that Quarter is concluded with Candour and Truth; and with regard to former Treaties, and that the Places which have been taken Poſſeſſion be given up, great and ſmall; that Favour be not ſhewn to Ragonaut Row, and that he be delivered up to the Row Pundit Purdhaun. I have the fulleſt Confidence that the Governor, without further Stickling or Debate regarding any of theſe Articles, will pay a Regard to the future, and conſulting true Wiſdom, will ſend a Treaty concluded with a ſincere Diſpoſition, ſo that I may have Doubts or Difficulties in ſpeaking or writing to the Pundit Purdhaun and his Miniſters; that I may take a determinate Part in enforcing their Acquieſcence; and that I may diſpoſe the Nabob Nizam-ul-Dowlah and Scindia with Unanimity both in Forms and in Meaning to join in promoting theſe Meaſures. But it is above all Things neceſſary that Letters ſhould be ſent to me addreſſed to the Nabob Nizam-ul-Dowlah, and alſo to Sindiah, the Pundit Purdhaun, and Balajee Row Jenardain; and it is highly requiſite that the Satisfaction of Nizam-ul-Dowlah, and the ſettling of his juſt Pretenſions, ſhould be effected through the Channel of this Court; ſo that, with the Aſſiſtance of the ſaid Nabob and Sindiah, I may take Meaſures to lay a proper Foundation for a Treaty with Pundit Purdhaun. It muſt not depend entirely on the Negociations of Mr. John Hollond; for if that Gentleman

tleman is employed it will not be in our Power here to make ſure of the Aſſiſtance of the above-mentioned Nabob: He will be drawn another Way, and this will be the Means of interrupting the whole Buſineſs As that Gentleman will write in one Style to Calcutta, and I in another, hence a Difference will ariſe, which will occaſion Doubts and Suſpicions. It is particularly neceſſary to be careful to prevent this; for the Nabob is the firſt and moſt diſtinguiſhed of the Chiefs of the Decan, and he is in ſome Meaſure ſatisfied with the Engliſh Gentlemen on the Reſtoration of Mortezanagur. It is therefore very adviſable that he ſhould be conciliated by Civilities and Profeſſions, and the Settlement of his juſt Pretenſions, and thereby brought over to co operate in promoting the deſired Objects. You write, that the Governor after expreſſing many Doubts and Objections about [illegible]ying the Expences of the Troops which are arrived at Cuttack, and after you had ſatisfied him, ſaid "The Gentlemen of the Council will not agree; for my own Part I approve of it. For the preſent "I will give thus much Money; but the Troops of this Place are going to Madras: Let near 3000 "Horſe of the Troops which are at Cuttack accompany them, ſo that they may arrive in Safety at "the Place of their Deſtination; but let nothing be ſaid of the Chout of Bengal, for this would "draw great Diſcredit on me with the Council and the Engliſh; and where Advantages of Crores "and Lacks are in Contemplation, it is improper to look to ſuch inconſiderable Objects. Some "Compenſation will be found for it." The Caſe is this: In all the Correſpondence which has paſſed during Two Years, not a Word has ſlipped from my Pen that has had the leaſt Relation to Avarice or Self-Intereſt. But I am embarraſſed on Account of the Troops which are arrived at Cuttack, from my Friendſhip to both Sides, namely, the Pundit Purdhaun and the Engliſh; they are prevented from ravaging any of the Engliſh Territories from a Regard to the latter; and they are prevented from returning from a Regard to the Plan which has been laid down by the Pundit Purdhaun. I am perplexed therefore betwixt a Regard to my Friendſhip: I had no other Motive in what I wrote. But Two poſitive Conditions are propoſed by the Governor before he will agree; the one is to relinquiſh the Chout of Bengal out of Friendſhip to the Engliſh; the Second is to ſend 3000 Horſe along with the Officer who has been detached to Madras. The Caſe is this: The Exertions which were made by the late Rajah to obtain the Chout, the Labours he went through, and the Valour he diſplayed, are as apparent as the Sun. In theſe Wars, Worlds were overturned, Multitudes were trampled under the Feet of Horſes; the Treaſures and Goods of Merchants, Bankers, and Inhabitants of that Country, were plundered and deſtroyed, and Two and Twenty of the moſt diſtinguiſhed Chiefs of this Country, together with many of their Companions and Friends, from the Treachery of the Soubah of Bengal, fell in the Service of their Maſter; till at length our hereditary Right and Property of the Chout was fully eſtabliſhed and confirmed. Although from an Union with the Engliſh the greateſt Advantages can be obtained, yet how can we relinquiſh theſe Rights and Inheritances which commemorate the Fame of our Anceſtors, without forfeiting at the ſame Time our Dignity and Rank as Princes? In the ſame Manner as the Governor ſays Diſcredit would be drawn upon him with the Council, ſo would this draw upon us the Contempt of all our Neighbours. What therefore is written regarding the Relinquiſhment of the Chout of Bengal, is no ways proper. It is adviſable that our Name ſhould be preſerved in that Soubah; but except this, mention any other Difficulties which occur, ſo that they may be obviated. In preſerving the Name of our Chout great Advantages will be derived to the Engliſh; every one will be afraid to invade their Country: This will be a great Advantage. If Troops were to be ſent along with the Officer of the Engliſh, Intelligence thereof would doubtleſs be carried to the Peſhwa and Nizam-ul-Dowlah; and they will ſay with Certainty, that Booſhla and the Engliſh have in their Hearts been ſecretly united, and now it is diſcovered: He is in fact, therefore, one of the Engliſh, and we muſt concert Meaſures and provide againſt him. All that has been written to Poona and to the Nabob, regarding Peace and the Treaty which is coming from Calcutta, will be rendered ineffectual, and a War will be occaſioned with the Chiefs of the Decan: Then at leaſt 50,000 Horſe, beſides the neceſſary Stores and Ammunition, muſt be got ready before any thing can be done. By the Bleſſing of God, whenever my Letters arrive, as many Troops as are wanted can be procured; but I am without Money. As the Courage and Bravery of the Family of Booſhla is well known, great Revenues would be neceſſary. Although with the Spirit and Ability of the Engliſh, the Aſſiſtance of Crores and Lacks is not ſo very great a Matter, and Men who accumulate Treaſure, accumulate it for ſuch Days as theſe; yet when ſo many Objections are made to aſſiſt in paying the Expences of the Troops at Cuttack, how can I place my Expectations in obtaining larger Heaps? If ſo much Spirit be ſhewn from that Quarter, I am ready; and I know well that this will not be done by the Council. As the Friendſhip of the Engliſh is at all Events the firſt and moſt neceſſary Conſideration, I will therefore exert myſelf in eſtabliſhing Peace; for the Power of making Peace with all is the beſt Object. To this all other Meaſures are ſubſervient; and this will certainly be done by them (the Engliſh.) You write, "That after having laid the Foundation of Peace with the Pundit Purdhaun, it is requiſite that ſome Troops ſhould be ſent along with Colonel Goddard againſt Hyder Naig, and take Poſſeſſion of his Country, when all theſe Engagements and Propoſals may be aſſented to." My Reaſon is confounded in diſcuſſing this Suggeſtion. At a Time when Hyder Naig is in every Reſpect in Alliance with the Peiſhwa, and has aſſiſted with his Soul and Life to repel the Engliſh, ſo as to unite our Troops with thoſe of the Enemy, and endeavour to extirpate him, would not this fix the Stamp of Infamy upon us for ever? Would any Prince, for Generations to come, ever after aſſiſt or unite with the Peiſhwa? Be yourſelf the Judge; and whether ſuch a Conduct would become a Prince, or not? Why then do you mention it? Why do you write it? The Caſe is as follows: At firſt there

was

was the utmoſt Enmity betwixt Hyder Naig and the Pundit Purdhaun, and there was the fulleſt Intention of ſending Troops into Hyder Naig's Country: And after the Concluſion of the War with Bombay, and the Capture of Ragonaut Row, it was firmly reſolved to ſend Troops into that Quarter, and a Reliance was placed on the Treaty which was entered into by the Gentlemen of Bombay before the War; but when Ragonaut Row again went to them, and General Goddard was ready to commence Hoſtilities, when no Regard was paid to the friendly Propoſals made by us and the Pundit Purdhaun, when they deſiſted from coming to Poona agreeable to their Promiſe, and a categorical Anſwer was given to the Deputies from Poona, the Miniſters of Poona then conſulted amongſt themſelves, and having adviſed with the Nabob Nizam-ul-Dowlah, they conſidered that as Enemies were appearing on both Sides, and it would be difficult to cope with both, what was to be done? Peace muſt be made with one of them, and War muſt be carried on with the other. They wiſhed above all Things in their Hearts to make Peace with the Engliſh Gentlemen, and unite with them to puniſh Hyder Naig: But theſe Gentlemen had plainly refuſed to enter into any Terms of Reconciliation; it was therefore adviſable to accommodate Matters with Hyder Naig. Although he had long been an Enemy, what elſe could be done? Having nothing elſe left for it, they were compelled to enter into an Union with Hyder; but as the innate Diſpoſition of that Prince is compoſed of Ingratitude and Infidelity, and he can never ceaſe to err, it is certain that he will violate the Treaty and yield; a Pretence that will render it adviſable for us, in Conjunction with the Engliſh, to take Vengeance, without incurring the Imputation of a Breach of Treaties. We muſt therefore wait for an Opportunity when he ſhall commit ſome Fault, and doubtleſs he will commit one; but the Time and Opportunity are ſtill to come, and this is the Way: After the Treaty formed with Sincerity and Candour arrives from your Quarter, I will ſet out for Poona to conclude theſe important Matters, and will accompliſh every thing as wiſhed for. I will unite Sindiah with me, and I will ſatisfy the Nabob Nizam-ul-Dowlah; and as the utmoſt Diſguſt ſubſiſts in the Hearts of the Miniſters and Nizam-ul-Dowlah againſt Hyder, yet for the Sake of Appearances, as ſome Pretence is neceſſary, we will conſult together; find out ſome Accuſation againſt him. We muſt fix all our Thoughts on this; but ſome little Delay is neceſſary to effect all theſe Objects. This you well underſtand, and be not impatient. Things which at firſt can eaſily and ſpeedily be accompliſhed, from the Viciſſitude of Affairs may afterwards be difficult. At preſent, the Eſtabliſhment of Peace between the Engliſh Gentlemen, the Pundit Purdhaun, and the Nabob Nizam-ul-Dowlah, is highly expedient; and, as I formerly wrote, the Loſs which each Party has ſuſtained from keeping up their Armies, may be indemnified from ſome Operations carried on by them in Conjunction. This is certainly true. In former Times it might have been done immediately: If now, a Delay of ſome Days muſt take place, it does not ſignify: What comes ſlowly, comes well. The Root and Exiſtence of Hyder Naig will, in proceſs of Time, be extirpated. To conclude: Formerly a long Correſpondence of this Kind took place with Lord Clive, which aroſe from a cordial Friendſhip on both Sides; after that, no Correſpondence was kept up, till knowing the diſtinguiſhed Character of the preſent Governor, and finding that he was capable of comprehending all theſe Objects, an Intercourſe and confidential Communication has been eſtabliſhed. God, who ſeeth the Inſide of all Hearts, is a Witneſs whether it proceeded from Intereſtedneſs, or from the ſincereſt Friendſhip. The Event will infallibly evince, that it would be difficult to find throughout the whole Extent of the Decan, and of India, a Friend ſo truly attached as the Rajah my Maſter.

Poſtſcript. To the Letter which you wrote to Bowanny Pundit to this Effect, That if Pundit Purdhaun ſhould not be ſatisfied with the Treaty on Account of the News of Hyder Naig, it is proper that you ſhould cultivate the Friendſhip of the Engliſh, becauſe many Advantages may ariſe from it, and the Governor reckons you his firm Friend. I hope that all theſe Advantages agreeable to my Inclinations will be brought about. *This is the Anſwer; That after the Arrival of the true and undiſſembling Treaty from Calcutta to this Effect, to forſake Ragonaut Row, and to deliver him to Pundit Purdhaun, and to reſtore all the Places in the Kokan, and Guzerat, and the Talooks of Hind.* I will go to Poona, and will get a Treaty on his (the Peiſhwa) Part; and whatever is in my Heart I will get eſtabliſhed in the Treaty. But if the Peiſhwa does not agree to this equitable Treaty, and peremptorily refuſes it, I will then write to you (agreeable to your Letter) whatever is proper to be written. To keep an Army, much Money is requiſite; but I ſhall in no Reſpect be neglectful in preſerving Friendſhip with the Engliſh, and withdrawing from all others will adhere to them.

A true Copy of the Tranſlation.

E. Hay,
Aſſ^t Sec^y.

Tranſlation of a Letter from Rajah Seina Behadar to Beneram Pundit, dated the 23*d* Suffier; and a Duplicate to the ſame Purport: Received the 26*th* February.

Having committed many Particulars verbally to Biſſumber Pundit, I diſpatched him to your Quarter. All thoſe Particulars you will have underſtood, as alſo the Letters which have ſince been written to you. From the Friendſhip of the Nabob Amaud-ul-Dowla, we are loaded with the Reproaches of Pundit Purdhaun and Nizam Ally Khan; and out of Regard to the Friendſhip of the Nabob, no Objection or Oppoſition has been made to the March of Colonel Pearſe; but how will the Event

Event of this appear? The Maha Raja formerly wrote to me that he was at a great Diſtance, but that the Nabob was near me, and that whatever was proper I ſhould write to the Nabob and act agreeable to his Orders. Accordingly, to this Time I have acted in that Manner; and it is therefore incumbent and neceſſary for the Nabob, in Conſideration of his Friendſhip, to think of and ſettle ſome Plan for the Relief of our Diſtreſſes. You muſt now explain fully to the Nabob this Letter, and ſatisfy him. Inform me of its Succeſs. After the Diſtreſſes of the Army ſhall have been removed, and the Foundation of our Friendſhip ſtrengthened, great Advantage will accrue. To this Time, from an Attention to my Friendſhip, I have readily ſubmitted to theſe Expences and Reproaches which have been thrown upon us by Pundit Purdhaun and Nizam Ally Khan. The Nabob Amaud-ul-Dowlah is [illegible] It is neceſſary that he pay Regard not to the Money but to the Friendſhip of the Maha Raja, and that he performs what ought to be done. This Friendſhip will be of great Utility. I diſpatch this Letter under Charge of Two Coſſids: Return them with an Anſwer ſpeedily.

In the Raja's Hand:—I have ſaid to Biſſumber Sheo Behader whatever was proper to be ſaid. He will have made every Point known to you. Send him back hither ſoon, and return a ſpeedy Anſwer.

A true Copy of the Tranſlation:
E. Hay,
Act^s Sec^r.

From Bowanny Pundit Appa to the Same; 23d Suffier.

Having committed ſeveral Points of Negociation to Biſſumber Pundit, I have diſpatched him to your Quarter; and afterwards other Letters were ſent, which you will have received, and underſtood the Contents: You will now learn all Particulars from the Letter of the Raja. From the Friendſhip of the Nabob great Expences and Diſtreſſes have come upon us; and Seremunt Row Pundit Purdhaun and the Nabob Nizam Ally Khan have reviled and reproached us; it is therefore incumbent upon the Nabob not to pay any Attention to the Money but to the Friendſhip of the Maha Raja. You are a Well-wiſher to both Sides, and muſt explain this in a proper Manner, and ſend a ſpeedy Anſwer.

In the Pundit's Hand:—Mr. Anderſon arrived, but no Opportunity offered for an Interview He has ſent the Letters which was with him, and which I underſtood. We have done what the Nabob requeſted, and the Nabob muſt now keep his Eyes on the Friendſhip, to give us Relief in the Article of Pay to the Army; by ſo doing the Nabob would enſure great Advantage to himſelf.

A true Copy of the Tranſlation.
E. Hay,
Act^s Sec^r.

From Rajah Ram Pundit to the Same; 23d Suffier.

I have before this written to you all Particulars which you will have underſtood. Biſſumber Pundit having obtained Permiſſion from the Preſence, ſent for me from Cuttack. When I arrived at the Army by the Advice of the Pundit, and agreeable to your former Letters received at Cuttack, I explained every Particular in a proper Manner to Appa Saheb, and repreſented them likewiſe to the Rajah. I alſo ſpoke, at Biſſumber Pundit's Deſire, reſpecting the March and Station of the Army, and got it ſettled that Colonel Pearſe ſhould march without any Moleſtation with his Army, ſuch Days Journies as he may chuſe. Accordingly, all the Requeſts of Biſſumber were agreed to, and the Pundit has been diſpatched to the Nabob and to you. Do you now execute whatever Plan may bring Things to an Iſſue. I am the leaſt of the Servants of the Sirkar. Out of the Regard to the Friendſhip of the Nabob, we for 10 Months, to prevent the ſmalleſt Injury being done, detained the Army in Cuttack, and to the Extent of our Abilities to bear, brought into theſe Diſtreſſes not only ourſelves but our Relations, Friends, and Allies, and attempted to defray thoſe Expences. Biſſumber Pundit is well acquainted with the Sentiments, Views, and Wiſhes of this Quarter, and will have explained them to you. I have, to compleat the Point you have propoſed to me, ſpoken to the Appa Saheb, and by procuring a free Paſſage for the Battalion have, with my Eyes open, ſubmitted to a heavy Reproach; and leaving only the Propriety of this Matter to you, I have executed it, as this was for the Intereſt and Advantage of both Governments: But how long is this Friendſhip to be maintained through the Intervention of others? The Nabob from his Wiſdom and Prudence having conquered the whole Country, has for theſe 20 Years ſent to Europe large Sums of Money; and it is well known, that for theſe 20 Years the Maha Rajah has never once ſent an Army towards this Country; and as he for 10 Years did not think the Friendſhip of the Nabob adviſable, the Nabob remained in Peace, attending to the Management of his Country, and raiſing his Glory. If I was to make an Account of the Chout, to how much would it not amount? But Fear of God is neceſſary. For a whole Year an Army of 30,000 Horſe has remained with their Eyes towards that Quarter, and continued within their own Limits, and did not commit the ſmalleſt Injury in the Country of Bengal, to the Damage of even a dry Leaf. Much Money will be received, but it is difficult for this Seaſon, and the Advantages of Friendſhip to be attained. I am now releaſed from this, the Blame of it belongs to

to the Nabob. I performed the ſame friendly Offices at Hoſhungabad, and enabled them to go with Safety to Surat; and in this Place what could be my Motive for delivering up the Frenchman to the Nabob? God is Witneſs that it was to give Pleaſure to the Nabob. It is now univerſally known that I procured a Paſſage for the Battalions. Should the Nabob at this Time alter his Sentiments God will bear Witneſs. This Time is diſtreſſing; the Soldiers pray that they may be led to Blood and Plunder, and daily and nightly make this Requeſt. You will explain all theſe Particulars to the Nabob in a proper Manner, and having ſettled it, write me Intelligence of it. The Seaſon of Opportunity is gone; this may be of great Conſequence and Advantage. If he is inclined to maintain and ſupport his Greatneſs, let him remain firm in his Friendſhip for the Nabob. Reflect on this maturely; as I am ſatisfied as to the Pay of the Army, I will do every thing which may be for the Intereſts of the Nabob; having ſettled this, ſpeedily inform me of it.

A true Copy of the Tranſlation.
E. Hay,
Act[g] Secr[y]

From Hurry Hurr Maha Deo; 26th Suffier.

Your Letters dated in Suffier, was received the laſt Day of that Month. According to your Deſire I am going with Munnijee Pundit to the Army: After my Arrival there, I will repreſent all Particulars to you. I have heard that Biſſumber Pundit being arrived at Ballaſore, is remaining there, in Expectation of ſeeing Mr. Anderſon; before this he is doubtleſs arrived at Calcutta. Colonel Pearſe is arrived with his Army at Balaſore, and Buggerunt Row Nanna has had an Interview with him. At this Time Letters are received from Rajah Seina Bahadre and Rajah Ram Pundit to Dewan Huderam and Munjoo Choudry, to this Purport: That between the Nabob Amaud-ul-Dowlah and the Maha Rajah the firmeſt Friendſhip exiſts; that Colonel Pearſe is going with an Army to oppoſe Hyder Naig; that I muſt therefore come immediately to Gunneſe Nagur Ghaut, and prepare the Ferry Boats for the Army to croſs as ſoon as they may arrive there; and that Munjoo Choudry and Namdar Khawn muſt accompany them to the Limits of Ganjam: That I muſt quiet the Inhabitants of the Town, and prevent their conceiving any Apprehenſions; that the Battalions are going to Madras and will do no Injury; and that I muſt give poſitive Orders to the ſame Effect to Shawbeg Khan and Nabar Khan, &c. who are on the other Side of the River Gunjoory. Whatever further may learn will repreſent to you.

A true Copy of the Tranſlation.
E. Hay,
Act[g] Secr[y].

A Second Letter from Rajah Ram Pundit to Beneram.

Whatever I and Biſſumber Pundit together repreſented to the Rajah and Appe Saheb, will have been made known to you by the Pundit, who has been diſpatched from hence. Colonel Pearſe has had Permiſſion to march, and ſtrict Orders have been given to the Beuſſaries to furniſh him with Proviſions; and having ſent an Agent from us with him, he has been forwarded to the Southward from the Neighbourhood of Cuttack. Biſſember Pundit at the Time of his Departure petitioned from the Preſence, that they would not leave Cuttack till he ſhould addreſs an Arzee to them after his Arrival at Calcutta. The Troops here complain greatly, that they came in the Hopes of enriching themſelves in the Country of Bengal, and that to this Time they had neglected all thoſe Hopes of acquiring Money and Goods; that they had now, for the ſake of Friendſhip, given free Paſſage to Colonel Pearſe; that they muſt now either give them Intelligence where to get their Money, or elſe ſuffer them to ſhew their Courage and Activity. How long are theſe Diſcourſes to laſt? We are anxiouſly expecting Letters from your Quarter. We have performed the Duties of Friendſhip. To this Time you and I have, in all Caſes and Seaſons, exerted ourſelves in repreſenting all Matters, and pointing out the Opportunities. The Execution of every thing depends upon the Nabob: He will do whatever is right.

A true Copy of the Tranſlation.
E. Hay,
Act[g] Secr[y].

From Bowanny Pundit, Moonſhy to Moodajee Bhooſla, to Beneram Pundit; dated 20th Moherrira, and received in Calcutta the 22d Suffier, 21ſt February.

Your Letter dated the 6th Zeheidja arrived on the 9th Mohurrim, under Charge of the Coſſids of Teek Chunder Meerdha; together with Hindoſtanny Letters, addreſſed to the Maha Rajah, my Maſter, and the Dewan; and the Receipt of it made me acquainted with all Particulars, and gave me the greateſt Satisfaction. You write, that at firſt you could not agree in any Point of your Converſations, till after the Arrival of the Letters from the Preſence, and from Dada Saheb; when on the contrary every thing was unanimouſly aſſented to, and the Paper of Advice and Requeſts, and all the

the other Points, were approved of, agreeable to what they had written: That upon theſe Particulars being determined on, Karetahs and Letters from the Nabob, with a Treaty under the Seal and Signature of the Council, written in Engliſh and Perſian, and with Letters from you, were diſpatched by the Way of Benares, and by that of Cuttack; and that the Letters from hence were returned by the ſame Conveyance: That as yet no Anſwer had arrived to any one of them, which Circumſtance had thrown you into the greateſt Terror and Apprehenſions, leſt theſe Papers, containing Secrets of ſuch Importance, ſhould not have arrived ſafe at the Preſence, but ſhould have been loſt in the many Dangers of the Road: That you requeſt the Receipt of them may be acknowledged as ſpeedily as poſſible, in order to reſtore Tranquillity to your Mind: That you have, agreeable to the Contents of the Letters from the Preſence and Dada Saheb, dated the 20th of Rāmzan, repreſented to the Nabob the Means of ſupporting the War on all Four Sides, which requires the Preſence of an Engliſh Army in every Quarter, and will be attended with a conſiderable Expence; and that you enquired of him, in caſe he ſhould not adopt this Plan, and ſhould not chuſe to incur too great an Expence of Money, in that Caſe what Advice and Reſolution he would take, and what he would determine on for us? and if he does not act in that Manner, what other Plan he has adopted? That the Nabob is accordingly meditating on the above mentioned Points, and has begun to ſettle about the Money, which will be entirely adjuſted after the Arrival of the Anſwers from hence: That the Nabob declares that he has given up the aſſiſting of Ragonaut Row ſolely out of Friendſhip for the Maha Rajah, for that otherwiſe there are many Chiefs and Miniſters in Decan who are ambitious, and who would give Money and Treaſure for Aſſiſtance: That at this Time Keeroo Butt, a truſty Servant of Ragonaut Row, is come for this very Purpoſe, on the Part of ſeveral Perſons of Credit and Diſtinction, and promiſes Money on Condition of Ragonaut's being placed on the Throne; but that he pays no Attention to ſuch Promiſes, being reſolved to maintain the Friendſhip of the Maha Rajah, and never to aſſiſt Ragonaut Row; and that now he has ſent the Treaty, he can never think of giving any Aſſiſtance, and that he is anxious for the Receipt of the Anſwers from hence. That you ſaid in Anſwer, that the Maha Rajah alſo was in every Situation attentive to his Friendſhip, and would, without Doubt, act agreeable to what the Nabob had written: That it is adviſable to ſend an Anſwer as ſpeedily as poſſible, becauſe, in ſhort, to this Time every Converſation and Negociation has been founded on a Deſire for Friendſhip and Alliance. But what is learnt from Bowanny Pundit Buckſhy being of a contrary Nature, and Rajah Chimnajee Baboo having left his Cantonments and encamped, and intending to enter the Engliſh Dominions, Colonel Pearſe, an Engliſh Chief, has been ordered to march with 8 Battalions by Land; that they are waiting in Expectation of the Anſwers from hence. If theſe arrive ſoon it is well, if not, they will not remain long patient, but will march forwards and begin Hoſtilities; and the Valour and Courage of the Engliſh, which is univerſally known and extolled, will give a bad Iſſue to the Matter; the Receipt of the Money will be prevented, and Plunder and Rapine muſt be expected in the room of it: That it is therefore moſt adviſable to remain on friendly Terms with the Engliſh, and to enter into Alliance and intimate Connection with them, and at all Events to effect a Reconciliation between them and Pundit Purdhaun. That you have, agreeable to the former Letters from hence, ſet on Foot a Negociation reſpecting the Money, of which there are required ſeveral Lacks; and that you will inform us of whatever may be determined after the Arrival of the Anſwers from hence. What you write conformably to the Letters from hence, dated the 2d Zekaida, that although the Favours which the Nabob ſhews to you encreaſe daily, and although he has a ſincere Affection for you, yet if it is the Pleaſure of the Preſence that you ſhould remain, you muſt be informed of it, otherwiſe you will go to Benares. All theſe Particulars are perfectly underſtood; and from the Newſpaper of the Royal Durbar, the Manner and Method of all the Affairs at the Durbar, and the open and undiſguiſed Proceedings in tranſacting all the Concerns of the Sultanut and Country were likewiſe fully learnt: And the Paper, containing the Preparations of the Engliſh in collecting Troops at Benares, Ellahabad, Fyzabad, the Neighbourhood of Gwalior, and in the Carnatic, was peruſed, and the full Particulars of your Letter, together with the Abſtract and Abridgement of ſeveral Secret and Important Points were in a proper and compleat Manner explained to the Maha Rajah and his Miniſters, and the informing us of all Occurrences and of the Situation of Affairs which you at this Diſtance ſend continually and repeatedly: The explaining the concealed Parts of all Matters; the diſcovering the Whole of our Views and Wiſhes; the foreſeeing the End of every Thing at the very Commencement of it; the holding faſt in your Hand the Chain of Caution and Circumſpection for the Intereſts and Advantage of your Maſter; the being from your Heart and Soul employed in maintaining Truth and Faith, and in obſerving the Duties of Gratitude; your keeping up at the Durbar of the Engliſh a Diſtinction and Superiority above all the reſt; have gained you the Favour and Affection of the Maha Rajah and his Miniſter; and the Advantage to reſult from that, will, by the Bleſſing of God, ſhortly appear to the utmoſt of your Wiſhes. Knowing it to be incumbent on my Friendſhip to give you the earlieſt Intelligence of this lucky Event, I have written it to you.

The Karetahs and Treaties which were ſent in Duplicate by the Way of Benares, are all ſafe arrived, and Letters from you were received accompanying them, beſides a ſeparate Letter conformable to what you wrote; but by the way of Cuttack no Karetah or Letter was received. In anſwer to theſe, Karetahs and Letters were diſpatched at Two different Times, under charge of the Coſſid which came from your Quarter, accompanied by others from hence; firſt from Ramleez the 15th Zeheidja, and afterwards from Naigpore the 2d Mohurrem. Doubtleſs, they have arrived in ſucceſſive Order, and have made you acquainted with all the Contents. You need not be under any Apprehenſion reſpecting the Arrival of the Letters of the Nabob Nizam Ally Khan,

Khan, which you ſent back, as they were ſafely received at the ſame Time as the Letter for Zuffer-ud-Dowlah; but Two Papers of News written by Kiſſen Row Billall remain with you; thoſe likewiſe you will without Doubt ſend. The Letter which I wrote to you, under Date the 6th Mohurrem, and diſpatched under Charge of Coſſids belonging to the Sirkar, was written conformable to the Orders of the Maha Rajah and the Directions of the Dewan, and was free from all Obſcurity and Diſguiſe, was full of Truth and Sincerity, and had not the ſmalleſt Degree of Doubt, Excuſe, or Diſſimulation; and at this Time alſo, whatever I heard from the Maha Rajah my Maſter, and from his Miniſter, I have written in the fulleſt Manner: It is as follows; That what the Nabob has ſaid, namely, that notwithſtanding the Engliſh Forces are ſtationed in all Quarters, from Benares and Allahabad as far as Gwalior, and from Conkan to the Carnatic, for the Settlement of the War and Diſputes from the Four Quarters, and for the Recovery of their military Reputation, and for ſupplying the Expences required by theſe Meaſures; and that notwithſtanding that many of the Chiefs and Miniſters are inclined towards Ragonaut Row, and promiſe to ſupply large Sums of Money in caſe of his being reſtored to the Throne; yet he has, ſolely with a View to pleaſe the Maha Rajah, ſent of himſelf a Treaty, and has deſiſted from all Aſſiſtance of Ragonaut Row; for that otherwiſe, to this Time he had no Inclination to enter into Peace and Alliance with them; that he is anxiouſly expecting the Anſwer of the Maha Rajah. The Caſe is this: That in the Commencement of a War, the Event of it, which muſt be either Defeat or Victory, is known only to God, who ſees the inward as well as outward. It is firſt neceſſary to quit the Guard of one's own Country before one can carry Fire into the Dominions of another; and while the other does not commit any Breach of his Engagements, to bind on without Cauſe the Girdle of Enmity, and to act in Oppoſition to all Faith and Treaties, is contrary to the Opinion of all wiſe Men, and is the Heighth of Infidelity. Beſides this, General Goddard's being at Hoſhungabad was conſidered and pointed at through all Parts of Decan, as a Proof of the Friendſhip and Alliance between theſe Two Countries: For this Reaſon in the Letters from hence it was adviſed and requeſted, conformable to our Friendſhip and good Wiſhes, that Peace and Reconciliation be effected, and in conſequence of that not being approved of, a Karetah was ſent to you, containing the Means of ſupporting this arduous War. In anſwer to this the Nabob wrote, That he had dropped that Intention, and wiſhed for nothing but Friendſhip. From this you muſt reflect, that if the Letters from this Quarter to that Quarter had had any Weight, out of thoſe Two Propoſals, One would certainly have met with his Approbation. Enough of this. When after the Bombay Defeat the Dewan went to Poona, and Hyder Naig had no other Kind of Connection with Pundit Peſhwa, except the ſending an Army into his Country, and General Goddard from himſelf had propoſed Peace and Friendſhip, and when his declining to aſſiſt Ragonaut Row, and his promiſing to come to Poona, was ſolely for the Purpoſe of a Reconciliation; and at that Time although the Dewan in Perſon exerted and employed the moſt powerful Arguments for this Purpoſe, yet they had no Effect. Having no other Reſource, the People of Poona entered into an Alliance with Hyder Naig; and whatever was to be done in conſequence has been done, and is ſtill doing. At that Time, why did not the General act for the Maha Rajah's Satisfaction? It is now become abſolutely neceſſary for us to approve the Plan and Scheme, and to raiſe an Army and ſend it into Oriſſa, otherwiſe we ſhould never have had Occaſion to raiſe an Army and ſend it into Oriſſa, or to ſubmit to an Expence of Lacks and Crores of Rupees. All this has been the Conſequence of General Goddard's coming to Hoſhungabad, and our Wiſh to maintain the Friendſhip of the Engliſh. You muſt be juſt, and conſider well from what have proceeded the Difficulties of this War and the preſent Alarms. Afterwards, when the Dewan returned to Naugpore, the Army which is arrived at Cuttack was put into Cantonments ſolely for the Friendſhip of the Engliſh Gentlemen. Karetahs and Letters were ſent from hence, containing many political and friendly Sentiments, and adviſing, that as Peace was a Thouſand Times preferable to War, and as Obſervance of Treaties and Engagements was the Standard of Faith, Peace ſhould be effected; or, that if this was not agreed to, then the Proſecution of War on the Four Quarters, the ſtationing of Engliſh Battalions on all Sides, and the providing Money for the Expences, muſt be thought of. When Letters from hence to this Purport were repeatedly received in that Quarter, yet the Nabob, rejecting all the Rights of Friendſhip and Affection, ſaid to you, That we were partial to Pundit Purdhaun, and wiſhed for his Friendſhip and Alliance; that he would decline our Alliance; that it was of no Uſe for you to remain with him, but that you might return Home. Reflect what Wiſh to give Satisfaction to this Quarter; was there any ſuch Expreſſion it would have been right in him to have ſaid, That he had not the ſmalleſt Intention of making Peace with Pundit Purdhaun; that we are his Friends, and are pointed at by all the People of Dekan on account of our Friendſhip with him, who are not amicably inclined towards us, and wiſh to ſee no other Intercourſe between us than that of Diſputes; that we have therefore ſent an Army into Oriſſa, and that it was neceſſary for us to unite ourſelves with him, by which Means the Army at Cuttack would become his; that as for the oppoſing his Enemies, a large Force was requiſite, it was therefore neceſſary for him to collect Troops, and that for that Purpoſe he would give us ſuch a Sum of Money, and would pay us ſo much for the Support of the Army of Cuttack. If he had ſpoken in this Manner it would have ſet our Minds at eaſe, and we ſhould, in Hopes of Aſſiſtance from him, have determined on Plans and Meaſures to be purſued: But he rejecting theſe Words, which would have been conſiſtent with the Advice required by the Circumſtances, ſaid to you only this, That you might return Home. At that Time where was his Wiſh to give us Satisfaction, which he now writes has alone prompted him to make Peace and to ſend the Treaty? As in Friendſhip

ſhip and Alliance ſuch a Diſpute is not proper nor becoming, we have therefore aſſented and approved that he makes Peace merely to pleaſe us, but only in caſe the Treaty is made conformable to the former Engagements. This will be an Obligation conferred on his Friends, and will reſtore Tranquillity to the Inhabitants, will extinguiſh the Flames of War, and will eſtabliſh the Reputation of our true Friend the Nabob Amaud-ul-Dowlah; but when we have aſſumed the Name of Amaud-ul-Dowlah, why ſhould we render it abortive, and of no Effect, on account of theſe Expreſſions about our Satisfaction? What we do for him, we do for ourſelves; but only on Condition that the Treaty be plain and undiſguiſed, and conformable to former eſtabliſhed Engagements. When the Articles of it had been maturely conſidered, in the Point of Ragonaut Row's being at Liberty to reſide wherever he may think proper, to that of the Fort of Ahmedabad, and the Shah of Guzerat being and maintained in the Poſſeſſion of Futty Sing Guicawar, agreeable to your Engagements; and in the like Article ſecuring Gwalior to the Rana of Gohud, there appeared a Variation from former Treaties, and a Neceſſity for an Alteration, beſides the Article engaging to attack and ruin Hyder Naig in concert; all which Articles as we knew could never be aſſented to by the Poona Miniſters: We therefore wrote in Anſwer, whatever was right and was required by Faith and Obſervance of Treaties, with the greateſt Sincerity and Truth, and diſpatched the Karetahs and Letters to your Quarter, where I have no Doubt but they are ſafe arrived. If Truth, and Faith, and Obſervance of Treaties, and Peace, and Reconciliation, ſhould be their Wiſh, they will then give their Aſſent to every thing which has been written from their Quarter, and will conſider it to have been dictated by Friendſhip. Whatever they may have determined upon will be beſt. But I ſwear by the Almighty, and by my Holy Religion, that the Maha Rajah my Maſter, and the Dewan, notwithſtanding that their Plans and Counſels above written have not availed or been approved of, have no other Thoughts or Views but the Intereſts and Advantages of the Engliſh Gentlemen, and the Glory of the Nabob Amaud-ul Dowlah; and how great, and of what a long Standing muſt their Friendſhip be, which, notwithſtanding repeated Denials and Contradictions, has received no Injury? This will by Degrees be tried and plainly ſeen by the Nabob: At preſent many Things veil it and keep it under Darkneſs, as a Cloud does the Sun; but at laſt the Light of the Sun breaks forth by its own Vigour. As the illuſtrious and noble Family of Bhooſlah are famed for their Obſervance of Faith and Sincerity, and have been brought into the Plan and Meaſures of Pundit Purdhaun, they are therefore without Remedy and Reſource, and are wiſhing to extricate themſelves from their Engagements with the Poona Rulers. The Maha Rajah had for this Purpoſe imagined and ſettled a Scheme which he explained to me himſelf, and ordered me to write it to you in my Letter of the 6th Moheuran, from which Letter you will have thoroughly comprehended it. In this Caſe, if the Dependencies of the Engliſh have ſuffered from the Army at Cuttack, or if from the Dread of the Engliſh Battalions the Province of Oriſſa has received any Damage, or even if any ſmall Hoſtility has happened between them, it makes no Difference, becauſe wherever the Hearts are ſincerely unanimous, no outward Appearance of Miſunderſtanding can be of any Effect; from that a Plea may be procured for ſeparating ourſelves from the Connection with Pundit Purdhaun, but it muſt not be looked upon as an Act of Enmity: This you muſt explain to the Nabob, and convince him that the ſole End propoſed from this Meaſure, is to ſeparate ourſelves from Pundit Peiſhwa, and that after extricating ourſelves from our Engagements to him, and from this diſtreſſing Plan of his, every Meaſure will be ſettled with the Aſſiſtance and Advice of the Engliſh Gentlemen. But the Means of ſupporting the Expences of the Pay to the Army at Cuttack, and to the new Troops, which this Plan will require to be raiſed, depend altogether on the Aſſiſtance of the Nabob Amaud-ul Dowlah; having ſettled this Point in a binding Manner, you muſt write us ſo.

The Reaſon of the determining on this Plan is as follows: When Copies of the Treaty had been ſent to the Poona Miniſters after Two Months, when Baſſein had been loſt, and War had commenced in Bore Ghaut with the Engliſh, they ſent Anſwers to this Purport; That they could place no kind of Dependance on the Promiſes and Engagements of the Engliſh, who had repeatedly entered into Treaties and as often broke them; that we ought to examine what want of Faith they had ever ſhewn that the Engliſh ſhould commence ſuch Hoſtilities againſt them, and ſhould employ themſelves for the Aſſiſtance of Ragonaut Row, and then ſay that any Breach of Treaty which happened was committed by the Chief of Bombay; but after the Defeat of the Bombay Army, from what Side have the preſent Hoſtilities and Devaſtation ariſen? That the preſent Treaty therefore can be no more relied on. That it is therefore neceſſary for the Army at Cuttack to loſe no more Time in uſeleſs Delays, but to enter the Engliſh Dependencies. The Maha Rajah therefore to extricate himſelf from theſe Meaſures, has of himſelf imagined this Plan, and has made me write it to you, that you might repreſent it in a proper Manner.

Poſtſcript. While this important Plan is under Diſcuſſion, it is adviſable and neceſſary that you remain with the Nabob, who doubtleſs will willingly and with Pleaſure retain you: Why do you therefore mention any thing reſpecting your coming to Benares; you muſt exert yourſelf in the Service of your Maſter, and in your Attachment to the Nabob for the proſecuting the Points now in Conſideration, and the other important Concerns; to the promoting the Friendſhip between the Nabob and the Maha Rajah, that it may derive inwardly Advantage from theſe ſeeming outward Contradictions. To write more to you who are wiſe would be uſeleſs.

Poſtſcript:

Poſtſcript. This is the Seaſon to fix ultimately the Plan propoſed, that from the Four Quarters Armies be ſent to the Engliſh Dependencies, and War be commenced; and ſhould Peace be thought adviſable, let it be by the Intervention and Knowledge of every one; namely, the Nabob Nizam Ally Khan, Pundit Peſhwa, and the Maha Rajah; and at this Time, in conſequence of his Connection with Pundit Purdhaun, Hyder Ally Khan has entered himſelf into this Negociation, and, like the Elephant at Cheſs, has claimed this Plan on the Four Sides, that one of them without the other cannot act in this Meaſure: But this Connection and the Conditions of the Engagements between Hyder Ally Khan and Pundit Peſhwa, were entered into without the Knowledge of the Nabob Nizam Ally Khan, for which Reaſon he has conceived Diſpleaſure and Enmity againſt Hyder; and Hyder, from the Pride of having a large Army and a conſiderable Treaſure, of ſeeing his Country in Security, and of having effected a ſmall Part of his Scheme in an Attack on ſome Engliſh Battalions, conceived Thoughts very far diſtant from his Situation and Rank, and ſent a Vackeel to the Preſence, to the Vizier Nudjiff Cawn, and repreſented, that as he had ſhewn ſuch Courage and Conduct in the War againſt the Engliſh, he hoped from the Royal Favour that he might receive as a Reward the Sunnuds for the Soubahs of Deckan; and that if he obtained ſuch his Deſire, he would lay at his Majeſty's Feet every thing which his Loyalty and Obedience could require. Accordingly the Vackeel was admitted to his Majeſty's Preſence, and to an Interview with the Vizier; and a Firmaun, containing the Praiſes and Virtues of Hyder, and promiſing him his Requeſt, together with a Turban from his Majeſty's Head, and a Khellaut from his Wardrobe, were ſent to Hyder. We ſhall ſoon ſee what more his Negociation there will effect. As this ſame News muſt have been contained in the Papers ſent to your Quarter, any more on this Subject would be ſuperfluous. In ſhort, the Nabob Nizam-ul-Dowlah being enraged at theſe Tranſactions, is watching for an Opportunity to revenge himſelf: It is therefore moſt adviſable for the Nabob Amaud-ul-Dowlah to exert himſelf by all Means to give Satisfaction to the Nabob Nizam-ul-Dowlah, and not to refuſe ſending them Preſents and Gifts, but at any rate to gain, through Mr. Hollond, the Friendſhip of ſo great a Chief, who is the Support of the Throne, and is poſſeſſed of ſuch Armies and Reſources; and when this ſhall have been firmly ſettled, and this powerful Chief has been gained over, beſides the Maha Rajah and the Nabob Zuffer-ud-Dowlah, who are ſincerely attached to the Engliſh, and are likewiſe united with Nizam-ul-Dowlah both in Schemes and Counſels, and in the Management of War and Hoſtilities, what Power or Ability would then remain for the Chiefs and Rulers of Poona to act hoſtilely againſt the Engliſh Gentlemen, without the Permiſſion of the Nabob and Maha Rajah? on the contrary, they would certainly be reconciled, and would act in every thing by the Directions of the Nabob and Maha Rajah; and at that Time Treaties and Engagements, ſuch as are wiſhed for, will be effected. The Abſtract of this long Letter is, That by prudent Management and Conduct the Iron Chain which is ſtrongly bound on the Feet of the Elephant will be removed, and what remains, which is only the Chain from Hyder's Foot, muſt be ſeparated by the Strength of the Sword, and he muſt be deſtroyed by the combined Force of the others, and his Country ſhared according to Agreement which will then be made; and being relieved from all Dangers by the Guarantee of the Nabob and the Maha Rajah, they will then remain in Peace and Security at Home. You will therefore, in a proper Manner, repreſent the above written Particulars to the Nabob Amaud-ul-Dowlah; but till this important Point can be adjuſted and finally effected, you muſt write to us in an explicit Manner from Calcutta; till that Time the ſeeming Preparations on both Sides to enter each other's Dominions, ſome ſmall Hoſtilities, and even a Degree of Plundering on both Sides, is to be recommended as adviſable, and as Veil over the Plan. This muſt be conſidered as ſweet to the Taſte, and muſt not be looked upon as bitter, as a bitter Medicine is of the moſt Service to the Body; you will therefore exert your utmoſt Abilities to effect this Plan, and will at any rate ſatisfy and convince the Nabob, that all what I have written are Secrets entruſted to me by the Maha Rajah and his Miniſter, and I take God to Witneſs that it is true. You muſt conſider this as a Secret more precious than your own Life, and muſt tear the Letter, as it would be of the greateſt Detriment ſhould any one elſe be acquainted with it. For the keeping of this Secret you are bound by your moſt binding of all Oaths, your Duty to your Maſter. I need write no more, the reſt depends on your Management and Conduct.

A true Copy of the Tranſlation.

E. Hay,
Act^g Sec^y.

Tranſlation of a Letter from Dewan Dewagur Pundit to Beneram Pundit. Dated the 20th Mohurren. Received the 8th March.

Your Letter has been received, and the Contents underſtood. You write, That the Nabob Amaud-ul-Dowlah has diſpatched a Treaty full of Oaths and Engagements, with ſeparate Karetahs addreſſed to Row Pundit Purdhaun, to Nanah Purnaveſe, to the Maha Rajah, to the Nabob Zuffer-ud-Dowlah, and to me; but that as yet no Anſwer has been received to any one of them, which he is anxiouſly looking for. You further mention, that a Karetah has been ſent from Calcutta to the Nabob Nizam-ul-Dowlah, which, with other Contents of your Letter, is underſtood, and the Treaty and Karetahs have been carefully and attentively peruſed; and agreeably to what the Nabob Amaud-ul Dowlah

ul-Dowlah wrote, we have kept with us the original Treaties and Karetahs, and have written the Particulars and Contents of them to Pundit Purdhaun. What was written reſpecting the Oath to prevent any Deviation from the Treaty, that it ſhould be neither encreaſed nor diminiſhed, has been fully comprehended. The Caſe is this: That in the firſt Place the chief Article for Pundit Purdhaun, namely Ragonaut Row, is not written in a plain Manner; neither are the Articles reſpecting Guealior, Guzerat, the Guicawar, and the Forts, and many other Points which ought to have been rendered ſatisfactory, written with any Plainneſs, otherwiſe I ſhould have gone in Perſon and exerted myſelf to adjuſt every Point. I have therefore not ſent the Treaty, but have kept it carefully in my Poſſeſſion. At the Beginning the Opportunity was ſuffered to eſcape; that is to ſay, the Time when I was at Poona, when I wrote Letters to General Goddard [illegible] Anſwers were received, if at that Time an Interview had taken place between Pundit Purdhaun and General Goddard, all Miſunderſtanding would have been cleared up and reconciled, and the Engliſh and Pundit Purdhaun would have become one Mind and one Soul, and would have ruined Hyder Naig and conquered his Country: But this did not take place, and the General and Scindia prepared for War, and Pundit Purdhaun entered into Alliance with Hyder Naig, and gave him a Country of 80 Lacks of Rupees on the other Side of the Kiſhna, with this View, that he might carry Deſolation into the Country belonging to the Engliſh. Engagements were entered into, agreeable to which the Nabob Nizam-ul-Dowlah ſettled a Plan, and having written to Pundit Purdhaun, forced me into theſe Difficulties. Had I not agreed to the Plan, it would have cauſed [illegible] to the Rauje, and great Damage to me who am united with the Rauje: It being therefore neceſſary for me to aſſent to the Plan propoſed, I was compelled to raiſe 30,000 Men, and to ſend them under the Command of Rajah Chimnajee Saheb towards Bengal. A Year and a Half have nearly elapſed, during which theſe Troops have brought us under a Load of Expences, amounting to upwards of 1½ Crore, and have remained all the Time on our own Confines without acting in any Manner. My earneſt Wiſh is, that at any rate Peace and Friendſhip may be effected between the Nabob Amaud-ul-Dowlah and Pundit Purdhaun, and that our Friendſhip to both Parties may remain entire; with this View I have taken all theſe Pains, and the Maha Rajah has adopted the Name of Amaud-ul-Dowlah, and has continually written, that he is the Friend, the Friend, the Friend, and that he is determined to effect and compaſs this Point: But Raja Chimna Saheb is in great Diſtreſs for the Expences of his Army. My Wiſh was, that in caſe of Peace taking place Pundit Purdhaun would contribute ſomething; that ſome Part might be procured from the Nabob Nizam-ul-Dowlah, and another Share from the Nabob Amaud-ul-Dowlah, while we ſhould have ſubmitted to bear the Remainder; by which Means all our Difficulties would have been removed. I had great Dependance on this; but Peace does not take place between the Nabob Amaud-ul-Dowlah and Pundit Purdhaun. How long am I to wait in Expectation? Great Difficulty is come upon me from the Plan which had been ſettled; and Rajah Chimnajee Bahader from the ſame Plan is fallen under great Diſtreſs; ſo that we muſt do whatever appears likely to remove theſe Difficulties. I am a ſincere Friend, and never omit any Duties towards him with whom I enter into Friendſhip. From the Want of Reconciliation between the Nabob Amaud-ul-Dowlah and Pundit Purdhaun, am I fallen into this Dilemma. Be convinced that this is true. I have, to preſerve my Friendſhip with the Nabob Amaud-ul Dowlah, been backward in the Proſecution of the Plan which had been ſettled: I have readily ſubmitted to whatever is come upon me, and ſolely from my Deſire to effect a Reconciliation between the Nabob and Pundit Purdhaun, have theſe Difficulties ariſen; yet, notwithſtanding all this, he is not my Friend: I am fallen into the Dilemma of that Plan, and have no Remedy. The Nabob Amaud-ul-Dowlah is juſt, and will reflect on this with Juſtice. How long muſt I repeat the ſame Thing? What has happened muſt neceſſarily have happened from that Plan, and we muſt ſubmit to it. The Maha Rajah is connected by Treaties with Pundit Purdhaun, and the Family of Booſla is known for their Faith and Obſervance of Engagements; they never did nor will vary a Hair's Breadth from any Treaty: Many Powers have attempted to injure them, but their Government has remained firm and gains daily Strength, ſolely from their exalted Faith and remarkable Fidelity. The Nabob Amaud-ul-Dowlah is wiſe, and will be convinced, that to this Time I have never been guilty of any Neglect in the Duties of my Friendſhip, in which it is neceſſary to explain every thing ſincerely and plainly, and to avoid all Appearance of Diſtinction.

In the Dewan's own Hand.

I am convinced and ſenſible of the great Zeal and Conduct which you have ſhewn in the Maha Rajah's Service, and in promoting the Friendſhip and Alliance of the Engliſh. I have accordingly before written to you in Perſian on that Subject, and now the Moonſhy will inform you of every thing which the Maha Rajah ſaid reſpecting it. You will repreſent to the Nabob, that his Poſſeſſions and thoſe of the Maha Rajah are one, and have no Kind of Diſtinctions; but there is a Treaty and Engagement which circumſcribes us, and from which it is neceſſary we ſhould be releaſed. This alone diſtreſſes us, for there is no other Cauſe: There is already One Crore of Rupees due to the Army, and it is daily encreaſing. The Cauſe of all theſe Difficulties is the Arrival of General Goddard at Hoſhungabad, and our performing the Duties of Friendſhip and Hoſpitality to him, which it is unneceſſary to write or repreſent: By this we are become the Mark for every one to point at, and by this Affairs are brought into this State. The Nabob Amaud-ul-Dowlah is wiſe, and is thoroughly convinced that we have never been forgetful or negligent. There is no Remedy againſt the

Neceſſity

Neceſſity of the Times. In future no Variation ſhall ever happen in our Friendſhip, in which we are firm and ſtedfaſt.

A true Copy of the Tranſlation.
E. Hay,
Act. Sec^y.

APPENDIX, N° 364.

Letter from Bengal. Secret Department.

To the Honourable the Court of Directors for Affairs of the Honourable United Company of Merchants of England trading to the Eaſt Indies; dated 27th April 1781.

Honourable Sirs,

1. WE had the Honour of addreſſing you from this Department by the Fox and Walpole, on the 19th November. We have ſince written to you under Date the 7th and 13th January by Major Scott, and the 3d February in Duplicate by the Way of Buſſorah. Duplicates of the Letters written by Major Scott, and a Triplicate of that addreſſed to you over Land, are tranſmitted with their Diſpatches. We have alſo the Honour of forwarding by the Neptune, the Annual Set of our Conſultations in this Department for the Year 1780, and a broken Set of our Proceedings from the 2d November to the 2d Inſtant.

2. We were honoured on the 13th ultimo, with the Receipt of Letters from the Committee of Secrecy, under Date the 9th July 1779, 12th, 29th April, and 17th May, 1780, by the Packets of the Neptune, Bellmont, and Groſvenor; the Diſpatches of the latter Ship being conveyed to us by the Neptune, in conſequence of the Reſolution taken at Fort Saint George to detain the Groſvenor at that Preſidency, for the Purpoſe of ſending her to Europe in the Month of June. We received on the ſame Day Copies of the Letters dated in July 1779 and April 1780, from Bombay; together with your Diſpatches tranſmitted over Land by Richard Scott, Eſquire, according to the Liſt of Packet. We have nothing to ſay in Anſwer to the Letters which we have the Honour to acknowledge, and in Addition to the Information already ſent to you, but that the Orders given to us have received, and always will receive, our punctual Execution of them.

10 You were adviſed in our Letter of the 7th of January, tranſmitted to you by Major Scott, of the Motives which had induced us to propoſe a Treaty of Alliance with the Dutch, whoſe Poſſeſſions at and adjacent to Cochin had lately been invaded by Hyder Ally Khan. The Treaty was ſent to your Preſident and Select Committee of Fort Saint George, by Mr. Dighton, and it was left with them to obtain the Nabob Walla Jaw's Concurrence in it, as well as afterwards to tranſmit to Cochin and Columbo our Diſpatches relative to it. A Reference to their Letter of the 16th of February, Co
will make you acquainted with the Reaſons which had operated with your Preſident and Select Committee at Fort Saint George, againſt promoting the Ratification of it. The Treaty itſelf was founded Tr
on the deſperate Neceſſity of their Affairs, and was one of the great and numerous Exertions which Di
we made for their Relief. A more proſperous State having ſince ſucceeded, the Meaſure has been rendered unneceſſary, and we are well pleaſed therefore that they have thought proper to reject it. The great Object of the Treaty was a Supply of European Strength. It was of ſo much Importance, that we determined to avail ourſelves of other Means alſo of obtaining it; and on the 22d of January, we wrote to your Preſident and Select Committee at Fort Marlborough, to deſire that they would ſpare to us the European Force at that Preſidency, conſiſting of 400 Men. We conſidered them well able to do us this Service, as their remaining Force conſiſting of Coffrees and Malays, is ſufficient for the Defence of Fort Marlborough againſt the Enemies of the Country, and the ſmall Force in Europeans unequal to its Defence againſt an Attack from an European Enemy. Our Letter to the Preſident and Select Committee at Fort Marlborough, appears in the Conſultations noted in the Co
Margin.

11. About the Middle of the laſt Month arrived in Fort William, Syed Aſſam Cawn Behaudre, Dewan of his Highneſs the Nabob Walla Jaw, accompanied by Mr. Richard Joſeph Sulivan; their Arrival was reported to us by the Governor General on the 29th of that Month, and a Tranſlation of their Credentials as Miniſters and Plenipotentiaries extraordinary from his Highneſs the Nabob Walla Jaw was laid before us, together with a Paper of Requiſitions prepared by the Dewan, who in the Name of his Maſter requeſted the Board's Reply, expreſſing their Reſolution on each Article as expeditiouſly as poſſible; their Object being of the utmoſt Importance, not only to the future Proſperity of his Country, but alſo to the Safety of the Engliſh Poſſeſſions in the Carnatic, and to the Relief of his numerous Creditors, whoſe Claims and Neceſſities he repreſented as great and diſtreſſing. We had

Mar. had a few Days before received from the Nabob's new Conſolidated Creditors, a Propoſal for the Satisfaction of the Debt owing to them from his Highneſs, and your Select Committee at Fort Saint George had tranſmitted to us with it a Copy of their Minutes on a ſimilar Propoſal made to them.

12. Senſible of the heavy Load of Difficulties under which the Nabob Wallah Jaw hath laboured for a conſiderable Length of Time, and anxious that a permanent Plan ſhould be adopted for the future Regulation of the Affairs of the Carnatic, we readily acquieſced in the Deſire of Syed Aſſam Cawn, that diſtinct Replies ſhould be given by us to each of the ſeveral Propoſitions of the Nabob; and we agreed, that the Replies, if approved by the Dewan, ſhould ſerve for the Baſis of an Agreement between this Government and that of the Carnatic. As the Agreement includes many Particulars which cannot be made ſo clear in an Abſtract of them as in the Peruſal of the Agreement itſelf, we have thought it neceſſary to tranſmit to you a Copy of the Requeſts of the Nabob Wallah Jah, and of our Replies to them, which together form the Agreement, Numbers in this Diſpatch. The Agreement having been fairly engroſſed on Two diſtinct Papers, bearing the Seal and Signature of the Nabob Wallah Jaw, and the Dewan Syed Aſſam Cawn Behauder and Mr. Richard Joſeph Sulivan; attending at our Council on the 2d Inſtant, it was ſealed and ſigned by them in our Preſence, and by us in their Preſence, and formally interchanged.

13. We ſhould have previouſly acquainted you, that we were fully ſatisfied with the Sufficiency of the Powers with which Syed Aſſam Cawn Behaudre and Mr. Richard Joſeph Sulivan were inveſted on the Part of the Nabob Wallah Jaw; and being anxious that ſpeedy and effectual Remedies ſhould be applied to the diſordered State of the Affairs of the Carnatic, deemed it of eſſential Moment that the entire Sanction of the controlling Government of India ſhould be given to the Agreement; and the more eſpecially, as in the Letters which have been received from the Preſidency of Fort Saint George ſince the Commencement of the late Troubles in the Carnatic, they have repeatedly declared their total and abſolute Inability to obtain from the Carnatic the ſmalleſt Supply of Money for the Maintenance of the War, or the Support of their current Expences.

14. In conſequence of the Requeſt of the Nabob Wallah Jaw, the Purport of which we duly weighed, being equally convinced of the Neceſſity of the Appointment of a Perſon to reſide with the Nabob as the Repreſentative and Miniſter of this Government, for the Maintenance of the Agreement actually concluded between us; being alſo firmly of Opinion, that without the Reſources of the Carnatic, the War in which it is engaged cannot be ſupported but by uncertain and languid Supplies from Bengal, and eventually involve both in one common State of Diſtreſs, if not utter Ruin; and having alſo conſidered the Recommendation made by his Highneſs the Nabob in Favour
Mar. of Mr. Richard Joſeph Sulivan, together with the Reaſons which have been urged as his Inducement to it, and deeming theſe as well as the Objects of the Appointment of too great Importance to be ſacrificed to that Punctilio which on a leſs urgent Occaſion might diſſuade us from employing a Servant of another Preſidency, although equally a Servant of the ſame common Maſters; we have appointed Mr. Richard Joſeph Sulivan the Repreſentative and Miniſter of this Government at the Court of the Nabob Wallah Jaw, for the Purpoſe of maintaining the Faith of this Government in the Agreement concluded with the ſaid Nabob, and for the Repreſentation of ſuch Matters as may at any Time require his Interpoſition in that Character and in our Name, either with the Nabob, or with the Preſident and Council or Select Committee of Fort Saint George; and our Credentials have been granted to him to this Effect in the uſual Form.

April. 15. The Letters which we have written to the Preſident and Select Committee at Fort Saint George, and to Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote, appear on the Proceedings noted in the Margin, as well as that from the Governor General to the Nabob of the Carnatic.

16. The Line of Conduct followed by the Nabob Nizam Ally Cawn ſince we had the Honour of addreſſing you laſt, will appear to you in the ſeveral Letters which we have received from Mr. John
and Hollond, and recorded in our Proceedings noted in the Margin. It has hitherto been in general
uary, neutral, and ſo far we are happy to obſerve to you, that our Endeavours to preſerve the Peace with
hFe- and the Nizam, by promiſing to do him Juſtice, have been attended with Succeſs. It is alſo deſerving of
h. Remark, that of Four great Powers combined againſt the Company, Two only have been yet brought to act againſt them; and that of thoſe Two, One is nearly defeated by the ſucceſsful Operations of your Forces under this Government. The Nizam, availing himſelf of the Company's preſent Situation, has frequently urged Mr. Hollond for immediate Payment of the Arrears of the Piſchuſh. As our laſt Reply to Mr. Hollond on this and other Subjects is material, we think it neceſſary to tranſmit it to you for your Information, a Number in this Diſpatch.

17. Mr. Hollond's ill State of Health not permitting his Continuance at Hydrabad, he has requeſted our Permiſſion to reſign his Office, of our Reſident at the Nizam's Court: Concerned as we are for the Cauſe which obliged him to make this Requeſt, it was yet of ſo forcible a Nature, that we could not refuſe our Aſſent to it. We have permitted him therefore to reſign the Office which he held at the Court of his Highneſs the Nabob Nizam Ally Cawn, and as an Acknowledgment of the Services performed by him during his Reſidence thereat, as well as a Teſtimony of the high Eſtimation in which we held his Abilities and Zeal for the Service of the Company, we have deſired his Acceptance of a Gratuity of Ten thouſand Rupees, and authorized him to continue drawing his Allowances, and the Charges of his Eſtabliſhment, until his Return to Fort Saint George. No one is yet appointed by us to fill the Station at Hydrabad, vacated by Mr. Hollond; but the Governor

General

General has written to the Nazein, to be informed of his Pleaſure concerning the Nomination of another Miniſter to reſide at his Highneſs's Court.

18. We are well pleaſed to acquaint you, that the Preſident and Select Committee at Fort Saint George have thought proper to reſcind the Act by which Mr. Hollond was ſuſpended from the Service of the Company on that Eſtabliſhment, and admitted him to a Seat in the Council. We had ſome Weeks before the Receipt of their Letter, adviſing us of their Reſolution, recommended it ſtrongly to them; but we have the Pleaſure to obſerve, that the intended Effect of our Deſire was anticipated by their own Regard to Mr. Hollond's Merits.

19. You were informed, in our Letter of the 29th November, of the Reſolution which we have taken, to detach over Land towards Madras, a Company of European Artillery, and a Body of Six Battalions of Native Infantry, under the Command of Lieutenant Colonel Pearſe, to aid the Operations of our Troops on the Coaſt. This Detachment having been collected near Narainghur, in Midnapore, marched from the Place of Rendezvous on the 21ſt January, and croſſed the Soubenzeka on the 9th February.

20. Although the low State of the Country through which its Route lay, the long Continuance of the Rains, and the uncommon Difficulties which, after the Exertions made to furniſh our firſt Aids to Fort Saint George, preſented themſelves in the Equipment of this Force, were ſufficient Impediments to an earlier Movement of it; we had beſides a political Motive for not urging it ſooner, in the Deſire of waiting for Replies from the Government of Berar, to the Diſpatches which we had ſent thither in September, with our Offers of Peace to the Maratta State; leſt, by a precipitate March of the Detachment into the Borders of Cuttac, before Time had been allowed to the commanding Officer of the Berar Troops which lay there; and in its deſtined Paſſage, we might expoſe them to mutual Hoſtilities, and defeat the Ends of our Negociation with that Government. But when the expected Replies arrived, and contained a total Rejection of our Propoſals, founded, as we had every Reaſon to believe, on an Opinion that our Affairs were reduced to ſo deſperate a State as might render it too hazardous for them to take a decided Part in our Favour, and afforded them no Hope of Succeſs in the Mediation which had been preſcribed to them; we then deemed it incumbent upon us, equally on the Principle of maintaining the Credit of our Power, and on the ſubſtantial Grounds on which the Expedition had been originally planned, to order its inſtant Commencement. Orders to this Effect were accordingly and immediately iſſued: But that we might at the ſame Time provide for the unmoleſted March of the Detachment through the Province of Oriſſa, and mark that Attention which was due to the Relation in which we had till that Time ſtood with the Government of Berar, we choſe to depute a confidential Perſon to Raja Chimnajee Booſla, the Chief of the Berar Army, who ſhould notify to him the Order which we had given to Colonel Pearſe, to requeſt him, in our Name, to cauſe ſuch of his Troops as might yet be in the Road through which the Detachment was to paſs, to remove at ſuch a Diſtance from it as might prevent Individuals on either Side from engaging in mutual Broils; and if the Raja ſhould be diſpoſed to take a more decided Part in our Favour, to ſolicit the Aid of a Body of Cavalry, to accompany Colonel Pearſe, and to act under his Command. —Mr. David Anderſon was appointed to this Service. Conf

21. The Inſtructions which we gave to Colonel Pearſe were conſonant to thoſe given to Mr. Anderſon; and at the ſame Time that they cautioned him in the ſtrongeſt Manner to prevent, to the utmoſt of his Power, any Acts, or the Permiſſion of any, on the Part of his Detachment or its Followers, which could lead to Hoſtilities with the Government of Cuttac or the Berar Army, they directed him, in the Event of his Progreſs being obſtructed, to make his Way againſt all Oppoſition. The Event has fully anſwered our Expectations, as will be ſhewn in the Sequel.

22. Mr. Anderſon miſſing Raja Chimnajee Booſla, who was engaged in a remote Expedition, and the Communication being ſtopped, was ordered to return at the Solicitation of the Maratta Chief. He was a Second Time deputed to him, and ſoon after returned, bringing with him Rajah Ram Pundit, the Naib of Cuttac; with whom an Engagement was formally concluded in the Name of his Maſter Raja Chimnajee; by which it was ſtipulated, that a Body of 2000 effective Horſe ſhould be detached from the Army at Cuttac, and placed under the Command of Colonel Pearſe; their Pay to be iſſued by our Pay Maſter, at the rate of One Lack of Rupees per Month; and that a Party of the Company's Forces ſhould aſſiſt the Government of Berar in aſſerting its Pretenſions to the Diſtrict of Gurra Mundela, a ſmall Territory lying on the Banks of the Nerbudda, and under the actual Poſſeſſion of the Peiſhwa. Major William Popham, a moſt deſerving Officer in your Service, whom we have before had the Pleaſure to diſtinguiſh to you for his ſpirited and gallant Conduct in the Capture of the Fort of Gwalior, as well as on other Occaſions of Military Duty, has been accordingly ordered on this Service with the Regiment of Native Infantry, and the other Troops which had been in Gwalior, to garriſon that Fortreſs. Conf Mucl

23. It was at the ſame Time reſolved, That a Gratuity of 13 Lacks of Rupees, being the Remainder of the Sum of 16 Lacks of Rupees, propoſed as a Contribution for the Relief of the Forces in the Province of Cuttac, in the Event of the Acquieſcence of the Government of Berar in the Propoſals which were tranſmitted in October laſt to them, ſhould be granted and delivered to Rajah Ram Pundit, in the Behalf of Chimnajee; for the Relief of the Army repreſented to be in the greateſt Diſtreſs, and as an Acknowledgment for the paſt and ſeaſonable Inſtances afforded of the Friendſhip of that Government. It was alſo reſolved, That a Loan of Ten Lacks, requeſted for the ſame Purpoſe, ſhould be granted to Chimnajee, on the Part of the Government of Berar, on the Security of Rajah Ram Pundit for Payment.

24. As

24. As the Detail of this Negociation contains many Particulars which are improper to be entered in the Body of our Conſultations, we have therefore judged it expedient to form a detached Narrative of it, and to tranſmit it in a ſeparate Copy to the Secret Committee of your Honourable Court.

25. We ſhall briefly obſerve, that we have laboured, and we think with a Succeſs now decided, to detach the moſt powerful Member of the Maratta State, and in its Relation to Bengal the moſt capable of any in India to do it either Service or Hurt, from the general Confederacy which has been formed againſt us, and have converted it, oſtenſibly at leaſt, into a Party to our Cauſe. The Event will ſhortly prove the Truth of our Concluſions.

26. During the Courſe of this Tranſaction, the Detachment under the Command of Colonel Pearſe proceeded by a quiet and unmoleſted Progreſs to Ganjam, where it arrived on the 17th ultimo, accompanied to the Borders of that Diſtrict by a Perſon of Rank, deputed by the Order of Raja Chimnajee, and abundantly ſupplied with Proviſions and every other Aid and Accommodation it required. Some of the Plunderers of Chimnajee's Army made an Incurſion on our Frontier, which he ſeverely reſented, inſtantly cauſing the Offenders to be ſeized and puniſhed in a public and exemplary Manner. This is the only Inſtance in which our Provinces have ſuffered any real Injury from the ſuſpicious Situation of the Berar Army during ſo long a Time in our Neighbourhood. It is now on its Return to Naypore.

27. All Apprehenſions of an Invaſion from the Marattas being removed, we have given Orders for the Return of the 3d Brigade, and of the Regiments of Sepoys which were ſent from Barrackpore to join it, to their reſpective Stations, excepting the Artillery, which we have ordered down to the Preſidency.

28. In the Interval between the Time at which the Detachment left Midnapore, and the Day of its Arrival at Ganjam, nothing ſufficiently material to be noticed happened reſpecting it, excepting a numerous and extraordinary Deſertion, which originated in the firſt Inſtance with the 20th Battalion of Sepoys, formerly commanded by Captain Peter Grant: For the Occaſion of this Deſertion, and our Proceedings in conſequence, we beg Leave to refer you to our Letter from the Public Department. With reſpect to the Cauſes which have operated to the Deſertion of thoſe Men who did not belong formerly to Captain Grant's Battalion, we are at a Loſs to account for it on any other Principle than the Contagion of Example.

29. Soon after the Arrival of Colonel Pearſe's Detachment at Ganjam, an infectious Diſorder pervaded the Camp, which obliged him to leave Ganjam and march to Itchapore. Our laſt Letters from him are from Culwall Delaub, a Place about Five Miles diſtant from Itchapore. The Diſorder which we have mentioned prevailed generally, and has had very ſevere Conſequences; but the Means taken by Colonel Pearſe to put a Stop to it for the preſent, having been in the latter Reſpect nearly effectual, we hope ſoon to hear that the Troops have generally recovered; and we are aſſured by Colonel Pearſe, that he will not ſuffer a Moment's Delay, which can be by any Means avoided, in the further Proſecution of his March.

30. Our Concern on this Occaſion is not confined to the Effect of the Diſaſter in the Sickneſs of a large Body of Men, or in the Diminution which it has occaſioned of Colonel Pearſe's Force, though ſuch Conſequences are felt by us in the moſt ſenſible Manner; but the Delay which is thereby neceſſarily and unavoidably occaſioned in the March of the Troops, is another ſerious Evil which attends it, and cruelly oppoſes the Wiſhes and Expectations we had formed of their early Arrival at Fort Saint George.

31. The Diſorder to which we allude has not been confined to the Country near Ganjam; it afterwards found its Way to this Place, and after chiefly affecting the native Inhabitants, ſo as to occaſion a great Mortality during a Period of a Fortnight, it is now greatly abated, and purſuing its Courſe
15th Feb. to the Northward. The Letters which we have received from Colonel Pearſe, from the Time of his
9th leaving the Midnapore Diſtrict to that of his Arrival at Ganjam, are according to the Dates, and appear on the Proceedings noted in the Margin.

32. When we had the Honour of addreſſing you on the 13th of January, we congratulated you on the important Capture of the Fortreſs of Baſſein on the 12th December, by your Forces under the Command of Brigadier General Goddard; and we tranſmitted to you a Copy of the Papers of In-
Jan. telligence which adviſed us of it. We had ſoon afterwards the Pleaſure of receiving a Letter from the General, in which he himſelf communicated to us the pleaſing News of this Event. The Particulars of the Siege appear in a Letter to the Commander in Chief, recorded on our Proceedings of the 26th February. Every Preparation had been previouſly concerted and made for a ſucceſsful Attack, and a reſpectable Force was left in the Province of Guzerat to defend it againſt the Enemy if they ſhould venture to invade it. After the Succeſs at Baſſein, General Goddard's Operations were directed againſt the Fort of Arnall, which ſurrendered at Diſcretion to a Detachment of his Army on the 18th of January. The Fort of Arnall is repreſented by General Goddard likely to be a very uſeful Poſſeſſion to the Company, as compleating the Line of Conqueſts from Guzerat to Bombay, and as being to be defended by a ſmall Body of Men againſt any Force that can be brought to act againſt it. The whole Army marched afterwards towards the Gauts, at the Foot of which the Enemy had continued for ſome Time. A Letter which we have lately received from General Goddard, under Date the 11th February, and which we have the Honour to tranſmit to you with its Enclofure a Number in the Packet, acquaints us, that the Enemy is entirely driven out of the

Concan; and that your Army under his Command were then in Poſſeſſion of Bhou Gaut, beyond which the whole of the Maratta Forces were encamped on the Road to Poona.

33. With a Letter received by us from the Preſident and Select Committee of Fort Saint George, under Date the 23d January, and recorded on our Proceedings of the 23d of the following Month, is tranſmitted to us Copy of a Letter received by the Nabob Wallaw Jaw from his Vackeel at Poona; on which the Gentlemen at Fort Saint George obſerve, that "They are happy to perceive the "Adminiſtration there are inclinable to pacific Terms." A Suggeſtion of this Nature raiſed our Curioſity to a Knowledge of the Terms which the peaceable Intentions of the Poona Government were to be proved to us; and as we ſincerely wiſhed for a Peace with the Marattas, we were in Hopes that the Terms propoſed would have been ſuch as to admit of our according to them. You will judge then of our Surpriſe when we found the following to be the Conditions recommended: "That we ſhould deliver up to the Marattas the Iſlands of Salſette and Baſſein, the Fort of Gualior, "the Forts in Guzerat, and all the Countries which we had taken from them in Concan, &c. and "ſurrender to their Pleaſure the Perſon of Ragonaut Row."

34. Although we wiſh for Peace with the Maratta State, we will not make Peace on Terms diſhonourable to ourſelves; we will not diſgrace the Engliſh Name by ſubmitting to Conditions which cannot be complied with without a Sacrifice of the Honour and Intereſt of the Company; yet ſuch are the Conditions preſcribed in the Propoſal to which we have alluded. On Hyder's Invaſion of the Carnatic, and on the unfortunate Intelligence which we received of the Defeat of a Detachment of your Troops near Conjeveram, you have been adviſed, that ſuch Terms were agreed to be propoſed to the Maratta State, through the Mediation of the Rajah of Berar, as appeared to us very reaſonable, and ſuch as might be honourably yielded to on both Sides; they were ſuch, therefore, as we thought would not be refuſed by the Enemy. But the Event has been otherwiſe: Inſtead of finding them inclined to make Peace, the Diſtreſs which the Company's Affairs have ſuffered in the Carnatic, and their Belief of our conſequent Inability to ſupport the War againſt them, has raiſed their Preſumption, and induced them to inſiſt on Terms for the Concluſion of it, which the worſt State of your Affairs would not warrant us in yielding to. We are morally convinced, that nothing but a vigorous and ſucceſsful Proſecution of the War will prevail on them to make a Peace, or overcome their preſent Diſinclination to it. Peace is our Object, and we are determined to purſue the Means which appear to us likely to give it an honourable Effect, and we will readily accept it when we can.

35. The ſeveral Letters which we have received from Lieutenant Colonel Camac, whom we appointed to the Command of a Detachment employed on the Weſtern Side of the Jumna, appear in the Proceedings noted in the Margin. Conſ. 16th Jan. 8th and 19th Feb. 29th March, and 2d April.

36. The firſt Operations of Lieutenant Colonel Camac's Detachment were directed againſt Sippree, the Capital of a conſiderable Territory extending from the Narwar Paſs, which it commands, to Niah Sirai. He proceeded to Seronge, where he arrived on the 16th of February. Here he unfortunately took Poſt, and thereby afforded an Opportunity to Madajee Scindia, who having aſſembled his Forces, met him at this Place to ſurround him, and cut off his Supplies. In this Situation, and with a Proſpect of the greateſt Diſtreſs for Want of Proviſions, Lieutenant Colonel Camac ſent repeated Letters, preſſing Colonel Morgan who commanded the Troops appointed for the Defence of the Vizier's Dominions, and Colonel Muir, to afford him inſtant and powerful Aſſiſtance.

37. In conſequence of this Deſire, and of other Letters received by Colonel Morgan reſpecting Lieutenant Colonel Camac's Situation, he ordered Three Regiments of Sepoys, Two Regiments of Cavalry, and a Company of Artillery, under the Command of Colonel Muir, to march immediately to the Relief of Lieutenant Colonel Camac's Detachment. We expect to hear daily of the Junction of the Two Detachments, and as Colonel Muir being a ſenior Officer to Lieutenant Colonel Camac, is in conſequence entitled to the Command of the collected Forces, we have ſent Orders to Lieutenant Colonel Camac to deliver up the ſame to him, and to Colonel Muir to receive it. A Copy of the Inſtructions ſent to Colonel Muir for his Guidance, is tranſmitted to you a Number in the Packet. Conſ. 22d Marc Conſ. 2d Apr

38. It appears by Letters under Date the 10th and 11th of March, received by the Governor General from Lieutenant Colonel Camac, that the Want of Proviſions had obliged him to retreat from Seronge into a Country where the Troops were plentifully ſupplied with Proviſions; and we have great Pleaſure in acquainting you, that in a ſucceſsful Attack made upon Scindia's Camps, your Troops under the Command of Lieutenant Colonel Camac, have poſſeſſed themſelves of the Enemy's Guns, Stores, and Ammunition. There are 13 Guns, 21 Camels, 2 Elephants, and the Flag Elephant with the Enemy's Grand Standard.

39. Lieutenant Colonel Camac having urgently and repeatedly repreſented the Neceſſity of a Body of Cavalry to the Operations of his Detachment, and the Nature of the Service on which he is employed appearing to us to require it, One of the Regiments ſtationed at Futtyghur was ordered to join it. Conſ. 13th March.

40. The Conqueſt of the Fortreſs of Gwalior having been made for the expreſs Benefit and Behalf of the Rana of Ghode, and ſo eſpecially guaranteed to him by his Treaty with the Company, that in the 8th Article of it, it is made an Exception to any Ceſſions which may be hereafter made, whenever Peace ſhall be concluded between the Company and the Maratta State, although the Time in which it ſhould be put into his Poſſeſſion is not preſcribed; the Rana having alſo repeatedly urged his Claim to this Acquiſition, and having been informed from Authority, that the Rana having heard of Colonel Camac's Situation, when it was moſt diſtreſſed, had reſolved to march to his Aſſiſtance in Perſon, declaring his Intention by this Conduct to manifeſt his Attachment and Fidelity to the Company; we

we for theſe Reaſons, and becauſe we thought it peculiarly neceſſary at a Time in which we were endeavouring to form new Alliances of the firſt Conſequence to our Intereſt, to remove every Circumſtance that might tend to throw Doubts on the Company's Fidelity to their Public Treaties, have reſolved to deliver up Gwalior to the Rana; and accordingly ſent Orders to Major Popham to this
1 April. Purpoſe.

41 In conſequence of the Recommendation of the Commander in Chief, Colonel Morgan was directed on the 12th of February to march with the 2d Brigade to Ackbarpoor, diſtant a few Coſs from Culpee, in order to ſtrike an Awe into the Maratta Chiefs poſſeſſing the Diſtrict lying between Culpee and Narwar, and by engaging them at Home, prevent them from annoying the Rear of Colonel Camac's Detachment; ſuch alſo being the Situation of Ackbarpoor, as to enable Colonel Morgan to advance to Itawah, ſhould Nudjiff Cawn attempt any thing againſt the Quiet of the Daub. Colonel Morgan was at the ſame Time directed to hold his Troops in Readineſs to croſs the Jumna, whenever our farther Orders ſhould require them to do ſo.

42. The Station to which Colonel Morgan had been thus directed to conduct the Forces under his Command, bringing him into the Neighbourhood of Culpee, the preſent weak State of the Maratta Government in that Quarter affording alſo ſufficient Grounds to us to hope that the War might be ſucceſsfully carried on there, in ſuch Mode as might contribute to the Relief of the heavy Expence, which have hitherto attended it, we thought it expedient on the 19th ultimo, to order the immediate Detachment of a Force from that Command, of ſuch a Strength as the Commander in Chief ſhould judge adequate to the Service, to take Poſſeſſion of the Fort of Culpee; and a Letter which we have lately received from Colonel Morgan, fixes us in the daily Expectation of hearing that theſe Orders have been carried into Execution with Succeſs. Our Inſtructions to Colonel Morgan have alſo been to require the Chiefs of the Diſtricts dependent on the Government of Culpee, to ſubmit themſelves and their Dominions to the Authority of the Company, and to pay to the Company the ſame Tribute or Revenue as has hitherto been drawn from them by the Maratta Government. We have left it to Colonel Morgan's Diſcretion to apply ſuch immediate and temporary Meaſures as he ſhall judge neceſſary, for ſecuring the Revenue eventually acquired in Execution of this Plan, and ſhall wait to receive his Report thereof, before we tranſmit to him our final Inſtructions upon the Subject.

43. We think it proper to acquaint you, that in conſequence of the many Repreſentations of a Want of Force to aid the Collections from the Countries in his Excellency's Dominions aſſigned to the Company, the native Sibandy Eſtabliſhment being unequal to this Purpoſe; and in conſequence of Orders, that all the ſcattered Detachments of your Troops near the Frontier ſhould join their reſpective Stations, we recommended it to the Vizier to re-eſtabliſh the Corps lately commanded by Mr. Oſborne; and as Captain Clarke, a deſerving Officer in your Service, was in every Reſpect qualified to fill the Command, it was recommended to the Nabob to appoint him to it.

44. Some Delays ariſing, which were likely to prevent Mr. Auriol from commencing his Negociations with the Portugueſe Government for ſome Months, and the State of his Health being ſuch as to make it doubtful whether it would be adviſable for him to proceed to the Malabar Coaſt or not, we have in a great Meaſure left the Proſecution of his Commiſſion to his Option. If the State of his Health ſhould oblige him to proceed to the other Side of India, and he ſhould receive no Orders from us in the mean Time to deſiſt from the Proſecution of the Commiſſion, it is continued; but if his Health ſhould be ſo far reſtored as to permit him to return, we have authorized his Return.

45. Mr. Crommelin, a Man in Years, and of very reſpectable Character, who formerly filled a high Station in the Service of the Company, is appointed to ſucceed to the Office of our Miniſter at Goa, when it is relinquiſhed by Mr. Auriol.

46. Mr. Francis Fowke having been recalled from his Reſidency at Benares, and appointed Agent for the Proviſion of Boats to the Army after the Expiration of the preſent Contract, we have appointed Mr. William Markham to that Reſidency.

Jan. 47. We beg Leave to refer you to Mr. Middleton's Letters, recorded on the Conſultation noted in the Margin, for a particular Account of the Situation of his Excellency the Vizier, and of the Proviſion which he has been enabled to make for the Company's Demand on him. His great Diſtreſs would not permit him to make compleat Payment of the Company's Claim on him for the laſt Year, and that Diſtreſs not only continuing but encreaſing, we have been obliged to be content with the following Settlement made with his Excellency for the preſent Year:

In Aſſignments — —	Rupees	98,95,345
Bonds — — — —		43,18,613
		142,13,958

We think it neceſſary only to obſerve to you further on this Subject, that the Amount of the Aſſignments by Mr. Middleton's Calculation, exceeds the neceſſary Claim upon the Company for the Services of the Current Year by above Six Lacks.

48. The Nabob Vizier having repeatedly and urgently repreſented to the Governor General the Injuries which his Authority and Revenues have endured, from the Abuſes of the Agents acting under the commanding Officers at the fixed Stations, in the Management of the Camp Buzars, we thought it proper to publiſh to the Army ſerving in his Dominions, the general Order which appears

on

on our Records of the 15th February, for the Prevention of ſimilar Cauſes of Complaint in future; but as this Regulation in redreſſing the Injury done to the Nabob might deprive the commanding Officers of a long-eſtabliſhed, and under juſt Reſtrictions perhaps a juſt, Perquiſite in the Duties collected upon the Proviſions and Neceſſaries voluntarily brought into their Camp, the Nabob has been requeſted to grant ſuch a Gratuity, in lieu of the Emoluments taken from the commanding Officers, as he and our Collector Mr. Nathaniel Middleton may mutually agree upon as equitable, the ſame being previouſly ſubmitted to us for our Approval.

49th. It appearing from Letters which his Excellency the Vizier has written to the Governor General, that the Nabob Fyzulla Khan has evaded the Performance of his Part of the Treaty between the late Nabob Shujah-ul-Dowla and him, to which the Honourable Company were Guarantee, and upon which he was lately ſummoned to furniſh the ſtipulated Number of Troops, which he is obliged to furniſh, as the Conditions to which he holds the Jaghire granted to him, it has been recommended to the Nabob Vizier to ſend a Deputation to him, accompanied by an Agent from Mr. Middleton, in Behalf of this Government as Guarantees, and that in Preſence of proper Witneſſes they do unitedly, upon the following Clauſe,

" That he will conſider the Vizier's Friends as his Friends, and all his Enemies as his own; that " with whomſoever the Vizier ſhall declare War, Fyzulla Khan ſhall join with his Army Two or " Three thouſand Men, to the utmoſt of his Ability; and that if the Vizier marches againſt any " Enemy in Perſon, he ſhall then bring his whole Army to join him; and if he is unable to join " him, becauſe the Number of 5000 Men, to which his Standing Army is limited, are too few; in " ſuch Caſe he ſhall have Leave to raiſe Four thouſand more, that he may then join him with a ſuf- " ficient Force, and theſe Expences ſhall be defrayed,"

demand immediate Delivery of 3000 Cavalry. If the Nabob Fyzullah Khan ſhall evade or refuſe Compliance, the Deputies are to deliver to him a formal Proteſt againſt him for Breach of Treaty, and return, making their Report to the Vizier, which Mr. Middleton is to tranſmit to us.

50th. In the caſe of Compliance of Fyzullah Khan, by the Delivery of the Horſe required, Mr. Middleton has been directed to eſtabliſh ſome Mode of ſecuring a Fund for the regular Payment of them, that they may not from want of Pay become troubleſome inſtead of uſeful, or the Company run the Riſk of being involved by the Neceſſity of making Advances to them.

We are,
Honourable Sirs,
Your moſt faithful
humble Servants,
Warren Haſtings,
Edwd. Wheler.

Fort William,
27th of April, 1781.

APPENDIX, N° 365.

Letter from Bengal (Secret Department)

To the Honourable the Committee of Secrecy of the Honourable Court of Directors for Affairs of the Honourable United Company of Merchants of England trading to the Eaſt Indies; dated 30th April 1781.

Honourable Sirs,

1. IN our general Letter to the Honourable Court of Directors, bearing Date the 27th Inſtant, we have acquainted them with our Intention of tranſmitting to you in a ſeparate Addreſs, an Account or Narrative of our Proceedings, with reſpect to the Berar Government and the Army of the Berar Rajah, ſtationed for a long Time in the Province of Oriſſa, which contained Matter of too ſecret a Nature to appear on the Face of our Records, and we have now the Honour of communicating the ſame to you.

2. To render the Subject of the Narrative clear and intelligible, it will be neceſſary to revert to ſome Circumſtances which happened a few Months ago, and to unfold the Diſpoſitions and Views of ſome of the principal Powers of Hindoſtan.

3. In the Month of September 1780, Advices were received here from the Governor and Council of Madras, of the melancholy Fate of Colonel Baillie's Detachment, the Retreat of the Army under General Munro, and the deſperate State of our Affairs on the Coaſt of Coromandel: It was immediately

diately reſolved that the moſt vigorous Meaſures ſhould be taken to aſſiſt the Preſidency of Madras with Men and Money from Bengal. Accordingly, Tranſports were fitted out with all Expedition, and General Sir Eyre Coote was ſent round by Sea with a Supply of 15 Lacks of Rupees, and a ſtrong Detachment of European Infantry and Artillery, the Flower of our Army; and it was agreed, that a further Reinforcement of Five thouſand Sepoys ſhould be aſſembled at Midnapore, and ſent afterwards by Land under the Command of Colonel Pearſe.

At this important Period we were engaged in a War with the Maratta Government at Poona, which had laſted for ſome Years; much Expence had already been incurred, and notwithſtanding a conſtant Train of Succeſſes which had attended all the Operations of our Army under the Command of General Goddard, we had ſtill no immediate Proſpect of terminating the War.

It was at this Time known that Moodajee Bhooſla the Rajah of the Maratta State of Berar, and Nizam Ally Cawn the Soubah of the Decan, had united in a Plan of Confederacy againſt the Engliſh with Hyder Ally the Nabob of Myſore and the Miniſters of the Peſhwa's Government at Poona. Moodajee was to invade Bengal, and the Nizam was to enter the Company's Circars of Chicacole, whilſt Hyder Ally was to paſs the Ghauts and lay waſte the Carnatic. The Government of Poona, preſſed in their own Territories, could only contribute to this Plan of offenſive War by Grants of Lands to its Allies.

The Rajah of Berar had nevertheleſs on many Occaſions given the moſt evincing Proofs of his pacific Diſpoſition towards the Engliſh, and had even given us early Intimation of this Confederacy, alledging, that he had been compelled to enter into it from a Dread of the Reſentment of his Aſſociates; and aſſuring us, that whatever Appearances he might be conſtrained to aſſume, he would not involve the Berar Government in a decided Enmity with the Engliſh. In Conformity to this Plan of Policy, Moodajee had ſent from 30 to 40,000 Horſe, under the Command of his Second Son Chimnajee Baboo: They received their Diſmiſſion on the Day of the Duſſerah, on the 11th of Auguſt 1779. The Plan of Operations preſcribed to them by the Confederates, was to march into Behar, which they might have reached in Two Months; but inſtead of following this Plan they took a different Road, and by ſtudied Delays had only reached Cuttack in the Month of May following, being about the Time when the periodical Rains uſually ſet in in that Province, which of courſe ſerved them as a Pretext for deferring the Proſecution of their profeſſed Deſign; and they were at this Time ſtill laying at Cuttack.

The Nizam had committed no open Hoſtilities againſt us, though there is every Reaſon to ſuppoſe (and he has even himſelf avowed it) that he was the Projector of the Confederacy, and had ſecretly ſupplied the other Powers with Money to carry on their Operations againſt us.

The Advices from Madras proved but too fully the Activity and Spirit with which Hyder had begun to perform his Part in this alarming Confederacy.

Such was the Poſture in which we ſtood with reſpect to the Powers of this Country. Our Advices regarding our European Enemies were uncertain; it was however firmly believed, that an Expedition would be attempted by the French, in the courſe of the Seaſon, againſt ſome of the Company's Settlements in India, though it was impoſſible to ſee whether it would fall on Bengal, Madras, or Bombay, though the latter was moſt probable.

Under theſe Circumſtances it became expedient to contract as much as poſſible the Sphere of our Military Operations, ſo that without endangering the Safety of our own Poſſeſſions in Bengal, we might be able to act with more Force and Efficacy in our Endeavours to recover the Carnatic, and to revenge the Injury which the Engliſh had ſuſtained from Hyder Ally Cawn. The Government at Poona had long borne an inveterate and avowed Enmity againſt Hyder, and though temporary Policy had now united them in one Cauſe, yet his great and unexpected Succeſſes might naturally revive their former Jealouſy, and alarm the Miniſters of Poona with Apprehenſions for the future Safety of their own Territories: The Opportunity therefore ſeemed favourable for propoſing to them Terms of Reconciliation from this Government, and as Moodajee Booſla had always profeſſed the ſtrongeſt Deſire of effecting a Pacification betwixt us and the Maratta States, it was thought neceſſary to engage him as a Mediator in the intended Negociation. With theſe Views a Treaty was drawn out by us, and ſent
1780. to Naugpore, and Moodajee was deſired to get it executed by the Peſhwa and his Miniſters, and to ſign it himſelf as the Guarantee for the punctual Obſervance of it on both Sides.

Whilſt this Negociation was in Suſpence, it was agreed to poſtpone the March of the Detachment deſtined by Land for Madras, becauſe its Route lay through the Territories of Moodajee Booſla, and it muſt neceſſarily paſs by that Part of his Army which was laying at Cuttack, under the Command of Chimnajee; Circumſtances which, without having obtained the previous Concurrence of Moodajee, might, in the unſettled State of our Connection with that Prince, not only expoſe the Detachment to Difficulties and Oppoſition in its March, but lead it into Operations very different from the Intention of its Equipment, and draw on us the decided Enmity of Moodajee, whoſe Power when exerted againſt us would prove an important Acquiſition to the Strength of Hyder and the Miniſters of Poona. The great Exertions which had already been made by this Government, required alſo ſome Time before the neceſſary Arrangements could be made for fitting out a new Detachment, which was to perform ſo long a March, and be employed in Service of ſo much Importance.

ndix, and On the 9th January 1781, Anſwers were at length received from the Rajah of Berar and his Miniſters, which contained however ſo many Objections to the propoſed Treaty, that little room was left to hope for an immediate Accommodation with the Government of Poona; and beſides the Points which came into Diſcuſſion, from their immediate Connection with the Treaty, theſe Letters

contained a Variety of Claims and Propoſitions aſſerted by Moodajee on his own Account, which though they were not wholly new, were recapitulated in a Style that impreſſed us with Doubts regarding the Sincerity of Moodajee's former Profeſſions and Aſſurances.

The Seaſon for Action was now far advanced, Colonel Pearſe's Detachment was almoſt ready, and the State of our Affairs on the Coaſt would not admit of longer Delay. It was evident alſo, from the Anſwers which had been received from Moodajee, that he conceived that our Affairs were reduced to a State more deſperate than they really were. To remove therefore this Impreſſion, as well as to afford the moſt ſpeedy Aſſiſtance to the Preſidency of Madras, it was reſolved, That the Detachment ſhould immediately proceed and make its Way through the Province of Oriſſa againſt all Oppoſition. To reconcile Moodajee however to this Meaſure by every Mark of Attention in our Power, and to prevent, if poſſible, a Rupture from the Meeting of the Two Armies, it was agreed to depute a Gentleman from this Government to Chimnajee Baboo at Cuttack. Mr. Anderſon was ſelected for this Service, and the following Inſtructions were given to him:

To Mr. David Anderſon.

Sir,

We hereby appoint you our ſpecial Miniſter to Rajah Chimnajee Bhooſla, the Commander of the Army of the Government of Berar, now in the Province of Cuttack; and we direct you to proceed thither with all poſſible Expedition for the following Purpoſes.

Firſt, You will produce to the Rajah your Credentials, and deliver to him and to the Dewan Bowanny Punt Appa, the introductory Letters which you will receive from the Governor General.

Secondly, You will notify to them in Form, that Orders have been given to Lieutenant Colonel Pearſe, the Commander of the Army lately formed at Midnapore, to march into the Carnatic by the Way of Cuttack, its only practicable Route; apprizing them that this Information is given them in Conſideration of the ancient Friendſhip which has ſubſiſted between our Forces in the Carnatic and the Government of Naugpore, and for the Prevention of any Cauſe which might eventually diſturb it. For this Reaſon we have inſtructed you to requeſt them in our Name to cauſe ſuch of their Troops as may yet be in the Road through which our Army muſt paſs, to remove at ſuch a Diſtance from it as may prevent the Individuals on either Side, and particularly the Followers of the Camps, whoſe Licentiouſneſs is the moſt difficult to be reſtrained, from engaging in mutual Broils which might imperceptibly lead to ſerious and alarming Conſequences, affecting the Union of the Two States; and to acquaint them that the ſtricteſt Orders have from the ſame Motives been iſſued to the Commander of the Engliſh Army, who is a Man of Underſtanding and Prudence, to obſerve all the Duties of Friendſhip with the Rajah and his People, and to avoid whatever may tend to create a Miſunderſtanding with either. That the Force has been ſome Time ſince aſſembled and ready to march; but Letters having been before ſent to Naugpore, containing the Subſtance of a Treaty propoſed for the Guarantee of Rajah Mhoodajee Bhooſla, and the Acceptance and Ratification of the Miniſters of the Peſhwa, with other Subjects tending to draw the Two Governments of Berar and Bengal into a cloſer and firmer Connection of Friendſhip and Intereſt, the March of the Army was therefore withheld till an Anſwer ſhould be received from Naugpore: That an Anſwer has been received, but not concluſive, many Points remaining for Adjuſtment which may be the Work of Time: That we are aſſured of the inflexible Determination of the Rajah to maintain the ancient Friendſhip of the Bhoſila Family with this Government, and to unite with it in one common Cauſe, whenever the Terms and Objects of it can be ſettled to our mutual Satisfaction; but that we cannot ſuffer the neceſſary Plans and Meaſures of Government to remain ſuſpended in the Expectation of this Concluſion, nor our Armies to loſe the Seaſon of Action, while thoſe of our Enemies are employing it againſt us; and that having acquitted ourſelves of the Obligation impoſed upon us by our Senſe of the Relation ſubſiſting between the Two Governments, the reſt remains with them, and they muſt be anſwerable for the Conſequences if they do not conform to our Example. You will be careful to make them underſtand that the Orders to Colonel Pearſe are poſitive to proſecute his March, and make his Way againſt all Oppoſition.

Thirdly, If you find the Rajah and his Dewan diſpoſed to take a more decided Part in our Favour, of which indeed we have no Expectation, we deſire that you will ſolicit the Aid of 2000 effective and choſen Horſe, or any leſs Number which they may be willing to contribute, to accompany Colonel Pearſe, and to act under his Command, and receive their Pay from the Company through their Pay Maſter; the Mode and Rate of which we empower you to ſettle by written Stipulation.

Fourthly, We expect that this Application will draw from them other Demands; but theſe we direct you to tranſmit to us, and wait our Anſwers to them, not judging it either neceſſary or expedient to give you more poſitive Orders upon other Points.

It is our Order that you correſpond with Lieutenant Colonel Pearſe, tranſmitting to him ſpeedy and regular Information of all Matters proper for his Knowledge.

We are, &c.

Fort William,
the 14th January, 1781.

Mr. Anderſon having received theſe Inſtructions, proceeded on his Journey towards Cuttack; on his Arrival at Ballaſore, he found that Chimnajee had marched with his Army againſt the Fort of Dhekanall, which is ſituated amongſt the Hills, and that it would be impoſſible at that Time to penetrate

penetrate through the Paſſes which were in the Poſſeſſion of the Mountaineers. Mr. Anderſon communicated this Difficulty to the Governor General in the following Letters.

To the Honourable Warren Haſtings, Eſquire.

Honourable Sir,

I arrived here this Morning. The Maratta Army is I find engaged in the Siege of Dhekanall, which lays amongſt the Hills, a conſiderable Diſtance to the Weſtward of the Cuttack Road. The Communication is I am told almoſt entirely ſtopped, as there is a thick Jungle of near 17 Coſs in Length betwixt the Road and Dhekanall, which is ſo much infeſted by the People of the rebellious Rajah's, that ſome Days ago a conſiderable Body of Horſe which attempted to penetrate to the Army, with ſome Supplies from Cuttack, were obliged to return.

I foreſee therefore a great Difficulty in reaching Chimnajee's Camp in Time to carry on any Negociation, before the Arrival of Colonel Pearſe's Detachment; and what will I fear conſiderably augment it, is the Abſence of the Phouſdar of this Place, for whom I brought a Letter from Beneram Pundit. I have delivered the Letter to his Naib, but having no previous Notice, he ſeems undetermined how to act until he ſhall receive Directions from the Subahdar at Cuttack. This would require a Delay of 4 or 5 Days, but you may be aſſured I ſhall endeavour to find Means of proceeding ſooner.

Whilſt I regret extremely this Delay, it is with ſome Pleaſure that I remark that the ſame Circumſtance which is the Cauſe of it, renders the Object of my Deputation leſs important than it would have been, had the Army of the Marattas been unemployed and on the high Road to Cuttack.

If I can get the Naib Phouſdar's Permiſſion, and a few of his Servants for my Protection, (which I find from Experience is abſolutely neceſſary) I ſhall ſet out To morrow for Cuttack, and there wait until I can hear from Chimnajee, or until I can get an Eſcort to conduct me through the Hills.

Ballaſore, 22d January 1781. I have the Honour to be, with much Reſpect, &c.

Honourable Sir,
Your, &c.

Honourable Sir,

I had the Honour to write you Yeſterday. I have now determined to ſet out for Cuttack To-morrow Morning at all Events. The Naib Phouſdar has promiſed to ſend Two or Three of his Sepoys along with me, which will I hope prevent any Delay from my being ſtopped by the Chowkeydars on the Road. Biſſumber Pundit is I find with Rajah Ram Pundit at Cuttack. I ſhall conſult with him about my future Operations, and if the Road to Chimnajee's Camp is impracticable, I ſhall wait at Cuttack until I ſhall receive your Orders, or until I can find Means to convey a Letter and receive an Anſwer from Chimnajee. I do not underſtand that there are many Troops in this Part of the Country, they are moſtly gone with Chimnajee into the Dhekanall Country. The few that are left are I believe under the Command of Rajah Ram Pundit, who is a Man of high Rank, and much reſpected among the Marattas. I think it is probable that the chief Object of my Deputation may be anſwered by an Interview with him. I mean the Declaration which you have enjoined me to make with reſpect to the March of Colonel Pearſe. But if you ſhould think it at all Events neceſſary that I ſhould find Means of waiting on Chimnajee, to purſue the remaining Objects of my Commiſſion, viz. To perſuade him to take an active Part and join us, or to enter into ſome Engagement to remain paſſive, it will be neceſſary to ſend me more particular Inſtructions, becauſe theſe Propoſitions will, as you have obſerved, lead to Demands on his Part that I ſhall be unable to anſwer, until I can write to the Board and receive their Orders, which (hemmed in as Chimnajee is at preſent by the rebellious Rajahs) would be very difficult, and if effected, would be attended with ſo much Delay, as to render my Negociations with the Marattas, either regarding a Junction or remaining paſſive, of no Uſe with reſpect to Colonel Pearſe's Detachment. I beg Leave to ſubmit theſe Circumſtances to your Conſideration, and to requeſt your Orders; which as far as I can judge at preſent, may reach me before it will be in my Power to leave Cuttack.

Ballaſore, 2d January, 1781. I have the Honour to be, with the utmoſt Reſpect,

Honourable Sir,
Your faithful, &c.

The Governor General laid theſe Letters before the Board, and as there appeared ſo little Probability of Mr. Anderſon's being able to effect an Interview with Chimnajee, and that Gentleman's Preſence was wanted at the Preſidency for the Duties of a very important Station, to which we had lately appointed him, we agreed to direct him to return to the Preſidency, and to leave the Subject of his Commiſſion with Rajah Ram Pundit, the Naib of Cuttack. The following Letter was accordingly written to him by the Secretary.

Mr.

APPENDIX, N° 365.

Mr. David Anderſon.

Sir,

I am directed to convey to you the Orders of the Honourable Governor General and Council, that you immediately return to the Preſidency, delivering the Subject of your Commiſſion to Rajah Ram Pundit, the Naib of Cuttack, to be by him communicated to Chimnajee Baboo.

Fort William,
Council Chamber,
the 29th January 1781.

I am Sir,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
(Signed) E. Hay,
Act^s Secr^y.

Mr. Anderſon in the mean Time proceeded on to Cuttack, and during his Stay there wrote the following Letters to the Board.

To the Honourable Warren Haſtings, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Council, Fort William.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

On my Arrival here Three Days ago, I was informed that Rajah Chimnajee was encamped with his whole Army amongſt the Hills, about 24 Coſs from this Place; that the Mountaineers were in general up in Arms againſt the Maratta Government; that they had for ſome Time entirely cut off the Communication betwixt this Place and the Rajah's Camp, but that it was then again in ſome Meaſure opened by the Reduction of the Rajah of Dheckanall, who had been one of the principal and moſt active Leaders in the Rebellion. I immediately diſpatched Letters to Rajah Chimnagee, and his Dewan Bowanny Pundit, informing them of my Deputation from you, and of my Arrival here, and requeſting to know if it would be agreeable to them that I ſhould wait on them in Camp. It is with Concern I am obliged to acquaint you that the Hircarrahs who carried the Letters have now returned, and inform me that it is utterly impoſſible to paſs through the Hills; even conſiderable Bodies of Horſe who have attempted to join the main Army being obliged to return. This Information is confirmed by the Voice of all thoſe with whom I have had an Opportunity of converſing.

As there has been no Intercourſe whatever betwixt this Place and the Camp for ſome Days, it is impoſſible to ſay where the Army is at preſent. All the Inhabitants here conclude from a Variety of Circumſtances that it is in Motion. But different Opinions and Reports prevail regarding its Deſtination; ſome alledge that it was Chimnajee's Intention to march againſt the Rajah of Sumbelpore, who had refuſed to ſubmit to the heavy Exactions impoſed by the Maratta Government; whilſt others conjecture that he is now actually on his March towards the Weſtern Paſſes of Bengal. Though this is merely Conjecture, yet the well-known Diſtreſſes and Importunities of Chimnajee's Army, and the Impoſſibility of finding any further Reſources in this exhauſted Country, give it an Appearance of Probability that will not allow me wholly to reject it.

I think it neceſſary to inform you that there are few or no Troops at preſent in this Part of the Country.

I am this Evening to have a Conference with Manoojee, the Dewan of Rajah Chimnajee's Duftun, and Hurdy Ram, the Dewan of Cuttack, which will probably determine me regarding the Meaſures which are now left for me to purſue.

I am, &c.

Cuttack,
31ſt January, 1781.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I had Yeſterday Evening the Honour to receive your Secretary's Letter of the 29th ultimo.

Rajah Ram Pundit being at preſent with Chimnajee Baboo, and it appearing the Intention of your Order that I ſhould communicate the Subject of my Commiſſion to the Perſons who for the Time being might be conſidered as the Repreſentative of the Maratta Government at Cuttack, I this Morning waited on Manoojee Pundit and Hurdy Ram, the former of whom as Phurnoveſe, poſſeſſes great Weight in the Councils of the Berar State, and the latter as Dewan of Cuttack holds the executive Authority of this Soubah in the Abſence of Rajah Ram Pundit. I had at a former Interview opened to them the Intention of my Deputation, and I this Morning entered on the Subject more fully, explaining it to them nearly in the Words of my Inſtructions. During the Courſe of our Converſation, Manoojee and Hurdy Ram at firſt expreſſed ſome Apprehenſions, from the Reſentment which the Peſhwa and his Miniſters would entertain at their Maſters ſuffering Colonel Pearſe's Detachment to paſs. They enlarged much on the ſteady Attachment ſhewn by Moodajee to the Engliſh, even whilſt all the other Nations were at Enmity with us; and obſerved that he had ſent his Son to command the Troops, who, notwithſtanding the preſſing Inſtances of the Peſhwa and his Miniſters, had thus long avoided an Invaſion of our Territories, and had even now, under Pretence of reducing ſome Petty Rajahs, removed his Army to a conſiderable Diſtance, on Purpoſe that our Troops might the more eaſily paſs. This was a Proof of Friendſhip which had not occurred to them at our Firſt Interview; I was pleaſed however to find it adduced, and readily admitted it; I purſued the favourable Diſpoſition which is diſcovered, and I have the Pleaſure to inform you, that Manoojee and Hurdy Ram

Ram promiſed that Orders ſhould be ſent to all the Tanadars and Officers on the Road, not only to avoid doing any thing which might be productive of Diſputes, but to aſſiſt as far as poſſible in ſupplying the Detachment with Proviſions in their Route. The Performance of this Promiſe muſt however, I am ſenſible, depend on the Intentions of the Maratta Government, and the Orders which may be received from Chimnajee. At the Requeſt of Manooje and Hurdy Ram, I delivered to them the Letters of Introduction which I received from the Governor General for Chimnajee, and ſome Diſpatches which I had brought from Beneram Pundit to his Brother, and they promiſed that they would immediately forward them to Camp under a ſtrong Eſcort, together with a Letter from themſelves to Rajah Chimnajee, informing him of the Subject of my Commiſſion.

I learned from Manoojee and Hurdy Ram, that Chimnajee, with almoſt the Whole of his Army, was at a Place called Khoud, on the Boundaries of the Cunjer Country, about 35 Coſs from hence. It lays, as I am informed, nearly N. W. from Cuttack, and no Inference can be drawn regarding Chimnajee's Intentions from the ſuppoſed Situation of the Army, as it is ſaid to be almoſt equally convenient for marching to any of the Places for which Report variouſly deſtines it, to Jumbelpore, to Great Naugpore, or to the Weſtern Frontiers of Bengal.

In Obedience to your Orders of the 29th ultimo, I ſhall ſet out To-morrow on my Return to Bengal.

5th February 1781. I am, &c.

Mr. Anderſon afterwards left Cuttack and ſet out on his Return to the Preſidency: On his Arrival at Ballapore he overtook Biſſumber Pundit, a Vackeel whom Chimnajee Baboo had ſent through the Hills under a ſtrong Eſcort with Diſpatches to the Governor General. Mr. Anderſon agreed to travel in Company with Biſſumber Pundit to Calcutta; but before he left Balaſore, he heard that Chimnajee with all his Army was come down into the open Country, which was confirmed by a Letter which he received from Chimnajee's Miniſter, Bhowanny Pundit; expreſſing a great Deſire to ſee him, and requeſting him to return from Balaſore to Chimnajee's Camp, which was then in the Neighbourhood of Jaagepore: But as the Order of the Board, of the 29th January, was poſitive, and Mr. Anderſon knew not on what Grounds it was iſſued, he thought he could not take upon himſelf to deviate from it; he excuſed himſelf therefore to Bowanny Pundit in the beſt Manner he could, and having written all the Circumſtances to the Governor General, he proceeded by ſlow Journies towards Calcutta, expecting to receive on the Road further Orders for his Conduct. The Governor General accordingly did write to him Three Letters, directing him to comply with Bowanny Pundit's Deſire; but as they were ſent by one Road, and Mr. Anderſon proceeded by another, they did not reach him till after his Arrival at Calcutta.

In the mean Time Colonel Pearſe's Detachment entered the Maratta Territories, and Chimnajee Baboo, whoſe Army was now within a few Miles of the Road, not only ſuffered him to paſs without Oppoſition, but directed one of his principal Officers to attend the Colonel, and ſupply the Detachment with whatever they might want. The Colonel's Letter afforded daily Teſtimony of the Care with which the Officer executed his Inſtructions, and the Detachment during the whole of the March through Oriſſa had the moſt plentiful Supplies of Grain and every Kind of Proviſions.

Repeated Diſpatches were about this Time received from Chimnajee and his Miniſters (Vide Appendix, N° 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9) profeſſing their friendly Diſpoſition towards the Engliſh, and declaring their Reſolution to afford Colonel Pearſe every Aſſiſtance during his March through Oriſſa; but all of them complaining at the ſame Time of the Hardſhips which their Friendſhip for the Engliſh had brought upon them, and the Difficulty which they found in pacifying their Troops, who complained
ix. of their Want of Pay, and loudly called out to be led to Plunder. A Letter was likewiſe about this Time received from Bowanny Pundit, the Moonſhee of Rajah Moodajee Bhooſla, addreſſed to Beneram Pundit, the Berar Vackeel at Calcutta, which throws ſome Light on the Views and Policy of the Court of Berar.

The Meſſage which Biſſumber Pundit conveyed from Rajah Chimnagee Baboo contained ſeveral Propoſitions of great Importance, and as the Rajah had expreſſed ſome Chagrin at not ſeeing Mr. Anderſon on his firſt Deputation, we agreed to ſend that Gentleman back to him. The Governor General alſo ſent Biſſumber Pundit back at the ſame Time with Anſwers to the Rajah's Propoſitions. As it became neceſſary to inform Mr. Anderſon of the Propoſitions conveyed by Biſſumber Pundit, and to direct him to ſound the Diſpoſitions of the Rajah and his Miniſters, regarding ſeveral Objects of a ſecret Nature, it was thought adviſable to iſſue his Inſtructions from the Governor General only, without minuting the Particulars of them on the uſual Records of the Council. The following is a Copy of the Letter which being agreed on by the Board was written to him:

N. B. The Committee have upon due Conſideration thought it proper to leave out the Letter of Inſtructions to Mr. Anderſon.

Letter from the Governor General.

Dear Sir, Baraſſet, 1 March 1781.

I now ſend you my private Inſtructions; they are ſuch as could not properly or prudently be given in Public Orders, and expoſed as of courſe theſe would be to our official Records. Mr. Wheler approves them, and authorizes me to declare his Approbation of them. They appear rather longer than the Matter of mere Converſation needs to be; but I ſhould have made them ſtill longer had they been

addreſſed to a Perſon leſs informed, or leſs capable of drawing the probable Concluſions from known or ſuppoſed Facts, than you are; for I think much will depend on the Temper and Inclinations of the young Rajah, and therefore I have been ſo particular in ſtating the Points which are moſt likely to influence his Mind, and even to preſcribe the Manner in which you may moſt ſucceſsfully urge them.

I recommend to you to take Minutes of every Converſation with him; they will be uſeful not only for Reference, but by connecting the Sentiments of the Rajah expreſſed at different Times, they will afford you a better Clue to his real Views and Intentions.

Reſpecting the Connection of the Government of Berar with Nizam Ally Cawn, I would rather refer you to Biſſumber Pundit, who can give you the fulleſt Information concerning it. I will only ſay in a few Words, that I conſider them as natural Enemies, although they are on Terms of outward Friendſhip. I can perceive that Moodajee (or rather his Dewan, whoſe Dictates the Rajah implicitly follows in all political Meaſures) ſtands in ſome Awe of Nizam Ally, and I have ſometimes intimated the Poſſibility of our being driven to the Neceſſity of courting his Alliance in the Manner in which I have hitherto ſought that of the Government of Berar, if the latter ſhould continue to procraſtinate. He was the Projector of the preſent Confederacy, and is ſaid to be at this Time detached from it by the Report of Hyder's having obtained a Grant from the King of his Dominions: The Report is certainly true.

Do not fail to make my Acknowledgments to Chimnajee, for the liberal Manner in which he has acted to Colonel Pearſe, of which the Colonel writes his daily Teſtimony. He has a Claim to a grateful Return, and on that Footing I would yield him Advantages which ſhould be withheld from him for ever, if he employed the Means of Hoſtility or Menace to obtain them.

Rajah Ram Pundit has been very uſeful to us by his Influence and Counſels: Let him know that I know it, and am ſenſible of it. If you ſhall judge it neceſſary to enſure either his or Bowaeny Pundit's Friendſhip by Gifts of Money, or to make ſimilar Preſents to others, you have my Authority to draw on me for any Sums, and to diſtribute them according to your Diſcretion.

If any thing that I have ſaid ſhould require further Explanation, and ſuch as can only be conveyed effectually by Converſation, as I ſhall of courſe return to Town for a Day, in a Day or Two hence, let me know, and I will go earlier to ſee you.

I am,
Dear Sir,
Your's affectionately.

Mr. Anderſon having expreſſed ſome Doubts regarding the Intention of ſome Parts of the preceding Inſtructions, the Governor General thought it neceſſary to explain them more fully in the following Letter.

Dear Sir, Baraſet, 2d March 1781.

To remove every Ambiguity in the Conſtruction of the Paragraph concerning which you have expreſſed your Doubts, I deſire you will read it with the following Correction:

"You may engage to ſupply them with Twelve Lacks of Rupees. This is the Sum which I formerly promiſed my Intereſt with this Government to grant them, in the Event of the Rajah's (that is, Moodajee's) Compliance with the Requiſition made to him in October laſt."

This Requiſition was, that he ſhould execute the Treaty which was propoſed to him, and order his Troops at Cuttack either to return or to join us. The Requiſition has not been complied with. I now offer the ſame Sum to Chimna Baboo, with the Condition only that he will return, or ſolemnly promiſe not to employ the Forces under his Command againſt us. I limit the Condition to no Time, but to the Forces which are actually under the Command of Chimna Baboo. Theſe muſt never be employed againſt us.

Here I think it neceſſary to diſtinguiſh between the Motive of this Bounty, or the Condition *for* which it is granted, and the Condition *on* which it is granted; and I deſire that you will mark the Diſtinction in all your Diſcourſes upon the Subject. It is this, I conſider the Government of Berar as a Sufferer by the many Inſtances which it has given of its Attachment to our's, and therefore entitled to ſome Retribution from us. To the World, the Appearance of its Forces ſo near to our Borders, and their profeſſed Deſtination againſt our Provinces, will be conſtrued an Hoſtility. To me who know the Compulſion under which this Meaſure was undertaken, and the Pretexts which have been uſed to elude the Purpoſe for which it was profeſſedly formed, to whom both its profeſſed Deſtination and the intended Evaſion of it were early notified, and the latter verified by the ſlow Progreſs of the Army, its Inactivity, its Diſtreſſes, and above all, by its Forbearance with an Engliſh Army paſſing in their Route, and through their own Territory; it is an Evidence of the pacific Diſpoſition of the Government of Berar, and its Attachment to ours, equal even to the Hoſpitality ſhewn by it to General Goddard's Detachment. We cannot repay the Expence which they have incurred by ſo long an Employment of ſo large a Body of Cavalry in In-action, and in a remote and deſtitute Country; but I deem it incumbent upon our Government to relieve its preſent Wants, and to afford it the Means of a Retreat. It is a Debt of Honour, Juſtice, and even Policy, for I doubt whether the Rajah could return with them, unleſs he could either diſcharge a Part of their Arrears, or lead them to Plunder. It is therefore as a Compenſation for Loſſes ſuſtained on our Account, as an Acknowledgment and Return for paſt Kindneſs, not the Purchaſe of future Forbearance, that we conſent to grant them the Aid which you are inſtructed

inſtructed to tender to them. At the ſame Time we have thought it proper to give it with the obvious Precaution, that it be not employed to our own Hurt, nor the Right forfeited on which it was granted by future Hoſtilities.

You muſt not exceed the Sum of Two Lacks in private Diſtributions; even that you will doubtleſs conſider an Exceſs, unleſs ſome very ſubſtantial Benefit can be purchaſed by it.

I am, Dear Sir,
Your's affectionately.

P. S. I am not yet ſatisfied with the preceding Explanations; complete as they may appear, they want their direct and poſitive Application, which I now add.—If Chimnajee in his Acceptance of the Sum proffered to him ſhall inſiſt on any Reſervation of the Right to employ his Forces againſt us in the next Seaſon, or at any Period before their Return to Naugpore, you muſt declare to him, that his Claim to this Supply will become Forfeit by ſuch a Reſervation, and that it will put it out of our Power to grant it; in a Word, that *we will not grant it*.

With theſe Inſtructions Mr. Anderſon proceeded to the Maratta Camp, where he held ſeveral long Conferences with the Rajah and his Miniſters. The Subject of theſe Conferences will beſt appear from the following Papers which were ſent by Mr. Anderſon to the Governor General. They were originally intended by that Gentleman to have been conſidered only as private Information, previous to his finding Leiſure to deliver in a regular Report of his Proceedings to the Board; but as theſe Papers were written almoſt at the Moment in which the ſeveral Conferences related in them actually paſſed, they will afford the beſt Inſight into the Views of the Parties, and probably be more acceptable than a Relation more leiſurely and methodically digeſted.

Honourable Sir, Camp, 13th March, 1781.

On my Arrival Yeſterday Evening, I was received in Camp with every Mark of Attention and Reſpect. I was introduced to the Rajah, and all his principal Officers aſſembled. I delivered to him and his Dewan Bowanny Pundit the Letters which I received from you. I took Occaſion at this Interview to inform the Rajah that you had ſent him ſome Preſents of Silks, which together with all my own Baggage had been left at Beercool, the Coolies who carried them having run away terrified at the Reports of the Depredations committed by a Body of Maratta Horſe, which had entered the Province of Jellaſore. The Rajah aſſured me that theſe Outrages on our Territories were committed in Oppoſition to his Orders, and that the Moment he had heard of them, he had ſent to recall the plundering Party, and to puniſh the Perſons who compoſed it. I deemed it neceſſary to obtain this Aſſurance before I entered on the Subject of my Commiſſion.

This Morning I again waited on the Rajah by Appointment, and had a very long Conference with him, or rather with the Dewan Bowanny Pundit in his Preſence. Having produced my Credentials, I explained the profeſſed Object of my former and of my preſent Deputation. Our Converſation afterwards turned on the Propoſitions which had been made to you through Biſſumber Pundit. I was called on for the Anſwers, as Biſſumber Pundit had referred them to me, and had affected an Ignorance of your Sentiments, even on thoſe Points which you have replied to in the cleareſt Terms. The Dewan in diſcuſſing the Preliminary Article of theſe Propoſitions, endeavoured to involve under it the Nature of our Situation with reſpect to the Peſhwa, and it was with ſome Difficulty that I could confine the Queſtion to the Point of View in which you had conſidered it, and which at the Time of ſtating it was certainly the Point of View in which it was intended you ſhould conſider it, being an Appeal from the Rajah to your Juſtice. I went through all the Arguments which you have ſo fully laid down in my Inſtructions; and as the Dewan ſeemed inclined to combat every one of them, the Converſation was carried on to a great Length. The Dewan at laſt in ſome Meaſure concurred in the Propriety of the Advice which you had given to the Rajah, but he reſted every thing on your Compliance with his Expectations reſpecting the firſt Article of the Propoſitions, namely, the Expence of the Troops. I then proceeded to inform the Rajah of the Offer which you had empowered me to make him, of the Motives which induced you to grant him that Supply, and of the Promiſe which you had directed me to exact from him. The Rajah, his Dewan, Rajah Ram Pundit, One or Two of the Miniſters who were preſent, and even Biſſumber Pundit, affected much Surpriſe at the Smallneſs of the Sum: They obſerved, that near Two Crores of Rupees had been expended on account of their Attachment to the Engliſh; they expatiated on their preſent Diſtreſſes, and remarked that the Sum which you had tendered was ſcarcely adequate to diſcharge the Arrears of a ſingle Jemautder, and inſinuated the Conſequences to which they might be driven by Hunger, Diſappointment, and Deſpair. I acknowledged in the fulleſt Degree the Senſe you entertained of their Attachment, and admitted the Reality of their Diſtreſſes: I requeſted, however, that they would conſider alſo the Situation of our Government; that we were engaged in Wars with ſeveral powerful States; that although we had indeed latterly been ſucceſsful, yet that theſe Succeſſes had been obtained at a vaſt Expence of Treaſure, and that much more might ſtill be neceſſary; that as theſe Troops had not come thus far at our Requeſt, nor ever been employed in our Service, it was not to be expected that we could defray the whole of their Expence; all that could be looked for was, that we ſhould aſſiſt in relieving them from their preſent Diſtreſſes, of which their Attachment to our Government had partly been the Occaſion; and this I aſſured them

you had attended to in as full a Degree as our own Situation could poſſibly admit: In ſhort, much Argument paſſed on the Subject, and as the Dewan ſeemed to reject the Offer with a kind of Slight, which I deemed inconſiſtent with the Connection which has ſubſiſted betwixt the Two Governments of Berar and Bengal, I thought it my Duty to turn to the Rajah and aſk, whether this was a poſitive and final Anſwer, or whether it would be agreeable to him before he gave me my Diſmiſſion, to take ſome Days to weigh all that I had ſaid in his own Mind, and then give me an Anſwer?

I proceeded to communicate your Anſwers regarding the remaining Three Propoſitions. I was permitted to go through thoſe which relate to Ragonaut Row, and the Paſſage of the Troops through Goyah, without being interrupted or receiving a Reply. When I came to the laſt Article, and when I queſtioned whether the Rajah was authorized to treat upon it, the Dewan informed me that he was; and on my telling him, that I ſhould in that Caſe hear and tranſmit to you whatever he had to ſay, he replied, that too much Delay had taken place on that Subject already: He ran through the whole Story of the Manner in which the Chout had been acquired; ſaid that the Exaction of it had been ſuſpended on account of the Troubles which had happened in the Berar State, but that the Right ſtill remained, and that the Troops who had acquired it were ſtill the ſame. I ſatisfied myſelf with replying, that the Troops of Aliverdy Cawn and thoſe of the Engliſh were different; and we ſoon afterwards imperceptibly paſſed from this Article without my having an Opportunity of fully ſounding their Diſpoſition in the Manner which you have enjoined. The Article of the Expences ſeemed to engroſs the whole of their Thoughts. They ſaid they were willing to engage hereafter in any of our Views, particularly to unite with us againſt Hyder Ally, if he had actually ſolicited Sunnuds for the Deckan; but the Arrears of their Troops muſt firſt be paid, without which it was impoſſible for them to do any thing: That it was with the utmoſt Difficulty they could now prevent them from mutinying, by buoying up their Hopes with Promiſes of Relief from Bengal; and that if a Mutiny ſhould happen, it might prove very fatal to the Rajah and them all; that their Diſtreſſes and Apprehenſions were now ſuch, that if I went away without fulfilling the Expectations of the Troops, the Rajah muſt go alſo, from Neceſſity, and throw himſelf upon you for Relief at Calcutta. On the whole, you will not imagine that I had much Reaſon to be ſatisfied with the Expectations ſhewn by the Dewan in this Day's Converſation: I am not, however, entirely diſcouraged, as I aſcribe it chiefly to the Idea with which Biſſumber Pundit has impreſſed them, of my being poſſeſſed with full Powers to ſettle any Sum which I may think fit, and it is natural for them to try every Method of raiſing it as high as poſſible. I am endeavouring to remove this Idea, and I would fain hope, that when this is effected, the Dewan will change his Opinion regarding the Offer which you have made to the Rajah. You will obſerve from the Manner in which this Converſation has been carried on, that I have little to expect from an Attention to the particular Diſpoſition of the young Rajah: He ſhewed a Kind of complacent Indifference during the whole Time, and it was in vain that I endeavoured to engage him in the Diſcuſſion by frequent Appeals to him in Points where the Dewans and I differed. I am again to viſit him To-morrow Evening to deliver your Preſents, which I underſtand are arrived at Balaſore: I ſhall then confine our Converſation to Subjects of leſs Importance, and endeavour to obtain a more thorough Inſight into his Temper and Character, and to acquire his Good-will and favourable Opinion. I ſhall be in no Haſte to leave his Camp whilſt there remains the ſmalleſt Hope of my Stay being productive of any Good. Rajah Ram Pundit, who has frequently viſited me ſince my Arrival, has particularly implored me to repreſent to you their Diſtreſſes, and entreat you to prevent them by a more conſiderable Supply. It is in vain that I have repeated to him, and indeed to all the reſt who have ſpoken to me, that you have fixed a Sum, and that I was certain that you would on no Account exceed it. Under the preſent Appearances I have thought it would be to no Purpoſe and premature to try the Mode which you have authorized of private Diſtributions. Notwithſtanding the Length of this Letter, I have been obliged to omit many Things which I could wiſh to have mentioned. I muſt make an Apology for the haſty and inaccurate Manner in which I have written, and requeſt that you will conſider it as a private Letter addreſſed to yourſelf only.

I am, &c.

Poſtſcript, 14th in the Morning.

Biſſumber Pundit has juſt now been with me with a Meſſage from the Rajah. He has ſhewn me your Letter to him, to evince that I have a diſcretional Power to encreaſe the Sum tendered as I may think fit. I have explained to him, that although you have referred the Rajah to me, yet you have communicated to me your utmoſt Intentions, and I muſt abide by them. He deſired, in the Rajah's Name, to know whether he ſhould march forwards To-day, and whether he ſhould give me my Diſmiſſion? I have told him that I wiſh him to weigh well the Views which I have ſuggeſted Yeſterday, and to act accordingly; that it is not my Deſire to leave him ſo ſoon; that on the contrary it is my Wiſh to ſtay ſome Time with him, that I may obtain a Knowledge of all his Sentiments and Wiſhes, ſo that on my Return I may be enabled to explain them to you; but that on both of the above Points it muſt reſt with him to determine: That I could not give him any Expectations whatever of a larger Sum. I do not imagine he will give me my Diſmiſſion, though poſſibly he may make a Shew of marching. I am to viſit Bowanny Pundit this Morning.

On a further Conſideration of my Inſtructions, ſome Doubts ariſe in my Mind, which as they may ſtill have their Application, I beg Leave to ſtate in ſhort Queſtions.

1ſt. Shall the Rajah's Promiſe to return or not, employ his Troops againſt us, be in *Writing*, or will a verbal Promiſe be enough?

2d. Shall

2d. Shall it either in Writing or verbally be required to be *on Oath?*

3d. Shall the Word *never* be poſitively expreſſed, or will it be enough if the general Tenor of the Rajah's Diſcourſe ſhews no Inclination *ever* to employ his Troops againſt us; and in his formal Promiſe will the Word *not* inſtead of *never* be in ſuch Caſe ſufficient?

If you think any of theſe Points of Conſequence, I beg you will be pleaſed to ſend me Anſwers to them, as they are not particularly expreſſed in my Inſtructions; and I wiſh to adhere cloſely to your Inclinations in every thing.

Minutes of ſeveral Conferences on the 14th and 15th March.

14th. I received ſeveral curſory Viſits in the courſe of the Day from Biſſumber Pundit and Rajah Ram Pundit; but as little paſſed excepting Expreſſions of the Apprehenſions which they entertained of the Conſequences which would accrue to both Parties, from our not being able to come to an Agreement on the preſent Occaſion, I forbear to minute at full Length the Particulars of our Converſation.

In the Evening I went with them to pay a Viſit to the Dewan. The Converſation was begun by his aſking me if I had conſidered the Particulars of Yeſterday's Conference, and what Advice I had to offer? I replied that my Advice, in Conformity to that of the Governor, was for them to accept of the Sum, which in regard to their Attachment had been proffered for the Relief of their preſent Diſtreſſes; and either reſolve to join us when Circumſtances would admit, in carrying on the War againſt Hyder, or in proſecuting the Object which I had pointed out to them, of acquiring the Rauje of the Maratta State for the Bhooſla Family. The Dewan replied, that Supplies were neceſſary. To this I anſwered, that when they ſhould reſolve to join in the former Object, the Terms of our Union would neceſſarily be ſettled; but that if they ſhould embrace the latter Propoſal, the Object would be more for their Benefit than for our's, and that I imagined it could be effected without their incurring much Expence; that our Troops alone had already reduced the Government of Poona to the greateſt Extremity, but that when joined with theirs, or ſupported with the Sanction of their Name, they could not fail of Succeſs; that the Rauje was now vacant, inſomuch that even the Name of it was ſcarcely preſerved; that (as they themſelves muſt be ſenſible) it was their known hereditary Right; that there was probably no Power would be inclined, and none I was certain would be capable to oppoſe their Pretenſions; and that on the whole therefore I thought the Acquiſition would be eaſy and infallible. The Dewan replied, That their engaging in this Object was a Matter which muſt depend on the Councils at Naugpore; that this therefore would require ſome Delay, and that in the mean Time what were they to do to relieve the Diſtreſſes of their Troops which had come thus far, and which had for Sixteen Months depended on their Expectations from our Government. I replied, that for this Purpoſe the Sum was now tendered them. He anſwered that the Sum tendered was ſcarcely a Mouthful; that the Rajah had remarked to him, that the Governor had ſtiled him in his Letters Yeazaz-az Jiam, dearer than Life; was this a Proof of it? Was this all that he would do for one that was ſo dear to him? It would appear that he regarded Money as more dear. I informed him, that I had not had an Opportunity of knowing the Subject of all the Conferences which had paſſed betwixt the Governor and Beneram Pundit and Biſſumber Pundit, or of all the Letters which had been written to and from Naugpore; but that I never had underſtood that any more than what now proffered had ever been required or promiſed: That I had ſeen one Letter from Dewagur Pundit, which, though it mentioned high Expectations in caſe of a Junction againſt Hyder Ally, yet it implied no higher Expectations for the Relief of the Troops ſent to Cuttac. I aſked him, if any higher Promiſe had ever been made? He acknowledged, that no expreſs Promiſe had ever been made of a larger Sum, but that the Governor had always promiſed his Friendſhip, and in promiſing *that* had given them Reaſon to expect a Supply adequate to their Neceſſity. Rajah Ram Pundit obſerved, that the Letter to which I alluded from Dewagur Pundit, related to a particular Occaſion, when the Supply wanted was only for One or Two Months.—I think it here neceſſary to remark, that Rajah Ram Pundit Yeſterday obſerved, at the Conference held in Preſence of the Rajah, that the Sum now tendered was only equal to what was in Agitation at the End of the Rains, when the Treaty was firſt offered to the Poona Government, and that Eight Months Expences had ſince been incurred. I then replied, that the ſubſequent Delay could not be aſcribed to us but to their own Government, which had returned the Treaty with Propoſitions which could not eaſily be acceded to.—To return to the Conference of To-day: The Dewan aſked, what mighty Matter it would have been if the Governor, conſidering their hereditary Claims on Bengal, and from a Regard to his Friendſhip to Chimnajee, as well as to prevent the Conſequences which may ariſe to our own Territories, from their Diſtreſs and Deſpair, had made each of the Zemindars contribute to raiſe a Sum to relieve Chimnajee, and enable him to return to Naugpore? He laid ſo much Streſs upon this Method of raiſing a Supply, that I thought it neceſſary to inform him, that Money paid by a Contribution by our Zemindars, or Money paid from our own Treaſury, was to us much the ſame Thing; or if there was any Difference, the latter was preferable.

Biſſumber Pundit having declared to them, that he knew not the Extent of the Governor's Intentions, that he had only told him he would aſſiſt them with a Supply in Proportion to his Abilities, and that he had deputed me with full Powers for this Purpoſe, I thought it neceſſary to repeat to them again and again, that the Intention of my Deputation was chiefly to afford a public Teſtimony of the Acknowledgments of our Government for the Friendſhip ſhewn by Chimnajee in regard to Colonel Pearſe's

Pearſe's Detachment; That the Governor had, however, for my Information, communicated to me the Anſwers which he had delivered to Biſſumber Pundit to the Propoſitions conveyed to him from the Rajah, and had inſtructed me, in Conformity to his Anſwer regarding the Expences, to engage to ſupply the particular Sum which he expreſſed; that it was not in my Power to deviate from it; that however, if they choſe, I ſhould certainly write to the Governor, and communicate to him all that had paſſed; but that I could give them no Hopes that this would be productive of a larger Supply. They did not require me to write, but left it to me to do as I pleaſed. We afterwards mutually regretted the Interruption which from preſent Appearances was likely to take place in the Friendſhip which had ſubſiſted betwixt the Engliſh and Berar Government, and which, if preſerved, we agreed might have tended to the mutual Benefit of both States. This is almoſt Word for Word all that paſſed at this Interview. I ſtudiouſly avoided Argument, becauſe I had obſerved a Captiouſneſs in the Dewan, which notwithſtanding frequent Profeſſions of Friendſhip gave our Yeſterday's Conference more the Appearance of Diſpute than I thought conſiſtent with calm and friendly Diſcuſſion. Nothing however of this Nature paſſed at this Interview; every thing was ſaid in a cool and deliberate Tone, and due Attention was paid by each to whatever was ſaid by the other. I afterwards went and paid a Viſit to the Rajah, and delivered to him the Governor's Preſents, which he accepted with much ſeeming Complacency. Nothing paſſed at this Interview relating to Buſineſs. I endeavoured to engage the Rajah in ordinary Topics of Converſation; but either owing to a natural Shyneſs of Diſpoſition, or to the Diffidence of a young Man unaccuſtomed to converſe with Strangers, or perhaps to the Reſtraint impoſed upon him by his Miniſters, he ſhewed little Inclination to enter into any Diſcourſe. His Anſwers were always ſhort, and his Queſtions very few; but his Silence ſhewed no Want of Affability. Biſſumber Pundit came to me afterwards, and informed me, that Rajah Ram Pundit would ſhortly come to me with a Meſſage from the Rajah, to aſk me whether he ſhould march on To-morrow? The Effect of his March we both agreed would be the letting looſe all thoſe plundering Parties who had hitherto with ſo much Difficulty been reſtrained; and Biſſumber Pundit acknowledged that when a Fire was once kindled, it was not eaſy afterwards to extinguiſh it. Biſſumber Pundit ſaid, that the Rajah's Expectations were about Fifty Lacks; he has ſince talked of Thirty or Twenty-five. About Ten at Night Biſſumber Pundit came again, and informed me that Rajah Ram Pundit was coming to aſk me about the March of the Troops: I deſired he would tell Rajah Ram Pundit before hand, that I had no Right to object to the Rajah's marching to any Part of his Territories; but the Manner in which this March was propoſed immediately after our Conferences, would to all the World carry the Appearance of a Threat, as it really was; and that as I was inſtructed to offer a Supply, from Motives of Gratitude and not from Motives of Fear, I ſhould not, if the Rajah marched, think myſelf authorized to repeat the Offer which I had made to him: That I had now done every thing in a public Capacity that lay in my Power to prevent a Rupture; but that there was indeed one Thing of a private Nature which I could take upon myſelf to do, and that was to make Preſents to the Amount of a Lack, or One and a Half, or thereabouts, to Bowanny Pundit, Rajah Ram Pundit, or any of the Rajah's Miniſters, and this he might mention to Rajah Ram Pundit.

The ſame Night, about Half paſt Eleven, Biſſumber and Rajah Ram Pundit came to me: Rajah Ram Pundit ſaid, that Biſſumber Pundit had mentioned to him all that I had told him: He obſerved, that in ſettling Farms of Purguannahs, or Buſineſs of ſuch a Nature, Preſents to the Mutſuddies employed were uſual and proper; but that this was a Matter in which the Lives and Happineſs of Thouſands were eventually concerned, and that in ſuch a Negociation ſuch Preſents could have no Place. I excuſed myſelf to him; I reminded him that the Idea had been ſuggeſted by himſelf the Evening before, when he had inſinuated to me, that if my Object was to obtain any thing for myſelf, the Houſe of Booſla could eaſily give it: I repeated to him what I had ſaid to Biſſumber Pundit about the March of the Troops, and the Impoſſibility of my continuing after it the Governor's Offer. He then drew ſo ſtrong a Picture of the Diſtreſſes that the Engliſh would thus entail on their Provinces, that, conſidering it as a Kind of Menace, I begged he would deſiſt from ſuch Diſcourſe; that it was perhaps improper for me to anſwer it, as I was ſent only on the Idea of their pacific Diſpoſition; but that I would once for all repeat to them, that Fear for our own Territories had no Part in the Governor's Intention in ſending me; that our Troops were in Poſſeſſion of all the Gauts, and that we had a Body in the Field which the whole of the Maratta Army could not face; that all that could happen to us (independant of the Loſs of diſtant political Views) would be the ſpreading Terror amongſt the Inhabitants of Midnapore, Jellaſore, and perhaps Part of Burdwan. Rajah Ram Pundit then told me, that as I could not be brought to alter my Offer, a Thought had occurred to him, which was, for the Army to go on to Ramchundernapore, and for him and Biſſumber Pundit and me to go to the Governor at Calcutta, to ſee and prevail on him to give a larger Supply, but that I muſt promiſe to uſe my Endeavours in perſuading the Governor; and that we ſhould in the mean Time leave Mr. Redfearn with the Rajah.

I objected to leave Mr. Redfearn after I ſhould go myſelf; but I ſaid, that I would ſend Mr. Redfearn with them, and ſtay with the Rajah myſelf; that their going however would, I was certain, be to no Purpoſe, if the Army moved any nearer our Provinces after what had paſſed, as the Governor would not afterwards confer on the Subject: That as to my perſuading the Governor, Biſſumber Pundit could tell him, that the Governor did every thing from himſelf; that his Reaſon and Judgment were much ſuperior to mine; that it was my Duty to regulate mine by his, and not to attempt to influence his; that I could not even promiſe to adviſe; that I wiſhed to preſerve Peace, and

and had a Regard for the Rajah, but all that I could engage was to repreſent all that I had ſeen and heard; and concluded with telling him that I could give him no further Aſſurances or Expectations of better Succeſs with you.

It was agreed by Rajah Ram Pundit and Biſſumber Pundit to repreſent what had paſſed to the Rajah.

15th. Early in the Morning Biſſumber Pundit came to me, and told me that the Rajah had approved of Rajah Ram Pundit's going with Biſſumber Pundit, Mr. Redfearn, and me, to the Governor, and that the Rajah had deſired him to apologize to me for any Want of Affability which he might have ſhewn Yeſterday; that I muſt make Allowance for his Feelings as a Soldier, hurt at being ſtopped on his March from what I had ſaid in the Morning. Rajah Ram Pundit ſaid, that he was hurt at ſomething that paſſed betwixt him and ſome of his Jemmautdars.

Received the following Letter from the Governor General:

Sir, Fort William, 11th March 1781.

A Letter is received from Major McPherſon, which reports, that on the 7th Inſtant a large Party of Marattas croſſed the Soubenrekah, and came ſo near to Fort Knox, that the Officer ſtationed there fired upon them; and that they moved off, as he ſuppoſed, in ſearch of Plunder. He adds, that Dumdarva with a conſiderable Force was expected in the ſame Quarter on that Evening, or the next Morning.

I deſire that you will remonſtrate with Chimnajee Baboo on the Impropriety of this Conduct, and require his inſtant Orders for the Retreat of his Troops from our Neighbourhood, declaring that we ſhall conſider their paſſing our Frontier Line, and even their Continuance near it, as a decided Hoſtility, ſince neither can be attributed to any other Deſign. It is alſo my Order that you forbear to make the Tender to Chimnajee Baboo, directed in my Inſtructions; or if you have made it, that you formally retract it, until he ſhall have recalled all his Forces, of every Denomination, to a Man, to the Southward of Ballaſore.

Mr. Wheler authorizes me to notify his Concurence in theſe Orders, which you will therefore regard as equivalent to thoſe of the Board delivered in the cuſtomary Form.

I am, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servant.

P. S. A Letter ſince received from Mr. Pearſe, confirms the Intelligence of Major McPherſon; I herewith ſend you a Copy of it, by which you will ſee the Conſequences which this indiſcreet Act, if it hath not received the Authority of the Rajah, is likely to produce.

I viſited afterwards the Rajah, and communicated to him the Purport of the Governor's Letter. He deſired me to aſſure the Governor that he had already iſſued the Orders which the Governor required. I ſhall minute the Particulars of this Interview hereafter; ſuffice it for the preſent to ſay, that the Rajah diſmiſſed me, pleaſed with the Marks of Attention which he ſhewed to me, and with the good Inclinations which he diſcovered towards our Government.

Honourable Sir,

As I have not Leiſure to ſend you a regular Detail of my Proceedings in the Form of an Addreſs, I have taken the Liberty to ſend you encloſed a Copy of the Minutes which I have taken, agreeable to your Direction, of every thing that has paſſed ſince my laſt Letter. They are incorrect, but will perhaps communicate to you a more clear Idea of the State of Opinions here than I could poſſibly convey to you in a ſtudied and regular Addreſs.

It is now ſettled that Rajah Ram Pundit, Biſſumber Pundit, and I and Mr. Redfearn, are immediately to proceed to Calcutta; and that in the mean Time the Army is not to move from this Place. I am ſenſible that Rajah Ram Pundit's Viſit, and the Repreſentation which he will make to you of the Diſtreſſes of his Army, will put your Feelings as an Individual to a ſevere Trial: But conſidered in a political Light, Rajah Ram Pundit's Propoſal of viſiting you ſeemed ſo much to our Advantage, that I could not poſſibly object to it. It will transfer the Appearance of a ſubmiſſive Diſpoſition from us to them. It will prevent an immediate Rupture if there was any Danger of it; and will ſo long protract Negociation, that you will have the Power to dictate Terms, without Regard to any other Conſiderations but thoſe of preſent Compaſſion or Gratitude, and a View to future Advantages from an Alliance between the Two States. This Army will then depend almoſt entirely on your Mercy, for the Seaſon will be too far ſpent for them afterwards to be able to do any Miſchief: A Conſideration which I doubt not muſt have its Weight with you, though I have conſtantly and invariably in all my Conferences maintained the contrary. It is probable, I think, that Rajah Ram Pundit will be inſtructed to converſe with you on the more important Views which I have ſuggeſted, of a Junction againſt Hyder, or the Acquiſition of the Rauje. Their Faith towards the Peſhwa, or their Connection with Hyder, has ſcarcely been mentioned, and I have no Doubt but ſomething of Importance would be ſtruck out betwixt you and Rajah Ram Pundit, if the preſent Emergency could be got over.

I am thoroughly convinced that nothing but Diſtreſs will ever induce the Rajah or his Miniſters to break with the Engliſh. Whatever has paſſed of a different Tendency ſince my Arrival here, has proceeded

ceeded from the miſtaken Notion that it might work on me to augment the Supply that I had proffered. The young Rajah, who received me To-day without Reſtraint, has deſired me to implore you to take him and his Army under your Protection, to conſider them as much your own as General Goddard's Detachment; to enable them to return to Naugpore, and to command their Services afterwards as you may think fit. We ſhall travel by daily Journies to Narainghur, and from thence I have deſired Mr. Pearce to relay Bearers to Oolbareah. I have written to my Correſpondent at Calcutta to ſend down a ſufficient Number of Boats and Budgerows to Oolbareah, ſo that there will be no Occaſion for you to take any Trouble about our Journey; but I beg Leave to ſuggeſt to you the Propriety of ſending down ſome Gentlemen of your Family to meet Rajah Ram Pundit: This will be a Mark of Reſpect to which his Rank, and ſtill more his Attachment to the Engliſh entitles him; and it will be only a Return for a ſimilar Mark of Reſpect which was ſhewn to me.

Maratta Camp,
near Ballaſore,
15th March 1781.

I have the Honour to be,
With the moſt unfeigned Reſpect,
Honourable Sir,
Your, &c. &c.

P. S. I expect to be at Oolbareah in Five Days.

The Rajah has expreſſed ſo much Anxiety for my ſpeedy Return to you, that I have been obliged to receive my Diſmiſſion without finding the Opportunity I wiſhed for, of ſpeaking to him in private. It would have given much Suſpicion if I had deſired that his Miniſters and Biſſumber Pundit ſhould withdraw, and he has always been ſurrounded by them.

On receiving the Two firſt of theſe Letters, the Governor General wrote the following Anſwer to Mr. Anderſon:

David Anderſon, Eſq.

Sir,

Fort William, 18th March 1781.

I have received your Letters of the 10th and 11th.

Inform the Rajah that the Offer which you have been authorized to make him, was purely gratuitous, not intended for Negociation, but Acceptance; and decline any further Diſcourſe upon it as improper.

The Rajah's Promiſe to return, or not to employ his Troops againſt us, may be expreſſed either in Writing or verbally; but the Requiſition muſt be verbal, and not in Writing.

It is indifferent whether the Word "*not*," be uſed, or "*never*."

I am perfectly ſatisfied with the Care which the Rajah has taken to repreſs the licentious Spirit of his People, and to publiſh his Diſapprobation of the late Inſtance of it, of which I deſire you will give him an Aſſurance.

I am, with Eſteem,
Sir,
Your moſt affectionate Friend.

Whilſt Mr. Anderſon was at Ballaſore, Letters were received from Dewagur Pundit, the Miniſter of Moodajee Bhoosla, repeating the Circumſtances of the Embarraſſments under which his Connection with the Engliſh had drawn him, and ſtrongly urging the Neceſſity of our ſupplying the Troops under Chimnajee with Money.

Mr. Anderſon on his Return delivered to the Governor General the following Letter: Vide Appendix

Honourable Sir,

In the Minutes which I had the Honour to ſend you from Ballaſore, I had only Leiſure to mention in a few Words my laſt Interviews with Rajah Chimnajee; I ſhall now beg Leave to mention it more circumſtantially. The Rajah early in the Morning ſent me a Meſſage, That he wiſhed Mr. Redfearn and I would come and dine in his Tent before our Departure. We accordingly went, and found the Rajah ſitting with little Ceremony amongſt a few of his Officers. He received us with a frank and cheerful Air; all that cold Reſerve, that affected Indifference, which I had remarked at our former Meetings, was now changed into an open and animated Behaviour. We talked of indifferent Subjects, ſuch as the Cuſtoms of Europe and Aſia, with much good Humour; and his Officers, who had at our former Interviews preſerved a formal and reſpectful Silence, now mixed in our Converſation with eaſy Familiarity. At length our Diſcourſe turned on my Departure for Calcutta: The Rajah then changed his Mien; his Diſtreſſes ruſhed full into his Mind, and he deſcribed them with a Degree of Energy that excited Compaſſion; then taking hold of my Hand, he in a Tone of Supplication begged, that as I had been an Eye-witneſs of his Diſtreſſes, I would repreſent them to you in their real Colours; that I would put you in mind that they were drawn upon him by his Deſire of preſerving a Friendſhip with the Engliſh; and that I would, in his Name, implore you to take himſelf and his Army under your Protection; to conſider them as much your own as Colonel Goddard's Army; to make as great Exertions for their Relief, and to enable them only to return to Naugpore, and afterwards command them as you pleaſe. He inſiſted more than once on my promiſing to repreſent all thoſe Matters in the ſtrongeſt Manner, and earneſtly entreated me to become

become his Advocate with you. I could only repeat to him, that I ſhould faithfully report every thing to you.

When the Servants informed us that the Dinner which the Rajah had ordered to be prepared for Mr. Redfearn and me was ready, we retired to a ſeparate Tent: The Rajah however ſoon afterwards followed, and ſtanding at a Diſtance, preſſed us to eat, in a Manner that ſhewed the ſtrongeſt Deſire of pleaſing. I mention this Circumſtance, though apparently trivial, becauſe it was a kind of Condeſcenſion which to me marked the Diſpoſition of the Rajah's Mind more ſtrongly than the moſt exaggerated Profeſſions.

We afterwards returned to the Rajah's Tent, and paſſed more than an Hour with him, before he would conſent to give us our Diſmiſſion. Bowanny Pundit in the mean Time joined us, but he took little Part in the Converſation, being chiefly employed in dictating to the Moonſhee Anſwers to the Letters which I had brought from you.

Before we received our Diſmiſſion, the Rajah inſiſted on our accepting of a Horſe, a Turban, and a few Pieces of Cloth; and then having repeated his Requeſt that I would join Rajah Ram Pundit, and intercede in his Behalf with you, he took Leave of us with a Degree of Warmth and Emotion that ſhewed both how much he was deſirous of repreſenting his Conduct in a favourable Light, and how much he conſidered his future Welfare as dependent on your Determination.

I have the Honour to be with the greateſt Reſpect,

Honourable Sir,

Your moſt faithful and

obedient humble Servant.

Fort William,
26th March 1781.

Rajah Ram Pundit arrived at Calcutta the 25th March, and the next Day waited on the Governor General.

During the Firſt Two Viſits Rajah Ram Pundit drew a ſtrong Picture of the Diſtreſſes of Chimnajee's Army; and to prove how incumbent it was on us to relieve them, he expatiated on the Friendſhip which had been ſhewn by the Berar Government towards the Engliſh. He enumerated a Variety of Inſtances—their Conduct towards General Goddard's Detachment at Hoſhungabad—their delivering up Monſieur Chevalier, who had taken Refuge in their Country—their forbearing to invade our Territories, notwithſtanding the Remonſtrances of all their Allies; and laſtly, the Aſſiſtance which they had offered to Colonel Pearſe on his March through Oriſſa. He diſcuſſed with great Ability the Intereſts of the Maratta States, and ſhewed that he was very ſenſible how much it would be for the mutual Advantage of the Engliſh and Moodajee Booſla to unite cordially in a cloſe Alliance. Still however his Obſervations were general, and he ſeemed to avoid any clear or particular Propoſitions; it was agreed therefore, for the Purpoſe of bringing the Negociation to a ſpeedy Concluſion, the following Propoſitions ſhould be ſtated in Writing, and communicated to Rajah Ram Pundit by Mr. Anderſon.

"That as a Return for the Proofs of Attachment ſhewn by the Berar Government to the Engliſh, and to relieve the Troops from the Diſtreſſes which they at preſent ſuffered, and which were in ſome Meaſure occaſioned by their amicable Inclinations towards this Government, we would give them Twelve Lacks to complete the Sum which we had formerly promiſed to them.

"That we deſired to know what was afterwards neceſſary to be done to effect the deſired Union of the Two States. Would Chimnajee reſolve immediately to ſend 3000, or even 1500 of his beſt Horſe to join Colonel Pearſe, and act with him againſt Hyder? Would he return with the reſt of his Army to Naugpore? And would he promiſe to intereſt himſelf with his Father to engage in Alliance with us, and to ſend a Perſon from Naugpore to ſettle finally the Terms of a Treaty? That the following might be the Grounds of the Plan: That we ſhould engage to aſſiſt them with a Part of our Troops in taking Poſſeſſion of the Forts of Burhanpore and Aſſur, and the Country of Khandeiſh, which had been lately aſſigned by the Peſhwa as an Annexation to the Jagheer already poſſeſſed by Madajee Scindia: That if it ſhould be adviſable to purſue further Conqueſts, we would aſſiſt on a Plan of Participation; and that they on their Parts ſhould engage to unite with us in effecting the total Extirpation of Hyder Ally Cawn: But that if ſuch a Plan could not be ſettled, we deſired to know clearly what they would do on their Part to merit any further Aſſiſtance from us."

The next day Rajah Ram Pundit returned an Anſwer to the following Purport. "The Demands of Chimnajee's Army amount to Two Crores of Rupees; in Part thereof Fifty Lacks have already been paid; let the Engliſh pay Fifty Lacks more, the Troops will then have received One-half of their Pay, with which it will be in Chimnajee's Power in ſome Meaſure to ſatisfy them; and in this Caſe he will ſend 3000 Men along with Colonel Pearſe, and will march the reſt to Naugpore. If it is deſired that a more cloſe Connection ſhould take Place, let a truſty Perſon be ſent from hence to Naugpore, and a Treaty may there be concerted and ſettled for the Eſtabliſhment of a permanent Alliance betwixt the Engliſh and the Marattas, and the Extirpation of Hyder Naig; or let Mr. Anderſon be ſent immediately with Fifty Lacks to Chimnajee to ſatisfy the Troops, and bring Bowanny Pundit to meet the Governor at the Subenreka, or in either of the Engliſh Camps at Dantoon or Naraingur, to ſettle with him a Treaty containing the Terms of an Alliance. If this is approved, the Sum of 50 Lacks muſt be ſent immediately, becauſe it will not be in Chimnajee's Power to leave the Troops until he has ſatisfied them. If the Governor will give ſome Aſſurances that theſe Propoſitions will be ſhortly taken into Conſideration, Rajah Ram Pundit will accept of the Twelve Lacks, tendered for the preſent as a Part of the Fifty, and will cauſe the Army immediately to march to a greater Diſtance

from

from Bengal. But unleſs ſome Aſſurances of the Kind are given, he muſt decline receiving the Twelve Lacks; will repay the Sum of Three Lacks which was formerly ſent to Chimnajee, and deſires to receive his Diſmiſſion immediately."

Theſe Propoſitions ſeemed ſo highly unreaſonable, that the Governor General immediately ſent Mr. Anderſon to Rajah Ram Pundit with a Meſſage; the Subſtance of which was as follows: "That he would ſend the Twelve Lacks if Rajah Ram Pundit would accept of that Sum in the Name of Chimnajee: That no more would be given: That the Rajah, on the Acceptance of this Sum, muſt return to Naugpore, and not ſtay any longer at Cuttack: That if he would ſend 2000 Horſe with Colonel Pearſe, their Charge ſhould be defrayed by us: That the Governor General muſt decline a Meeting with the Rajah, unleſs the Grounds on which they are to meet are previouſly ſettled, as he cannot poſſibly think of meeting to treat about Money: That Rajah Ram Pundit may ſtay here if he pleaſes; but that he need not ſtay in Expectation of more Money, as that Subject muſt now be dropped."

This Meſſage being accordingly communicated to Rajah Ram Pundit, he deſired Mr. Anderſon would return to the Governor General with the following Anſwer: "He conſents to ſend 2000 Horſe with Colonel Pearſe, who may receive the Pay which ſhall be agreed on: He accepts the Supply now offered as a Return of Kindneſs; but to prevent a Mutiny of the Troops, requeſts that a Loan of a further Sum of 25 Lacks may be given, ſo that he may be enabled to quiet them. It does not ſignify, although a Delay of 12 or 15 Days ſhould take place in procuring the Loan; if it is only agreed to by the Governor, he will immediately ſend off the 12 Lacks, and cauſe the Troops to remove towards Naugpore: He propoſes that the Loan ſhould be obtained either in his Name, or in that of Syna Behader (Chimnajee) from Merchants, and that the Company ſhould be Security. It may afterwards be repaid by Means of Conqueſts of Countries on a Plan which may be ſettled. It is requeſted from Neceſſity, becauſe Syna Behader has no Means of ſatisfying his Troops: He deſires that this may be accepted as an Apology for his repeating with ſo much Importunity the Subject of Money: He begs that the Governor General will take Syna Behader under his Protection, and relieve him in his preſent Diſtreſs. If this Loan is not acceded to, Rajah Ram Pundit wiſhes to be diſmiſſed as ſoon as the Governor General pleaſes; and in that Caſe nothing can be ſettled, as the Sum tendered cannot be accepted, and a Mutiny muſt be the Conſequence amongſt the Troops in Oriſſa."

The above Propoſitions being laid before the Board, the following Reſolution was paſſed: "It is neceſſary to bring this Negociation to a Concluſion. We cannot comply with either of the Propoſitions made by Rajah Ram Pundit; we cannot advance the Money required; we cannot give our Security to the Loan, becauſe we know it to be impracticable at the Rate of Intereſt allowed by our Bonds, and to allow a higher Rate will deſtroy our own Credit; beſides, that ſuch a Security will be conſtrued, and will be in effect, a Payment. If the Government of Naugpore is willing to concur with our Views for its Aggrandiſement, and a Connection of Intereſts in the Manner which has been held out to it, we are ready to aſſiſt them with our Forces. We will endeavour to give them the Poſſeſſion of Burhanpore and of Aſſur, which will yield a Revenue of 80 Lacks; and of Gurrah Mundela, of which the Amount is unknown, but valuable. If the Government of Naugpore looks only to the Acquiſition of Ready Money, we have it not to give, nor will their Friendſhip be an Object to us on ſuch a Footing. Let this be underſtood to be our final Anſwer."

Rajah Ram Pundit on being informed of the above Reſolution, returned a new Set of Propoſitions, the Subject of which was as follows:

"That the Sum formerly tendered to the Government of Naugpore was 16 Lacks, and that only Three have yet been paid: That he will accept of the remaining 13 Lacks, which he will diſpatch to Syna Behader for the Relief of his Army; that he will cauſe the Army to march immediately to Dhekanaul on the Way to Gurrah Mundelah; that he himſelf will ſtay here for ſome Time longer on this Government's giving him Aſſurances that they will afterwards aſſiſt him in procuring a Loan of 10 or 15 Lacks, to be repaid in Two Years from the Money to be acquired from the Conqueſt of Gurrah Mundelah, and for which he, as Naib of Cuttack, will be Security. That he will for the preſent engage to ſend 2000 Horſe to join Colonel Pearſe, and to aſſiſt in the War againſt Hyder Ally; and that Dewagur Pundit will afterwards come from Naugpore, and ſettle more fully the Terms of an Alliance betwixt the Two States."

Theſe Propoſitions were declared to be final. The Point on which our Negociations hinged, was now reduced to an Object which appeared of little Magnitude when compared with the vaſt Importance of turning the Scale of the Powers of Hindoſtan, by detaching the Berar Government from the Confederacy formed againſt us, and engaging it on our Side. When the Propoſitions therefore were laid before the Board, it was immediately reſolved to accede to them. Accordingly the Sum of 13 Lacks was advanced to Rajah Ram Pundit; and on the 2d of April he attended us in Council, and laid before us the following Articles of Agreement, which he deſired to be conſidered as preliminary to a definitive Treaty betwixt the Engliſh and Berar Governments.

Account of the Monthly Expence of the Troops to be ſent along with Colonel Pearſe.

2000 Suars on Horſe, at 50,000 Rupees per Month, for each 1000, making altogether One Lack of Rupees per Month.

Dated 8th Rebbe-ul-Sanee, in the 22d Year of the Reign. The

The ſaid Allowance ſhall commence from the Time of the Troops leaving Cuttack, and when they ſhall have finiſhed the Service, and (having received their Diſmiſſion from the Commander of the Engliſh Troops) they ſhall return to their own Country, their Pay ſhall be continued according to the Number of *Munzels*, or Days Journies which there may be from the Place of their Diſmiſſion to the City of Cuttack.

Whereas a Friendſhip is firmly eſtabliſhed betwixt Maha Rajah Moodajee Bhooſla, and the Engliſh; the following Articles are accordingly ſettled by Syna Behader, through Rajah Ram Pundit.

1ſt. That Rajah Syna Behader ſhall ſend 2000 good and effective Horſe along with Colonel Pearſe, to aſſiſt the Engliſh in the War againſt Hyder Naig; that the Officer commanding them ſhall act under the Orders of the ſaid Colonel or the Officer who ſhall command the Bengal Troops in the Carnatic; and that they ſhall receive from the Officer who ſhall command the Bengal Troops in the Carnatic, an Allowance for their Support, at the Rate which hath been ſettled in a ſeparate Paper by the Governor General and Council and Rajah Ram Pundit, Month by Month, in the ſame Proportion as the Engliſh Troops ſhall receive their Pay.

2d. That the Army of Rajah Syna Behader will immediately leave Oriſſa, and march on an Expedition againſt Gurrah Mundela. Let the Governor General and Council of the Engliſh, from a Regard to the Friendſhip which ſubſiſts betwixt the Family of Bhooſla and the Engliſh, give Orders that an Engliſh Officer, with a Body of the Troops now ſtationed in Hindoſtan, may march from that Quarter to aſſiſt the Rajah in the abovementioned Expedition, and having reduced Gurrah Mundelah, eſtabliſh immediately the Rajah's Garriſons there.

3d. That in order that the Friendſhip betwixt the Family of Maha Rajah Moodajee Bhooſla and the Engliſh may daily be ſtrengthened and augmented, let the Governor General and Council for the preſent ſend a truſty Perſon to Naugpore, and hereafter the Dewan Dewagur Pundit will come from that Place, and have an Interview with the Governor General, when with their mutual Advice and Approbation, the Deſires and Demands of both Parties will be adjuſted and ſettled.

4th. That if it ſhould happen from particular Circumſtances that an Interview betwixt Dewagur Pundit and the Governor General cannot take place, in that Caſe the Deſires and Demands of both Parties may be ſettled at Naugpore by the Intervention of a truſty Perſon, and the Bonds of Friendſhip ſhall be ſo firmly eſtabliſhed betwixt the Family of Bhooſla and the Engliſh, that no Infraction or Injury can ever by any Means happen to them.

Theſe Papers being ſigned by us and Rajah Ram Pundit, with the Teſtimony of Beneram Pundit, the Vackeel of Moodajee Bhooſla, Copies of them were mutually interchanged. An Order has ſince been iſſued by us to the Sub-Treaſurer to advance ſuch Sums, on account of the intended Loan of Ten Lacks, as the State of our Treaſury will admit; and Rajah Ram Pundit has delivered to us an Engagement to the following Purport:

"Whereas the Governor General and Council of the Engliſh have promiſed, that in order to aſſiſt in ſupplying the Expences of the Troops of Maha Rajah Moodajee Bhooſla, which are arrived with Rajah Syna Behauder in Oriſſa, they will procure the Sum of Ten Lacks of Sicca Rupees from Merchants of the Province of Bengal, and deliver it as a Loan through the Hands of Beneram Pundit; and accordingly an Order has been delivered to the ſaid Pundit for the ſaid Sum on the Engliſh Treaſurer: In Conſideration thereof, it is ſtipulated and written on Behalf of the aforeſaid Rajah Syna Behauder by Rajah Ram Pundit, that he will diſcharge the ſaid Sum within the Term of Two Years, and will pay Intereſt at the Rate of 8 per Cent. per Annum, to be calculated from the Dates of the ſeveral Payments, which will be aſcertained from the Receipts of Beneram Pundit: In caſe the ſaid Loan and Intereſt ſhould not be punctually repaid by Maha Rajah Moodajee Booſla and Rajah Syna Behauder, Rajah Ram Pundit, who is Naib of the Province of Oriſſa, engages on his own Part that he will pay, in the Term above limited, the ſaid Sum with Intereſt, at the Rate abovementioned, either from his own private Fortune, or from the Revenues of the Province of Oriſſa.

Written the 6th April 1781, or 11th of Rebbee-ul-Sanee 1170 of the Hegyra."

Rajah Ram Pundit has ſince taken his Leave, and is gone to Chimnajee's Camp, to make the neceſſary Arrangements for the March of the 2000 Horſe, which are to join Colonel Pearſe.

We have thus fully given a Narrative of this Negociation, becauſe we think the Iſſue of it may be productive of an important Change in the political State of Hindoſtan: We ſhall now beg Leave to cloſe it with a few Obſervations. By acceding to Rajah Ram Pundit's Propoſitions, we have effectually detached one of the moſt powerful States from the general Confederacy againſt us, into which it had apparently entered; we ſhall by this Meaſure add Strength to ourſelves in Proportion as we diminiſh that of the Confederacy. The Separation of the Berar Government will doubtleſs excite Diſtruſt amongſt the remaining Powers, and probably the Example will be followed. The Nizam who has not yet entered into open Hoſtilities againſt us, and the Miniſters of Poona, who already tremble for their own Exiſtence, ſeeing the Confederacy begin to diſſolve, will naturally be deſirous of ſecuring themſelves by an early Peace. The mere Fame of an Alliance betwixt the Engliſh and the Government of Berar, will have a great Effect. We ſhall no longer be conſidered as ſinking under the united Weight of every State in Hindoſtan, the Scale of Power is evidently turned in our Favour, and this is of more Importance than could be well imagined in Europe, where the Policy of Nations is regulated

regulated by Principles the very reverſe of thoſe which prevail in Aſia. There, in Conteſts betwixt Nations, the weaker is held up by the Support of its Neighbours, who know how much their own Safety depends on the Preſervation of a proper Balance. But in Aſia, the Deſire of partaking of the Spoils of a falling Nation, and the Dread of incurring the Reſentment of the ſtronger Party are the immediate Motives of Policy, and every State wiſhes to aſſociate itſelf with that Power which has a decided Superiority.

It is true, the Alliance which is held out in Rajah Ram Pundit's Propoſitions, apparently relates to Objects of a very limited Nature. But it is not to be doubted, that when once the Marattas of Naugpore are fairly involved with us in the Proſecution of theſe Objects, it will not long reſt with them to ſet Bounds to our Connection. The Aſſiſtance which is to be given to us in the War with Hyder, is as full a Declaration of Hoſtility againſt that Prince as if they had ſent their whole Army. And their employing our Forces to aſſiſt them in recovering Gurrah Mundelah from a Tributary of the Peſhwah, will probably lead to a complete Junction of their Strength and ours againſt the Government of Poona, or reduce the latter to the Neceſſity of becoming a Party with them and us.

We will now conſider what would have been the Alternative if we had refuſed to accede to Propoſitions which were evidently ſo deſirable. Whatever might have been the real Inclination of Chimnajee, or the Dictates of his Father Moodajee Bhooſlah, his unpaid Troops had long been kept quiet only by the Hopes which were held out to them of acquiring Wealth from the Plunder of Bengal; and if no Supply had been granted to them, it is probable that extreme Diſtreſs would have compelled them to ſeek for Support by an Invaſion of our Frontiers. It would be little Conſolation to us to know that their own Deſtruction would be the certain Effect of ſuch a Meaſure: We know that, before they could have been totally deſtroyed, or even expelled, much Miſchief would have been done in the Provinces of Burdwan and Midnapore by their Depredations, and ſtill more by the Alarm which they would have excited amongſt the Inhabitants: The Revenues and Inveſtments muſt have been put to a Stop from the Deſertion of the Ryots and Manufacturers: The immediate Loſs would have conſiderably exceeded the Sum now requeſted, and the fatal Conſequences of ſuch an Irruption would have been felt throughout theſe Provinces, and particularly in the Manufactures, for many ſucceeding Years. We can mention on the beſt Information, that the Deſertion of the Manufacturers for only Three Days from the Aurung of Radnagur alone, would have occaſioned a Loſs of Four Lacks of Rupees, as the Silk Worms muſt have been wholly deſtroyed, and their Loſs could not have been recovered for many Years. If the Troops of Chimnajee had been driven to this Extremity, a War muſt inevitably have enſued with the Government of Berar, more dangerous to our Poſſeſſions in Bengal than any in which we have ever been engaged ſince our Acquiſition of the Dewanny.

Nor are the Advantages to be derived from the preſent Agreement merely ſpeculative or negative: The great and almoſt the only Defect of the Detachment ſent under the Command of Colonel Pearſe to the Relief of the Carnatic, is the Want of a Body of Cavalry: The preſent Offer of 2000 of Chimnajee's Horſe will amply ſupply this Defect; they will be fully ſufficient to prevent the Detachment from being harraſſed on the March, or ſuffering from Want of Proviſions; and though little can be expected in the Field of Battle from the Diſcipline of Maratta Horſe, yet as much may be expected from them as from the Horſe that will be oppoſed to them by Hyder Ally: The Junction of this Body will prove therefore of real and immediate Service.

We are aware that Men who are inclined to object will not fail to employ the moſt ſpecious Arguments to draw Cenſure on this Negociation: They will avail themſelves of Maxims which have already obtained the popular Opinion; they will without Heſitation aſcribe our Conduct in ſupplying Chimnajee with Money to Weakneſs or Want of Foreſight; and they will declaim that the Hiſtory of all Ages, from the remoteſt Period down to the preſent Century, ſhews, that to purchaſe the Forbearance of invading Enemies ſerves only to tempt them to return with increaſed Numbers. It is in vain to attempt to anſwer every Objection which Ingenuity may deviſe: We muſt rely on your Candour to impute our Conduct to more honourable and judicious Motives. It cannot eſcape your Attention, that the Negociation for Money began at a Time when we could have little to apprehend, though much to hope from the Government of Naugpore; that it was held out as an Inducement to obtain their Aſſiſtance in effecting an Accommodation with the Government of Poona, and that the profeſſed Object of it was a Retribution for the heavy Expence which they had incurred from their Deſire of preſerving Peace with the Engliſh. When their Anſwers from Naugpore affected a higher Style, and indicated a Change of Diſpoſition, Mr. Anderſon was ſent to Cuttack without any Authority, to treat on Money; Colonel Pearſe was ordered to proceed through Oriſſa in Defiance of all Oppoſition; and an Army was aſſembled under the Command of Colonel Ironſide for the Defence of our Frontiers of Burdwan and Midnapore. During all this Time the Negociation for Money was dropped, nor was it renewed until Colonel Pearſe had paſſed without Oppoſition cloſe to the Maratta Army, and until new Proofs were given us of an amicable Diſpoſition; the Governor General's Letter of the 2d March to Mr. Anderſon, will fully explain to you, that though we thought it in Prudence neceſſary to ſtipulate the Return of Chimnajee's Army as a Condition on granting the Supply, yet the Motives or the Conditions for which we were willing to grant it, were different; and the Governor General's Letters of the 11th and 18th March will

will ſhew, that when Motives of Gratitude ceaſed, and Hoſtilities were expected, we inſtantly directed Mr. Anderſon to retract our Offer, and to decline any further Diſcourſe on the Subject of Money. At length the affecting Manner in which the Rajah opened his Diſtreſſes to Mr. Anderſon at his laſt Interview, and threw himſelf on our Mercy for Relief, induced us to reſume the Subject with Rajah Ram Pundit.

Theſe Circumſtances have not eſcaped the Attention of the Marattas themſelves, and we are ſatisfied that they, in whoſe Opinion the Public is perhaps moſt intereſted, have not miſtaken the Motives of our Conduct. Nor need we apprehend that the Supply which they have received will ever tempt them to return to theſe Provinces; they beſt know the extreme Diſtreſſes which they have ſuffered, the heavy Expences which they have incurred, and the Miſery which they have entailed by this Expedition on their Province of Oriſſa; and it is not to be ſuppoſed that they will ever again attempt to fit out an Army of 30,000 Horſe, at an unavoidable Expence of more than a Crore of Rupees, to march a Thouſand Miles through a hilly Country, in the Expectation of acquiring a Supply of 12 Lacks of Rupees. On the Whole, whatever the deſigning or uninformed Part of the World may ſay, we flatter ourſelves that you, in whoſe Approbation we are moſt particularly intereſted, having all theſe Circumſtances fully before you, will be pleaſed not only to approve of the Motives which have influenced us in this Negociation, but alſo of the favourable Iſſue to which we have happily brought it.

It remains only for us to obſerve, that Letters have lately been received from Çhimnajee, confirming every thing that has been ſettled by Rajah Ram Pundit; and we have the Pleaſure to think that he has now engaged ſincerely and cordially on our Side.

Fort William,
the 30th April 1781.

We have the Honour to be,
Honourable Sirs,
Your moſt faithful
humble Servants,
Warren Haſtings,
Edwd Wheler.

APPENDIX, N° 366.

Inſtructions from the Governor General and Council to Colonel Grainger Muir, the 21ſt of April 1781.

Sir,

AS you have been ordered by Colonel Morgan to proceed from the Station at Futtyghur with a Detachment of the Company's Troops, conſiſting of Two Regiments of Cavalry, Three of Sepoys, and a Company of Artillery, to the Aſſiſtance of Lieutenant Colonel Camac, on Application made by the latter for that Purpoſe; we have ſuppoſed, that before this Period the Forces under your Command muſt have joined thoſe heretofore commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Camac; and under ſuch Suppoſition, we directed you on the 2d Inſtant to take the Command of that Detachment, at the ſame Time ordering Lieutenant Colonel Camac to deliver it up to you.

As the collected Force of Infantry and Cavalry of the Two Detachments when joined muſt greatly exceed the Service remaining to employ them, and the Artillery certainly ſo beyond all Proportion, we direct that you diſmiſs ſuch Part of your Force in Infantry and Artillery as the actual or probable Exigency may not require you to retain, and order their Return to the Douab. We direct alſo, that you diſmiſs the 2d Regiment of Cavalry, retaining the 3d.

We direct that you make it your Object to obtain Poſſeſſion of Oogein and its Dependencies, and for this Purpoſe we order you to proceed thither, demanding the Aſſiſtance of ſuch a Body of the Rana's Troops, as you may think requiſite, and the Rana's Preſence with them.

If the Rana ſhould refuſe or evade Compliance with the Requiſition made of him, you are to deliver to him in Writing a Proteſt againſt his Conduct, declaring him guilty of an Infraction of his Treaty with this Government; of which a Copy is encloſed.

In the Courſe of your March you will take ſuch Advantage of the Enemy as Opportunities may offer to you: But for the ſake of ſuch Advantage you muſt not be diverted from the Object which we have preſcribed, but keep invariably in Proſpect until you have accompliſhed it.

All Inſtructions to you are intended to be general, and rather to mark the Objects which we wiſh to attain by the Operations of the Troops under your Command, than to fix the Means of their Accompliſhment. Theſe Means we leave to your own Judgment and to the Exigency of Circumſtances, of which we cannot be aware or adviſed in ſufficient Time to inſtruct you particularly on them; and

we have ſo great Reliance on your Activity and Experience, that we cannot ſuffer ourſelves to heſitate in leaving this Power in your Hands; convinced that you never will adopt a Meaſure without a full Conſideration of its probable Conſequences, nor abate from the Proſecution of it when once undertaken, unleſs compelled by urgent and evident Neceſſity.

We think it neceſſary to recommend to you in the ſtrongeſt Manner to keep your Force entire, making no Detachments from it but ſuch as are abſolutely neceſſary and unavoidable; and in order to give Effect to this Inſtruction, and to remove the Neceſſity of your eſtabliſhing Garriſons for the Places which may either ſurrender to our Arms or require our Protection, we direct and empower you to aſſign them to the Charge or abſolute Poſſeſſion of ſuch of the neighbouring Zemindars as are beſt qualified to receive them, either by natural Right or by Situation, added to that of Service and approved Attachment; excepting only ſuch as lie contiguous to the Dominons of the Rana of Gohud, and appertain to him in virtue of the Treaty.

With theſe Explanations we give you a full Diſcretion for Diſpoſal of all conquered Places and Territories in your Route, hoping that you may be able to make ſuch Stipulations with the Proprietors, as may obtain either a preſent Aid in Money for the Relief of the Expence of the Expedition, or a future and permanent Income in the way of Tribute.

Fort William,
21ſt April 1781.

We are,
Sir, &c. &c.
(Signed) Governor General and Council.

Examined:
A true Copy.
E. Hay,
Actg Secry.

Extract of Bombay Diary, the 12th May 1781.

Extract of a Letter from Colonel Camac to Mr. Malet, dated near Holaries, the 29th March 1781.

In reſpect to my Operations, I had penetrated into Malva as far as the Town of Seronge, when being diſappointed in the Aſſiſtance I had Reaſon to expect from the Nabob of Bhopaul and the neighbouring Rajahs; being unable for want of Cavalry to prevent the Deſolation of the Country, and Scindiah's Army with a Train of Artillery, Field and Battering, arriving at the ſame Time, I found my Stock of Proviſions ſoon exhauſted, and having taken the Opinions of my principal Officers, determined on a Retreat. The Enemy had cannonaded us for Seven Days, thereby attempting to draw us from the Town which was our only Reſource for Proviſions. It was on the 7th, at Midnight, that we moved off, and with ſo much Secrecy that the Enemy did not come up with us till near Day-break. They then attacked us from all Quarters, but were as often repulſed. They purſued their Attack on the Second Day, and on the Third I reached a Town called Mohautpore, which I forced to ſupply me, and then marched out, and in vain attempted to bring on an Engagement. We halted there ſeveral Days to refreſh our People, and relieve our Wounded, of which we had a great Number. The orderly Retreat that was made before ſo able a General as Scindiah, and ſo numerous an Army, does the higheſt Credit to the Troops; they behaved like Heroes. On arriving at this Place, finding that the Enemy encamped within Three Coſs, and kept their Baggage Seven Coſs in the Rear, I determined to beat up their Quarters on the Night of the 24th. We accordingly ſucceeded to Admiration; ſurprized and routed their firſt Camp where Scindiah was, purſued them to their Second, drove them Three Coſs further, and acroſs the Sind, where we overtook their Artillery, and by Nine o'Clock were Maſters of Ten Pieces of Cannon, all their Tumbrills, Two Elephants, and the greateſt Part of their Stores and Ammunition, and Baggage. We took the Guns yoked, otherwiſe we could not have brought them off. The Enemy are in the utmoſt Diſorder, and I truſt that this Succeſs will have the beſt Influence on our Concerns in every Part, but particularly on your Side of the Continent.

I am, &c.
J. Camac.

A true Copy.
C. W. Malet.

APPENDIX, N° 367.

Additional Secret Letter from Bengal, 15th May 1781.

To the Honourable the Court of Directors for Affairs of the Honourable United Company of Merchants of England trading to the Eaſt Indies.

Art¹. Honourable Sirs,

THE Diſpatch of the Two Ships Neptune and Bellmont, by which we have had the Honour to addreſs you under Date the 27th ultimo, having been unavoidably delayed on account of bad Weather, we do not think it proper to loſe the Opportunity which preſents itſelf to us on this Occaſion, of tranſmitting to you ſuch further Advices as we deem neceſſary for your Information.

It appears in a Letter from Brigadier General Goddard to the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, under Date the 9th of February, that having taken Poſſeſſion of Bore-Ghaut, as we had the Honour to acquaint you in our laſt Letter, it was his Intention to eſtabliſh a ſtrong Poſt at the Head of it, and to continue there until he had collected ſuch a Magazine of Stores and Proviſions as would enable him to proſecute his further Operations in ſuch Manner as might be judged moſt expedient. By a Letter which we have ourſelves received lately from Brigadier General Goddard, we find that he was at the ſame Place on the 6th of March, and One Bill of Exchange which he has lately drawn is dated from it on the 8th ultimo.

During the Continuance of the Army at the Head of the Ghauts, an indirect Intimation appears to have been ſent to General Goddard from the Miniſter, of his Deſire to conclude a Peace. The Meſſenger was a Man named Runſoor Naigue, and brought a Letter to the General from one Byroo Pundit, a Brahmin, ſaid to be much in the Confidence of Nana Furneſe. The Purport of this Letter, the Particulars of the General's Conference with the Bearer of it, the Event of the Negociation, and the ſubſequent Advances unſucceſsfully made by the General to the Miniſter for a Termination of War on the Conditions ſtated in our Propoſals of the 2d of October, appearing in his Addreſs of the 6th March, which we deem of Importance, we have the Honour to tranſmit it and its Accompanyments to you a Number in the Packet.

The Unwillingneſs of the Miniſter to accept the Offer of our Treaty does not diſappoint us; we are rather pleaſed with it, ſince it leaves us at Liberty to ſecure to the Company the important Poſſeſſion of Baſſein; and the Advantages acquired by your Troops in the Weſt of India ſince the Time at which our Treaty was written, will warrant us in declaring our Reſolution not to part with this valuable Acquiſition, unleſs indeed ſome great Reverſe of Fortune (which God forbid) ſhould attend the Operations of your Arms, and oblige us to ſubmit to the Loſs of it. Reſpecting other Conditions on which we might be willing to accede to a Peace, the ill Succeſs with which our Advances have been hitherto attended, and the Preſumption which they ſeem to have given Birth to in the arrogant Conduct of the Miniſter, diſcourage us in looking to any favourable Termination of the War, but as we have adviſed you in our laſt Addreſs, by the moſt vigorous and ſucceſsful Proſecution of it.

We have received within theſe Five Days a Letter from the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, under Date the 30th March; in which they inform us that "they have judged it the moſt "adviſable Conduct to reduce the War on their Part to a mere Syſtem of Defence, and to confine "their Military Operations to the Security and Preſervation of their own Poſſeſſions." Our Anſwer to this Letter is tranſmitted to you a Number in the Packet, and we truſt that it will have the good Effect which we intend by it, in altering a Plan of Conduct in your Select Committee of Bombay, as oppoſite to their late Opinions as we deem it hoſtile to the Obtainment of the Object which we both profeſs to aim at, an honourable and advantageous Peace.

In the ſame Letter from Bombay, we are adviſed of their Reſolution to ſend back all the Fort Saint George Troops ſerving on the Malabar Coaſt, and their Hopes of landing them at Anjengo in the courſe of the laſt Month. The Meaſure of ſending back the Madras Detachment conforms ſtrictly to the Inſtructions ſent by us to Brigadier General Goddard, ſo long ago as the 20th April 1780; but we apprehend that it may have an unfavourable Influence on our Affairs at this Time, which may be conſidered at their Criſis, by impreſſing the Minds of the Public with an Opinion that ſome Neceſſity, or a Conſciouſneſs of our Inability to proſecute the great Advantages which we have acquired, has compelled us to ſtop at the Inſtant of their Completion. Yet in other Reſpects we have no Reaſon to be diſſatisfied with it, ſince the Troops of this Preſidency and that of Bombay are ſufficient for the Proſecution of the War, and the Defence of our Poſſeſſions on the Malabar Coaſt; and the Services of the Madras Detachment in the Carnatic, may be of great Uſe and Importance to the Succeſs of the War in which you are engaged with Hyder Ally Cawn.

A Letter which we have received from Rear Admiral Sir Edward Hughes, under Date the 23d February, informs us of his Succeſs on the 9th December laſt, in deſtroying Two Ships mounting 26 and 28 Nine Pounder Guns, and 4 Ketches mounting each 12 Six and Four Pounder Guns, belonging to Hyder Ally, in Mangalore Road. It being impracticable to remove the Ships and Veſſels taken, as they were grounded, Orders were given for them to be burnt.

We

We have received Information which we deem authentic, that the Portugueze Government at Goa have entered into a Treaty of Alliance offenſive and defenſive with Hyder Ally. The Subſtance of the Treaty appears in a Letter from Mr. Auriol, whom we had appointed our Miniſter to the Court of Goa, but who fortunately had not proceeded on his Commiſſion when he received Advice of their Alliance with our Enemies; and a Copy of this Letter we think it neceſſary to tranſmit to you a Number in the Packet.

We have the Pleaſure to acquaint you, that a Garriſon of your Troops is in Poſſeſſion of Kalpy Fort, which they entered without Oppoſition. The Maratta Chief who held the Kalpy Diſtrict under the Maratta Government having ſhewn an Unwillingneſs to comply with the Requiſition made to him to pay to the Company the ſame Tribute that he was uſed to pay to the Marattas, and an Inclination to delay coming to an Accommodation until the preſent Year is ended, and all the Collections made, with a View of appropriating them to his own Uſe, we have inſtructed Colonel Morgan to oblige him to pay into the Company's Treaſury the Sum due to his former Maſter for this whole Year, which is nearly paſſed. We have approved of a Meaſure recommended to us by Colonel Morgan, that the whole Diſtricts of Kalpy and Humeerpoor ſhould be taken into the Company's Hands entirely, and an Aumil placed over them; and we have directed him to receive the Propoſals of Allmaſs Ally Cawn, a Man of Property, and Aumil of a large Tract of Country in his Excellency the Vizier's Dominions, for the Rentage of theſe Diſtricts from the Company: We are in Hopes that they will yield a conſiderable Revenue.

A large Body of Maratta Horſe and Foot, to the Number of 2000, having appeared in the Town of Kalpy ſince our Poſſeſſion of it, and attempted to plunder and diſturb the People reſiding there, a Detachment of Six Companies of Grenadiers, with Two Guns and a Tumbrill, was ſent to diſperſe them, and the Marattas were inſtantly defeated, with Loſs on their Part, but with none on ours.

Fort William,
the 15th May 1781.

We have the Honour to be,
Honourable Sirs,
Your moſt faithful
humble Servants,
Warren Haſtings,
Edward Wheler.

Letter from J. P. Auriol to the Honourable Warren Haſtings, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Members of the Supreme Council, Fort William.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Underſtanding that the Portugueſe Government at Goa had lately entered into a Treaty of Alliance offenſive and defenſive with the Nabob Hyder Ally, I thought it my Duty to aſcertain the Nature and Conditions of ſuch Compact, before I ventured to expoſe the Honour of the Commiſſion with which I am entruſted to the Riſk of any Slight or Indignity, in having the proffered Honour of a Connection with the Company rejected by the Captain General at Goa; on that Ground I have therefore made it my Buſineſs ſince my Arrival here to enquire into the Particulars of it.

That a Treaty has been concluded, is a Fact eſtabliſhed and confirmed by various Authorities; but for the Purport of it I am indebted chiefly to Mr. Lloyd, a Perſon who lately held a confidential Station in the Service of Hyder Ally. He aſſured me that he was preſent at all the Conferences between Hyder and the Portugueſe Miniſter which produced it; and from the ready and unprevaricated Account he gave me of it, *in a long Converſation which I held with him upon the Subject*, I have no Reaſon to doubt any Part of his Information.

Mr. Lloyd acquainted me that Colonel Aſſa, an Officer in the Portugueſe Service, arrived at Hyder Ally's Camp about the Beginning of Auguſt laſt, attended by 50 Sepoys, a few Horſemen, and a numerous Suite of Attendants, among whom were a Band of Muſicians; that he came publicly deputed from the Captain General at Goa, to negociate a Treaty in the Name of his Sovereign with Hyder Ally, and delivered him a valuable Preſent on the Occaſion, conſiſting of a Broad Sword hilted with Gold, and very richly ornamented with Diamonds and Rubies, and a kind of Cane ſet and adorned in the ſame Manner, beſides various other Articles; that he was treated with great Reſpect and Attention during his Stay in Hyder's Camp, and that a Treaty was concluded between them to the following Effect:

"That the Friends and Enemies of each Party were to be reciprocally ſo conſidered by the other Party.

"That the Portugueze where to ſupply Hyder Ally with a Body of Troops, conſiſting of 500 Trhings, whether Natives of Europe or Goa, to be commanded by European Officers; and 50 European Artiſts of different Callings, to ſerve him in his Arſenal, his Engineer Corps, and Artillery, he paying them according to Rates ſtipulated:

"That all Vacancies in this Supply ſhould be replaced, and the Numbers kept conſtantly compleat by occaſional Recruits from Goa:

"That Hyder Ally was likewiſe to be ſupplied by the Portugueze, from Time to Time, with any Quantity of Arms or Military Stores which he ſhould have Occaſion for, by Purchaſe:

"That

"That the Portugueze in Return ſhould enjoy all their Eſtabliſhments on the Malabar Coaſt in profound Peace; that their Trade ſhould be preſerved to them unmoleſted by Hyder Ally's Dependants, their Privileges maintained in full Force, and a Right granted them to ſettle any new Factories on his Coaſts, if they ſhould require it."

The above are the Conditions actually agreed upon in the Treaty: It was further demanded by Hyder Ally, that the Portugueze naval Armament ſhould join his Fleet at Mangalore on his Requiſition, and thence proceed in Conjunction with it to co-operate in any Hoſtilities which he might undertake in ſupport of the French, on the Arrival of their Forces in India; and that the Portugueze ſhould further aſſiſt him in his Military Operations with a Body of Sepoys, in caſe he thought fit to call on them for that Purpoſe, he paying their Expences: But theſe Two Articles Colonel Aſſa not having Power to aſſent to, were omitted, and the Treaty ſigned, on his Promiſe that a Reference of them ſhould be made to the King of Portugal.

It appears that the Treaty was not finally ſettled and concluded until 8 or 10 Days after the unfortunate Defeat of Colonel Baillie's Detachment in September; and I learn that Colonel Aſſa, upon taking his Leave ſhortly after to return to Goa, was complimented with Preſents in Jewels, &c. to the Value of about 60,000 Rupees for himſelf, and ſomething more conſiderable for the Captain General at Goa.

The Troops furniſhed by the Portugueſe in virtue of the above Treaty are to be on the ſame Eſtabliſhment and Regulations as thoſe now commanded by Monſieur Pigmorin, a Frenchman, conſiſting of 150 Cavalry and about 100 Infantry. Theſe Corps, with their proper Complement of Officers, were appointed by a ſpecial Agreement made between Monſieur Law, the late Governor of Pondicherry, and Hyder Ally, to aſſiſt the latter in all his Wars, though they were to be conſidered as French Troops, and recruited occaſionally from Pondicherry.

Mr. Lloyd informs me, that he ſaw a Letter which Hyder Ally received about 12 Days before he left Arcot from the Captain General of Goa, notifying the March of the Troops which he was engaged to ſupply, and he believes them to be now actually on the Road towards the Place of Rendezvous.

As theſe Circumſtances would infallibly fruſtrate the End of my Negociations, I ſhall not hazard the Credit of Government by proceeding in them until I am honoured with further Orders from you in Reply to my preſent Letter.

I am, with Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient,
humble Servant,
(Signed) J. P. Auriol.

Fort Saint George,
26th March 1781.

Examined T. P.

A true Copy.
E. Hay, Act^g Sec^y.

APPENDIX, N° 368.

Extract of Letter from Bengal (Secret Department)

To the Honourable the Court of Directors for the Affairs of the Honourable United Company of Merchants of England, trading to the Eaſt Indies; dated 3d February 1781.

Honourable Sirs,

WE avail ourſelves of an Opportunity of addreſſing you by the Way of Buſſorah, and of communicating to you the principal Facts of Moment which have occurred ſince we had the Honour of writing to you by the Ceres. The Channel of Conveyance makes it neceſſary that theſe Facts ſhould be related with all poſſible Brevity and Conciſeneſs.—

Reſolve to detach over Land towards Madras Six Battalions of Sepoys with their Guns, and One Company of Artillery, the Command given to Lieutenant Colonel Pearce; One Company of Golandaaze and a Troop of Horſe, added afterwards to the Strength of this Detachment.

Treaty with Dutch, prepared with the Advice of Mr. Roſs, the Director at Chinſurah, and propoſed to the Governors of Columbo and Cochin, for Alliances againſt Hyder Ally; Object in this Alliance a Supply of 1000 Infantry European, 200 European Artillery, and 1000 Malays, with their Complement of Officers.

Diſpatch the Portland to Madras and Bombay; remit by her to Madras Sicca Rupees 3,65,235. 1. 6. and to Bombay Current Rupees 5,31,159. 11. 4; have alſo authorized the latter to draw on us for ſuch further Sums as they may want.

Our

Our Supplies of Treaſure and Grain to Madras much impeded by a French Cruizer at the Mouth of the River that has taken many ſmall Veſſels along the Coaſt. Unable to repel it by our own Means (for although we have Ships, we cannot man them) we have ſent to the Admiral to detach a Ship for this Purpoſe.

Total Amount of Remittances to Fort Saint George by Specie and Bills ſince the 22d of September, Current Rupees 19,59,762. 12. 4. D° D° Remittances of Grain to D° ſince the 22d of September, Maunds 227,465. Rupees 7,58,924. 10.—Continue the Supply of Grain to Fort Saint George to an unlimited Quantity.

Letters received from the Rajah of Berar containing ſuch Exceptions to the Treaty with the Marattas reſolved on in September laſt, as amount to a Rejection of the Terms; reſolve to confide in our own Strength, and on the Expectation of Succours from Europe, and order Colonel Pearſe's Detachment to march direct to Madras.

The Maratta Army quiet at Cuttac; has lately left that Place, and marched to the Weſtward to reduce ſome refractory Zemindars—Colonel Pearſe's unmoleſted Paſſage—thus certain Motions of the Berar Army probably made with this Intention.

Informed by Mr. Hollond, that the Nabob Nizam Ally Cawn has taken to himſelf the Guntoor Circar, inſtead of leaving it to the Poſſeſſion of his Brother: The Meaſure does not affect us, and we will not interfere.

The Expences of Fort Saint George and Bombay, and theſe augmented, added to our own; ſuch an Expence, and the Loſs of Specie to theſe Provinces, are our only Diſtreſs: We hope to obviate them by an Increaſe of Revenue and official Œconomy.—The Means taken to keep the War at a Diſtance from our own Borders is likely to prove effectual for this Seaſon, which is all we want; we ſhall be prepared the next, by the Completion of our new Eſtabliſhment, and by ſuch a Diſpoſition of it as ſhall be equal to repel any Attempts, however multiplied, of an Enemy: Upon the whole, notwithſtanding the dreadful Calamity which has befallen your Intereſts in the Carnatic, and which has contributed to drain us of our Reſources, both of Strength and Money, to retrieve it, we have the beſt Grounds to hope of being able to overcome all our Difficulties and Dangers, and even to convert them into the Inſtruments of your future Proſperity; at leaſt, if the Event ſhould not prove anſwerable to theſe Expectations, you ſhall have no Cauſe to reproach your Adminiſtration of the Want of ſuch Exertions as were moſt likely to fulfil them.

We reſolved on the 29th, that the Drafts under Captain Popham's Command ſhould be relieved by Four regular Battalions, put under the Command of Major Camac. This Reſolution continued and ſtrengthened by an Order that the Four Battalions of Drafts ſhould be appointed to the Eſtabliſhment, and make Part of Major Camac's Detachment.—Major Camac ſince appointed a Lieutenant Colonel.

New Arrangement paſſed with reſpect to the Corps of Cavalry—the Horſes made the Property of the Company.

The Vizier's great Diſtreſs would not permit him to make complete Payment of the Company's Demand on him for the laſt Year; and that Diſtreſs continuing, we have been obliged to be content with the following Settlement with him for the preſent Year.

In Aſſignments	—	—		98,95,345
Bonds	—	—	—	43,18,613
				1,42,13,958

The Amount of the Aſſignments exceeds the neceſſary Claims upon the Company for the Services of the Current Year by above Six Lacks—Mr. Purling recalled from Lucknow; and Mr. Nathaniel Middleton, Collector of the Vizier's Aſſignments to the Company, and Agent for managing his Excellency's pecuniary Engagements with them.

Required from the Rajah of Benares the ſame Subſidy for the enſuing Year that he paid in the laſt; One Lack paid immediately, the remaining Four Lacks not paid until the 18th October.

The Aſſiſtance of a Body of Cavalry required from him to be returned at the Concluſion of the War.—Mr. Francis Fowke recalled from Benares, and appointed Agent for the Proviſion of Boats to the Army, after the Expiration of the preſent Contract.—Mr. Markham appointed Reſident at Benares.—Reſolved to take up Money on Loan on the following Scheme:

One Loan for 45 Lacks of Rupees, to be paid on or before the 30th November, for Bonds bearing an Intereſt at 8 per Cent.

Second Loan in favour of the Company's Servants for 20 Lacks; to be ſubſcribed for on or before the 28th of February, for Bonds bearing an Intereſt of 4 per Cent. from the Day of Subſcription. The Intereſt, together with 20 per Cent. of the Principal, to be paid by Drafts on you, out of the Sum Annually drawn upon you by us, ſo often as ſuch Drafts are permitted, or that Channel of Remittance remains open, at the Exchange of Two Shillings per Current Rupee. Should we be forbidden to draw upon you, it is at the Option of the Subſcribers to receive Payment of the remaining Part of their Principal, with the Intereſt which ſhall accrue from the laſt Payment, at the Rate of 8 per Cent. per Annum; or to let it remain at that Rate of Intereſt, and receive Notes for the ſame, according to the Firſt Mode abovementioned.

Third

Third Loan in favour of the Company's Servants and other European Inhabitants, of 20 Lacks, to be ſubſcribed on or before the 28th February 1781, in Exchange for Annuities, payable by Bills on you, out of the Sum uſually drawn on you by us: The Particulars have been already tranſmitted to you in Duplicate. The Annuities are redeemable on or before the 1ſt of January 1783, if the Plan ſhould not meet with your Approbation.

The State of our Treaſuries this Day is as follows:

Ready Money	30,599	5	—
Bills receivable	2,59,331	7	—
Mint	2,59,724	1	9
Unſorted Treaſure	5,59,464	6	3
Total	11,09,119	4	—

Deduct appropriated Sums, viz.

Balance Account Depoſits	9,41,611	3	5
Accountant General Mayor's Court	1,36,358	4	—
Amount of the Old Bond Debt on which the Intereſt has ceaſed by Public Advertiſement	79,342	11	10
D° of D°, on Account of the Churchwardens, bearing a running Intereſt by Order of the Court of Directors	98,200	—	—
D° of the New Bond Debt	71,14,351	1	6
D° Four per Cent. Remittance Loan	17,18,550	—	—
D° Annuities 1780	94,720	—	—
Total	1,01,83,133	4	9

Fort William,
3d February 1781.

We have the Honour to be,
Honourable Sirs,
Your moſt faithful humble Servants,
Warren Haſtings,
Ed°. Wheler.

Mr. John Hollond, Reſident at the Court of his Highneſs Nizam-ul-Mulck.

Sir,

We have received the Letter which you have written to us under Date the 15th ultimo, and the Governor General has laid before us thoſe which you have addreſſed to him on the 5th, 26th, 29th, and 31ſt ultimo.

The Line and Meaſures which you inform us the Nabob Nizam Ally Cawn has thought proper to adopt reſpecting the Sircar of Guntoor, do not appear to us to require any new Orders to you or Repreſentation to him: It is to us a Point of mere Indifference, whether the Sircar of Guntoor be in his Highneſs's Poſſeſſion, or in that of his Brother. It was not guaranteed by the Company to the latter, but yielded at the Inſtance of the Nabob Nizam Ally Cawn, who had granted it as a Jaghier to him. If the Nabob now thinks proper to reſume his own Gift, we ſee no Cauſe to warrant us in interfering, particularly when ſuch Interference might involve us in Differences with him, which at this Time eſpecially we wiſh to avoid; and as we think his Poſſeſſion of the Sircar an Event more likely to prove of Service than Prejudice to our Affairs, by embarraſſing his Highneſs with Hyder Ally Cawn, ſuppoſing it to be true, as he aſſerts, that the latter has formed Deſigns on the Northern Circars, from which it is not probable that an Exemption will be made in favour of that of Guntoor; yet we do not mean, by the Part which we have determined to purſue on this Occaſion, either to invalidate the Claim of the Company to the Reverſion of the Circar of Guntoor, agreeable to the Treaty of 1768, on the Death of Baſſalet Jung, or the Right which they derive to it from the ſame Authority, when he breaks the Conditions under which this Reſervation was originally made by the Treaty in favour of Baſſalet Jung.

With reſpect to the future Payment of the Arrears of the Peſhcuſh, we give you full Authority to aſſure his Highneſs that they ſhall be completely diſcharged at the Termination of the War, and that the current Demands on this Account be regularly diſcharged from that Fund: That at preſent, and during the Continuance of the War, our Reſources are all engaged in the Proſecution of it, and that we cannot employ them on other Service. We authorize you alſo to inform his Highneſs, that be the preſent Loſs ſuſtained by him from our Inability to diſcharge the Sums due to him from the Company, what it may, it is imputable to himſelf only, for that he is the Cauſe of the War, being the avowed Author of the Confederacy which occaſioned it; and that without taking upon us to condemn the Motives of his Conduct, or even to declare that it might not be juſtified by that of the Preſidency

of Fort Saint George. We affirm, that at the Moment when we complained of their Injuſtice towards him, when he inſtigated the other States of India to combine againſt the Company, he well knew the controlling Powers veſted in this Government over all the other Preſidencies, and that we were able to do him Juſtice; yet he made not any Application to us for that Purpoſe.

His Highneſs ſeems to be miſinformed of the preſent Relation which ſubſiſts between this Government and Ragonaut Row; and we are induced to believe ſo from a Part of your Letter to us of the 15th ultimo, wherein you recite a Converſation that had paſſed, in which he expreſſed his Readineſs to join us againſt Hyder on certain Conditions; the Firſt of which is ſaid to be, that the Support of Ragonaut Row ſhould be for ever abandoned. If by the Word "Support" be meant the Support of his Claims at Poona, we authorize you to declare to his Highneſs that Ragoba is not ſupported by us in it in any Manner whatſoever, and that at this Moment we are not connected with him, though we ſhould think it diſhonourable to deliver him into the Hands of his Enemies.

We are well pleaſed with the Attention which you have ſhewn us in the conſtant and particular Advices which you have tranſmitted to us of your Tranſactions at the Nabob's Court, and of his Highneſs's Deſigns, and we depend on a Continuance of the ſame Communications to us in future.

Fort William,
22d January 1781.

We are, &c. &c.
(Signed) Governor General and Council.

A true Copy.
E. Hay,
Act[g] Secr[y].

APPENDIX, N° 369.

Extracts from a Copy of a Letter from the Preſident and Select Committee of Fort Saint George to the Court of Directors, dated 17th February 1781.

WE did ourſelves the Honour of addreſſing you by your Ship the Duke of Kingſton, that ſailed from hence the 15th of laſt Month, and there in the fulleſt Manner ſtated to you the general Situation of military and political Affairs, as immediately or relatively connected with this Preſidency. Duplicates of that Diſpatch now waits upon you by Colonel James Capper, who takes his Paſſage on a Portugueſe Ship.

2. Alarmed as you will naturally have been at the very gloomy Proſpect which there preſented itſelf; the being enabled in ſo ſhort a Space of Time to acquaint you of a favourable Turn in your Affairs on this Coaſt, cannot but afford us the moſt ſolid and real Satisfaction. The invariable Language which hath been held to you by this Committee will have convinced your Honours, that in our Opinion nothing but a Peace with the Marattas could poſſibly extricate us from our Difficulties, or your other Settlements of Bengal or Bombay, from the accumulating Load of Expence, and conſequently Debt, which it was unavoidable to incur. This Opinion was daily increaſed from the Effects we could perceive of *univerſal Diſſatisfaction in the Country Powers.* Happily indeed the many Reſources which have been found in your own Poſſeſſions have hitherto empowered the Arms of the Company to penetrate into the moſt formidable Parts of the Peninſula; but theſe Reſources are in no Reſpect adequate to the Continuance of ſuch great and ſuch diſtant Operations. The ſtepping beyond the Bounds of political Moderation, and of your own and the Territories of your Allies, is fraught with Effects of the moſt pernicious Tendency. Extenſion of Dominion hath been uniformly one of the Objects you have commanded us to refrain from: The Reaſon is clear; that which you have already is as much as you ever can be able to turn to Advantage; more would but load you with Incumbrances, and render your Poſſeſſions defenceleſs and open to the Invaſions of every reſtleſs Neighbour.

The Maratta War, though it originated perhaps in the one Idea of merely affording Support to the Cauſe of Ragonaut Row, when that Support could be ſuppoſed to be but very inconſiderable, has yet in its Conſequences involved a Variety of Miſchiefs and Embarraſſments of an alarming Nature to your preſent and your future Influence. In deliberating on this Subject, it is probable your controuling Government of Bengal have left unexplained no Matter which it would be proper for you to be acquainted with: We ſhall therefore avoid entering in a more diffuſive Manner into the Subject, eſpecially as we underſtand the Diſpatches which now wait upon you from Bengal, are full and particular, from its Commencement by the Preſidency of Bombay to the preſent Hour. Accompanying, however, you will receive Copies of Two Letters that were received from Poona about the Middle of laſt Month. The firſt is from the Peſhwa Mhadoo Row to our Preſident, and the latter is to the Nabob from his Vackeel, who reſides at the Peſhwa's Court. From both theſe Letters you will perceive that the Diſpoſition of the Poona Adminiſtration is far from being ſo hoſtile as it naturally might be

be ſuppoſed. We have tranſmitted Copies of theſe Letters to the Governor General and Council; and have recommended to the Nabob, in the ſtrongeſt Terms, the exerting the utmoſt of his Influence towards the terminating the preſent Troubles, by a permanent and honourable Peace. The Negociations of the Nabob, at the expreſs Deſire of the Governor General, are now going on for the Accompliſhment of this wiſhed-for End; and he gives us the ſtrongeſt Reaſon to hope he ſhall be ſucceſsful in his Mediation. To the like Purport as the above Letters, Sir Eyre Coote has been written to by the Chief Miniſter, Nanna Furnaveeſe; but as in the Hurry of taking the Field he forgot to furniſh us with a Tranſlate of what he had received, we can only in general Terms inform you, that the Miniſter expreſſed himſelf to General Coote as deſirous of putting an End to the War, provided the Advantages were not all to be expected on our Side.

9. In our former Advices we explained to your Honours our Reaſons for apprehending the Soubah's Intentions to be entirely hoſtile to the Company: His public Declarations were expreſſive of Abundance of Ill-humour, and he heſitated not to avow himſelf to the Governor General the Adviſer of the Confederacy between Hyder Ally and the Marattas. However willing the Soubah might have been to have availed himſelf of the embarraſſed Situation of our Affairs, he yet hath fortunately refrained from any hoſtile Attempt. His Complaints indeed have of late aſſumed a milder Tone, and we have Reaſon to believe, from our Intelligence from the Decan, that nothing dangerous to our Repoſe may be immediately expected from that Quarter.

APPENDIX, N° 370.

Major Scot's Examination before the Court of Directors, 26th February 1782.

Q. FROM whom did you receive Copy of the Revenue Letter of 5th May 1781, from the Governor General and Council of Bengal to the Court of Directors, with the other Papers relating to the Revenues of Bengal?

A. They were ſent me by Mr. Haſtings the Governor General, under the Care of Mr. Grady, from whom I received them.

Q. When did you receive thoſe Papers?

A. I think on the 19th Inſtant; Mr. Grady was particularly directed to deliver them into my Hands.

Q. What Directions did you receive from the Governor General reſpecting the above Letter and Papers?

A. They were ſent for my Information, and I ſuppoſed that the Court of Directors would have received the Revenue Letter by the ſame Ship. Theſe Papers were put on board the Neptune, on which Ship Mr. Grady had taken his Paſſage; but ſhe being unable to proceeed he embarked on board the Bellmont; wrote to the Governor General to know what he ſhould do with the Papers, but receiving no Anſwer, he brought them with him on the Bellmont.

Q. Were the Papers ſealed up and directed to you?

A. Yes; in a Box ſealed up, directed to the particular Care of Mr. Grady.

Q. Are the Papers produced the Original ones delivered in by him?

A. They are not the Original ones, but appear by the Endorſement to be Copies of them.

Q. Did you receive any other Papers relating to the Company's Affairs from Mr. Grady?

A. Yes, ſeveral other Papers relating to the Company's Affairs.

Q. When you tendered thoſe Papers which are delivered in, what Reaſon had you for withholding the others?

A. I underſtood that the Revenue Letter and Papers had not been received by the Company; but if there are any other Papers in my Poſſeſſion, being Copies of the Proceedings of the Governor General and Council, the Originals of which have not been received by the Company, I will with great Pleaſure, and I think it my Duty ſo to do, lay them before the Honourable the Court of Directors. It is from ſome Accident which I cannot account for, that Papers of ſuch Conſequence have not been received, becauſe I am ſure it was Mr. Haſtings's Intention to have tranſmitted them.

Q. How

Q. How came you to know that the Originals of thoſe Papers which were delivered in were not received by the Company?

A. I heard ſo at this Houſe, and that the Revenue Packet had not been received. I had aſked that Queſtion before I had received any Letter myſelf.

Q. By what Means can you aſcertain that the Papers which you have delivered in, and thoſe others which you received from the Governor General by Mr. Grady, are true Copies from the Company's Records?

A. I firmly believe them to be ſo, becauſe they are endorſed by the Governor General himſelf, and becauſe he refers me to them very particularly in his private Letters.

Q. Can you recollect the Purport of the other Papers in your Poſſeſſion which came by Mr. Grady, and which you have not delivered in?

A. I cannot recollect them all, but will mention as far as I am able. Copies of many of them were in my Poſſeſſion before, which Mr. Haſtings had forgot.

The propoſed Treaty with the Dutch—The Debates relative to Sir Elijah Impey's Appointment—New Regulations for the Courts of Juſtice, dated I think the 15th of April 1781—Regulations of the Cuſtoms—Mr. Anderſon's Negociation with Chimnajee Booſla, including the Governor General's Inſtructions to that Gentleman—Letter from Dewangur Pundit, Miniſter of the Rajah of Berar, to the Governor General, received at Calcutta the 10th May 1781—Copy of the Correſpondence with Fort Saint George, from Auguſt 1780 to February 1781.—I believe theſe are all the Public Papers; if there are any others I will ſend them in. I had forgot to mention the Copy of Mr. Haſtings's Minute and Mr. Wheler's, on the Appointment of Mr. Markham to the Reſidency of Benares.

Q. Were thoſe Papers tranſmitted by the Governor General for your private Information?

A. They were.

Q. Have you Directions from the Governor General to communicate thoſe Papers or their Contents to any other Perſon or Perſons?

A. Mr. Haſtings has deſired me to ſhew a private Letter to his particular Friends, but the other Papers are left to my Diſcretion. Theſe Papers are often referred to in that private Letter, and I ſhould have ſhewn them to thoſe particular Friends who deſired to read them.

Q. Are any of thoſe Friends in the Direction of the Eaſt India Company's Affairs?

A. They are not—many of them are Proprietors.

Q. How long have you reſided in India, at what Settlements, and in what Stations?

A. I was appointed a Cadet by the Court of Directors 16 Years and a Half ago—Arrived at Bombay in Auguſt 1766—Served Seven Months on that Coaſt, and went with Permiſſion to Bengal, where I came in a Cadet in June 1767—I ſerved in the Army till the 7th January 1781, and then *reſigned the Honourable Company's Service.*

Q. When did you leave Bengal?

A. I left Calcutta the 9th January 1781, and the Pilot left the Ship the 17th.

APPENDIX, N° 371.

Letter from the Governor General to the Chairman of the Court of Directors; dated 6th January 1781.

Sir,

HAVING thought proper to appoint an Agent at Home for the Purpoſe of attending to my political Intereſts, and managing all my public Concerns, I take this Opportunity of acquainting you that I have ſelected Major Scott for this Service, and have furniſhed him with ſuitable Inſtructions; and as this Gentleman is poſſeſſed of every neceſſary Information relative to the State of this Government, he will be ready to communicate with you on all Matters wherein you may think it proper to aſk his Opinion.

It

It is material to me to make one Obſervation, that in my Inſtructions to Major Scott I have particularly provided, that I will ſuffer no Perſon whatever to perform any Act in my Name that ſhall be conſtrued to imply a Reſignation of my Authority; proteſting againſt the Exerciſe of ſo dangerous a Power, from its having been aſſumed upon a former Occaſion without being warranted by my Conſent, or by any previous Inſtructions that could bear the moſt diſtant Tendency to ſuch a Meaſure.

Fort William,
January 6th, 1781.

I have the Honour to be,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient,
and moſt humble Servant,
Warren Haſtings.

APPENDIX, N° 372.

Tranſlation of a Letter from Dewagur Pundit, Miniſter to Moodajee Booſla, the Rajah of Berar, to Mr. Haſtings. Dated 5th April; received 10th May, 1781.

After the uſual Compliments,

PRIOR to this, in the fulneſs of Friendſhip and Reſpect, which God, the Creator of Heaven and Earth, knew to be ſincere; I wrote Four Letters concerning the Affairs of this Province, ſtating the Buſineſs in Agitation in all its Points of View; and ſetting forth the Meaſures to be taken, and the Conſequences attending your Reſolution for Peace or War: That if in order to reſtore your Reputation, which had ſuffered from the Incapacity of the Bombay Commanders, you were determined upon War, there were ſuch and ſuch Meaſures neceſſary to be taken to carry it on with Succeſs: That if you ſpoke the Language of Peace, and wiſhed that the Garden of the State ſhould preſerve its Beauty unviolated by the Thorns of War and Confuſion, you ſhould ſend Propoſals for a Treaty, fully and particularly drawn out, reſpecting every Article, in ſuch and ſuch Form, and to ſuch and ſuch Purport; that the Thorns of Diſcontent might be removed, and a Foundation laid for our mutual Agreements to laſt for ever; that the Country might flouriſh in Tranquillity, the Inhabitants be at Eaſe, and the General and Soldiers free from the Fatigues of inceſſant Toil. I conclude that theſe Letters have been reſpectively received, and that you muſt be acquainted with their Contents; and moſt undoubtedly your extenſive Capacity and univerſal Knowledge have enabled you to comprehend the ſecret Meaning of every Hint and Suggeſtion contained in the Lines which I wrote regarding the Negociation of a Treaty; and will have conſidered every Matter, both in its Beginning and its Conſequences. But as, contrary to former Cuſtom, when a mutual Correſpondence every Month reſpecting Buſineſs ſubſiſted between us, your Anſwer in the preſent Inſtance, although the Welfare of the State depended upon it, has been delayed; my Heart, which is captivated in the Ties of Affection and Good-will towards you, is involuntarily ſtruck with Surpriſe, and filled with Uneaſineſs. The Raja himſelf often calling to Mind the Excellence of your Diſpoſition and Underſtanding, aſks, What can be the Reaſon, that in Three Months no Letter has been received from Calcutta?—What Reaſon can I aſſign?——I replied, That as the Letters from here were all written in the Cauſe of Peace, through the Favour of the Almighty, their Contents were engraved in your Heart, ſince you of yourſelf had ſent the Drafts of a Treaty. But as the daring Ambition of Hyder Naig has filled Arcot with War and Confuſion, that you, being unable to bear his daring Inſolence, were taken up with the neceſſary Preparation of ſending Troops to chaſtiſe him, occaſioned this Delay; but that it was no Matter, as your Anſwer would certainly arrive in a few Days. To ſpeak to the Point at once; the Greatneſs of the Wealth, and the numerous Armies of the State; the Strength and Power of the Purdhan Pundit, and his Generals; the Multitude of Forts and Strong-Holds in their Poſſeſſion; and the Strength, Valour, and Proweſs, which they have diſplayed for theſe Fifty Years paſt in the Wars carried on in the Decan and Hindoſtan, are written on the Leaves of the World; and are too well known to need a Repetition. There are few Places in Decan or Hindoſtan which have not felt the Hoofs of the Mahratta Horſes. Their Armies ſpread like the Ocean, and are in all Places. But Praiſes, a Thouſand Praiſes, to the Excellency of your Meaſures, your Exertions in War, and your Regard to Honour and Glory; that amidſt the Diſcord which ſhakes the World, you ſtand like a Rock on your Ground unmoved; and in Proportion as the Troubles increaſe beyond the Power of Remedy, your Strength and Proweſs riſe ſuperior a Hundred-fold; who only, from the Circumſtance of a Frenchman's having been admitted to the Preſence of the Regency of Poona, obſerved the Scent of Enmity and Separation, and inſtantly conceived the Remedy, ſent a Force under the Command of Colonel Leſlie againſt this Place, and diſpatched Mr. Elliott to negociate the Affair; and when that Gentleman died on the Expedition, Beneram Pundit was furniſhed with proper Diſpatches and Inſtructions from hence; General Goddard was written to,

that

that at firſt he ſhould try every Means, and uſe his utmoſt Endeavours for Peace; but in caſe of this failing, he was to proceed to Hoſtilities. After the Defeat of the Bombay Detachment, General Goddard marched to Surat, ſeized upon Guzzerat, and gave Aſſiſtance to Futty Sing Guicawar; Letters were ſent to the Government of Poona and to me for a Ratification of the Treaty, as laid down by Colonel Upton, which by the unfortunate Chances of Things were not attended to; and by the Advice and Suggeſtion of the Nabob Nizam-ul-Dowlah, a Plan was laid out to effect the Buſineſs by War. Forces were ſent into every Quarter. The Valour and Activity ſhewn by your Troops, when in the Field, need not be repeated. The Intrepidity and Skill diſplayed by General Goddard for Six Months, in his Attack upon Scindia, are beyond a Doubt equal to the Labours of Ruſtum and Eſfendyar; as none before had ever been victorious over Chiefs ſo mighty and powerful as Scindia and Holkar. In like Manner, in the Provinces of Madras and Arcot, &c. although the Engliſh Troops are but few, and thoſe diſperſed in many Places; and although Hyder Naig had a numerous Army, and well provided with Stores, yet their Valour and Reſolution has not been damped, particularly ſince the Arrival of General Coote at Madras. Theſe are the Effects of your Exertions, by which your Forces have gained additional Strength.—The whole are now aſſembled, and are in the Field againſt Hyder; perhaps, by this Time there has been a deciſive Engagement; as Hyder is in Alliance with the French, and a large Force is on the Way by Sea to aſſiſt him, the Engliſh have ſent out a Fleet properly equipped to intercept it. In the Zellah of Kandeiſh, dependant on the Province of Berrampore, the Engliſh are engaged in a bloody War with Holkar. In the Province of Malva, near Oogeyn, the Conteſt is wonderful; Scindia, at the Head of Thirty Thouſand Horſe, attended by all the Rajahs and Zemindars of that Country, making in all near Fifty Thouſand Horſe, have ſurrounded the Engliſh Troops which had marched from Bopaul and Nawa at Seronge. The Engliſh, though their Number is ſmall, are prepared to fight them. General Goddard, in Three Days and Nights, in Defiance of the Forces of Ram Chunder Gunnis, who attempted to oppoſe his Progreſs, has taken the Fort of Baſſein, which is the firſt amongſt the Forts for Strength; and after ſettling that ſtrong Fort, and taking ſome other Places, he is now in the Field againſt Hurry Pundit and Holkar, who have an Army of Fifty Thouſand tried Horſe and Native Generals, and many large Cannon at the Ghaut; and has taken Poſt in Places of difficult Acceſs, and great natural Strength. The Government and Chiefs of Poona have thrown aſide their Affection to their Families, and are reſolved to devote their Town to the Flames. They only wait 'till they hear of General Goddard's marching from his Station at the Ghaut, and then that which is to be will take Place. Although the Nabob Nizam-ul-Dowlah has not yet joined the Poona Army, yet he has collected his Forces, and made the neceſſary Preparations. In ſhort, your good Senſe, Valour, and victorious Fortune in every Part, againſt all Oppoſition, has lighted up ſo aſtoniſhing a Flame of War, that for 50 or 100 Years back no Power has been ſo univerſally ſucceſsful againſt every General, and every Power oppoſed to them. The Rajah is continually ſinging the Praiſes of theſe Exertions; and I, whoſe Heart and Soul are intereſted in your Welfare, wiſh earneſtly and ſincerely for the Honour of an Interview with you, and that, without waiting for the Permiſſion of the Miniſter of the Pundit Purdhaun, I may ſee with my own Eyes the Form of that Greatneſs, which is the Source of all this Bravery, Conduct, Grandeur, State, Wiſdom, and Knowledge of Mankind; that I may explain to you my Ideas, and the Plan which I have for a long Time revolved in my Mind for the Benefit of the State, and hear from your own Mouth the Obſervations which you ſhall think proper to make; that I may be able to ſettle the Terms of ſuch a Treaty between the Engliſh and the Peſhwa, as may be for the Benefit of both; that the Thorns of Diſcontent, which are in the Breaſt of the Engliſh Nation againſt Hyder Naig and the French, by Conſultation with each other, may be removed with Eaſe. Your Name and Reputation is great in the World, and in the Preſence of the Royal Majeſty of England: But what can I do? I have been Six Months confined by Illneſs, and at preſent I am ſo tortured with Pains in my left Leg and Arms, that I can ſcarce ſit down or riſe up: I receive no Benefit from the Medicines I take. As you have with you Gentlemen compleatly ſkilled in Phyſic, if any ſuch Gentleman with proper Medicines and Oils can come, it will be regarded by me as the greateſt Favour and Kindneſs; it will be giving a Renewal of Life to this Well-wiſher, who is equal to manifold Services; and when I ſhall be reſtored to Health, and ſhall preſent myſelf before you, what ſhall then be done it is ſuperfluous to write. Whatever ſhall come within the Compaſs of actual Obſervation and Experience is Truth itſelf. But 'till the Completion of my Wiſhes, which depend upon my Recovery, be pleaſed to aſſent to what I write in the Fullneſs of Friendſhip and Regard; and believe that what I ſay is only from Motives of Truth and Friendſhip, a Foreſight of Conſequences, and a Knowledge of the Affairs; and it is this, that as full Revenge has been taken for the Diſgrace of the Bombay Detachment, and the Engliſh Name is a Hundred Times greater than before, and the Dread and Reſpect of the Engliſh ſo eſtabliſhed over all, that if any one ſhall hereafter be at Enmity with them, the ſame Conſequences will be expected to follow; it is therefore not conſonant to Wiſdom, to ſuffer the Flames of War to lay waſte and ſpread the Earth with Deſolation. For what you have gained by your Power, Fortune, and the Favour of God, to this Hour be thankful, that ſo ſmall a Force has been able to prevail againſt ſuch numerous Hoſts in every Part; and you ſhould by all Means open the Door to Peace and Friendſhip, and uſe your utmoſt Power to root out the French and Hyder Naig. If you ſhould ſay, I myſelf have formed a Treaty, which if they will not accept, what am I to do? The Anſwer is this: The Articles inſerted in your Propoſals reſpecting Ragonaut Row, the Fort of Gwalior, and Futty Sing Guicawar, contained obvious Grounds

Grounds for Objection; and the Affairs of the State, and the Greatneſs of the Pundit Purdhaun, by his acceding to the above Three Articles, would have been injured; therefore ſuch Anſwers were returned as were judged neceſſary and proper: And further, at the Time the propoſed Treaty arrived here, the Engliſh Forces were employed in ſubduing the Country of Cokan, and General Goddard was likewiſe exerting himſelf with the greateſt Activity in the Siege of the Fort of Baſſein, and the Flames of Contention were every Day gaining new Str[illegible]h; wherefore, amidſt this Conflagration of War, where was there room for Deliberation? And h[illegible]Propoſals for Peace and Friendſhip be approved of at ſuch a Time? They rather would be [illegible]Language of Deceit. If a Man was to ſeize another by the Head, and attempt to ta[illegible]m, and a Struggle enſued, and at ſuch a Time any one was to propoſe to the latter a Re[illegible]w would he receive ſuch a Propoſal? He would Firſt effect his own Deliverance, and then in[illegible]Terms of Accommodation. Your proffered Treaties arrived in the Midſt of the Ferment of War and Paſſion, and therefore remained in Suſpence; nor had any Anſwers arrived to what had been ſent from hence. What is paſt is paſt. At this Time in which I am writing, the Scale of Strength between the Forces of both Parties hangs equal. No Time can be better than the preſent for the Work of Peace; you ſhould look upon this as propitious, and not let it ſlip, ſince the Wiſe never let Opportunity paſs, for it is impoſſible to be recalled: Therefore you ſhould begin a Negociation through the Mediation of the Nabob Nizam-ul-Dowlah, who is one of the moſt principal Chiefs of the Deckan. He will repreſent here whatever you ſhall think proper to write to him, without Diminution or Exaggeration; and in return, by the ſame Channel, whatever is to be written, will be written; and let the Nabob Mobarez-ul-Mulk be applied to in reſpect of this Negociation, who is the firm Pillar of the Fortune and Greatneſs of the Aſofean Race, and to whom you have heretofore written; ſo that the Rajah, the Nabob Mobarez-ul-Mulk, and the Nabob Nizam-ul-Dowlah may join in a Mediation, and obtain from Pundit Purdhaun ſuch a Treaty as may prevent any Diſputes in future, and a Plan laid for extirpating the Power of Hyder and the French.

The above Advice is juſt, and according to good Senſe; you will certainly ſee the Propriety of it, and ſoon ſhew your Approbation publicly; and you will believe what I have written to be the Dictates of my Friendſhip and good Wiſhes; but if not, the Matter will be carried to ſuch a Length, that it will be impoſſible to bring it again in the ſame Train. For how long will General Goddard remain at the Ghauts? As it will not be proper for him to retreat, he will deſcend from the Ghaut upon Poona. The Maratta Chiefs with their own Hands will ſet Fire to the Town, level all their Houſes with the Duſt, and ſprinkling their Arms and Feet with the Aſhes of their Habitations, and devoting their Families and Poſſeſſions to Deſtruction, will perform Acts beyond the Power of Imagination, which their Opponents will never be able to get the better of. Nizam-ul-Dowlah alſo will not ſit an idle Spectator of the ſame. Hyder, with ſo large a Force, and the Aſſiſtance of the French, will not remain inactive: And Scindeah, who is a renowned and warlike Chief, and who has a Force of near 50,000 Horſe, with Rajahs and Zemindars, and who has of old rendered Services to the Imperial Throne, will exert himſelf while able to move Hand or Foot. God knows what they may be able to perform, or what Game the deceitful Heavens may play: You ſhould therefore look on what has already been brought to paſs as fortunate, and begin the Work of Peace. What I have written is merely from a Regard to the Friendſhip which you have at all Times diſplayed towards me. In the Letters with which you formerly honoured me, you wrote, that "On your Comfort and Satisfaction "depend the Comfort and Satisfaction of Mankind, and the Peace and Happineſs of the People; "let not therefore Sorrow for your deceaſed Wife prey upon your Heart."

From the Emotions of my Heart therefore, and the Impulſe of Friendſhip which attracts me towards you, I have been induced to write ſo fully. I have not omitted a ſingle Point in this Letter that could contribute to ſet Matters in the fulleſt Light, either in weighing the preſent Circumſtances, or looking forward to future Conſequences. I have the ſtrongeſt Hope that you will examine the whole by yourſelf, Word by Word, and approve of all that I have ſaid. And after the Foundation of Peace is thus laid, and I am relieved a little from my Diſorder, I will certainly do myſelf the Honour of having one Time an Interview with you.

APPENDIX, N° 373.

Extract of Letter from the Preſident and Select Committee at Fort Saint George; dated the 9th January 1781.

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Par. 19. FROM the invariable Tenor of our Advices to your Honours, you will perceive a ſtrong, and we are ſorry to believe a juſt Opinion of the ruinous Conſequences which would ſooner or later fall upon the Company, from the War which your Servants at the other Preſidencies had unneceſſarily entered into with the Maratta State.

Bordering

Bordering upon each other's Dominions, and heated by Jealouſy and a deſire of Plunder, Hyder and the Marattas never could have remained upon amicable Terms. Every Year, unleſs when we ſtepped in to ſuſpend their Operations, the Country of the one or the other was the Theatre of War. Their Succeſs was various; but the Effect to the Engliſh Intereſt was the ſame, they reciprocally waſted their Strength, and found a Sufficiency of Employment at Home to hinder their diſturbing the Tranquillity of their Neighbours.

20. Whilſt theſe Two Governments, the moſt powerful in Hindoſtan, were thus weakening themſelves by an inveterate War, which from the known Diſpoſition of the Parties, was never likely to have an End, your Settlements were at Peace, and your Proſperity was making the quickeſt Advances to its fulleſt State. Unhappily for your Intereſts, the Flame of Diſſention at length broke forth at Bombay. The Seeds of War which were then ſown in Support of the Cauſe of Ragonaut Row, and which were afterwards nouriſhed in the moſt unbounded Manner by the Government of Bengal, gave a Reſpite to theſe rival Powers. They ſoon began to ſlacken in their Oppoſition: The Pretenſions of each became every Day more moderate. At length they combined againſt us, and from being Enemies cemented the ſtrongeſt Ties of mutual Aſſiſtance and Support, againſt a Conſequence which they had every Reaſon to conſider as too formidable and interfering for the Repoſe of India.

92. In this Manner did we communicate our Sentiments to the Governor General and Council, on the Subject of the Guntoor Circar. Your Honours will determine whether they accord with the Deciſion they have been pleaſed to paſs in their Letter of the 10th October 1780, "That we preſumed "to hold the Circar of Guntoor at all Events, in Defiance of a Requiſition from the Governor Ge"neral and Council peremptorily made to return it. That we had refuſed to withdraw our Troops, "and remove our Agents and Collectors from it, knowing as we did that they had formerly pledged "the Faith of the Company to the Nabob Nizam Ally Cawn for both thoſe Points, thereby de"grading the Authority, weakening the Energy, and preventing the Efficacy of the Power of their "Government."

93. Involved as your Affairs are in every Quarter of Hindoſtan, the Accuſation of wantonly adding to the Flame, carries in its Conſequences a Degree of Criminality which every Government, ſatisfied with the Rectitude of its Actions, is warranted to clear itſelf of, and even to retort upon thoſe who are primarily and principally concerned.

94. We have already ſaid, and we again repeat it, the Maratta War is the ſole Cauſe of all the Miſchiefs which hitherto have been felt, or hereafter may befal the Intereſts of England in India. The viſionary Purſuit of that Scheme hath plunged you into the moſt complicated public Calamity. The Country Powers tired of the Yoke, rejoice at the ruinous Meaſures, which to the Expenditure of all your Treaſure in Bengal, and of all that hath been borrowed, hath been offenſively carried on againſt the combined Maratta Empire. Nor ſhall we heſitate in delaring it our Opinion, that unleſs a Peace is ſpeedily concluded with that Power, the hard earned Supremacy of your Situation will ſink under a Blow the moſt ſevere that it hath ever yet received.

APPENDIX, N° 374.

Minute of Sir Eyre Coote; 12th January 1781.

AT the ſame Time I put my Signature to the General Letter of the 9th of January 1781, I muſt, in Candour and Conformity to thoſe Opinions which I have both held and expreſſed, except againſt one Part of it, and which aſcribes all our preſent Misfortunes to the Maratta War.

That that Meaſure may firſt have given Birth to the Idea of a general Combination of the Powers of Hindoſtan againſt us, I will not endeavour to diſprove; but that to it alone we owe the formidable Incurſion of Hyder Ally into the Carnatic, I cannot admit. Firſt, Becauſe long after we had commenced Hoſtilities againſt the Marattas, Hyder himſelf continued to make Conqueſts upon them, and which our Operations no doubt facilitated. It was his favourite Object, and which I am confident he would never have quitted, or ſought for an Union with the Marattas againſt us, had not our Negociations with Bazalet Jung about the Guntoor Circar, on which he had alſo Views, and the Mode in which they were carried on, awakened his Jealouſy, and very naturally made him apprehend that our ultimate Intentions were to poſſeſs ourſelves of ſome Part of his Country. Whilſt it anſwered his Purpoſe to make Peace with the Marattas, in order that his Attention or Strength might in no Shape be diverted from providing effectually for the Security of his own Territories, it was entirely ſuitable to the Marattas in their then Situation, as it enabled them to direct their whole Force againſt the Operations of our Army under Brigadier General Goddard. We alarmed his Fears for the Safety of his own Country, croſſed his Views upon the Guntoor Circar, which he was deſirous of obtaining in Farm from Bazalet Jung. That an able Agent might not be wanting to foment theſe Offences, we deliberately gave Umbrage to the Nabob Nizam; firſt, by ſeeking and actually

actually ſubſcribing to a Treaty of Friendſhip with ther and Subject Bazalet Jung, without aſking his Conſent or Approbation; and next, by de g of him a Remiſſion of the Peſhcuſh, or Tribute, which for theſe Eleven Years and upwa have paid him, as in Treaty bound, on account of the Northern Circars. To prevent any b ſequences ariſing from the Delay in the Payment of the Peſhcuſh, which was owing in the fir to a temporary Inability created by the heavy current Expences which were unavoidably inc the Siege of Pondicherry; and in the next Place, perhaps by Miſmanagement, I was indu... d here in my Way to Bengal, to recommend the Miſſion of Mr. Hollond as Ambaſſado ro aſſure him that the Peſhcuſh ſhould be paid, and to explain to him the Cauſe o...

The Nizam has in his Letters to this Government, and in his Conve... who communicated them to the Governor General and Council, avowed his Diſpleaſ... of our Behaviour with regard to the Peſhcuſh and the Guntoor Treaty, and has without Scrupl... knowledged his having for theſe Reaſons encouraged and connived at a Combination of the Powers againſt us.

With all theſe Circumſtances before me, and which the Records both here and in Bengal bear Teſtimony, and further knowing it as a Thing certain, that at the very Time the Treaty was carrying on with Bazalet Jung, Hyder would have entered into an offenſive and defenſive Alliance with us, I would do an Injury to myſelf, and a ſtill greater one to our Superiors, who are to paſs their Judgment on Men and Meaſures by the Documents handed them from their reſpective Governments in India, did I tacitly ſubſcribe to that Part of the General Letter to the Court of Directors which I have hereby excepted againſt, and not alſo elucidate the other Cauſes, beſides the Maratta War, which have aſſiſted to haſten our preſent Diſtreſſes.

I requeſt that this may go a Number in the Packet now under Diſpatch.

(Signed) Eyre Coote.

A true Copy.
R. J. Sulivan.

APPENDIX, N° 375.

Extract of Bombay Diary, the 15th April 1781.

Extract of Letter from General Sir Eyre Coote to Brigadier General Goddard; dated Camp, New Town, 1ſt March 1781.

WHEN I wrote you in the Terms I did, the moſt expreſſive I could dictate, of the diſtreſſed Situation of Affairs here, wherein I enumerated the various Difficulties I had to combat againſt; the Smallneſs of my Force, and the Impoſſibility of attacking the Enemy in the ſtrong Holds he was poſſeſſed of, unleſs a Diverſion was created in his Country, to oblige him to divide the very formidable Force he had in the Carnatic; I ſay, when I ſtated theſe Circumſtances, and added to them my firm Opinion, that nothing but our united Efforts ſpeedily exerted could poſſibly retrieve the Misfortunes which had fallen upon our Intereſts on this Coaſt, and the conſequent Ruin which threatened the whole of the Engliſh Poſſeſſions in India, I did not mean to enhance any Credit which might ariſe from my honeſt Exertions in the Cauſe of my Country, and my Employers, but that you might be the better convinced of the real Neceſſity there was for ſeeking for an Accommodation with the Marattas on any Terms, rather than that by proſecuting a deſtructive War, Delay ſhould have happened in purſuing ſuch Meaſures as promiſed the Accompliſhment of the grand national Object, giving an effectual Check to the encreaſing Power and Influence of Hyder Ally Cawn. I will not argue how far my Orders as Commander in Chief ought to have weighed with you on the Occaſion; but I muſt ſay, when, together with them, I ſtated the imminent Danger which I conceived to impend the Britiſh Intereſts in India, and under the expreſs Authority delegated to me over the Bengal Troops under your Command, pointed out the Mode whereby that Danger might be averted; I experienced a very heavy Diſappointment in your not having at leaſt aimed at the Ceſſation of Hoſtilities with the Marattas, for which the Reſolutions of the Governor General and Council, as well as the Spirit of the propoſed Treaty itſelf, gave a clear Latitude with the Authority you poſſeſs over the Bengal Troops independant of the Bombay Adminiſtration, and furniſhed with a juſt Account of the Situation of Affairs of the moſt ſerious Importance, and which ſtood in need of ſuch ſpeedy Support. I am confident, that had you made it, as it deſerved, the firſt Object in your Deliberations with the Bombay Council, that they would have ſeen the Propriety of countenancing it; and that had they and you in conſequence been ſolicitous about it in our Communication with the Miniſters at Poona, I have every Reaſon to think, from the Situation which the Affairs of the Maratta State were then in, might eaſily

have been effected. I will not be certain tha no Endeavours have been exerted to that End, but as you make no Mention of any thing to that Effect in your Letters, I am juſtified in drawing the Concluſion I have done; and in adding, that I conceive my Powers as Commander in Chief in India have not been treated with that Attention to which in a Time of Warfare they are entitled to, and more particularly at a Juncture and on an Occaſion like the preſent, which called for their Exerciſe and Interpoſition. I wiſh nevertheleſs to reſt the Judgment to be formed of my Conduct, and the Conduct of the other Parties, who have had either an executive or deliberative Share in the Management of public Affairs, upon our own evident Neceſſities, which it muſt be confeſſed were too alarming to juſtify any Meaſures that could delay the much-wanted Cure of all our Diſtreſſes, a Maratta Peace. Although I ever conſidered the Policy of warring againſt the Maratta State a moſt ruinous one to the Intereſts both of the Company and the Engliſh Nation; ſtill on the Eve of your late Succeſs, if we had no other Power to combat againſt, I might have ſubſcribed to the Plan you adviſed me, as laid down for the Operations of your Campaign, as the moſt likely to procure us honourable Terms of Accommodation; but engaged as we are in a Scene of Contention, I may ſay with every Power of any Conſideration in India, all Steps, the Event of which could not be clearly aſcertained as an unfailing Remedy, muſt be exceptionable. By proſecuting the War our Difficulties muſt be encreaſed, and the Proſpect of obtaining Peace become daily more diſtant. Our Reſources, anticipated by the current Demands of our Military Eſtabliſhment, to which they are unequal, and burthened with a heavy Debt, cannot long ſupport the preſent Syſtem. I muſt therefore impoſe it upon you as a Duty you owe your King, your Country, and your Employers, to leave no Means which may depend upon you, untried, to effect a Peace with the Marattas, and which may enable you ſpeedily to carry into Execution my Orders for entering and creating a powerful Diverſion in Hyder Ally's Country on the Malabar Side.

P. S. I think it neceſſary to inform you I have received Information, that Hyder Ally Cawn is uſing every Means in his Power to defeat our Views of Peace with the Marattas, and has even carried his Intrigue ſo far as to authorize Ragonaut Row to employ his Credit in the Expenditure of whatever Sums he may find neceſſary to that End.

Extract of Bombay Diary, the 15th April 1781.

Letter from Sir Eyre Coote to the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay.

Gentlemen,

By Letters which I have received from Brigadier General Goddard, I have had the Pleaſure to be informed of the Surrender of the important Fortreſs of Baſſein to our Arms on the 11th December; on which Event permit me to congratulate you.

Although I have not been honoured with any Reply to my Letter November, theſe Letters alſo ſufficiently inform me of your having been made acquainted with my earneſt Deſire of the Troops under Brigadier General Goddard's Command, being employed againſt the Poſſeſſions of Hyder Ally, of my Reaſons for expreſſing that Deſire; and in order that he might do ſo to the beſt Advantage, of my anxious Wiſh to ſee an Accommodation take Place between the Marattas. By the ſame Letters it alſo appears, that you were in Poſſeſſion of the Terms of the Treaty offered to them by the Supreme Council, and of their Deliberations thereon, conſequently you were poſſeſſed of every Material and Authority neceſſary to aſſiſt and ſanctify your Councils, which it gives me Concern to find ſhould have terminated in a Reſolution to proſecute Hoſtilities againſt the Marattas.

What are the Grounds upon which this Reſolution was taken, and its Neceſſity evinced, it is impoſſible I ſhould know without having ſeen your Proceedings; of this however I am certain, that if to enable us to direct our whole Force againſt Hyder Ally it was neceſſary to make Peace with the Marattas, even upon their own Terms, it would have been according to what I am fully convinced ought not to be put in Competition with the Riſk which is now run by proſecuting the War, and would in the preſent Situation of Affairs, which is truly a deſperate one, been a much better Policy, and in the End have terminated more to the Advantage of the Company and the Nation, than that which has been adopted, and which nothing but a Succeſſion of the moſt fortuitous Circumſtances can poſſibly bring to a happy Concluſion. The Deliberations of the Governor General and Council on the Subject of Peace with the Marattas, gave a Latitude for a Ceſſation of Hoſtilities, but I cannot gather from the Letters I have received from Brigadier General Goddard, that any Endeavours have been exerted to that End, which certainly, circumſtanced as we are, was an Object at leaſt to have been purſued, if we had failed in the Accompliſhment of it.

For your further Information, I encloſe you a Copy of my Letter to General Goddard, and leaſt the Original may miſcarry, as all Land Conveyances are now become very precarious, I beg you will tranſmit him a Copy of it.

Camp, Newtown,
2d March 1781.

I have the Honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servant,
Eyre Coote.

APPENDIX N° 376. A.

Extract of a Letter from the President and Select Committee ... *Eyre Coote, K. B.*
dated 26th April 1781.

IN our Letter of the 15th February, by the Indus, we fully explained our Motive... ...ding to General Goddard a vigorous Profecution of the War againſt the Marattas, w... we thought the moſt probable and rational Method of bringing them to Terms; neither had we in that Caſe any Room for Deliberation, our Line of Conduct being diſtinctly marked out by the Governor General and Council, who, after acquainting us that they had offered Terms to the Maratta Government, direct us, on Receipt of a certain Requiſition and Notification from the Peſhwa, immediately to ſuſpend all Hoſtilities and military Operations; but in the mean Time, and until the Receipt of ſuch Requiſition or Notification, they earneſtly recommended a vigorous Proſecution of the War, ſo far as our Troops were engaged in it; and acquainted us that a ſimilar Order had been ſent to General Goddard.

We are convinced of the Neceſſity, and ſincerely deſirous of bringing the Maratta War to a Concluſion; but it is not becauſe we are deſirous of Peace, or that Peace is neceſſary to our Affairs, that will prove Arguments with the Enemy for conſenting to an Accommodation; and until that happens it would be as impracticable and as unſafe for us to employ the Army againſt the Poſſeſſions of Hyder Ally, as it would be for you to make a Diverſion in our Favour againſt the Marattas: In this Situation we have done the utmoſt in our Power for the Common Cauſe. We have reduced the War on our Part as nearly as poſſible to a mere Syſtem of Defence, and determined to ſend back all the Madras Troops ſerving on this Coaſt, in order to make the Army under your Command more reſpectable and formidable, and thereby to diſtreſs Hyder to the utmoſt Degree that lay within our Power.

It is not to be doubted but that the Marattas and Hyder are bound by mutual Engagements, which we may conclude they will abide by ſo long as they may find it for their Intereſt or Safety. Proviſion muſt therefore be made to reſiſt the Attempts of both theſe Powers until one or other can be detached from their Engagements, or be effectually depreſſed; and it now appears to us that we can only expect this Criſis from the Event of your Operations againſt Hyder, which we have ſanguine Hopes will be attended with the moſt deciſive Succeſs, and that Hyder himſelf will be inclined to Peace now he finds himſelf diſappointed in his Hopes of Aſſiſtance from the French. We then might hope to bring the Marattas to Terms, which it has appeared the Offers from Bengal have not been able to effect; though, as we have already mentioned in our Letter, dated the 6th March, General Goddard, in conſequence of our Recommendation, ſent a Copy of the Articles directly from himſelf to the Miniſter, who had affected Ignorance of their Contents.

We have encloſed a Copy of the Anſwer the General received from the Miniſter, wherein he evidently alludes to, and acknowledges Engagements with, Hyder Ally, and in direct Terms refuſes to accede to the Offers.

We have Advices, which we believe very authentic, of Hyder having ſuſtained a very material Loſs by the blowing up of his Magazine and Powder Works at Bednare, on the 2d or 3d of laſt Month.

No 376. B.

The Requeſts of the Nabob Walla Jah from the Governor General.

1. Let a Treaty be firmly eſtabliſhed between us, which may laſt for ever and be ſubject to no Deviation.

2. I am hereditary Prince of the Carnatic, and of Balla Ghauts under Peanghaut, and am independant of every one, and I have entire Right and Authority over my Country, my Children, my Family, my Servants, and Subjects, and have Power in the political and domeſtic Adminiſtration of my Country. This ought to be altogether dependant on me, and let not my Friends interfere in it.

3. As the Company and Engliſh Nation are the Protectors of my Honour and Government, they will act in thoſe Points only where the Advancement of my Intereſts is concerned.

4. Ten Battalions of well-diſciplined Troops are ſtationed by me with the Company, and are paid by me; let them take nothing from me, except the Pay of them, and let all the Contingent Expences, the Batta for their Marches, and the Repairs of the Forts, be by my Conſent; and let the Accounts of every Three Months be punctually delivered to me within the Sixth Month: When Peace ſhall be reſtored, I will diſcharge the Amount regularly, and let the Governor and

Council

Council of Madras give me a full Receipt, and in Time of Peace let them aſſiſt me with theſe Ten Battalions, that I may ſettle the Country ſubject to me, and derive ſome Advantage from the Expence.

5. Many Polygars, notwithſtanding that they have met with the greateſt Favour from me in Time of Peace, have, from their ambitious and rebellious Views, joined my Enemy Hyder Ally, and began open War; I can therefore never place any Reliance upon them or look upon them as deſerving of Favour. In this Caſe, my Subjects are to be kept in Awe by the Puniſhment of theſe People; for which Aſſiſtance is neceſſary.

6. After Peace and Alliance is made between us and the Engliſh Company, the Enemies, the Security, and the Dangers of both will be the ſame; that is to ſay, whoever of us ſuffers an Injury it will be felt by both of us. I therefore wiſh that the Engliſh in India, or the King of Great Britain, would make a Treaty of Peace with the King of France; and let the Peace and Security of the Carnatic, and the Rights of my Government, without the Connection of any one, and my Power to appoint a Succeſſor in the Carnatic, be ſettled in a ſolid Manner, and included in the Treaty.

7. In the Garriſons of my Forts, Commandants and Pay-maſters are ſent, who at the Advice of their Dabpaſh's, with a View to Profit, lend Money to the Ryots at an exorbitant Intereſt, and afterwards are preſſing for the Money, and interfere in the Government and aſſiſt one another, by which great Injury is done to my Subjects and to myſelf: Let it be poſitively ordered, that without my Permiſſion no one lend Money to my Subjects, and that for what is paſt as well as future the Intereſt on all Loans be 12 per Cent. per Annum, and that if any Perſon ſhould act contrary to this, and ſhould diſtreſs the Ryots, I ſhall complain againſt him, and requeſt his Removal; and the Governor and Council of Madras will remove him from his Office, and appoint another Perſon in his room.

8. My conſtant Wiſh has been to diſcharge the Money due to the Troops ſtationed by the Company, and I have always exerted myſelf for this Purpoſe; from the Commencement of my Connection I have paid very conſiderable Sums on this Account, and on the Day that Hyder invaded the Carnatic I owed the Governor and Council of Madras leſs than One Lack of Pagodas, which I was in Hopes of diſcharging by receiving Bills from the Bankers in the Country, when in the mean while the Attack of our Enemy began, and inſtead of paying the Balance in Money to the Company, provided in my Country a greater Amount than that in Rice and Bullocks and Sheep for the Army, beſides the Stores in my Forts, of which there is a large Supply in Trichinopoly, and a great Quantity in Velore, &c. and what was in thoſe Forts which our Enemy has taken is in his Poſſeſſion; had not my bad Deſtiny produced many Obſtacles, there is no Doubt but at this Time I ſhould not have been indebted One ſingle Pagoda to the Company. Of ſeveral Talooks of the Carnatic, which are ſtill ſecure from our Enemy, the Collections are included in the Accounts of the Company, but ſome Talooks are aſſigned to my Creditors, and ſome I have received the Paiſhgall in Advance; for whatever is collected from thoſe Mahls, let it be expended for the Company; but for the Satisfaction of my Creditors, my Friends muſt be juſt; as ſoon as the Enemy ſhall have left my Country, let the Collections of thoſe Talooks be given to my Creditors in order to pay off their Principals agreeable to my Engagements with them.

9. For ſeveral Reaſons, and from the Invaſion of my Enemy, which are not unknown to my Friends, I am greatly diſtreſſed, and my Subjects are not in a State to ſuffer me to have any Hopes from them. With my Exertions and Endeavours alone, it is difficult to adjuſt my Concerns; it is neceſſary that my Friends ſhould be juſt and favourable to me, and ſhould aſſiſt me in this Manner, by giving into my Hands, after the Defeat of our Enemy, the Talook of Herpah and Zurghaut, and ſeveral Mahls in Ballaghaut belonging to Carnatic Peanghaut, which are in my Country, and are my Right; and I will maintain in my Service 5000 well-diſciplined Horſe for the Collection of it.

10. The Talooks of Tanjore, which are my Right, I, at a conſiderable Expence, conformably to the Rules and Practice of Hindoſtan, took Poſſeſſion of; in this my Friends aſſiſted me, for which I returned them Thanks; ſince that they have, at the ſole Inſtigation of Self-intereſted People, taken it from me by Force, which has brought great Damage to me, my Subjects, and Creditors: To this Time ſuch is the Situation. Numbers of my Creditors are Engliſhmen, which is not unknown to you, as I have repeatedly written to you. From that Time my Right has been given up to a Ryot of mine, but no Advantage has accrued from it to the Company's Concerns; but on the contrary, he has connected himſelf ſtrictly with Hyder Ally and the Marattas, and has refuſed to ſupply Money and Stores, but keeps all his Money in Negapatam, a Dutch Settlement. If my Friends would act juſtly, and give the Talook to me, great Advantage would be derived to the Company's and my Affairs, and the Views of our Enemies would be counteracted: Otherwiſe let the whole Collections of Tanjore be appropriated to the Payment of the Carnatic Army, my public and private Debts, and the Expulſion of our Enemy. Tanjore is a Talook of the Carnatic; and let a Share of it be aſſigned to my Creditors, that they may be quieted and pacified in ſome Degree till my Friends in England ſhall have done me Juſtice, and let the Governor General and Council, conformably to their Juſtice and Greatneſs, write about this Matter, which is my Right.

The Governor General and Council have the Adminiſtation of the Affairs of India; if the Enquiry into this Matter depends on the Gentlemen in Europe, it is for the general Advantage that they ſhould write about it. I am the Friend of the Company: The great Weight of Debts, the Mortgaging

gaging my Jewels, and the Sale of them, have brough me a Diſgrace and Diſtreſs which the Company never meant to come upon their old Friend.

11. Beſides the Expences of the Company, the Pay of oops, the native Bankers, my Creditors, the Hindoo and Muſſulmen Securities, I am indebt t 70 Lacks of Pagodas to European Creditors, both old and new; and People living under otection of the Company; reflect on the Payment of ſuch large Sums. I am plunged into a S iſtreſs. Except from the Aſſiſtance of my Friends, I can ſee no Releaſe from this heavy Load, d from ſuch Anxiety might apply myſelf to the Cultivation of the Country, and th I therefore beg your Advice and Sentiments on this Point, which I requeſt you as no Injury may ariſe to my Concerns and Reputation, no Detriment to my Cred Company.

A true Copy.
E. Hay,
Actg Secry.

Replies from the Honourable the Governor General and Council to the Requeſts of the Nabob Walla Jah.

1. A temporary Treaty ſhall be made, ſubject to the Reviſion and Approbation of the Company, and it is hoped that this may ſerve as the Baſis of another Treaty, to be concluded under the Orders and Inſtructions of the Company, and even with the Sanction of the Engliſh Parliament, which may endure for ever, and rendered ſo binding, that it ſhall not be in the Power of any Individual to break it, or to depart from it.

2. The Right and Authority which the Nabob poſſeſſes over his Country, his Children, his Family, his Servants, and Subjects, in all the political and domeſtic Adminiſtration of his Country, we will maintain and ſupport.

3. Certainly.

4. Both the Pay of theſe Troops, and their Batta and contingent Expences, and even the Repairs of the Forts, if any Repairs are neceſſary, ought undoubtedly to be charged to the Nabob's Account, becauſe theſe are Expences incurred for his own immediate Service; and in the Time of War muſt depend upon the Commander in Chief of the Forces, under the cuſtomary Regulations and Reſtrictions. The Remainder of this Article is very proper; but it ſeems ſtrange to us that a Claim ſhould be made of this Kind, or any Doubts implied concerning it.

5. The Nabob is the Maſter of his own Country, and the Diſtributer of Juſtice to his own Subjects. This is ſo clear that it appears as if ſomething more was meant than is expreſſed in the Propoſition.

6. In whatever Treaty ſhall be concluded between the Nabob and the Company, it will of courſe be ſtipulated, that the Friends or Enemies of either Party ſhould be held as equally the Friends or Enemies of the other, and their Intereſt, their Safety, and their Danger the ſame. Such has been the implied Condition of the Alliance hitherto ſubſiſting between the Nabob and the Company, although unſupported by any written Engagements. Reſpecting the latter Claim of this Article, we are informed by Aſſam Cawn, the Nabob's Dewan, that the Nabob poſſeſſes Letters from the Company, the King's Miniſter, and the King himſelf, on the Subject of his Will; and he has produced Copies of thoſe from the King and from the Company, which all expreſs a clear Acknowledgment of the Nabob's Right to appoint a Succeſſor to the Government of the Carnatic. It is therefore unneceſſary, and would be unbecoming in this Government, to make any Proviſion, even in a temporary Treaty for ſuch Event; which we hope is far diſtant. Such Acknowledgments are equivalent to Treaties, and of the higheſt poſſible Authority; and muſt be binding on all the Servants of the Company, and on all the King's Subjects.

7. We are greatly afflicted that any Occaſion ſhould have been afforded for ſuch Complaints as are ſtated in this Article; they are no leſs repugnant to Juſtice, than injurious to the Engliſh Reputation. We are willing to engage on the Part of the Engliſh Company, and of all their Dependants, that no one under their Authority ſhall be permitted to lend Money to any of the Nabob's Subjects for the Time to come: That it ſhall be prohibited in public Orders. And it is equitable, that if any Perſon ſhall act contrary to this Prohibition, or ſhall oppreſs the Ryots, the Nabob ſhall have a Right to require his Removal: And that the Governor and Council of Madras ſhall be bound in ſuch Requiſition to remove him, and to bring him to a public Trial, that he may ſuffer ſuch Sentence as ſhall be due to the Degree of the Offence, if it ſhall be eſtabliſhed againſt him. But as we conceive that it will be often difficult in Caſes of this Nature to obtain ſuch Evidence of the Facts as the ſtrict Forms of our military Laws require, and muſt in every Caſe render the Nabob popularly obnoxious, by ſtanding forth, as he neceſſarily muſt, in the Character of a Proſecutor, againſt the Servants of the Company, to whom he ought never to be known but by Acts of Benevolence; and as the Appointment to military Commands in his Country is intended for his ſole Benefit and the Support of his Government and Intereſts; we proceed yet further to declare, that the Nabob has a juſt Claim to object

object to the Appointment of any Perſon of whom he ſhall diſapprove, to any Command in his Country, or to the Continuance of any Perſon in ſuch Command, againſt whom he ſhall have Cauſe of ſufficient Validity for his own Conviction to object; and that in every ſuch Caſe the Governor and Council ought to conform to his Opinions: But the invariable Application of this Rule can only be admitted in a Time of Peace. In a State of actual War it might be productive of dangerous Conſequences, and the Principle on which it is conſtructed muſt be therefore in ſuch a Seaſon left to the Equity of the Governor and Council, and the Diſcretion of the Commander in Chief of the Forces.

8. This is juſt. Let the Nabob conſent and engage to aſſign all the Revenues of his Country during the War, without any Exception, to the Company, for the actual Support of the War. Let the Collections and their Aſſignments be made by his own Aumils, in Conjunction with Perſons appointed by the Preſident and Council of Fort Saint George, and inveſted with an Authority from him to receive from the Aumils all the Money which ſhall be collected, and to intercept and ſeize all Sums of Money which the Aumils or others ſhall attempt to ſecrete from the Diſtricts under their Juriſdiction, that the Whole may be applied and excluſively appropriated to the Service of the War, excepting ſuch Sums as the Nabob ſhall require to be paid immediately to himſelf for his and the neceſſary Diſburſements of his Country: That he will remove and puniſh ſuch of his Aumils as ſhall attempt to elude this Regulation; and that the Perſons as above mentioned appointed to receive the Revenues, as the Pledge of their Integrity ſhall be required to ſwear that they will be true to the Truſt repoſed in them, and that they will neither receive nor permit to be taken, either directly or indirectly, any Portion of the Revenues but ſuch as they ſhall bring to a public Account. That of ſuch Talooks as have been aſſigned to the Nabob's Creditors, the nett Sums of the Collections ſhall be received into the Company's Treaſury for the Service of the War, as above provided, but carried to the Credit of the collective Head of the Nabob's Creditors, to whom they have been aſſigned, to be hereafter diſtributed amongſt them according to their reſpective Claims. By this Arrangement the Reſources of the Carnatic will be applied, as they ought to be, to its immediate Defence and Preſervation, and the Nabob's Faith and the Rights of the Creditors will be ſecured: And this is agreeable to the Requeſt which the Creditors themſelves have formerly made.

9. The Recovery of the Carnatic from the Hands of the Enemy muſt be our firſt Object; that of its Dependencies will be ſecond: But it will reſt upon our Ability. It cannot be made a fixed Article of a Treaty, the Purpoſe for which the propoſed Annexations of Curkapah and Zeer Ghaut Gutti, and the ſeveral Mahals in Balaghaut, which belong to Carnatic Payen Ghaut, is profeſſed to be intended, is equally neceſſary for the Service of the Nabob and of the Company: And the future Security of their common Intereſts; and therefore muſt be equally the Deſire of both.

10. This Government has no Authority to enquire into the reciprocal Claims of the Nabob and the Rajah of Tanjore; theſe are before a higher and a competent Tribunal. We can only require that as the Zemindary of Tanjore is a Member of the Soubah or Province of Carnatic, its Reſources ſhall in like Manner be primarily, and at this Time of common Danger, be excluſively applied to the Maintenance of the Forces employed in the Defence and Preſervation of the Whole: That the Revenues be taken in Aſſignment and put under a Commiſſion, ſimilar to that propoſed for the reſt of the Carnatic, and received and applied in the ſame Manner, and for the ſame Purpoſes. This Requiſition has been partly made, and ſhall be repeated in the above Terms to the Preſident and Council at Fort Saint George; but it will reſt with them to conform to it, or by rejecting it to take the Reſponſibility of it upon themſelves.

11. Our Advice is this, that a new Adjuſtment be made of all the Nabob's Debts contracted with Britiſh Subjects, without any Diſtinction of old Debts; of thoſe of a more recent Kind, called his Conſolidated Debts; or of others newly contracted, but not yet brought to any public Account or Adjuſtment: That the Intereſt upon the whole and each Debt ſhall be allowed and added to the original Debt, to the 25th November 1781, and thenceforward ſhall ceaſe: That from ſuch Debts as have been transferred from the original Proprietors, by Purchaſe or otherwiſe, a Deduction ſhall be made of 25 per Cent. from the whole Amount: And the Remainder be the Sum for which the Nabob ſhall be finally debited: That the Adjuſtment being made in this Manner, the Sum adjuſted to be reſpectively due to each Creditor, ſhall be brought to his ſeparate Credit: That Company's Bonds, with the uſual Intereſt, ſhall be granted to each who ſhall be entitled to a Share in the Sums received on Account of the aſſigned Revenues in the Proportion of his reſpective Debt: And in like Manner to the Creditors for Advances made on the Security of the public Revenue for the Sums brought to their Account; and that it ſhall be left to the Nabob, with the Concurrence of the Preſident and Council of Fort Saint George, and the Sanction of the Governor General and Council, to appropriate ſuch a Portion of the Revenues after the Concluſion of the War, or any Period of it, which ſhall admit of ſuch an Application of them, as an Aſſignment for the Annual Payment of the Debt, until the Whole ſhall be diſcharged: That this Plan is recommended, both to the Nabob, the Preſident and Council of Fort Saint George and the Creditors, and will be ſubmitted to the Company in the firſt Advices to them from the Preſidency.

If an Agreement ſhall take place according to the above-mentioned Plan, it will be neceſſary, both for the Purpoſe of rendering it effectual, and for preventing the like Diſtreſſes from falling on the Nabob and Individuals in future, that the Nabob ſhall ſolemnly engage that he will never hereafter borrow Money from the Company's Servants, or any other Britiſh Subjects: That the moſt public Notice

Notice ſhall be given, that no Loans to the Nabob
valid, or the Loans recoverable by any Influence or
tives: And the Governor General and Council will
pany, and their Repreſentatives, that no Authority
Saint George, ſhall be employed for the Recovery o[illegible]

onds accepted upon ſuch Loans, ſhall be
erence of the Company or its Repreſenta-
: on their Part, for themſelves, the Com-
Company, or of the Preſidency of Fort
-hts ſo contracted.

1780 and the 1st May 1781.

D. C.

To Receipts, which are expected llowing Departments, within the 30th

GENERA T.

Civil.

Draughts on Europe for Lord C		8,32,214	15	—
Certificates to the Commanders		7,28,634	11	1
16 Ships, at £. 8,000 each		2,34,968	—	2
utta Customs, as in 1778-9		17,220	—	—
t Duties, as in 1778-9		74,934	14	—
lections in the Poſtmaſter Ge		61,085	8	—
Dions of Chandernagore		1,61,356	4	11
heyte Sing's Tribute fo		57,063	4	10
		4,636	4	1
		81,415	—	—
dy from the Nabo		1,06,523	13	4
		4,619	12	11
Batta		23,677	8	8
				23,88,350 1 —

of the eſtimated Expen contingent Charges,

dargades ſerving in h		4,83,122	10	6
		67,983	7	6
ajee Sing's Subſidy for ew		50,000	—	—
ar				6,01,106 2 —
				29,89,456 3 —

ales of Military Stores, as in

Amount to be received from ary General.

Marine.

Amount Sales of Marine Stores, 1,45,61,521 7 6

REVENU

Receipts of Revenue expecte

Wm. Larkins,
Accountant General.

AL DEPARTMENT.

Board of Trade in 1780-1

Current Rupees

D.

To Receipts — — — — Brought forward — — —		34,06,73,567 1 6

COMMERCIAL DEPARTMENT.

Receipts expected, as per their Estimate of the probable Receipts and Disbursements of their Department, within the 30th April 1780 and the 1st May 1781.

Import Sales — — — — — — —	13,00,000 — —		
Ophium — — — — — — —	10,00,000 — —		
Salt — — — — — — —	3,87,940 9 3		
		26,87,940 9 3	
			4,33,61,507 10 9
To Excess of Disbursements — — — — — — — — —			27,28,778 4 9
Rupees —			4,60,90,285 15 6

C.

By Disbursements — — — — Brought forward — —			2,49,68,154 8 18

REVENUE DEPARTMENT.

Charges of the following Divisions, as in 1778-9.

Khalsa — — —	4,00,623 15 —	
Provincial Council of Revenue of Burdwan	7,15,674 5 —	
Provincial Council of Revenue of Dacca	3,85,005 2 7 3	
Provincial Council of Revenue of Dinagepore — — —	2,55,206 4 18 3	
Provincial Council of Revenue of Moorshedabad — — —	10,15,077 12 5	
Provincial Council of Revenue of Patna	3,57,604 14 10	
Calcutta Committee of Revenue —	6,65,712 9 4 1	
Collector of Boglepore — —	82,219 11 3 1	
Collector of Chittagong — —	89,690 8 15 1	
Collector of Putteh Sing — —	23,481 10 13	
Collector of Jungleterry — —	11,651 3 —	
Collector of Midnapore — —	50,368 1 18	
Collector of Rajemehal — —	25,511 8 15	
Collector of Ramgur — —	39,803 12 5	
Collector of Rungpore — —	1,10,690 — 7	
Collector of Silhurris — —	13,650 — —	
Collector of Silhet — —	28,260 10 3	
Collector of Sircar Sarun — —	47,413 12 5	
	42,97,645 14 8	
Batta 16 per Cent. —	6,87,623 5 10	
		49,85,269 3 11

GOVERNMENT CUSTOMS.

Charges of the following, as in 1778-9.

Board of Customs — — —	15,632 6 —	
Collector of Government Customs at Calcutta — — —	73,386 1 10	
Collector of Government Customs at Chittagong — — —	1,092 — —	
Collector of Goverement Customs at Dacca	18,588 8 —	
Collector of Government Customs at Houghly — — —	16,817 13 8	
Collector of Government Customs at Moorshedabad — — —	28,868 1 19	
Collector of Government Customs at Patna	31,207 15 —	
	1,85,592 13 17	
Batta 16 per Cent. —	29,694 13 14 3	
		2,15,287 11 7

DURBAR DEPARTMENT, at Moorshedabad.

Stipends and Allowances, as in 1778-9 —	24,60,568 2 17 1		
Sundry Charges — Do —	65,001 9 2 2		
	25,25,569 11 19 3		
Batta 16 per Cent. —	4,04,091 2 11 1		
		29,29,660 14 7	
Lord Clive's Jaghire for One Year — — —		2,58,631 2 —	
Commission on the Revenues — — —		1,16,892 5 6	
			85,05,741 5 7

Extraordinary Disbursements, as in 1778-9.

Profit and Loss — — — —	49,143 15 2 2		
Salt Advances and Charges — — —	9,579 12 12		
Salt Petre Advances and Charges — — —	55,817 13 10		
Ophium Advances and Charges — — —	7,61,851 8 12 1		
Chowkey Bundy — — — —	33,227 14 6 1		
Elephants at Seiket — — —	7,128 13 1		
Tuckavy — — — —	28,414 — 9		
	9,45,163 13 13		
Batta 16 per Cent. — — —	1,51,226 3 9 1		
		10,96,390 1 1	
			96,02,131 6 8
By Extraordinary Disbursements.			3,45,70,285 15

COMMERCIAL DEPARTMENT.

Amount to be advanced to the Board of Trade in 1780-1 — — — — — —			1,00,00,000 — —
Supplies to other Presidencies.			
Bombay — — — — — — — —	15,00,000 — —		
St. Helena — — — — — — — —	20,000 — —		
		15,20,000 — —	
			1,15,20,000 — —
Current Rupees — —			4,60,90,285 15 6

Fort William,
Accountant General's Office,
the 1st March 1780.

Errors excepted.

Wm Larkins,
Accountant General.

A

At a Court of Directors of the United East India Company, held the 20th March 1782;

William Mills, Junior, Eſquire, delivered in a Paper, intituled, "Eſtimate of probable Receipts and Diſburſements of the Bengal Government, between the 30th April 1781 and the 1ſt May 1782;" viz.

ESTIMATE of probable Receipts and Disbursements of the Bengal Government, between the 30th April 1781 and the 1st May 1782.

D.

To Receipts.

Resources.

GENERAL DEPARTMENT.

Civil.

Calcutta Customs		4,15,000	
Mint Duties		25,000	
Pollage		61,000	
Rajah Cheyt Sing's Tribute		25,77,000	
			30,78,000

Military.

Army Subsidy from the Nabob Asoph-ul-Dowlah		34,63,000	
Amount to be received from him, for the Pay, &c. of Troops employed for the Defence of his Dominions, not guaranteed by Treaty	37,75,000		
		72,38,000	
Rajah Cheyt Sing's Subsidy		5,45,000	
		77,83,000	
			1,08,61,000

REVENUE DEPARTMENT.

Land Revenues		24,52,000	
Government Customs		11,32,000	
	Sa Rs	2,53,84,000	
Batta 16 per Cent.		40,61,440	
		2,94,45,440	
			4,03,06,440

Extraordinary Receipts.

GENERAL DEPARTMENT.

Civil.

Collections of Chandernagore		19,000	
Drafts on Europe		10,00,000	
		10,19,000	

Military.

Sales of Military Stores		42,000	
To be received for the Sale of the Powder Works		24,000	
		66,000	

Marine.

Sales of Naval Stores		19,000	
		11,04,000	

REVENUE DEPARTMENT.

Ophium Sales		11,48,000	
Salt		9,68,000	
	Sa Rs	21,16,000	
Batta 16 per Cent.		3,38,560	
		24,54,560	

COMMERCIAL DEPARTMENT.

Import Sales		14,28,000	
			49,86,560
			4,52,93,000
Current Rupees			4,52,93,000

Fort William,
Accountant General's Office,
the 13th January 1781.

C.

By Disbursements.

Charges.

GENERAL DEPARTMENT.

Civil.

Civil Charges		25,19,000	
Supreme Court	4,89,000		
Law Suits	1,43,000		
	6,32,000		
		31,51,000	

Military.

Pay, &c. for the Troops, as estimated by the Military Paymaster General, Troops within the Provinces, and at Cawnpore		98,00,000	
Ds maintained for the Defence of the Nabob's Dominions, not guaranteed by Treaty		37,75,000	
Ds with General Goddard		24,42,000	
Ds with Major Camac		19,47,000	
Ds with Colonel Pearse		19,76,000	
Ds with General Coote		7,20,000	
		2,06,60,000	
Military Storekeepers Disbursements, as in 1779-80		7,91,000	
Agent Victualler of the Garrison		1,30,000	

Military Buildings, &c.

At the Presidency	4,20,000		
Dinapore and Burrampore	1,11,000		
	5,31,000		
		2,21,12,000	

Marine.

Presidency	4,41,000		
Chittagong	41,000		
	4,82,000		
		2,57,65,000	

REVENUE DEPARTMENT.

Charges of collecting the Land Revenues		42,76,000	
——— the Government Customs		2,04,000	
Commission on the Revenues		93,000	
Lord Clive's Jaghire		2,23,000	
Ds of the Durbar Department at Moorshedabad		21,29,000	
	Sa Rs	69,25,000	
Batta 16 per Cent.		11,88,000	
		80,33,000	
			3,37,78,000

Extraordinary Disbursements.

GENERAL DEPARTMENT.

Civil.

Collector of Chandernagore		11,000	
Commissary of the Effects taken from the French		76,000	
Interest on Money borrowed		7,00,000	
		7,87,000	

REVENUE DEPARTMENT.

Profit and Loss		5,000	
Salt Petre Advances		18,000	
Ophium		7,90,000	
Choukey Bundy		3,000	
Elephants		2,000	
	Sa Rs	8,18,000	
Batta 16 per Cent.		1,30,880	
		9,48,880	

Supplies to the other Presidencies.

Bombay		15,00,000	
Bencoolen		2,00,000	
St. Helena		30,000	
Madras requires 84 Lacks, but the utmoft that can be afforded from theſe Funds is		67,21,120	
		84,51,120	

COMMERCIAL DEPARTMENT.

Import Sales, which they will probably withhold		14,28,000	
			1,15,15,000
			4,52,93,000
Current Rupees			4,52,93,000

Errors excepted.
(Signed) Wm Larkins, Accountant General.

APPEND

APPENDIX, N° 378.

BY a Statement laid before the Board by the Governor General, the 5th of July 1779, it appeared that the Expences of General Goddard's Detachment from May 1778 to April 1779, amounted to — — — Cur^{t} R^{s} 28,02,509 15 10

The Letter from the Governor General and Council, in their Public Department, dated 14th January 1780, ſtates the Amount of Bills drawn by General ary Goddard ſince his Arrival at Surat,* to be Sicca Rupees 32,49,090. 7. 1.
or CR^{s} 37,68,944 — —

And Specie ſupplied him, viz.

By Bills — — — — — —	5,00,000	
By the Britannia — — — — —	8,00,000	
And by the Beſborourgh — — — —	2,00,000	
		15,00,000

Beſides 5 Lacks loſt on the Stafford.

By Letter from the Select Committee of Bombay to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, dated 31ſt December 1779, Par. 35 and 76, it appears that General Goddard had been furniſhed by that Preſidency with — 6,00,000

See Bombay Sel. Conſ. 21ſt Septr 1779. Folio 440
26th Decr 723.

In the Eſtimate of Bengal Reſources and Diſburſements for the Year 1780-81, the Expence of General Goddard's Detachment is eſtimated at 36,27,518

Deduct Diſburſements on Account of the Bombay Detachment ſerving under General Goddard — — — — — 3,09,570
33,17,948

C^{t} R^{s} — 119,89,401 15 10

377. Expence of Captain Popham's Detachment for 1780-81, eſtimated at — 11,73,743

N. B. The Expences of other Detachments may be viewed in the Eſtimates for 1781-2, in Appendix, 377.

Extract of the Proceedings of the Governor General and Council at Fort William, in their Public Department, 5th July 1779.

Governor General—The Amount of the Expences of the Detachment under General Goddard, from the 30th April 1778 to the 1ſt of May laſt, is Current Rupees, 28,02,509. 15. 10. as I am informed by the following Account from the Military Paymaſter General.

Honourable Sir,

In Compliance with your Orders, I ſend you annexed, an Account of the Monthly Expences of the Bombay Detachment, from the 1ſt of May 1778, to the 30th of April 1779.

Calcutta, 5th July 1779.

I have the Honour, &c.
(Signed) Wm Pawſon.
Mr Pr Mr Genl.

May 1778 — — —	1,38,904	1	2
June D° — — — —	3,17,587	15	1
July D° — — — —	2,42,738	—	1
Auguſt D° — — — —	2,19,003	—	5
September D° — — —	2,13,761	1	11
October D° — — — —	2,33,589	6	6
November D° — — —	2,15,241	14	4
December D° — — —	2,31,745	—	9
January 1779 — — —	2,72,857	—	8
February D° — — —	2,35,684	13	4
March D° — — — —	2,46,662	3	9
April D° — — — —	2,34,735	5	10
Current Rupees —	28,02,509	15	10

Extract of Letter from the Governor General and Council at Fort William, in their Public Department, to the Court of Directors; dated 14th January 1780.

Par. 44. The Drafts made upon us by General Goddard ſince his Arrival at Surat, have amounted to Sicca Rupees 32,49,090. 7. 1. beſides which, we have ſupplied him by Bills 5 Lacks, in Specie by the Britannia 8 Lacks, and by the Beſborough 2 Lacks.

45. The great Diſadvantage ſuffered by the Company in the low Rate of Exchange obtained by General Goddard for his Bills, ſome of which were drawn at 93, and none higher than 95 Surat Rupees for 100 Calcutta Siccas, induced us to put a Stop to his Power of drawing, and to adopt the Remittance of Bullion, as a preſent Mode of Supply, which may enable us to bring back the Exchange ſomewhat nearer to its original Standard.

46. The united Demands upon us from Bombay, General Goddard, and the different Offices here, for the neceſſary Charges of our own Eſtabliſhments, added to the total Loſs of 5 Lacks in the Stafford, have ſo far dried up our immediate Reſources, that we have been obliged to refuſe any further Compliance with the Application of the Preſidency of Fort Saint George for Caſh, and to excuſe ourſelves from ſending the Balance, being 5 Lacks, which remained to compleat the Supply of 15 Lacks, promiſed to them in March laſt

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APPENDIX, N° 379.

Extract of Circular Letter from the Committee of Secrecy to Bengal, Fort Saint George, and Bombay; dated the 24th March 1780.

YOU have been informed by our Secret Committee of the Deſigns of the Enemy to attempt the Capture of our Settlements. You will be vigilant to guard againſt Surprize, and communicate theſe Particulars to the Commander in Chief of His Majeſty's Ships in India, and to every other Preſident and Council, ſo ſoon as poſſible. The French expect to be joined by the Marattas or Hyder Ally, at or near Callicut, who are ſaid to be impatient for their Arrival. Bombay is probably their Object. We moſt earneſtly deſire that Peace may be ſpeedily concluded with the Marattas, on the Terms of excluding the French from that Side of India; and that our Friendſhip and Connection with Hyder Ally may be ſtrengthened as much and as ſpeedily as poſſible, on the ſame Terms.

We are
Your loving Friends,
(Signed) Wm James,
Wm Devaynes,
Lau. Sulivan,
John Harriſon,
Henry Savage,
John Manſhip,
J. Purling.

Circular Letter from the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors to the following Preſidencies; Bengal, Fort Saint George, Bombay, and China.

Encloſed we tranſmit for your particular Information Copy of His Majeſty's Order in Council, dated the 17th of April Inſtant, declaring that the Subjects of the United Provinces are henceforward to be conſidered upon the ſame Footing with thoſe of other neutral States, not privileged by Treaty; and ſuſpending proviſionally, and till further Order, all the particular Stipulations reſpecting the Freedom of Navigation and Commerce, in Time of War, of the Subjects of the States General, contained in the ſeveral Treaties now ſubſiſting between His Majeſty and the Republic.

But although the Situation of the Affairs of this Country is rendered thus critical reſpecting the States General; and although that Republic, by their Failure in the Execution of their Part in the ſeveral Treaties with Great Britain, have juſtly forfeited, and by His Majeſty's Proclamation are declared to have forfeited, all particular Rights and Privileges which they were entitled to under the ſaid Treaties; yet, His Majeſty ſtill conſiders them as in a State of Amity with Great Britain, only reduced by their own Conduct to the Situation of a neutral State, not privileged by Treaty.

Upon this Ground we caution you to avoid becoming Aggreſſors in any Act of Hoſtility againſt the Subjects of the Republic in India, and direct, that your Conduct be ſuch only as ſhall tend to the Preſervation of that good Underſtanding which ſtill ſubſiſts between the Two Countries.

But

But at the ſame Time that we recommend to you the moſt ſcrupulous Attention to avoid any Offence or Act of Aggreſſion whatever againſt the Subjects or Poſſeſſions of the Republic, you will moſt vigilantly guard againſt any Conſequences which may eventually ariſe from the Meaſures which His Majeſty has been under the Neceſſity of adopting. We do not mean, however, that you ſhall take any other Steps, in conſequence of this Suggeſtion, but ſuch as ſhall be warranted by that Line of Prudence and Caution which the Security of the Company's Poſſeſſions and Property ſhall fully juſtify, and of which the States General ſhall have no well-grounded Reaſon of Complaint.

London,
29th April 1781.

We are
Your loving Friends,
(Signed) Wm Devaynes,
Lau. Sulivan,
George Cuming,
John Harriſon,
Ben. Booth.

APPENDIX, N° 380.

Extract of General Letter to Bengal, dated 2d February 1781.

Par. 35. OUR Select Committee at Bombay have tranſmitted us a Copy of the Treaty which General Goddard has concluded with Futty Sing. By a Letter from our ſaid Committee, dated the 16th of March 1780, we were led to hope for a favourable and ſpeedy Concluſion to a Negociation which had then been opened with Madjee Scindia; and although the Event has proved otherwiſe, yet as Scindia has ſince experienced the Superiority of our Arms, we think it probable that he may again be induced to offer or accept reaſonable Terms. If not, we have little Doubt of his being ſoon compelled thereto by the Force employed on that Service, under ſo active and able an Officer as General Goddard.

36. In the beforementioned Letter, we find our Select Committee of Bombay had repreſented to General Goddard the Importance of obtaining Poſſeſſion of Baſſein, and offered it as their Opinion, that no other Object could claim a Preference to the General's Attention, or bring the Campaign to a more honourable and advantageous Concluſion; they alſo flattered themſelves, that General Goddard having been reinforced with Troops from Madras, would be able to protect effectually our Poſſeſſions in Guzerat, and to undertake the Siege of Baſſein; and if this Plan of Operations has been purſued, we hope it has been attended with the deſired Succeſs.

37. It ſeems to be the Opinion of our ſaid Committee, (provided no Efforts would be made by the French to retrieve their Affairs in India) that the Views of the Company, after eſtabliſhing ourſelves at Baſſein and ſecuring our Share of the Guzerat Country, ſhould be merely defenſive.

38. No material Objection to this Plan occurs to us at preſent, provided due Care be taken that our European Enemies are prevented from regaining their Influence, and precluded from ſettling in the Maratta Dominions. It would however be ſtill more eligible if Proviſion could be made for reimburſing the heavy Charges incurred by the War; but if this be found impracticable, we think a Relaxation in the Demand for Indemnification, would be more prudent than further Prolongation of the War on that Account.

39. We obſerve that when you firſt reſolved to ſend Military Aſſiſtance to Bombay, you underſtood the Plan of Operation to be confined merely to the Objects of Security to the Engliſh Poſſeſſions in India, and to the Excluſion of the natural Enemies of the Britiſh Government, from any Influence or Connection with the Marattas, *and you made it an expreſs Condition of your Concurrence, that our Servants at Bombay ſhould withdraw their Forces ſo ſoon as the End required and defined ſhould be accompliſhed.*

40. Theſe Sentiments are conſonant to our own Ideas, agreeable to the general Tenor of our repeated Orders and Inſtructions, and conſiſtent with the Intereſt of the Company. And although the want of Succeſs in the Bombay Expedition might render it neceſſary to carry your Views further * than were firſt intended, and the Honour of the Company, which had been deeply wounded by the diſgraceful Convention of Worgaum, called for the ſtrongeſt Exertions, as well to reſtore and preſerve the Reputation of our Arms, as to reduce the Enemy to the Neceſſity of liſtening to reaſonable Terms of Accommodation; yet as we truſt theſe Ends have been anſwered, and as the French are alſo expelled

* Powers to conclude a Treaty with Futty Sing were not given to General Goddard till December 1779, which was nearly 11 Months after the Convention of Worgaum.

from

from India, we enjoin you to convince the Marattas, and all the native Powers around you, that our Troops ſhall not be employed againſt our Neighbours, unleſs they become the Aggreſſors; and that we utterly diſavow all Ideas of diſturbing the Public Tranquillity for the Sake of Conqueſt.

41. Hoping therefore that our Arms have continued ſucceſsful, that the acquired Countries in the Guzerat Province are properly ſecured, and that Baſſein is in our Poſſeſſion, the Reſtoration of Peace becomes an Object of our moſt earneſt Deſire; and it will give us inexpreſſible Satisfaction to find it eſtabliſhed upon a Footing ſo advantageous to the Company.

42. The open and avowed Predilection of the Court of Poona in favour of French Agents, was the only Ground upon which we countenanced Hoſtilities againſt the Marattas. Upon the Removal of European Influence we repeat our moſt anxious Solicitude to have a ſpeedy Termination put to the War; and as Conqueſt is by no Means our Object, we deſire no other Benefit from the late Succeſs of our Arms, than a full Compliance with the Stipulations of the Treaty of Poorunder, and the Ceſſion of Baſſein, as a neceſſary Appendage to Salſette.

43. In order therefore to manifeſt to the ruling Powers of Poona the Sincerity of our Diſpoſition to be at Peace upon honourable Terms, we ſhall have no Objection, on the above Conditions, to reſtore the Guzerat Countries, provided the Safety and Honour of Futty Sing be effectually ſecured, unleſs better Terms have been or can be ſoon and eaſily obtained.

44. But if, contrary to our Expectations, unfortunate Circumſtances ſhall have rendered it impoſſible to make Peace with the Marattas on the above Conditions; and if ſupporting the War ſhall be found impracticable, without reducing our Inveſtments, and depriving us of thoſe Aids which Bengal has uſually furniſhed to our China Trade; in ſuch Caſe a ſpeedy Accommodation with the Marattas will be neceſſary upon the beſt Terms poſſible, taking Care that the Faith and Honour of the Company be in all Reſpects inviolably preſerved, and that effectual Proviſion be made for the Security of our Poſſeſſions.

45. Our Select Committee entertained Hopes that their Views in Point of Territory might be eſtabliſhed in a few Months; they therefore propoſed ſtating their Sentiments on the Subject to you, and alſo reſpecting the great Importance of reducing the Charges of the War to more moderate Bounds than could be expected whilſt the Troops of other Preſidencies are ſerving with thoſe of Bombay; and to theſe important Objects you will not fail to pay early Attention. Indeed we aſſure ourſelves that the Reduction of Expence will appear to you ſo abſolutely neceſſary, that every Step will be taken which ſhall have a Tendency to bring it within the moſt moderate Bounds.

46. You will have been informed, that the Forts of Perſick and Bellapore have been ſurprized by Detachments from Bombay; that a conſiderable Quantity of Grain had been thereby obtained, of which they were in great Want; and that a Source of future Supply is opened, which in the preſent State of Affairs appears of the utmoſt Conſequence.

47. It is with Pleaſure we remark, that although our Servants at Bombay ſeem in ſome Degree hurt by the independant Powers granted by you to General Goddard, the moſt perfect Harmony has nevertheleſs ſubſiſted between the General and our Select Committee at Bombay; and from this Circumſtance, and their manifeſt Diſpoſition to concur heartily in future Operations, we venture to draw the moſt favourable Concluſion.

48. It is impoſſible at this Diſtance, and without more recent Information before us, to be more particular reſpecting the Situation of our Affairs on the Weſtern Side of India. We truſt every thing in your Power has been done to render the Iſſue of the War adequate to the vaſt Expence incurred; the Safety of our Poſſeſſions has we hope been effected, and there ſeems no Doubt of the Reputation of our Arms having been fully reſtored, by the ſpirited, judicious, and very gallant Conduct of General Goddard, and the Army under his Command.

APPENDIX, N° 381.

Bengal, Political. } Letter from the Court of Directors to the Governor General and Council at Fort William, in Bengal; dated 11th April 1781.

Par. 1. IN our Letter of the 2df Feb ruary laſt, we gave you our Sentiments and Inſtructions on the Poſture of Affairs on the Weſtern Side of India, ſo far as we were able from the Advices then before us. Since that Period, we have received a Letter from our Select Committee at Bombay, dated the 25th of July 1780, and are thereby informed, that though the laſt Campaign had not produced deciſive Advantages, the Superiority of our Arms had been evinced in the moſt honourable and ſtriking Manner; and it will afford us infinite Satisfaction, if the Conſequences have a Tendency to haſten the Concluſion of a ſafe and honourable Peace.

2. It

2. It is with Concern we acquaint you, that by an intercepted Extract of a Gazette from the Iſle of France, Information is received of Hyder Ally having in July laſt croſſed the Gauts, through the Paſs of Changama, entered the Carnatic with a large Army, defeated a Detachment under the Command of Colonels Baillie and Fletcher, and gained other Advantages. The Action is ſaid to have happened the 10th of September.

3. We have no official Information from Fort Saint George later than the 3d of April: By Advices of that Date we are acquainted, that the Nizam had, in the ſtrongeſt Terms, recommended to Bazalet Jung, to give the Guntoor Circar at Rent to Hyder Ally; that Hyder had actually invaded Bazalet Jung's Country, in order to force a Compliance, and threatened entire Conqueſt, if Bazalet Jung ſhould heſitate to renounce his Engagements with the Engliſh: That Bazalet Jung (obliged to ſubmit to Neceſſity) had deſired the March of our Troops to be ſtopped, and Poſſeſſion of the Country to be reſtored to him: That our Select Committee at Fort Saint George had readily agreed to the former, but declined complying with the latter Propoſition. It alſo appears that a ſpecial Meſſenger had been ſent by the Select Committee to Hyder's Court; but that Hyder was not deſirous of their Friendſhip, nor did he treat Mr. George Gray, their Meſſenger on that Occaſion, with Reſpect or Civility.

4. From the above Particulars, we conclude it poſſible that Hyder may have entered the Carnatic, and commenced Hoſtilities with a View to diſtreſs Mahomed Ally Khan, who had been put in Poſſeſſion of the Guntoor Circar, and to compel him to relinquiſh ſuch Poſſeſſion.

5. In our laſt Advices we expreſſed our Expectation that your conciliatory Letter to Hyder, of the 17th of February 1780, would be productive of ſalutary Effects; we would ſtill entertain the Hope of your having been able to ſettle Matters amicably with him; and in ſuch Caſe direct that you renew the Aſſurances given of our Deſire to be on Terms of cordial Friendſhip; but under preſent Circumſtances we can preſcribe no poſitive Rules for your Conduct in this reſpect.

6. If Hyder has really invaded the Carnatic, though the French Accounts before us are probably much exaggerated, ſuch an Event muſt nevertheleſs have produced great and immediate Diſtreſs; and in ſuch Caſe it will require your inſtant and powerful Exertion to recover Affairs from Diſorder in that Quarter. We have no Doubt of your Zeal and Ability, and rely with Confidence upon your beſt Endeavours being immediately exerted for that Purpoſe.

7. We alſo aſſure ourſelves, that Harmony and Unanimity in this Inſtance will guide your Councils, and give Vigour and Diſpatch to your Proceedings; we particularly enjoin it; and the more confidently expect it, becauſe it does not appear to us that you have differed in Sentiment concerning thoſe Tranſactions on the Coaſt, which we fear have been the immediate Cauſe of Troubles in the Carnatic.

8. We have no Doubt but Hyder Ally is in cloſe Connection with the French: His Conduct reſpecting Mahie, and on other Occaſions, affords the cleareſt Proof of his Attachment to that Nation. The French ſeem to have no other probable Means of regaining Conſequence and Advantage in India, but by Means of Hyder; nor can we be of Opinion that Hyder would venture to attack our Poſſeſſions, unleſs aſſured of ſpeedy and powerful Support from France. One Object unites the French with Hyder: If the Engliſh are depreſſed on the Coaſt, the French gain their Purpoſe, and Hyder becomes irreſiſtible in the Carnatic; all the Country Powers, from Cape Comorin to the Kiſtnah, muſt fall a Prey to his Ambition; even the Decan would be at his Mercy; the Northern Circars be loſt to the Company; and our Troops, without the Means of Subſiſtence, might be compelled to take Shelter within the Walls of Fort Saint George.

9. It would be very deſirable, but perhaps not practicable, to detach Hyder from the Marattas, if a League offenſive and defenſive has really been formed between them; but we apprehend it would be leſs difficult to prevail upon the Marattas to quit their Connection with Hyder: The Alliance, on their Part, is unnatural, except againſt the Engliſh, with whom their Cauſe of Quarrel is temporary. If Hyder's Force be now troubleſome, it may ſoon become dangerous; and if he has invaded the Country with Succeſs, we fear there will be no Bounds to his Ambition, nor Safety but in his Reduction.

10. If you ſhould find this to be the Caſe, and a ſeparate Peace with the Marattas can be made, which on any Terms is preferable to the Alternative of maintaining a War againſt the combined Force of Hyder and his Dependants united with the Marattas, you may then be at Liberty to draw down General Goddard's Army from the Northward, and, by well-judged and vigorous Exertions, make ſuch Impreſſions upon Hyder's Territories, as may reduce him to Reaſon, and compel him to quit the Carnatic, in order to provide for the Defence of his own Capital, and thus pave the Way to an equitable and permanent Peace.

11. Theſe are our preſent Ideas, if War with Hyder ſhall be found utterly unavoidable: But not knowing what Events may have happened, we muſt leave it to your Diſcretion on the Spot, to determine how far they are to be adopted, as conſiſtent with ſound Policy, and practicable in the Execution; and we muſt alſo add, that a ſafe and immediate Peace, both with Hyder and the Marattas, is to be your primary Object.

12. In order, to the utmoſt of our Power, to afford ſpeedy Aſſiſtance to our Settlement of Fort Saint George, we have applied to His Majeſty for a preſent Reinforcement of Troops and Ships of War; and we have the Satisfaction to acquaint you, that His Majeſty has been graciouſly pleaſed to grant us an immediate Reinforcement of 1000 Britiſh Troops for that Purpoſe, which we expect to ſail for India

by the Middle of next Month. Meaſures will alſo be taken to furniſh ſuch additional Strength, naval and military, as the Exigency of Affairs will permit.

13. We have reſolved, in Conſideration of the critical Situation of the Company's Affairs on the Coaſt, to take off the Suſpenſion of Brigadier General James Stuart, and to avail ourſelves in the preſent Criſis, of the Services of ſo able and experienced an Officer, by reſtoring him to his Rank in the Company's Service at Fort Saint George, next below General Munro.

14. In regard to the Political Affairs of your own Preſidency, we are extemely ſorry to find that the Vizier's Country has ſuffered ſo much from Drought and other Circumſtances, as to render it difficult to draw from thence the Reſources which your Neceſſities require.

15. We truſt Mr. Briſtow who concluded the Treaty with Auſuph-ul-Dowlah in June 1775, would arrive in Bengal ſoon after the Date of your laſt Conſultations; and as, in conſequence of our Orders, he would alſo proceed immediately to the Vizier's Court, we entertain the moſt favourable Expectations of his being able to conciliate the Mind of the Vizier, and to aſſiſt him effectually in arranging and reſtoring his Finances to a more flouriſhing Condition.

16. We notice the Repugnance with which you agree to enforce a Requiſition for more than the Amount of the ſtipulated Subſidy; and we can eaſily conceive, that in all ſuch Caſes, if the Nabob comply, it muſt be from a Principle of Fear, and with great Reluctance. And for theſe Reaſons, added to our former Obſervations on the Subject, we particularly renew our Injunction, that every Effort be uſed to reſtore and eſtabliſh Peace with all your Neighbours, on Terms of the moſt perfect Moderation, in order to be able to abridge your own inſupportable Charges, and to relieve your Friends and Allies from additional Expences incurred on account of the War; and alſo, that you may be able to exert your whole Force againſt the national Enemies, if the Continuance of European Troubles ſhall render it neceſſary.

We are
Your affectionate Friends,

London,
11th April 1780.

(Signed) W. Devaynes,
L. Sulivan,
Jn° Woodhouſe
Jn° Michie,
Wm James,
John Roberts,
Fran^s Baring,
Ja^s Moffatt,
Thos Cheap,
L. Darell, Jun.
J. Stables,
Jn° Townſon,
W. G. Freeman,
John Harriſon,
Chas Boddam.

Extract of Circular Letter to the Governor General and Council at Bengal, to the Select Committee at Bombay, and to the Select Committee at Fort Saint George; dated the 11th April 1781.

By the Court's Letter of this Date, you will be informed of the Line of Conduct to be obſerved reſpecting Hyder Ally Khan, if Matters cannot be finally adjuſted without proceeding to Extremities. We therefore enjoin you to loſe no Time in preparing for the Attack of Mangalore, and from that Side of India, for the Reduction of Hyder's Capital in the Myſore Country, as the ſureſt Means of forcing him to accept Terms of Accommodation ſafe and honourable for the Company.

And as we truſt Matters with the Marattas will be ſettled, and Peace reſtored between them and the Company immediately upon the Receipt of the Court's preſent Orders, if not done before, we conclude that the Troops under General Goddard will be totally at Liberty to act againſt Hyder; and, with ſuch other Force as may be brought to co-operate, be ſufficient for every Service that ſhall be found neceſſary.

APPENDIX, N° 382.

Extract of General Letter from the Court of Directors to the Governor General and Council of Bengal; dated the 31ſt May 1781.

Par. 1. OUR laſt Letters were dated the 11th of April, by which you are adviſed of the Information then before us, reſpecting the Irruption of Hyder Ally into the Carnatic, and our Sentiments on that alarming Event.

2. By the Trial Schooner we received, the 16th ultimo, ſeveral Packets from our Governor General and Council, and from the late Select Committee of Fort Saint George, confirming the Accounts before received of the Invaſion of the Carnatic by the Troops of Hyder Ally Khan, with Letters dated as follows, viz.

Public Letter from Bengal, dated 26th Auguſt 1780. Secret Letter, 13th October, D° Public D° 17th D° D°
Letter from the Select Committee at Fort Saint George, dated 15th October 1780. D° D° 29th November D°

3. The immediate Cauſe of this unfortunate War; the unprepared State of the Government of Fort Saint George to reſiſt or repel the Invader; the ſevere Loſs ſuſtained by the Defeat and Deſtruction of Colonel Baillie's Detachment; the Retreat of the Army under General Munro, and the future Succeſs of the Enemy, are Events which have occaſioned univerſal Conſternation and Aſtoniſhment; and we now inform you, that a Select Committee of Secrecy is appointed by Parliament to enquire into the Cauſes of the preſent War that ſubſiſts in the Carnatic, and into the preſent State of our Poſſeſſions in thoſe Parts; alſo to make their Obſervations thereon, and to report the ſame to the Honourable the Houſe of Commons.

4. At the earneſt Requeſt of the Company, in the preſent alarming Criſis, His Majeſty has been moſt graciouſly pleaſed to order that One thouſand regular Troops, and Two hundred Recruits for the 73d Regiment, ſhall embark on the Ships now under Diſpatch for India. The Particulars of their Embarkation, and other neceſſary Circumſtances, will be communicated to you by James Moffatt and Lionell Darell, Eſquires, who are now at Portſmouth to ſuperintend and regulate the ſaid Embarkation.

5. Reſpecting further Succours to be ſent to our Settlements, and ſuch Information and Advice as require temporary Secrecy, you will be addreſſed by Laurence Sulivan, Eſquire, our Chairman, and Sir William James, Baronet, our Deputy Chairman, who have been appointed a Committee of Secrecy, with like Powers to thoſe veſted in the Chairman and Deputy Chairman, as adviſed in the Court's Letter of the 11th of January 1781, and all Orders and Inſtructions given by our ſaid Chairman and Deputy Chairman relative to Naval or Military Operations, muſt be obeyed in the ſame Manner as though they were ſigned by Thirteen or more of the Court of Directors.

6. We much approve and applaud the Attention paid by our Governor General and Council to the Company's Affairs on the Coaſt of Coromandel: The inſtant Relief propoſed by the Governor General; his Requiſition to Sir Eyre Coote to proceed and take upon himſelf the Command of the Army on the Coaſt; the Terms and Manner in which the Requiſition was made; the General's ready Acceptance of a Service, big with Difficulty and Danger; and the Concurrence of the other Members of Council in the wiſe and active Meaſures propoſed on that moſt important Occaſion, do them much Honour. From their future Exertions, and the hearty Co operation of our other Settlements, we hope the Scene in the Carnatic has been, or ſoon will be, reverſed.

Extract of General Letter from the Court of Directors to the Governor General and Council of Bengal; dated 31ſt May 1781.

Par. 7. A few Days ſince, we received a Letter from our Select Committee of Bombay, dated the 11th of January 1781, by which we are informed of the Reduction of Baſſein, with very little Loſs, by the Army under the Command of General Goddard. The Conduct of our ſaid Committee appears to have been judicious, and the Behaviour of the Troops highly ſatisfactory. In regard to the General, we have already given our Sentiments reſpecting the meritorious Services of that good and gallant Officer, and we are exceedingly happy in the preſent Opportunity of repeating thoſe Sentiments, and in teſtifying, as we now do, that we have the greateſt Dependance upon his Zeal and Ability if warlike Operations be ſtill unavoidable; and that he will contribute to the utmoſt of his Power towards removing every Obſtacle to a juſt, ſpeedy, and honourable Peace.

8. As the Fall of Baſſein was an Event expected by our Governor General and Council, and by our Select Committee of Bombay, we hope, according to their own Ideas, and agreeable to the Tenor

of our Inſtructions of the 2d of February, that upon giving up other Diſtricts lately obtained to the Marattas, Baſſein may have been preſerved to the Company; but we are nevertheleſs of Opinion, that if Peace could not be re-eſtabliſhed with the Marattas without giving up [illegible] and if their Aſſiſtance in repelling the Incurſions of Hyder Ally could be obtained by the Surrender of that Fortreſs, in ſuch Caſe Baſſein ſhould be forthwith reſtored. And indeed the State of Affairs at Fort Saint George by the laſt Advices, is ſo very different from what we had Reaſon to expect when we wrote the before-mentioned Letter, that if Peace be purchaſed by the Reſtitution of Baſſein, and of other Conqueſts made from the Marattas, Sallette and Caranja excepted, we are convinced that the abſolute Neceſſity of the Meaſure muſt have been evident, before it would be adopted, and in ſuch Caſe it will have our Approbation.

9. Our Advices from Ganjam ſtate the Apprehenſions which naturally aroſe upon the Arrival of an Army in that Quarter from the Rajah of Berar. We have noticed the Sentiments and Proceedings of our Governor General and Council reſpecting the Deſigns of Moodajee Booſla, and particularly the Examination of his Vackeel before the Board at Calcutta; and we hope it will prove, that the Rajah has not entertained unfavourable Deſigns againſt the Company, but that it is his real Deſire and Intention to act the Part of a Mediator between the Company and the Marattas.

10. We remark with peculiar Satisfaction, that our Governor General and Council intend to obtain a proper Proviſion for the Support of Ragoba during his Life. We earneſtly hope this Point will have been duly attended to and properly ſecured, in caſe pacific Arrangements may have taken place before the Receipt of theſe our Inſtructions.

11. For the moſt obvious Reaſons we forbear at preſent to enter upon the further Conſideration of the Occurrences of your Preſidency in Detail; we expect before the Diſpatch of the October Fleet to be in Poſſeſſion of more recent Advices, and ſhall not fail to give ſuch Orders and Inſtructions as ſhall then be neceſſary. In the mean time, we have the moſt perfect Reliance upon your Wiſdom, Zeal, and watchful Attention, to promote the Welfare of the Company, and to guard againſt and render abortive all Deſigns formed by the Enemies of Britain to the Prejudice of our Intereſt in India

Extracts of Circular Letter from the Committee of Secrecy to the Governor General and Council at Bengal, and to the Preſidents and Select Committees of Bombay and Fort Saint George; dated 31ſt May 1781.

The Powers delegated to the late Chairman and Deputy Chairman, as adviſed in the Court's Letter of the 5th of July 1780, having been renewed and veſted in us, we addreſs you as a Committee of Secrecy accordingly.

By the Trial Schooner we have received Packets from our Governor General and Council, and from the late Select Committee of Fort St. George, adviſing us of the Invaſion of the Carnatic by Hyder Ally. The immediate Cauſe of the War; the unprepared State of the late Government of Fort Saint George to reſiſt or repel the Invader; the ſevere Loſs ſuſtained by the Defeat and Deſtruction of Colonel Baillie's Detachment; the Retreat of the Army under General Munro; and the future Succeſs of the Enemy, are Events which have occaſioned univerſal Conſternation and Aſtoniſhment.

As we write in Cypher, we enter into no Detail by this Diſpatch. We however inform you, that a parliamentary Enquiry into the Cauſe or Cauſes of the late Misfortunes on the Coaſt has taken place at the Requiſition of Adminiſtration.

We exceedingly approve and applaud the ready Attention paid by our Governor General and Council to the Company's Affairs on the Coaſt of Coromandel. The inſtant Relief afforded, and wiſe Meaſures adopted at that moſt alarming Criſis, do them much Honour. From their future Exertions, and the Co-operation of our other Settlements, we hope the Scene in the Carnatic will ſoon be reverſed.

The principal Deſign of this Letter is to inform you what Succours may be expected from hence, in addition to thoſe already ſent to India.

You will always remember, that our Firſt and grand Object is Peace with the Country Powers of India, upon ſafe and honourable Terms. Our Governor General and Council muſt take the lead in all Negociations, and direct or authorize the Plan of Operation for all our Settlements; and all their Inſtructions and Requiſitions muſt be obeyed.

We rely upon your hearty Co-operation in giving Effect to every Meaſure adopted for reſtoring the Public Tranquillity, and for re-eſtabliſhing the Company's Affairs on a ſolid Foundation, and ſhall write you more at large by the firſt Sea Conveyance.

London,
31ſt May 1781.

We are
Your loving Friends,
L. Sulivan,
Wm James.

Letters from the Court of

Our President and Select Committee, Bombay.

YOUR [illegible] Advices of the 31ſt December and [illegible] were received over-land in Cypher. Transcripts were alſo received by the Hawke [illegible] likewiſe your Letter of the 30th of [illegible] which arrived here the 21ſt Inſtant.

For your further Information, we tranſmit you a Copy [illegible] Part of our Letter to our Governor General and Council, which relates to the War carrying [illegible] againſt the Marattas; you will conſider this Letter in the ſame Point of View as though the Su[illegible]ter had been ſpecially addreſſed to you; and co-operate ſo far as depends upon you, [illegible] meaſure that ſhall have a Tendency to facilitate the Reſtoration of Peace, which you [illegible] ſtrongly inculcated in our Letter to them.

London, [illegible]
[illegible]ruary 1781.

Your loving Friends,
W. Devaynes,
Lau. Sulivan,
Jn° Woodhouſe,
W° Lewis,
Jn° Michell,
Ben. Booth,
Tho° Cheap,
L. Darell,
W. G. Freeman,
John Harriſon,
George Cumming,
Rich° Becher,
Fran. Baring,
J. Purling,
John Roberts,
Hen° Savage,
Cha° Boddam,
Ja° Moffatt,
J. Stables,
H° Fletcher.

Our Preſident and Select Committee, Bombay.

Par. 1. By the enclosed Copy of our Letter of this Date, to the Governor General and Council at Bengal, you will be informed of the very alarming Intelligence received by an intercepted Packet from the Iſle of France, reſpecting the Invaſion of the Carnatic by Hyder Ally Khan: In that Letter we have ſtated our Ideas on the preſent Poſture of Affairs on the Weſt Coaſt, and on the general Line of Policy, which we apprehend it may be neceſſary to adopt, for curbing the Ambition of Hyder, and reſtoring and ſecuring Peace to the Carnatic.

2. It is impoſſible for us in the preſent Conjuncture to [illegible] poſitive Orders upon a Subject of ſo great Importance, of which we have no official Information [illegible] the general Outline given is upon the known Attachment of Hyder to the French; and upon a Suſpicion alſo, that he has actually commenced Hoſtilities by invading our Poſſeſſions, or thoſe of our old and faithful Ally the Nabob of Arcot.

3. You will obſerve by the general Tendency of our Inſtructions to Bengal, that our grand Object is Peace; and as our Governor General and Council will of courſe take the lead in Negociation be neceſſary, ſo muſt they alſo direct the Plan of [illegible]ation for all our Preſidencies, if War ſhall be unavoidable; and it is our Order, that all [illegible]poſitions be, to the utmoſt of your Ability, implicitly obeyed.

4. We have no Doubt of your ready Concurrence in ſuch [illegible]ures as the Governor General and Council ſhall deem neceſſary for the public Welfare, and we rely upon your hearty Co-operation with our other Preſidencies, in giving Effect to every Plan formed, [illegible] formed, for reſtoring the Public Tranquillity, and for eſtabliſhing a permanent Peace with the [illegible]try Powers in India.

You will learn, from our Letter to Bengal, the Steps [illegible] for affording ſpeedy Aſſiſtance to the Settlement at Fort Saint George.

5. We have reſolved, in Conſideration of the critical [illegible] the Company's Affairs on the Coaſt, to take off the Suſpenſion of Brigadier General [illegible] and to avail ourſelves of the [illegible]

riſis of the Services of ſo able and experienced an Officer, by reſtoring him to his
pany's Service at Fort St. George, next below General Munro.

We are

don,
ril, 1781.

Your loving Friends,

Ja' Moffatt,	Wm Devaynes,
Tho' Cheap,	L. Sulivan,
L. Darell,	Jn° Woodhouſe,
J. Stables,	Jn° Michie,
Jn° Townſon,	Fran' Baring,
W. G Freeman,	Wm James,
Jn° Harriſon,	John Roberts,
Cha' Boddam.	

Our Preſident and Select Committee at Bombay.

a ſhort Letter of the 11th of April, you were informed of the Intelligence received by an
ed Packet, concerning the Invaſion of the Carnatic by Hyder Ally Khan
ſaid Letter was accompanied by Copy of our Letter of like Date, to our Governor General
Council, at Fort William, containing our Sentiments relative to the general Line of Policy
to be obſerved according to the Information then before us, and directing your hearty Co-
with our Governor General and Council, in giving Effect to every Plan formed, or to be
for reſtoring the Public Tranquillity, and for eſtabliſhing a permanent Peace with the
Powers in India.

3. Since that Period we have received by the Trial Schooner, a very full and circumſtantial
of all the Diſaſters which have happened on the Coaſt of Coromandel.

4. We have alſo received your Letter, dated 11th January 1781, which brings us the agree-
and important Advice of Baſſein having been conquered, and of other Proceedings on that Side
of India.

5. Being uncertain what may be the particular Poſture of Affairs when the preſent Diſpatches ſhall
India, we have again adopted the Mode obſerved by the Court in April laſt, and herewith
you an Extract of our preſent Letter to the Governor General and Council at Fort William,
political Affairs, which you will conſider as addreſſed to yourſelves, in all Caſes which require
Co-operation with our ſaid Governor General and Council.

6. We have no Doubt of your Zeal and Activity in contributing to the Reſtoration of a ſpeedy,
and honourable Peace, and ſhall only direct, that all Inſtructions given, and Requiſitions made
by our Governor General and Council, for the Accompliſhment of this deſirable Purpoſe, be duly
obſerved and carried into Execution.

7. Laurence Sulivan, Eſquire, our Chairman, and Sir William James, Baronet, our Deputy
Chairman, will addreſs you on Subjects which require temporary Secrecy; and all Orders and In-
ſtructions given by them, concerning naval and military Operations, muſt be implicitly obeyed.

London,
the 31ſt May 1781.

We are
Your loving Friends,

(Signed)

L. Sulivan,	
Wm James,	
J^n Woodhouſe,	
Henry Savage,	
W. G. Freeman,	
John Smith,	
George Tatem,	
Ben. Booth,	
Joſeph Sparkes,	
Tho' Cheap,	
John Harriſon,	
John Hunter,	
J. Stables,	
George Cuming,	
W. Mills, Jun'	
Fran. Baring.	

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